Work Values Shift Tendencies During the Post-Communist Transformation Period: Possibilities and Difficulties toward the Building of Post-Modern Work Values Orientations. The Polish and Bulgarian Examples
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In this essay we will try to support with data some theoretical arguments about the relationship between macro-scale social changes and the following changes in value orientations, and particularly, orientations toward work. We will argue that, at the very beginning of post-communist transformation, the tendencies on the macro-societal level, mainly connected with the economic sphere turn, although decisive for the direction of the work value orientations in long-run, are not definite cause for them in the short-run.

Value change in the period of post-communist transformation is influenced by three different factors: 1) the legacies of communism; 2) the necessities of the current socio-economic transformation, by which we mean rearrangement of life strategies due to the change in the general social and economic conditions of life; and 3) the ongoing globalization world processes. All these influences and tendencies create a complex mixture of materialist (or scarcity based), post-modern, traditional, and "Homo sovieticus" types of value orientations as a main characteristic of the transformation period.

Although we are interested mostly in work orientations during the post-communist transformation, it seems indispensable to consider them in relation to leisure time values. The description of the specifics of the current alteration in work orientations, by examining them within the framework of the above-mentioned relationship is essential, if the enduring value shift in the developed societies toward post-modern and post-materialist orientation-directed toward growing importance of leisure time should be taken into account.

Therefore, we will begin theorizing of the problem of post-communist work value orientations by putting it within the wider context of the current world cultural trends, since the post-materialist and post-modern value changes observed in the West during the last decade is a good privileged point of view allowing better understanding of the contradictory directions of the east European values shift.

In his last article, Bauman began to use a new term, which is a kind of quintessence of the world development tendencies. His concept of glocalization\(^1\) emphasizes the recent tendencies in world's divisions that are

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\(^1\) Bauman, Z. 1996. "On Glocalization-or Globalization for Some, Localization for
grounded not only the level of economic and technological development, but, also, on cultural differences that go beyond the national boundaries and are connected with the economic, cultural and lifestyle distinctions between different geopolitical regions. The cold war symbol of the "iron curtain" now turn out to be a natural division between the developed West and backward East. It is an already legitimized division, based on differences in values, life chances, produced by the continuous economic growth of the one part of the world and the permanent backwardness and the recent economic hardships of the other part of the world.

Within the affluent world's area, cultural changes occur that lead to the de-emphasis on economic growth as the main aim of society as well as the decline of economic criteria as one of the most important standards of rational thinking. Simultaneously, the backward "East" area is continuously and even more deeply characterized by the building of survival life strategies and dominance of scarcity values, where the main criteria about rational behavior is that based on economic prosperity-for the individual and for the society as a whole.

The involvement of people in the national political and economic matters "on the East side of the globe" demonstrates the awareness of the populations about their dependence on society. In contrast with that tendency, the decline of traditional political divisions and lowering of the importance of economic matter shows the growing relative independence of the individual from the society "on the West side of the globe."

Following these global societal distinctions, we can put a question about the place of post-communist countries within the mentioned world divisions of values.

Taking in account the relative economic backwardness of east central Europe in comparison with western Europe, as well as the collectivist heritage of these countries connected with their communist past, we are broadly interested in inter-generational degree of individualism understood as possible in two forms-orientations based on scarcity and those based on post-modern values at the individual level only.

Here, we should make explicit what we consider to be post-modern values in the context of former socialist countries. Generally, we rely on Inglehard's distinction between modern or scarcity-based values, emphasizing mainly hard work and financial achievement as a characteristic of a modernizing and relatively backward stage of societal development, vs. post-modern/security/value orientations, a result of continuous economic and technological development of Western countries. These value orientations lead to a degree of material security that is unprecedented for human history, a precondition for a formation of new type of values.

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The key elements of post-modern values, according to Inglehart, are post-materialist orientations that stress non-material goal, usually concerning societal development such as different forms of post-modern type of social movements, and de-emphasize economic growth and scientific development as the core of human development. What is specific for the value orientations is that they are formed on the basis of a distinctive level of societal and economic development that makes possible a public level of their expression.

