

THE DEBATE OVER POLITICAL POLARIZATION: AN UPDATED EXAMINATION OF  
PUBLIC POLARIZATION

by

Julia Stamper

A Senior Honors Project Presented to the

Honors College

East Carolina University

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for

Graduation with Honors

by

Julia Stamper

Greenville, NC

December 2018

Approved by:

Dr. Peter Francia

Department of Political Science

The Debate over Political Polarization: An Updated Examination of Public Polarization

Julia Stamper

Senior Honors Thesis – Political Science

East Carolina University

December 2018

Political polarization has been and continues to be a popular and controversial subject in academic research for more than a decade. The term itself, “political polarization,” refers to the vast opinion gap that separates Democrats from Republicans, and liberals from conservatives, on various political issues. However, for there to be polarization, mere division on issues is not sufficient; there needs to be a *deep* and *substantial* divide between the two positions. When looking at the two parties in Congress, for example, there is evidence that Republicans have moved further to the right, whereas Democrats have moved further to the left (Poole and Rosenthal 2016). However, does a similar gap exist within the public?

Although there is a general consensus among political scientists that the U.S. Congress has become more polarized in the last several decades, there is a heated debate regarding whether congressional polarization is mirrored by polarization in the public. Some argue that polarization of the public has, indeed, increased since the 1950s, but not enough to account for the vast increase in the polarization of Congress (Hill and Tausanovitch 2015). Still others argue that the public is not polarized by any substantial measure, and our divide is largely a myth fabricated by politicians and perpetuated by the media (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011). And yet still others argue the public is, indeed, polarized (Abramowitz 2013). So, the question remains: is the public polarized?

This research is important because polarization affects public policy. Legislative gridlock and/or government shutdowns have become increasingly common. Increased polarization also has pushed more ideologically moderate Congress members to retire in recent years, making compromise and bipartisanship more difficult (Therriault 2008). Regardless of whether the polarization of the American public has caused the polarization of the Congress in the past, a public that is increasingly more polarized will undoubtedly have an effect on the

ideological composition of the Congress in the future as elected officials will follow their constituents' positions in order to remain in office (Downs 1957). This development has obvious implications for the future of American government (Davis and Mason 2016).

### **The Polarization Debate**

Polarization of the American public has been the study of extensive research in recent decades. Beginning in 2005 and continuing through the present, Morris Fiorina and his co-authors propose that the American public is not as polarized as many media accounts suggest. They argue that though polarization may exist, it does not extend outside of the “political class” comprised of politicians and strong party activists, claiming that, “most Americans are somewhat like the unfortunate citizens of some third-world countries who try to stay out of the crossfire while left-wing guerrillas and right-wing death squads shoot at each other” (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011, 8).

Additionally, they observe that the majority of Americans are not interested in and are ill-informed about politics. When individuals do have opinions, most hold positions in or around the center of the ideological spectrum (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011). Fiorina draws his conclusions by comparing survey responses taken from residents in “red states” and those in “blue states” (whether a state is red or blue is determined based on the previous presidential election. States where Republican candidates won are red and states where Democratic candidates won are blue). His results reveal no substantial differences between red state and blue state respondents (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011).

Fiorina finds that there are minimal differences on policy preferences and “dividing issues” between citizens of red and blue states. In 2000, residents of red states were just as likely

as those in blue states to believe that corporations had too much power and made too much profit. Likewise, similar percentages of residents in blue states agreed with residents in red states that government was almost always wasteful and inefficient. Majorities in both states viewed religion as very important, and minorities in both states believed homosexuality should be accepted by society (Fiorina Abrams, and Pope 2011). In 2004, a nearly identical minority of residents in red and blue states (46% and 45% respectively) thought that immigration should decrease and that homosexual marriage should be allowed (31% and 39%).

Fiorina also observes that constituents are reluctant to categorize themselves as Republicans or Democrats, choosing instead to identify as an Independent. A similar phenomenon occurs when individuals are asked to categorize their ideological position; few categorize themselves as conservatives or liberals, preferring the term moderate (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2011). However, of those who do categorize themselves as conservatives and liberals, there are more conservatives dwelling in both the red and blue states. This indicates that the supposed “red state-blue state divide” is more myth than reality.

Other political scientists have since disputed Fiorina’s claims, including Francia and Baumgartner (2006) who claim that the public is indeed polarized, and this polarization is evident when comparing survey data between rural and urban populations. They find that there is clear geographic polarization, including a lack of homogeneity even within the red and blue states.

Perhaps the most formidable argument against Fiorina’s is one proposed by Alan Abramowitz. Abramowitz (2013) takes a different approach than Francia and Baumgartner and claims that polarization is evident in survey data from red and blue states, and shows Americans are deeply divided, especially on key issues such as, healthcare, abortion, gay marriage and other

cultural, geographic, and economic issues. He argues that the American public has become fixated on party membership and loyalty and, consequently, has damaged Republicans' and Democrats' ability to work with each other (Abramowitz 2013). He rejects Fiorina's claim that the polarization is only evident in the political class claiming instead that, "there is no disconnect between elected officials and the voters who put them in office.... Polarization is not a result of a failure of representation; it is the result of successful representation" (Abramowitz 2013, Preface xiii).

Abramowitz counters Fiorina's claim that individuals' self-identification indicates the opposite of polarization with data that the average ideological position for self-identified Democrats moves steadily towards "strong liberal" while the average position for self-identified Republicans moves steadily towards "strong conservative" (Abramowitz 2013). Additionally, he graphs the average ideological position for self-identified Democrats and Republicans compared to the average ideological placement for each party. If the electorate is truly a collection of moderates being forced to choose between two ideologically polarized parties, then both Democrats and Republicans should categorize themselves in the exact middle of the two parties. Instead, Democrats and Republicans both categorize themselves extremely close to their respective parties (Abramowitz 2013). The largest discrepancy is in the 1970s when the public position for Democrats averaged 3.7 while the Democratic Party's average was 3.4; however, the prevalence of conservative, Southern Democrats likely explains this result.

Abramowitz also has data that indicate Americans are polarized on key issues. Individuals who perceived universal health care as either important or very important in 2008 were deeply divided on whether healthcare should be a purely private or governmental function. When asked their opinions on universal healthcare, approximately 70% of Democrats "favored it

a great deal” while 70% of Republicans “opposed it a great deal” (Abramowitz 2013). There is also clear separation on the topic of abortion over time (1980-present). In 1980, white Democrats were closely divided between the pro-choice and pro-life stance, 49% to 49%. In 2008, a gap had developed and grown to 61% pro-choice and 28% pro-life.

Given the conflicting assessments in the academic literature, the purpose of this study is to use the most recent survey data available to determine whether Fiorina (*Culture War: The Myth of Polarized America*) or Abramowitz (*The Polarized Public: Why American Government is So Dysfunctional*) better depicts the reality of polarization (or the lack thereof) in contemporary American political life. Additionally, the country has changed significantly since Fiorina first published his findings in 2005, and it is arguably different still since his last examination in 2011 and Abramowitz’s examination in 2013; one does not need to look far for evidence of the changes.

Baldassarri and Gelman (2008) find that issue partisanship, or liberal/conservative identification, has increased, allowing parties to attract individuals more easily into their camps by effectively sorting them into ideological, moral, social, and economic viewpoints. However, they do not find strong evidence to indicate that there is public polarization on key issues (new lifestyles, traditional values, abortion, affirmative action, federal spending for the environment, moral behavior, and equality). Hence, their results do not point to deep divisions on what are typically considered “polarizing” issues (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008). In short, there is more evidence for party sorting than issue-based polarization. However, others argue just the opposite; they claim political parties have managed to sort the electorate into their ideological camps based on issues that have the most traction and salience by taking more distinct stances on these issues (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Layman, Casey, and Horowitz 2006).

