THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN DURING CRISIS:
FROM THE RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN TO 9/11
by
Margaret M. Huffman
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Director of Thesis: Dr. Michael Palmer
Major Department: History

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the major influences on the Pakistan-United States relationship in an effort to identify patterns that could help future policymakers. The factors that most affected the relationship were: crises in Afghanistan, American aid and arms sales to Pakistan, India, nuclear proliferation, and Pakistan’s historic struggle between its military establishment and democratic institutions. The Pakistan-United States relationship has been characterized by periods of amity as well as mutual distrust. Immediately before the first Afghan crisis in 1979, the Pakistan-United States relationship suffered from Pakistan’s withdrawal from CENTO, arms embargos, and a marked discord between the two governments. The peak of the relationship occurred in 1986. In 1986, Pakistan accepted a generous six-year aid program from the United States, the relationship between the heads-of-state was friendly, and the Russian troops in Afghanistan were taking heavy losses. This thesis analyzes the deciding factors in the Pakistan-United States relationship since Pakistan’s creation while focusing on the periods of crisis in Afghanistan.
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Margaret M. Huffman
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Margaret M. Huffman

APPROVED BY:

DIRECTOR OF THESIS

Dr. Michael Palmer, Ph.D.

COMMITTEE MEMBER

Dr. Mona Russell, Ph.D.

COMMITTEE MEMBER

Dr. Wade Dudley, Ph.D.

COMMITTEE MEMBER

Dr. Allen Guidry, Ph.D.

CHAIRMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Dr. Gerald Prokopowicz, Ph.D.

DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

Dr. Paul Gemperline, Ph.D.
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Introduction

During the Cold War, American policymakers continuously sought countries to join the effort of the “Free World” to “contain” the expansion of communism. The Cold War began with conflicts such as the Korean and Vietnam Wars, in which American soldiers fought side-by-side with East Asian soldiers. By the 1980s, the United States embarked upon a completely different type of proxy war in Southwest Asia. In this historically volatile region, a relationship developed between Pakistan and the United States. The countries’ relationship prior to 1979 can be described as unsteady and incongruous, but this began to change on December 24 as Russian tanks and troops rolled across the northern border of neighboring Afghanistan.

American policy against the expansion of communism escalated from containment to “rollback” under Ronald Reagan. The United States solidified its Cold War connection to Pakistan in an effort to expel communism from Afghanistan. Not only did the United States and Pakistan have to work together on the Afghanistan issue, they also had to overcome many barriers to their relationship. The Carter and Reagan administrations negotiated differently with Pakistan, which in turn produced strikingly different results. In terms of creating a firm partnership, the Reagan administration was much more successful in building a relationship that peaked in 1986. Yet, by the end of Reagan’s second term, following President Zia al-Huq’s death, and the end of the Afghan crisis, the partnership was rapidly weakening. Nevertheless, the United States worked with Pakistan throughout the Afghan crisis and a relationship formed that outlasted the Cold War and became unnatural and not easily broken. Although the United States and Pakistan “won” by expelling the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, they also “lost” their object of a peaceful and stable Afghanistan, which would later come back to haunt them.
Pakistan and the United States quickly developed new security strategies to face the growing threat from Afghanistan in both 1979 and 2001. This thesis will examine the common-ground relationships that developed between the “Leader of the Free World” and an occasionally democracy-deprived Pakistan due to their mutual goals. Major geopolitical risks from Pakistan’s neighbors, most notably India, increased tension in the region and led to an arms race in which the United States was forced to choose a side. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the deciding factor for Presidents Carter and Reagan to renew a strong and mutually beneficial bilateral relationship with Pakistan. These two presidents’ relationship with Pakistan’s leader of the time, Zia al-Haq, demonstrated several recurring patterns in the partnership, such as reciprocal distrust and wariness and mutual cooperation and shared goals. Although the decade from 1980-1990 proved largely successful in draining the Soviet Union of resources and eventually played a difficult to quantify role in the collapse of the country, the partnership between the United States and Pakistan deteriorated and never returned to its former strength. Rather, in the past twenty years, Pakistan has continuously oscillated between ally and uncomfortable acquaintance of the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, the issue of Pakistan’s right to develop and maintain nuclear weapons reemerged and constituted a chaffing point in American policy toward Pakistan.

The major issues that affected the Pakistan-United States relationship since the 1950s compounded this problem. American aid to Pakistan and the arms sales relationship has not been ideal for either Pakistan or the United States. Pakistani officials have repeatedly emphasized their desire for a stable arms sales relationship. Yet, the United States has enforced a reactive policy of attaching aid to other requirements, such as nuclear nonproliferation or the
preservation of democratic institutions. This policy has backfired, illustrated by Pakistan’s successful nuclear program and its unstable, and at times nonexistent, civilian government. The India factor also contributed to a sense of disillusionment with American foreign policy in Pakistan. Americans have been frustrated with the persistent conflict in Kashmir. Despite the reemergence of these harmful factors after the first Afghan crisis, after 11 September 2001 Pakistan and the United States once again formed a partnership for another conflict in Afghanistan. While the goals of the two nations were similar and the relationship seemed to strengthen, eventually, as before, the mutual ambitions of Pakistan and the United States diverged. As of 2012, the relationship can once again be described as unsteady and incongruous.

The nations of the Middle East and Southwest Asia deserve attention for many reasons. Not only does the United States military maintain a strong presence in the region, but the United States also has deep commercial, geopolitical, and historic connections there. Because it is impossible to generalize the unique relationships the United States has with each country, relationships with each nation in the region should be continuously analyzed and understood in terms of its connection with the United States and the overall role it plays in the greater area. Pakistan, and subsequently its interconnected history with its neighbors, Afghanistan and India, requires consideration now more than ever due to its ever-changing and precarious relationship with the United States.

The historical events that took place in the period since World War II are extremely important to understand. The United States developed clear anticommunist policies, but since the collapse of communism, the policies have not always been as clear. The threat of terrorism has replaced the threat from communism and the United States has been forced to create a new set of cogent policies that fit into a new post-9/11 paradigm. One broad policy will not work in
the many countries from Northern Africa to Southwest Asia. Each country needs its own contingency policy; no longer is a single set of guidelines such as the Carter or Reagan Doctrines realistic. To determine the best route of action for the United States, researchers must at all times be aware of the history of a particular country and the effect it has had upon its relationship with the United States while also paying careful attention to current issues and developments regionally and globally. Several questions regarding the United States-Pakistan relationship have become ubiquitous: How did the relationship begin? Why does the United States still financially support Pakistan? Does the United States need Pakistan? Why is the relationship so fluid? Can it be salvaged? What does the future hold? These questions are extremely important and can only be answered after a thorough examination of the recent past.
Chapter 1: The Formation of the Pakistan-United States Relationship

Since the entrance of Pakistan onto the world stage, the country’s history has been determined by its geopolitics. Pakistan’s relationships with its neighbors have had significant and lasting effects on Pakistan’s foreign policy. Pakistan suffered from regional instability vis-à-vis its greatest enemy: India. Because of border disputes and ethnic rivalries, Afghanistan constituted another security threat to Pakistan. Pakistan’s proximity to the Soviet Union increased Pakistan’s potential to be drawn into a Cold War conflict as a proxy, as would happen in 1979. Its position on the border between the Middle East and South Asia gave it the potential to be a geostrategic asset to the United States.

But the United States did not immediately move toward an alliance with Pakistan; and between 1947 and 1979, the two nations’ relationship experienced times of warm friendship and distant acquaintance. Arms transfers were the best indicator of the closeness between Pakistan and the United States. During times of arms sales, interactions between Pakistan and the United States were friendly; but during arms embargos and restrictions, the relationship was precarious. The different perceptions of threats often led to divergent goals between the United States and Pakistan. During the Cold War, the United States was intensely focused on countering communism on a global scale while Pakistan was mostly preoccupied with the security threat from India. The India factor caused the greatest strain to the Pakistan-United States relationship. By the 1970s, nuclear proliferation constituted another barrier to a strong alliance.

After World War II, the United States emerged as a superpower with global responsibilities. The United States was constantly seeking new allies around the world because of competition with the Soviet Union. In a memorandum to President Harry Truman, Secretary of State George Marshall called the president’s attention to the potential value of Pakistan as the
largest Muslim country in the world and a country with a strategic position in South Asia. Yet, the United States was initially hesitant to make a commitment to Pakistan. Pakistan asked the United States for two billion dollars of assistance over five years for “primarily defence, and secondly, economic development.” The United States replied that it did not have adequate resources to meet that request, but did offer a smaller amount of aid for humanitarian purposes. The State Department did not want to assume “virtual US military responsibility” for Pakistan. Tensions in the disputed region of Kashmir further contributed to American caution of aligning itself with Pakistan.

The territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir erupted in 1947. The United States wished to remain neutral, and in a note to Pakistan and India, the United States claimed it was a “firm friend” of both countries, urging the two countries to work together to solve the dispute. The United States wanted the issue to be addressed through bilateral negotiations between Pakistan and India, but the United States also acknowledged that the problem was unlikely to be resolved without outside assistance. The United Nations assumed the role of arbiter and, on 13 August 1948, the United Nations Commission for Pakistan and India (UNCIP) declared a cease-fire. By 1950, tensions in Kashmir remained unresolved and demilitarization had not occurred as ordered by the UNCIP resolution. American State Department officials wrote: “Both India and Pakistan have proved difficult and recalcitrant and

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6 “18 UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 19.
both are far from blameless in the matter.” The United States acted though the United Nations and attempted neutrality in the late 1940s, but as fighting waxed and waned between India and Pakistan throughout the following decades, the United States became embroiled in the conflict.

From 1948-1950, the United States policy toward Pakistan remained ambiguous. The American position on assistance relied on the British to have the “paramount responsibility of the maintenance of international peace and security in South Asia.” Although Pakistan desperately wanted arms assistance from the United States, the Truman Administration gave priority to Western Europe. Gradually, however, the United States began to acknowledge the possibility that Pakistan could be a Cold War asset to the United States. In 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that Karachi and Lahore could be of “strategic importance” if the United States needed a base of operations against the Soviet Union or a launching point for recapture of crucial oil areas in the Middle East. The ambiguous nature of the early Pakistan-United States relationship was exemplified during 1950.

The United States and Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, ushering in an important precedent of American military sales to Pakistan. But, in a State Department “Country Statement,” Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee wrote that the small amounts...
of military aid to Pakistan were only “psychological” and merely “token assistance.”

The United States gradually became more invested in Pakistan as the decade progressed, despite lingering concerns over the violence between Pakistan and India.

A National Security Staff Study in 1951 recommended that the United States “pursue our objectives in South Asia with more vigor.” As British influence in the area declined, the United States decided that it should pursue arms assistance matters with Pakistan independently. The situation in Kashmir remained in a “deadlock,” and the problems between India and Pakistan created significant anxiety for United States policymakers regarding entering into a stronger military relationship with Pakistan. In 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: “The trouble with Pakistan at the moment is that we do not have any program of military aid for Pakistan, because we don’t dare do it because of the repercussions on India.”

The commander of Pakistan’s armed forces and future president, Ayub Khan, met with then Vice President Richard Nixon in an effort to convince him to increase military aid to Pakistan because he believed that the Soviet Union would use India as a “cat’s-paw for establishing a major presence in South Asia.”

The United States Ambassador to India warned American politicians that large amounts of aid to Pakistan would be a “mistake” because it would enmesh the United States in the

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12 “35 ‘Country Statement’ on Pakistan, enclosed in McGhee’s memorandum to James Bruce, Director of MDAP, 10 February 1950 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 20.
13 “52 NSC Staff Study (98/1): ‘The Position of the United States with Respect to South Asia,’ January 1951 (approved by President Truman on 25 January 1951) (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 44.
15 “90 Report by the President of the UN Security Council on discussions with India and Pakistan on the Kashmir question, 29 April 1957 (Extract)” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 87.
16 “80 Testimony by Secretary of State Dulles in the executive session of the Senate CFR, 3 June 1953 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 78.
17 “86 Extracts from the Memoirs of Richard Nixon on his visit to Pakistan, 7-9 December 1953 (Extract),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 84.
regional problems between Pakistan and India. The ambassador also thought it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would send its forces into the Middle East, and if they did, Pakistan would most likely remain “aloof.” Concerns over exacerbating tension between Pakistan and India by providing military assistance to Pakistan continued to plague the Pakistan-United States relationship; but by 1953, the United States became less ambiguous toward Pakistan and significantly altered its position on an arms sales relationship.

On a visit to Pakistan in 1953, Dulles stated that Pakistan was a “dependable bulwark against communism.” He described meetings between him and Pakistani officials as having a “feeling of warm friendship.” In 1954, after the announcement that Turkey and Pakistan intended to cooperate to maintain peace and security in the Middle East, the United States responded with political support and guarantees of military assistance in the form of equipment and training. The Baghdad Pact between Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey garnered American sympathies. The United States was extremely supportive of the Baghdad Pact and the collaboration of ‘northern tier’ countries. The Baghdad Pact formed the “link connecting NATO on the West and SEATO on the East, thus completing the strategic defensive perimeter.”

Prime Minister of Pakistan, H. S. Subrawardy, explained the importance of the American association with the Baghdad Pact:

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18 “79 Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on his visit to India and Pakistan, 1 June 1953 (Extract),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 77.
19 “79 Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on his visit to India and Pakistan, 1 June 1953 (Extract),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 77.
20 “79 Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on his visit to India and Pakistan, 1 June 1953 (Extract),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 77.
21 “79 Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on his visit to India and Pakistan, 1 June 1953 (Extract),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 77.
22 “94 Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for NEA Henry A. Byroade before the Hellenic-American Chamber of Commerce, New York, 5 March 1954 (Extract),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 92.
The question is asked. Why don’t we (the Muslim countries) get together rather than be tied to a big power like the UK or America? My answer is that zero plus zero plus zero is after all equal to zero. We have, therefore, to go farther afield rather than get all the zeros together because they will never be able to produce something substantial.\(^ {24} \)

This statement indicates an awareness of the power of the United States and the reason Pakistan desired a close relationship with America. Pakistan’s numerous alliances, such as SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, assured the United States that it had a partner against the expansion of communism, which then motivated the United States to supply Pakistan with military assistance. Another important connection between Pakistan and the United States was the Mutual Security Act of 1954. Pakistan’s nickname, “America’s most allied ally in Asia,” was based on the growing political ties between the United States and Pakistan.\(^ {25} \) One reason the United States wanted to maintain multiple alliances with Pakistan was the concern that the Soviet Union would one day push to the south through Pakistan or Afghanistan in an effort to obtain a warm-water port in the oil rich region of the Persian Gulf. Assistant Secretary of State George Allen stated before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that he could not predict exactly when or if Pakistan would be attacked by the Soviet Union.\(^ {26} \) But the United States government had not forgotten that, in 1940, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, affirmed that “the territorial ambitions of the Soviet Union lay south to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.”\(^ {27} \) Pakistan benefitted militarily from American anxieties regarding Soviet intentions in the Middle East and South Asia.

\(^ {24} \)“132 NSC 5701: ‘U.S. Policy toward South Asia,’ 10 January 1957 (Extracts),” \textit{America-Pakistan Relations}, vol. 1, 125.
\(^ {25} \)“228 Address by Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan to US, at the Naval War College, New Port, Rhode Island, 14 May 1963 (Extracts),” \textit{America-Pakistan Relations}, vol. 1, 221.
\(^ {26} \)“108 Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for NEA George V. Allen in the hearings before the Senate CFR on the Mutual Security Act of 1955, 12 May 1955 (Extracts),” \textit{America-Pakistan Relations}, vol. 1, 107.
\(^ {27} \)“108 Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for NEA George V. Allen in the hearings before the Senate CFR on the Mutual Security Act of 1955, 12 May 1955 (Extracts),” \textit{America-Pakistan Relations}, vol. 1, 107.
The United States continued to favor Pakistan throughout the late 1950s. A United States communication center was approved for construction in Peshawar, Pakistan, which is significant because Pakistani officials were formerly wary of allowing American armed forces to establish facilities on Pakistani soil. Maintained by the United States Air Force, this accession was an important step toward cooperation against communist activities in the Middle East and Asia. In 1959, the United States and Pakistan signed a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, “strengthening the bonds of peace and friendship” between them.

The most important seal of Pakistan-United States relations was the 1959 Agreement of Cooperation between Pakistan and the United States. The document specifically referenced the Baghdad Pact, and included an explicit agreement to “cooperate for their security and defense.” This union drew Pakistan and the United States closer, but a lack of clarity on whether the agreement applied to aggression from India later led to Pakistani disenchantment with America. The United States recognized that the “broad and loose wording” of the agreement misled Pakistani officials and caused them to believe that this agreement applied to security threats from “any source.” The United States only meant the agreement to pertain to communism, hence the reference to the Baghdad Pact. Yet, this misunderstanding eventually contributed to reoccurring disillusionment in Pakistan with United States foreign policy.

Nor did the advancement of the Pakistan-United States relationship go unnoticed by India. The United States had been giving India economic and developmental aid for years. The

\[\text{28}^{\text{a}}\]Department of State press release on the establishment of a communications facility at Peshawar in Pakistan, 18 July 1959,” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 169.


United States did not want India to approach a level of economic poverty that would lead it to embrace communism. The United States ultimate goal was to curb communism in South Asia but the United States could not achieve its objective without angering Pakistan. Balancing regional objectives and alliances with global interests would continue to adversely affect United States foreign policy, specifically in regard to its relationship with Pakistan.

In a 1959 meeting of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon and committee-members analyzed the costs and benefits of aiding both countries simultaneously. One senator made a revealing statement that emphasized America’s conundrum in South Asia and the volatility of the Kashmir issue.