Hence, in our analysis, we will consider post-materialist values a societal-level post-modern values, insisting that the concept of post-modern values orientation is wider than that of post-materialist. Post-materialist values contain in the societal level of post-modern values that is difficult to be considered as a characteristic of East European countries, for they are based on particularly high level of economic and technological development. Therefore, we regard that the societal level of post-modern values, or—using the terminology of Inglehart, of post-materialist orientations, i.e. values that are publicly articulated, organized, and institutionalized in new movement such as feminist's and green movements—is difficult to be found there because of economic underdevelopment of these countries. The term "post-modern" as a possible characteristic of a post-communist value system is understood as existing on the individual level only and therefore is taken as merely conventional. This is because the East European economic condition that can form such specific societal-level value orientations are quite different from what is decisive for the formation of post-materialist and broadly post-modern values in the affluent West. By this distinction we aim at stressing the differences between what can be considered as post-modern in the "eastern part of the globe" and what is post-modern in its Western part.

Hence, we consider the orientations to self-expression, individual freedom, emotional experience and a rejection of all forms of authority a individual-level post-modern values. Self-realization, oriented in the domain of leisure time and friendship circle, de-emphasis on hard work (outside of its content and meaning) as a main goal of individual existence, and a de-emphasis on financial achievement as justification for hard work, are the major characteristics of post-modern values as well. Also, a rejection of all 'grand narratives' of human history or societal ideologies is typical for post-modern value system, including the rejection ideology of Marxism, specific for former communist countries.

To clarify the specifics of what could be called East-European post-modern values on the individual level, we may also use the Flanagan's distinction between private and public values. While private value, he in-it, are associated with individual experience and one's philosophical viewpoint reflecting the deep personal understanding of life a such, public values represent "a transcendence of private values to the public domain of society and politics."

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Following the above-mentioned distinction, we argue that, if there is a post-modern trend in value orientation in Eastern Europe, it is only at the private or individual level and still does not touch the public values sphere. As we mentioned already, the main conditions for the post-modern value orientations on the societal level is considered to be the economic and technological level of societal development, which allows relative material security on which ground new value orientations might be built. These new public-oriented values are supported by the Western political and social tradition of independence of civil society from the state as well as the tradition of discursive communication within civil society. Both of these factors—continuous economic and technological progress and civil society development—are still absent in post-communist societies. In addition, the current difficulties of the economic transformation, such as inflation and unemployment, increase the dependence of people on the society and particularly, on state matters and government decisions. This makes impossible a mass-scale individual independent existence from macro-economic influences and, consequently, the creation of post-materialist public value orientations. Public values, if any, exist as near-additive sum of individual expectations, demands, and interests directed toward overcoming of the national economic asperity. This is way what may be called "public values" in post-communist countries are moving in the opposite direction of post-materialist and societal-level post-modern western public values. Therefore, the key dynamic of post-modern value orientations are considered here as predominantly culturally based and not so much economically determined. Postmodernism is viewed here, for the purposes of the analysis, mainly as "general cultural orientation." (See the analysis of post-modern values conducted by John Gibbins and Bo Reimer). Here, we will consider the main area of individualist-collectivist orientations based on scarcity and post-modern values to be the attitudes toward work and money achievement and leisure time. What we will try to examine in this essay is the problem of inter-generational changes in the significance of work and leisure time in a situation of social and economic transformation in two post-communist countries: Poland and Bulgaria. Two main processes in the sphere of values will be taken in account as a common framework in which work orientations are realized—the first concerns the individualism vs. collectivism (or paternalism) value orientation axis, understood as principles on which social and economic order should be based; and the second concerns modern (or scarcity)-post-modern value orientations, taken from the point of view of hard work vs. leisure time value orientations. It must be mentioned that leisure time orientation as an important element of a post-modern viewpoint does not indicate an anti-work orientation, but a change of the personal meaning of work—from the main

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source of physical survival in scarcity-based societies: to one of the chief areas of individual self-realization. In scarcity-based societies, work is a fundamental means of individual material existence, the dominant time-consuming condition of human life. In the process, it becomes the primary goal of one's life. Thus, during the entire modernity period, being a reified means for human existence, work is commonly perceived and rationalized as the most admirable and valuable goal of individual life.