Others still have explored the possible impact of the advances in technology, media bias, the prevalence of campaign ads, and the rise of social media on the American electorate from a variety of standpoints such as political socialization, partisan sorting, informative power, and even their positive effects on the democratic process (Davis and Dunaway 2016; Dellavigna and Kaplan 2007; Farrell, Lawrence, and Sides 2008; Geer 2010). Social media allow individuals to bypass information from those with whom they disagree and instead turn to their own information sources comprised solely of those with whom they share similar beliefs (Sunstein 2018). Individuals prefer messages that are already in line with their current views, which could be contributing to the increased polarization in recent decades (Knobloch-Westerwick and Meng 2009; 2011).

Regardless of what factors some scholars may argue are contributing to polarization, the fact remains that the world of American politics has changed and so have the opinions of the American electorate. Even if all the academic literature above is discounted, the 2016 election would be reason enough to reexamine polarization as it saw not only nasty attacks of those with contrasting views—both candidate-on-candidate and citizen-on-citizen attacks—but the rise of extremely polarized candidates themselves. From a business man promising to build a wall along the southern border to a self-proclaimed democratic-socialist who favors tax rates as high as 90%, primary voters responded favorably to both. Immediately after the election, there were protests across the nation, and deep division remains today, two years later. At least anecdotally, there are plenty of examples that people no longer politely disagree with each other's policy preferences; instead, we prefer to attack each other on personal and moral grounds and claim they, and those like them, will be the downfall of the country. It is for reasons such as these that an updated examination of the political polarization of the American public is needed.



### **Research Questions and Hypothesis**

This research centers around the research question: Is the American public politically polarized? The hypotheses of Fiorina and Abramowitz are tested to answer this research question. The American National Election Studies (ANES) is used to compare and contrast the two claims.

If Fiorina's hypothesis is correct, then analyzing public survey data would reveal that a majority of Americans have opinions that are situated in the middle, or moderate, position. A graph of the data would form a normal distribution, a bell curve. If Abramowitz is correct, then an analysis of public opinion surveys would reveal a majority of opinions in the extremes of the spectrum instead of in the middle. The graph would then shift from a normally distributed bell curve to a bimodal, or "u" shaped, curve.

### **Methodology**

The ANES is used because it allows for the analysis of responses over several decades and therefore provides a better picture of shifts in public opinion. Polarization of the electorate is evident over many facets of political life—and even nonpolitical, some would argue (Iyengar and Westwood 2014). For this reason, I chose to analyze several separate indicators: ideological self-identification, feelings towards presidents of the opposite party, feelings toward the opposite party in general, and opinions on policy issues.

Research shows that while the electorate may have followed the lead of party elites and national parties, the public has ultimately become more ideologically consistent and our political system would be unrecognizable without the alignment (Abramowitz 2010; Baumer and Howard 2016; Levendusky 2009) so, I examined how Democrats and Republicans placed themselves on

the ideological spectrum. There also has been extensive research on issue polarization (Adams 2014; Carsey and Layman 2006; Iyengar and Westwood 2014; Mason 2014), meaning that there is a deep divide in opinions between Republicans and Democrats on salient policy issues; therefore, I examine the changing opinions of Democrats and Republicans on three long-term and relevant issues: health insurance, abortion, and immigration. Finally, polarization can be measured on the basis of Republicans' and Democrats' feelings towards the opposite party (Iyengar and Westwood 2014; Iyengar and Krupenkin 2018); this led me to examine how Republicans and Democrats respond on feeling thermometers towards presidents—particularly those of the opposite party— and the opposite party as a whole.

Comparison of the average responses (means) of Republicans and Democrats each year and cross tabulation analysis is used to determine if there is any evidence of political polarization at the surface level on Democrats' and Republicans' ideological self-placement, opinions on three long-term and prevalent policy issues—health insurance, abortion, and immigration — and feelings towards the opposite party itself and presidents of the opposite party. After the cross tabulation analysis and a comparison of the mean responses establishes that Democrats and Republicans were indeed divided, and deeply divided, increasingly more so with the passage of time, I use multi-variate analysis to ensure that the polarization on the policy issues is primarily a result of respondents' political party identification and not other factors. Additionally, after establishing that political party identification is indeed the dividing factor, predictive probability distributions are used to determine the policy positions of strong party identifiers, party identifiers, weak party identifiers, and pure independents. The methods of analysis for cross tabulations, comparisons of means, regressions, and predictive probabilities are each explained in more detail below. For all three methods, the ANES time series data from 1948- 2016 is used to

not only identify potential polarization in recent years, but also to compare to polarization in years past.

Cross tabulations are used to analyze the distribution of Republicans' and Democrats' responses on 7-point Likert scales and similar scales of a smaller range (4-point or 5-point). In order to ensure accuracy when measuring the suspected polarization in the American public, I analyze questions in which individuals are asked about their opinion on a current issue (abortion, immigration, health insurance) or are asked to categorize their ideological leanings on a 1-7 scale where 1 represents "strong liberal" and 7 represents "strong conservative." The opinions on issues are categorized on a scale that varies from question to question, but the scale and meaning are defined for each issue. Any responses labeled "Do not know" or "Did not answer" or any such similar responses are excluded.

When polarization does not exist, then a graph of public opinions is a bell curve with the majority of responses collecting around the middle, or moderate, viewpoint. For example, if there is no ideological polarization, a majority of Americans would ideologically categorize themselves as a 3, 4, or 5 (on a 7-point scale) and thus create a bell curve. When polarization does exist, however, there are a greater percentage of responses gathered in the extremes of the scales creating an inverse bell curve. For example, if the ideology scales indicate polarization, the largest numbers of responses are concentrated in the left (1-2) and right (6-7) sides making the graph look more like a 'u' than a bell curve. This holds true for scales of any number; measured on a scale of 5 and with no polarization, the majority of response should cluster around 2, 3, and 4 as opposed to 1 and 5.

I also analyze feeling thermometer scales for how positively or negatively Democrats and Republicans feel towards presidents while they were in office and towards the opposite party. A

response of 51-100 degrees indicates a more favorable feeling while a response of 0-49 degrees indicates a more negative feeling. A response of 50 indicates a completely neutral opinion. For the purposes of visual representation of how polarized the American public is in their feelings towards Republican and Democrat Presidents and the Republican and Democrat parties, I recode the 1-100 scale into a condensed, 5-point scale and used a cross tabulation analysis. Responses of 0-19 degrees are coded as 1, 20-39 degrees as 2, 40-59 degrees as 3, 60-79 degrees as 4, and 80-100 degrees as 5. Category 1 represents a very unfavorable opinion, 2 an unfavorable opinion, 3 a neutral opinion, 4 a favorable opinion, and 5 a very favorable opinion. Once again, responses of “Do not know” or “Did not answer” or other such similar responses were excluded. Using the same methods, I also examined feeling thermometer data for how self-identified Democrats and Republicans feel towards the opposite party.

Since all responses to the ANES are recorded on numerical scales, I also compare the mean response of Republicans and Democrats over time to demonstrate how polarized the public has become. When polarization exists, the average response for Republicans moves steadily toward the most conservative choice while the average response for Democrats moves to the more liberal choice. As the average opinion moves farther and farther towards the extremes, there is clear separation in the graph. This logically follows cross tabulation data because as more and more respondents categorize their opinions in the extremes of the scale, those responses will pull the mean towards the tail end of the scale. The mean response for both Republicans and Democrats was analyzed for the ideological self-identification, all three policy issues, and the two feeling thermometers for each year data are available. Those responses are graphed chronologically over time to represent visually how the gap in the opinions of Republicans and Democrats grows.

