
Abstract

In the spring of 1778 the Continental frigate Raleigh, homeward bound from France, captured a merchant vessel with a cargo of salt off the Carolina coast. The craft was sent into Port Beaufort, North Carolina. After having been condemned in a Court of Admiralty as a legal prize and sold, the vessel was stolen or "cut out" by a British privateer crew under Captain John Goodrich. Unable to sail the ship out of Old Topsail (Beaufort) Inlet, Goodrich ran her aground on a convenient sandbank and set her afire to prevent her use by the Americans.

The intention of this study is threefold. First, to gather as much information as possible about the ship, the nature and value of its cargo, the chain of events that led up to its destruction, and about the various individuals involved in this sequence of events. Second, through analysis of this information, hitherto unrealised connections have been established between the individuals within the historical context of this work, as a result of their
involvement with the prize ship. Third, significant information regarding the site and the its potential as a cultural resource has been obtained.

John Goodrich, Sr., was a patriot-turned-Tory who, together with four of his sons and other Loyalist sea captains, constituted one of the most destructive forces in the entire war. Goodrich created a powerful squadron of privateers which raided American shipping and ravaged coastal towns and plantations all along the coast. The activities of this highly talented group of men illustrate several significant aspects of the war, from the business of privateering to the often extreme hatreds between those in the Tory and patriot camps. Burning the ship at Beaufort was but one of numerous acts of destruction they committed over the course of the war.

The Continental (CN) frigate Raleigh was one of thirteen frigates Congress ordered built in 1775. The voyage during which she captured the subject vessel is examined together with the contacts had by members of her crew with other individuals of significance to this work.

The prize was disposed of by Richard Ellis, the local prize agent for Congress. Ellis' activities highlight some of the weaknesses inherent in the prize agent system. The difficulties encountered by the prize master in collecting payment for the ship underscore the problem of sectionalism in America at the time.
The significance of the cargo as a necessary article of survival is discussed as it relates to the socioeconomic structure of Revolutionary North Carolina. The problems of ensuring the supply and the compromises which resulted are examined.

An effort to trace the ship's identity through its type reveals a number of significant facts. Other relevant vessel types are discussed as well, insofar as they may relate to the topic of this paper.

The sale and purchase of war prizes was of great economic significance, many respected citizens being involved. The system is examined as it pertains to Raleigh's prize and CN vessels in general.

In 1972, a submerged wrecksite was discovered on Shackleford Banks. The physical remains together with studies of the local meteorology and geomorphology suggest that this site may be the prize vessel and offer a number of clues to how she came to be in there.
HISTORICAL AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS CONCERNING A REVOLUTIONARY WAR VESSEL BURNED AT BEAUFORT, NORTH CAROLINA IN 1778

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of History East Carolina University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in the Program for Maritime History and Underwater Research

by

James R. Reedy, Jr.

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INTRODUCTION

This study was inspired by the accidental discovery in 1972 of the remains of a very old wooden-hulled sailing vessel near Beaufort, North Carolina. The find predated the establishment of the East Carolina University Program in Maritime History and Underwater Research by several years. While no formal research on the site was initiated until 1981, certain facts came to light over the intervening years which suggested the wreck might be that of an 18th century merchant ship, specifically a prize vessel sent into Port Beaufort in the spring of 1778.

Concentrated research on the ship and the events surrounding her demise began in 1982. The original study design called for relocating the site, excavating and identifying the remains, and using the information thus acquired ascertain the the approximate tonnage, build, possible place of origin and other characteristics of the craft. Archival data was to be used to reconstruct the vessel's background, history, and the place she occupied in the commerce of the period. As the field work and research went forward, it became apparent that alterations in this plan would be necessary.

At the time of discovery, the wreck had been lying in several feet of water and had been partially exposed. When finally relocated it was found to be buried under some eight to twelve feet of sand. This effectively abrogated any
possibility of excavating the site without special equipment and funds far in excess of the available means. It was therefore decided to pursue the field work through its first phase only, that being the establishment of the position of the site and mapping it through the use of remote sensing equipment. The results of this endeavor comprise a large part of Chapter VI of this report.

Virtually no documentary evidence that could be used to identify the vessel by name was located. In the few extant records she is mentioned only briefly and never by name. The absence of official records is quite pronounced, both on State and Federal levels in the United States and in Great Britain as well. A large amount of other documentary information was located, primarily concerning people and events connected with the prize in one way or another. This material was found to diverge on several distinct tracks, all of which are inter-related and all of which bear directly on the prize ship.

The primary objective in pursuing these seemingly diverse lines of inquiry was that one or more of them might lead to a positive identification of the wreck. While this did not turn out to be the case, a large collection of pertinent facts was amassed, from which the main body of the text of this report is drawn.

The result is a series of chapters on a range of topics, any one of which would be suitable as the subject of
a thesis, and all of which are concerned with the object which first sparked research interest, the ship and her destruction being the bond which ties the elements of the study together.

This report does not attempt to prove or disprove the hypothesis that the Shackleford Banks wreck is that of the prize ship; indeed, most of the material necessary for such proof has either disappeared or is currently beyond reach. Its purpose is simply to bring into common perspective a number of previously unassociated characters and events, synthesizing the information and arranging it so as to best illustrate several different facets of an interesting microcosm of the American Revolution.
In May, 1972 the remains of a very old wooden sailing vessel were discovered approximately 100 feet up a small vestigial channel on the north side of the western end of Shackleford Banks in Carteret County, North Carolina. The find was made by a group of sport scuba divers and was not reported to any governmental agency or academic institution at the time. The site was of only incidental interest to the divers, and the fact of its discovery was not learned by the investigator until several weeks after the event. At that time all available information regarding the find was gathered through Key Informant interviews with the divers. All the debriefings were oral, and all pertinent information was recorded by the investigator.

One small piece of the vessel which had been recovered displayed part of a futtock having planking secured to it with treenails. Both the frame and the planking appeared to have been shaped with edged tools. There was extensive evidence of fire on the wrecksite. At the time of discovery the wreck was partially exposed and lying in from ten to twelve feet of water.¹ The investigator did not have the opportunity to visit the site until several years after its discovery, and was therefore unable to conduct a first-hand examination of the remains. However, certain documentary evidence uncovered during research on other projects indicated the possibility
that the wreck may have been that of a prize sent into Port Beaufort in the spring of 1778 by the Continental frigate Raleigh. This prize, a brig or brigantine with a cargo of salt on board, was condemned in a Court of Admiralty and sold, only to be cut out some days later by a British privateer who ran the vessel aground and burned her when he could not get her out of Old Topsail Inlet.²

In selecting this vessel as the subject for research, the original intention was that data obtained through the excavation of the site, plus documentary information collected during archival research, together with meteorological and geomorphological data would be combined to build a factual case regarding the identity, specifications and history of the prize ship, and furnish evidence in support of the theory that the Shackleford Banks vessel was indeed Raleigh's prize. While this assumption remains, an entirely different project structure developed as the research and field work progressed.

The initial work of relocating the site commenced in 1982, ten years after the discovery. Consultations with the divemaster of the 1972 party plus exhaustive searches of three separate areas of Back Sound resulted in the location of the wreck in 1984. A large dipolar anomaly of approximately 50 γ (gamma) strength was recorded at the spot where the wreck had originally been reported, and a second positive anomaly of like strength was found a short distance to the east. The site was mapped, its position recorded, and details of the work duly reported to the North Carolina Department of
Archives and History.³

Concurrent with the field work, archival research was being conducted. In addition to the examination of manuscripts, microfilmed material, and published documents, this involved inquiries regarding meteorological and geological factors which might have influenced the vessel's course and resulted in her coming to rest at that particular location, or that might have affected her condition over the two centuries since she was run ashore. A number of interviews with county residents who had lived on the banks when they were settled, or whose forebears had lived there, proved entirely unproductive.

The primary objective of the archival search was to discover the name of the vessel and as many concrete facts about her as possible. A great deal of information concerning characters and events connected with the prize were located, but most of the official records in which her name might have been listed had disappeared. Those records which had survived were of no help.

Neither the records of North Carolina's ports nor the records of its Courts Maritime and Merchant, the equivalent of Court of Admiralty, either of which might have mentioned the entry of the ship into Beaufort Harbor or her trial and condemnation, are known to survive from the Revolutionary War era.⁴ Efforts to locate the personal papers of Raleigh's crew were for the most part unsuccessful, and manuscript collections from residents of Beaufort and New Bern, North
Carolina held little information. A canvass of maritime museums and historical organizations in Maine, New Hampshire and Massachusetts, the area of Raleigh's home port, was likewise unsuccessful. Admiralty Records Series ADM 51 through ADM 53, and High Court of Admiralty Classes HCA 8/1-2, HCA 49/93-94, and HCA 2/30 of the Public Records Office (PRO), London, were also searched without result. Relatively few vice-admiralty court records survive in the PRO, and it was not uncommon for the name of a captured ship to be listed only as "unknown" in the official records. 5

Since it appeared extremely unlikely that the vessel would ever be positively identified by name, it was decided to concentrate the archival research on the historical characters, events and circumstances surrounding her destruction. With the prize as a focal point, research into the activities of the Continental frigate Raleigh, the British privateer who cut the prize out of Beaufort Harbor, and other persons directly and indirectly concerned with the ship was continued. Inquiries were made regarding the few facts that were known about the vessel in an attempt to better clarify what her rig and tonnage might have been.

The result is a collection of facts which the investigator has endeavoured to classify and arrange so as to highlight the significance of each topic, both as regards its place in the network of events concerning the prize ship, and also as regards the place of that individual or event in the overall picture of the Revolution.
ENDNOTES: Project Overview


2. Present-day Beaufort Inlet was originally known as Topsail Inlet. During the mid-eighteenth century it became known as "Old" Topsail Inlet in deference to a newly opened inlet which had appeared to the south. That inlet is the present-day Old Topsail Inlet. Beaufort Inlet acquired its present name during the nineteenth century. North Carolina Gazette (New Bern), 15 May, 1778; Marine Committee to Richard Ellis, 25 May, 1778, Charles O. Paullin (ed.), Out-Letters of the Continental Marine Committee and Board of Admiralty (New York, 1914), I, 246, hereinafter cited as Paullin, Out-Letters; "Plan of Old Topsail Inlet and the Harbour of Beaufort, November 17, 1777," Legislative Papers, Box 14, folder November, 1777, North Carolina Department of Archives and History, Raleigh, hereinafter cited as Legislative Papers, "Old Topsail"; Samuel Hodge to Richard Caswell, 27 October, 1778, Governor’s Papers, State Series, Richard Caswell, G.P.4, 5, North Carolina Department of Archives and History, Raleigh, hereinafter cited as Governor’s Papers, "Caswell."

3. Reedy, "83BkS524" and permit application.


THE GODRICH PRIVATEERS

John Goodrich and his sons John, Jr., William, Bridger, and Bartlett formed the nucleus of a large and efficient privateer fleet which operated from New England to the Caribbean, raiding American shipping and wreaking devastation on coastal towns and plantations. Patriarch of a large and influential Virginia family, John Goodrich, Sr., was a highly successful planter, merchant, and shipper in the Norfolk-Portsmouth area.¹ His property included over 2,000 acres of arable land, at least five town lots, and some dozen seagoing vessels. These were primarily small sloops and schooners of about fifty tons, and were employed in the West Indian and New England trade. Goodrich's businesses included dry-goods stores, a ship chandlery, a cooperage, and a blacksmith shop. He also had a reputation as a "contraband man," which is to say, a smuggler. Together with his son-in-law Robert Shedden, he owned some of the largest wharves in Portsmouth and a number of warehouses. Two more merchant vessels being built for Goodrich were destroyed on the stocks in 1776. An astute businessman, John, Sr. not only raised his sons with a knowledge of sailing and navigation of all the waterways into which their enterprise took them, he also trained selected slaves as pilots and crew for his vessels.²

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities the family was actually engaged on the American side, importing gunpowder
for the Virginia Committee of Safety. The story of how this powerful family came to be turned against the American cause is one of the more unfortunate episodes of the war, and one which bears directly on the subject of this paper.

Profit, not patriotism, was the motivating force behind Goodrich's decision to import gunpowder for the Virginians in 1775. On April 20, the Royal Governor, Lord Dunmore, removed from the Williamsburg magazine several tons of powder to which the Virginia patriots claimed ownership. The Virginia Convention, anxious to replace it because of the deteriorating relations between the colonies and England, sought out John Goodrich, with his extensive connections in the West Indies and the navigational and sailing expertise to complete the project, as the man to serve their needs. Through Thomas Newton, Jr., the Convention contacted William Goodrich and presented a contract. William in turn brought the idea before his family who, always receptive to the idea of a profitable venture, agreed to the deal. William was to go to the West Indies and secure as much powder as he could find, and bring it back to Virginia if at all possible. In the event he had to land in Carolina, the patriots themselves agreed to transport the powder overland to Williamsburg. Upon acceptance of the contract, the Convention furnished William with £5,000 in bills of exchange for his purchases and advised him to write his father prior to his return telling him "...when we may expect you on the coast that we
may keep a lookout and advise you of any danger."  

Encouraged by the prospect of future government contracts and spurred by visions of enormous profits to be made in other areas, the family decided to send more of their vessels to the West Indies to acquire salt, cloth, and other cargoes useful to the Virginians. In so doing they risked violating both the Articles of Association, which severely restricted the shipment of British goods into American ports, and the Boston Ports Act, by which Great Britain refused to allow any but British goods to be imported into the Colonies.

William's mission to buy gunpowder had the approval and support of both the Convention and the Committee of Safety, therefore he had only to worry about being caught by Dunmore's patrols. In their other ventures, however, the family put itself in double jeopardy by buying French, Dutch, British, or any other available saleable cargoes and importing them to Virginia for disposal. They knowingly violated both sets of regulations simultaneously. The family clearly intended to stay in business and turn a profit on the war by supplying Virginia, not Lord Dunmore. They were willing to risk breaking the laws of both sides in the name of monetary gain. Unfortunately for Goodrich he was caught both by the British and by the patriots.

William departed Virginia on July 15, 1775. In the free-trade port of the island of St. Eustatius he collected 4,150 pounds of powder partly through his own efforts and
partly through the Dutch firm of Isaac Van Dam. He also made unsuccessful attempts to find more at Antigua, Martinique and other islands. Leaving an account of £2,000 for additional purchases of powder with Van Dam, he returned north, reaching Ocracoke Inlet, North Carolina on October 9. From there he sailed to a point on the Pasquotank River above Elizabeth City, thence on horseback to one of the family plantations in Virginia. The gunpowder was transported under guard by wagon to Williamsburg.³

Lord Dunmore, aware of the plot to import the powder, was nevertheless unable to prevent its delivery to the patriots. However, a week later he intercepted a letter from Robert Shedden to John Goodrich, Sr., outlining the plot and naming the principals. John, Sr. was away on the sea coast, but Shedden and John, Jr. were immediately arrested and taken aboard the Royal Navy sloop Otter for interrogation. Shedden confessed to the plot, and leaving John, Jr. as hostage to the British, went to inform John, Sr. of Dunmore's desire to settle the matter. William Goodrich was arrested soon after the others and also held aboard Otter.⁴

Dunmore, realizing that the family's actions stemmed from profit motive rather than a desire to rebel against their king, had the elder Goodrich brought aboard his ship and confined. Eventually he convinced the merchant that his financial aims could best be served in loyalty to the Crown. Dunmore realized that whichever side was able to secure the
services of this "Spirited Active, industrious Family" would benefit greatly therefrom, and he was not about to let this opportunity slip from his grasp. Goodrich capitulated. By year several of the Goodrich vessels were under Dunmore's command and had the use of his official pass, allowing them to travel freely on waters patrolled by His Majesty's ships. Goodrich had become a loyalist, and his business had begun to change from mercantile shipping to outright privateering in the service of the Crown.  

Privateering was a potentially profitable but somewhat risky system of legalized robbery on the high seas. Practiced world-wide until the latter quarter of the 19th century, it consisted of arming and provisioning privately owned vessels to prey on an enemy's commerce. Outfitted at the owner's expense, these private warships were furnished with privateering commissions by the belligerent power under whose flag they sailed. A privateer normally carried a very large crew, as its purpose was to capture and send into friendly ports whatever enemy merchantmen it could catch. Legal prizes were condemned at Courts of Admiralty and sold, the profits going to the crew of the privateer. Many fortunes were made and lost in this adventurous trade. The Goodriches were to demonstrate that they had all the skill, daring and experience necessary to be highly successful in it.
The Virginia Convention, aware of Goodrich's arrest by Dunmore, took no action until January, 1776. Upon receiving reports that the Goodrich vessels were unopposedly sailing past the British warships guarding the James and Nansemond Rivers, they incarcerated John, Sr. while allegations against him and the family were investigated. Goodrich managed, through a combination of half-lies and reminders of his past service to the Colony, to talk himself free, but he still faced charges that he and his sons John, Jr. and Bartlett had illegally purchased and imported British goods, disguising them as Dutch. The suspicions of the Convention against the family became more pronounced, and when Abraham Van Bibber, the Maryland agent in St. Eustatius, reported that Bartlett and William had attempted to recover the money left there on account, for the purpose of giving it to Lord Dunmore, all doubts vanished. On March 29, 1776, the Virginia Committee of Safety issued a directive for the sequestering and inventorying of all the Goodrich property in Isle of Wight and Nansemond Counties as security against the unfulfilled portion of the gunpowder contract. This was done under the so-called "enemies act," a statute passed by the Convention on January 20, 1776, which defined what constituted treasonous action against Virginia and set the punishment therefore.

By this time most of the Goodrich clan had moved aboard vessels in the protection of Lord Dunmore's fleet, and with good reason. Since at least February several of the men had
been actively aiding Dunmore's forces in the Chesapeake Bay. Had there been any hope of a reconciliation between the patriots and the Goodriches, it would have been irrevocably dashed by two events that occurred in April.

During the first few days of that month, William Goodrich, supported by two armed cutters from the British fleet, attempted to remove livestock and slaves from his father's plantation in Isle of Wight County. He recovered no animals and only two slaves before being driven off, but the Committee of Safety responded by ordering all the other slaves "secured," which is to say locked up, and all the stock sold. Later in the month General Charles Lee, Commander of the Southern Division of the Continental Army, ordered the destruction of much of the Goodrich property in Portsmouth.

Lee's reputation as a zealous patriot and Tory-hater was well deserved. From the moment of his arrival in Virginia in March he exhibited what can only be described as strong-arm tactics, rounding up known and suspected Loyalists, including Robert Shedden and some of the Goodriches. Annoyed at what he considered the lax attitude of the convention in dealing with some of these people, Lee acted on his own.

Confiscating stores, provisions, and merchandise belonging to Shedden and the Goodriches, he destroyed their waterfront properties and burned several of their houses,
plus two new ships being built for Goodrich at Portsmouth. This action drove the family irredeemably into Lord Dunmore's fold and earned for the Americans one of their staunchest and most implacable enemies.¹⁹

By mid-April, when John, Sr. was captured at Ocracoke Inlet, his activities had earned him such epithets as "that infamous old piratical scoundrel," and "the old villain." It was with great delight that the Continental authorities reported his capture. Commanding the sloop Lilly, he came in over the bar and took the merchant schooner Polly and three other vessels. Two of these were immediately taken out by the ten-gun sloop Fincastle, under Lieutenant John Wright, R.N., the vessel to which Lilly was tender. Goodrich, with the other two prizes, one of which was Polly, were caught by wind. Prevented from getting out, they were later captured by a band of Ocracoke pilots who rowed out in several whaleboats and retook the ships. Goodrich and his crew of negro slaves were taken to the jail at Halifax, North Carolina and transferred a short time later to Williamsburg.¹⁴

The two captured sloops, Lilly and Polly, were taken to New Bern, North Carolina where a special Court of Admiralty was convened in order that they might be bought into the North Carolina Navy as tenders to its armed brigs King Tammany and Pennsylvania Farmer.¹⁵ No mention of the fate of the other prize vessel has been found.
Goodrich appears to have had no qualms about "confessing" to his activities on behalf of the British. He admitted being in the service of Lord Dunmore, commanding Lilly under the direct orders of Lt. Wright in Fincastle, and having come into Ocracoke specifically to capture provisions for Dunmore's fleet. He gave a detailed account of the situation of the British naval forces in the Chesapeake Bay and claimed to have been superintending pilot on board HMS Otter when she sailed up the bay to burn shipping at Baltimore. He and his sons had been active in other areas as well.16

Goodrich was found guilty of bearing arms against the Colony of Virginia, and "guilty of aiding and assisting the enemy, by giving them intelligence..." The Virginia Convention Committee of Privileges and Elections ordered that he be incarcerated at Charlottesville, in Albemarle County, Virginia until further orders. His estate was to be disposed of "as directed by the Ordinance prescribing a mode of punishment for the enemies of America in this colony; that the debt due from the said Goodrich to the country [for the remainder of the gunpowder] be in the first place discharged, and that they make a reasonable provision for the support and maintenance of the wife and young children of the said John Goodrich out of his estate..."17

Goodrich, who had been ill with a fever, was maintained at Williamsburg in Princess Anne County jail until
July 22, 1776, when he was judged sufficiently healthy to travel. He was then transported under guard to the prison at Charlottesville where he remained for over a year.¹⁸

John, Jr. was arrested and held in Princess Anne with his father following the latter’s capture, but was released into the custody of his father-in-law, William Harwood, after paying a security bond of £1000. His wife, who had been living aboard a vessel in Lord Dunmore’s fleet, was allowed to visit him in jail and very probably resided with him on her father’s plantation during his bond period.¹⁹

During this time Bridger and Bartlett were both actively privateering and assisting Dunmore. Bridger appears to have been the most flamboyant of the brothers, involving himself in many bold and dashing exploits which often included pitched battles with patriot forces. He commanded the tender sloop Lady Susan from at least as early as June, 1776, and often used her in raiding up and down the Chesapeake.²⁰

While the actual number of ships in the Goodrich fleet undoubtedly varied somewhat, several of them were relatively constant throughout the war. HMS Otter (16) and HMS Harlem (12) were commissioned Royal Navy vessels. While they cannot be said to have belonged to Goodrich, they appear to have been in constant company with his privateers. Dunmore (16), Hammond (14), Lord North (12) and Fincastle (12) were all owned by the family and engaged in service as
privateers. These last four names surface continually in the literature and it was likely one of the last two that conducted the May, 1778 cutting out expedition in Beaufort Harbor.