In post-modern societies, work ceases to be a means for survival and consequently, desists to be rationalized as the chief goal of human life, being already a condition and at the same time an outcome of personal self-realization. In order that process of fundamental change of work-perception to be conditioned in a society, a relatively high degree of economic wealth should be achieved.

In order to examine properly the role of work as a self-realization tool, a serious analysis of the influence of the level of economic and technological progress and the consequent development of the division of labor over the professional and occupational specialization should be made. This issue, however, exceeds the task of our essay, although that aspect of the problem should be kept in mind for the proper understanding of the complexity of post-communist "post-modern" values "syndrome."

Concerning post-communist eastern Europe during the initial period of transformation, one more feature could be added to the "difficulty" of the use of work as a mass self-realization device. It is the relative decreasing of the role of professional qualifications as an instrument of achieving a sufficient standard of life. This is even followed by the blurring of the boundaries between different professions and occupational statuses because of the initial recession, unemployment, and economic deterioration of life that accompanied the transition. That "blurring" of professional statuses is structurally based on the long-term observed decomposition of social stratification during the socialist period, understood as inconsistency between education, occupational status, and income, contrary to the tendency in the West for those factors to be strongly correlated. What intensifies that tendency in some post-communist countries at the beginning of the transformation, is essentially the role of education and, particularly, the educational class or intelligentsia during socialism. In particular, educational requirements have changed due to the economic transformation. What we can say in short about the specific function of education during socialism is that the high educational level held during socialism was not based on or primarily used for economic and technological development. A socialist educational class or group was predominantly a cultural and ideological phenomenon but not economic and technological, as it is in the West.

Thus, the process of initial "blurring" of professional and occupational boundaries at the beginning of economic transformation is a

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natural phenomenon due not so much to the breakdown of the communist-type of economic system, but because of
collapse of the artificial socialist professional and occupational stratification. This was artificial in a sense, in that it is not
built in accordance with economic rationality, but is an irrationa 1 product of an irrationally built economy.
The above-mentioned explains to some extent why in post-communist countries leisure time is not connected with work
by its genesis, as it is in the affluent part of the world. Work in the West is the condition and outcome for appearance of
post-modern value orientations, while, in the East, what can be considered to be a "post-modern" value orientation has
different roots. These roots are connected with a kind of education that is culturally and ideologically based and not
grounded on a technological and economic boom leading to a new character and the content of work.
So, referring to the above presuppositions, we can conclude that, because it is difficult to consider post-communist
countries to be mass post-modern societies-at least in the initial period of transformation-we will regard post-modern
values mainly in the domain of self-realization and the increasing significance of leisure time and friendship circle.
Thus, we will examine post-communist work orientations through two value dichotomies: 1) individualism vs.
collectivism, where the latter is meant as paternalism, and
2) modern or scarcity values vs. post-modern values.
The choice of these dichotomies is made on the assumption that the value changes are mediated and thus, directed in
some respect by the basic processes of transformation on the macro-societal level. The macro societal transformation is
the very basis of the value transformation in post-communist east European societies. Hence, in order to orient
ourselves to these value changes, we must take into account the basic processes on the macro-societal plane.
Considering the above mentioned, we argue that the rise of individualist values will be a characteristic of value
transformation of post-communist societies. The reasons for this should be searched in macro-social reversal in value
transformation from collectivist to individualist values, following the main socio-economic transformation-from common
property rights, social justice based on equality, to private property, freedom, and independence. These structural
systemic changes, as well as the communist legacies, are the basis on which two main directions of the value
orientations coexist-those oriented toward reliance on the state and these based on self-reliance.
The entire period of socialism was characterized by the dominance of collectivism. Real socialism was a collectivist-
oriented society, where the main social and economic actor was not the individual but the state. One of the main
transformation processes of the society now is oriented toward the change of that socio-economic actor.
The period under consideration during this survey reflects the very beginning of the post-communist transformation (1990-1994). In spite of the fact that the real macro-economic property changes at that time were only beginning, the value transformation may precede somehow the completeness of the macro-level process needed in order for the latter to be grounded in human motivation. Thus, in some respects, the value changes could be even prior to the changes in economic macro-structure. As a whole, the two processes should be viewed in their mutual relationship and interdependence. The hidden dimension of individualist-collectivist value orientations defines to major extent the other characteristics of the systemic transformation—its emotional understanding, its content, and its results. This period is characterized by the existence of value crisis, which might be provoked by the necessity the individual to adapt to the new macro-social values.