Since a surface level analysis of distribution of responses and comparison of the average responses reveals deep divisions between Republicans and Democrats, regression analysis is used to control for other characteristics that could cause the respondents to have such dividing responses. Factors such as age, gender, race, education level, and family income are controlled for. To aid in the understanding of the regression models, I use predictive probabilities (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2002) to translate the regression findings back onto each issues' individual scale thus showing how each respondent would respond to that question based on their party identification and controlling for the demographic factors.

While only the charts for the first year the questions appear in the ANES and 2016 are included in the Findings section, charts for every year data is available can be found in the Appendix to visually demonstrate the shift in opinions over time. The mean values for Republicans and Democrats as well as the expected responses for partisans generated in the predictive probabilities are also included in the Appendix.


## **Findings**

### **Comparison of Means and Cross Tabulations for Ideological Self-Identification and Feeling Thermometers**

In 1972, when asked to identify themselves on a 7-point scale ranging from "very liberal" to "very conservative," the mean score for Democrats was 3.77 and the mean score for Republicans was 4.64. When asked the same question in 2016, the mean score for Democrats was 3.05 and the mean score for Republicans was 5.3. This indicates that Democrats in 2016 were 19.25% "more liberal" than Democrats in 1972 while Republicans in 2016 were 14.33% "more conservative" than Republicans in 1972. Figure 1 shows the steady widening of mean

ideological scores for Democrats and Republicans since 1972. In 1972, Republicans and Democrats were separated by .87 and by 2016, the spread had grown to 2.26. A 160.73% increase in spread. If there was no polarization, then there would be a minimal or nonexistent gap between the means of Democrats and Republicans. However, as the gap expands an enormous 160.73% over 44 years, it indicates the public has become much more polarized since the 1970s.

Figure 1



There is also evidence of polarization in the distribution of how liberal or conservative Democrats and Republicans categorize themselves. In 1972, 36.3% of Democrats and 33.4% of Republicans categorized themselves as “moderate” (category 4). Conversely, 19.3% of Democrats categorized themselves as “strong liberals” (category 1) or “liberals” (category 2) while 24.7% of Republicans categorized themselves as “strong conservatives” (category 7) or “conservatives” (category 6). In 2016, 29.5% of Democrats and 19.3% of Republicans categorized themselves as “moderate;” 38.5% of Democrats categorized themselves as either

“strong liberals” or liberals,” and 52.6% of Republicans categorized themselves as either “strong conservatives” or “conservatives.” Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate the shift in the distribution from 1972 and 2016.

Figure 2





Figure 3



There is also evidence of polarization in the feeling thermometer data. In 1968, 90.3% of Democrats and 72.1% of Republicans felt neutral, favorable, or very favorable towards Lyndon Johnson. In 2016, 94.4% of Democrats felt neutral, favorable, or very favorable towards Barack Obama while only 24.8% of Republicans did. Figures 4 and 5 indicate this.

Figure 4





Figure 5





A similar phenomenon holds true for Republican presidents and presidential candidates. In 1970, 98.1% of Republicans and 78.6% of Democrats felt neutral, favorable, or very favorable towards Richard Nixon. In 2008, 83.6% of Republicans and 35.7% of Democrats felt neutral, favorable, or very favorable towards George W. Bush. Additionally, in 2016, 82.5% of Republicans and 16.7% of Democrats felt neutral, favorable, or very favorable towards then presidential candidate Donald Trump. Figures 6, 7, and 8 visually represent this.

Figure 6




Figure 7





Figure 8



Since 1968, Democrats and Republicans feelings towards presidents of the opposite political party have declined steadily as indicated not only by the increase in percentage of respondents who feel “unfavorably” or “very unfavorably,” but also by the mean of all responses. In 1970, on the condensed feeling thermometer, the average Democrat response towards a Republican president (President Nixon at the time) was 3.03, which represents a “neutral” response. By 2016, the average Democrat response for a Republican candidate (Trump) was 1.52, which would represent a “very unfavorable” response. This is a 1.51 change on a five-point scale. There is a similar decline in opinion for Republicans’ feelings towards Democratic presidents. In 1968, the average Republican response toward a Democratic president (President Johnson) was 3.04, which is once again a “neutral” response. In 2016, the average Republican response toward a Democratic president (President Obama) was 1.92, which can be interpreted as “very unfavorable.” A comparison of the means is also represented on a full feeling thermometer as coded by the ANES—not in the condensed five categories. For Democrat presidents, the average response moves from 66.7 for Democrats in 1968 to 79.37 in 2016 and from 46.21 for Republicans in 1968 to 23.81 in 2016. A similar phenomenon occurs

for Republican presidents as Democrats move from 46.78 in 1970 to 25.58 in 2008 and Republicans shift from 78.63 in 1970 to 62.531 in 2016. Figures 9 and 10 represent this data.

Figure 9a




Figure 9b




Figure 10a





Figure 10b



Republicans' and Democrats' distaste for presidents of the opposite party is mirrored by their growing distaste for the entire party in general. In 1978, the data was normally distributed in almost a perfect bell curve as 50% of Democrats felt neutral; when combining categories, 82.9% of Democrats felt "neutral," "favorable," or "very favorable" towards the Republican Party. By comparison, 55.4% of Republicans felt "neutral" while 82.3% felt "neutral," "favorable," or "very favorable" towards the Democrat Party. By 2016, however, only 35% of Democrats felt "neutral," "favorable," or "very favorable" towards the Republican Party, whereas 61.6% of Republicans felt likewise towards the Democrat Party. Figures 11 and 12 represent this.

Similar to the previous graphs, a normally distributed bell curve indicates a lack of polarization; however, polarization would not be represented by a bimodal curve in this instance. Since these figures represent the responses towards the opposite party, if the average respondents' feelings towards the opposite party decrease (and therefore indicate polarization),

the graph should move from a normal distribution to a right-skewed graph as a greater percentage of respondents categorize the opposite party in the more unfavorable responses

Figure 11





Figure 12



Once again, the mean feeling thermometer response of Republicans and Democrats towards the opposite party paints a similar picture. In 1978, the average Democrat response regarding the Republican Party was 3.07 while the average Republican response regarding the

Democrat Party was 3.35. On the condensed feeling thermometer, both represent a neutral opinion. In 2016, the average Democrat response was 1.86 and the average Republican response was 1.92. Both of these responses represent an unfavorable response. On a five point scale, Democrats moved down 1.20 points—a 39% change— while Republicans moved down 1.44—a 42% change. Once again, the average response on the full feeling thermometer is also given. In 1978, the average Democrat response towards the Republican Party was 48.32, which dropped to 26.96 in 2016. Similarly, the average Republican response towards the Democrat Party dropped from 47.41 in 1978 to 24.91 in 2016. Figure 13 visually represents this.

Figure 13a





Figure 13b



### Comparison of Means and Cross Tabulations for Salient Policy Issues

Even beyond citizens' ideological self-placement and their feelings towards presidents of the opposite party and the opposite party in general, there is evidence to suggest that citizens are polarized on key issues—health insurance, abortion, and immigration. These issues were chosen because of their long-term prevalence in American politics.