Senator Sparkman: We are in a way indirectly subsidizing both India and Pakistan to enable them to maintain the forces they are maintaining, really, against each other. By the way, I was told by officials in both countries who suggested to me that we were more or less underwriting their economies to permit them to maintain these heavy forces against each other. I think it is highly important that we do everything we can to get the settlement of the Kashmir question.
Mr. Dillon: I would agree.32

Another senator questioned the wisdom of providing aid to Pakistan that would most likely be directed at India rather than at the Soviet Union.

Senator Church: The military assistance program is directed toward the threat of Soviet aggression. Now, we have a case in Pakistan where we are supplying large amounts of money to maintain a military force. The Pakistani feeling is that the threat comes primarily from India. I question very seriously the propriety of spending American funds to arm one ally against the threat posed by another. We are not giving military assistance at the present time to India, are we?
Mr. Dillon: No, we are not. I would like to make clear what I said, and I think you noted it in your statement, was that this was the Pakistani idea that the threat came from India. We do not feel the same concern that Pakistan does about the threat. The aid to Pakistan was in connection with Pakistan’s joining the Baghdad Pact, which was a defensive pact against the U.S.S.R., and our Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that these forces from our point of

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32 “172 Statement by Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon in the hearings before the Senate CFR on the Mutual Security Act of 1959, 13 May 1959 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 166.
view would be effective, and useful in the case of all-out trouble with the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East region.  

These concerns would become extremely relevant in the 1960s after the outbreak of the 1962 Indo-China War and the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.

The beginning of the 1960s foreshadowed the future of turbulent relations between Pakistan and the United States. After the U-2 incident in 1960, when an American spy plane originating from the American Air Force installation in Peshawar was shot down over the Soviet Union, Pakistan withstood considerable pressure from the U.S.S.R, including the threat of “annihilation.” The United States recognized Pakistan’s contributions, such as speaking out in favor of the ‘Free World,’ but, shortly after, Pakistan began to question America’s allegiance.

The first major obstacle to the Pakistan-United States relationship occurred when the United States began sending military aid to India in response to its conflict with China. American arms to India came as a “rude shock” to Pakistanis who felt betrayed by the United States. President Ayub called for rapprochement between India and Pakistan based on a “just and honorable settlement of Kashmir” rather than “the injection of massive doses of military aid to India.” The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali, was frustrated that the United States aided India when it was “crystal clear to us that India was making a mountain of a mole hill and was raising Cain in order to bamboozle the Anglo-American powers.” As a result, Pakistan began to question its relationship with the United States and its position in world affairs.

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34 “232 Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s speech in the National Assembly, 24 July 1963 (Extract),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 222-3.
37 “222 Statement by Foreign Minister Mohammed Ali in the National Assembly of Pakistan during the discussion on the emergency situation arising out of large-scale supply of arms to India, 22 November 1962 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 213.
specifically its membership in SEATO and CENTO. Pakistan began considering neutralism as the best way to achieve security.\footnote{204 Ayub’s interview in London by ABC’s Paris correspondent Jack Begon and ABC’s diplomatic correspondent John Scally, 9 June 1961 (Extracts), “America-Pakistan Relations,” vol. 1, 197.} This change in foreign policy included normalizing relations with countries like China, Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union.

Because they shared a common dislike for India, Pakistan and China engaged in friendly diplomacy during the early 1960s. The advancing relationship between China and Pakistan unnerved American policymakers and politicians. The Sino-Pak relationship was a “mockery” to Pakistan’s former anticommunist stance.\footnote{39 Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 340.} Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and later president, told the United States that Pakistan had “moved forward in our relations with China but we have not moved backwards in our relations with the United States.”\footnote{40 “246 Statement by Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto at a press conference at his Clifton residence in Karachi, 28 March 1965 (Extracts), America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 233.} The China factor strained the Pakistan-United States relationship. The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 further pushed Pakistan’s foreign policy away from the United States and toward neutralism.

The beginning of the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 occurred in the Rann of Kutch. India claimed that Pakistan was using arms from America in the fighting, which violated earlier American guarantees to India.\footnote{41 “102 ‘Facts About Sind-Kutch Boundary,’ pamphlet issued by the Indian Embassy in Washington drawing attention to use of American arms in the Rann of Kutch, May 1965 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 105.} As hostilities expanded into Kashmir and breached the ceasefire line, the United States halted military aid to both India and Pakistan.\footnote{42 “107 Statement by US representative Goldberg in the UN Security Council, 17 December 1965 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 113.} Pakistan considered this “grossly unequal treatment” because the United States was Pakistan’s main supplier of war
material while India had access to military equipment from other countries. Although the United States assured Pakistan that the embargo was not intended to be a form of punishment, but only an effort to support the United Nations’ peace mission, Pakistan felt betrayed. Bhutto replied that “if the United States could only act through the Security Council then there was no need for alliances.”

The United States was in a predicament. The fighting in Kashmir not only concerned the United States because it wanted to maintain its friendship with both countries, but also because “just over the Himalayas Red China was sitting, eagerly waiting for a chance to pick up the pieces.” American policy over the previous decade was to deter China by bolstering Pakistan and India, a policy that ultimately backfired. After the conclusion of the second Indo-Pakistan War, the United States instituted a policy of arms restraint on the subcontinent. The United States enacted a policy of only selling non-lethal weapons to Pakistan and India, which affected Pakistan much more severely because the United States was its main supplier of weapons.

Tensions between India and Pakistan continued to elevate after India began developing nuclear technology in the late 1960s. Bhutto threatened: “If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry. But we will get one of our own.” The escalation of the arms race and nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent became a hindrance to the Pakistan-United States relationship from the 1960s to the present. The Indo-China War of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 had a lasting impact on the relationship between the United States and

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45 “Address by Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB Katzenbach before the Institute of International Relations, Stanford University, California, 17 November 1967 (Extract),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 132.
Pakistan. No longer were strong alliances and military sales the most prominent characteristics of the relationship. Rather, Pakistan improved its relationships with China and the Soviet Union, America’s sworn enemies in the fight against communism.

In a 1968 situation report by Larry Niksch, an Asian affairs analyst for the Congressional Research Service, it was apparent that Pakistan had forgone its close ties with the United States and moved considerably closer to a foreign policy based on neutrality. The “triangular policy” of Pakistan allowed the country to receive some form of either economic or military aid from China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Maintaining friendly relations with the three nations required Pakistan to “constantly walk a tightrope.” Yet, the “triangular policy” was considered a “success” and positively contributed to Pakistan’s economic and developmental progress. The United States continued to send economic aid to Pakistan despite its associations with the communist powers. For example, the United States contributed fifty million dollars to the construction of the Tarbela Dam.

Nonetheless, the military alliance was in decline. Pakistan no longer played an active role in SEATO or CENTO, illustrating the country’s policy shift to neutralism. By 1968, the “special relationship” between Pakistan and the United States that was founded on the Mutual Security Act of 1954 and the Bilateral Agreement of 1959 had “ceased to exist.” The United States was asked to let its lease on the facility in Peshawar run out without renewal in 1969. The United States no longer needed the station because the information was available elsewhere, but the closing of the American installation allowed Pakistan to receive arms sales from the

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49 Niksch, “Pakistan: Situation Report,” 2.
51 “280 Arshad Husain’s statement in the National Assembly of Pakistan, 28 June 1968 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 266.
52 “280 Arshad Husain’s statement in the National Assembly of Pakistan, 28 June 1968 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 266.
Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{54} The Pakistan-United States relationship became strained during the 1960s and events in the 1970s would continue to test the former allies’ commitment to each another.

In October 1970, the United States approved a request from Pakistan for 300 armored personnel carriers.\textsuperscript{55} The United States also sold Pakistan a small amount of weapons and replacement parts, making a “one-time exception” to America’s policy of selling only non-lethal military supplies to Pakistan. As military aid continued to trickle into Pakistan, South Asia entered into another crisis that would lead to the third Indo-Pakistan War of 1971.

The ties between East and West Pakistan eroded due to East Pakistan’s desire for autonomy. These tensions resulted in a civil war in East Pakistan. The United States implemented a policy of “quiet diplomacy,” in which the United States would not condemn Pakistan’s actions and would continue to send small amounts of military and economic assistance.\textsuperscript{56} America’s public opinion was that the conflict was an “internal matter” and the strong powers such as India or the Soviet Union should not interfere.\textsuperscript{57} Efforts toward negotiation were fruitless, and from March to November between 200,000 and one million people died.\textsuperscript{58}

The Pakistan Army began targeting Hindus in East Pakistan, many of whom subsequently fled to India.\textsuperscript{59} The United States and United Nations tried to alleviate the pressure of the refugees on India and avert further tensions between India and Pakistan by sending

\textsuperscript{54} Niksch, “Pakistan: Situation Report,” 29.
\textsuperscript{57} “Statement by the Spokesman of the Department of State, 5 April 1971 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 143.
\textsuperscript{58} “The India-Pakistan War of November-December 1971,” 2.
\textsuperscript{59} “The India-Pakistan War of November-December 1971,” 2.
humanitarian aid to India, but their efforts were unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{60} India trained over 50,000 rebels and refugees in India to fight the Pakistan army in East Pakistan.\textsuperscript{61} Diplomacy failed and the Indian Army moved into East Pakistan where hostilities broke out. The United States declared that India’s military intervention was “unjustified” and suspended all arms equipment sales to India, but not to Pakistan, which was a notably different policy than America followed in the Indo-Pakistan War in 1965.\textsuperscript{62}

The United States did not directly intervene on the behalf of Pakistan, but it did not abandon Pakistan either. Maintaining the balance of power in Asia was a priority of the Nixon administration. In 1971, India and the Soviet Union announced the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.\textsuperscript{63} Nixon perceived the Indo-Pakistan war as a “vehicle for the expansion of Soviet influence in South Asia.”\textsuperscript{64} During the war, Nixon was also pursuing détente with China, which supported Pakistan. The fragile diplomacy between China and the United States hinged on America not alienating Pakistan.\textsuperscript{65} President Richard Nixon’s National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, told the Washington Special Advisory Group (WSAG): “I am getting hell every half hour from the president that we are not being tough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants us to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise.”\textsuperscript{66}

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\bibitem{60} "The India-Pakistan War of November-December 1971," 35
\bibitem{61} "The India-Pakistan War of November-December 1971," 2.
\bibitem{62} "166 Statement by State Department Spokesman, Charles W. Bray, 3 December 1971 (Extracts)," \textit{America-Pakistan Relations}, vol. 2, 166.  "176 Background briefing by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, 7 December 1971 (summary)," \textit{America-Pakistan Relations}, vol. 2, 181.
\bibitem{63} "The India-Pakistan War of November-December 1971," 33.
\bibitem{64} "The India-Pakistan War of November-December 1971," 32.
\bibitem{65} "The India-Pakistan War of November-December 1971," 34.
\bibitem{66} "165 Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) meeting on India/Pakistan, 3 December 1971 (summary) (Extracts)," \textit{America-Pakistan Relations}, vol. 2, 165. The WSAG consists of State Department, Defense Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, Agency for International Development, and National Security Council Staff.
\end{thebibliography}
Nixon wanted it to be clear that any encroachment on West Pakistan by India would be unacceptable. He ordered a task force, which included the aircraft carrier *Enterprise*, to the Bay of Bengal.\(^{67}\) This decision was done under the guise of evacuating United States citizens, and according to Kissinger, the actual purpose was “to give emphasis on our warnings against an attack on West Pakistan.”\(^{68}\) Future American diplomatic relations in Asia and the Middle East depended on American policy during the Indo-Pakistan War.

In another WSAG meeting, Kissinger said that “Everyone knows that India will ultimately occupy East Pakistan.”\(^{69}\) He also stated, “The UN is likely to be an exercise in futility,” because the Soviet Union would veto anything detrimental to India.\(^{70}\) Not only was Nixon concerned about the integrity of Pakistan, and the potential effects of the war on the Sino-American détente, he similarly worried about the reputation of the United State in the Middle East. If West Pakistan was overcome by India there would be grave implications on the relationships between America and its other allies. The United States did not want countries in the Middle East, such as Iran, to question the United States’ dependability on issues of Soviet influence or encroachment. When the war ended, West Pakistan maintained its sovereignty.

Prime Minister Bhutto expressed his thanks to both China and the United States for supporting the preservation of West Pakistan.\(^{71}\) In an interview for a broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corporation, Bhutto was questioned about his opinion of Indian intentions toward Pakistan.

\(^{67}\) Jain, *US-Pak Relations*, 34-5.

\(^{68}\) Jain, *US-Pak Relations*, 35.

\(^{69}\) “168 WSAG meeting on Indo-Pakistan hostilities, 4 December 1971 (summary) (Extracts),” *America-Pakistan Relations*, vol. 2, 168.

\(^{70}\) “168 WSAG meeting on Indo-Pakistan hostilities, 4 December 1971 (summary) (Extracts),” *America-Pakistan Relations*, vol. 2, 168.

\(^{71}\) “183 Statement by Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto in the UN Security Council, 12 December 1971 (Extracts),” *America-Pakistan Relations*, vol. 2, 191.
Q. If this was, however, still a fundamental aim of Indian policy [to end partition and reabsorb Pakistan] couldn’t they have finished the job last time?
A. Yes, they might have and I think they intended to, but the world situation was there and the world powers took an active attitude towards the conflict finally and the United States put a foot down and so India declared a unilateral ceasefire. I don’t think it was a voluntary declaration.  

The posture of the United States toward Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars was markedly different. In the earlier war, the United States put a complete embargo on Pakistan. In the later war, America discarded its policy of strict neutrality between Pakistan and India. It acted on its own by sending a task force to the Indian Ocean, rather than leaving the matter completely in the hands of the United Nations. The American tilt toward Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 strengthened the relationship between Pakistan and the United States and advanced American relations with China. Although the most significant threats to Pakistan’s integrity came from Indian conflicts, events in Afghanistan during the 1970s began to capture the world’s attention.

Pakistan’s history has often been deeply affected by its relations with and events in neighboring countries. Border disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan plagued the countries’ relationship since their inception. The Durand Line, which staked the northern and western boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, was constantly a source of friction between the two countries. Afghanistan also advocated political autonomy for the Pashtu-speaking people in Pakistan. Afghanistan, partnered with India, “continuously agitated” the “Pushtunistan” issue, which was likened to the Kashmir problem between India and Pakistan.  

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72 “200 President Bhutto’s interview with Ian MacIntyre, broadcast by BBC on 18 February 1972 (Extract),” *America-Pakistan Relations*, vol. 2, 227.
73 “54 Department of State Policy Statement with regard to Afghanistan, 21 February 1951 (Extract),” *America-Pakistan Relations*, vol. 1, 46.
surrounded by hostile nations, especially after Afghanistan and India signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1951.  

Furthermore, Pakistan was concerned with Afghanistan’s commercial dependence on the Soviet Union. After a coup in Afghanistan in 1973, Mohammed Daoud assumed leadership and implemented pro-Soviet policies. The strengthening of the Soviet-Afghan relationship sent a “shockwave of apprehension” through Pakistan and neighboring countries. Soviet influence in Afghanistan had the potential to further exacerbate ethnic divisions in Pakistan and Iran. The Baluchis, a group which spanned across Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, desired political independence. Pakistan and Iran were concerned that the Soviet Union would foment unrest in Baluchistan in an effort to gain control of the region and thereby gain access to the Persian Gulf where it could establish a warm-water port. In 1973, Iran invited America to assess Iran’s defense capabilities on its border with Afghanistan after the Soviet Union supplied Afghanistan with advanced aircraft.

The Soviet Union continued to support the Daoud government, which concerned the United States. In a telegram from the American Embassy in Karachi to State Department officials in Washington, the American ambassador called attention to speculation that Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had noticed “U.S. war

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74 “54 Department of State Policy Statement with regard to Afghanistan, 21 February 1951 (Extract),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 47.
76 “Afghanistan: Soviet Invasion and U.S. Response,” DNSA.
77 “Baluchistan: A Primer,” General CIA, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD.
weariness and preoccupation with domestic affairs” during the Washington Summit.\textsuperscript{79} Brezhnev concluded that “this [was a] safe time [to] take [a] major step to bolster [the] Soviet position in South Asia and [the] Persian Gulf region.”\textsuperscript{80} While the United States and Pakistan became increasingly alarmed with developments in Afghanistan, their relationship rapidly eroded.

The continuance of the arms embargo on lethal weapons constituted the major source of disagreement between the United States and Pakistan. Bhutto claimed that Pakistan was being “singled out” and treated unjustly.\textsuperscript{81} Kissinger agreed, and argued that withholding weapons sales from an ally whose Indian neighbor was stockpiling massive amounts of arms was “morally, politically, and symbolically improper.”\textsuperscript{82} After India tested a nuclear device in 1974, Pakistan tried to persuade the United States to lift the embargo or accept Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear technology.

Bhutto explained that Pakistan would not need a nuclear weapon if it could defend itself by conventional means.\textsuperscript{83} He told India that, if the United States lifted the embargo, it should not cause fear in India because it would only rectify “the anomaly whereby an ally of the United States was denied the right to purchase American arms for self defense.”\textsuperscript{84} When Pakistan did not receive an offer of weapons sales, it turned to France to acquire a reprocessing plant.