The second problem, connected, according to us, with the change of work orientation in a specific way, followed, paradoxically, both from the globalization processes and from the socialist legacies, concerns the existence of post-modern values directed to leisure, friendship circle, consumption pleasure and, using the Bauman's words, "life oriented toward immediate gratification".

We assume that individual-level post-modern value orientations exist in post-socialist societies partly as a legacy of socialism, and at the same time, as built in opposition to socialist principles of modernity. Such value orientations, created during the communist period, were a type of psychological resistance of the youth against modernist-communist ideology values and against the society that could not offer legitimate goals to be followed. The building of these values, also, is a result of the influence of globalization processes that spread to the East during the last communist decade.

It should be acknowledged that socialism has allowed relatively safe and calm existence from financial point of view, especially for the youth. Paternalist social pattern created conditions of relative life security. In a word, the material survival has been guaranteed by a paternalist state, together with the poorness of that existence. The paternalistic atmosphere, along with the soft pressure to work effectively, paradoxically created conditions in which young people had enough leisure time for the creation of self-expression techniques and formation of a kind of extravagant individualism.

The very nature of post-modernity and post-modern values is based on anti-modernity orientations. Thus, post-modern value orientations must be grasped in relation to modern value orientations. As John Gibbins and Bo Reimer rightly pointed, it is a kind of transfer from a rational, instrumental, and materialist culture stressing role, to one emphasizing life styles, signifying

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9 Bauman, Z. op.cit.
feelings and expression. For socialism was pure emotion project society, the questioning of its main principles were reed in its socialist-collectivist variant, even though the existence of different styles of life, self-expression, and self-individualization is a natural cultural process.

According to Gibbins and Reimer, modernity, taken from economic point of view, was characterized by two rational arms of production and distribution: capitalism (based on economic individualism) and communism (based on economic collectivism). Both were maerialist in ethos and followed the logic of mass industrial production. The breakthrough of communism was a failure of modernity in its collectivist variant. More, its breakthrough was caused partly by unfinished modernization. Hence, it could be considered as a failure of modernity project in its socialist-collectivist version. An open question is whether socialist-ified post-modern values have mistrusted the very modernizing grid of communism, or its unfinished modernization that developed in the wrong direction.

In this context, the character of the post-communist transformation should be examined from the point of view of the post-modern perspective of the globalizing world. There is a common understanding among most scholars that the 1989 revolutions are modernizing revolutions trying to return to the route of modernity. (See Z. Bauman, L. Holmes, Habermas, Kumar.) Also, it is generally accepted that these revolutions were implemented through mass popular support. Here, one of the most important factors for that support was the existence of the western point of reference, based on a comparison with the western standards, styles of life, and consumption, which are characteristic of post-modern value orientations of "the other side of the globe." It is already common knowledge that the initial phase of the post-communist revolution was followed by popular disillusionment about the possibility to achieve quickly the Western styles of life. The realities of economic transformation have forged people’s existence into another, almost opposite direction of coping with deterioration of standards of life and increasing insecurity of everyday existence. Then, one can ask what will be the main direction of post-communist values orientations—modern or post-modern.

In some respect, post-communist transformation aims at repeating the 19th century Western Europe processes of capital accumulation and technological economic development. The necessity of capitalist accumulation at the initial period of post-communist transformation requires,

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10 Gibbins, J. and B. Reimer, op.cit.
11 See Bauman,op.cit.
12 Gibbins, J. and B. Reimer, op.cit.
13 Lesley Holmes points out that most theories of modernity define the leading role of individualism, but, as we mentioned above, individualism was not a characteristic of the communist state. Holmes, L. 1995. "On Communism, Post-communism, Modernity and Post-modernity." In: The Great Transformation
15 See Bauman, Z.; L Holmes,op.cit.
following Bauman's point of view, a "this-worldly asceticism" of the Protestant ethic. This ethic is specific to 19th-century modernity and well-analyzed by Max Weber, and is one of the main characteristics of the emergence of capitalist order. "This-worldly asceticism" indicates the delay of gratification, postponed consumption, and suppression of quick enjoyment of life.