Bartlett Goodrich, returning in a small sloop to the Chesapeake from the West Indies with a cargo for Dunmore's fleet, had the misfortune to run afoul of a determined land force in a small backwater on Virginia's Eastern Shore. Caught literally "up the creek," he was captured and jailed in Princess Anne with his father in early June, 1776. Another brother was soon to follow.

On July 27 Lady Susan, enroute from Bermuda to Virginia with William Goodrich in command, was captured by the Continental Navy (CN) brig Lexington. This vessel, formerly the merchant brig Wild Duck, was commanded by none other than John Barry, the highly talented Irishman who, two years later, would be ordered to take the Continental frigate Raleigh south from Boston in an effort to destroy the Goodrich fleet. William was imprisoned at Philadelphia where, probably in an attempt to obtain his own release, he made a detailed statement to the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety regarding his part in the gunpowder plot of 1775. Letters to his brothers Bridger, Bartlett and John, Jr. not only give a lively account of the capture of Lady Susan, but also afford an insight into the nature and spirit of the combatants.
With the defeat of Washington’s army at the hands of General William Howe in August, 1776, the city of New York came firmly under British control. It immediately became a favorite haven for British privateers. The Goodriches operated from there and from Bermuda, working with the aid and support of Dunmore and other British leaders to continue ravaging American shipping in the Atlantic and Caribbean and to conduct their destructive hit-and-run raids on towns and plantations. The family had lost their entire extensive fortune in Virginia. They were determined to recover it through the lucrative practice of legalized piracy, and this determination was to cost the Americans dearly. As their depredations continued and their field of operations grew, so did their infamy.

The misfortunes of John, Sr., William and Bartlett in no way hindered the operation of the family business. John, Jr. and Bridger conducted the enterprise, enlisting the services of other Loyalist sea captains who gladly took command of Goodrich vessels. Bridger, in command of the ship Molly, one of Dunmore’s prizes, was captured in September by Captain Nicholas Biddle of the CN brig Andrew Doria, and jailed at Philadelphia with his brother William.24 They and several other prisoners were removed to the city of Baltimore just prior to December 21, 1776. On the 29th of that month, along with four Scots Tories from North Carolina, they made their escape. The brothers later claimed to have bribed
their jailer with £600 sterling. An idea of the reputation which the family had acquired by this time can be ascertained from contemporary accounts of the escape. William and Bridger are described as "two of the most noted traitors in America; both being partisans of lord Dunmore and very active for him in all the piracies and depredations committed by him in Chasapeake Bay." Physical descriptions are included. Their importance is further indicated by the rewards offered: fifteen pounds apiece for each of the North Carolinians, one hundred pounds each for the Goodrich brothers.25

John Goodrich, Sr. escaped from Charlottesville in August, 1777, but was soon recaptured. William was reported operating the sloop Hammond between Bermuda, New York and Virginia in March, 1777. Bridger was in the Chesapeake in May, working with Dunmore. Bartlett was either released or escaped from Princess Anne jail sometime prior to January, 1778, but no record has been located.26

By the fall of 1777 Bermuda had become the primary base of the family's operations. Located within easy sailing distance of every sea lane from the Delaware Capes to the Caribbean, the island was under British control and had good facilities for the maintenance and repair of warships. It was an ideal location from which to raid shipping along the southern Atlantic seaboard. Bermudian merchant vessels were exempted from capture by Continental ships by order of the Marine Committee of Congress, and many of the island's
inhabitants carried on a constant trade with the colonies, especially with North Carolina. Their primary activity was exchanging salt, which the island had in abundance, for foodstuffs, which the Crown could not supply to its island possessions. This situation caused a great deal of tension between the islanders and the Tory privateersmen.27

Many of the Loyalist captains who sailed with the Goodriches commanded their own vessels. Others took temporary command of ships owned by the ex-Virginians. Some of these men were, like the Goodriches, American colonists who had chosen to remain loyal to their king. Others, described as "Scottish and Irish adventurers," were no doubt in the trade simply for money and excitement.28

The favorite sailing tactic of these privateer squadrons was similar to the wolfpack methods of the German U-boats of World War II. Three, four or more vessels, cruising together, would spread out in a long line across a stretch of ocean, like a huge net to catch unwary merchantmen. Their search area was vastly greater than that of a single vessel, the chance of the prey to escape was reduced, and the combined firepower of the privateers was usually much greater than anything but a man-of-war.

Although the record is far from complete it is apparent that even though captured by the Americans from time to time the Goodrich brothers and their father remained at large throughout most of the war. William and Bridger appear to
have been the most active in the actual conduct of the family's seaborne ventures. Bartlett, who was out of Princess Anne jail by the latter part of 1777, spent at least part of his time in England securing military supplies for the family business. By British law, anyone desiring to transport goods out of the country was required to submit a petition to the Crown through the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations for permission to do so. These petitions gave the nature of the cargo, who wished to ship it, in what ship(s), its destination, and the purpose for which it was intended. Bartlett, in addition to buying supplies, was responsible for making arrangements for shipping the material and making the proper petition to get it to its destination. He also attempted to secure political aid in obtaining the release of his father, who was still locked up in Virginia.29

In North Carolina, because the privateers had become so active along the coast, the legislature began taking steps to protect the commerce and citizenry of the State. The establishment of the tiny North Carolina Navy in 1776 had been their first step, but by the first months of 1778 at least one of its ships, Pennsylvania Farmer, had been decommissioned and sold. Part of her stores were used to supply Fort Hancock, which was being constructed at Cape Lookout, near Beaufort. Funds were also allocated for the "repair of Fort Johnson," a defensive structure located near present-day Southport, at the mouth of the Cape Fear River.30
The Goodrich ships and other privateers were constantly hovering about the various inlets in North Carolina, hoping to snap up prizes as they entered and left the ports. The cruisers tended to stay just far enough offshore to be able to run from a warship or heavily armed American privateer, but remained close enough to keep a sharp watch for merchant traffic. They were well known for entering the inlets and river mouths in their quest for captures, so it was with no great surprise that the North Carolina Gazette reported the cutting out from Beaufort Harbor of Raleigh's erstwhile prize:

There are now cruising on this coast three privateers. Capt. McFarling in a 16 gun brig, and Captains Neal and Goodrich in 10 gun sloops. They have lately taken several vessels near Ocracock Bar, and a few days ago, Captain Goodrich decoyed the pilots at old Topsail Inlet, came in and took a brig, a prize sent in by the Continental frigate Raleigh, and a vessel just arrived from Charlestown with a valuable cargo and a large sum of money on board. He endeavoured to carry off the brig, but not being able to get her out, set her on fire and left her; she had on board 1200 bushels of salt, had just been condemned by the court of admiralty and sold, and we hear those concerned extinguished the fire and have saved the salt, but the vessel is ruined. A fort is now building at Cape Lookout bay, for the protection of vessels that may lie there, but the harbour within old Topsail Inlet is quite exploded, and while the pilots on the sea coast are so easily decoyed, and receive such ample rewards for their fidelity, we fear the trade of this State will be entirely stopped.\[3]

Such brash tactics are exactly the kind of thing one would expect from Bridger Goodrich, although the sloop could have been commanded by any of the family. The action of burning the prize when it could not be successfully taken out
was also typical privateer practice, although the Goodriches may have gotten slightly more satisfaction from watching the enemy's property going up in flames than would the average Tory. A large number of depredations along the North Carolina coast were blamed on Goodrich throughout the summer and into the fall. The persistence and frequency of these attacks is further evidence of the heavy concentration of British raiders at Bermuda.\textsuperscript{32} It is not known with certainty whether only one Goodrich or several were active in the area. Momentary hope that a Goodrich sloop had gone down in a storm in August, 1778, appear to have been groundless, as there are no reports of any of the brothers being lost at sea.\textsuperscript{33}

The seriousness of the situation eventually prompted action on the part of the Marine Committee of the Continental Congress, who in late August ordered Captain John Barry in the frigate Raleigh to take his ship south and "to take certain armed Vessels fitted out by the Goodriches, or any other of the enemies Vessels that may be infesting that Coast."\textsuperscript{34} There are no indications that this cruise ever took place.

On November 15 a Goodrich sloop came into Currituck Inlet and burned two outward bound merchantmen. The sloop then landed men at Liberty Plains who killed several head of cattle before retiring to their ships. In a letter to the Navy Board dated only one day later, the Marine Committee expressed its concern regarding the seriousness of the Goodrich threat, and requested that a naval force be put
together to deal with the problem once and for all. Like Barry's mission, there is no record of this force ever having been assembled or sent after the Britishers.

The Goodriches were active up until the very end of the war. Early in 1779, a concentration of their ships lay off the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay, their fleet having attained such numbers that Congress again voiced its alarm to the Navy Board. At least one Goodrich took part in every major raid into Virginia during that period. In May, 1779, several of their vessels entered the bay with the fleet of Commodore Sir George Collier for a joint attack of naval and military units on Norfolk, Portsmouth and Suffolk, Virginia. This turned out to be one of the most destructive expeditions of the entire war. Even after Collier withdrew his troops from the shore and his ships from the bay, the Goodriches remained, burning, plundering and rampaging up and down the Chesapeake shore. At least one Goodrich ship, Arbuthnot (20), was with General Leslie during his seizure of Portsmouth in the fall of 1780, and Goodrich himself supposedly loaned the British government some £200,000 to help mount the expedition.

The merchant ship that Goodrich cut out and burned at the entrance to Beaufort Harbor was but one of the many he victimized during the war. By his own count John Goodrich, Senior claimed to have taken or destroyed over five hundred vessels in the interest of his country. This rather astounding claim was supported by a number of high ranking
British officers. The entire family returned to England in 1783, and John, Sr. died at Grove House, Topsham, Devon, in 1785.²⁷
ENDNOTES: Chapter I


3. John Page to Thomas Jefferson, November 24, 1775, remarking that "Gatrick" [Goodrich] had been taken by Dunmore, but supporting the notion that he was the right man for the job, Julian P. Boyd (ed.), The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton, 1950), I, 265, hereinafter cited as Boyd, Papers; Curtis, "Family," 53; John Murray Dunmore, the Fourth Earl of Dunmore, 1732-1809, was governor of Virginia from 1771 until he was forced to flee in 1775. He commanded the British naval and military forces in the Chesapeake Bay until he returned to England in 1781. He was later made governor of the Bahamas. Mark M. Boatner, Encyclopedia of the American Revolution (New York, 1963), 340, hereinafter cited as Boatner, Encyclopedia.


6. Curtis, "Family," 58-59; William Goodrich to the Pennsylvania Council of Safety, September 7, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, VI, 738-739; Dixon and Hunter's Virginia Gazette, October 21, 1775; Robert Carter Nicholas to the Virginia Delegates in Congress, November 25, 1775, "...old Capt. Jno. Goodrich and his Son William have likewise been seised. They have given mortal Offence in securing and bringing into us a little Gun Powder," Boyd, Papers, I, 267.

7. Lord Dunmore to Lord George Germain, March 30, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, IV, 586; Curtis, "Family," 60; William
8. St. Eustatius was a Dutch free-trade port through which an enormous amount of commerce was transacted during the Revolution. Goods were imported from nations all over the world, relabeled, repacked and resold. Dutch and French gunpowder was sold to the rebelling colonies disguised as British tea, and other contraband changed hands, often ending up in the hands of the enemies of its country of origin. Astronomical profits could be made, and the Goodriches did no more than hundreds of other merchants all during the war. Curtis, "Family," 61-62; Edwin Dethlefsen et al., "Archaeology on St. Eustatius: Pompeii of the New World," Archaeology, 35 (March-April, 1982), 9, hereinafter cited as Dethlefsen, "St. Eustatius"; William M. Fowler, Rebels Under Sail (New York, 1976), 93, hereinafter cited as Fowler, Rebels; Charles Moran, "St. Eustatius, the Island that was Different," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 88 (January, 1942), 85, hereinafter cited as Moran, "St. Eustatius"; Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1905 (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, reprint 1980), 168-169; hereinafter cited as Mahan, Sea Power; Toth, West Indies, 156.


11. Captain Andrew Snape Hammond, R.N. to Captain Matthew Squire, HMS Otter, February 26, 1776, ordering him to "consult with Mr. Goodrich [Bridger Goodrich] regarding the matter of securing provisions from the inhabitants of the Chesapeake Bay country, Clark, Naval Documents, IV, 93; Maryland Council of Safety to the Virginia Committee of Safety, March 9, 1776, reports HMS Otter and two tenders raiding for provisions and taking prizes in the Patuxent and Patapsco Rivers, Peter Force (ed.), American Archives Consisting of a Collection of Authentick Records, State Papers, Debates and Letters and Other Notices of Publick Affairs, Ser. 4, V, 145, hereinafter cited as Force, Archives; the examination of Captain Thomas Wirt, March 10, 1776, reports a Goodrich (probably Bridger) in command of Otter's tender raiding along the Maryland shore, Clark, Naval Documents, IV, 289; Lord Dunmore to Lord George
Germain, March 30, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, IV, 586; Lord Dunmore to Vice Admiral James Young, April 9, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, IV, 742; Vice Admiral James Young to Lord Dunmore, May 13, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, V, 83; Confession of John Goodrich, "Virginia Legislative Papers," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, XVII (1909), 171-172, hereinafter cited as VMHB, "Papers."

12. Minutes of the Virginia Committee of safety, April 3, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, IV, 653; Curtis, "Family," 67.


14. This is a widely reported and profusely documented incident. Goodrich, "that infamous old piratical scoundrel," was by this time as unpopular with the Americans as he could have wished to be. His depredations had been felt throughout the colonies, and there was great jubilation at the news of his capture. Extract of a Letter from North-Carolina dated Halifax the Twenty-second of April, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, IV, 1209; Thomas Jones to James Iredell, April 28, 1776, Griffith J. McRee, The Life and Correspondence of James Iredell (New York, 1857), I, 279, hereinafter cited as McRee, Iredell; James Iredell to Joseph Hewes, April 29, 1776, William L. Saunders (ed.), The Colonial Records of North Carolina (Raleigh, 1910), X, 1037, hereinafter cited as Saunders, Records; also McRee, Iredell, II, 596; Journal of the Provincial Congress at Halifax, North Carolina, April 30, 1776, Saunders, Records, X, 549-550, also Clark, Naval Documents, IV, 1345-1346; William Lux and Daniel Bowly to the Maryland Council of Safety, April 30, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, IV, 1344-1345; Purdie’s Virginia Gazette, May 3, 1776; Pennsylvania Evening Post (Philadelphia), May 3, 1776; David Stick, The Outer Banks of North Carolina (Chapel Hill, 1958), 45-47, hereinafter cited as Stick, Outer Banks; Force, Archives, Ser. 5, II, 162; the tactics employed by the Ocracoke pilots marks but one instance of whaleboats and other small craft being used by the Americans against British ships and installations, an activity so widespread it has been referred to as "whaleboat warfare," and its practitioners as "whaleboat guerrillas," David Syrett, "Defeat at Sea: The Impact of American Naval Operations upon the British, 1775-1778," Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution (Washington, D.C., 1977), 14-15 hereinafter cited as Syrett, "Defeat"; Boatner, Encyclopedia, 82, 537-538, 680, 1196; Earnest E. Rogers, "Captain Charles Bulkeley’s Narrative of Personal Experiences in the War of the American Revolution from His Original Manuscript," Connecticut’s Naval Office at New London during the War of the American Revolution (New Haven, 1933), 126, hereinafter cited as Rogers, "Bulkeley"; Gardner W. Allen, A Naval History of the American Revolution (New York, 1913), II, 568, hereinafter
cited as Allen, History.


19. Minutes of the Virginia Committee of Safety, May 3, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, IV, 1394; Virginia Convention, May 20, 1776, Force, Archives, Ser. 4, VI, 1530; one entry in Force, Archives states that Mrs. Goodrich and her "young children" are to be allowed to visit John Goodrich in jail, but does not specify Junior or Senior, also it notes that she is not to be allowed to leave the city of Williamsburg after said visits, Force, Archives, Ser. 4, VI, 1530 and 1543.

20. Bridger Goodrich figures prominently in many of the naval actions along the shores of the Chesapeake and its tributary rivers. In April, 1776, he captured a New England vessel at Hobbs Hole on the Rappahannock but had to abandon it after a two-hour battle with some "armed pilot boats," at the cost to himself of several men killed. Before leaving the prize Goodrich ran her aground and fired her, Diary of Colonel Landon Carter, April 22, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, IV, 1207; Purdie's Virginia Gazette, May 3, 1776; Goodrich's orders were to "...take and destroy...any other Vessels, or boats you may meet...and otherwise annoy the enemy by every means in your power," Captain Andrew Snape Hammond, R.N. to Lieutenant John Wright, June 10, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, V, 463; Bridger Goodrich's command, the sloop Lady Susan, is reported as mounting four three-pounder carriage guns and a pair of two-pounders, with a crew of twenty men, while Fincastle, her usual consort, mounted ten four-pounders and had a crew of thirty-five, E. Johnson to
Lieutenant Alexander Somerville, Calvert County [Maryland], June 22, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, V, 685; a "List of Ships in Lord Dunmore's Fleet" in July, 1776, reports Fincastle as mounting twelve guns and includes "Seven sloops occupied by Messrs Spedden [Shedden] and Goodriches familys," and the "Sloop Lady Susan a Tender Briger Goodrich Commander," Clark, Naval Documents, V, 1021-1022, also Force, Archives, Ser. 5, I, 152.


22. Purdie's Virginia Gazette, June 7, 1776; Dixon and Hunter's Virginia Gazette, June 8, 1776.

23. The capture of Lady Susan (armed at that time with eight four-pounder carriage guns) was challenged by her owner, one Joseph Hinkson of Bermuda, on the grounds that his ship had been illegally commandeered by Lord Dunmore. On August 22, 1776, the Court of Admiralty for Philadelphia ruled that the owner should receive one-half the money from the sale of Lady Susan, one-third of the remainder to go to John Barry and the crew of Lexington, and the other two-thirds to go to Congress, Clark, Naval Documents, VI, 42n; Extract of a letter from Philadelphia, August 3, 1776, Force, Archives, Ser. 5, I, 741; Josiah Bartlett to John Langdon, August 5, 1776, remarks about the "infamous Goodriches of Virginia," Clark, Naval Documents, VI, 63-64; Extract: William Goodrich to John Goodrich, Jr., September 5, 1776, gives details of Lady Susan's capture by Lexington and Barry's subsequent capture by ruse of the British privateer sloop Betsey, Samuel Kerr, master. The attitude of the combatants in these actions appears to have been quite jovial, almost as if the whole war were something of a joke, Clark, Naval Documents, VI, 716; William Goodrich to Bridger and Bartlett Goodrich, n.d., Clark, Naval Documents, VI, 741n; John F. Millar, American Ships of the Colonial and Revolutionary Periods (New York, 1978), 174, 176, hereinafter cited as Millar, Ships; William Lux to Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, March 15, 1776, Force, Archives, Ser. 4, IV, 231; Pennsylvania Packet, September 10, 1776.

24. Pennsylvania Journal, September 18, 1776; Pennsylvania Packet, September 24 and November 12, 1776.

25. On November 23, 1776, while still in the Philadelphia jail, William Goodrich lodged a claim with Congress that the Pennsylvania Council of Safety had taken some money from him at the time of his capture which they refused to acknowledge, and that he needed the money to send to his parents and to have winter clothes made for himself and his
brother [Bridger], Force, Archives, Ser. 5, III, 821; Journal of the Continental Congress, December 21, 1776, a notice informing Congress that a number of prisoners had arrived at Baltimore from Philadelphia, and a resolution that while the other prisoners were to be secured in a convenient room under guard, William and Bridger Goodrich were to be committed to jail, Force, Archives, Ser. 5, III, 1607; from the Maryland Gazette, January 2, 1777, announcement of the escape of the Goodrich brothers, Clark, Naval Documents, VII, 670; Maryland Council to Robert Townsend Hooe, May 30, 1777, in which Captain Laurence Sanford reported that he had seen William and Bridger aboard HMS Roebuck and that the brothers told him they "had effected their escape by bribing the jailor and that it cost them 600 £," Clark, Naval Documents, VIII, 1045.