Tensions over nuclear proliferation progressively worsened. In a meeting between Kissinger and Bhutto, Kissinger stated that Pakistan should not “insult the intelligence” of the United States by

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\item\textsuperscript{80} “Afghan Coup: View from Quetta,” DNSA.
\item\textsuperscript{81} “324 Bhutto’s interview to National Broadcasting Corporation, September 1974 (Extract),” \textit{America-Pakistan Relations}, vol. 1, 302.
\item\textsuperscript{82} Jain, \textit{US-Pak Relations}, 53.
\item\textsuperscript{83} “327 Bhutto’s interview with Bernard Weinrub, correspondent of the new York Times, at Rawalpindi, 9 October 1974 (Extracts),” \textit{America-Pakistan Relations}, vol. 2, 305.
\item\textsuperscript{84} “335 Bhutto’s statement at Larkana, 24 February 1975,” \textit{America-Pakistan Relations}, vol. 2, 310.
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claiming the reprocessing plant was for peaceful, energy-related purposes.\textsuperscript{85} Bhutto later claimed that Kissinger threatened him by saying he must end nuclear development or the United States “would make a horrible example of him.”\textsuperscript{86} Bhutto responded by stating that no country had the right to tell Pakistan what it could or could not do.\textsuperscript{87} The meeting highlighted the quickly deteriorating relationship between Pakistan and the United States.

Shortly after the meeting, Pakistan held its 1977 elections. Protests and accusations of corruption against Bhutto erupted on the streets of Pakistan, which Bhutto blamed on a “colossal international conspiracy.”\textsuperscript{88} Bhutto claimed that the “political bloodhounds were after him” because he refused to comply with American insistence on halting the nuclear program.\textsuperscript{89} Secretary of State Cyrus Vance denied any American interference with the elections in Pakistan and warned Bhutto of making public statements that would damage the Pakistan-United States relationship.\textsuperscript{90} Zia al-Huq displaced Bhutto in a bloodless coup, but the relationship between Pakistan and the United States did not improve.

In 1977, the United States implemented the Symington Amendment, which allowed Congress to halt economic and military assistance to any country that tried to acquire nuclear weapons technology.\textsuperscript{91} The diplomatic alliances that had bound the two countries together in the 1950s completely broke down. In March 1979, Pakistan withdrew from CENTO, which had

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\textsuperscript{85} Weissman and Krosney, \textit{The Islamic Bomb}, 163.
\textsuperscript{86} Weissman and Krosney, \textit{The Islamic Bomb}, 163.
\textsuperscript{87} Jain, \textit{US-Pak Relations}, 61.
\textsuperscript{88} “357 Statement by Prime Minister Bhutto to a joint session of Parliament, 28 April 1977 (Extracts),” \textit{America-Pakistan Relations}, vol. 2, 329.
\textsuperscript{89} “357 Statement by Prime Minister Bhutto to a joint session of Parliament, 28 April 1977 (Extracts),” \textit{America-Pakistan Relations}, vol. 2, 329.
\textsuperscript{90} “359 Letter of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Prime Minister Bhutto, 29 April 1977,” \textit{America-Pakistan Relations}, vol. 2, 330.
\textsuperscript{91} Weissman and Krosney, \textit{The Islamic Bomb}, 168.
\end{flushleft}
“not turned out to be too meaningful an organization.”  

Zia stated that the United States never stood by its allies when the “chips were down.” He recounted American neutrality during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and asserted that “when the crunch came, Pakistan was left alone.” The lowest point in the Pakistan-United States relationship occurred in 1979.

In November of 1979, Pakistani sentiment toward the United States flared into open hostility after a radio report incorrectly blamed Americans for violence in Mecca on the Holy Kabaa. An angry mob breached the American Embassy compound in Islamabad, and four personnel died, including one U.S. Marine. The American Center in Lahore and the American Cultural Center in Rawalpindi were also attacked and burned. Serious questions arose about the amount of time it took for Pakistan to respond to the attacks. During the most volatile time of Pakistan and American diplomacy, events in Afghanistan indicated future instability in the region.

The Communist Party in Afghanistan struggled to remain in control due to increased resistance from rebels. The Soviet Union’s investment in a pro-Soviet, communist Afghanistan was in serious jeopardy. The potential overthrow of the Afghan regime would be a damaging

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93 “376 Zia ul-Haq’s interview to CBS television in Rawalpindi, 22 February 1979 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 344.
94 “376 Zia ul-Haq’s interview to CBS television in Rawalpindi, 22 February 1979 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 344.
95 “398 Zia al-Haqs address to the nation, 21 November 1979 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 366.
setback to the Soviet Union’s “international prestige” and had the potential to replace Soviet influence with Chinese or Pakistani influence. The Soviet Union started analyzing its options in Afghanistan, which ranged from completely abandoning efforts there to launching a full-scale invasion.

In 1979, the uncertainty in Afghanistan combined with the fall of the Shah in Iran unnerved leaders in both Pakistan and the United States. A Soviet occupied Afghanistan would constitute a “legitimate” threat to Pakistan’s security and America’s attempt to contain communism. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 24 December 1979, Pakistan and the United States gained a common interest: countering the Russians in Afghanistan. This common interest eventually revitalized the Pakistan-United States relationship, but not without difficulty.

Prior to the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States and Pakistan embarked on a diplomatic relationship characterized by strength but degraded by Pakistan’s confrontations with India and disagreements over arm sales. America’s aid to India during the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the embargo on arms to Pakistan after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War amounted to the end of a close relationship and the disillusionment in Pakistan with the United States. In Pakistan’s opinion, the 1959 Agreement was a meaningless document that signified a lack of American commitment to Pakistan. American reaction to the conflicts between Pakistan and India served as the greatest irritant between the United States and Pakistan.

From 1947-1979, American policies toward Pakistan remained in flux. President Dwight Eisenhower “favored Pakistan over India” in an effort to establish intelligence gathering outposts

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in Pakistan. He also oversaw Pakistan’s entrance into important alliances such as SEATO and CENTO. During the Kennedy Administration, progress toward a sturdy relationship reversed. The pro-Indian initiatives during the early 1960s were detrimental to Pakistan’s opinion of the United States and signified the beginning of the declining bonds. The Nixon Administration’s détente with China caused India to nurture its relationship with the Soviet Union. The Johnson Administration, which implemented a policy of “using aid as a club” only “intensified the core problems” of the relationship. With the emergence of nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent, the United States further alienated Pakistan by selling enriched uranium to India. Pakistan perceived these actions as “hypocrisy in U.S. non-proliferation policy.” The inconsistent policies of the United States, and its vacillations between New Delhi and Islamabad cased the United States to have “poor relations with both simultaneously.” Washington’s inability to create an effective policy in South Asia was caused by “myriad challenges” and “contrary interests, priorities, commitments, and decisions of other actors.”

Another reason for the irregularity of American policies can be attributed to its internal politics. Traditionally, Republicans tended to show “greater understanding of and sympathy for Pakistan.” This tendency is illustrated in the case of President Robert Kennedy and Richard Nixon. Later, it is also apparent in the case of President Carter and Ronald Reagan. No matter the leaders of the United States or Pakistan, the ultimate failure of the Pakistan-United States relationship was the “fundamental dichotomy between the American and Pakistani perceptions

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102 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, 340.
106 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, 339.
Pakistan entered into alliances with the United States on the assumption that America would take Pakistan’s side during conflicts with India. The United States’ main motivation originated from the desire to counter Soviet presence in South Asia and the Middle East. Ultimately, both nations were disappointed. Pakistan cultivated a close relationship with China and the Soviet Union detected an opportunity to exert its influence in Afghanistan. South Asia was “sucked into the Cold War vortex.” The emergence of a common threat in South Asia, however, gave Pakistan and the United States the impetus to rekindle the smoldering relationship.

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Chapter 2: The Pakistan-United States Relationship during the First Afghan Crisis

Since Pakistan was created in 1947, its relationship with the United States has wavered between an ally and an uncomfortable acquaintance. The relationship had moved across a spectrum, from Pakistan being “America’s most allied ally in Asia” in the 1950s, to a sense of betrayal in Pakistan because of the lack of American intervention during its defeat in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 and the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led to a repetition of the oscillating relationship between Pakistan and the United States. But this cycle was different because it included the all-time peak of the relationship in 1986, when Pakistan and the United States not only reached a firm foundation of their friendship through a generous American six-year aid plan to Pakistan, but also coordinated a massive effort to mobilize the mujahidin in Afghanistan and turn the tide of war against the Soviet Union. Yet, within a few years, the bilateral partnership between the United States and Pakistan returned to cool relations reminiscent of the 1960s and 1970s because of the reemergence of the same obstacles: Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, tensions with India, and the lack of democratic institutions. To understand this pattern, it is necessary to analyze the galvanizing event that sparked the rekindling of the Pakistan-United States relationship – the Soviet Union’s intervention in Afghanistan.

A turning point in the relationship between the United States and Pakistan came in 1979. As the year progressed, the relations between the two countries deteriorated over myriad issues. Because of continued speculation about Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear program, the United

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States suspended aid to Pakistan. Nuclear anxieties and the arms race on the subcontinent compounded the strained relations between Pakistan and India. By the end of the 1979, however, Pakistan’s strategic value to the United States and regional threats to Pakistan led to further efforts by both countries to revitalize the Pakistan-United States relationship. The best interests of both countries led to cooperation in addressing the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

President Zia al-Huq and other high-ranking officials perceived the crisis in Afghanistan as an opportunity to advance their army’s capabilities. According to specialist A. Z. Hilali: “Zia and his colleagues took the decision to get involved in Afghanistan because they saw it as militarily and economically profitable.” The modernization of Pakistan’s outdated weapons and defense systems would also serve as a deterrent to India. Another reason Pakistan wanted to aid the Afghan rebels was Pakistan’s desire for strategic depth against India. Zia thought that, if the Soviet Union could be expelled from Afghanistan and a government friendly to Pakistan could be installed in Afghanistan, Pakistan would gain influence in the region not only by solving decades-old border disputes but also by avoiding a pro-Indian neighbor. Pakistan was not the only country that had a reason to be involved in Afghanistan.

The significance of Pakistan in American foreign policy immediately expanded as the Cold War suddenly escalated and Russian troops entered Afghanistan on 24 December 1979. President James “Jimmy” Carter termed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as “the greatest

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112 Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship, 111.
113 Marvin Weinbaum, “Pakistan and Afghanistan: The Strategic Relationship,” Asian Survey 31, no. 6 (June 1991), 498.
114 Weinbaum, “Pakistan and Afghanistan,” 498.
threat to World Peace since the Second World War.”\textsuperscript{115} Not only was the Persian Gulf considered the “oil jugular” of the West, but also Soviet interference in Afghanistan represented an aggressive violation of international norms.\textsuperscript{116} Soviet leaders decided to intervene on the behalf of the struggling communist leadership in Kabul, citing the Brezhnev Doctrine as their cause. While the Brezhnev Doctrine referred specifically to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the same justification was used in the case of Afghanistan. As Leonid Brezhnev had urged in a speech, solidarity with “fraternal” and socialist countries was a state priority.\textsuperscript{117}

In Carter’s 1980 State of the Union Address, the president underscored the American commitment to the Persian Gulf region and its steady supply of oil. Not only did Carter declare that any “attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf . . . will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force,” but he publicly announced that the 1959 agreement with Pakistan had been reconfirmed and the United States was committed to preserving Pakistan’s “independence and its integrity.”\textsuperscript{118} These public statements highlighted the increasing attention to Pakistan and the greater region, yet, it is important to note that the reaffirmation of the 1959 agreement only pertained to a communist threat to Pakistan, not a threat emanating from India.\textsuperscript{119} This detail had been a sore point in Pakistan-United States foreign policy since 1965 and significantly hindered the renewal of the Pakistan-United States relationship.

\textsuperscript{116} Hilali, United States-Pakistan Relationship, 3.
\textsuperscript{119} “Document 480: Replies by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Questions Asked at an Interview With the “Wall Street Journal, [sic]” January 15, 1980 (Excerpt),” AFP, 905
Another chaffing point in that relationship was the suspension of American aid to
Pakistan in 1979 and Pakistan’s desperate desire to acquire military supplies. Under the Carter
administration, millions of dollars of military aid for training programs were cut because
Pakistan refused to end its nuclear program. After the Russian invasion of Afghanistan,
Pakistan’s “insecurity dilemma” heightened and Pakistani officials viewed a military sales
relationship as the most important aspect for Pakistan to initiate cooperation with the United
States. When Pakistan became a “frontline state,” its Korean War-era weaponry and defense
systems needed to be updated to meet the Soviet threat on its western border. This element
was Pakistan’s most immediate concern; but Carter was not as accommodating or as generous as
the Pakistani government wanted.

When Carter arrived in office in 1977, Congress had set a record for supporting controls
and restraints on United States arms transfers, a policy which Carter expanded by adding a more
strict set of restrictions, most notably including the prohibition of selling new and advanced
weaponry. Carter announced that he intended to support a policy of further arms restraints,
and arms transfers would be “an exceptional foreign policy implement.” “Extraordinary
circumstances” were required for the president to issue a presidential waiver to countries such as
Pakistan that had violated the terms for qualifying for arms sales. The most immediate
obstacle to approving any arms transfer to Pakistan was Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons
program.

120 Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship, 65.
121 Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship, 52.
122 “515 Zia’s address to members of Pakistani community, San Francisco, 12 December 1982 (Extract),” K.
123 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, 97th Cong.,
124 Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, 122.
125 Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, 122.
After aid was suspended in 1979 over nuclear proliferation violations, Carter and the United States Congress had to decide whether to override the existing legislation that prohibited arms sales or aid to a country that was suspected of developing nuclear weapons capabilities. On 6 January 1980, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that the United States and Pakistan were faced with an “exceptional situation,” referring to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. On 1 February 1980, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance requested an “exception to existing legislation” from the Senate Appropriations Committee. It is clear that policymakers were trying to make the case that the situation in Pakistan was anything but ordinary and the Glenn-Symington Amendment that barred aid to countries pursuing nuclear programs needed to be lifted so military materials could flow into Pakistan. In a State Department cable to several American embassies, the situation in Southwest Asia was described as “extraordinary” and, although Carter had approved military and economic aid to Pakistan, the United States government would still maintain its policy by pressing for a halt to Pakistan’s nuclear program. Although policymakers stressed the exceptional and extraordinary conditions regarding Pakistan, using the exact words of Carter’s Arms Transfers Policy of 1977, and Carter agreed to renew aid to Pakistan, the United States failed to produce a satisfactory offer.

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129 SECSTATE WASHDC, “U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy ad Renewed Assistance to Pakistan,” 16 June 2011. General CIA 80STATE025686, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, MD.
The United States proposed a 400 million dollar aid package, divided equally between military and economic aid, which Zia rejected as “peanuts.” Zia complained that the offer was “devoid of credibility and durability.” Zia’s response referred to the perceived American bias to India, lingering distrust from the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, and the mere two year extension for the offer. Also, the proposal was supposedly “wrapped up in onerous conditions.” Pakistan had been clear that it was a non-aligned state and would not enter into an entangling aid relationship. Zia even threatened accommodation with the Soviet Union. He stated in February 1980:

If the US is going to help Pakistan, let it come who le hog. If I accept such a meaningless level of aid, I will only provoke the Russians without really getting a defence against them. I will burn my bridges: Do you really want me to do that?

Pakistan continued to talk tough throughout Carter’s presidency and accused Carter’s administration of “ostrich symptom.” Pakistan wanted arms sales through credit; and to Zia the 400 million dollar offer was “not even a drop in the ocean.” Although the first offer from the United States was dismissed, the relationship between the heads of state and their respective countries still appeared promising.

At a dinner given in honor of National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in Pakistan, Zia stated that, although relations between Pakistan and the United States had “gone under strains,” they were not snapped and he was encouraged that the United States, Pakistan’s

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132 Weinbaum, “Pakistan and Afghanistan,” 498.
134 Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship, 112.
136 Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship, 68.
“traditional ally,” was attempting to reestablish its ties with its “lost Asian ally.” In response, Brzezinski emphasized that the United States wanted to renew its friendship with Pakistan and work together to confront the Soviet threat in Afghanistan. In an interview with Walter Cronkite in May 1980, Zia presented Pakistan as an “island of stability,” and encouraged the United States to be more assertive rather than “hibernate and go back into the shell.” He further explained: “The period of pre-1919 is over, Mr. Cronkite, your country today is the beacon light of the free world and it has to act that way.” Zia was unimpressed with the hesitant and mild proposals of the Carter administration and encouraged the United States policymakers to be more bold and generous. Carter adhered to the arms sales policies outlined in 1977, and offered weapons to Pakistan, but he failed to finalize an arrangement with Pakistan.

Thomas Thornton, an expert on South Asian affairs, described Washington’s Pakistan policy under Carter as a “near total failure.” While Carter struggled to reach an agreement with Zia, Carter did act with “swiftness” by sending rifles to mujahidin (Afghan freedom fighters) in Pakistan within two weeks of the Soviet invasion. Carter made limited progress by authorizing covert operations in Pakistan, which included training the mujahidin. A Special Coordinating Committee of the National Security Council provided for light infantry weapons for the mujahidin. The Carter administration also contributed about 700 million dollars over a

138 “412 Brzezinski’s speech at the banquet, 2 February 1980 (Extract),” *America-Pakistan Relations*, vol. 2, 379.
143 W. Howard Wriggans, “Pakistan’s Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan,” *Pacific Affairs* 57, no. 2 (1984), 290.
span of approximately three years to the rebels. Politically, America tried to reassure Pakistan of its commitment in the region by reaffirming the 1959 Agreement of Cooperation. There was an “upsurge”\textsuperscript{144} in pro-United States sentiment after Brzezinski’s affirmations of friendship and solidarity between the two nations to confront the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, although it is undeniable that an element of uncertainty and distrust from the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 and America’s failure to intervene on the behalf of Pakistan reignited feelings in Pakistanis that America had “let Pakistan down” before and was likely to do it again.\textsuperscript{145} The aid to the mujahidin that trickled into Pakistan under Carter turned into a flood under President Ronald Reagan and the military sales relationship and diplomatic relationship between Pakistan and the United States improved dramatically.