The problem that arises is whether a new 20th century Puritanism is possible. Or, to put it in a different way, since the post-communist systemic transformation appears to be deeply in its content, whether a new modernity project is able to mobilize enough motivational energy from the population in order to be realized.

Hence, what creates the complexity of the post-communist transformation in value orientations is the coexistence of contradictory tendencies: the increasing significance of a hard-work orientation as a basis for life survival (caused by, broadly speaking, the individualization of economic life, which is a characteristic of modernity), and on the other hand the project of keeping and developing post-modern values of self-expression, leisure time and friendship enjoyment.

The post-communist transformation created totally new conditions of life, in comparison with the relative social security of socialism: the compulsion to work for survival, the danger of unemployment, and the necessity to be an active agent of one's own material life. Thus, the specifics of the economic transformation in post-communist societies require the dominance of mostly modern value orientations toward work, which are in contradiction with the western world economic and cultural tendencies coming up to the rise of post-modern and post-materialist value orientation.

The main question concerning value transformation in Eastern Europe is whether the post-communist period will be dominated by individualistic modern values or by post-modern.

Another question consists the second part of the same problem, or its second face: what form the post-communist post-modern values might take, as they are not based on post-materialist values, which are products of a different macro-social and economic context. Is it possible for post-modern values in whatever form to exist in a scarcity-based post-communist society, where the paternalist-type of social security has been dismantled together with the communist state? Or, is it possible to be leisure-time oriented, to evaluate higher immediate gratification life than hard work and money, when it is necessary to work for survival? The problem is how survival life strategies may coexist with post-modernity values of self-expression, consumption orientations, etc. in the domain of leisure time predominantly.

Hypotheses
The hypotheses concern the two main contradictory tendencies that are observed in post-communist transformation period. One is the influence of world globalization processes toward post-modern values being built in

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eastern Europe, increased by the above-mentioned legacies of 1) the socialist anti-modern cultural and ideological youth "revolt" vs. 2) the influence of localization processes caused by the modernist character of the post-communist economic transformation and the increasing importance of scarcity-oriented work values.

We theoretically argue above, that, in the near future, the main direction of the post-communist transformation will not follow the line of development of West European countries toward post-materialist values. We could also hypothesize that these changes will be primarily directed toward the development of materialist values (or scarcity values, using the terminology of Inglehard). However, the limitation of the data we are using, concerning the time period of the initial stage of post-communists transformation (1990-1991) is forcing us to make an opposite hypothesis, due to the time period in which the survey was conducted. The lack of longitudinal data will not allow us to identify clear tendencies. Thus, only a tentative conclusion can be drawn about the plausibility of our hypotheses.

Hence, because of the too-early period of post-communist transformation that has been observed, we expect a dominance of post-modern values toward work over modern-or scarcity-work orientation among highly educated and city resident youth (Hypothesis(1)). What we anticipate to find is a kind of post-modern value orientation that will influence the work evaluation, due to, both, globalization processes and the specific legacies of socialism.

We expect a significant value pluralization within one generation and between the generations due to two processes. On the one hand, there are world-wide globalization processes, making possible the sharing of predominantly post-modem values in a not-post-materialist social and economic environment among quite small part of well educated and city resident youth. On the other hand, there is the heritage of totalitarianism, represented by widespread Homo Sovieticus and "gimme" syndromes among the parts of middle and older generations. These two types of value systems will coexist with mainly traditionalistic value systems among the oldest population, which is based on the historically later process of industrial development and societal and cultural modernization in that geographical area.

(Thus, two dimensions of value orientations will be taken in account: individualism-collectivism-paternalism axis and scarcity-post-modern values axis.)
Modern Individualism Post-Modern Individualism
Scarcity values---------+------Post-modem values
Traditionalism Homo Sovieticus
Collectivism !Paternalism/

We will consider the evaluation of the role of work and leisure time in one's life as the main dividing line between the scarcity value orientations and the post-modern value orientations. Post-modem values tend to diminish the role of work in one's personal life at the expense of leisure time and friendship communities, where the scarcity-based orientations we will consider to be material-achievement and hard-work oriented.