Health insurance has been a polarizing issue in the United States since Lyndon Johnson's Great Society and the introduction of Medicaid and Medicare in 1965 and continues to be today. The data indicate spikes in polarization that are responsive to each of the health insurance reforms implemented since the 1960s. However, though American's opinions on health insurance are somewhat fluid depending on the most recent health care policies, the data indicate that polarization has none-the-less increased steadily since the 1970s and the gap in opinions between Republicans and Democrats is greater now than ever before.

The ANES first asked citizens' opinions on health insurance in 1970 and asked them to categorize those feelings on a 1-7 scale. A response of 1 represents the opinion that there should



be a government insurance plan that covers all medical and hospital expenses while a response of 7 represents the opinion that medical expenses should be paid for by individuals or private health insurance plans. Of course, individuals can hold opinions somewhere in between that is represented by a response of 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 with 4 representing a neutral position. In 1970, the average response for Republicans was 4.58 while the average response for Democrats was 3.44, which is a spread of 1.15. While the spread is large for a 7-point scale, both parties' averages are about .5 points away from the neutral response. By 2016, the average response for Republicans was 5.22, which is a 13.9% percent change from 1970. The average response for Democrats steadily shifted more to the left coming to rest at 3.09 in 2016, which is a 10.2% change from 1970. Overall, the gap between the average responses from both parties grows to an even more polarized 2.13 points on a 7-point scale, which is an 86% increase. Figure 14 displays this information visually.

Figure 14



In addition to the widening gap in average opinion held by Republicans and Democrats, the percentage of individuals who respond in the extreme, tail, ends of the 7-point scale (1-2 and 6-7), also indicates polarization. In 1970, 12.8% of Democrats and 17.3% of Republicans responded 4 (the neutral position). Conversely, 45.8% of Democrats responded 1 or 2 and 44.8% of Republicans responded 6 or 7. In 2016, the percentage of neutral responses (4) for Democrats was 21.5% and for Republicans it was 16.4%. In the extremes, 43.1% of Democrats responded 1 or 2 while 52.2% of Republicans responded 6 or 7. Therefore, Democrats experiences a 5% decrease in extreme response while percentage of Republicans with extreme responses grew 16%. This indicates that Republicans have certainly become more polarized when it comes to government vs private health insurance, but Democrats have shifted little over the past 40-50 years. Of course, part of the shift in Republicans opinions could be due to the health insurance policies of President Clinton and Obama in the past 20 years. Figures 15 and 16 show the shift in opinions.

Figure 15





Figure 16




Health insurance is not the only popular issue Americans are polarized about. Abortion has also been a divisive issue since even before its legalization in *Roe v. Wade* (1973). The ANES asks respondents their opinions on a 4-point scale, but unlike most of the other opinion questions, this scale is reversed. Meaning that a response of 1 is the most conservative response and the responses become more liberal the higher in number they are as opposed to the more common scales where 1 is the most liberal responses and responses become steadily more conservative as the number increases. The most conservative response, 1, represents the opinion, “By law, abortion should never be permitted,” 2 represents, “The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the woman’s life is in danger,” 3 represents, “The law should permit abortion for reason other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman’s life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established,” and finally, the most liberal response, 4, represents, “By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice.” The scale clearly has two extreme positions, but its format, a 4-point

scale instead of a 5 or 7-point one, could cause the polarization to seem insignificant when displayed visually as the data points obviously cannot separate as much as they could on a larger, more robust scale.

In 1980, the data indicate low polarization as the average response for Democrats and Republicans was extremely close, and the Republicans' average response was surprisingly, slightly more liberal than the Democrats'. Democrats had an average response of 2.80 and Republicans was 2.82. By 2016, the gap had widened significantly and Republicans were solidly closer to the conservative response than Democrats. The average Democrat response was 3.32 and the average Republican response was 2.52. The percentage of change for Democrats was 18.61% while it is only 10.7% change for Republicans. Therefore, while Republicans may have had a larger opinion shift in regards to health insurance, Democrats shifted more on the topic of abortion. Additionally, the gap grows from a very close .03 to a much larger .8 on a 4-point scale, which is a 3,088% increase in under 40 years. Therefore, Republicans and Democrats have become so polarized that it is immediately evident despite the restrictions of a smaller response scale than health insurance or immigration (discussed as the next issue). Figure 17 shows the widening gap in average responses between Republicans and Democrats.

Figure 17



Once again, polarization is also evident in the percentage of Republicans and Democrats who respond in the extreme categories, 1 (in this case, the most conservative) and 4 (the most liberal). In 1980, 9% of Republicans responded 1 (“By law, abortion should never be permitted”) and 33.8% of Democrats responded 4 (By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice”). By 2016, the percentages in the extremes nearly doubled for both parties. Approximately, 19.1% of Republicans responded with 1 and 62.9% of Democrats responded with 4. There is also evidence of party sorting throughout the past 40 years. In 1980, the percentage of Republicans who responded with 4 was nearly as high as the percentage of Democrats. This indicates that the parties have become more ideologically cohesive on key issues. Additionally, many Republicans believe in individual liberty and individuals’ autonomy over their lives, which could explain the higher percentage of Republicans respondents in the 4 category than would be traditionally expected. Figures 18 and 19 show the shift in public opinions.

Figure 18





Figure 19




There is also evidence of increasing polarization regarding immigration. Beginning in 1990, respondents were asked their opinions regarding whether the number of immigrants should be increased or decreased on a 5-point scale. A response of 1 represents the opinion that the

number of immigrants should be, “increased a lot,” 2, “increased a little,” 3, “same as now,” 4, “decreased a little,” and 5, “decreased a lot.”

Once again, there is evidence of low polarization in 1992, when the question was first asked, as the average response for Republicans was 3.66, which is extremely close to the Democrat average which was 3.56. However, over the next 20 years, the gap would grow from a pretty insignificant .1 to a much larger .86 which is a 760% increase as the Republican average response moved to 3.92 and the Democrat average response move to 3.06. While such a large percentage of change is shocking over 24 years in itself, what is even more significant is that the overwhelming majority of the gap between the two parties’ average response comes in the last 10 years. Through 2008, the average response stayed extremely close to each other; the most they were separated by was .14 in 2004, but in 2012, the gap grew to .35 and ultimately continued growing to be the .86 gap in 2016 as discussed above. Figure 20 demonstrates this extreme separation in such a short time frame.

Figure 20



The evidence of polarization is once again furthered by analyzing the percentage of respondents who selected the extreme responses (responses 1 and 5). In 1992, only 3% of Democrats responded 1 while 24.1% of Republicans responded 5 (for reference, 22.2% of Democrats also responded 5). A response of 3, the moderate “stay the same” response, was selected by nearly half of all Republicans and Democrats with 44.3% and 42.8% respectively. In 2016, however, Republicans move towards and Democrats move away from the 5 category with 38.8% of Republicans and 12% of Democrats selecting it. Now, 8.6% of Democrats respond 1. The moderate, 3, response also saw change as now 47.1% of Democrats and 31.4% of Republicans select it. Figures 21 and 22 represent the change in distributions.

Figure 21







Figure 22



### Multi-variate Analysis: Regression Models and Predictive Probability

While there are clear differences between Republicans and Democrats on salient policy issues, could these differences possibly be explained by other factors, such as demographic differences? Using an OLS regression model, I examine that possibility. The dependent variable for each regression is the respondents' opinion on each issue—health insurance, abortion, and immigration—on that issue's scale as defined above. The primary explanatory variable is the respondents party identification on a 7-point Likert scale where a response 1 represents "Strong Democrat", 2 represents "Democrat," 3 represents "Weak Democrat," 4 represents "Independent," 5 represents "Weak Republican," 6 represents "Republican," and 7 represents "Strong Republican." I control for common demographic variables that are often considered to affect an individuals' opinion on political issues: age, gender, race, education level, and family income.