26. Thomas Jefferson served as County Lieutenant for Albemarle County, Virginia during the period of Goodrich’s imprisonment, escape and reincarceration, Boyd, Papers, II, 5n; a proclamation by His Excellency Patrick Henry offers rewards for "John Goodrich the elder" and three others, plus some Negroes, who had escaped from Albemarle jail and were reported armed and making their way down the James River. The reward for Goodrich was set at one hundred dollars, fifty dollars each for the other white men, twenty-five each for the blacks, Dixon and Hunter’s Virginia Gazette, August 22, 1777, New York Gazette and the Weekly Mercury, March 24, 1777; Purdie’s Virginia Gazette, March 28, 1777; Lord Dunmore to Lord George Germain, February 28, 1777, Clark, Naval Documents, VIII, 619; Maryland Council of Safety to Robert Townsend Hooe, May 30, 1777, Clark, Naval Documents, VIII, 1045.

27. Because of the severe shortage of provisions in Bermuda and other islands controlled by the Crown, and an equally serious deficiency of salt in the colonies, allowances exempting Bermudian merchantmen from capture were instituted by both the Continental and some Provincial Congresses, provided the Bermuda ships were bringing salt to trade, and only for provisions, Walter B. Clark (ed.), State Records of North Carolina (Winston and Goldsboro, 1890-1906), XIII, 553, XXII, 933, and XXIV, 119-122, hereinafter cited as Clark, State Records; British privateering commission issued 10 January, 1778 at Bermuda to Bridger Goodrich of Hammond, 100 tons, eight guns, twenty men, armed by Robert Shelden [Shedden] and William Goodrich, "merchants of Bermuda." Bridger Goodrich, aware that some Bermudian merchants were probably trading contraband to the rebels, announced that he would make prizes of any Bermuda vessels except authorized provision ships, that he found steering
for America, Toth, West Indies, 151-152, 162; Bermuda Court of Vice Admiralty, Proclamation on a libel of Bridger Goodrich, letter-of-marque brigantine Hammond, and William Austin, letter-of-marque sloop Adventure, condemnation of the schooner Boston as a legal prize of war, n.d., Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library (Record Group 45), Area File of the Naval Records Collection 1775-1910, M625, R199, f0246, hereinafter cited as Area File; Bridger Goodrich to Commodore William Hotham, February 7, 1778, stating that the "People of Bermuda forced me to give up two lawful prizes and to promise to take no more of their ships. Many are strong advocates of America and trade with Carolina," Kenneth G. Davies (ed.), Documents of the American Revolution, 1770-1783 (Shannon, Ireland, 1972-1979), XIII, 293, hereinafter cited as Davies, Documents; North Carolina Gazette (New Bern), March 13, 1778.

28. The Goodriches no doubt owe at least part of their reputation to a number of Loyalist captains who sailed in company with them; several of the names appear repeatedly in the literature, often in connection with one of the known Goodrich vessels. A large proportion of them were Scots, Toth, West Indies, 162; Purdie's Virginia Gazette Supplement, April 26, 1776; North Carolina Gazette, May 15 and July 17, 1778; William Goodrich to John Goodrich, Jr., September 5, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, VI, 715; Public instrument dated August 21, 1779 concerning the capture of the schooner John by the British sloop Lord North, Charles Mc Daniels, commander, Area File, M625, R199, f0242.

29. Minutes of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, January 6, 1778, petition of "Bartlet Goodriche" for leave to export sundry military stores to New York on board the ship Bellona (approved), A.E. Stamp (ed.), Journal of the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, January 1776 to May 1782 (London, 1938), XIV, 151, hereinafter cited as Stamp, Journal; Minutes of the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, February 26, 1779, petition of John Ingram to export sundry ordnance and military stores "for the use of several privateers belonging to Messieurs Bartlett and Goodrick" (approved after consideration), Stamp, Journal, XIV, 230; Lord George Germain to General Sir William Howe, March 10, 1778, enclosing a memorial of Bartlett Goodrich, late of Virginia, soliciting aid in obtaining the release of his father, Davies, Documents, XIII, 248; John Goodrich, Sr., escaped from the Charlottesville (Albemarle County) jail August 18, 1777, was caught and confined in Botetourt County, then transferred to Bedford County and was finally sent back to Albemarle County in February, 1778 for trial, after which he was apparently released, Patrick Henry to Thomas Jefferson, Boyd, Papers, II, 173, 174n.


32. Francis Brice to Governor Caswell, Wilmington, May 24, 1778, states that a sloop with "public Pork" was taken by Goodrich and sent to New York, and that he [Brice] fears to ship any more because of "three small privateers constantly cruizing off Beaufort," Clark, *State Records*, XIII, 134; John Easton to Richard Caswell, June 29, 1778, "Gutteridge [Goodrich] with a Brigg in Comp. drove 2 Vessels into a small inlet against Hunting Quar ters last week...," *Governor's Papers*, North Carolina Department of Archives and History, Raleigh, G.P. 4, 107, also Clark, *State Records*, XIII, 175; the John Moseley map of North Carolina, 1733, shows Hunting Quarters Inlet as being located on Core Banks above Drum Inlet and below New Inlet (now closed). The area of sound behind the banks here is called Hunting Quarters, John Moseley map, 1733, North Carolina Department of Archives and History, Raleigh; Diary of Colonel Landon Carter, April 22, 1776, Clark, *Naval Documents*, IV, 1207; "...Old Mr. Goodrich and one of his sons, in two armed Vessels, lately went into Ocracock inlet and burnt four vessels, and carried off five more that were loaded and ready to proceed to sea," Purdie's *Virginia Gazette*, June 19, 1778; *North Carolina Gazette*, July 17, 1778.
33. North Carolina Gazette, August 21, 1778.


35. Samuel Jarvis to Governor Caswell; Clark, State Records, XIII, 285; Delaney, "Outer Banks," 12; Marine Committee to the Commissioners of the Navy Board, November 16, 1778, stating that "At present we consider it an Object of importance to destroy the infamous Goodrich who has much infested our Coast, Cruizing with a squadron of 4, 5, or 6 armed Vessels from 16 Guns downward from Egg harbour to Cape Fear in Carolina, therefore you will please to order a Sufficient force to range the said Coast to remove that nuisance," and reporting that four of the Goodrich vessels had been careening at Bermuda seventeen days previously, Paullin, Out-Letters, II, 27-28.

36. Marine Committee to the Commissioners of the Navy Board of the Eastern Department, January 9, 1779, Paullin, Out-Letters, II, 37; Governor Caswell to Pres't Rutledge of South Carolina, May 26, 1779, describes pillage and destruction committed in Suffolk, Virginia 10-16 May, 1779 by British forces and "a number of Tories among whom old Goodrich is the principal," Clark, State Records, XIV, 99; William Hooper to James Iredell, June 15, 1779, McRee, Iredell, I, 428; Allen, History, II, 569; Charles B. Cross, Jr., A Navy for Virginia (Yorktown, 1980), 63; Stick, Outer Banks, 67-68; John Steuben to Thomas Jefferson, January 21, 1781, Boyd, Papers, IV, 422; George Muter to Thomas Jefferson, March 20, 1781, Boyd, Papers, V, 191.

The American Colonies began their revolution with no navy at all. Despite the existence of a well developed shipbuilding industry, a long established maritime tradition, and a reserve of several thousand experienced seamen trained in her mercantile and fishing fleets, colonial leaders appear to have given little consideration to the actual construction of ships for a Continental Navy until well into 1775. Though a few vessels were purchased for conversion to warships during that year, it was not until December that a definitive effort toward building a navy was made. Early in the month Congress replaced its seven member Naval Committee with a twelve member Marine Committee, asking them to submit a plan for the building of a Continental fleet. The plan they presented, only two days later, was basically identical to one which had been introduced earlier in the year by the Rhode Island delegates Samuel Ward and Stephen Hopkins. It called for the construction of thirteen frigates, five of thirty-two guns, five of twenty-eight guns, and three of twenty-four guns. Responsibility for construction of the various vessels was to be assigned to the different Colonies. New Hampshire was cited for one of the thirty-twos, which was to be the Continental Navy (CN) frigate Raleigh.¹

The formulators of American naval policy realized from the outset that attempting to meet and defeat the British Navy at sea was an audaciously unwise and ultimately unhealthy
idea. For all its resources and the experience and determination of its people, the country had neither the facilities for constructing nor the manpower reserves necessary to man the fleet of line-of-battle ships that would be required to match the English in a conventional naval war. Instead, Congress made it their aim to provide a fleet which could keep open the vital lines of communication between America and her sources of supply in Europe and the West Indies, while simultaneously harassing the British whenever and wherever it could, thereby tying up as much of His Majesty's fleet as possible. In this regard the frigates were the ideal choice. They could be built rapidly and with comparative ease, their speed made them ideal for communications, and they were versatile enough to be suitable for reconnaissance, escort duty, commerce raiding and even transporting supplies. American naval strategy also relied heavily on the numerous privateers spawned by the war.

A large privateer fleet was a definite asset to any belligerent in a sea-borne war, the raiders occupying the attentions of the enemy through depredations on their merchant fleets. With the aid of these private warships, the new Continental Navy was intended to wage a protracted, large-scale guerrilla war on the sea, and it was designed to fit that purpose.²

Congress established that the member of the Marine Committee from the State where each Continental vessel was to
be built would be accountable for its construction. Thus Raleigh became the responsibility of John Langdon, a prominent New Hampshire merchant and shipowner, who was eventually to become governor of that State. Langdon supplied the necessary funds for construction and outfitting, and provided land for a building site on Rising Castle Island (also known as Langdon’s Island and Badger’s Island) in the Piscataqua River between Portsmouth, New Hampshire and Kittery, Maine.¹

Langdon appointed a well respected shipbuilder, one James H. Hackett of Salisbury, Massachusetts, together with Stephen Paul and James Hill of Portsmouth, to build the new frigate. A local sea captain and shipbuilder, Thomas Thompson, was designated as her inspector. Congress was supposed to supply plans of each vessel to the contractors, but was so slow in doing so that the Rhode Island and New Hampshire builders went ahead on their own. Hackett had a design of his own for a thirty-two gun frigate, and Langdon authorized its use rather than continuing to wait for the plans from Congress.² Raleigh’s keel was laid March 21, 1776, and her completed hull was launched May 21 of the same year, in the incredibly short time of just sixty days. She was moved to a dock at Langdon’s yard to finish fitting out, and she commenced enlisting her crew in June.³

When completed, Raleigh’s hull measured 131 feet, 5 inches on the gun deck, with a keel length of 110 feet, 7 1/4 inches. Her beam was 34 feet, 5 inches and her depth of hold
11 feet. Her displacement, fully rigged out, provisioned and ready for sea was 697 tons. Raleigh carried the standard sail configuration for a frigate of her day, being ship-rigged, with a square course, topsail, and topgallant on each of her three masts, with the addition of a gaff-rigged spanker, or driver, on the mizzen. She also carried a number of headsails and staysails. Her full war crew would have numbered 240 officers and men, but considering the difficulties usually encountered in manning government ships, it is doubtful that she ever carried a full complement. Raleigh probably shipped about seventy tons of ballast, a figure of around ten per cent of a vessel's displacement being standard for CN ships.

American shipbuilders used a variety of materials in constructing their vessels. Ships launched in the New England colonies were usually framed and planked with live oak, decked and masted with pine, with spruce being used for some of the lighter spars. While some American yards employed the brine cured oak used in most European navy yards, the rush program to build America's new frigates allowed no time for this lengthy process to be implemented, or even for the wood to age adequately after being cut. Consequently, many of the vessels constructed during this period, both for the government and for private concerns as well, were built of improperly seasoned timber. The lighter, freshly cut wood made the American vessels faster under sail and cheaper to construct.
than European ships of comparable size, but it also earned them a reputation for poor quality and susceptibility to rot. American ships became known for their speed, handling qualities and grace of design, but not for their longevity.

Despite the rapidity with which the frigate's hull had been completed, Langdon now began to encounter difficulties which would keep his ship in Portsmouth for over a year.

Aside from the fact that Congress was characteristically slow to reimburse him for the money he was paying out to get the ship built, manned and supplied, Langdon was plagued by shortages of necessary equipment and materials. Iron for ship fittings appears to have been especially scarce, and the few American foundries that existed were unable to supply the demands of the entire country. In Raleigh's case the deficit was made up in part by stripping captured British ships which had been brought into Portsmouth as prizes.

The difficulties of supplying and crewing Continental ships were further increased by the presence of large numbers of privateers fitting out in American ports. Privateer owners paid for materials in cash, on the spot, and without undue haggling, unlike Congress, which paid reluctantly (if at all) and only after repeated requests from the vendor. Consequently the privateer trade got preferential treatment from ship chandlers and yards, often to the point that regular Navy ships went without needed supplies for months at a time.
Privateers created other problems for Continental vessels as well. By the time Congress got around to authorizing the construction of a navy, the American seacoast had been swept clean of experienced seamen, most of whom had shipped aboard privateers. Few of these men had any desire to forgo the lucrative, easy-disciplined pastime of privateering for the more harsh and far less profitable life aboard a CN ship, and the Navy had to make do with whatever personnel it could get.\textsuperscript{12}

Raleigh’s problem was further compounded by the fact that during the latter part of her fitting out she was in competition with the CN ship Ranger, under the celebrated Captain John Paul Jones, who was also outfitting and recruiting at Portsmouth, as were at least five privateers. Ironically, Ranger was also Langdon’s responsibility, and some of the privateers were wholly or partially owned by him as well.\textsuperscript{13}

During this outfitting period Thomas Thompson was appointed captain of the new frigate. There were excellent reasons for his selection for this position, above and beyond his familiarity with the ship. In the 18th century there were no basic training camps or pools of recruits from which commanders could draw to man their vessels. Men were enlisted from the same geographic area in which a ship was built or homeported, and enlistments were usually for only one voyage, or for one year. No self-respecting seaman would sign into a ship unless the recruiting captain was either a well-respected
local man, as was Thompson, or a man of substantial professional reputation, as was Jones. Consequently, most of the CN captains assigned to the new ships were residents of the localities in which the vessels were built.\textsuperscript{14}

Langdon's most severe problem in getting Raleigh ready for sea was guns. One of the larger of the 1776 frigates, she mounted thirty-two cannon, her main battery consisting of twenty-six twelve pounders on the gun deck, with half a dozen six-pounders on the quarter deck.\textsuperscript{15} The story of Langdon's efforts to obtain a full set of guns for the ship is one of persistence, bureaucratic ineptitude, and plain greed on the part of civilian suppliers. His correspondence on the subject is voluminous, and includes letters to Governor Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut, where the guns were originally to have been cast, to William Whipple, Josiah Bartlett and John Hancock of the Continental Congress, plus numerous other officials and dignitaries.\textsuperscript{16} After fully a year of protestations, no less than four trips to Providence, Rhode Island, and accusations that prompted a Congressional investigation, Langdon was forced to abandon his quest. Raleigh was armed with a badly mismatched collection of pieces, some donated locally, some purchased, and some taken from prizes.\textsuperscript{17}

Finally, about August 12, 1777, over a year after her launching and still short of her 240-man complement, Raleigh got to sea in company with the twenty-four gun frigate Alfred
(formerly the merchantman Black Prince) under Captain Elisha Hinman, bound for France. ¹⁰

The voyage of Raleigh and Alfred across the Atlantic illustrates some of the reasons Congress ordered frigates built for the Navy instead of larger, more formidable vessels. They were quite fast, and a prime consideration was communication with America's European allies, most notably France. Virtually every Continental ship crossing the Atlantic carried dispatches to or from the Congress and American diplomats in Paris. Frigates were well enough armed to out-gun anything they were unable to outsail, and fast enough to outsail anything more heavily armed than themselves. On this voyage, Raleigh and Alfred carried a cargo of masts and spars, delivered dispatches, and engaged in a little commerce raiding along the way.

During the crossing, according to various sources, the two frigates took a schooner from New York with $4390 on board, much of which was counterfeit Continental and Massachusetts money. They burned this vessel, but sent in another, the snow Nancy, as a prize. On September 3, they encountered part of the British Windward Islands fleet, having learned its location from the crew of Nancy. This group of about sixty ships was under convoy by four British men of war, one of whom, HMS Druid (20), Captain Carteret, R.N., was attacked and engaged by Raleigh. Carteret was wounded in the first broadside, and Raleigh mauled Druid so badly that she
had to put into harbor for repairs. Thompson had to break off the action when the other three escorts arrived to assist Druid. Alfred was too far to windward to partake in this action, and Thompson was later criticized for letting the fleet get away with no prizes being taken. A vessel from Bermuda was also captured on the voyage, but was released due to the neutral status enjoyed by merchantmen from that island.

Raleigh and Alfred arrived at L'Orient, France, in late October, putting into that port in what one member of Alfred's crew referred to as "sham distress," although it is unclear exactly what he intends the phrase to mean. They had a pair of prizes in company, which they anchored off a coastal island before going in. During the refit and reprovisioning that followed, Thompson visited Paris in hope of enlisting the aid of the American commissioners in acquiring an adequate assortment of guns for his ship. He and Captain Hinman also recruited hands from among the numerous unemployed French seamen to serve aboard their vessels. This caused the "English Minister" in the port to complain, but the French authorities did nothing to halt the practice.

Four days after Christmas, 1777, the two frigates sailed from the port in company with the sloop Mars and the French frigate La Sylphide. Soon afterwards they were pounced upon by a pair of English frigates which had been patrolling off L'Orient for the specific purpose of capturing American ships.
Raleigh and Alfred sustained sufficient damage in this action that they were forced to return to L'Orient for repairs. They departed again in February, 1778, with a load of military stores for the colonies. Homeward bound, the frigates cruised past Madiera and down the West African coast, where they captured a wine-laden sloop off the Senegal Bar, then turned west for the Windward Islands. The voyage appears to have been uneventful until March 9.23

At six o'clock that morning off Deseada Island, some sixty-seven leagues north of Barbados, the American frigates were sighted by two British ships, HMS Ceres (16), and HMS Ariadne (20), who gave chase. Coming within gun range about five hours later Ariadne fired two shots at Raleigh with no effect. At half past twelve Ceres came up with Alfred and the two commenced exchanging broadsides. At one o'clock Ariadne joined her companion, forcing Hinman to strike his colors approximately half an hour later. Instead of coming to Alfred's assistance, Thompson made off, throwing stores and cargo overboard to lighten his vessel. The British continued their pursuit until eight o'clock the following morning before abandoning the chase. Thompson later claimed that Raleigh was too far to windward to assist Alfred, and that the smaller ship "bore away at an unfavorable time" and was captured as a result. Less charitable historians attribute this victory by the two more lightly armed British ships to temerity on Thompson's part and generally sloppy seamanship by both
American vessels. One of Alfred's crew members bluntly questioned Thompson's loyalty, stating that "...we commenced action and the Raleigh, Capt. Thompson (he being an Englishman) ran away and left us without firing a gun."24

The Marine Committee would appear to have been in agreement; Raleigh reached Portsmouth on April 6, 1778, and Thompson was suspended from command on May 9, pending a hearing. This was about as fast as messages could be expected to travel between Portsmouth and Philadelphia and back. John Barry was appointed to command the frigate on May 30. Captain Thompson was later cashiered from the Navy, although a number of Alfred's crew would have much preferred to have seen him hanged.25

It was during the last part of this cruise, between March 10 and April 6, 1778, that Raleigh encountered and captured a salt-laden vessel that she sent into Port Beaufort, North Carolina. She was by that time in an area of heavy ship traffic between the West Indies and the colonies, an area favored by American warships and privateers as a hunting ground for British merchantmen. Salt was an important and extremely valuable cargo often carried between the two regions. The fact that the prize was sent into Beaufort instead of St. Croix, St. Eustatius, or one of the other Caribbean ports friendly to the Americans suggests that the capture occurred to the north of the Bahamas and probably south of Bermuda. The selection of Beaufort over other
American ports such as Charles Town, South Carolina and Portsmouth, Virginia, strengthens and supports this theory. The exact date of her arrival at Beaufort has not been determined, but as late as April 16 New England newspapers were reporting that all of Raleigh’s prizes “except one brig with salt” had come safely into port.\textsuperscript{26}

Richard Ellis, the Continental prize agent at New Bern, North Carolina whose jurisdiction included Beaufort, notified the Marine Committee of the vessel’s arrival in a letter written April 27, 1778. Their reply, dated May 25, acknowledges Ellis’ letter and gives him instructions for the disposal of the ship and cargo. Ironically, by the time the Committee issued its response, the prize had already been condemned, sold, captured by John Goodrich, and burned.\textsuperscript{27}

In August, under her new captain, Raleigh was in Boston attempting to ship hands but having a difficult time, “...the Thirst being for Privateering.” On August 24 the Marine Committee ordered Barry south “...to take certain armed Vessels fitted out by the Goodriches, or any other of the enemies Vessels that may be infesting that Coast.” It is not certain whether this cruise was ever undertaken. If Barry did go south he was unsuccessful, as Goodrich and his fleet were quite active right up until the end of the war.\textsuperscript{28}

Raleigh did eventually ship enough hands to get to sea, even though Barry had to sign on a few prisoners of war to do it. The frigate left Boston on September 25, escorting two
merchant vessels. Three days later, off the coast of Maine, she encountered HMS *Experiment* (50) and HMS *Unicorn* (22). Barry, outnumbered and badly outgunned, led the King's ships on a sixty-hour chase and then fought the pair of them for seven hours. Only after losing his foretopmast and main topgallantmast, and with a jib and most of his staysails shot away, did Barry order his ship run ashore. He managed to save about eighty-five of his crew from capture. Some twenty-five were killed and 140 taken prisoner. *Raleigh* herself was captured by the British after one of her midshipmen, one Jesse Jaycocks, failed to light the fires that would have destroyed her. The English crews refloated her and she was bought into the Royal Navy as HMS *Raleigh*. She was described as one of the British squadron at the siege of Charles Town, South Carolina, in 1780. She was condemned and sold out of the service in July, 1783. Barry was exonerated by a court of inquiry and continued his career, becoming one of the most exceptional naval officers in American history.