The role of the "individualism vs. paternalism" axis allows us to take in account the main orientation of individuals toward self-reliance vs. reliance on the state. That dichotomy additionally specifies the orientations toward hard work vs. leisure.

Our Hypothesis (2) is that scarcity-based value orientations will be highly correlated with individualist values and will be a characteristic both of youth and the middle age group (Modern Individualism).

We assume other types of value orientations - Traditionalist, described as hard work value orientations based on egalitarian collectivist societal level orientations, a characteristic of the oldest, lower-educated generation that resides in the countryside. (Hypothesis (3)).

Hypothesis (4) considers that what might be taken conventionally as "post-modern" values towards work and leisure time may be based on egalitarianism and can be a characteristic orientation of the old and middle age groups (Homo Sovieticus). These are a kind of non-materialist-oriented values based on the gimme syndrome. The higher evaluation of leisure at the expense of work might be based on hidden egalitarianism and a Homo Sovieticus type of values where the de-emphasis of the role of work and financial achievement in personal life is based on collectivist and egalitarian and not on individualist orientations. The reason for such orientations lies in the diminished possibilities of some social groups and individuals for material prosperity and social mobility.

Analytic Strategy The data sources that are used are representative national samples in Poland and Bulgaria of the 1991 European value Survey.

We use several items of each survey in order to operationalize the two axes according to which the four types of value orientations in relation to work are defined. The first step of our statistical work contains factor analysis.
made in order to chose the items for building of the two indexes—that of scarcity vs. post-modern values index, and individualism vs. collectivism /paternalism/ index. These indexes are created on the basis of unrotated factor correlation, by using a standardized score of the chosen items, ordered in following directions: 1) for scarcity vs. post-modern axis—from scarcity values as hard-work orientation to high evaluation of leisure time and friendship, and 2) for individualism vs. paternalism axis—from collectivist and paternalist preferences to individualist attitudes. Scarcity vs. post-modern values index is created on the basis of three items concerning the importance of hard work, leisure time, and friendship as follows: "Please, indicate for each of the following, how important it is in your life—

• work /q 116/;

• friends and acquaintances /q 118/;

• leisure time."/v 119/.

Hence, the additive scale of scarcity vs. post-modern values index is built as an additive sum of the weights of modified variables xQ116, xQ 118 and xQ119.

Scarcity vs. post-modern values index = xQ116 + xQ118 + xQ119.

The individualism-collectivism /paternalism/ index contains items regarding the preference of freedom vs. equality as well as items reflecting the attitudes to the form of preferred type of ownership, individual vs. government responsibility for people's well being, and attitudes toward the role of competition. They are as follows:

q477: "Which of these two statements comes closest to your own opinion?

A. I find that both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider personal freedom more important, that is, everyone can live in freedom and develop without hindrance;

B. Certainly both freedom and equality are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider equality more important, that is, that nobody is under-privileged and that social class differences are not so strong;

"Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?"

q516 Incomes should be made more equal <-> There should be greater incentives for individual effort;

q518 Private ownership of business and industry should be increased <-> Government ownership of business and industry should be increased;

q520 Individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves <-> the state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for;
q524 Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas <-> Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people.
Then, we divided each index into two parts around its mean value, which is 1.50 for scarcity vs. post-modern values, and 3.00 for paternalism vs. individualism index. By combination of the four parts of the indexes we created the four value orientation groups:
a) post-modern profile group, characterized by high evaluation of leisure time and friendship on scarcity vs. post-modernity axis, and high level of individualism on individualism vs. paternalism axis (scarcity vs. post-modern values index greater then 1.50 and paternalism vs. individualism greater than 3.00);
b) modern profile group, based on emphasizing the value of hard work and a high level of individualism (scarcity vs. post-modem values index less or equal to 1.50 and paternalism vs. individualism greater than 3.00);
c) traditionalist profile group, characterized by high evaluation of hard work and paternalist and egalitarian attitudes (scarcity vs. post-modern values index less or equal to 1.50 and paternalism vs. individualism less or equal to 3.00), and
d) "gimme syndrome" group, which specifics are marked by importance of leisure time and friendship along with paternalist and collectivist attitudes on the societal level (scarcity vs. post-modern values index greater then 1.50, and paternalism vs. individualism les than or equal to 3.00) (see Figure 1).
In order to examine the inter-generational and intra-generational specifics, we created three age groups: youth age group-from 18 to 34 years~ middle-from 35 to 49 years, and an older generation-over 50 years.
The further analysis is made on the basis of the means of the each index within each age group as well as on cross-tables of age groups by the four value-orientation groups.
What has been additionally done is regression analyses with dependent variables of scarcity-post-modern values index and independent variables-the most important socio-demographic characteristics-of income, social status, education, age, sex, and place of residence, as well as an item that we chose in order to check out the relevance of the indexes toward modernist vs. post-modernist values in Inglehard's sense. The same reason was used to add the item for the evaluation of the decreasing of the role of work in future. The independent variables within the mUltiple regres ion equation are as follows:
q530: There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals that different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important:
• maintaining a high level of economic growth;
• making sure this country has strong defense forces;
• seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities;
• trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.