Reagan’s foreign policy differed greatly from that of Carter’s. Reagan’s foreign policy of seeking a steady alliance with Pakistan was markedly more aggressive than Carter’s foreign policy. Reagan, a ‘super-hawk,’ called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” in a 1983 speech in Orlando, Florida.\textsuperscript{146} Rather than fully embracing the concept of containment, Reagan went further by advocating ‘rolling back’ any advance of communism. This principle applied to the Soviet Union’s presence in Afghanistan. To counter the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Reagan considered the transfer of conventional arms “an essential element of its [United States] global defense posture and an indispensible component” of American foreign policy.\textsuperscript{147} Unlike Carter’s policies, there was also no explicit mention of the human rights factor when deciding


\textsuperscript{145}“Peshawar Reaction to Afghan Developments as of 4 Jan 80,” DNSA. Wriggans, “Pakistan’s Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan,” 290.


\textsuperscript{147}House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, 127.
whether to supply a nation with weapons. Reagan stated that the “United States cannot defend the Free World alone;” it needed the help of its friends and allies, especially ‘Third World’ countries such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, to deter and combat Soviet aggression. In the case of Pakistan, Reagan believed that punishing Pakistan by cutting off aid had not had the desired effect of ending Pakistan’s nuclear program; and rather, American policies would be more effective if they satisfied the security anxieties of Pakistan. With a more expansive policy concerning arms transfers to Pakistan than Carter, Reagan and Zia were much better suited to create a mutually beneficial relationship based on arms sales.

In 1981, over 300 Soviet aircraft crossed the Afghan border into Pakistan; and, in twelve of the incidents firing occurred. Five people died from Soviet-Kabul air attacks in 1981 and, as time progressed, the casualties increased. These air violations underscored the need for Pakistan to acquire more sophisticated air defense systems to protect its border regions. Zia called attention to the geostrategic importance of Pakistan to the United States’ oil demands by reminding policymakers that Pakistan was the “back door to the gulf” and should not be neglected. Pakistan demonstrated the need for improved defense capabilities and emphasized the benefit to the United States of providing these advancements to Pakistan.

In June 1981, Agha Shahi, Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, described the emerging relationship between Pakistan and the United States in romantic terms, from “courtship” to “engagement;” Shahi reminded Americans that the relationship had not yet been

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148 Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy, 127.
151 Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship, 205.
“consummated.” Shahi made it clear that, to follow the metaphor, a marriage would only occur under certain conditions: a relationship based on military sales, not a military pact, so that Pakistan could uphold a non-aligned status, and the sale of sophisticated weaponry, most specifically the F-16 fighter aircraft which had been a sore point in the Carter-Zia relationship. Pakistan considered the Five Year Plan proposed by the United States and totaling approximately 3.2 billion dollars of credit and aid to be much more agreeable than the previous 400 million dollar offer from President Carter. Although the plan had to be approved annually by Congress, the aid program instilled a sense of trust in the Reagan administration.

In July, the Pakistani Ministry of Defense, Joint Staff, including army, navy and air force representatives, joined American leaders of all the military branches to assess Pakistan’s defense needs and how the United States could bolster Pakistan’s border defenses. Leaders of the Pakistani Air Force traveled to the United States to tour an air force base to view the F-16 aircraft. Pakistan perceived the sale of forty F-16s as the final step to solidifying the Pakistan-United States relationship. A report to the Committee on Foreign Relations in November 1981 stated that “to all concerned the aircraft are the keystone of the new United States-Pakistani relationship.” Yet, the sale of F-16s to Pakistan still remained troublesome for several reasons. The F-16 deal was temporarily denied by the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs due to “the Human Rights Situation in Pakistan,” specifically referring to

153 “467 Agha Shahi’s speech at a seminar held under the auspices of the Council of Pakistan newspapers Editors at Lahore, 30 June 1981 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 433.
154 “467 Agha Shahi’s speech,” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 1, 433.
political imprisonment and cruel and unusual punishment. The transfer of such sophisticated aircraft also worried policymakers because of the possible repercussions on United States-Indian foreign relations. The report to Congress warned the lawmakers that no “clear and unencumbered foreign policy” existed. While the F-16 issue was not finalized in President Reagan’s first year of office, the Reagan Administration made measurable progress with the Five Year Plan.

By 1982, the Reagan-Zia relationship became increasingly friendly. Reagan wrote in his diary, “He’s [Zia] a good man (cavalry). Gave me his word they are not building an atomic or nuclear bomb.” On two separate occasions in December, both President Zia and President Reagan described the “warmth” of the relationship between the two nations. The overtly friendly nature of the two heads of state marked a critical step to cooperation and was important to overcoming the obstacles of the India factor. In a statement before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee, Nicholas Veliotes, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, assured the committee, and by extension India, that the 275 million dollars credited to Pakistan for the purchase of F-16s, armored personal carriers (APCs), and other weaponry was in no way meant to inflame Pakistan’s historic rivalry against India, or to reflect favoritism from the United States, but solely for the purpose of defending Pakistan’s western border against the Soviet Union. Not only

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159 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Economic Assistance to Pakistan Hearings on H.R. 211, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981, 342.
were United States policymakers worried about the reaction to arms sales to Pakistan, Pakistani leaders in Islamabad were also worried that if Pakistan faced aggression from India, the United States would discontinue aid to Pakistan. Additionally, Pakistani government officials were concerned that the United States would abandon its efforts in Afghanistan and subsequently abandon its relationship with Pakistan, forcing Pakistan to deal with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan without its most powerful ally. These worries were compounded by the difficulties arising from the finalization of the F-16 sale.

The F-16 issue irritated Pakistan-United States relations. The F-16s were finally approved for sale in November, but the delivery of the first six F-16s was delayed because Pakistan refused to purchase them without first being equipped with the radar warning receiver used by the United States Air Force (ALR-69). A secret memo from the office of the Director of Central Intelligence lamented the Department of Defense’s refusal to include the USAF radar equipment. Not only did denial of the advanced radar technology have the potential to “seriously damage the totality of the US-Pakistan relationship,” but also to affect a “serious blow to US worldwide nonproliferation efforts.” In several reports and intelligence analyses, the CIA urged policymakers to take into consideration that the “sale of advanced weapons is the yardstick by which Islamabad measures US support.” On 7 December 1982, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinburger reported to the Associated Press of Pakistan that the issue had been resolved.

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“happily” and the F-16s would be delivered with the sophisticated radar warning receiver ALR-69. 169

Not only did the greatest step toward solidifying the arms sales relationship with Pakistan occur in 1982, but the American military increased its presence in the region and both Pakistan and the United States cooperated and shared intelligence. A visit of the Middle East Force Command, which operated in the Persian Gulf, to the port of Karachi symbolized the cooperation between the two nations. American officials met with Rear Admiral T. K. Khan, Commander Karachi (COMKAR); Rear Admiral I. A. Sirohey, Commander Pakistan Fleet (COMPAK); Rear Admiral G. A. Zaidi, Commander Logistics (COMLOG) and later in the week, the Chief and Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Niazi and Vice Admiral Quadir respectively. 170 This meeting signified a strong partnership between navies that was important for many reasons. Not only did military supplies for both Pakistan and Afghanistan enter through the port of Karachi, but the American Rapid Deployment Task Force (RDJTF) was created in 1980 to have its main focus on the Persian Gulf region. 171 Such concentration of naval groups in the Persian Gulf reflected the significance of the region to the United States as dictated by the Carter Doctrine (as made explicit in the 1980 State of the Union Address). The initiation of naval cooperation constituted a crucial step in the advancement of the United States-Pakistan relationship.

President Zia’s pledge to share intelligence gathered by electronic surveillance with the United States further strengthened the military partnership further.\(^{172}\) Also, President Zia’s public denial of channeling foreign weapons to the mujahidin strengthened the relationship by allowing the United States to drain the Soviet Union of resources in Afghanistan without being publicly accountable.\(^{173}\) The strengthening of the military relationship between the United States and Pakistan demonstrated not only the amicability between the heads of state, but also the “durability and credibility” that Pakistan had made clear it required before entering into a military sales relationship.\(^{174}\) President Zia addressed Reagan in a speech at the White House on 7 December, emphasizing common interests and a “friendship mature enough to withstand differences of opinion and mirrored by the very candor and sincerity of our mutual exchanges.”\(^{175}\) As the diplomatic ties strengthened between Pakistan and the United States, so did the military connections.

The creation of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) on 1 January 1983 emphasized the importance of the region in American foreign policy and military strategy planning. Its purpose was to deter aggression and bolster the security of Southwest Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa. Commander in Chief of USCENTCOM, Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston, explained that USCENTCOM’s responsibilities exceed merely guaranteeing the supply of oil, but also include maintaining ties with friendly nations and preserving their independence.\(^{176}\) In the case of Pakistan, this meant conducting joint military exercises and sharing intelligence and technology. In 1984, a group of experts recommended the

\(^{172}\) “513 Zia’s interview on the NBC ‘Meet the Press’ programme, 12 December 1982 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 488.

\(^{173}\) “513 Zia’s interview,” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 488.


\(^{176}\) “United States Central Command,” DNSA.
most cost-effective way to secure the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan from air attacks. A similar visit occurred in 1985 when USCENTCOM supervised a “survey/assistance visit” to Pakistan to assess and propose enhancements to Pakistan’s air force strategy, capabilities, maintenance, and other support activities.

Because of USCENTCOM’s responsibility to protect United States interests and those of its allies, the command prepared several contingency plans, mostly regarding possible Soviet invasions or aggression in the region. CONPLAN 1005 was a secret contingency plan for “United States Assistance to Pakistan in Countering a Soviet or Soviet-Supported Attack from Afghanistan.” USCENTCOM’s presence in the region and its cooperation with Pakistani military leaders reflected the growing cooperation between Pakistan and the United States in responding to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The United States was not only focused on the Soviet Union, however, but also Pakistan’s relationship with its other neighbors.

A secret memo from the CIA Directorate of Intelligence predicted the safety of United States weapons technology in Pakistan from being shared with China “unless major strains develop” in the United States-Pakistan relationship. Despite the close relationship between Pakistan and China, the CIA cite two reasons that they had reasonable faith that Pakistan would withhold military weapon technology from China. Not only did Pakistan sign the Security of Military Information Agreement with the United States but also the solution to the F-16 fighter-

jet and ALR-69 radar issue instilled a sense of trust in Islamabad.\textsuperscript{182} As predicted years before, the F-16 agreement had serious and lasting positive effects on the Pakistan-United States relationship. Yet, the CIA did acknowledge the potential risk that China could gain access to United States’ weapons if the United States pressured Pakistan over the nuclear issue or discontinued military sales to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{183} Tensions between India and Pakistan similarly constituted a concern for the United States.

The United States knew that Pakistan and India had nuclear programs that were not monitored to the extent that the United States wanted and the United States greatly suspected Pakistan of attempting to use its nuclear technology for weapons use. A Department of State briefing paper from 1984 placed an emphasis on “encouraging Islamabad and New Delhi to resume their normalization dialogue.”\textsuperscript{184} The United States was not only interested in quelling the tensions between Pakistan and India because of nuclear weapons but also because the disagreements led India to turn to the Soviet Union for military supplies to continue the arms race on the subcontinent.\textsuperscript{185} The continuous anxieties between Pakistan and India often interfered with the attention on Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Reagan and Zia devoted their attentions to rebuilding the Pakistan-United States relationship.

For Reagan, the fact that Zia “looks us in the eye and tells us he isn’t building a bomb” was sufficient to continue the presidential waivers to maintain aid and weapons transfers to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{186} Despite significant concerns that the Zia regime was losing favor and stability in Pakistan because of Zia’s imposition of martial law and his non-democratic rise to power, the United States continued to support Zia because of the depth of the Reagan-Zia relationship.

\textsuperscript{182} “Pakistan-China-US: Arms Technology Transfer,” (Crest).
\textsuperscript{183} “Pakistan-China-US: Arms Technology Transfer,” (Crest).
\textsuperscript{185} “South Asia and Afghanistan,” (Crest).
\textsuperscript{186} The Reagan Diaries, 262-63.
President Zia had also developed a strong relationship with the CIA. As Charles Cogan, CIA division chief for that area, wrote, “Without Zia, there would have been no Afghan war, and no Afghan victory.” Despite the many obstacles to a perfect relationship, such as internal tensions in Pakistan regarding Zia’s leadership, Indo-Pakistan tensions, and the nuclear issue, Richard P. Cronin, Specialist in Asian Affairs, qualified the United States-Pakistan relationship in a report to Congress as a “qualified foreign policy success.” The success of the Pakistan-United States relationship peaked, however, in 1986.

That year Congress approved a six-year program totaling 4.02 billion dollars in total aid to Pakistan. Of this, 1.74 billion dollars would be for foreign military sales (FMS), 340 million dollars beginning in 1986. In a meeting with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, Reagan stated that the amount of aid planned for the next six years displayed the “durability and continuity of the US commitment to strengthen Pakistan’s defense capabilities in the face of Soviet pressures from Afghanistan.” Reagan remembered the requirements stressed years earlier when Zia refused Carter’s 400 million dollar offer because Zia believed it lacked durability. The State Department issued a memorandum summarizing the joint statement on Prime Minister Junejo’s visit issued in Washington on 18 July 1986. The memo illustrated the diplomatic smoothness of the relationship at its height. The President praised the end of martial law in Pakistan and “lauded the return of representative democracy to Pakistan.”

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190 “SECDEF Visit to Pakistan,” DNSA.
192 “Joint Statement on Junejo Visit,” DNSA.
Prime Minister reassured Reagan that Pakistan’s nuclear program was not intended for creating an explosive device. This affirmation was important because Pakistan’s aid had been based on either presidential or congressional waivers since 1979. Reagan also acknowledged a commitment between India and Pakistan not to preemptively strike one another’s nuclear installations while further encouraging bilateral peace efforts between the two nations. The president made it clear that he supported peace initiatives and cooperation in Southwest Asia, especially the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The two leaders even discussed the growing narcotics trade in the region and how best to curtail its expansion. The Prime Minister’s meeting with President Reagan addressed all the major talking points and was conducted amicably.

Another reason that 1986 was the apex of the Pakistan-United States relationship was the marked success in turning the tide of war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration pursued a policy of providing Soviet weaponry to the mujahidin, especially Kalashnikovs and other non-American light weapons, to ensure a level of deniability to the international community and Pakistan in particular. Yet, by the mid-1980s, pressure in Congress, specifically from Texas Representative Charlie Wilson, influenced the Reagan administration to provide more sophisticated and effective weapons to the mujahidin. The most crucial of these was the newly-developed and exclusive Stinger surface-to-air missile (SAM) which was introduced to the mujahidin in 1986. These shoulder mounted missiles provided the mujahidin with an opportunity to counter the Soviet Hind gunships that had ruled the air and leveled Afghan cities virtually uncontested. Congress and the CIA provided the mujahidin with 250 launchers and 1,000 missiles (Costing approximately $200,000 each). The mujahidin’s

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193 “Joint Statement on Junejo Visit,” DNSA.
first success occurred on 25 September 1986, when three mujahidin used their Stingers to take down three Soviet gunships near the Jelalabad airfield. Until the Soviet withdrawal, the Stingers wreaked havoc on Soviet forces.

Using Stingers and other advanced weapons and defense systems required training. The CIA sent several plain clothes agents to assist. During the 1980s, over a million mujahidin were trained in joint Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI-Pakistan’s equivalent of the CIA) and CIA camps. The United States and Pakistan cooperated closely throughout the Afghan War. In the early 1980s, “Bill” Casey, the director of the CIA, and General Akhtar Abdul Rehman Khan, Director General of the ISI, established a close relationship and kept in direct communication. Money from the CIA went either to arms purchases from countries such as China, Egypt, Israel, Britain, or America, or directly to ISI offices in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and Quetta. The weapons were then distributed to one of the seven groups of mujahidin. The influx of arms and aid to Pakistan from the United States, and other nations, led Pakistan to become a safe-haven for the mujahidin, where they could train, resupply, and regroup themselves before continuing the fight in Afghanistan. In his article, “Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan since 1979,” Charles Cogan describes the Pakistan border as a “psychological Yalu River.” In roughly a decade, the United States supplied the mujahidin with 2.5 billion dollars in arms and equipment.

The degree of cooperation and commitment to the mujahidin during this decade is a measure of the success of the Pakistan-United States relationship. The turning point in the war

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197 Yousaf and Adkin, *Afghanistan-The Bear Trap*, 82.
198 Yousaf and Adkin, *Afghanistan-The Bear Trap*, 82.
199 Cogan, “Partners in Time,” 79.
against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan came in 1986, when the United States started providing
the mujahidin with weapons the United States rarely shared. Stingers were representative of the
climax of the cooperation and trust between Pakistan and the United States in the combined
efforts to expel the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Because the American government offered
Pakistan a six-year commitment of over four billion dollars in the same year, 1986 is the
pinnacle of the Pakistan-United States relationship.