Richard Ellis, the Continental agent who probably handled the condemnation and sale of the prize, continued in his office until the end of the war. Whether or not his contact with Samuel Hodge and *Raleigh*’s prize crew was direct, and to what extent he may have involved himself in the legal proceedings regarding the vessel was the subject of considerable research. A description of the agent system and Ellis’ place therein is contained in the following chapter.
ENDNOTES: Chapter II


3. Later in the war John Langdon also took on responsibility for the construction of the CN corvette Ranger and the seventy-four gun ship America, the only line of battle ship built during the Revolution, Fowler, Rebels, 191, 218; Samuel Elliot Morison, John Paul Jones, a Sailor’s Biography (Boston, 1959), 104, hereinafter cited as Morison, Jones; Oliver P. Remick, A Record of the Services of the Commissioned Officers and Enlisted Men of Kittery and Elliot, Maine (Boston, n.d.), 6, hereinafter cited as Remick, Record; a copy of this source (Remick, Record) in the Manuscripts Division of the New Hampshire Historical Society, signed and annotated by the author, was published in 1901 and updated by hand in 1909, Personal Communication, Thomas E. Camden, New Hampshire Historical Society, Concord, New Hampshire, November 5, 1982.

4. It was standard practice to assign an experienced shipbuilder who was not involved in the construction of a
vessel as its inspector, to insure the ship was properly built and that the owner's money was well spent, Fowler, Rebels, 191, 195-196; Morison, Jones, 90; Charles G. Davis, Ships of the Past (New York, 1929), 78; hereinafter cited as Davis, Ships.


6. Chapelle, Navy, 69; Davis, Ships, 78 and plate facing 83.

7. Davis, Ships, 78, 87, 91; Fowler, Rebels, 208; Chapelle, Navy, 76.

8. While there are some differences of opinion regarding types of timber used in the construction of colonial vessels, this description is probably accurate. Materials depended largely on what woods were available locally. In the Southern Colonies, oak was generally used for framing, cedar and pine for planking. Unseasoned or improperly seasoned wood is much more susceptible to "dry rot," a deterioration resulting from repeated wetting and drying of the wood. Brine cured timber was soaked in salt water for up to two years before being used in ship construction, and usually outlasted untreated wood by from two to five times as long, Marshall Smelser and William I. Davisson, "The Longevity of Colonial Ships," The American Neptune, XXXIII (January, 1973), 17, hereinafter cited as Smelser, "Longevity"; Howard A. LeVan, Jr., "The Continental Navy Frigate Raleigh," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 85, #682 (December, 1959), 148, hereinafter cited as LeVan, "Raleigh"; Davis, Ships, 80; Fowler, Rebels, 18.

9. John Langdon to John Hancock, November 6, 1776, reminding the "Honbl Committee" that Langdon is paying out a lot of money for the construction and outfitting of Raleigh and that the Committee has yet to reimburse him for any of it, Clark, Naval Documents, VII, 59.

10. Eighteenth century iron manufacture was then, as it is now, a capital intensive enterprise. This, plus the fact that facilities had to be located close to sources of ore, fuel, and water power, restricted the number of forges and concentrated them in specific geographical areas, primarily eastern Pennsylvania, New Jersey and southeastern Massachusetts. The problems of manufacturing and transporting the enormous quantities of iron needed to outfit the new frigates were vastly increased by the
British blockade, as the easier sea routes were suddenly closed and all the material had to be shipped overland, Fowler, Rebels, 207.

11. Observations of a British sea captain, Mr. Lamont of the British ship Spies remarks, "There is another six and thirty gun frigate building in Piscataqua, the furnishing of which is retarded by the want of iron, but lately they have got a small supply from Philadelphia, and some ready manufactured, in the Julius Caesar, from London," Clark, Naval Documents, VII, 300.

12. According to the first set of prize regulations issued by Congress on September 25, 1775, the government would keep one-half the prize money from all enemy warships captured by Continental Navy vessels, the other half to be shared out among the crew of the capturing vessel. Congress was to receive two-thirds of the proceeds from all transports, supply ships and merchantmen taken by CN ships. This regulation was changed in October, 1776 to allow the captors full value for captured warships and one-half value for transports, supply ships and merchantmen. By contrast, private warships (privateers) were required to divide their profits with no one, nor were their crews subject to harsh naval discipline, and they generally avoided combat with Royal Navy ships and the larger of the British privateers, Morison, Jones, 34; Journal of the Continental Congress, October 30, 1776, Force, Archives, Ser. 5, II, 1417; Mevers, "Naval Policy," 5; William Whipple to Josiah Bartlett, July 12, 1778, in which he complains that privateering has forced wages for laborers up to three or four dollars a day, and with it the price of provisions, and remarks on the dearth of available seamen in American ports due to the same cause: "...you may depend no public ship will ever be manned while there is a privateer fitting out," William Whipple, "Stray Leaves from an Autograph Collection," Historical Magazine, VI (March, 1862), 73-78, hereinafter cited as Whipple, "Stray Leaves."

13. Morison, Jones, 105-110; Fowler, Rebels, 218; Commodore Hopkins to the Marine Committee, November 2, 1776, discussing a proposed embargo against privateer vessels enlisting men until CN ships were manned, which embargo had failed to pass in Congress because so many of the members were involved in the privateer trade, Force, Archives, Ser. 5, III, 490.

14. During his stay in Portsmouth getting Ranger ready for sea, John Paul Jones met Thompson on several occasions,
and while he (Jones) regarded him as a "good natured fellow and able shipbuilder," his opinion of Thompson as suitable for a command at sea was less than favorable, Morison, Jones, 90, 121; William Whipple to John Langdon, June 10, 1776, Force, Archives, Ser. 4, VI, 1026; Journal of the Continental Congress, June 6, 1776, Force, Archives, Ser. 4, VI, 1698.

15. John Langdon to William Whipple, August 5, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, VI, 56; Fowler, Rebels, 208.

16. When his Connecticut connection through Governor Trumbull failed, Langdon turned to John and Nicholas Brown, owners of the Hope Furnace at Scituate, Rhode Island. His vitriolic letters to Congress describe his troubles with the Rhode Islanders in great detail and fairly accuse them of hoarding materials and selling off the guns designated for Raleigh to a higher bidder. It was not the last time a government contractor would be accused of supplying "private adventurers" in preference to Navy ships. Langdon to Josiah Bartlett, August 19, 1776, indicating he suspects a conspiracy among the Rhode Islanders to prevent him from getting the cannon, Clark, Naval Documents, VI, 229; Langdon to Governor Trumbull, December 3, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, VII, 353; Langdon to William Whipple, December 21, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, VII, 537; Langdon to William Whipple, January 15, 1777, Clark, Naval Documents, VII, 957; Langdon to John Hancock, January 22, 1777, gives full account of Raleigh’s difficulties getting guns and other problems that have delayed her departure, Clark, Naval Documents, VII, 1011-1013; "A List of the Ships & c: at Portsmouth in New-Hampshire, May the 22d. 1777" refers to Raleigh as "A New-Ship pierced for Thirty-two Guns, but has only six or eight Mounted," also mentions Thomas Thompson’s supposed intention to quit Raleigh for another ship, Clark, Naval Documents, VIII, 1016; Fowler, Rebels, 211.

17. Fowler, Rebels, 244; Allen, History, I, 222; "A List of the Ships & c: at Portsmouth in New-Hampshire, May the 22d. 1777," Clark, Naval Documents, VIII, 1016; the subject of Raleigh’s armament was not laid to rest with Langdon’s motley acquisitions. A letter from Hugh Orr, a New England gun founder, to Samuel Phipps Savage, president of the Massachusetts Board of War reads, "With respect to the Expence of Cannon Cast for the Raleigh that Acct. is Setled with Mr. Bradford But that Your Honor may have full Satisfaction I would beg the favour that one of your Clerks may call on Mr. Bradford or his Clerk Mr. Jackson who will favour You with the Acct that I Setled with him."
Presumably this item refers to a set of guns cast for Raleigh after she departed Portsmouth on her maiden voyage, Hugh Orr to Samuel Phipps Savage, July 22, 1779, Area File, M625, R68, f0735-f0736.

18. Remick, Record, 9; Fowler, Rebels, 58.

19. In reports of this incident we have an example of one of the problems encountered when using records from diverse sources for this period. Emmons, Navy, shows Druid as mounting twenty guns and mentions her rescue by the other British escorts. He reports her damage and casualties but fails to give Raleigh's casualties. Remick, Record, gives Druid only fourteen guns, makes no mention of the other British vessels, and reports casualties in Raleigh as "three killed and wounded." Both sources agree on Druid's casualties, putting them as six killed and twenty-six wounded, George F. Emmons, The Navy of the United States from the Commencement, 1775 to 1853 (Washington, D.C., 1853), 44-45, hereinafter cited as Emmons, Navy; Remick, Record, 9; accounts of Thomas Thompson, Lt. Bourchier, R.N. of HMS Druid, and the log of HMS Camel vary considerably in detail, Allen, History, I, 223-230; pension application and testimonials by Thomas Thompson, Surgeon Jno: Jackson, and Geo: Jerry Osborn, Captain of Marines aboard Raleigh, to the effect that John McCoy of Barrington, New Hampshire, was wounded in the thigh by grapeshot during the Raleigh-Druid action. McCoy had enlisted July 12, 1777, for one year as a Marine, Area File, M625, R67, f0613-0614; "A List of the Ships & c: at Portsmouth in New-Hampshire, May the 22d. 1777," Clark, Naval Documents, VIII, 1016.


21. Recruiting of French nationals by American vessels was widely practiced, and though it was a violation of France's neutral status in the Anglo-American conflict, it was essentially ignored by French officials. According to Charles Bulkeley of Alfred, "Whilst we lay in Port, the English Minister making representations and such a noise that we were shipping men, a French Officer was then sent on board to examine and he passed by about forty-five and he could not see one," Rogers, "Bulkeley," 127; British Admiralty Captain's log #60, HMS Ariadne frigate, extract and list of prisoners taken out of Alfred, indicates those

22. Marine Committee to the American Commissioners in France, April 29, 1777, requesting that they assist Thompson in finding guns and supplies, Clark, *Naval Documents*, VIII, 475; M. Courlade to Benjamin Franklin, December 29, 1777, "...the Raleigh and Alfred as well as the sloop Mars set sail this afternoon around three o'clock...", *Area File*, M625, R2, f0713.

23. Letter dated "Portsmouth 16th March 1778," mentions a forty-gun ship, possibly *La Sylphide*, which had sailed in company with Raleigh and Alfred "...but that those two ships had an engagement with two British ships in the Bay [Bay of Biscay] and were obliged to put back to refit..." This explains the two conflicting sailing dates of December 29, 1777 and February, 1778, found elsewhere in the literature, Langdon-Elywn Family Papers, Manuscript Collection, New Hampshire Historical Society, Box 1, Folder 8; Rogers, "Bulkeley," 127; Remick, *Record*, 12; *Boston Continental Journal and Weekly Advertiser*, April 9, 1778.

24. Deseada (Deserada, Desiderada, La Desirade) Island was a major landfall for ships following the westbound tradewinds across the Atlantic. It was generally taken to be the dividing point between the Windward and Leeward Islands, Thomas Jeffreys, "A Map of the Caribee Islands," in Emerson Fite and Archibald Freeman, A Book of Old Maps (Boston, 1926), 197; British Admiralty Captain's log #60, HMS Ariadne frigate, *Area File*, M625, R199, f0142-0146; Remick, *Record*, 12; Fowler, *Rebels*, 147; Allen, *History*, I, 301-304; Rogers, "Bulkeley," 127; *Boston Continental Journal and Weekly Advertiser*, April 9, 1778, *Boston Gazette and Country Journal*, April 13, 1778.


26. *Boston Continental Journal and Weekly Advertiser*, April 9, 1778, *Independent Chronicle and the Universal Advertiser* (Boston), April 16, 1778; Robert Morris to the Marine Committee, February, 1777, indicating the best cruising grounds for American commerce raiders, in speaking of a proposed cruise to the West African coast, pointed out the
amount of British merchant traffic in the area, "you may, it is true, do them much mischief, but the same may be done by cruizing to windward of Barbadoes as all their Guineamen fall in there," Paullin, Out-Letters, I, 65-70.

27. Marine Committee to Richard Ellis, May 25, 1778, acknowledging a letter from Ellis of April 27, noting Raleigh’s prize and instructing Ellis to "purchase the half of the salt belonging to the Captors at the lowest rate you can" and store it at New Bern, Paullin Out-Letters, I, 246; North Carolina Gazette, May 15, 1778.

28. Marine Committee to John Barry, August 24, 1778, Paullin, Out-Letters, I, 287; Allen, History, I, 315; William Heath to Henry Laurens, August 11, 1778, noting Raleigh’s presence in Boston and indicating that she would "sail in a day or two," Papers of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, National Archives, Washington, D.C., M247, R177, i157, p190, hereinafter cited as PCC.

29. Petition to the Massachusetts State Council from John Barry, September 21, 1778, to take five of his "Country Men [Irishmen?] now Imprisoned on board the Gaurd Ship," to serve in Raleigh, and an order from council on the same date giving him permission to do so, Area File, M625, R69, f0107; John Barry’s account of the defense of Raleigh, typed transcript, from the Hepburn Collection, Area File, M625, R69, f0142-0147; narratives of two of Raleigh’s officers describing the action, Allen, History, I, 315-319; a brief account of the capture of Raleigh plus several depictions of Raleigh, Alfred, Druid, Unicorn and other vessels based on original plans and contemporary descriptions, Nowland Van Powell and Richard B. Morris, The American Navies of the Revolutionary War (New York, 1974), 23, 95, 97, 99, 100, 101; hereinafter cited as Van Powell, Navies; document entitled "An exact description of the enemy vessels as they lie in the Channel within the Bar of Charles Town 21st March 5 o’Clock PM 1780 having been very attentively viewed and examined...vis-," the second vessel listed is described as:

"A Frigate (which Mr. Poole said was the Raleigh) a handsome American built vessel; her whole side painted yellow when she came but now only her waste [waist], mounting 26 Guns on her battery."

This document probably accompanied a report from General Benjamin Lincoln to His Excellency Samuel Huntington, President of Congress. Note that the report accounts for
Raleigh's main battery guns only and does not mention her quarterdeck six-pounders, PCC, M247, R177, i156, p351; Chapelle, Navy, 70.
RICHARD ELLIS, CONTINENTAL AGENT

The man who handled the condemnation and sale of Raleigh's prize was the appointed Continental agent for the area, one Richard Ellis, a prosperous New Bern merchant. A prominent and well-respected citizen, Ellis was a highly successful businessman, trader and shipper. He had been appointed commissioner for Port Beaufort in 1770 under the Colonial government. As was the case with most of his contemporaries on both sides of the conflict, especially those in the mercantile and shipping businesses, Ellis saw the war as an unparalleled opportunity for making money. His access to vessels and captains, plus his trading connections outside the country, put him in an ideal position for profitable ventures in trade and privateering, which he undertook along with most of the other well-to-do families in coastal North Carolina. It is highly likely that Ellis and most of his social peers were motivated as much by profit in their wartime activities as by patriotic fervor. Many members of the upper strata of American society were heavily involved as agents, outfitters and owners of privateers and letter-of-marque ships. Many of the most distinguished names in North Carolina appear in connection with the trade: Cornelius Harnett, John Gray Blount, Richard Dobbs Spaight and Joseph Hewes to name but a few.
Ellis had mercantile interests in Charleston, South Carolina, and New Bern from about 1760 and may have had an establishment in Wilmington, North Carolina as well. As a shipper he owned or had access to many vessels, knew the capabilities, strengths and weaknesses of numerous sailing captains, and was ideally suited to make considerable profits from the privateering trade. By the summer of 1778 Ellis owned two privateer vessels outright, the sixteen-gun brig Bellona and the smaller Heart of Oak, and was part owner of three others, Polly, Chatham and Harlequin.

An idea of the kind of money that could be made during wartime in the eighteenth century can be gleaned from a few of the facts that are known about Ellis' financial ventures during the period. In 1776 the merchant was making a one hundred percent profit on gunpowder and arms imported for government use. By 1778 such cargoes were bringing seven and a half to twelve times their original cost, and the prices being paid for captured enemy ships were similarly high. Ships and cargoes found no want of buyers, and business was brisk as well as profitable. On one short cruise in 1778, Ellis' brig Bellona took four ships, all but one of which carried valuable cargoes, and all of which were sold at tremendous financial gain. So lucrative was this trade that virtually any vessel capable of carrying a few guns, whose owners could scrape together the price of the required bond, was being sent out to prey on the enemy.
Ellis' position enabled him to profit in other ways. A resident of Ireland before emigrating to America, one of his ideas was to smuggle linen out of the bleaching yards near his former home and sell it in the colonies, however there is no record of this undertaking ever having reached fruition. Ellis' name also appears on the accounts of other vessel besides his own, although in what capacity is not always clear."

What may have been Ellis' most profitable single contract involved the purchase, outfitting and eventual decommissioning of the North Carolina Navy's armed brig Pennsylvania Farmer. Very early in the war the North Carolina Provincial Council recognised the weaknesses and shortcomings of the embryonic Continental Navy, realizing at the same time that should the British be able to effectively blockade the State's inlets, the economy of North Carolina would be severely impaired if not completely prostrated. To help compensate for the potential ineffectualities of the Continental fleet, the Provincial Council in December, 1775 voted to fit out three ships for the protection of the State's trade. These vessels, Pennsylvania Farmer, King Tammany, and General Washington, were intended to "cruize within the Rivers or within five leagues of the sea coast, but shall not be ordered out to sea when any vessels of Force belonging to the enemy are known to be cruizing in the neighborhood." They were intended purely for defense against whatever smaller
enemy craft might enter the State's inlets in pursuit of American merchantmen."

Richard Ellis, Joseph Leech, and David Barron were appointed commissioners for Pennsylvania Farmer in December, 1776 and were given the responsibility of fitting her out, arming her, and furnishing her with provisions. As Pennsylvania Farmer was a vessel of approximately 120 tons, carrying sixteen carriage guns and ten swivels, and shipping a crew of 110 men, this was no small task. The ship was not fully outfitted until August, 1777, and was decommissioned only eight months later. Ellis handled both these jobs, and probably made a good deal of money both times.

In April, 1776 the Marine Committee of the Continental Congress selected certain "recommended gentlemen" to serve as its agents in the various colonies. Along with Cornelius Harnett in Wilmington and Robert Smith in Edenton, Ellis was given the post at New Bern and Beaufort. The duties of a naval agent were to supply all Continental Navy (CN) ships which might visit his port with whatever necessities they required, to be of assistance to CN officers, making monetary advances to them when necessary, and to handle the disposition of prizes, including their sale. They were also required to see that CN crews received their fair share of the prize money. Continental agents were directly accountable to the Marine Committee for all these duties, and for all money that passed through their hands while conducting their country's
business. Specific instructions regarding procedures for the disposal of prizes and outlining the other duties of agents were issued by the committee in circular letters, along with lists of agents in each State.9

On paper this system looks efficient and fairly streamlined. In actual practice it may not have worked well at all. Naval prize agents as a group acquired a reputation for laziness and dishonesty that could hardly have been worse. Crews of CN ships often had to wait months on end for prize money from their captures, and agents were notoriously slow in obtaining supplies for government vessels, especially when privateers were fitting out in the same port. This condition became so widespread and debilitating to the welfare of the Navy that at one point it was suggested that the Marine Committee have the crew of each CN vessel appoint its own agents for the sale of its prizes.10

Although there is no concrete evidence to link Ellis himself with such behavior, the possibility certainly exists. A letter to him from the Marine Committee dated April 22, 1778, sharply questions the fact that the prize sloop Tryall, taken by the CN sloop Providence and sent into New Bern, had brought only a small fraction of the price that it should have, and that none of the accounts relating to the transaction had accompanied Ellis' report. The Committee very pointedly asks for an explanation and reminds Ellis of his responsibilities.11 In the specific case of Raleigh's prize,
Ellis informed the Committee of its presence at Beaufort on April 27, 1778. On May 25 the Committee responded with instructions for the purchase of the cargo of salt and its storage, reminding Ellis that he was "not to sell anything belonging to the Continent that may come into your hands...unless the same should be of a perishable nature." By the time this letter was written the prize had been condemned, sold, retaken by Goodrich, and destroyed. Except for the fact that it was saved from the fire, no record was found of what became of the salt.12

With the exception of the North Carolina Gazette article of May 15, 1778, there are no further references to the prize until October 27 of that year, when the following letter, posted from "Tarr River," was sent to Governor Richard Caswell:

May it Please Your Excellency: Pardon this intrusion as I have no other method left me to communicate a matter which immediately concerns my Interest. From the universal good character your Excellency bears and the station in life you possess I am confident you will do me justice as far as your Power extends and therefore must beg your attention a few moments to the matter I shall here endeavour to explain to you in as fair and true a light as my abilities admit of. Your petitioner had the honor to serve as an officer on board one of the Continental frigates from whence I was ordered to take charge of a brig captured by said Frigate and proceed for the Continent. I arrived at Beaufort where s'd Brig, with Cargo and appurtenances were sold for the sum of Eight thousand four Hundred and Eighty four pounds seven shillings & six pence, the one Moiety of which belonged to the Captors. In consequence I have demanded it from the Marshall both in private and public. He utterly refuseth giving me the money or Security for the payment of the same, by which means I have been detained here this four months or more as being convinced the money would be demanded
from me by the Capturers whenever I returned to New England. I am a stranger here and friendless, which I hope will be a sufficient excuse for the trouble I am giving your Excellency and pray you will take it into your wise Consideration and afford me what Relief is in your Power. I wrote to Doctor Savage desiring him to wait on your Excellency. I beg you would instruct him in what manner I am to act in the affair so that I may obtain speedy redress. I should have done myself the honor to wait on you but am in one of the Doctors vessels ready for sailing; I must therefore beg your kind acceptance of this my poor petition and grant a pardon to all its Imperfections.