For each of the three issues, there is a simple regression without controls and a regression with the controls. This is done to show that adding the controls actually weakens the adjusted  $R^2$ —the proportion of variation that can be explained by the independent variables—or only

increases the adjusted  $R^2$  value slightly. This coupled with the findings of the analysis indicate that an individual's party identification is strongly related to their opinion on policy issues, and more consistently so than other demographic factors. Three years with presidential elections were selected for comparison.

Table 1: Opinion on Health Insurance without controls: 1972, 1996, and 2016

	<b>1972</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>2016</b>
Party ID 7pt	.224 (.036)***	.339 (.021)***	.457 (.013)***
<i>Constant</i>	3.044 (.151)***	2.715 (.089)***	2.281 (.06)***
<i>N</i>	<b>1,107</b>	<b>1,531</b>	<b>3,752</b>
<i>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i>	<b>.033</b>	<b>.145</b>	<b>.235</b>

\*  $p < .05$  \*\* $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Note: Table reports unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors. Data from American National Election Studies.

Table 2: Opinion on Health Insurance: 1972, 1996, and 2016

	<b>1972</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>2016</b>
Party ID 7pt	.176 (.038)***	.316 (.025)***	.419 (.016)***
<i>Controls</i>			
Age	-.008 (.005)	.007 (.003)*	.010 (.002)***
Male	-.264 (.151)	.044 (.1)	-.039 (.067)
Black	-1.048 (.259)***	.198 (.165)	.359 (.122)**
Hispanic	-.865 (.718)	-.031 (.173)	-.120 (.113)
Other	-.149 (.972)	-.608 (.333)	-.122 (.129)
Education Level	-.029 (.05)	.031 (.037)	-.010 (.027)
Family Income	.231 (.074)**	.290 (.051)***	.185 (.033)
<i>Constant</i>	3.257 (.389)***	1.451 (.271)***	1.477 (.188)***
<i>N</i>	<b>1,119</b>	<b>1,255</b>	<b>2,938</b>
<i>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i>	<b>.061</b>	<b>.172</b>	<b>.221</b>

\*  $p < .05$  \*\* $p < .01$  \*\*\*  $p < .001$

Note: Table reports unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors. Data from American National Election Studies.

Table 3: Opinion on Immigration without controls: 1992, 2004, and 2016

	<b>1992</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2016</b>
Party ID 7pt	.026 (.010)*	.032 (.014)*	.186 (.008)***
<i>Constant</i>	3.515 (.044)***	3.415 (.064)***	2.758 (.036)***
<b><i>N</i></b>	<b>2,159</b>	<b>1,032</b>	<b>3,605</b>
<b><i>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i></b>	<b>.002</b>	<b>.004</b>	<b>.124</b>

\* p < .05 \*\*p < .01 \*\*\* p < .001

Note: Table reports unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors. Data from American National Election Studies.

Table 4: Opinion on Immigration: 1992, 2004, and 2016

	<b>1992</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2016</b>
Party ID 7pt	.014 (.012)	.038 (.017)*	.167 (.010)***
<i>Controls</i>			
Age	-.002 (.001)	.003 (.002)*	.009 (.001)***
Male	.035 (.046)	-.29 (.067)	-.075 (.039)
Black	-.204 (.073)**	-.003 (.103)	-.079 (.069)
Hispanic	-.058 (.084)	-.417 (.114)***	-.286 (.065)***
Other	-.086 (.159)	-.556 (.177)***	-.227 (.077)**
Education Level	-.073 (.017)***	-.153 (.026)***	-.090 (.015)***
Family Income	.046 (.023)*	.038 (.031)	-.030 (.019)
<i>Constant</i>	3.849 (.119)***	4.138 (.184)***	3.041 (.107)***
<b><i>N</i></b>	<b>1,807</b>	<b>793</b>	<b>2,861</b>
<b><i>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i></b>	<b>.013</b>	<b>.090</b>	<b>.153</b>

\* p < .05 \*\*p < .01 \*\*\* p < .001

Note: Table reports unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors. Data from American National Election Studies.

Table 5: Opinion on Abortion without controls: 1980, 1996, and 2016

	<b>1980</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>2016</b>
Party ID 7pt	.020 (.014)*	-.077 (.013)***	-.173 (.008)***
<i>Constant</i>	2.743 (.056)***	3.174 (.053)***	3.607 (.033)***
<b><i>N</i></b>	<b>1,545</b>	<b>1,674</b>	<b>4,192</b>
<b><i>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i></b>	<b>.001</b>	<b>.022</b>	<b>.113</b>

\* p < .05 \*\*p < .01 \*\*\* p < .001

Note: Table reports unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors. Data from American National Election Studies.

Table 6: Opinion on Abortion: 1980, 1996, and 2016

	<b>1980</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>2016</b>
Party ID 7pt	-0.012 (.015)	-.101 (.015)***	-.182 (.009)***
<i>Controls</i>			
Age	-.006 (.002)***	-.005 (.002)**	.000 (.001)
Male	.012 (.058)	-.04 (.058)	.041 (.036)
Black	-.129 (.095)	-.208 (.096)*	-.135 (.064)*
Hispanic	-.005 (.141)	-.277 (.102)**	-.361 (.060)***
Other	.232 (.309)	-.452 (.19)*	-.065 (.069)
Education Level	.132 (.021)***	.124 (.021)***	.112 (.014)***
Family Income	.098 (.028)***	.081 (.029)**	.085 (.018)***
<i>Constant</i>	2.358 (.147)***	2.786 (.155)***	2.894 (.100)***
<b><i>N</i></b>	<b>1,295</b>	<b>1,377</b>	<b>3,333</b>
<b><i>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></i></b>	<b>.086</b>	<b>.079</b>	<b>.138</b>

\* p < .05 \*\*p < .01 \*\*\* p < .001

Note: Table reports unstandardized regression coefficients and their standard errors. Data from American National Election Studies.

To explain the results further of the regression analysis, I use predictive estimates generated using CLARIFY (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2002) to allow for a better visual representation of how much an individual's party identification can affect their opinion on health insurance, abortion, and immigration, while controlling for the demographic variables. Figures 23, 25 and 27 show the stance of strong party identifiers (1 and 7) and pure independents (4). Figures 24, 26, and 28 represent the stance of all party identifiers (1-3 and 5-7) and independents (4), as well as the mean response on the party identification scale. The mean response on the party identification scale is included to show the average person's opinion on the issues. Though it is extremely close to the independent response, it does vary slightly and provides insight to the ideological leanings of the average voter that also varies depending on the issue.

The predictive estimates reinforce the descriptive analysis. Health insurance was already a topic of contention in the 1970s and only becomes more polarized as we move into the present; Figures 23 and 24 illustrate this shift. In 1970, the estimated response for a strong Republican was 4.69, the estimated response for a strong Democrat was 3.56, and the estimated Independent response was 4.13. By 2016, strong party identifiers move substantially farther into their respective ideological camps, and Independents remain relatively unchanged at 4.1. Strong Republicans' estimated placement is 5.35, whereas strong Democrats' estimated placement is 2.85. There is a similar, but smaller, amount of growth in weaker identifiers. Democrats (2) move from 3.75 to 3.26, weak Democrats (3) from 3.94 to 3.68, weak Republicans (5) from 4.31 to 3.52, and Republicans (6) from 4.5 to 4.94. Once again, the opinions on health insurance are highly affected by the changes in the law implemented by Democratic presidents (Johnson's Great Society, Clinton's health care reform, and Obama care). Despite this, strong Republicans desire to have insurance be a largely privately funded entity is greater than ever and strong

Democrats desire for the opposite—largely government funded—is almost as low as it was in 1992 in the midst of Clinton’s campaign health care reform promises. The initiation of these programs by Democrat presidents could be what caused the strong Republicans to have a higher percentage of change than strong Democrats (30% vs 13%).