Here is a list of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each one, if it were to happen whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad thing, or don't you mind?

• Q538—decrease in importance of work in our lives;
• q540—greater emphasis on the development of technology.

Q716—sex of respondent;
Q721—age at completion of full time education;
Q731—income scale;
Q733—socio-economic status of respondent:
• upper, upper-middle class;
• middle, non-manual workers;
• manual workers-skilled, semi-skilled
• manual workers-unskilled, unemployed.
Q742b—size of town;
Q747—age.

The supposed multiple regression equation we made is the following for each sample:

Scarcity vs. post-modern values = B1q530a + B2q538 + B3qS40d + B4q742b + B5q747 + B6q731 + B7q733 + B8q721 + B9q716 + BIO individualism vs. paternalism index + Constant.

The regression was run once for the total samples and after that, within each age group. Therefore, the partial multiple regression equations results are as follows:

For the Polish sample:
for the total sample: Scarcity vs. post-modern values = -.12q747 + .09q538 + .09 individualism vs. paternalism index + 1.49.
within the group of youth: Scarcity vs. post-modern values = -.15q747 + .13q538 + .13 individualism vs. paternalism index + 1.20.
• within the middle age group: Scarcity vs. post-modern values = .14q538 + 1.55. The multiple regression equation does not work for the old age group in Polish sample. For the Bulgarian sample:
• for the total sample: Scarcity vs. post-modern values = -.20q747 + .07q538 + .10 individualism vs. paternalism index + .12q 742b +1.44.
within the group of youth: Scarcity vs. post-modern values = -.20q747 + .13q538 + .18 individualism vs. paternalism index + 1.29.

• within the middle age group: Scarcity vs. post-modern values = -.18q747 + .17q742h + 2.16.
Empirical Findings

The percentage distribution of the four value orientations in each country is given in Table 1, and the mean values for the two indexes is presented in Table 2. The results of the multiple regression analyses for both samples and for each age group within these countries are presented in Table 3.

Table 1 Percentages of age groups within work value orientations groups for Poland (PL) and Bulgaria (BG)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle generation</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old generation</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Mean values of the "scarcity vs. post-modern orientations" index and "individualism vs. paternalism" index for each country:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Entire sample</th>
<th>Youth</th>
<th>Middle generation</th>
<th>Old generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scarcity value orientations vs. post-modern orientations 1.50 1.59 1.59 1.79 1.49 1.58 1.45 1.47

Individualism vs. paternalism value orientations 3.06 3.00 3.16 3.32 3.04 3.19 2.96 2.78
Table 3 Beta coefficient of regression analyses with independent variable "scarcity vs. post-modern values" index (only statistically significant determinants will be presented).