In 1987, several obstacles threatened the United States-Pakistan relationship. The FMS
cOMPONENT of the six-year plan was temporarily delayed because of difficulties obtaining a
congressional waiver to the law preventing aid to countries pursuing unsupervised nuclear
programs. In the same year, a Pakistani national in Canada, Ashad Pervez, was arrested for
attempting to illegally export a type of steel used in nuclear applications. The United States
Congress was also aware of reports that Pakistan was enriching uranium “well above” the level
required for peaceful purposes. Nuclear suspicions complicated the relationship between the
United States and Pakistan as more evidence surfaced that could be used to halt all aid to
Pakistan, which in turn would jeopardize the American efforts to aid the mujahidin. Tensions
between Pakistan and India continued to worry United States policymakers when a bill was
introduced to Congress to provide Pakistan with an Airborne Early Warning (AEW) system. In a
House of Representatives Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, politicians weighed
the balance between exacerbating the arms race on the subcontinent, reassuring India that
advanced AEW systems were only intended for use against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and

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201 1987 United States Central Command History. Operational Archives of the U.S. Navy, Washington,
D.C.
87STATE323725, CIA Records Search Tool (Crest).
203 “GOJ Request for Status of U.S. Aid to Pakistan,” (Crest).
remaining a “reliable source of military aid” to Pakistan.\footnote{House Committee on Foreign Affairs, \textit{Provision of an Airborne Early Warning System for Pakistan}, 100\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 1987, 161.} While the Pakistan-United States relationship remained intact in 1987, and the cooperation between Pakistan and the United States in regard to the Afghan War continued, 1988 signaled the imminent collapse of the relationship.

The final accomplishment of the United States and Pakistan was the forced withdrawal of the Soviet Union outlined in the Geneva Accords. The Geneva Accords called for a return to normalized relations and “good-neighborliness” between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the United States emerged as the watchdog and enforcer of the Soviet timetable for withdrawal.\footnote{House Committee on Foreign Affairs, \textit{The Geneva Accords on Afghanistan}, 100\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 2\textsuperscript{nd} sess., 1988, 51.} The situation in Afghanistan was unresolved for the Afghans, and as the United States decreased aid to the \textit{mujahidin} who were now fighting amongst themselves for power, disagreements arose over the best way to deal with the lawlessness in Kabul. Congressman Charlie Wilson explicitly criticized the American “endgame.”\footnote{George Crile, \textit{Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of How the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of Our Times} (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 523.} Reagan wrote in his diary, “Senator Humphrey thinks we’re selling out the Afghans…he’s wrong…we aren’t deserting them.”\footnote{The Reagan Diaries, 594.} The rising power of the warlords in Afghanistan and the lasting effects of the destroyed infrastructure of the country undeniably had lasting effects, which will be discussed in the next chapter. While the situation in Afghanistan rapidly deteriorated, so did the relationship between the American and Pakistani heads of state.

When Zia cancelled his trip to Washington, D.C. to meet with Reagan it became apparent that the partnership was in rapid decline. A week later, when Zia declared that Islamic law would be the supreme law the land in Pakistan, Reagan wrote, “That puts them into the
In the same year, Zia, General Akhtar, the United States Ambassador to Pakistan, and a military attaché died in a mysterious plane crash. Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, former director of the Afghan Bureau of the ISI, claimed that the plane was sabotaged, most likely by Soviet Union’s covert affairs officers with the help of Pakistani military personnel. He stated that “The US shed some crocodile tears over Zia’s death, but the reality was they were not sorry to see him go.” He cited that the American belief that Zia was fundamentalist, anti-democratic, pro-nuclear, and a “liability” contributed to the lack of a thorough investigation of the plane crash. With Reagan leaving office and Zia dead, 1989 ushered in a new stage of the United States-Pakistan relationship, one that continued to decline and will be the topic of discussion in the next chapter.

The decade from 1979 to 1989 saw several dramatic shifts in the Pakistan-United States relationship. The relationship progressed from a low-point in early 1979 to mutually increased interest in each other in December 1979. The road to friendship was rocky during the Carter years, but the remarkable policy shift from “superdoves to superhawks” after the election of Reagan laid the foundation for a strong bilateral relationship. As A. Z. Hilali stated: “On the whole, Reagan was more successful than Carter in defending the Gulf and augmenting American capabilities to fight against the Soviet Union.

Pakistan became the third largest recipient of American aid and received a new arsenal of weapons such as F-16s, naval destroyers, Cobra Combat helicopters, Stingers, Harpoon missiles, and M1A1 Abrams tanks. Pakistan’s technological capabilities drastically increased from the

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208 The Reagan Diaries, 619.  
209 Yousaf and Adkin, Afghanistan-The Bear Trap, 234.  
210 Yousaf and Adkin, Afghanistan-The Bear Trap, 234.  
211 Yousaf and Adkin, Afghanistan-The Bear Trap, 234.  
212 Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship, 159.  
acquisition of E-2C-Hawkeye AEW, radar defense systems, and reconnaissance aircraft.\textsuperscript{215} The relationship projected the greatest strength in the region around 1986, when the Afghan rebels started to bring down Soviet helicopters that had previously ruled the skies of Afghanistan. Yet, old problems continued to plague the relationship, specifically the nuclear issue, America’s fear of alienating India, and the lack of democracy and rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan.

In a speech on 7 December 1982, President Reagan told Zia that, although “Differences may come between our nations…they proved to be transitory.”\textsuperscript{216} To some extent this symbolizes the Pakistan-United States relationship throughout time. Yet, the disagreements were not really transitory; they were always there. But sometimes, in times of mutual goals or threats, for example the Afghan War, the differences were overlooked. Eventually, however, the mutual goals between the two nations proved transitory. When the Russians announced their withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States no longer saw Pakistan as a “frontline” state that they could befriend in the effort to curtail communism. The United States no longer needed Pakistan. And the same can be said for Pakistan. The Pakistani army underwent modernization and increased power and wealth from the United States during the 1980s. In the 1990s, the two countries’ relationship was severely hindered by the “transitory” issues that had always hampered a lasting friendship. It was not until 11 September 2001 that mutual goals in the region turned to a rekindling of the partnership in a combined effort on the Global War on Terror.

\textsuperscript{215} Hilali, \textit{US Pakistan Relationship}, 195.
\textsuperscript{216} “504 President Reagan’s speech at the banquet given in honor of President Zia, 7 December 1982 (Extracts),” \textit{America-Pakistan Relations}, vol. 2, 482.
Chapter 3: The Pakistan-United States Relationship from the End of the First Afghan Crisis to the Beginning of the Second Afghan Crisis

The Post-Afghan Crisis Relationship

In 1988, Afghanistan remained largely lawless and under the control of militant factions of former mujahidin. These groups, led by warlords, vied for control by violent means. Pakistan faced an unresolved situation in Afghanistan, which caused many refugees to remain in Pakistan and created general instability in the region. The crumbling of the Soviet Union and other dramatic worldwide events, such as Tiananmen Square and the Palestinian Intifada, distracted the superpowers and other leading nations from focusing on the consequences of the Afghan crisis on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Satisfied with the apparently “amicable” Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington and Moscow maintained a “strategic disinterest” in both Afghanistan and its Pakistani neighbor.

Pakistan and the United States continued to monitor the events unfolding in Afghanistan, but the United States failed to take an active role in establishing a stable and legitimate government. In a report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) stated that the United States’ interests in Afghanistan were “preeminently humanitarian.” He explained: “Having supported the Afghan people for ten years it would be wrong for us to abandon them now.” Yet, both Afghans and Pakistanis felt abandoned by the United States. The perceived American betrayal of Afghanistan in the late 1980s “was only to add fuel to the fire of Anti-Americanism in Pakistan.” “Now that you no longer need us against the Russians in Afghanistan, we have been discarded like a used Kleenex,” was a

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218 Stalemate in Afghanistan Democracy in Pakistan, 5.
219 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (Armonk, NY: East Gate Book, 2005), 238.
frequent expression of Pakistani resentment during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{220} Many refugees remained in Pakistan, poverty was endemic, and soldiers returned to a harsh reality. Even after the Soviet withdrawal, former fighters remained unsettled and many were unable to integrate into society as productive and peaceful citizens. Described as “Kalashnikov Culture,” the widespread use of weapons and violence became the dominant source of power in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The emergence of this culture in Pakistan is exemplified by the fact that, at one point, one could rent an AK-47 (Kalashnikov) for less than two dollars an hour.\textsuperscript{221} Money from Saudi Arabia poured into Pakistan, and former Afghan and Arab mujahidin attended madrasas that taught Saudi Arabia’s strict form of Wahhabi Islam.\textsuperscript{222} This trend continued to attract anti-Western youth; and by 2003, an estimated 859 madrasas were teaching approximately 200,000 young men in Karachi alone.\textsuperscript{223} On a visit to the United States in 1989, Benazir Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, warned President George H. W. Bush: “I fear we have created a Frankenstei

\textsuperscript{n’s monster that will come back to haunt us.”\textsuperscript{224} By 1991, Moscow and Washington had ceased sending aid to Afghan militants.\textsuperscript{225} The Pakistan-United States relationship that had reached its apex during the Afghan crisis began to fracture along the same lines as before 1979.

Problems that had strained the relations between Pakistan and the United States prior to the Afghan crisis re-emerged in force by 1990. Although these troubles were present during the

\textsuperscript{220} Dennis Kux, \textit{Pakistan: Flawed Not Failed State} (New York; Foreign Policy Association, 2001), 70.
\textsuperscript{221} Abbas, \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}, 11.
\textsuperscript{222} Abbas, \textit{Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism}, 11.
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, they were not “killer issues.” The security threat shared by Pakistan and the United States allowed President Reagan and President Zia to overlook disagreements about the lack of democratically elected leadership in Pakistan and Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation. The United States was able to export massive amounts of financial and military aid despite concerns about nuclear weapons research in Pakistan. From 1979-1988, the United States was not lured into any major Indo-Pakistan conflict, which had historically and repetitively been a hindrance to a productive and trusting relationship between Pakistan and the United States. But, in the final decade of the millennium, three issues – democracy, nuclear proliferation, and the India factor – combined with the rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan and Afghanistan to define the dimensions of the Pakistan-United States relationship.

It is important to look at each of these factors individually. This will create a focused examination of the dominating influences in the relationship. The first three factors exemplify the cyclical, if not redundant, nature of Pakistan-United States relations. The final factor, the rise of fundamentalism, the Taliban, and terrorism, can be traced to the Afghan conflict in which the actions of Pakistan, and the United States in particular, led to what Bhutto predicted would return to haunt them.

The Impact of Pakistan’s Nuclear Program: The Pressler Amendment

American aid to Pakistan has historically been attached to prerequisites. For example, aid to Pakistan was suspended after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and the embargo was only completely dissolved during the Afghan crisis. In the post-Cold War world, the United States adopted a policy of refusing to aid countries with unauthorized possession of nuclear devices.

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This posed several problems. The United States had to attempt fairness in dealing with both Pakistan and India’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. If the United States ended its aid program with Pakistan, it would lose influence in Islamabad. Aid was meant to be an incentive, but Pakistan’s armed forces had undergone dramatic modernization and gained strength during the Afghan crisis and were not in desperate need of military equipment to the extent that they had been in 1979. Pakistani officials were more preoccupied with acquiring nuclear technology to counter their rival neighbor, India, even at the cost of losing aid programs from the United States. The United States was rapidly losing influence in Islamabad and American policy toward Pakistan was an unbalanced and ineffective mixture of providing aid as incentive or ending aid as punishment.

In 1989, Howard Schaffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, testified before the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs that it would be “counterproductive” to stop assistance to Pakistan based on nonproliferation initiatives because the American security commitment and military and economic aid were the “most significant means to attain any degree of influence” on Pakistan’s nuclear program. He stated that Pakistan was aware that acquiring a nuclear device would constitute the imposition of federal laws terminating aid, but nuclear capabilities development continued in Pakistan. “Post Cold War nonproliferation warriors” focused on Pakistan because it was more “visible” than the more clandestine nuclear programs of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. There had been positive global nonproliferation efforts, such as success in South Africa when the country announced that it would halt its nuclear program and when Brazil and

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Argentina signed a nonproliferation agreement in 1990. Despite assurances from Pakistan’s leading nuclear scientist, A. Q. Khan, that Pakistan’s nuclear program was only for “peaceful purposes,” the United States Congress enacted the Pressler amendment in 1990.

In October 1990, President Bush was unable to guarantee Congress that Pakistan did not have a nuclear explosive device. Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, the Pressler amendment, required all arms sales and even Pakistan’s prior purchases of military equipment to end. A significant consequence of the Pressler amendment was the withholding of seventy-one F-16 aircraft that Pakistan had ordered in 1989, twenty-eight of which had already been purchased. The United States required Pakistan to pay storage fees for the F-16s, which President Bill Clinton described as a “diplomatic insult.” During a 1995 visit to the United States, Bhutto asked Clinton to either refund the money or deliver the planes. Clinton replied that he would “ask Congress to show some flexibility,” which he did in 1994 by appealing to Congress for a one-time exception to the Pressler amendment to release the twenty-eight F-16s. Clinton urged Congress to give Pakistan the F-16s. In exchange, Pakistan would cap its fissile production. Yet, the issue remained unresolved and Pakistan threatened to resort to

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238 “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 7 December 1994, CRS, ProQuest Congressional.
\footnote{Redacted, \textit{Pakistan: Tough Choices on Afghanistan,} 16 June 2011. General CIA NESA 82-10366, CIA Records Search Tool (Crest).}

The F-16 dispute constituted a major irritant to the Pakistan-United States relationship, much as it had during the early years of the Afghan crisis. The repeated struggle to finalize major arms sales is reminiscent of the historically fragile military sales relationship between Pakistan and the United States. Described by the CIA in 1982, that F-16 deal was the “yardstick” by which Pakistan measured its trust and friendship with the United States.\footnote{A. Z. Hilali, \textit{US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan} (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005), 235.}

The emergence of such a similar disagreement less than ten years later illustrated Congress’s power over decisions to sell arms to Pakistan and the negative effect it could have on relations between the two nations. It is also important to note that Clinton actively sought an agreeable solution to the problem, which countered the traditional perception in Pakistan that Democrats were “anti-Pakistan and pro-India.”\footnote{``Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 28 May 1998, CRS, ProQuest Congressional.}

Clinton was also able to sign into law a one-time exception to the Pressler amendment in 1996, which allowed the United States to deliver over 300 million dollars worth of military hardware Pakistan had ordered prior to 1990.\footnote{``Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 28 May 1998, CRS, ProQuest Congressional.}

Despite the imposition of the Pressler amendment in 1990 and, in effect, the failed F-16 sale, Pakistan and the United States continued to engage in military cooperation. During a visit to Islamabad in 1995, Secretary of Defense William Perry re-established the US-Pakistan Consultative Group.\footnote{``Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 28 May 1998, CRS, ProQuest Congressional.} This group had been inactive since the 1990 aid cutoff; but after Perry’s visit, the group oversaw “defense cooperation planning, peacekeeping operations, regional
security issues, and [the] exchange of intelligence.” Although the American and Pakistani militaries remained cooperative, America’s policy of suspending aid to Pakistan in 1990 to deter its pursuit of nuclear weapons proved a complete failure.

India conducted nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. Pakistan promptly responded to on 28 May with its own explosions. Nuclear anxieties on the subcontinent immediately elevated. CIA Director James Woolsey testified to Congress that the arms race between Pakistan and India posed “perhaps the most probable prospect for future use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons,” a statement which supported concerns that a nuclear war on the subcontinent was not only possible, but likely. In a 1999 hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Samuel Brownback (R-KS) questioned the efficacy of American policy toward Pakistan.

The problems we are experiencing today precede Pakistan’s nuclear detonation. They precede Nawaz Sharif’s current government and his previous one as well. They are, I believe, in large part the result of an inconsistent and I believe a failed policy toward what was once one of our best friends in South Asia. You will, I am sure, be pleased to hear that I am persuaded that both the administration and the Congress share the blame: Congress for sanctioning Pakistan and curtailing our ability to influence Islamabad; the administration for, I believe pursuing a one-issue policy since the nuclear test a year and a half ago. Do not mistake what I am saying. The U.S. rightly strived to have influence in an important part of the world. One of the ways we can do that is by not falling into the trap of zero sum politics on the South Asian subcontinent. What is good for India is not bad for Pakistan and what is bad for Pakistan is not good for India. Each nation in its own right deserves a separate foreign policy. However – and this is a vital caveat – when the U.S. treats the same problem in India and Pakistan differently, we create problems for ourselves. Neither nation should be in the nuclear business. Neither nation should have detonated a nuclear device. And when they did, each deserved the sanctions imposed on them by the President. Looking back, however, I believe we made a mistake in threatening and then sanctioning only Pakistan for its development of a nuclear weapon. While I understand some of the motivations behind the Pressler amendment, I am persuaded that ultimately it had the effect of driving Pakistan to a greater reliance on a nuclear deterrent. It also had the effect of lessening our influence over the Pakistani military which, whether we like it or not, is where the real power resides, in Pakistan…

244 “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 28 May 1998, CRS, ProQuest Congressional.
The United States has pressured Pakistan not to do any further missile testing, and this is an excellent policy. But was it imperative to beat the Sharif government into this submission on this matter in light of India’s continued testing?\textsuperscript{247}

Brownback’s testimony reflected the controversial nature of providing aid to Pakistan based on pre-conditions and expectations. Throughout the years of the Pakistan-United States relationship, American policymakers implemented a conditional and thus unsteady aid policy. Some believed that aid was a type of bargaining chip that could be used as either an incentive or a punishment. This is a reactive policy that failed to produce the desired results. Others, such as Senator Brownback, Howard Schaffer, and (earlier) President Ronald Reagan, thought that, without an aid program to Pakistan, the United States had minimal influence on Pakistan’s policies. In the past, the United States ended aid programs to Pakistan during its disputes with India and over its nuclear program. Yet, this neither prevented additional Indo-Pakistan conflicts nor deterred Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions. Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto had warned the United States in 1974 that, if it could acquire sufficient conventional weapons from the United States, it would not need a nuclear weapon to deter India. But his requests were denied and Pakistan developed nuclear weapons capability. Using aid as a tool to shape Pakistan’s policy could have been more successful if the United States made firm and unbreakable commitments to Pakistan.