Figure 23





Figure 24



Abortion and immigration have moved away from topics of general agreement to highly polarizing issues. Both issues have nearly identical responses for over a decade before the opinions indicate any level of polarization. When the opinions do finally split, they do so intensely; this further indicates that public opinion on key issues responds to certain triggers.

With the exception of 1984, there is almost no movement by any party identifiers on the topic of abortion until 1992; as illustrated by Figures 25 and 26, a gap developed and grows through the present. This 1992 split can most likely be attributed to the Supreme Court cases regarding abortion (namely *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* 1991 when the trimester approach was replaced with the undue burden standard). Though party identifiers remained relatively stagnant around the ideological center for a decade, they are much more ideologically sorted today. Strong Democrats move from 2.84 in 1980 to 3.49 in 2016 and strong Republicans move from 2.76 to 2.39 (as mentioned above, the abortion scale is “backwards,” and the most conservative response is represented by 1 while the most liberal response by 4). True independents remained relatively constant throughout, but do become slightly more liberal in their responses moving from 2.8 to 2.95. Weaker party identifiers fall in line and move according towards their respective ideological camps as well: Democrats (2) moved from 2.83 to 3.3, weak Democrats (3) from 2.81 to 3.12, weak Republicans (5) from 2.79 to 2.76, and Republicans (6) from 2.78 to 2.57. Contrarily to the topic of health insurance, strong Democrats have changed their opinions much more than strong Republicans (22% vs 13%); however, as mentioned above, Republicans are more likely to support individual liberty and this could affect their feelings regarding abortion.

Figure 25





Figure 26



Interestingly, opinions on immigration remain almost exactly identical even for strong party identifiers until 2012. Then, the scale is, in effect, “blown wide open” and the gap in opinions only increases in 2016. This could be the result of the 2016 election, which saw the



promises of Donald Trump to build/reinforce physical borders and the unrivaled hatred and adoration of those statements by some Democrats and some Republicans respectively. As figure 27 and 28 represent, strong Democrats could be expected to respond 3.65 in 1990 and 3.07 in 2016 while strong Republicans expected response move from 3.73 in 1990 to 4.07 in 2016. Once again, Independents experience low movement and their small shift is towards the ideological left moving from 3.69 to 3.57. Democrats (2) move from 3.66 to 3.24, weak Democrats (3) from 3.68 to 3.41, weak Republicans (5) from 3.7 to 3.74, and Republicans (6) from 3.72 to 3.91. The ANES immigration question is asked on a 5-point scale and a gap of 1 (3.07 and 4.07) should be unheard of in a society devoid of mass, public polarization, as some would claim we live in. Even weak party identifiers have a gap of .33 (3.41 and 3.74).

What is highly intriguing and also concerning about this gap in opinions on immigration is its development and growth in just 8 years. Also intriguing is how the Democrats expected position on immigration never falls below the moderate response (3 on this 5-point scale); so, while Republicans became much more conservative on the topic of immigration, Democrats do not become much more liberal. This could be because both parties started closer to the conservative position in 1990. However, Democrats had a greater percentage of change (15.89% vs 9.11%), so their opinions could eventually move firmly into the “liberal camp.” This trend should be followed closely in the coming years.

Figure 27





Figure 28





### Conclusion




This research provides evidence that the American public is, indeed, polarized on three separate measures of polarization—ideological self-identification, feelings towards the opposite party and key figures within that party, and stances on salient policy issues—using both descriptive and multi-variate analysis. A higher proportion of party identifiers are more likely to identify at the tail ends of the ideological spectrum, the scales showing policy preference, and the feeling thermometers towards presidents and the opposite party. The mean response for all three scales mentioned has also moved farther and farther towards the extremes and the gap between Republicans and Democrats has grown, or in some cases developed and grown, and grown at a higher rate in the last 10 years. The multi-variate analysis provides further evidence for the separation between party identifiers and indicates that demographic factors do not affect individuals' policy preferences as much as their party identification. In short, the American public has become increasingly polarized along party lines with both strong and weak party identifiers having sizeable gaps in opinions when compared to their opposite party counterparts.




Moving forward, more examination of causes of the polarization seems in order. Similarly, the trend of Republicans becoming more conservative on the topic of immigration, but Democrats hovering around the moderate position should be followed as more data become available; this should especially be the case if Democrats' opinions continue to become more liberal at a faster rate than Republicans' opinions become more conservative. Examination of why Republicans experience a greater shift on some issues and Democrats on others would also contribute to the conversation of polarization. In the meantime, it is safe to say that the divisions found between Democrats and Republicans indicate that the United States is, indeed, a polarized nation.




**Appendix**




Ideology Cross Tabulations for each year ANES data is available from 1948-2016.





























Mean responses for Republicans and Democrats on Ideology for each year data is available in the ANES Time Series 1948-2016.




Year	Democrats	Republicans	Year	Democrats	Republicans
<b>1972</b>	3.7719	4.637	<b>1994</b>	3.6621	5.1157
<b>1974</b>	3.7347	4.7351	<b>1996</b>	3.5737	5.1873
<b>1976</b>	3.7919	4.8847	<b>1998</b>	3.4965	4.9459
<b>1978</b>	3.8252	4.9761	<b>2000</b>	3.4189	5.0528
<b>1980</b>	3.8252	4.9761	<b>2002</b>	3.3994	5.194
<b>1982</b>	3.8497	4.9939	<b>2004</b>	3.6392	5.1606
<b>1984</b>	3.6787	4.849	<b>2008</b>	3.4754	5.2148
<b>1986</b>	3.8386	4.787	<b>2012</b>	3.3994	5.2742
<b>1988</b>	3.8213	4.9414	<b>2016</b>	3.0458	5.3014
<b>1990</b>	3.786	4.6837			
<b>1992</b>	3.6016	4.9196			

Condensed Feeling Thermometer Towards Presidents Cross Tabulations for each year data is available from the ANES Time Series 1948-2016.




Democratic Presidents
















Republican Presidents


















Mean Condense Feeling Thermometer responses for Republicans and Democrats on presidents for each year data is available in the ANES Time Series 1948-2016.




Year (President)	Democrat	Republican	Year (President)	Democrat	Republican
<b>1968 (Johnson)</b>	3.9528	3.0361	<b>1992 (Bush Sr.)</b>	2.6883	4.1308
<b>1970 (Nixon)</b>	3.0264	4.4759	<b>1994 (Clinton)</b>	4.1837	2.597
<b>1972 (Nixon)</b>	3.4255	4.5938	<b>1996 (Clinton)</b>	4.4004	2.5023
<b>1974 (Ford)</b>	3.5163	4.2423	<b>1998 (Clinton)</b>	4.2021	2.6445
<b>1976 (Ford)</b>	3.2769	4.3128	<b>2000 (Clinton)</b>	4.1991	2.3929
<b>1978 (Carter)</b>	4.1689	3.3343	<b>2002 (W. Bush)</b>	3.1184	5.6115
<b>1980 (Carter)</b>	4.0288	2.7273	<b>2004 (W. Bush)</b>	2.3847	4.5394
<b>1982 (Reagan)</b>	2.7743	4.4449	<b>2008 (W. Bush)</b>	2.0059	3.7152
<b>1984 (Regan)</b>	2.8956	4.5616	<b>2012 (Obama)</b>	4.5132	1.9965
<b>1986 (Reagan)</b>	3.2254	4.4883	<b>2016 (Obama)</b>	4.4591	1.9223
<b>1988 (Reagan)</b>	2.8677	4.4623	<b>2016 (candidate Trump)</b>	1.5203	3.7612
<b>1990 (Bush Sr.)</b>	3.4301	4.3319			




Full Feeling Thermometer for Republicans and Democrats on presidents for each year data is available in the ANES Time Series 1948-2016.