I Now Conclude with Beging leave to Subscribe Myself
Your Most Obedient and Most Humble Servt. SAMUEL HODGE

To His Excellency Richard Caswell Esqr. Governor In & Over the State of North Carolina.

Thus does the prize master, Samuel Hodge, Mate in Raleigh, describe his difficulties in obtaining the crew's share of the prize money.¹²

Hodge's letter is interesting as much for what it does not say as for what it does. Richard Ellis, who, as Continental agent, would have been the obvious person to whom Hodge should have appealed, is not mentioned. Instead, Hodge appears to have dealt primarily with Thomas Sitgreaves, Marshall of the Court of Admiralty at Beaufort, and with no success. Why he did not attempt to work through Ellis is uncertain, but the episode points out the following factors which illustrate why the agent system did not always work.

First and foremost was the problem of sectionalism. America in the later 18th century and long afterwards was distinctly regional, with variations in dialect, culture and political views. The difficulties of travel and the sluggishness of communications over long distances served to
accentuate these differences, tending to divide, rather than unite the country's population. Samuel Hodge was a New Englander, recruited from his native Kittery, Maine, to serve in Raleigh. He was a rank outsider to the people of the southern colony of North Carolina. His ship, for all that it was a Continental Navy vessel, was homeported in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, a world away from New Bern and Beaufort. The one tenuous link that existed between this lone Yankee naval officer and the people with whom he had to deal was Ellis, a local businessman who had been appointed by an agency of a very weak central government to handle their affairs. The lack of congressional authority created an atmosphere throughout the colonies that state and personal concerns took precedence and that national business could generally wait. No doubt this attitude prevailed in North Carolina as well as elsewhere.

Had the Goodrich sloop not appeared on the scene it is probable that Hodge would have been able to collect Raleigh's prize money with little or no difficulty. Indeed, the payment may have eventually been made, although no record or reference thereto has been discovered. As it was, this friendless "foreigner" found himself stranded in a strange country among people substantially different from himself, trying to collect payment for a ship which no longer existed and backed up only by the rather slight authority of a loosely organized government located some six hundred miles away. It is no
wonder then, that he had trouble, nor is it surprising that many of the Continental agents may have been somewhat lax in dealing with their responsibilities regarding CN ships.

The "Doctor Savage" Hodge mentions was probably William Savage of the firm of Savage and Westmore, of Edenton, North Carolina. This gentleman was an established trader of much the same caliber as Richard Ellis. Savage and Westmore owned two privateer brigs, Rainbeau and Fanny, and were frequent customers in the markets of St. Eustatius. It may have been one of these vessels that Hodge was in "ready for sailing," but no further record of the man exists to confirm that fact. If indeed Doctor Savage did wait on the governor in Hodge's behalf, there is no indication that it did any good.

It is probable that neither Ellis, Thomas Sitgreaves nor William Tisdale, the Court of Admiralty judge who presided over the trial and condemnation of the prize, were particularly inclined to assist Hodge, especially if it meant taking time away from their own concerns, or cutting into their profits, to do so.

Richard Ellis died in the spring of 1792. According to custom his personal goods and household furnishings were auctioned off. The list of items in his estate consists of six lengthy pages of very fine items, and the buyers include not only family members but a number of notable public figures as well, giving some indication of his social position. Ellis' commercial concerns in New Bern and Charleston, South
Carolina, were still in operation at the time of his death. 17

Unfortunately, what little documentary evidence of his life and business survive shed almost no light on the specifics of his dealings as agent for the Continental Congress or his activities in the Beaufort and New Bern Courts of Admiralty. No mention of the prize other than those noted were found. However, the effort to locate information on the ship continued through an investigation of the significance and possible disposition of the cargo.
ENDNOTES: Chapter III

1. An Act to amend and Continue an Act, For facilitating the Navigation of Port Bath, Port Roanoke and Port Beaufort, Clark, State Records, XXIII, 827.

2. A minor but nonetheless significant distinction was made between privateers and letter-of-marque vessels; privateers were privately owned and operated ships of war operating under a commission from one or another belligerent powers. Their purpose was to act as commerce raiders on the trade of enemy nations, and while they did carry cargo it was not their primary function. Letter-of-marque ships were primarily cargo carriers operating under a "letter of marque and reprisal" which in effect licensed them to attack and capture enemy vessels if and when their captains chose to do so, Nathan Miller, Sea of Glory, the Continental Navy Fights for Independence (New York, 1974), 255, hereinafter cited as Miller, Glory; Frye, "Privateers," 44; Thomas Blount to John Grey Blount, September 4, 1781, Alice E. Keith, John Grey Blount Papers (Raleigh, 1952), 1, 20-21, hereinafter cited as Keith, JGB; Joseph Hewes and Michael Payne to Governor Caswell, May 16, 1777, Clark, State Records, XI, 473-474; Richard Ellis to Governor Caswell, June 28, 1778, requesting blank commissions for Ellis' privateer Pellena and letter-of-marque Chathan, also discusses Caswell's purchase of a share of "the brig," in which a one-eighth share cost £3000, Clark, State Records, XIII, 174-175.

3. Author's commentary, Alice Noble Papers, Box 1, Volume I, #3949, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, hereinafter cited as Alice Noble; Cape Fear Mercury (Wilmington), December 29, 1773; Crittenden, Commerce, 103.

4. Issue of letter-of-marque to Richard Ellis for Heart of Oak, North Carolina Council of Safety, June 27, 1776, Force, Archives, Ser. 4, VI, 1453; Richard Ellis to Cornelius Harnett, July 7, 1776, stating that he (Ellis) is sole owner of the sloop Heart of Oak, 70 tons burthen, carrying "four guns about four pounders," commanded by George Denison, William Troop mate and "twelve common men," applying for a "Letter of Marque & reprisal" and sending the required bond (amount not stated), North Carolina
Treasurer’s and Comptroller’s Papers, Ports, Box 3, folder Port Beaufort, 1763-1789, North Carolina Department of Archives and History, Raleigh, hereinafter cited as North Carolina T&C Papers; Richard Ellis to Governor Caswell, June 28, 1778, Clark, State Records, XIII, 174-175; Richard Caswell to Richard Ellis, June 30, 1778, concerning shares in the privateer Bellona, Clark, State Records, XIII, 182; bond for $5,000 dated December 16, 1778, for the six-gun sloop Harlequin, owned by Richard and James Ellis, Jeremiah Vail, captain, to be commissioned as a privateer, North Carolina T&C Papers, Ports, Unknown Ports, Bonds for Privateering, 1776-1778; James Ellis identified as the nephew and business partner of Richard Ellis, author’s commentary, Alice Noble, Box 1, IV; Crittenden, Commerce, 125.

5. The protected location of New Bern, together with its proximity to Ocracoke Inlet, Old Topsail (Beaufort) Inlet, and Port Beaufort, made it an ideal base for privateers, many of whom fished out there. Crittenden lists Bellona's prizes for this cruise as the brig Elizabeth, from St. Augustine, with lumber and indigo, the schooner Actaeon from New York, in ballast, but with "a considerable sum of species" on board, a sloop carrying dry goods from New York to New Providence, and a British privateer from New York which had already taken two prizes of her own, Crittenden, Commerce, 126, 143; account for the jailing of "26 Prisoners Captured and brought into this port by the private Brig of War Called the Eilona fitted out of this State...," September 11, 1778, North Carolina T&C Papers, Military, Box 3, (capturing and jailing Tories, deserters and felons); commission for a letter of marque and reprisal for the schooner Johnston, Captain Edward Tinker, carrying four two-pounders and a crew of ten, June 25, 1776, illustrates that virtually anything was being armed at this point, North Carolina T&C Papers, Ports, Box 3, Port Beaufort, miscellaneous.

6. Richard Ellis to Cornelius Harnett, June 13, 1776, offering to sell powder and guns for the war effort, NCDAH, SSE; resolution that Richard Caswell draw on the Continental treasury for $2850 in favor of Richard Ellis for nineteen hundredweight of gunpowder imported "for the use of the publick," and a resolution that Ellis be allowed to export white
oak staves "to the French, Dutch or neutral West India islands, to the amount of £1040, being the net value of the Gun Powder imported by him..." North Carolina Council of Safety, June 27, 1776, Force, Archives, Ser. 4, VI, 1453; Richard Ellis' name appears on accounts of the brigantine William, kept by John Hamilton, dated 1775-1776, although his connection with the vessel is not clear, North Carolina T&C Papers, Ports, Box 25, Unknown Ports, 1756-1876; Richard Ellis listed as commissioner for the sale of the brig Hanover, April 17, 1777, Clark, State Records, XII, 20.

7. Still, Navy, 1, 4, 6; Resolution to the House of Commons, May 7, 1777, Clark, State Records, XII, 83.

8. Still, Navy, 6, 21-22, 24; Journal of the North Carolina Provincial Congress, December 11, 1776, NCDAH, SSP, 1774-1776, folder October-December 1776; letter from the commissioners appointed to fit out the brig Pennsylvania Farmer to the Council of Safety, 1776, NCDAH, SSP, Correspondence of the Council of Safety, Box 307; Richard Ellis to Cornelius Harnett, August 7, 1776, concerning the purchase of "Guns, Swivels, Ball &c &c ordered for the use of the Pennsylvania Farmer..." Clark, Naval Documents, VI, 107; Resolution of the North Carolina legislature to allow Richard Ellis to sell "gun carriages and other things in his Possession Belonging to the Armed Vessel Pennsylvania Farmer, except the Cannon Ball, which is to be delivered to the Captain of Fort Hancock..." dated May 1, 1778, Area File, M625, R68, f0515; Francis Brice to Governor Caswell, May 24, 1778, Clark, State Records, XIII, 134; John Easton to Richard Caswell, June 29, 1778, Governor's Papers, State Series, Richard Caswell, NCDAH, G.P. 4, 107, hereinafter cited as North Carolina, Governor's Papers; North Carolina Gazette (New Bern), July 17, 1778.

9. Journal of the Continental Congress, April 23, 1776, Clark, Naval Documents, IV, 1216; Mevers, "Naval Policy," 5-6; Paullin, Out-Letters, I, 27-29; circular letter to all Continental agents outlining procedures for disposal of prizes, also lists the various agents in all the States, October 18, 1776, Paullin, Out-Letters, I, 38.

11. Marine Committee to Richard Ellis, April 22, 1778, "...received from the Marshall of the Court of Admiralty at your place Two hundred & Sixty nine pounds 12/- for the two thirds of the net sail of the Prize Sloop Tryall taken by the Continental Sloop Providence...Considering the high prices at which Vessels are sold, we cannot help being surprized at the small sum which the Sloop sold for, therefore we must request you will inform us on that head and whether she had any cargo on board or not," Paullin, Out-Letters, I, 230.


13. Samuel Hodge to Richard Caswell, October 27, 1778, North Carolina, Governor's Papers, G.P. 4, 5; also Clark, State Records, XIII, 489.

14. Samuel Hodge signed into Raleigh as Mate on July 15, 1776 and again on January 15, 1778. He is described as an American, five feet ten inches tall, dark complexioned, and a resident of Kittery, Maine, William J. Morgan, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., personal communication, October 23, 1981.

15. Crittenden, Commerce, 125-127, 143.

16. Thomas Sitgreaves of New Bern was appointed Marshall of the Court of Admiralty in 1777 to replace Richard Cogdell, Junior, when it was found that Richard Cogdell, Junior was an infant who had been appointed by his father, Judge Richard Cogdell, Clark, State Records, XII, 20-21, 25; William Tisdale was elected judge of the Beaufort Court of Admiralty over Richard Cogdell and Alex Gaston, and Thomas Sitgreaves was elected marshall over John Green, April 28, 1777, Clark, State Records, XII, 45; Governor Caswell to William Tisdale, April 30, 1777, informing him of his election by the General Assembly to the judgeship of the Court of Admiralty at Port Beaufort, Clark, State Records, XIII, 108.

17. "An Account Sales of the Personal Property of Ric'd Ellis Esq. dec'd 3 April, 1792," Craven County, Miscellaneous Estate Papers, MF75, pages not numbered.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PRIZE CARGO

In order to fully appreciate the significance of the prize vessel and the importance of her cargo, it is helpful to be aware of the situation regarding commerce between Great Britain and her American colonies prior to the outbreak of the war. The predominating economic theory of the period, mercantilism, had been firmly embraced by the British and had been extended into all parts of their empire. By means of a series of navigation acts and restrictive trade laws prohibiting commercial intercourse between her colonies and non-British states and their possessions, the Crown, in theory, controlled colonial commerce and manufacturing while reaping enormous profits for the home country. Some of these acts dated as early as 1660.¹

In the case of the American colonies, these laws had the effect of stifling legal trade and severely hampering colonial manufacturing capabilities. America by the mid-eighteenth century had a population of nearly two million, substantial merchant and fishing fleets, and a prosperous and well educated class of merchants, planters and professional people, all of whom were beginning to chafe under the restrictions imposed upon them by the trade laws.

The American colonies had become England’s largest consumer of ironware. They were the premier market for the axes, hoes, plowshares, nails and wagon-fittings needed for
expanding the frontier and building a new country. The southern colonies especially were tied to England by trade in timber, tobacco, and naval stores. For its part, America was Britain's main supplier of tar, pitch, lumber, masts, and spars for the building and maintenance of her huge naval and merchant fleets. The naval stores industry in the colonies actually benefitted from the Navigation Acts which were choking other businesses.²

Most other American commercial activities were adversely affected. The colonists were forced to pay exorbitant duties on many goods imported from England, and the trade laws prevented them from obtaining such materials legally from other countries. Consequently a tremendously active and highly successful smuggling industry developed all along the Colonial seaboard.

The Caribbean possessions of England's economic and political rivals, primarily Holland and France, became centers of illicit trade where Europeans could purchase American products without having to pay the high duties imposed by British law, and colonial "contraband men" could obtain at fair market value merchandise all but unavailable except at the artificially inflated prices charged by the English merchants. The islands of Curacao, St. Croix, Martinique, and especially St. Eustatius became regular ports of call for American smugglers, and many a prosperous colonial merchant owed his financial success to this
profitable circumvention of the decidedly unfair trade regulations. With the commencement of hostilities, commercial activity in these ports accelerated. Vessels from all over Europe, and even from Britain herself, bought cloth, arms, gunpowder, and salt to trade for American tobacco, provisions, and naval stores, and great profits were made by all.

Britain's restrictive economic policies prior to the Revolution resulted in a rather peculiar circumstance that was to have a beneficial effect for the Americans during the course of the conflict. Because they were forbidden to trade with non-British nations, and because their own agricultural output was inadequate to feed their populations, most of Britain's West Indian island possessions came to depend on foodstuffs from the American continent as their primary source of sustenance. An exchange system developed whereby, in return for corn, rice and fish, these islands provided the Americans with sugar, rum, and most importantly, salt, a commodity they possessed in plenty. With the commencement of hostilities, the islanders' source of American provisions was cut off. The British government, accustomed to relying on the intercolonial trade that had kept the islands supplied through the years, had no means of providing them with food, and the inhabitants found themselves suddenly and literally faced with famine. Simultaneously, the colonies were deprived of their largest supply of salt. This situation,
together with the already pro-American attitudes of the Bermudians and some of the other West Indian planters, was to result in a trade situation between the colonies and Bermuda that was highly unusual for two nations supposedly at war.5

The people of Bermuda had a very favorable attitude toward the Americans, due in part to the closeness which had developed as a result of amicable trading. Many Bermudians "from the best families" had been educated in America and quite a few had gone into business there. This friendliness was reciprocated by the Americans. Also, by British law, Bermuda was a part of the colony of Virginia, and was technically, though not actually, in rebellion against the Crown. The result of this sociable atmosphere, coupled with their mutual needs, was the exclusion in 1775 of Bermuda from the terms of the Continental Association, which forbade trade between the rebelling colonies and any possession of Great Britain. Bermuda was also exempted from trade restrictions imposed by the Continental Congress against Great Britain. Trade of American foodstuffs for badly needed salt was not only authorized but encouraged by the American government. The various governors of Bermuda, while they officially condemned the trade, were forced to let it continue in order to prevent wide-spread famine. This situation continued throughout the war. The congressional lead was followed by the various State governments, including North Carolina. Bermuda vessels carrying salt were readily received in North
Carolina ports and allowed to trade for a like value in provisions. These ships were specifically exempted from capture by both American and British vessels of war. Except for an occasional instance, this situation continued even after the island had become a haven for British privateers, and remained in effect until the latter part of 1781.6

The attitude of England's European rivals toward the Navigation Acts was also an invaluable asset to the Americans. Exasperated by the trade laws that had for so long prevented them from trading openly with Britain's colonies, European businessmen wholeheartedly supported the colonists' bid for freedom.

To this end the Caribbean ports mentioned above, plus many others, played a most significant role in supplying the Americans with arms, ammunition, and other needed war materials, especially salt.

The enormous importance of salt as a feature of civilized life in the eighteenth century cannot be overemphasized. An item of great necessity in day-to-day living during peacetime, it was already an established factor in world economy. Extremely large quantities of this commodity were absolutely necessary to the conduct of warfare, and its importance and value rose tremendously in times of conflict. On both a national and State level it occupied the same prominence as guns and gunpowder as a factor in winning the new nation's independence. The many
and varied uses to which salt was put explain its value to some extent.

The use of salt as a seasoning for table food, the role in which the average person tends to think of it, was in fact very minor. In the eighteenth century there was, of course, no means of canning, freezing or refrigerating perishables. Salting, or "pickling," was the only known means of preserving meat, fish and vegetables for long periods of time. Smoking and drying were practiced to some extent on certain types of food, but these methods were time consuming and the products could not be counted on to keep anything like as long as salted provisions. Vast amounts of salt were absolutely essential in providing food for the armed forces of both sides in the conflict, and in providing a means by which the civilian population could store provisions at home. It was also of major importance in the tanning of leather and the bleaching and dying of certain fabrics, both of which activities were necessary for keeping armies and navies in the field. Preserving and insuring the salt supply was to occupy the time and effort of a large number of people throughout the war.  

Limited stocks of any article create opportunities for profiteering, and this was especially true with a commodity as valuable and as widely used as salt. In an effort to limit such activity the North Carolina Council of Safety, in July, 1776, ordered that no retailer of salt should receive
more than twenty-five percent above his first cost for the sale of that substance. Nevertheless, the low supply prompted more than one businessman to attempt a killing by holding out for high prices. Soon after the Council passed its order, the North Carolina Convention appointed a committee to investigate the conduct of a certain John Cooper of Beaufort County, who was reported to be monopolizing salt. Sometime later a report came out of Edenton that "a Dutchman from Maryland, has raised the price of salt, within a few days to fourteen dollars, which enrages the Country people of this place." One of the best documented incidents regarding the lack of availability of salt occurred in July, 1777, when Robert Rowan put down a minor uprising of Tories and other back country people at Cross Creek. Unable to obtain the commodity through their normal channels, they had come to take salt from the government warehouses by force, but were persuaded by Rowan to buy what they needed "...at the market price, which is 5 dollars..." The supply was never adequate, and salt prices remained extravagant throughout the war.

Both the State and Continental governments were constantly trying to procure additional supplies of the precious substance. Purchasing agents were sent to Europe, Bermuda and various West Indian islands, often with specific instructions regarding quantities to be purchased and how much the agents were to pay for it. Many times they were less than successful, especially as America's fortunes
appeared to wane on the battlefields of the colonies. Numerous means of increasing importation and home production of salt were instituted, and prohibitions were placed on exports of cargoes from the colonies, unless the ships involved returned with "Salt, Arms and Ammunition." A provisions tax levied on produce in North Carolina in 1780, to be paid in the form of a portion of the crop, was altered for the populace of Carteret County, who were, significantly, allowed to furnish a gallon of salt in lieu of the required provisions. Also, temporary restrictions on the exportation of salt and salted provisions (as to Bermuda) were occasionally imposed.10

A major inducement to salt production in North Carolina was a substantial premium offered to any person who would construct and operate a salt works on the coast. At least two such individuals, Robert Williams and Richard Blackledge, actually built such establishments, both in Carteret County. Williams' works was erected on Gallant's Point near Beaufort, and was of the solar drying or "sun evaporation" type. This area is still referred to as "the salt pond" by local residents. Williams felt that this process was superior in that it was the method employed by the Portugese, whose salt was believed to be the world's finest. Williams had visited Portugal and viewed the process first hand. Richard Blackledge's works, located at the confluence of Core Creek and the Newport River, were of the
"boiling off" variety, in which evaporation was achieved by boiling sea water to leave the salt. This system had the advantage of being operable year-round in all weathers, whereas the solar technique was effective only in sunny weather.\textsuperscript{11}

Even with the institution of all these measures the salt supply remained far below the demand. Prices remained high and shipments from any source were always welcome and sold readily for large sums. It is quite probable that the very substantial sum for which Raleigh's prize sold was due as much to her cargo of salt as to the value of the ship herself.