All samples
Poland Bulgaria

R Square .04 R Square .12
" Beta Beta 1) age -.12* -.20** 2) indiv-Paternal .09* .10* 3) decrease of .09* .07* work importance 4) place of residence

.12**

N of cases:
Poland -819
Bulgaria -862

* -significance at the level p =< 0.05
** -significance at the level p =< 0.001

Youth Poland Bulgaria
R Square .13 R Square .14

Beta

Beta
1) age -.15*

-.20**
2) indiv-Paternal .13*

.18**
3) decrease of .15*

.13* work importance

N of cases:
Poland -232
Bulgaria -311

* -significance at the level p =< 0.05
** -significance at the level p =< 0.001
Middle generation

Poland
R Square .04
Beta 1) age 2) decrease of work importance 3) place of residence .14*
N of cases: Poland -247

Bulgaria -526
* -significance at the level p =< 0.05 ** -significance at the level p =< 0.001

Old generation
Poland
R Square
Beta
I) indiv-paternal 2) age 3) place of residence
N of cases: Poland -302 Bulgaria -292
* -significance at the level p =< 0.05 ** -significance at the level p =< 0.001
Work Values Shift Tendencies

Percentages of each value profile group within age groups for each country
What can be seen from both samples is that the post-modern values are prevailing among the young generations, which proves our Hypothesis (1). The domination of traditionalist work orientations among the old generation is valid for Poland and Bulgaria and confirm the anticipated above (Hypothesis (3)). A high degree of value plurality was predicted, which is mostly a characteristic of the middle-age generation, where the differences between the two countries are greater. The dominance of traditionalist and modern values toward work in Poland and the prevalence of post-modern and "gimme syndrome" orientations in Bulgaria among the same age groups might be interpreted not merely by cultural differences but as a result of the different stages of economic transformation in these countries. The postponing of the economic reform in Bulgaria at the time of conducting the survey delays the re-evaluation of the role of work, necessary for the building of survival strategies, whereas the economic hardship connected with the beginning of the reform is already experienced in Poland and tends to create modern or "scarcity values" orientations. Also, it could be assumed that there is an influence of the higher level of religiosity in Poland, reflected in higher weight of "traditionalists" among the middle-aged and older generations. Nevertheless, for the middle-aged and older generations a tendency exists-to be more modern and traditionally oriented in Poland and more "post-modem-" and "gimme syndrome-" oriented in Bulgaria. We reject here a pure cultural-differences explanation and accept mainly the socio-economic, because an eventual cultural influence should be observed as differences among the younger group as well, which is not supported by the results.
What are the determinants of post-modern value orientations within the three generations in both samples?
It is obvious from Table 3 that for both countries the most important determinant is structural-age, which could be interpreted as a confirmation
of the globalization-influence dominance over the post-communist transformational hardship factor.

The other determinant is the individualism vs. paternalism index. Post-modern value orientations toward work and leisure time prove to be strongly correlated with a high level of economic self-reliance and anti-paternalist and anti-collectivist attitudes. That result, together with the third factor-the approval of the decreasing significance of work in near future-justify the correctness of the constructed index about modern vs. post-modern orienta
tions toward work and leisure time. That determinant of post-modern orientations verifies the reflexivity of the post-modern orientation especially among youth in both countries and the middle-aged generation in Poland.

One determinant that is observed only in Bulgarian ample is the place of residence. City residents tend to be much more leisure-time value-oriented than countryside residents-mostly among the middle-aged group there.

Comparing the two samples, it can be said that the significance of age over post-modern work orientations is higher in Bulgaria, i.e. age is the more influential determinant of post-modern orientations in Bulgaria than in Poland.

Conclusion

It can be inferred that at the initial stage of the post-communist transformation we cannot see a definite growth of modern (scarcity) over post-modern orientations toward work. The higher weight of age as the factor determining the post-modern value orientations, together with increased self-reliance and the reflexivity of the leisure-time-oriented attitudes tend to prove the globalization tendencies over economic hardship localization, a characteristic of the post-communist transformation period. We suppose that the result is due partly to a quite earlier transformation period that is reflected by the data we are using.

The time limitation of the data does not allow the possibility to check out the theoretical hypothesis about a supposed development of predominantly modern values among the youth and the middle generation with the advancement of the process of post-communist transformation. Thus only a tentative conclusion can be reached about the probability of our hypotheses.

Nevertheless, the effect of reflexivity of changes in evaluation of work and leisure time in the direction of higher weight of leisure time, shown by the regression analyses for both samples, suggests once again the globalizational domination in work values mainly among the young generation. In which way that tendency is changed in the very process of transformation is an open question that should be tested on the basis of recent data collection.
Diaspora and Re-Immigration (Abstracts)