Year (President)	Democrat	Republican	Year (President)	Democrat	Republican
<b>1968 (Johnson)</b>	66.7	46.2054	<b>1992 (Bush Sr.)</b>	69.5524	52.7473
<b>1970 (Nixon)</b>	46.7789	79.6268	<b>1994 (Clinton)</b>	71.3685	36.7530
<b>1972 (Nixon)</b>	55.4077	81.0544	<b>1996 (Clinton)</b>	73.1316	36.4089
<b>1974 (Ford)</b>	56.8062	72.2957	<b>1998 (Clinton)</b>	75.2343	39.4818
<b>1976 (Ford)</b>	51.3864	73.9306	<b>2000 (Clinton)</b>	72.0238	33.9335
<b>1978 (Carter)</b>	70.5941	52.636	<b>2002 (W. Bush)</b>	49.5107	81.6188
<b>1980 (Carter)</b>	67.96	40.528	<b>2004 (W. Bush)</b>	33.5169	80.5456
<b>1982 (Reagan)</b>	41.2428	76.9528	<b>2008 (W. Bush)</b>	25.5772	31.1853
<b>1984 (Regan)</b>	44.0436	80.1541	<b>2012 (Obama)</b>	80.1731	25.7086
<b>1986 (Reagan)</b>	50.5568	78.9582	<b>2016 (Obama)</b>	79.3679	23.8068
<b>1988 (Reagan)</b>	46.5366	78.5596	<b>2016 (candidate Trump)</b>	14.0609	62.5311
<b>1990 (Bush Sr.)</b>	55.0852	74.4191			




Condensed Feeling Thermometer Towards the Opposite Political Party Cross Tabulations for each year data is available from the ANES Time Series 1948-2016.





















Mean Condensed Feeling Thermometer responses for the opposite party for each year data is available in the ANES Time Series 1948-2016.




Year	Republican (feelings towards Democrats)	Democrats (feelings towards Republicans)	Year	Republican (feelings towards Democrats)	Democrats (feelings towards Republicans)
<b>1978</b>	3.3514	3.0755	<b>1994</b>	2.7304	2.7482
<b>1980</b>	3.0363	3.2209	<b>1996</b>	2.9364	2.5664
<b>1982</b>	3.3226	2.7734	<b>1998</b>	3.1468	2.5082
<b>1984</b>	3.3014	2.9747	<b>2000</b>	2.9348	2.6932
<b>1986</b>	3.3606	3.0453	<b>2004</b>	2.9286	2.2605
<b>1988</b>	3.222	3.1166	<b>2008</b>	3.0391	2.195
<b>1990</b>	3.333	2.9568	<b>2012</b>	2.4186	1.9025
<b>1992</b>	3.0917	2.6131	<b>2016</b>	1.9158	1.8648




Mean Full Feeling Thermometer responses for the opposite party for each year data is available in the ANES Time Series 1948-2016.




Year	Republican (feelings towards Democrats)	Democrats (feelings towards Republicans)	Year	Republican (feelings towards Democrats)	Democrats (feelings towards Republicans)
<b>1978</b>	47.4094	48.3223	<b>1994</b>	37.6756	45.5881
<b>1980</b>	44.4066	47.9749	<b>1996</b>	40.2193	41.3068
<b>1982</b>	45.4501	43.5878	<b>1998</b>	43.5484	37.9907
<b>1984</b>	47.3845	44.6718	<b>2000</b>	40.3780	41.8495
<b>1986</b>	46.8984	45.6854	<b>2004</b>	40.8445	37.05
<b>1988</b>	45.3719	45.6616	<b>2008</b>	39.14	33.3776
<b>1990</b>	48.5448	45.4366	<b>2012</b>	28.7856	26.3712
<b>1992</b>	43.0952	40.7788	<b>2016</b>	24.9136	26.9627

Health Insurance Cross Tabulations for each year data is available from the ANES Time Series 1948-2016

























Mean responses for Republicans and Democrats on health insurance for each year data is available in the ANES Time Series 1948-2016.




Year	Democrats	Republicans	Year	Democrats	Republicans
<b>1970</b>	3.4362	4.5831	<b>1994</b>	3.3236	4.8869
<b>1972</b>	3.4902	4.4824	<b>1996</b>	3.3921	4.7953
<b>1976</b>	3.4937	4.7056	<b>2000</b>	3.3396	4.5497
<b>1978</b>	3.3887	4.6881	<b>2004</b>	3.056	4.3714
<b>1984</b>	3.6138	4.4134	<b>2008</b>	2.9629	4.5272
<b>1998</b>	3.3518	4.4631	<b>2012</b>	3.1264	5.3176
<b>1992</b>	2.8652	4.1429	<b>2016</b>	3.0857	5.2201




Abortion Cross Tabulations for each year data is available from the ANES Time Series 1948-2016

















Mean responses for Republicans and Democrats on abortion for each year data is available in the ANES Time Series 1948-2016.



Year	Democrats	Republicans	Year	Democrats	Republicans
<b>1980</b>	2.7953	2.8203	<b>1996</b>	3.0387	2.7103
<b>1982</b>	2.7557	2.8519	<b>1998</b>	3.0386	2.667
<b>1984</b>	2.8721	2.7442	<b>2000</b>	3.0553	2.6988
<b>1986</b>	2.8426	2.8758	<b>2004</b>	3.004	2.6988
<b>1988</b>	2.7868	2.7405	<b>2008</b>	2.9933	2.6177
<b>1990</b>	2.8902	2.8255	<b>2012</b>	3.2197	2.5823
<b>1992</b>	3.0924	2.8092	<b>2016</b>	3.3154	2.5184
<b>1994</b>	3.0025	2.751			



Immigration Cross Tabulations for each year data is available from the ANES Time Series 1948-2016







Mean responses for Republicans and Democrats on immigration for each year data is available in the ANES Time Series 1948-2016.

Year	Democrats	Republicans	Year	Democrats	Republicans
<b>1992</b>	3.5611	3.6577	<b>2008</b>	3.4239	3.4597
<b>1994</b>	3.9779	4.0273	<b>2012</b>	3.301	3.6552
<b>1996</b>	3.7363	3.8213	<b>2016</b>	3.0577	3.918
<b>1998</b>	3.5321	3.5648			
<b>2004</b>	3.4474	3.5831			

Predictive probability responses for partisans on health insurance for each year data is available in the ANES Time Series 1948-2016.