Exactly why Captain Thompson and Samuel Hodge selected Port Beaufort as the spot to dispose of their prize is a question that will probably never be answered. The British blockade of American ports was firmly established. British privateer activity was heavy along the coast and had been for the previous two years. The Chesapeake Bay was alive with both privateers and Royal Navy ships, Cape Fear was a known haunt of several British vessels, and Ocracoke Inlet was undoubtedly being patrolled by one or more of John Goodrich's privateer squadron. Old Topsail Inlet may have been the only place open to Hodge and his prize crew, or it may simply have been the handiest port for him to attempt. Certainly it was attractively described, being "very safe and Navigable for vessels of Great Burthen" and having twelve
feet of water over the bar at low tide. The port itself had a large, spacious harbor with good facilities. Beaufort's main drawback was that it lacked adequate overland connections with the interior, and even with nearby towns. Consequently it was not at that time a shipping port of any great importance and was used very little by trading vessels.\(^{12}\) New Bern, several miles up the Neuse River, was the preferred point for transhipment. Being a New Englander and unfamiliar with the Southern Colonies, Hodge was probably unaware of most of these facts.

The prize and cargo sold at auction at Beaufort for the considerable sum of £484 pounds, seven shillings and sixpence, "the one Moiety of which belonged to the Captors." Although there is no record of Samuel Hodge ever having had direct contact with Richard Ellis, the Continental agent for New Bern and Port Beaufort, it seems unlikely that the two would not have met at some juncture, as Ellis was the representative of Congress in the sale and disposal of the ship and its cargo. Ellis notified Congress of the vessel's presence on 27 April, 1778. Their reply, penned almost a month later, expressed pleasure at the news of the prize and contained instructions for the purchase of the salt, which was needed for pickling meat for the army.\(^{13}\)

The fact that Hodge encountered great difficulty collecting the prize money due Raleigh's crew, and that he in fact may never have collected it, has been discussed in
Chapter III. The *North Carolina Gazette* account of Captain Goodrich's attack and the subsequent destruction of the prize states in part, "...she had on board 1200 bushels of salt...and we hear those concerned extinguished the fire and have saved the salt, but the vessel is ruined." The fact that the cargo was of enough importance for its nature and quantity to be described further indicates the value and significance of this extremely necessary commodity. Unfortunately no record has come to light suggesting who "those concerned" may have been, or what final disposition was made of this very precious and much needed cargo.

Regarding the vessel herself, few concrete facts as to either her size or rig came to light in the primary source material. However, research in that area resulted in the acquisition of significant information which will be discussed in the following section.
ENDNOTES: Chapter IV


2. Davis, Rise, 40-42.

3. The role of these and other islands as a source of supply of needed war materials during the American Revolution is well documented. Most Dutch, French and Spanish colonies in the Caribbean remained open and free to trade throughout the war. Deceptions and ruses learned during peacetime smuggling operations were often employed by traders exchanging war supplies for American products. Goods of one nation were often repacked and sold as those of another, or sold to the enemies of the nation of origin. Merchants, traders and secrat agents from all over the world bartered for goods virtually unavailable elsewhere, Crittenden, Commerce, 132, 134; Curtis, "Family," 62; Edwin Bethlefsen et al., "Archaeology on St. Eustatius, Pompeii of the New World," Archaeology, 35 (March-April, 1982), 9; Toth, West Indies, 156; Charles Moran, "Saint Eustatius, the Island that was Different," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 68 (January, 1942), 85; the Dutch, French and Spanish showed a definite inclination to protect American vessels trading in the Caribbean and were quite open in flaunting their support of the rebelling colonies even though not formally at war with England, extract of a letter from St. Eustatia dated May 15, 1776, [Town's Pennsylvania Evening Post, II, 215, Philadelphia, June 6, 1776] describing the seizure of an American schooner by the British ship Seaforl, and the reaction of Dutch officials, Area File, M625, R199, f0021; extract of a letter from Charles Town, South Carolina dated 29 December, 1776, stating that "The French and Spanish are inclined to protect American vessels," and mentioning four French and two Spanish frigates assigned to cruise off Hispaniola and "Port Rico," Area File, M625, R199, f0054; Continental Navy vessels regularly escorted American merchant ships clear of St. Eustatius as a protection against capture by British privateers, Fowler, Rebeles, 93; Mahan, Sea Power, 168-169.

4. As with many English goods which the colonists were forced to accept in trade for their own products,
English salt had for years been found to be less than adequate for the colonists' needs, Governor Dobbs [of North Carolina] to My Lords of the Board of Trade, January 4, 1755, complaining that "The Prohibition of the Trade of Salt from all Parts of Europe except Britain...is a considerable Drawback upon our Trade. The English Salt is found not so good, as the French, Spanish or Portuguese in curing our Pork & Beef...Limitations of this Trade oblige us to take that Salt at a great Disadvantage from New York and Pennsylvania at double freight and a further advanced Price to the Northern Importers," Saunders, Records, V, 317; Isabel M. Williams and Laura H. McEachern, Salt, That Necessary Article (Wilmington, NC, 1973), x, hereinafter cited as Williams, Salt; salt works had been erected on Turks Island in the Bahamas by residents of Bermuda as early as 1678. Most of this salt was traded to the American colonies for clothing and provisions, and constituted the Bermudians principal export, A.E. Verill, "Relations between Bermuda and the American Colonies during the Revolutionary War," Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, XIII, 1907-1908, 47-48, hereinafter cited as Verill, "Relations."

5. The professional and social connections between Bermuda and the American colonies were friendly and mutually sympathetic, and the majority of Bermudians, even in their Assembly, were at least pro-American if not actually anti-British, Verill, "Relations," 49.

6. From the outset of hostilities Congress authorized the sending of provisions to Bermuda, even specifying which of the colonies were to provide how much and what kind of foodstuffs. Resolutions for the allowance of trade with Bermuda for salt, arms and ammunition were introduced on July 15 and November 22, 1775, however, almost a year later the Bermudians sent a petition to the British government declaring the necessity of getting provisions from America, and saying that if not permitted to do so they "must ask the protection of Congress," Verill, "Relations," 61; Allen, History, I, 64; Minutes of the Continental Congress, December 29, 1775, Clark, State Records, X, 369; Williams, Salt, 6; Proceedings of the Provincial Council of North Carolina, March 2-4, prohibitions on exportation and importation passed by the Provincial Congress during 1775-1776 exempted vessels returning with "Salt, Arms and Ammunition," Clark, State Records, X, 471-473; Laws of North Carolina, 1777, XVI, I, Clark, State Records, XXIV, 119; Crittenden, Commerce, 127, 130; Toth, West
Indies, 151-152, 162; the neutral status granted to Bermuda trading vessels was often used as a defense against capture and condemnation, but there were sometimes strenuous objections. In 1777 Bridger Goodrich declared that except for "authorized provision ships" he would capture any Bermuda vessel he found steering for the Continent, Frye, "Privateers," 35; the lack of edibles was a constant spectre throughout the war, "...armed vessels from the islands are numerous, that provisions are so extremely scarce in Barbadoes that the inhabitants are perishing with hunger,...if no vessels had been allowed to carry provisions from the continent, the islands before this time, must have been nearly deserted," North Carolina Gazette, March 13, 1779; Crittenden, Commerce, 134; Governor Caswell to James Coor, February 5, 1778, regarding Bermuda vessels "with salt on the faith and credit of the Resolution of Congress," taking on cargoes of provisions, Clark, State Records, XIII, 23; Governor Caswell to Thomas Ogden, February 10, 1778, Clark, State Records, XIII, 38-39; Governor Caswell to Willis Wilson, December 3, 1779, requiring that every outward bound vessel be searched and that no provisions be carried out, and that Bermuda vessels be seized and sent "up to the court of admiralty," Clark, State Records, XIII, 312; Journal of the North Carolina House of Representatives, January 23, 1779, resolution that Henry Hinson, master of the sloop Mary, bound for Bermuda, be permitted to load with provisions, Clark, State Records, XIII, 654; Journal of the North Carolina House of Representatives, February 4, 1779, resolve in favor of the people of Bermuda, Clark, State Records, XIII, 693-694; Williams, Salt, 9; the diary of George Ewing, May 6, 1778, remarks on "a Day of Rejoysing" at the news that "the courts of France and Spain had declared the U States of America to be free and independent States and had ceded to us all the territories on the Continent of America...and also the Island of Bermuda...," recognizing the fact that Great Britain had considered the islands to be part of the colony of Virginia, Commager, Seventy-Six, 657.

7. Williams, Salt, x.

8. The twenty-five percent increase above first cost applied only if the salt had been purchased within the boundaries of the State, Journal of the Council of Safety, July 4, 1776, Resolution to limit the profit on Salt...," Clark, State Records, X, 685; Crittenden, Commerce, 146; Williams, Salt, 7.
9. Robert Smith to Governor Caswell, July 27, 1777, saying that the Tories are assembling on the pretense of going to Cross Creek to capture the salt stored there, but he thinks they may really be going after the munitions at Cape Fear, Clark, State Records, XI, 538; Colonel David Smith to Governor Caswell, July 29, 1777, regarding the sale of salt "upon reasonable terms" to the back country people at Cross Creek, Clark, State Records, XI, 548; Robert Rowan to General John Ashe, July 30, 1777, in which he describes quelling a mob of about 140 persons who had come to take salt from the government stores by force, then selling them what they needed, Clark, State Records, XI, 560; Williams, Salt, 9; mention of ships from Bermuda bringing in salt, which would hopefully lower the market price, North Carolina Gazette, March 13, 1778, also Clark, State Records, XIII, 380.

10. Journals of Council of State, 1777-1779, January 16, 1777, instructions to North Carolina purchasing agents to buy salt in Bermuda or elsewhere, twenty-five thousand barrels each, and to charter vessels to take it to North Carolina, Clark, State Records, XXII, 306; John Gray Blount, as a purchasing agent for North Carolina, found it difficult to buy salt on credit for the State, Crittenden, Commerce, 127; John Gray Blount to Governor Caswell, March 4, 1777, states that no one will accept a State draft, as they are unsure of the course of the war, plus "the risque of the vessel...makes it impossible to procure...without giving a most extravagant price," indicating the probability of capture was high, but says he is sending 750 bushels with the bearer, Captain Sears, and hopes to send more soon, Clark, State Records, XI, 406; Richard Caswell to the Honorable Speakers of the Senate and House of Delegates of Virginia, February 15, 1778, stating that he had issued a proclamation prohibiting the exportation of salt and salted provisions "for a limited time," Clark, State Records, XIII, 45; comments and recommendations on the trade with ships from Bermuda, allowing them to take provisions out in exchange for salt, April 7, 1778, Clark, State Records, XXII, 933; North Carolina Senate Journal, January 25, 1779, resolution that Bermuda vessels importing salt to North Carolina be allowed to export an equal value "and no more" of provisions, and an act for levying a provisions tax, September 5, 1780, Clark, State Records, XXIV, 344.

11. As early as August, 1775 a bounty of 750 pounds was offered to anyone erecting a salt works on the coast, Proceedings of the Provincial Congress of North Carolina, August 20, 1775, Saunders, Records, X, 165;
Williams, *Salt*, 14; Jean B. Kell, *Carteret County During the American Revolution* (Greenville, NC, 1980), 121-133, hereinafter cited as Kell, *Carteret County*; Robert Williams to Cornelius Harnett, May 27, 1776, describes the building methods, expenses and probable yield of Williams' salt works, and how they were copied from the "salt marshes" of Portugal, which produced the world's finest salt, and expressed concern over the safety of Beaufort and the salt works in the event of an enemy attack, Clark, *State Records*, Clark, *State Records*, XXII, 739; Williams, *Salt*, 11; Kell, *Carteret County*, 119; plans of Williams' works are shown in Kell, *Carteret County*, 115, and Williams, *Salt*, 13; Richard Blackledge to the North Carolina Council of Safety, August 1, 1776, describing his salt works, which would use the boiling off process, Saunders, *Records*, X, 716-718; Kell, *Carteret County*, 122.


VESSEL DESCRIPTIONS AND PRIZE DISPOSAL

As part of the original research design undertaken in the attempt to identify the prize vessel, efforts were made to track the craft through references to its type. During this process a great deal of information regarding various similarities in closely related ship types was uncovered. Because of the number of distinct vessel types referred to throughout the course of this study, and in order to clarify the appearance of these craft as closely as possible to the uninitiated student, and to give some idea of their respective purposes and capabilities, the decision was made to include this descriptive section.

The Continental frigate Raleigh is described in considerable detail in Chapter II of this study. As one of a particular class of warships she exhibited a distinctive hull configuration and sail plan. She is historically well documented in a great deal more detail than the limits of this study can encompass. No such description is available for the prize vessel, and contemporary material is of only minimal assistance in ascertaining the characteristics of that craft. Captain Goodrich's privateer sloop is likewise meagerly described. The following will serve to clarify certain aspects of the design and appearance of these and similar vessels of the period.
Raleigh's prize has been described as both a brig and as a brigantine in the source material. These terms refer to the sail plan and do not necessarily apply to a ship's size or hull configuration. The sail plan or "rig" of a vessel usually determined what it was called, consequently one finds brigs and brigantines in a wide range of lengths, beams and tonnages. The rig was determined by the preferences of the owner, the builder, and the master of the vessel, taking into consideration the various waters through which the ship was intended to sail and the tasks she was expected to perform. The question of exactly what constitutes a brig rig or a brigantine rig was the subject of considerable research effort. In addition, descriptions of two other closely related types, the snow and the hermaphrodite brig, were deemed of sufficient similarity to warrant inclusion here.

In researching sail plans of the smaller varieties of ocean-going craft, it quickly became apparent that there are no hard and fast rules governing what constitutes a particular type of rig. The four classes under consideration, brig, brigantine, hermaphrodite brig and snow, exhibit numerous similarities and differences, all of which are of varying degrees of importance in determining a ship's classification. Often features which were highly significant to one person regarding the designation of a craft might mean little or nothing to another. Geographic factors appear to have been of some consequence in this regard, particularly
between the Old World and the New, as well as between various regions of the Americas. Likewise the personal opinions, prejudices and lack of familiarity of some contemporary recorders with various types of sailing craft must be taken into account. Newspapermen, court officers and warehouse clerks were not always overly familiar with sea-going vessels and might be inclined to jot down anything they felt reasonably appropriate for a particular craft, with little regard for accuracy.

The four ship types researched ranged from about thirty-five tons to just over 200 tons, with an average of between ninety and ninety-five tons. All four types were two-masted, or essentially so, with a foremost and mainmast. Snows were something of an exception, having a small trymast stepped just abaft the mainmast. All were square rigged on the foremost and, depending on their size, carried a course, topsail, topgallant, and occasionally a royal. All were fixed-keel craft, as opposed to centerboard or drop-keel vessels. They were seldom used for coasting, but were primarily used in trans-oceanic trade, their sea routes being between the American colonies, Europe, Africa, and the West Indies.¹ Naval craft appear to have run somewhat larger than the average merchantman. A "typical" brig of the Royal Navy during the Revolution was about seventy-nine feet on the gun deck, with a beam of slightly over twenty-five feet and a depth of hold of about eleven feet, six inches. This would
have resulted in an overall length of just over one hundred feet and a displacement of slightly more than 200 tons.

It must be remembered however, that warships varied considerably from merchantmen in that they were designed for speed and maneuverability rather than carrying capacity. Their larger crews allowed greater ease in sail handling, and by consequence their rigs could be more substantial than their merchant counterparts.²

BRIGS

Contemporary newspaper accounts refer to the prize vessel sent in by Raleigh as a brig, however it is uncertain from what source the reporters may have received this information. Newspapers of the eighteenth century were at least as inaccurate, if not more so, than those of the present day. None of the accounts relating to Raleigh mention the specifics of the vessel or her rig, referring to her only as a brig.³

As to what constituted the sail plan of a brig, there appear to be two separate schools of thought, that of the Old World and that of the New, or at least the American Colonies. Chapelle (New World) states that the brig set a gaff spanker on her mainmast and omitted the use of a square main course because the gaff jaws made it difficult to set. Indeed, a great many illustrations from the period bear this out, showing the mainmast fitted with a gaff mainsail, with a
square topsail and topgallant. Most examples of American-built brigs show this configuration. European authorities take a different view. Bathe and Trykare both depict the brig as being rigged with either a mainyard or a crossjack yard on the mainsail, from which is suspended a loose-footed square main course. A gaff spanker is rigged to the mainmast. The American brig Badger, captured by the British early in the war and bought into the Royal Navy, shows this combination, but whether it was her original rig or the result of alterations by her captors is impossible to say.

The major point of difference then, is the presence or absence of a square main course. The omission of this sail could be a purely American, or at least New World, characteristic, although the only proof is the evidence provided by contemporary writers and illustrators. A brig would have also carried as many headsails as her size would have allowed, usually a forestaysail, jib, and flying jib.

BRIGANTINES

Samuel Hodge, Jr., Mate in Raleigh and master of the prize when it was sent into Port Beaufort, refers to the vessel as a brigantine. The word itself is a derivation of the word bergantino or brigantino, which originally denoted a small, fast, undecked galley used in the Mediterranean during the fourteenth century. While the earlier versions of this craft were rigged with lateen sails and oars, they gradually
increased in size to become seagoing ships of about 150 tons with two square rigged masts, a bowsprit, jibs, and a gaff rigged spanker. This is identical to the description of a European brig. Some modern authors consider the use of the term brigantine a misapplication since it originally referred to a lateen rig, and many "old salts" refuse to recognize its validity, insisting instead on the term hermaphrodite brig. Colonial records however, are replete with references to brigantines.

If anything, the variety of descriptions for the sail configuration of a brigantine are even more confused (and confusing) than for the brig. The simplest and most concise definition is "a seagoing vessel having two masts, one square rigged, the other fore-and-aft." Elsewhere it is described as having, in addition to the square rigged foremost, a gaff rigged mainsail with no square main course, which concurs with Chapelle's description of a brig, and as having square topsails on the mainmast before about 1720, but which were generally done away with after that date. This version, with gaff main and square topsails, is described by yet another author as a main topsail brigantine. The main topsail brigantine is pictured in one instance as having what appears to be a small trymast stepped abaft the foremost, with a fore-and-aft sail rigged to it. This particular illustration features a square fore course but no square main course, and is the only one found of a brigantine with both
square and fore-and-aft sails on both masts. It is also the only example found of a trymast stepped in that position. Brigantines that are depicted as fully fore-and-aft rigged on the mainmast invariably exhibit a gaff topsail above the spanker, giving an almost triangular appearance to the sails on that mast.

HERMAPHRODITE BRIGS

This term appears to have been employed in virtually the same way as was brigantine. The use of the word "hermaphrodite," denoting equal characteristics of two sexes, would seem to indicate the presence of two different types of sails in nearly equal proportions, thus it applies well to most rigs labelled as brigantines. It is interesting to note that while the terms brig, brigantine, and snow are all widely used throughout Colonial literature, the expression hermaphrodite brig is rarely found before the first quarter of the 19th century and only occasionally after that.

Angelucci describes a "two masted hermaphrodite brig" as square rigged on the foremost with a spanker and gaff topsail on the mainmast, which is to say square rigged on the foremost and fore-and-aft rigged on the main, and depicts a topsail hermaphrodite brig as the same, but with a square main topsail in place of the gaff topsail. These descriptions match Chapelle's post-1720 and pre-1720 brigantine rigs quite closely. Most other descriptions
follow the same general lines, leaning toward the idea of a vessel fully square rigged on the foremast and fully fore-and-aft rigged on the mainmast. It is even described by one author as being "very close to a schooner rig."*

It is obvious from the foregoing that the terms brigantine and hermaphrodite brig apply to virtually the same types of vessels. Brigantine simply enjoyed a much greater frequency of use, especially during the Colonial and Revolutionary periods. As for the differences between brigs and brigantines, it would appear that the only rig which could unequivocably be referred to as the latter would be one which was entirely square rigged on the foremast and entirely fore-and-aft rigged on the mainmast. Anything else would be open to debate, and might be known by different names in different places.