It is impossible to definitively say that, if the United States had provided Pakistan with conventional arms in the 1970s, Pakistan would never have developed a nuclear weapon. It is also difficult to predict the effect importing military equipment to Pakistan would have had on the India-United States relationship. American policymakers found themselves trapped in a situation where Pakistan was displeased with American aid to India and vice versa. If the United States had always tilted toward Pakistan, and provided aid on a continuous basis, it appeared

\textsuperscript{247} Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, \textit{Crisis in Pakistan}, 106\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1\textsuperscript{st} sess., 1999, 1-2.
likely that the Pakistan-United States relationship would have been more stable and amicable. But aid from the United States was inconsistent and was always measured against the potential impact it would have on the American relationship with India. From the prospective of using aid to buy influence and cooperation, the United States failed to gain a staunch and unwavering ally from either country by attempting to be conditional friends with both. Therefore, the policy of using aid as a “club” was ultimately unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{248} In the future, policymakers should take this into account and appeal to Pakistan’s historic desire for what President Zia called an arms sales relationship based on “durability and credibility.”\textsuperscript{249} At times, Pakistani leaders felt they were unable to trust America, not only as a steady military sales partner, but also in regard to the India situation. In Brownback’s statement to the Senate committee, he explained that the “The Pressler amendment is not the only culprit in the ‘who lost Pakistan’ debate.”\textsuperscript{250} He was specifically referencing American policy toward Pakistan and India regarding the numerous Kashmir crises.\textsuperscript{251}

Kashmir, Kargil, and Terrorism

The incessant conflicts between Pakistan and India regarding Kashmir reignited shortly after the first Afghan crisis and posed a grave threat to regional security. In April 1990, the military situation in Kashmir appeared to signal the onset of a third Indo-Pakistan war. India positioned approximately 200,000 troops across from 100,000 Pakistani soldiers, separated by the line of control (LOC) in Kashmir.\textsuperscript{252} The Indian and Pakistani troops were engaged in an

\textsuperscript{250} \textit{Crisis in Pakistan}, 2.
\textsuperscript{251} \textit{Crisis in Pakistan}, 2.
“eyeball-to-eyeball” staring contest; at times the two armies were only separated by 200 meters and the LOC. 253 American policymakers did not want war to erupt in South Asia because of speculation that India and Pakistan were “nuclear-weapon capable.” 254 The American policy regarding Kashmir had always been that the dispute should be resolved by rapprochement and diplomacy, not war, so the White House announced that Robert Gates, the Deputy National Security Advisor, would lead a special delegation to Pakistan and India. 255 From 19-21 May, the envoy attempted to “help both sides avoid a conflict over Kashmir” by opening “political dialogue” and reducing the tension between Pakistan and India. 256

In Islamabad, Gates explained to President Ghulum Ishaq Khan and Army Chief General Aslam Beg, that after war-gaming every scenario, Washington determined that “Pakistan was the loser in every scenario” of a war with India. 257 Gates made it clear that in the event of a Pakistani initiative across the LOC, the United States would end all military support and assistance to Pakistan. 258 Gates also insisted that Pakistan “refrain from supporting terrorism in Indian-occupied Kashmir,” and adopt confidence-building measures with India so the current crisis would not escalate and future crises could be averted. 259 Politicians in India received a “similar message,” but emphasized that Pakistan’s support for terrorism in the disputed territory was “the root cause of the turmoil in Kashmir,” and relations between Pakistan and India “could only be normalized after it stopped these activities.” 260 Gates informed Indian officials that Pakistan agreed to close camps used to train Kashmiri militants, yet Pakistan’s alleged support

254 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia, 118.
257 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia, 103.
258 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia, 103.
259 Chari, Cheema, and Cohen, Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia, 103.
for terrorism in Kashmir would remain an irritant to Pakistan’s relations with not only India, but the United States, in the following years.\(^{261}\)

In June, within two weeks of the Gates mission, Indian troops began to withdraw, followed by the Pakistani forces.\(^{262}\) Some analysts believe that the end of the crisis had more to do with the “searing summer heat . . . than any India magnanimity” brought on by the Gates mission, while Gates himself thought that his envoy helped avert a conflict by offering a “face-saving device to stand down.”\(^{263}\) Despite the differing opinions on the effect of the Gates mission to India and Pakistan, the 1990 crisis was the first test of American policy in regard to Indo-Pakistan rivalry after the Afghan crisis. As in previous conflicts, such as the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars, the United States attempted a mostly neutral policy and was unable to affect any sort of long-term solution to the Kashmir problem. Although the crisis was averted, the reoccurring conflicts in Kashmir remained unsettled and the United States failed to convince the leadership in Pakistan to end support for militants in Kashmir.

On 9 January 1993, the State Department alerted Pakistan that it was under consideration for inclusion on its list of terrorist states due to allegations of state-sponsored support for terrorist activities in the Indian states of Kashmir and Punjab.\(^{264}\) Although Pakistan was removed from the informal watch list in July 1993 for implementing “a policy of ending official support for terrorists in India,” a State Department Publication released in April 1995 reported that “there were credible reports in 1994; however, of official Pakistani support for Kashmiri militants, specifically from Pakistan.”\(^{265}\) Government officials denied giving any other type of assistance

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\(^{264}\) “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 28 May 1998, CRS, ProQuest Congressional.

than “moral, political, and diplomatic support” to the Kashmiri militants. The problem of armed militants in Kashmir persisted throughout the 1990s and led Pakistan and India to another crisis near the end of the decade.

In 1999, Muslim militants backed by Pakistan’s army infiltrated and crossed the LOC into the Kargil region of Indian Kashmir, engaging Indian forces in guerilla warfare and elevating tensions between Pakistan, India, and the United States. On 4 July 1999, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, met with President Clinton, to discuss a Pakistani withdrawal. Clinton reportedly told Sharif that, if Pakistan withdrew its troops from Kashmir, “the United States would express relief without praise,” but if Pakistan did not withdraw “the United States would be forced to shift its historic alliance with Pakistan publicly toward India.” The president claimed that Sharif’s delegation attempted to employ “trick language to suggest that Clinton somehow blessed a Pakistani withdrawal . . . or that Pakistan itself did not need to withdraw, because the fighters in Kashmir were really mujahidin fighters disguised as soldiers.” After intense conversation and diplomatic reasoning, Sharif agreed to withdraw, but predicted that he would pay a heavy domestic price for the concession.

Again, the American role in resolving the conflict was important because yet another full-scale war was prevented through negotiation, but it was only a repetition of the traditionally reactionary policy of the United States. Although the United States had historically advocated bilateral negotiations between Pakistan and India, have been unable to resolve their differences and come to an agreement on the Kashmir problem. Thus, the United States has followed a path


266 “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994,” DNSA.
of “crisis management” in regard to the frequent crises between Pakistan and India. The Pakistan-India relationship has hinged on the Kashmir problem, and the conflicts of the 1990s stemmed largely from the association of the Pakistani government with guerillas who were facilitating the perpetual instability and violence in the region. Not only were American policymakers aware of the possibility of fundamentalist activity on Pakistan’s eastern border, which they feared could lead to a nuclear war between Pakistan and India, they also had to address the rising fundamentalism on Pakistan’s western border.

Thousands of former mujahidin remained in Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, occupying Peshawar and the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan (NWFP). Analysts suspected that many of the religious schools in the NWFP were actually “fronts for terrorist training activities.” Throughout the 1990s, Pakistan suffered from an increase in violent acts of terrorism. Pakistan acknowledged the “problems posed by Afghan mujahedin [sic] and sympathetic Arabs” in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 1994, Pakistan declined to extend the visas of many of the Arab mujahidin who had remained in Pakistan after the conflict, and embarked upon a policy of countering the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism in Pakistan. The government of Pakistan shut down several nongovernmental organizations that were suspected of being “cover agencies for Islamic militants from the Middle East.” Pakistan cooperated with the United States in the effort to curb terrorism and instability in Pakistan.

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275 “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994,” DNSA.
276 “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994,” DNSA.
277 “Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1994,” DNSA.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assisted Pakistani investigators after the murder of two Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees in Pakistan in 1993. After the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, Pakistani and American officials worked together to capture Ramzi Yousef in Islamabad in 1995 and extradite him to the United States. The growing presence of anti-Western and extremist elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan worried American policymakers. As American policymakers and analysts became increasingly alarmed by the development of radical Islamic individuals and groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, some began to associate the problem with American efforts in Pakistan in the 1980s to counter the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

The assertion that the CIA’s actions during the Afghan crisis, specifically the channeling of weapons through Pakistan into Afghanistan and sparking an anti-Western jihad, is a contentious issue. Peter Bergen, a journalist who has interviewed Osama bin Laden, dismissed the idea that the CIA was to blame for the rise of bin Laden because he can find no evidence to indicate that the CIA ever gave money to the Arab mujahidin or that members of the CIA had ever met with bin Laden or any of his associates. Members of bin Laden’s inner circle, such as Ayman al Zawahiri, attest that the United States never aided the Arab mujahidin. According to Bergen, “The notion that bin Laden is a CIA creation, and that the 9/11 attacks were some form of ‘blowback’ from the CIA operation during the Afghan jihad is a boilerplate analysis among leftists and conspiracy theorists around the world.” Michael Moore, a filmmaker who subscribes to the idea that the CIA was responsible for launching bin Laden’s

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281 Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, 61.
282 Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, 61.
rise to terrorism, is an example of a prominent advocate of the ‘blowback’ theory. On 12 September 2001, Moore posted on his website: “WE created the monster known as Osama bin Laden! Where did he go to terrorist school? At the CIA!” Bergen argues that the CIA was unaware of bin Laden’s significance until “the bin Laden unit was set up within the CIA in January 1996.” The United States policy did not fail because it created “terrorist schools” for people like bin Laden, it failed in the sense that shortly after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, warlords and fundamentalists were able to gain control and foster extremism and violence which then crossed over the border into Pakistan.

In Pakistan’s case, militant, Islamic fundamentalism was no longer contained to the traditional, regional violence between Pakistan and India, but was rapidly expanding to include a global mission of anti-Western, and specifically anti-American, terrorism. Terrorism in Kashmir, whether sponsored by the government of Pakistan or not, has been a consistent and persistent factor in Pakistan-Indian relations for decades. Neither the United States, Pakistan, nor India has been able to solve this problem. This should sound a warning bell for American policymakers concerned about terrorism on Pakistan’s western border and in Afghanistan. The anti-Western extremism could prove as persistent as the decades-long militarism in Kashmir. The border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan is likely to mirror the unstable and violent border region between Pakistan and India.

Supporting Democracy: American Pressure on Pakistan

The oscillation between democratic leadership and military leadership in Pakistan characterizes Pakistan’s political history. United States policymakers have historically

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advocated for democratic leadership in Pakistan, which constituted another precondition for Pakistan to receive aid from the United States. For example, the United States Congress objected to the sale of F-16s in 1981 based on human rights issues and the state of martial law in Pakistan.  

After the Afghan crisis and Zia’s death, Benazir Bhutto, daughter of former Prime Minister Zulfikar Bhutto, was democratically elected as prime minister in 1988, thus breaking the trend of dictatorship in Pakistan. In 1990, President Ishaq Khan dismissed the Bhutto government, alleging corruption and failing to sustain law and order in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif was elected in 1990, but dismissed in 1993. The cycle repeated throughout the 1990s, with Bhutto regaining power after Sharif, only to be dismissed and subsequently replaced by Sharif again in 1997. The “chronic political instability,” combined with widespread corruption in the highest levels of the Pakistani Government, added stress to the Pakistan-United States relationship. Democracy during the 1990s ended after Nawaz Sharif lost control of Pakistan’s government.

On 12 October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf displaced Sharif after a military coup. Two days later, the United States Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing, entitled “Crisis in Pakistan,” to address the “disappoint[ing]” event and its ramifications on aid to Pakistan. The committee met to discuss the possible consequences of the military takeover, specifically imposing Section 508 of the 1999 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, which

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287 “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 31 December 2001, DNSA.
288 “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 31 December 2001, DNSA.
289 “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 31 December 2001, DNSA.
290 “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” 31 December 2001, DNSA.
292 *Crisis in Pakistan*, 1.
called for the cessation of aid programs to countries under military rule. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth, testified:

Pakistan is important. It is important because it can serve as an example of a progressive Islamic democracy . . . It is the history that is repeating itself that gives anyone dealing with Pakistan, as we do in the South Asian Bureau, cause to look at that history and say, are we seeing signs of its repeating itself? Again, there has been no democratically elected leader to fulfill his or her term in office, and the army has been in control in Pakistan for 25 of Pakistan’s 52-year history.

Senator Brownback (R-KS) pointed out that the United States had limited options for responding to the “extra-constitutional event.” He asked the committee: “What are we going to do? Are we going to cutoff aid? Did that. Give them the cold shoulder? Did that too.” Brownback suggested that the United States try to re-engage members of the Pakistani military by training them in the United States because the military maintained such a significant influence on Pakistan’s politics, exemplified by the case of General Musharraf’s accession to power.

The Pressler amendment caused the number of Pakistani military leaders trained in the United States to decrease from 50 percent to 10 percent, and as a result, American military leaders and politicians were unable to develop lasting and positive relationships with potentially powerful members of Pakistan’s military. Not only had the United States “lost touch with a generation of Pakistani military leaders,” but also the military institution was becoming increasingly Islamist. As previously mentioned, the American policy of using aid to persuade Pakistan to yield to American expectations failed in regard to nuclear proliferation. By ending aid to

293 Crisis in Pakistan, 2.
294 Crisis in Pakistan, 2.
295 Crisis in Pakistan, 2.
296 Crisis in Pakistan, 12.
297 Crisis in Pakistan, 12.
298 Crisis in Pakistan, 13.
Pakistan in 1990, the United States had nothing left with which to bargain on the collapse of democracy in 1999.

President Clinton publicly responded to the military coup. During a visit to South Asia in 2000, although the trip “focused primarily on broadening and deepening ties with India,” Clinton also visited Pakistan. Clinton announced that his stopover in Pakistan did not represent his approval or endorsement of the political situation in Pakistan. The politicians addressed various issues, most notably the administration attempted to urge Musharraf to conduct elections and return Pakistan to democracy. In an interview with Taylor Branch, Clinton reportedly said: “You’ll notice that Musharraf is saying a lot of nice things about wanting to restore democracy,” the president “sighed,” adding “but he never includes any target dates, partners, or interim steps.” Musharraf failed to hold any elections prior to 11 September 2001, yet, soon after the terrorist attacks, the United States resumed aid to Pakistan. Democracy was no longer a primary issue in the Pakistan-United States relationship. Just as Reagan overlooked martial law in Pakistan during the first Afghan crisis, President George W. Bush responded in a similar manner. Sanctions were lifted completely by September 22, 2001 because Bush found “denying export licenses and assistance not to be in the national security interests of the United States.” Whether or not the United States ever had a substantial impact on bolstering democracy in Pakistan, a larger question loomed: Was the Islamic Republic of Pakistan inherently opposed to Western-style democracy?


300 “President Clinton’s South Asia Trip,” 31 March 2000, CRS, ProQuest Congressional.

301 “President Clinton’s South Asia Trip,” 31 March 2000, CRS, ProQuest Congressional.

302 Branch, The Clinton Tapes, 570.

The compatibility, or incompatibility, of Islam with democracy has been a topic of interest for decades. But the subject came under increased scrutiny after the Cold War ended. In Francis Fukuyama’s *End of History and the Last Man*, Fukuyama identified the growing consensus of the legitimacy of liberal democracy and its superiority over other forms of government such as dictatorships, monarchy, and communism.\(^{304}\) He explained that: “Islam has indeed defeated liberal democracy in many parts of the Islamic world, posing a grave threat to liberal practice even in countries where it has not achieved political power.”\(^{305}\) The general trend of autocratic leadership in the Middle East combined with Islamization and other human rights practices in Pakistan during Zia’s leadership did not go unnoticed by American policymakers. Analyst and political science professor, Hasan-Askari Rizvi, and Benazir Bhutto, argued that the Islamization in Pakistan was an impediment to strong democratic institutions.

Some of the results of Zia’s Islamization program represented a shift in government policies and laws that did not promote improved human rights conditions and gender equality. Some of the effects of Islamization included: the reconstitution of the Council of Islamic Ideology to increase the number of orthodox and conservative advisors to the government, the intensification of Islamic principles studied at male schools and universities; increased censorship, a stricter dress code for women, and punishments that in the West would be considered cruel and unusual.\(^{306}\) For example, certain crimes were punishable by lashing or amputation, and adulterers could be stoned to death.\(^{307}\) Women’s rights were restricted; women were required to have two witnesses to a crime whereas men only needed one witness.\(^{308}\) Also,


\(^{305}\) Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 45. 