A possible solution is that the term brig may have originally been used as an abbreviation for brigantine. As the vessels evolved into two distinct types, the two terms came to apply to different sail configurations. Studies of shipping records of 18th century North Carolina imply that brig was simply the more comprehensive term, and that brigantine meant a particular type of brig.10

**SNOW**

The term snow originated with the Dutch word "snaauw," and is of interest because of its very close relationship in
size and appearance to the vessels already described. This unique rig was quite popular with Colonial shippers, and substantial numbers of snows are mentioned in the literature. In addition to its fore and main masts, the snow possessed a third mast stepped a foot or so abaft the mainmast. Not a true mizzenmast, it was simply an auxilliary to the mainmast and was known as a trysail mast, or trymast. Its purpose was to set a gaff spanker, sometimes called a "snowsail," where the gaff jaws would not interfere with working the square main course, which was hung from the mainyard. The trymast reached only as high as the top of the mainmast and was secured to the mainmast trestletrees. This mast and its accompanying gaff and boom were of considerably lighter construction than the other spars in the ship. The fore and main masts of a snow each carried a course, topsail and topgallant, with royals on some of the larger examples.\(^1\)

The snow rig was first reported in the Swedish fleet of 1669, where it was used on at least one escort vessel. A reconstruction of the draft of His Majesty's 18-gun snow Mohawk, built almost a century later at Oswego, New York, very clearly shows the relation of the trymast to the rest of the vessel. There appears to have been virtually no change in the rig from that time until at least the 1830's.\(^2\)

As regards the foregoing labels and the distinctions, or lack of distinctions between them, the following comment appears most appropriate:
"Whatever may have been their origin, the three terms snow, brigantine and brig seem at various periods to have been much confused and applied rather indiscriminantly to three kinds of vessels between which we today would not hesitate to differentiate."¹²

This opinion is borne out by the sometimes substantial differences found between descriptions by well-known authors of what are, in name, the same type of vessel. To some degree this may be attributed to lack of expertise in ship identification by the contemporary recorders. For example one of John Goodrich's privateer fleet, a vessel called *Hammond*, is described in reports of the period as a schooner, a sloop and a letter-of-marque brigantine.¹³ More than likely, many of the differences which would today be used to discriminate between vessel types were then of comparatively minor importance. The opinions of the builder and master would more probably have been the determining factors.

**SLOOP**

The last rig that bears consideration here is that of the vessel in which Captain Goodrich entered Beaufort Harbor and destroyed *Raleigh*’s prize. It was a ten-gun sloop that accomplished the mission. This term, when applied to the rig of a Colonial vessel, is generally taken to mean a single masted craft rigged completely fore-and-aft, most often with one large mainsail and one or two jibs. It was a fast-sailing, weatherly, easily handled rig and was extremely common in the Colonies.
The most probable design of Goodrich's vessel is that of a Bermuda sloop. Despite the name, this type of craft was built in virtually identical form in Virginia, the Carolinas, Bermuda, Jamaica and other parts of the Caribbean.\(^{15}\) The ability of these craft to sail to windward made them great favorites not only with West Indian traders like Goodrich, but with smugglers, pirates and privateers, which Goodrich eventually became. The maneuverability of a vessel and her ability to outsail prey and pursuers meant success and survival in those businesses. Goodrich's wartime privateer fleet consisted of several of his ex-trading vessels, the majority reported to be sloops.\(^{16}\)

When applied to commissioned warships of the American and British navies, however, the term \textit{sloop} had different and more potentially confusing meanings. A naval sloop was any vessel, regardless of rig, which carried all her guns on one deck, or which was commanded by an officer one grade below a captain, or a vessel which was sloop-rigged. This variety of meanings is at least partially responsible for other naval terminology. Labels like "ship-sloop" and "brig-sloop" may refer to the rig of a vessel, or the arrangement of her armament, or the rank of her commanding officer, or any combination of the three. John Paul Jones' \textit{Ranger}, one of the Continental Navy's most famous ships, was classed as a ship-sloop, although she is also referred to as a ship, a sloop-of-war and a corvette.\(^{17}\)
It was the excellent weatherliness and maneuverability of this type of craft that enabled Goodrich to slip quickly into Old Topsail Inlet and grab the salt-laden prize, and to make good his escape from the harbor when the captured ship was unable to get out. Had the Britisher been commanding a less agile craft, for instance a brig or brigantine, it is doubtful that he would have even entered the harbor, much less have attempted to cut the prize out. The further worth of these little ships is illustrated by the enormous amount of damage they inflicted on American shipping and the constant threat that the Goodrich fleet posed along the American seacoast.

The exact specifications of Raleigh’s prize, i.e., her sail plan, tonnage, and length and beam measurements, may never be determined. However, even if we ignore the physical evidence, certain conclusions can be drawn from the contemporary information available and our knowledge of contemporary ship types. Having been described as both a brig and as a brigantine, the vessel would have undoubtedly been two masted. Samuel Hodge refers to her as a brigantine. As a professional seaman, and as the man who sailed the prize into Beaufort Harbor, his opinion is to be respected. We can assume, therefore, that she was at least partially fore-and-aft rigged on her mainmast. The only remaining point in question is whether the main topsail was fore-and-aft or square rigged, and there is at present virtually no way to
make such a determination. Likewise, her exact length and beam cannot be determined until such time as an excavation of the physical remains takes place. If, however, she was of "average" size for the period she would have been in the neighborhood of sixty-five feet in length, with a beam of just over twenty feet, and displaced something on the order of 100 tons.¹⁸

No records regarding the Court of Admiralty trial, condemnation and sale of this particular craft have been located, however, the fact that these events did take place is confirmed by newspaper accounts and other evidence.¹⁹ North Carolina had an established Admiralty Court system, with rules in cases of capture that closely paralleled the Continental Congressional Resolves in those matters. These regulations set rules for such things as appeals in ship captures, division of prize money (North Carolina Navy ships only), payments to judges, marshalls and registers of the various courts, and other pertinent topics. The North Carolina courts were established in 1776 with jurisdiction over British vessels and goods seized on the high seas.²⁰

William Tisdale, a resident of New Bern, was judge for the Port Beaufort Court of Admiralty at the time of the prize trial. He and the marshall of the court, one Thomas Sitgreaves, had been elected by the North Carolina legislature the previous year. Tisdale may have held court in New Bern as well as Beaufort, and he is known to have
ruled on cases from at least as far away as Ocracoke. In July, 1781, Tisdale was suspended from his office on charges of bribery and corruption, but the suspension was removed the following May.\textsuperscript{21}

The case would have been tried by a jury composed of well-to-do local merchants and businessmen, most of whom would have had shipping and commercial interests and who would very likely have been the owners of, or shareholders in, privateers and letters-of-marque. By involving themselves in the court process these citizens could be assured that their own interests were being seen to. In some respects the courtroom was just as much a place of business as the marketplace. No records have been located to show that any of these men actually purchased the prize and her valuable cargo, however, it is quite probable that was the case.\textsuperscript{22}

An interesting point regarding the division of proceeds from the sale of prizes is that while the crews of privateers and Royal Navy ships were allowed to keep the full amount earned from the sale of portion of their prize money to the government. In the spring of 1778 this amounted to one-half the value received for merchantmen (into which category the salt-ship would have fallen), transports and storeships. CN crews received full value for captured warships and privateers.\textsuperscript{23} The portion of the prize money taken by Congress was intended to finance the operation of the Navy
itself. Samuel Hodge, therefore, should have collected half of the £8484 7s 6d which the sale of the ship netted, to be shared out among Raleigh's crew. In a letter to Governor Caswell he states that he has "demanded it from the Marshall..." which would have been Thomas Sitgreaves, but that the marshall "utterly refuseth giving me the money or Security for the payment of same,..." In October, 1778, more than five months after the prize was sold, Hodge had still not collected Raleigh's share of the prize money.24

The Congress, through its agents in the various States, often bought cargoes or portions thereof taken in prizes captured by CN warships. In the case of Raleigh's prize they instructed Richard Ellis, the Continental agent at New Bern, to "...purchase the half of the salt belonging to the Captors at the lowest rate...as this salt may be much wanted in the fall to pickle meat for the use of the Army."25 There is, unfortunately, no record of the final disposition of either the prize money or the cargo.
ENDNOTES: Chapter V


2. Brigs in the American Navy were all ex-merchant craft bought at the outbreak of the war and converted for naval warfare. There is nothing to indicate any substantial differences between these vessels and others in their class. The Continental brig Cabot was 75 feet in length and displaced 109 tons, while Lexington was 95 feet, no tonnage available, Anthony Preston et al, Navies of the American Revolution (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1975), 147, hereinafter cited as Preston, Navies; Morison, Jones, 38; in calculating the tonnage of a vessel, its measured length on the gun deck is taken to be approximately equal to the length between perpendiculars. Depth of hold is the vertical distance between the gun deck and floors. Tonnage is calculated by the formula:

\[
\text{Tons Burthen} = \frac{100 \times w \times d \times l}{l}
\]

where \(l\) = length of keel, \(d\) = depth of hold, and \(w\) = beam, all measurements being inside measurements. For net tonnage, 33% must be added to the result, William A. Baker, Colonial Vessels, Some 17th Century Sailing Craft, (Barre, Massachusetts, 1962); Crittenden, "Ships," 3.

3. The North Carolina newspaper reads in part, "...came in and took a brig, a prize sent in by the continental frigate Raleigh...," North Carolina Gazette (New Bern), 15 May, 1778, and several Northern papers reported that "The Raleigh and Alfred have taken six prizes since they left America last September, all of which, except one brig with salt, have arrived safe," Boston Continental Journal and Weekly Advertiser, 9 April, 1778; Boston Gazette and Country Journal, 13 April, 1778; Independent Chronicle and the Weekly Advertiser (Boston), 16 April, 1778.

5. The term "crossjack" or "cro'jack" referred to a square sail which was sometimes hung from the lowermost yard of the mizzenmast of a ship-rigged vessel. That yard became known as the "crossjack yard," and the term came to apply to any light lowermost yard on the aftermost mast of any vessel, Tver, *Dictionary*, 83; McGowan states that the brig used a cro'jack yard in place of a true mainyard on its mainmast, McGowan, *Century*, 35; Basil W. Bathe, *The Visual Encyclopedia of Nautical Terms Under Sail* (New York, 1978), 04.04, hereinafter cited as Bathe, *Nautical Terms*; the two European illustrators mentioned show the brig as having a square main course bent either to a light mainyard or to a crossjack yard, Bathe, *Nautical Terms*, 08.03; Tre Trykare, *The Lore of Ships* (New York, 1979), 74, 102, hereinafter cited as Trykare, *Lore*; illustration of the American brig *Badger*, Preston, *Navies*, 116-117; Cedric Rogers, *Sailing Ships* (Bristol, England, n.d.), 39, hereinafter cited as Rogers, *Sailing Ships*; only one author was found to omit the fore-and-aft sail and give the brig two fully square rigged masts, Daniel Hawthorne, *Ships of the Seven Seas* (Garden City, New York, 1924), 300, hereinafter
cited as Hawthorne, Ships; the simplest definition of a brig, "a two-masted vessel, square rigged," is accompanied by an illustration of a two masted craft carrying courses, topsails, topgallants and royals on both masts, with a gaff spanker on the main, a forestaysail, jib, and flying jib, Grant Uden and Richard Cooper, A Dictionary of British Ships and Seamen (New York, 1980), 62, hereinafter cited as Uden, British Ships.

6. Samuel Hodge, Jr., to Governor Richard Caswell, 27 October, 1778, North Carolina, Governor's Papers, G.P. 4, 5; also Clark, State Records, XIII, 489; Scandurra describes the bergantino as originally being smaller than a galliot, which was a small galley of 16-20 oars to a side, Enrico Scandurra, "The Maritime Republics: Medieval and Renaissance Ships in Italy," in George F. Bass (gen.ed.), A History of Seafaring Based on Underwater Archaeology (New York, 1972), 210; Captain Donald Macintyre, The Adventure of Sail (London, 1979), 32, 175, hereinafter cited as Macintyre, Adventure; the idea that the brig evolved from the bergantine is widely accepted among maritime historians, McGowan, Century, 36.

7. Evans, Notes, 59; Rogers, Sailing Ships, 39; Tver, Dictionary, 42; Chapelle, History, 11; McEwen, Encyclopedia, 58-59; Uden, British Ships, 62.

8. Trykare, Lore, 74, 130-131; Bathe, Nautical Terms, 08.03; Lionel Casson, Illustrated History of Ships and Boats (Garden City, New York, 1964), 138, hereinafter cited as Casson, Boats.

9. Objections to the use of the term "brigantine" when referring to this type of craft appear to be of rather recent origin, and may in fact have originated with historians rather than the men who actually built and sailed the ships. Because it originally designated a lateen rigged vessel, certain nautical chroniclers consider it a misapplication to apply the term to a vessel with square sails. The term "hermaphrodite brig," however, is very rarely found prior to the latter part of the 19th century, and may not have been in use at all before about 1815. Likewise, all illustrations and descriptions of hermaphrodite brigs found fit some type of brigantine rig, Hawthorne, Ships, 306; Trykare, Lore, 130-131; Casson, Boats, 138; Angelucci, Ships, 113; Macintyre, Adventure, 32; McEwen, Encyclopedia, 58-59; Uden, British Ships, 208.

11. Sail configurations were as varied as those of brigantines and hermaphrodite brigs, and numerous combinations are illustrated. The identifying feature of a snow was its trymast and sail, Trekare, Lore, 76, 90, 127, 130; Angelucci, Ships, 96; Tver, Dictionary, 42; Rogers, Sailing Ships, 41; Evans, Notes, 59; Bathe, Nautical Terms, 08.03; Chapelle, History, 15; McEwen, Encyclopedia, 514; Uden, British Ships, 484.

12. Angelucci, Ships, 96; Millar, Ships, 199; Macintyre, Adventure, 175.

13. Culver, Old Ships, 229.


15. Evans, Notes, 58; reference is the 10-gun Bermuda sloop Lady Hamond, Millar, Ships, 148, 300; McEwen, Encyclopedia, 511; Uden, British Ships, 481.

16. A list of ships known to be in Lord Dunmore's fleet in July, 1776, shows "Seven sloops occupied by Messrs Spedden and Goodriches familys" and the "Sloop Lady Susan a Tender Briger Goodrich Commander," Clark, Naval Documents, V, 1021-1022; Lord North, another of Goodrich's fleet of privateer vessels also described as a sloop, Public instrument dated 21 August, 1779, State of Massachusetts Bay, describing the capture of the schooner John by the British privateer sloop Lord North, Area File, M625, R199, f0242.

17. Another example is the American sloop Providence, also commanded by Jones, which had a much different rig than Ranger, being single masted, with a forestay sail, jib and flying jib as headsails, a gaff rigged mainsail and square topsail and topgallant, Morison, Jones, 99, 102, 109; Jack Coggin, Ships and Seamen of the American Revolution (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1969), 33-34, hereinafter cited as Coggin, Seamen; McEwen, Encyclopedia, 511; Uden, British Ships, 481; Macintyre, Adventure, 32.
18. The size given is a very rough estimate based on the results of a magnetometer survey of the site (described in Chapter VI), plus sizes and tonnages of contemporary vessels, Reedy, 88Blk5524, 7-8; Preston, Navies, 147; Morison, Jones, 38; Crittenden, "Ships," 3; McGowan, Century, 35.


21. William Tisdale was elected judge of the Court of Admiralty April 28, 1777 over Richard Cogdell and Alex Gaston; Thomas Sitgreaves was elected marshall over John Green, Clark, State Records, XII, 43-45; Clark, State Records, XIII, 108; William Tisdale's landholdings at New Bern included three hundred acres on Wild Cat Branch and the Trent River, Craven County, Record of Entries, MF81, I, 1778-1795, 191, items 19 and 20; Thomas Sitgreaves noted as living in New Bern and having a residence there in 1769-1770, Clark, State Records, XXII, 853; deposition taken at New Bern regarding the action of the Ocracoke pilots in allowing a French ship to go to pieces instead of coming to her aid, and then plundering the cargo, signed by William Tisdale, April 14, 1779, Area File, M625, R68, f0468-0471; Frye, "Privateers," 34.


23. According to the first set of prize regulations drawn up November 25, 1775, the Continental Congress was to receive one-half the prize money from all captured warships and two-thirds from all transports, supply ships and merchantmen. On October 30, 1776, this was amended as stated in the text, Morison, Jones, 34; Journal of the Continental Congress, Force, Archives, Ser. 5, 2, 1417.

24. Samuel Hodge to Governor Caswell, October 27, 1778, North Carolina, Governor's Papers, G.P. 4, 5; also

FIELD EXPLORATION AND SITUATION ANALYSIS

The field portion of this project was undertaken to ascertain the exact location of the site known to exist on the north side of Shackleford Banks as described in the project overview. The existence of the site was apparently unknown locally, except for the divers who had discovered and brought it to the author's attention, and to a pair of older local divers who may have visited the area in the mid-1950's. On both those occasions the vessel remains had been exposed. Over the decade between the last known finding and the commencement of this study, the small channel in which the remains lie had filled in completely, with only a vestige of the original waterway remaining. The remains are deeply buried beneath the sand. This necessitated the use of remote sensing equipment, in this case a proton precession magnetometer, to pinpoint the location.

Using verbal directions given from memory by an individual who had been to the site only once, some ten years previously, surveys of three possible areas were carried out. By a process of elimination, and through repeated conversations with the diver, the search area was gradually narrowed to the practically non-existent channel. Significant magnetometer readings were obtained at the spot
where the wreck should have been, according to the diver's recollection.

Background Research and Information

The investigator first became aware of the wreck in 1972 when a group of sport divers reported having found the timbers of a very old wooden vessel in a narrow channel on the north side of Shackleford Banks. A small commercial fishing vessel had snagged her net on a submerged obstruction approximately 100 feet inside the entrance to a slough which at that time extended well into the tidal flats on the western end of the banks. Water depth in the channel was reported as being ten to fifteen feet in the vicinity of the wreck.

In clearing the net, the divers encountered what appeared to be portions of the lower hull planking and structural timbers of a fairly large wooden sailing vessel protruding from the south bank of the channel. The remains appeared to be oriented in a generally east-west attitude. The divers reported extensive evidence of fire, with many burned timbers and much waterlogged charcoal and ash present.²

Only one piece of physical evidence was recovered from the site at that time. This artifact consisted of a length of square-cut timber just over twenty inches long,
curved, approximately eight inches by eight inches in cross section, with two sections of planking fastened to it with trenails. The planking measured six inches wide by one- and-one-half inches thick. The sections were just over ten inches long and were fitted to the inside curve of the larger piece, at right angles to it. The assumption was made at the time that the larger section was part of a futtock, the two smaller ones being remnants of the ceiling planking. That assumption stands. The surfaces of both the larger timber and the planks showed evidence of having been shaped with an edged tool, such as an axe or adz, rather than having been sawn. A series of longitudinal facets on the trenails indicated that they had either been whittled or shaped with a drawknife as opposed to having been turned on a lathe. Each had been split on the inboard end and had a wooden wedge driven into it.3

Unfortunately the recovered piece was in extremely fragile condition when examined by the investigator. Subsequent to the recording of its measurements it was accidentally destroyed before it could be photographed.

Although several pieces of information thought to relate to this wreck were brought to the investigator over the next few years, he was unable to visit the site. It was not until 1982 that any sort of concentrated search was begun. At this time the location as determined by the 1972
divers was known only vaguely to the investigator, and none of the divers were available. There were two widely separated areas containing three different channels in which the wreck might lie. The searches conducted during the 1982 season covered one of these areas and proved unproductive.

Field Work

In 1983, after considerable background research into the possible identity of the vessel, a permit was applied for and granted by the North Carolina Department of Archives and History to search an area in Back Sound off the northwestern end of Shackleford Banks adjacent to the north shore. The NCDAH permit number, 83BkS524, will be used to designate the site for the purposes of this study. Consultations with the leader of the 1972 dive team had by this time narrowed the search area considerably, but it still included two channels, both of which had to be investigated. At this point it was not known that the channel in which the wreck had originally been found had sanded in, and that the site was buried.

During July, August and September, 1983, a series of bottom searches were conducted. These consisted of dragging for the wreck using very light trawl doors and a thirty-foot tickler chain, and visual bottom examinations
running contours from the bottom of a twenty-foot deep channel upwards into depths of less than five feet. These searches covered an area approximately 1200 yards long by 100 yards out from the beach. Only one feature, a broken off section of daymarker piling about twenty feet long, was located.

In October, 1983, a series of random magnetometer sweeps was made over the area using a Sea Mag IV unit with a towed sensor. This produced two targets of between 25 and 35 gamma (τ) strength, but efforts to buoy the locations were defeated by the extreme current. Only general line-of-sight positioning was possible.*

An accurate magnetometer survey is a vital part of any archaeological field study, enabling the research team to locate submerged and buried sites of historical significance. Proper implementation of such a survey not only allows the researcher to find a site in the field, but often to locate various individual artifacts within the site prior to the commencement of excavation. A major factor in the success of such a survey is a precise and orderly method of acquiring data. Such a system was implemented on 83Bk5524.

The proton precession magnetometer is a highly developed electronic remote sensing instrument which measures the ambient intensity of the earth's magnetic
field over a given area and detects localized distortions, or anomalies, within it. The strength of such disturbances depends on the nature of the causative source and "the thermal and mechanical history of the magnetite present in either the cultural material or its burying medium." Both the ambient magnetic field and the strength of the disturbances within it are measured in units called "gammas", represented by the symbol "γ".