\(^{308}\) Rivzi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan*, 171.
when obtaining compensation for bodily injury, a woman was only entitled to half of what a man would receive for the same crime.\textsuperscript{309} These practices contradicted Bhutto’s idea of a free and equal society. She believed that “gender equality is a prerequisite for democracy to thrive.”\textsuperscript{310}

As Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto advocated for women’s rights by creating a Ministry of Women’s Development, establishing women’s studies programs in universities, appointing women to her Cabinet, and initiating a Women’s Development Bank to offer credit to “enterprising women.”\textsuperscript{311} Although, Bhutto believed that Pakistan’s internal political situation and the wavering trend of Islamization needed to be addressed, she explained that the West needed to re-examine its “caricature” of Islam.\textsuperscript{312}

Bhutto followed the idea that \textit{jihad} was an “internal and external struggle to follow the just and right path.”\textsuperscript{313} This contradicts the philosophy of Dr. Abdullah Azzam, a fundamentalist Muslim who produced a document entitled: “Defense of the Muslim Land: The First Obligation after Imam.”\textsuperscript{314} According to his teachings, if Muslims are not under attack from on outside force, “the fighting becomes \textit{fard kafiya} [initially compulsory, but voluntary upon fulfillment of specific condition] with the minimum requirement of appointing believers to guard borders, and the sending of an army at least once a year to terrorize the enemies of Islam.”\textsuperscript{315} The actual meaning of \textit{jihad} is a term open to a variety of interpretations. Bhutto did not advocate yearly raiding parties, but some Muslims maintain a stricter interpretation of the Quran. Bhutto conceded:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{309} Rivzi, \textit{Military, State and Society in Pakistan},
\item \textsuperscript{310} Bhutto, \textit{Reconciliation}, 288.
\item \textsuperscript{311} Bhutto, \textit{Reconciliation}, 200.
\item \textsuperscript{312} Bhutto, \textit{Reconciliation}, 18.
\item \textsuperscript{313} Bhutto, \textit{Reconciliation}, 22.
\item \textsuperscript{315} Azzam, “Defense of the Muslim Lands.”
\end{itemize}
If jihad is indeed about offensive war against other religions and Muslim sects, then surely Muslims will have trouble living in a democratic world, let alone forming their own functioning, pluralistic democracies. If this is the case, then my thesis – that democracy and Islam are not only compatible but mutually sustaining – will fail.\textsuperscript{316}

Bhutto’s portrayal of Islam and democracy as compatible was based on her interpretation of the Quran which “empowers the people with rights (democracy) demanding consultation between rulers and ruled (parliament) and requiring the leaders serve the interests of the people or be replaced by them (accountability).”\textsuperscript{317} Bhutto argued that for democracy to flourish in Islamic countries, the West needs to be actively engaged in supporting democratic movements. One way to do this is to acknowledge “the residual damage of colonialism and its support for dictatorships during the Cold War.”\textsuperscript{318} According to Bhutto, the interests of the West focused primarily on securing access to oil or containing communism.\textsuperscript{319}

A prime example of the United States cooperating with a non-democratically elected leader was during the Afghan crisis when Reagan and Zia formed a strong partnership. She adds that the alleged disparity between Islam and democracy is “used to divert attention from the sad history of Western political intervention in the Muslim world.”\textsuperscript{320} Another manifestation of this type of American policy was, until recently, the American support for Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. Egypt was the second largest recipient of aid from the United States, and the Egyptian and American armies cooperated during the Persian Gulf War. Nevertheless, in nearly thirty years in power, Mubarak failed to hold fair elections. There is now a general concern in the United States that the new leading factions of the government, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, will make the Egypt-United States relationship more fragile if Egypt follows a path of

\textsuperscript{316} Bhutto, Reconciliation, 22.
\textsuperscript{317} Bhutto, Reconciliation, 79.
\textsuperscript{318} Bhutto, Reconciliation, 81.
\textsuperscript{319} Bhutto, Reconciliation, 84.
\textsuperscript{320} Bhutto, Reconciliation, 81-2.
extremism, which could lead to instability in the region. This supports the theory that American leaders prefer to develop relationships with stable leaders and groups that are not explicitly anti-Western. American leaders propping up dictators in Pakistan is also shown in the case of Musharraf.

President Bush stated that the “Musharraf coup is going to bring stability to the region and I think that good news for the subcontinent.” Bush’s statement is actually ironic because Musharraf played an active role in the Kargil conflict and used Sharif’s withdrawal from the disputed territory as grounds for overthrowing him. Yet, it was easier for America to work with a moderate and powerful head of state with ties to the military than a weak civilian government or a radically Islamist leader, as is the case in the current Iran-United States relationship. This is especially the case after 11 September 2001.

Bhutto asserted that the United States “makes human rights the centerpiece of its foreign policy selectively.” She called attention to a section of Bush’s second inaugural address:

We will encourage reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations will require the decent treatment of their own people. America’s belief in human dignity will guide our policies, yet rights must be more than the grudging concessions of dictators; they are secured by free dissent and the participation of the governed. In the long run, there is no justice without freedom, and there can be no human rights without human liberty.

Although this served as a warning, it was benign in the case of Pakistan. Bush’s stand against rulers like Musharraf contradicted the reality of the deep partnership between Pakistan and the United States during the second Afghan crisis. It was also reminiscent of the Reagan-Zia partnership during the first Afghan crisis. The American attitude toward autocratic rulers in Pakistan during times of crisis and when the United States needed Pakistan as a strategic ally in

322 Bhutto, *Reconciliation*, 83.
323 Bhutto, *Reconciliation*, 83.
the region represents a contrasting image to the American policy of condemnation and aid cut-offs to Pakistan when the United States is not drawn into an Afghan crisis. This is a pattern in the Pakistan-United States relationship.

11 September 2001: The Second Afghan Crisis

Prior to 11 September 2001, Pakistan was “the most public defender of the Taliban,” the militant group that had gained control of Afghanistan during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{324} Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, were the only three countries to recognize the Taliban as the official and legitimate government of Pakistan.\textsuperscript{325} Throughout Pakistan’s history, leaders in the country had always desired a strong central Afghan government with which they could form a friendly relationship and thus give them strategic-depth against India. Musharraf explained that Pakistan had supported the Taliban for “geostrategic reasons . . . if we had broken with them, that would have created a new enemy on our western border, or a vacuum of power.”\textsuperscript{326} Leaders in Pakistan were concerned that if the Taliban lost power, members of the Northern Alliance, which contained “anti-Pakistan elements,” would lead to a contentious Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship.\textsuperscript{327} Members of the Taliban also had “strong ethnic and family linkages” with members of Pakistan’s government.\textsuperscript{328} As the Taliban exerted control in Afghanistan, they allowed Osama bin Laden and his organization, al-Qaida, a group which publically called for attacks against the United States and was responsible for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, to establish a base of operations in Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{324} “Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns,” DNSA.
\textsuperscript{325} “Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns,” DNSA.
\textsuperscript{326} Musharraf, \textit{In the Line of Fire}, 203.
\textsuperscript{327} Musharraf, \textit{In the Line of Fire}, 203.
\textsuperscript{328} Musharraf, \textit{In the Line of Fire}, 211.
Osama bin Laden moved to Afghanistan in 1996 and formed a partnership with Mullah Omar, the head of the Taliban. The leader of al-Qaida was allowed to open training camps in Kandahar and the Taliban “seemed to open the doors to all who wanted to come to Afghanistan to train in the camps.” In *The 9/11 Commission Report*, The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States speculated that Pakistan was aware of bin Laden’s move to Pakistan and military intelligence officers may have assisted his entrance into Afghanistan. The commission also had reason to believe that Pakistani intelligence officers had introduced bin Laden to high-ranking Taliban leaders in an effort to help bin Laden gain control of training camps that could have been used to train militants operating in Kashmir.

On 19 December 2000, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1333, spearheaded by the United States and Russia, to “drive a wedge between the Taliban and Pakistan” by encouraging Pakistan to stop providing military advice and aid to the Taliban. Although Pakistan did not end its military assistance to the Taliban, it did decrease the size of the Taliban’s staff in Pakistan’s embassy. In the follow-up Resolution 1363, approved 30 July 2001, Pakistani leaders agreed to allow the United Nations to establish border monitors to guarantee that military equipment was not filtering into Afghanistan from Pakistan. Pakistan’s “tentative steps” toward cooperation demonstrated an “increasing wariness that the Taliban movement was radicalizing existing Islamic movements in Pakistan.” Leaders in Pakistan also worried that by providing aid to Afghanistan, the United States would turn away from

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331 *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 64.
333 “Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns,” DNSA.
334 “Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns,” DNSA.
335 “Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns,” DNSA.
336 “Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns,” DNSA.
Pakistan and instead embrace India as a regional ally against extremism. The events on 11 September 2001 signaled the imminent collapse of the friendly relations between the Taliban and Pakistan.

Musharraf claimed that, on 12 September, Secretary of State Colin Powell called him with an ultimatum: “You are either with us or against us.” Musharraf also claimed that the Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, threatened the Director General of the Inter Services Intelligence Committee, General Mahmud Ahmad, saying: “We had to decide whether we were with America or with the terrorists, but that if we chose the terrorists, then we should be prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age.” Later, President George Bush, Armitage, and Ahmad denied that the inflammatory statement was ever made. Tariq Ali, who was born and educated in Pakistan and has written several studies on Pakistan, questions whether Musharraf may have lied about the threat. Ali raises the possibility that Musharraf “exaggerated to impress his corps commanders that there was no option but to do Washington’s bidding,” and asks whether it could have merely been a “ploy to increase sales of his book.” Either way, Pakistan quickly responded that it was on the side of the United States.

In a meeting on 13 September between Armitage, Ahmad, and Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, Maleeha Lodhi, the United States proposed seven conditions, or demands, to Pakistan that would form the basis of the early crisis partnership. They were:

- to stop al-Qaida operatives at its border and end all logistical support for Bin Laden;
- to give the United States blanket overflight and landing rights for all necessary military and intelligence operations;

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337 “Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns,” DNSA.
338 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 201.
339 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 201.
341 Ali, The Duel, x, 145.
• to provide territorial access to U.S. and allied military intelligence and other personal to conduct operations against al-Qaida;
• to provide the United States with intelligence information;
• to continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts;
• to cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan; and
• if the evidence implicated bin Laden and al-Qaida and the Taliban continued to harbor them, to break relations with the Taliban government.  

Ali stated that: “Without even looking closely at the printed sheet, Mahmud Ahmad put it in his pocket and said that he accepted everything.” According to Ali’s sources, Armitage was taken aback and asked Ahmad if he needed to consult with Musharraf first, especially since some of the requests were related to Pakistan’s sovereignty. The same day, in a National Security Council meeting, Colin Powell announced that “Musharraf had agreed to every U.S. request for support in the war on terrorism.” But this does not correlate with Musharraf’s account of the diplomatic encounters.

In Musharraf’s book, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, he claimed that some of the demands were “ludicrous.” For example, Musharraf explained that the fifth demand depended “on the interpretation of what constitutes verbal support for terrorism.” He thought that the statement “should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida . . . self-contradictory” because the United States could not be sure at such an early time who was responsible for the attacks. In his memoir, Musharraf asserted that he never agreed to the second or third demand because granting the United States total access to its naval ports and fighter aircraft bases would

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343 The 9/11 Commission Report, 331.
344 Ali, The Duel, 146.
345 Ali, The Duel, 146.
346 The 9/11 Commission Report, 331
347 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 205.
348 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 205.
349 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 205.
jeopardize Pakistan’s “strategic assets.” He stated that he only agreed to give the United States permission to use two bases, far from “sensitive areas,” that could only be used for logistics and aircraft recovery, not offensive operations. According to Musharraf, “The rest of the demands we could live with.” He was “happy” that the United States accepted his adaptations to the demands “without any fuss.” Musharraf was “shocked” at the assertion that he accepted the demands completely and without any adjustments.

Yet, on 13 September, the embassy in Islamabad confirmed Pakistan’s acceptance of the seven demands but explained that the use of Pakistani airspace and other “substantial concessions” would mean that the government of Pakistan, specifically Musharraf, would have to pay a “domestic price.” The 9/11 Commission Report makes no mention of any disagreements over the seven conditions. A Congressional Research Service report, “Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns,” noted that Pakistan had indeed conceded access to airfields, airspace, and ports. The differing accounts of the actual diplomatic communications and the willingness of Pakistan to comply with every measure of the list of demands may never be completely explained. It does seem likely, however, that Musharraf’s interpretation of events as explained in his book were skewed, and intended to dispel any notion that he had easily submitted to the United States. Despite the lingering lack of clarity on the negotiations between Pakistan and the United States in the days after 11 September, Pakistan accepted the role of partner to the United States, and benefited from it.

350 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 206.
351 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 206.
352 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 206.
353 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 206.
355 “Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns,” DNSA.
By cooperating with the United States, Pakistan was also able to avoid a strengthening of India-United States relations, especially after India offered its bases to the United States. Not only did the United States waive its sanctions on Pakistan, it also began sending significant amounts of aid, which as of 15 November 2001 was predicted to reach one billion dollars. In exchange for financial assistance from the United States, Pakistan was expected to try to negotiate the extradition of Osama bin Laden. Musharraf “initiated a dialogue [with Mullah Omar and the Taliban] immediately” to avoid “the wrath of the United States.” Allegedly, Mullah Omar did not express sympathy for the attacks, but rather dismissed the attacks as “God’s punishment for the injustices against Muslims.” Osama bin Laden remained at large for nearly ten years until he was found in Abbottabad, Pakistan in 2011.

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 represent the beginning of the second Afghan crisis. Unlike the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, the United States was under direct attack, but the reaction of American policymakers was strikingly similar to the American response in 1979. American leaders immediately reached out to Pakistan to address the problem in Afghanistan as it had thirty years earlier. Pakistan served as the most convenient route into landlocked Afghanistan and Pakistan’s connection with the Taliban and other leaders in Afghanistan made Pakistan a valuable ally. The United States immediately saw Pakistan as a partner again, not against communism, but against al-Qaida and terrorism. The United States benefitted from its partnership with Pakistan by its ability to plan and conduct its operations from Pakistan. Pakistan benefited from its renewed aid program with the United States. As the years

357 “Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Concerns,” DNSA.
358 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 215-16.
359 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, 216.
progressed, the Pakistan-United States relationship again deteriorated, continuing another
cyclical pattern of oscillation between high and low points in the relationship.

Conclusion

Pakistan occupies an important geopolitical position because of its proximity to the
Persian Gulf. During the Cold War, access to oil from the gulf was a high priority for American
policymakers, as illustrated by the Carter Doctrine. Not only was Pakistan’s location near the
“oil jugular of the West” an incentive for American diplomats to reach out to Pakistan, but
because it bordered Afghanistan, Pakistan played a deciding role in both the first and second
Afghan crises.360 Zbigniew Brzezinski characterized the combination of Pakistan and
Afghanistan as “geopolitical linchpin” states.361 He explained that “a linchpin state is one that is
both intrinsically important and in some sense ‘up for grabs.’”362 The area comprising Pakistan
and Afghanistan was important during the Cold War; both the Soviet Union and the United
States grappled for influence. While Pakistan was geopolitically valuable, it suffered from a
significant security threat from its archrival, India, and its strained relations with the government
of Afghanistan. Pakistan needed military equipment to counter its security threat, which the
United States often accommodated throughout the Pakistan-United States relationship. Yet,
geopolitical considerations were not enough to constitute a steady relationship between Pakistan
and the United States.

360 A. Z. Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Bulington, VT: Ashgate, 2005),
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361 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the US-Soviet Contest
362 Brzezinski, Game Plan, 52.
Stephen Cohen, an expert on Pakistan, has described the Pakistan-United States relationship as “episodic and discontinuous.”\textsuperscript{363} The cyclical nature of the bilateral relationship began in the 1950s, when Pakistan became “America’s most allied ally in Asia.”\textsuperscript{364} The close alliance between Pakistan and the United States, bolstered by memberships in SEATO, the Mutual Security Act of 1954, and the 1959 Agreement of Cooperation, was not permanent. The relationship declined during the 1960s after the 1962 Indo-China War, when the United States sent aid to India, and after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. The fluctuation prior to the first Afghan crisis reflected the nature of American Cold War policy and the struggle to balance global interests with that of its regional partners. The vacillation also appeared to stem from the different policies of Democrats and Republicans in American politics, as well as struggles over control of those policies by the Executive and Legislative Branches.

As discussed earlier, there is a general notion in Pakistan that Republican administrations were friendlier toward Pakistan than Democratic administrations. Historians agree that during the Afghan crisis, the Republican president, Ronald Reagan, was “more successful than Carter in defending the Gulf.”\textsuperscript{365} Whereas Democratic president Jimmy Carter focused on nuclear proliferation and arms restraint, Reagan successfully reignited the Pakistan-United States relationship by overlooking Pakistan’s nuclear activities and sending the country millions of dollars in military and economic aid to confront the Russian presence in Afghanistan. Reagan was markedly more aggressive. While the distinction between Republican and Democratic leadership is clear during the Afghan crisis, there is a lack of scholarship on the pre and post crisis periods.

\textsuperscript{364} “228 Address by Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan to US, at the Naval War College, New Port, Rhode Island, 14 May 1963 (Extracts),” K. Arif, ed., in \textit{America-Pakistan Relations}, vol. 2 (Lahore, Pakistan: Vanguard Books, 1984), 221.
\textsuperscript{365} Hilali, \textit{US-Pakistan Relationship}, 5.
The Republican tendency to advocate a closer military relationship and broader arms sales arrangements, and the Democratic pattern of stressing nonproliferation and democracy in Pakistan, appears to be an assumption in scholarship that is never fully addressed. This field of study could greatly benefit from an in-depth analysis of the key political players and the extent to which the American political system affected the “episodic” nature of the Pakistan-United States relationship. Identifying patterns in the relationship would not only contribute to the study of the past but could reveal clues about the future of the relationship.

Another deficit in the scholarship, which this thesis attempts to fill, is the lack of any endeavor to explicitly identify the peak and valley of the relationship by year. This thesis quantifies the high and low point of the relationship, and in effect, reveals that the low point came immediately prior to the galvanizing event of the first Afghan crisis and the highest point was in 1986, during the crisis. In 1979, the Pakistan-United States relationship suffered from arms and aid embargos, Pakistan’s withdrawal from CENTO, and strained relations between Pakistani and American leadership. Yet, within seven years the relationship rebounded due to several factors: a strong relationship between Reagan and Pakistan’s President Zia al-Haq, Congressional approval of a six-year aid program to Pakistan of over four billion dollars, and success in Afghanistan.