Anomalies of cultural origin generally fall into one of three categories: (1) those caused by induced magnetism, (2) those resulting from thermoremnant magnetism, and (3) those caused by objects possessing permanent magnetism. Induced magnetism results from the disturbance of naturally deposited magnetite-bearing materials on a site. A prime example is the removal or redistribution of earth as a result of the digging of foundations, ditches, fortifications, trash pits and privies on land sites. Such disturbances register as anomalies of low but measurable intensity. Thermoremnant magnetism results from the heating of certain substances somewhere in their history and the subsequent reorientation of the cooled material. Heating causes increased molecular activity within the material which results in a realignment of the elements of those molecules along the lines of the ambient magnetic
field. When such materials are removed to a different location after cooling the aligned molecules are again reoriented, causing a measurable anomaly. Examples of such materials would include fired brick, ceramics and igneous rock that has been moved from its point of origin. Permanent magnetism, like thermoremnant magnetism, is independent of the earth's magnetic field. On cultural sites it is most often associated with ferromagnetic materials, as these create the most readily detectable magnetic signatures. On shipwreck sites these consist of iron spikes, ship fittings, guns and anchors, as well as whatever ferrous components of the cargo may have survived. Ferromagnetic materials create high strength anomalies and are a decided advantage in the detection of submerged or buried sites, however, such high intensity signatures often mask less prominent readings resulting from other types of magnetism.

In implementing the magnetometer to survey an area two search methods, one for large areas and one for definitive on-site investigations, may be used. The effectiveness of each is dependent on the accuracy and uniformity with which the data is gathered and recorded. Both methods were employed on 83BkS524.

The area in which the site is situated is ideally located for an effective magnetometer survey. No large
ferromagnetic or composite structures containing large amounts of ferrous material exist in the immediate area. Activities associated with the deposition of intrusive or contaminating material, such as the building of docks, piers, and other facilities, or the use of the area as an anchorage, has been minimal, consequently there are few artifacts of modern vintage to confuse the magnetometer readings. A joint survey by the East Carolina University Program in Maritime History and Underwater Research and the North Carolina Department of Archives and History Underwater Archaeology Branch in July, 1982, failed to discern any significant anomalies anywhere close by.

In November, 1983, a closely controlled systematic survey of an area 100 yards by 1000 yards covering basically the same ground as the search performed in October, was undertaken using a Geometrics model G806-M magnetometer with a dry sensor, mounted in a twenty foot fiberglass survey boat. This equipment proved far more accurate and eminently more successful than that used previously. Buoyed lanes were run northwest-southeast and southeast-northwest at intervals of fifty feet. Targets were marked simultaneously by buoys thrown from the survey craft and flags set on the beach. A basic magnetic reading of 52800 f was used for this area. A total of five runs were made by the survey vessel, the results of which are
recorded below. An attempt to enter the slough channel at extreme high tide was defeated by the strengthening wind which grounded the survey boat and made maneuvering in the channel impossible.

Run #1 - Southeast to northwest in the 20-foot channel
Anomaly A1 - 20 τ positive, monopolar, NE mouth of slough channel
Anomaly A2 - 22 τ multicomponent, NE Morehead ship channel range marker

Run #2 - Southeast to northwest 50 feet inside Run #1, along the 20-foot contour
Anomaly A1 - 22 τ dipolar (10 negative, 12 positive)
Anomaly A2 - 28 τ dipolar (10 negative, 18 positive)

Run #3 - Northwest to southeast, 50 feet inside Run #2, along the 15-foot contour
Anomaly A2 - 10 τ positive, monopolar
Anomaly B - 35 τ positive, monopolar, due north of mouth of slough channel
Anomaly A1 - 41 τ dipolar (20 negative, 21 positive)

Run #4 - Southeast to northwest, 50 feet inside Run #3, along the 10-foot contour
Anomaly A1 - 45 τ multicomponent (25 negative, 20 positive)
Run #4 was interrupted short of its termination point by heavy westerly swells

Run #5 - Northwest to southeast, 50 feet off the beach, depth 4-5 feet
This run proceeded across the mouth of the slough channel and back to the southeast sector of the search area. No anomalies were detected

At the completion of Run #5 an attempt to run into the slough channel was made. The original discovery had by this time been determined as having been made approximately 100 feet back from the mouth of this channel. Sanding in over the intervening decade had reduced the depth of the channel to just over two feet at extreme high water. On attempting to enter, the survey boat was pinned to the southeast side of the channel by a
strong northwesterly wind and was freed only with difficulty. Surveying the channel was therefore postponed until conditions were more favorable.

By this time the investigator realized that when the site was located it would undoubtedly be inaccessible without equipment and logistical support far in excess of what was available to the project. In consultations with representatives of both the Program in Maritime History and Underwater Research and the North Carolina Department of Archives and History it was determined to pursue the project as a "phase one" archaeological search, concluding with the remote sensing location of the site. Actual excavation of the wreck was considered as a later possibility by one or both of those agencies.

During April, 1984, two searches of the slough channel were conducted using a hand-held Aqua-Pulse metal detector in an attempt to locate any large metallic concentrations in the area. These searches covered the entire channel, bank to bank, and extended from its mouth well into the tidal flats. Finds consisted entirely of modern non-biodegradable refuse, primarily foil and aluminum beverage containers. No indications of deeply buried metals were noted.

To obtain as accurate a representation as possible of a known site, especially one contained within a relatively small area, a tight pattern of precise magnetometer readings
is necessary. These measurements are used to produce a magnetic contour map similar in appearance to a topographical contour map. The map can then be used to determine the location of individual components of the site, insofar as the high intensity anomalies do not mask those of lesser strength. This procedure is especially important on sites such as 83Bk5524 where the entire cultural deposit is covered by several feet of sediment.

On 25 July, 1984, a systematic survey of the slough channel was begun using the Geometrics magnetometer employed the previous November, this time using a backpack carrier and a dry sensor. The survey was conducted at low tide when the channel was dry in order to facilitate coverage of the area and accuracy of the reading positions. A baseline was established parallel to the beach on a bearing of 305° Magnetic, and its end positions determined by compass bearings. Survey lanes were run every twenty-five feet at right angles to the baseline. The same basic magnetic reading of 52800 r was used. Readings were taken at increments of twenty-five feet out from the baseline to a distance of 175 feet. This distance covered the entire channel including both banks. An area of magnetic intensity of approximately 30 r negative over a distance of about fifty feet was noted between seventy-five and 125 feet south of the baseline, off its southeastern extremity. The line was then
extended 100 feet on a bearing of 125° (the reciprocal of 305°), and the surveying procedure continued. At the end of the day an area of approximately 40 r positive intensity was detected about 100 feet south of the extremity of the extended line. Compass bearings were taken on both reading locations and both were marked with stakes. The area covered by this survey was 175 feet by 300 feet.¹¹

On 7 August, 1984, the magnetometer survey of the slough channel continued. The baseline established 25 July was extended 250 feet on the 125° bearing. Readings were taken using the same equipment and procedures employed on 25 July. The centers of positive and negative intensity were rechecked and located on the new plot. By the end of this second survey it was apparent that a large dipolar anomaly existed at or very near the spot where the wreck had been reported in 1972. A second anomaly, this one positive, was located some fifty feet to the eastward of the large one. Several attempts to investigate the anomalies using a hydro-probe were unsuccessful because of difficulties with the equipment.¹²

**Identification of Anomalies**

The objective of the November, 1983 survey was to investigate the outer channel and more definitively locate
the anomalies noted in October, as by that time the wreck position had been ascertained as definitely being inside the slough channel. Consequently a controlled prospecting or wide area search pattern was employed. While this would not be an acceptable procedure for the establishment of complex magnetic profiles it is usually adequate for locating magnetic anomalies of cultural origin within a given area.\footnote{13}

The positions of anomalies A1 and A2 as determined in November correspond with the line-of-sight positions of the two anomalies detected on the random survey in October. Because of time limitations and the excessively hostile environmental conditions encountered in the channel, and because the object of the search was by that time known to lie inside the slough channel, no subsurface investigations of A1 and A2 were attempted at that time. Visual searches for A1 and A2 were conducted in June and July of 1984, with negative results. This area has been noted as a "Cable Area" on U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey charts for a number of years. Likewise topographic maps show telephone cables in this part of Back Sound. Judging by the apparent configuration and orientation of A1 and A2, it is quite probable that they are telephone or electrical cables installed during World War II, when there were military installations on the banks, or possibly telegraph cables of
an even earlier vintage.\textsuperscript{14}

Anomaly B is in the general area of the broken daymarker piling noted in the visual search undertaken in July, 1983. The possibility exists that this anomaly is associated with the daymarker, but in actuality anomaly B could be any relatively small object with 35 τ positive magnetic intensity. The visual searches of June-July 1984 were negative on this target also.\textsuperscript{15}

Establishment of Magnetic Contours

Using the data collected on 25 July and 7 August, 1984, a magnetic contour map of that part of the slough channel showing significant magnetic activity was compiled. This produced a dipolar anomaly of approximately 50 τ (13 positive, 37 negative), extending over an area roughly 100 feet by 75 feet, and a significant positive monopolar anomaly to the east of it. This might at first appear somewhat large for a vessel of the type described in the literature, that is, a late 18th-century brig or brigantine. However the extent of the readings may be accounted for in part by the scattering of material from the ship as it disintegrated, creating an extensive debris field of items bearing detectable magnetic signatures. This might include ceramics, glass and possibly igneous ballast rock, as well as ferromagnetic or permanently magnetized materials such as
ship's fittings. The depth of overburden on the site is approximately 8-12 feet, which would cause a certain degree of expansion of the signal, resulting in the target appearing larger than it actually is. The positive monopolar anomaly some fifty feet east of the large dipolar signature is about 58 and covers an area of roughly 50 feet by 50 feet. These two features are assumed to be related and will so be considered until proven otherwise.

In an effort to establish a hypothesis regarding the route by which the ship arrived at its present location, a study of the geomorphology and meteorology of the area was undertaken. The results of that study and the investigator's personal familiarity with the area over the past two decades have been combined with known historical facts in order to arrive at the most probable sequence of events to have put the brig where she lies today. A part of this hypothesis is that 83BkS524 is indeed the remains of the prize delivered to Beaufort by Samuel Hodge and the prize crew from Raleigh, and later burned by the British privateer, Captain Goodrich.

Analysis of Geomorphological Factors

A chart of Old Topsail Inlet (Beaufort Inlet) and the harbor of Beaufort dating from approximately six months before the incident indicates several channels and anchorages available to sailing craft. The main ship channel is shown
as having had between three and seven fathoms (eighteen to forty-two feet) of depth, with three fathoms over Old Topsail Bar. A smaller channel around what was then the west end of "Shackelford's Bank" held only eight feet of water and would have probably been suitable only for smaller craft. The main ship channel ran almost due north from the bar until it turned northwest just inside Bogue Banks.

Another substantial channel, the "Coresound" Channel, turned east out of the main ship channel before itself branching northeast and southwest about a mile north of the east end of Shackleford Banks. According to this document, anchorages apparently existed not only in front of the town of Beaufort, but off the western end of Carrot Island and in an area of deep water behind Shackleford Banks. This deep water still exists today and maintains a depth of sixty feet and more. A fourth anchorage, the "Ship Road," existed at the head of the main ship channel.

Given the existing danger from British privateers and naval craft at the time, it is doubtful that many vessels would have risked anchoring so close to the harbor entrance. Nor would a prudent captain have left his vessel in the "Ship Road," within easy reach of an enemy sailing up the main channel, if anchorage was available closer to the town. Most likely, a prize as valuable as the one in question would have been kept as near the waterfront as possible. Even that
was no guarantee of protection, as British privateers were quite skilled in using craft and deception to get close to their prey undetected.¹⁹ In this instance Goodrich succeeded in getting his sloop past the pilots and into the harbor, and was able to get a crew aboard the prize vessel, apparently without any interference from the citizens of Beaufort. Indeed, there is no mention of any action being taken by the townspeople until the vessel had been set afire and the British had left.²⁰

A comparison of the 1777 chart with a modern Coast and Geodetic Survey chart and aerial photographs of the physical changes in the west end of Shackleford Banks taken over the past half century makes a number of things evident. Of major interest is the fact that the mile-wide area of sand shoals pictured as being off the west end of the banks in 1777 gradually sanded in and became what is now the banks itself. The channel which is today just north of Shackleford Point is the Coresound Channel noted on the 1777 chart. The area of shoal between the Island of Marsh and Carrot Island on the 1777 document has built up to become Bird Shoal. Though still referred to as Island of Marsh by many local residents, this feature is now shown as "Town Marsh" on the charts. The small channels which used to cut through what is now Bird Shoal have all but disappeared.²¹
Analysis of Meteorological Factors

This facet of the project was limited somewhat by a decided lack of weather records for the colonial period in North Carolina. The records of the U.S. Weather Bureau and its predecessor agencies contain no information whatsoever for the colonial period in this State and very little for any other State. Most of these are in the form of diaries and personal journals where only major meteorological events were recorded. Neither the David Ludlum Collection at the National Climatic Center nor James N. Havens Annotated Bibliography of Meteorological Observations in the United States 1715-1818 make any mention of North Carolina weather. Nor is it scientifically possible to reconstruct past weather conditions for a specific date in history based on later observed weather data. It is, however, possible to establish general climatic conditions over a period of time from such observations.  

In order to establish as closely as possible the prevalent meteorological patterns, particularly regarding wind strength and direction, at Old Topsail Inlet for the general period in question, a study was made of local weather records from the earliest available up to the present. Readings for wind strength, wind direction, temperature, precipitation and sky cover were considered. Rather than
establish a mean value or measurement for each meteorological feature the study attempted to establish a general forecast in the style of an almanac, to give the most educated probability of what weather conditions might have been. Where available, records covering the period of the last two weeks of April, all of May and the first two weeks of June were examined for each year. Climatological data from nearby points on the coast were also noted when found.

Judging from these local records, the earliest of which went back 150 years, the first part of May in Beaufort can be expected to be generally sunny, mild and pleasant, with a minimum of overcast and rain on no more than three to five days, usually less. Temperatures are variable but never extreme. The most predictable meteorological factor for this time period is wind, and the occasional variations in speed and direction are the exception. Prevailing conditions call for breezes of between six and twelve knots from the southwest quadrant of the compass, generally southwest or south-southwest.23

Conclusions

There is very little doubt that the anomalies located on 25 July and 7 August, 1984 indicate the same wrecksite discovered by accident in 1972. The location has been verified by Key Informant #1 and there are no other
significant anomalies in the area surveyed. The readings obtained on 83Bk5524 are similar to others of like strength and distribution which have been found on other wrecksites and are considered "typical" of the buried remains of wooden sailing vessels.24

Absolute confirmation would, however, entail removing a considerable amount of overburden from the site, which is buried eight to twelve feet deep and is some 200 feet back from the low water mark. Such an operation would be quite costly and would inevitably be opposed by environmental groups. In addition, the recent acquisition of Shackleford Banks by the National Park Service will undoubtedly increase the difficulty of obtaining a permit to work the site.

Whether or not the ship is indeed Raleigh's erstwhile prize may never be irrefutably resolved, however, a number of factors point to the excellent probability that this is the case. The vessel was of wooden construction, and judging by the size of her frames was of at least moderate size. The magnetic contour map likewise indicates a craft of significant dimensions, certainly large enough for a brig. Evidence of workmanship on the observed section indicates construction without the extensive use of sawn timber and prior to widespread use of turned dowelling as fastenings. The absence of iron spikes, while not necessarily significant in itself is typical of colonial era vessels in areas such as
the southern colonies and the Caribbean where iron foundries were non-existent. Nor are there any magnetometer readings of sufficient magnitude to indicate large masses of ferrous metals that would indicate the machinery of a steam vessel. The profuse evidence of fire damage in the wreck also supports the hypothesis, as the ship was fired by Captain Goodrich when he could not get her out of the inlet.

Finally the position of the site coincides with the northern edge of the large sand shoal that existed off the west end of Shackleford Banks in 1778 and has since become part of the bank itself. Given the likelihood that the ship was anchored in front of the town or off the west end of Carrot Island, and the fact that Goodrich, having "...decoyed the pilots..." was able to board and cut her cable without incident, his quickest means of egress would have been down one of the small side channels to the Coresound Channel and out the inlet. Having reached the point just north of the large shoal area where the Coresound Channel and the smaller one meet, the square rig of the brig would have proved disadvantageous in proceeding in the face of a southwesterly wind. Goodrich may have preferred to burn her rather than to take the time necessary to tack out of the harbor, risking capture and another lengthy imprisonment. Conversely, had the wind been from a northerly quarter, sailing the prize
would have been no problem, but even a slight error in judgment on the part of men unfamiliar with the harbor would have been sufficient to put her aground. There is a submerged and buried wrecksite of a very old wooden sailing vessel located on what was at one time a significant hazard to navigation in Old Topsail Inlet. A great many factors indicate that it is the remains of the vessel which is the subject of this study. Having analyzed the situation and considered every possible parameter involved in a project to excavate and examine the site, the investigator is of the opinion that the educational and historical benefit to be derived therefrom do not presently warrant the expenditures necessary to complete such an investigation. Should that situation change, however, the investigator will certainly seek permission to undertake a complete archaeological investigation of the site.
ENDNOTES: Chapter VI

1. Personal interviews with Key Informant #1 were conducted in July, 1972, at the time of discovery of the site. Several years later it was learned that a pair of long-time residents of the county may have dived the site almost two decades previously. An interview with Key Informant #2 on that topic indicated that the site had been exposed and that several sections of hull planking identical to the material recovered in 1972 had been removed. These items had not survived; Key Informant #1 Interview, July, 1972; Key Informant #2 Interview, August, 1984.

2. These findings were confirmed by all members of the dive team present at the interview, and by the owner of the fishing craft. Apparently some effort had been taken to get an accurate idea of the identity of the structure and its orientation; Key Informant #1 Interview, July, 1972.

3. This item was in extremely fragile condition when seen by the investigator. Badly riddled with teredo and limnoria tunnels to begin with, the piece had been allowed to dry out and was beginning to disintegrate, nonetheless, the marks described could be clearly made out, Reedy, "838k5524," 2-3.

4. This exercise proved the futility of attempting to achieve any kind of accuracy with inadequate equipment and lack of prior planning. Except for the fact that two detectable anomalies were encountered, no appreciable results were forthcoming, Reedy, "838k5524," 5.


7. All three types of magnetism described can be found on any cultural site, however, submerged sites are usually located through the registering of signatures from items with permanent magnetic characteristics, Watts, "Magnetic Analysis," 2-4; Arnold, Padre Island, 193.

8. Magnetometer prospecting in this area during the course of a six-week graduate field school conducted prior to this study located no targets of any size or strength near 83BkS524, Gordon P. Watts, Jr., "Report of the Activities of the Field School in Maritime History and Underwater Research at Cape Lookout, North Carolina," unfinished ms., Program in Maritime History and Underwater Research, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina; Watts, "Magnetic Analysis," 8.

9. The "slough channel" referred to is the one in which the wreck was eventually located. It empties from the large area of tidal flats on the north side of the west end of Shackleford Banks into the 20-foot deep channel in which the magnetometer runs had been conducted, Reedy, "83BkS524," 5-6.

10. Arnold, Padre Island, 194.


13. Readings from ferromagnetic material in any quantity can mask or distort the more subtle profiles peculiar to induced and thremoremmant magnetism. The distinctive signatures of are quite prominent and usually indicate material of a cultural nature, Watts, "Magnetic Analysis," 4.


18. "Plan of Old Topsail Inlet and the Harbour of Beaufort, November 17, 1777," Legislative Papers, Box 14, folder November, 1777, hereinafter cited as Legislative Papers, "Old Topsail."

19. Description of the taking by ruse of two French vessels at Ocracoke by "a small sloop with 4 guns and 30 men," North Carolina Gazette (New Bern), 10 April, 1778;


APPENDIX A

A section of the Edward Moseley Map, 1733, showing the North Carolina Coast between Beaufort and Currituck, and including Hunting Quarters Inlet and Ocracoke Inlet.
A Map Of the Caribbee Islands, 1756, by Thomas Jeffreys, showing the locations of Deseada, Martinique, Barbados, St. Eustatius, and other islands pertinent to the text.
A Map of the Caribbee Islands, showing which belong to England, France, Spain, Dutch & Danes, collected from the best Authorities; by Mr. Jefferys, Geographer to his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales.

Explanation.
E. English, F. French, H. Dutch, D. Danes, S. Spaniards.
APPENDIX C

Vessel Illustrations


4. HM 18-gun Snow Mohawk, from Millar, Ships, 200.
Plan 3. Draught of RALEIGH, 32 guns, after the Admiralty draught made after her capture.
A Draft of the 10-Gun Sloop Lady Hamond, built at Bermuda about 1788

- Length between Perpendiculars: 68' 8"
- Length of Keel for Tonnage: 51' 2"
- Breadth: 20'
- Depth in Hold: 9' 11"
- Tonnage: 119
A Reconstruction of the Draft of His Majesty's 18-Gun Snow
*Mohawk*, built at Oswego, New York, in 1759
Length on the Deck

77'
APPENDIX D

Illustrations Depicting the Geomorphology of Beaufort Inlet.

1. A Plan of Old Topsail Inlet and the Harbour of Beaufort, November, 1777.


A Plan of Old Town &c. Intake and the Harbour of Beaufort. Shewn the 17th Nov. 1777.
Appendix E

Illustrations Pertinent to Field Investigations

1. Location of magnetometer survey, 83BkS524, November, 1983.

2. Aerial photograph of west end of Shackleford Banks, May, 1979, showing wreck location.

3. Magnetometer contour map of the wrecksite.
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