That the apex of the Pakistan-United States relationship came during a crisis period is revealing. Pakistan and the United States maintain stronger relationships during times of crisis, specifically the first and second Afghan crises. The peak of the relationship also occurred after American policymakers offered the government of Pakistan a long-term and significant aid package. Zia rejected Carter’s 1980 proposal of 400 million dollars over two years because he
perceived it as “devoid of credibility and durability.” The key to achieving a strong bilateral relationship with Pakistan relied on the willingness of American politicians to offer substantial aid to Pakistan. This was true during the first Afghan crisis and also constitutes a major sealant to the current Pakistan-United States relationship. During times of crisis, Pakistan responds best to generous aid packages.

In 1986, India and nuclear proliferation were virtually non-issues. Pakistan’s historic rivalry with India, the subsequent wars in 1965 and 1971, and the nuclear arms race on the subcontinent, constituted the most harmful aspects to the Pakistan-United States relationship. But in 1986, these issues were overlooked. As Zia told Reagan in 1982, the differences that come between Pakistan and the United States “proved to be transitory.” Before and after the crisis, the Indo-Pakistan relationship and nuclear programs of both countries had dramatic effects on the Pakistan-United States relationship. Both in 1977 and 1990, the United States ceased sending military aid to Pakistan because of its nuclear program. But during the first Afghan crisis, and to a degree the second Afghan crisis, these issues have been set aside, allowing the two countries to cooperate on achieving mutual goals. If this pattern continues, it can be expected that after the United States ends its combat mission in Afghanistan, the same issues will re-emerge, probably damaging the relationship to the extent that the United States will limit or end its aid program to Pakistan.

Historically, the provision of aid has served as the greatest factor affecting the Pakistan-United States relationship. Whether or not the United States was sending aid to Pakistan indicated the strength, or weakness, of relations between the countries. Throughout the past

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367 “504 President Reagan’s speech at the banquet given in honor of President Zia, 7 December 1982 (Extracts),” America-Pakistan Relations, vol. 2, 482.
decades, American aid has been attached to requirements, specifically to Pakistan’s nuclear program, lack of democracy, and conflicts with India. The United States government imposed the Pressler amendment in 1990, thus ending its aid program and contributing to a feeling of abandonment in Pakistan. Engrained in American policy toward Pakistan is the notion that using aid as positive or negative reinforcement is the best way to control Pakistan and make the country conform to American wishes of nuclear nonproliferation and democratic leadership. But this is largely a reactive policy that has ultimately been unsuccessful. The Pressler amendment did not stop Pakistan from pursuing nuclear technology. And in 1999, when Pervez Musharraf overthrew Nawaz Sharif, the United States had negligible influence in Pakistan because the relationship was already strained from the consequences of the Pressler amendment. Making aid conditional has ultimately decreased the amount of influence the United States has on Pakistan. In *Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan*, Robert McMahon noticed that President Lyndon Johnson’s “heavy-handed attempts to resolve” the India-Pakistan “conundrum by using U.S. aid as a club just intensified the core problems.” A feeling of distrust followed the suspension of American aid during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War and was repeated several times throughout the Pakistan-United States relationship. In the late 1970s, Pakistan felt threatened by India’s nuclear program and requested conventional arms, which the United States denied. After 1990, as the situation in Afghanistan remained largely unresolved, the United States ceased sending large amounts of military and economic aid.

American policymakers had reasons to end aid to Pakistan based on their expectations of the country, but Pakistanis nevertheless felt betrayed. The credible and durable arm sales relationship that Pakistan had always wanted from the United States was never stable. In effect,

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this contributed to the transient friendship between the two countries. Members of both
governments know that the relationship has been strained; but, if the United States had been an
unconditional friend of Pakistan, the relationship would be stronger and more amicable. Yet,
some analysts still believe that the United States should only give aid to Pakistan if the country
complies with American expectations.

Stephen Krasner, an international relations analyst, wrote a piece for *Foreign Affairs*
entitled: “Talking Tough to Pakistan: How to End Islamabad’s Defiance.” Published in the first
issue of 2012, this article is specifically in response to the currently frustrating relations between
Pakistan and the United States. Yet the question at hand has been the same for decades: how
should the United States implement its policy of aid to Pakistan? In combination with recent
reports of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) funding the terrorist group the Haqqani
network, or the outrage in Pakistan and the United States after the raid on Osama bin Laden’s
compound, Krasner also claimed the Pakistan has been the “world’s worst nuclear
proliferator.” He suggested that the United States take a markedly more aggressive approach
to its policy toward Pakistan, because “the only way the United States can get what it actually
wants from Pakistan is to make credible threats to retaliate if Pakistan does not comply with U.S.
demands.” He stated that: “The United States has shown that the sticks that come with its
carrots are hollow.” The idea that using harsh and inflammatory language toward an ally and
bullying Pakistan into compliancy as Krasner suggests, is a fallacy.

Pakistan had never responded positively to American demands because Pakistani leaders
have differing goals and regional problems than the United States. To think that Pakistan would

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369 Stephen D. Krasner, “Talking Tough to Pakistan: How to End Islamabad’s Defiance,” *Foreign Affairs*
2547308321&Fmt+3&clientId=15121&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed 13 February 2012).
370 Krasner, “Talking Tough to Pakistan.”
371 Krasner, “Talking Tough to Pakistan.”
end its nuclear program years ago, or allow any foreign power to hamper its nuclear weapons now, is naïve. Pakistanis have always been most concerned with regional threats, mostly from India, but from Afghanistan as well. The government of Pakistan’s friendship with the Taliban, frowned upon by Americans, was simply a continuation of its India strategy. If Pakistan could maintain friendly relations with leaders in Afghanistan it would have one more advantage over India. For American analysts, politicians, and policymakers to think Pakistanis would act in the interests of the United States rather than its own best interests is an issue that needs to be addressed, and hopefully eliminated. It is too late now to change history and undo the deeds that caused mutual distrust, and if American policymakers continue to enact realpolitik policies against Pakistan, they can only expect to harm the future of Pakistan-United States relations.

The second most influential, and damaging, issue between Pakistan and the United States emanates from the India-Pakistan rivalry. While scholars and politicians agree that rapprochement would be in India and Pakistan’s best interest, the general consensus is that bilateralism, multilateralism, or negotiations led by the United Nations is unlikely. In a hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in January 2004, Cohen testified that one of the “lessons learned” from the history of India-Pakistan relations was “India and Pakistan can reach agreement on ancillary issues, including confidence building measures, but not on Kashmir’s final status.” American politicians and diplomats have failed to remain impartial or solve the problem.

The American response to the numerous conflicts has always been reactionary because, as most historians agree, the Indian-Pakistan rivalry is persistent and the prospect for resolution

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373 Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Pakistan and India: Steps Toward Rapprochement, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., 2004, 15.
is unhopeful, and American policy cannot change that. Robert Wirsing, an expert in international relations, specifically Pakistan-United States relations, explained that “managing the Kashmir dispute — not resolving it — is, of course, what India and Pakistan have been doing all along.” The United States has attempted to help resolve the conflict, perhaps most notably in the 1999 meeting between Nawaz Sharif and President Bill Clinton. But American diplomats cannot directly mediate because not only does India refuse, but American-led mediation would be “impractical” since the United States is viewed as an “indifferent and unreliable” player in South Asian politics.

Wirsing accurately summarized American Cold War policy in regard to managing the security of the subcontinent as “essentially derivative of other objectives, and thus limited or transient.” During the Cold War, the United States was more concerned about containing communism from China and the Soviet Union than resolving a bitter dispute between India and Pakistan. Wirsing wrote in 1990: “There is very little reason to believe that the United States, freed from the problem of Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan, will now make a strong bid to resolve the Kashmir dispute.” The same prediction can be applied to the current American “problem” in Afghanistan. A popular trend in the study of Pakistan-United States relations, asking “what if?” has led scholars to question what policies the United States could have followed to avert entanglement in the India-Pakistan quagmire.

McMahon has identified two policies that might have been more effective than the poorly executed balancing act of American policy toward the subcontinent during the Cold War. He states that if American policymakers desired a cooperative relationship with a regional power in

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South Asia, an alliance with India rather than Pakistan would have made “eminent sense.” A relationship with a militarily and economically superior India, a country which exercised “greater international prestige and influence,” would have been more natural than the Pakistan-United States relationship. Another policy option for the United States could have been “careful evenhandedness, which eschewed formal political or security ties” with both countries. McMahon asserted that “strict impartiality would have carried far fewer risks.” He specifically referred to the regional arms race that erupted when American policymakers attempted to make both India and Pakistan Cold War partners. Although it is useful to question the past in the search for a better future, it must be done either thoroughly or not at all.

McMahon’s arguments are logical, but he failed to extend the consequences of his hypothetical history to the situation in Afghanistan. He should have explained what effect his preferred methods of American policy would have had on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Would the United State not have been involved in Afghanistan if it had chosen India as a regional ally instead of Pakistan? If America had followed a path of “strict impartiality” would the American effort to expel Russian troops from Afghanistan with the cooperation of Pakistan been impossible? In any consideration of Pakistan-United States relations, the Afghan crisis must be taken into account because of its deep impact on history.

So what can history suggest about the future of India-Pakistan-United States relations? If history is any indicator, the United States will continue to attempt friendly bilateral relations with both Pakistan and India while trying to avoid alienating either. In the past two Afghan crises, Pakistan was willing to serve as the United States’ gateway into Afghanistan, especially after the

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378 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, 341.
379 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, 341.
380 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, 341.
381 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, 342.
382 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery, 342.
lowest point in the Pakistan-United States relationship in 1979 and the tense relationship between the two in 2001. India is a rising power that the United States wants to trade with and have as a partner in the Indian Ocean region. Remarks from Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs on 24 April 2012 revealed that if the United States was going to embark on a mission to pursue a stronger bilateral relationship with India, even to the detriment of its relationship with Pakistan, now may be the time. As the war winds down in Afghanistan, and the United States becomes less dependent on Pakistan to fight the Global War on Terror (GWOT), Shapiro highlighted some facts that indicate an increasingly “robust relationship based on security interests.”

He stated that:

Since the signing of a bilateral defense framework agreement in 2005, our [the Indian and American] defense relationship has become a major pillar of the strategic partnership. For example:

- India now holds more than 50 annual military exercises with the United States, more than any other country.
- Cumulative defense sales have grown from virtually zero to more than $8 billion.
- And high-level exchanges on defense issues also have increased…

Even though prospects for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute appear unrealistic, a strong and mutually beneficial India-United States relationship will extend into the future, whether Pakistanis approve or not.

The effects of American policy toward Pakistan expanded dramatically after 11 September 2001. Pakistan re-emerged as America’s ally in confronting another Afghan crisis, this time against terrorism rather than communism. After 2001, the field of scholarship started analyzing the first Afghan crisis to reveal clues about the second. Most studies raise the question: What went wrong? The answer, from both South Asian and American scholars, typically blames American foreign policy for failing to make a long term commitment to the

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384 Shapiro, “Talks with India and Bangladesh.”
stability of Afghanistan after the Russian withdrawal, which, in turn, led to instability and a feeling of abandonment in Pakistan.

According to Hassan Abbas, author of *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror*, “the onset of the Afghan war was the most fateful dagger driven into the heart of Pakistan.” He asserted that Pakistan partnered with the United States during the first Afghan crisis only to face the consequences by itself. He explained that “Pakistan had helped America sow the wind in Afghanistan, but when the time came to reap the whirlwind, it had to do it alone.” Abbas is only one of many to criticize the way American policymakers handled the end of the first Afghan crisis.

Mohammed Yousef, co-author of *Afghanistan-The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower*, served in the ISI as the head of the Afghan Bureau from 1983 to 1987. His firsthand experience during the Afghan crisis left him with a distinct impression of frustration and anger toward American policy of the late 1980s. He argued that “it was the deliberate policy of the US government that we should never achieve a military victory in Afghanistan.” In his opinion, the United States military had “avenged Vietnam” and brought about a stalemate that would bring nothing but chaos and instability to Afghanistan. At that time, American policymakers were unaware that by leaving Afghanistan in the hands of warlords, they were laying the foundation for a future terrorist state.

The efforts of the post-11 September 2001 studies have succeeded in highlighting the consequences of abandoning Afghanistan. Dan Feldman, the Deputy Special Representative for

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385 Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror* (Armonk, New York: East Gate, 2005), 11.
386 Abbas, *Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism*, 11.
Pakistan and Afghanistan testified to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia that: “We have learned the lessons of history and are committed to avoiding the kind of precipitous pullout that can fuel instability, as was the case in the early 1990s.”

The United States will undoubtedly remain committed to Afghanistan even after 2014, but a similar commitment to Pakistan is less likely.

Another scholar of the Pakistan-United States relationship, A. Z. Hilali, argued that “the United States . . . took advantage of Pakistan’s desperate need for military and economic assistance.” Because Pakistan was the weaker partner in the relationship, its interests were “sacrificed” so that the interests of the stronger partner would prevail. While Hilali was correct, the United States was the dominant partner in the Pakistan-United States relationship, he failed to see the importance of the benefits Pakistan received from their relationship with the United States. Historically, Pakistani leaders have sought to bolster its military to deter and protect themselves from India. The danger of the Moscow-New Delhi Line (and after the invasion of Afghanistan, the Moscow-Kabul line) threatened to engulf Pakistan in a “strategic vise.”

Pakistan was a frail nation that overnight became a vulnerable ‘frontline state,’ making Pakistani officials eager for American assistance and aid. The American arms sales relationship with Pakistan helped strengthen its military force, arguably one of Pakistan’s most vital interests. Yet, fulfilling some of Pakistan’s interests damaged the prospects of others.

Abbas declared that by strengthening Pakistan’s military, “America lost the forest for the trees.” Sponsoring Pakistan’s army “meant the concomitant impoverishment of the country

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390 Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship, 1.
391 Hilali, US Pakistan Relationship, 279.
392 Brzezinski, Game Plan, 64.
393 Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, 10.
and the emasculation of the nascent political process.” As illustrated during both Afghan crises, the United States formed working relationships with non-democratically elected leaders, despite previous condemnations. The American desires for a strong executive leadership in Pakistan, and a forceful Pakistani military to cooperate with during times of crisis, appear incongruous. “As the army grew in strength” from aid from the United States, “it frequently took over the task of governance.” American policy has frequently been caught in a “Catch-22” in regard to Pakistan. Any action American policymakers took often had a negative reaction, which is exemplified by the case of balancing military strength and partnership in Pakistan with support for democratically-chosen presidents. The United States has to carefully consider the implications of its policies toward Pakistan and attempt to weigh the pros against the cons.

Scholars do not hesitate to put forth recommendations for how the United States can “fix” the Pakistan problem. These range from further economic support and funding for secular education to further insistence on democratic institutions and rapprochement with India. Abbas, Hilali, Ali, and Cohen agreed that continuing economic aid would have a positive effect on stabilizing Pakistan. Ali wrote that “to permanently continue as a satrapy is certainly not going to help Pakistan.” American economic assistance should extend to education. Abbas urged American policymakers to “realize that it cannot bomb an idea out of existence.” Instead the United States should provide economic opportunity as an alternative to fundamentalism. Usama Butt, a security analyst and Pakistan-United States scholar, recommended that while the United States should continue to advocate democracy in Pakistan, it should not expect Pakistan to adopt


Finally, the United States should remain focused on “facilitat[ng]” an end to the Kashmir conflict in any and every way possible.\footnote{New Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Chairmen’s Report of an Independent Task Force Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 7.}

All of these suggestions are worth considering, but American and Pakistani leaders should not be overly optimistic about the success of any of them. Cohen asserts that “there is no magic bullet theory, and the United States must balance competing interests, take account of the long and the short run, and recognize the difficulty of fostering change in another state’s fundamental institutions, all the while preparing for worst-case futures.”\footnote{Cohen, \textit{The Idea of Pakistan}, 306.} Krasner, who calls for a stricter policy of conditional aid, lamented that although American officials “recognize the flaws in their country’s current approach to Pakistan . . . instead of making radical changes to that policy, Washington continues to muddle through.”\footnote{Krasner, “Talking Tough to Pakistan.”} Perhaps muddling through is exactly what American policymakers want to do. Throughout the Pakistan-United States relationship, the United States has been most interested in Pakistan during times of crisis. As the war in Afghanistan reaches its end, the Pakistan-United States relationship is reminiscent of the last years of the first Afghan crisis. Pakistanis worry about being abandoned next to a hostile and unstable neighbor as they perceived they were in 1988. The United States is apprehensive about maintaining an aid relationship with a country with a significant number of active extremists and one that is governed by a fragile and allegedly corrupt government that is in many ways influenced by the military.

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\item \textsuperscript{400} Cohen, \textit{The Idea of Pakistan}, 306.
\item \textsuperscript{401} Krasner, “Talking Tough to Pakistan.”
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The United States and Pakistan are once again at a crossroads, and if history is any indicator, the Pakistan-United States relationship will enter a cooling-off stage. It can be expected that after the United States leaves Afghanistan, the United States and Pakistan will have strained relations on the issues of fundamentalism, the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, India-Pakistan relations, and the precarious nature of the civilian government. Perhaps the most revealing statement on the relationship between Pakistan and the United States during the second Afghan crisis was Musharraf’s advice to Hugo Chavez at the Non-Aligned Conference in Havana, Cuba, on 11 September 2006: “You are far too aggressive with the United States. Do as I do. Accept what they say and then do as you want.”

Pakistani leaders are well aware that after the Afghan crisis, the United States could soon return to its “historic default option: ignoring Pakistan.”

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