Year	Mean	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>1970</b>	4.02072	3.56412	3.75141	3.9387	4.126	4.31329	4.50059	4.68788
<b>1972</b>	3.86143	3.38711	3.56454	3.74198	3.91941	4.09685	5.27528	5.54191
<b>1976</b>	4.0471	3.51904	3.72889	3.91876	4.10862	4.29848	4.48834	4.6782
<b>1978</b>	3.77256	3.11695	3.37661	3.63628	3.89594	4.1556	4.41527	4.67493
<b>1984</b>	4.09946	3.76581	3.86243	3.98905	3.9507	4.19307	4.43543	4.49551
<b>1988</b>	3.92	3.22361	3.46597	3.70834	3.9507	4.19307	4.43543	4.67779
<b>1992</b>	3.51703	2.78698	3.05821	3.32944	3.60067	3.87191	4.14314	4.41437
<b>1994</b>	4.19237	3.20984	3.5411	3.87236	4.20363	4.53489	4.86616	5.19742
<b>1996</b>	3.92907	3.09766	3.41394	3.73023	4.04651	4.3628	4.67908	4.99537
<b>2000</b>	3.74947	3.15185	3.38415	3.61645	3.84875	4.08105	4.31355	4.5466
<b>2004</b>	3.6763	2.98251	3.22141	3.46321	3.69923	3.93813	4.17704	4.41595
<b>2008</b>	3.61207	2.92016	3.22644	3.53272	3.839	4.14528	4.45144	4.757783
<b>2012</b>	4.02312	2.95172	3.36717	3.78361	4.20006	4.6165	5.03295	5.4494
<b>2016</b>	4.09234	2.84652	3.26426	3.682	4.09973	4.51747	4.93521	5.35295

Predictive probability responses for partisans on abortion for each year data is available in the ANES Time Series 1948-2016.

Year	Mean	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>1980</b>	2.8079	2.83993	2.82732	2.81471	2.80209	2.78947	2.77686	2.76425
<b>1982</b>	2.78097	2.7834	2.7824	2.7814	2.7804	2.7794	2.7784	2.7774
<b>1984</b>	2.81896	2.96365	2.91136	2.85906	2.80677	2.75447	2.70218	2.64988
<b>1986</b>	2.79532	2.83277	2.82052	2.80527	2.79002	2.77477	2.75952	2.74427
<b>1988</b>	2.81216	2.90975	2.87557	2.84139	2.80721	2.77304	2.73886	2.70468
<b>1992</b>	2.99505	3.2619	3.16277	3.06363	2.9645	2.86537	2.76624	2.66711
<b>1994</b>	2.91239	3.16941	3.08117	2.99293	2.90469	2.81645	2.72821	2.63977
<b>1996</b>	2.88796	3.15502	3.05346	2.9519	2.85034	2.74878	2.64722	2.54566
<b>1998</b>	2.96033	3.22482	3.12499	3.02415	2.92382	2.82348	2.72315	2.62281
<b>2000</b>	2.91772	3.22565	3.11079	2.99592	2.88011	2.76619	2.65133	2.53647
<b>2004</b>	2.79188	3.15634	3.03218	2.90802	2.78386	2.3597	2.53554	2.41139
<b>2008</b>	2.90034	3.19734	3.06747	2.93761	2.80775	2.67789	2.54802	2.41816
<b>2012</b>	2.99137	3.40451	3.24	3.07848	2.91697	2.75546	2.59395	2.43244
<b>2016</b>	2.94985	3.48531	3.30305	3.12079	2.93853	2.75625	2.574	2.39174

Predictive probability responses for partisans on immigration for each year data is available in the ANES Time Series 1948-2016.

Year	Mean	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>1990</b>	3.68521	3.64735	3.66141	3.97548	3.68955	3.70362	3.71769	3.73176
<b>1992</b>	3.68521	3.64735	3.66141	3.67548	3.68955	3.70362	3.71769	3.73176
<b>1994</b>	4.07667	4.05062	4.05062	4.05955	4.06849	4.07743	4.0953	4.10424
<b>1996</b>	3.88122	3.87942	3.8801	3.88078	3.88146	3.88214	3.88282	3.8835
<b>1998</b>	3.63356	3.61845	3.62418	3.62992	3.63565	3.64139	3.64712	3.65283
<b>2000</b>	3.63826	3.52677	3.56466	3.60256	3.64046	3.67835	3.71625	3.75415
<b>2004</b>	3.63826	3.52677	3.56466	3.60256	3.64046	3.67835	3.71625	3.75415
<b>2008</b>	3.53015	3.53116	3.53073	3.53029	3.52986	3.52943	3.52899	3.52856
<b>2012</b>	2.57855	3.43361	3.49071	3.54781	3.60491	3.66202	3.71912	3.77322
<b>2016</b>	3.55882	3.07119	3.23711	3.40503	3.57195	3.73887	3.90579	4.07271

## References:

- Abramowitz, Alan. 2010. *The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Abramowitz, Alan I. 2013. *The Polarized Public?: Why American Government is So Dysfunctional*. Boston: Pearson.
- Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. 1998. "Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate." *The Journal of Politics*60(3): 634–52.
- Adams, Greg D. 1997. "Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution." *American Journal of Political Science*41(3): 718–37.
- "American National Election Studies." 2018. *American National Election Studies*.  
<http://www.electionstudies.org/> (November 26, 2017).
- Baldassarri, Delia, and Andrew Gelman. 2008. "Partisans Without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion." *American Journal of Sociology*114(2): 408–46.
- Baumer, Donald C., and Howard J. Gold. 2016. *Parties, Polarization, and Democracy in the United States*. London, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Carsey, Thomas M., and Geoffrey C. Layman. 2006. "Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate." *American Journal of Political Science*50(2): 464–77
- Davis, Nicholas T., and Johanna L. Dunaway. 2016. "Party Polarization, Media Choice, and Mass Partisan-Ideological Sorting." *Public Opinion Quarterly*80(S1): 272–97.
- Davis, Nicholas T., and Lilliana Mason. 2016. "Sorting and the Split-Ticket: Evidence from Presidential and Subpresidential Elections." *Political Behavior*38(2): 337–54.

- Dellavigna, Stefano, and Ethan Kaplan. 2007. "The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122(3): 1187–1234.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy: Anthony Downs*. N.Y.: Harper.
- Farrell, Henry John, Eric Lawrence, and John Sides. 2008. "Self-Segregation or Deliberation? Blog Readership, Participation and Polarization in American Politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 8(1): 141–57.
- Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy Pope. 2011. *Culture War?: the Myth of a Polarized America*. Boston, MA: Longman.
- Francia, Peter L., and Jody Baumgartner. 2006. "Victim or Victor of the Culture War? How Cultural Issues Affect Support for George W. Bush in Rural America." *American Review of Politics* 26: 349-367.
- Geer, John G. 2008. *In Defense of Negativity: Attack Ads in Presidential Campaigns*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hill, Seth J., and Chris Tausanovitch. 2015. "A Disconnect in Representation? Comparison of Trends in Congressional and Public Polarization." *The Journal of Politics* 77(4): 1058–75.
- Iyengar, Shanto, and Masha Krupenkin. 2018. "The Strengthening of Partisan Affect." *Political Psychology* 39(S1): 201–18.
- Iyengar, Shanto, and Sean J. Westwood. 2014. "Fear and Loathing across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(3): 690–707.
- King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. 2002. "Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation." *ICPSR Data Holdings*: 347–61.
- Knobloch-Westerwick, Silvia, and Jingbo Meng. 2009. "Looking the Other Way." *Communication Research* 36(3): 426–48.



Knobloch-Westerwick, Silvia, and Jingbo Meng. 2011. "Reinforcement of the Political Self Through Selective Exposure to Political Messages." *Journal of Communication* 61(2): 349–68.

Layman, Geoffrey C., Thomas M. Carsey, and Juliana Menasce Horowitz. 2006. "Party Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences." *Annual Review of Political Science* 9(1): 83–110.

Levendusky, Matthew. 2009. *The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mason, Lilliana. 2014. "'I Disrespectfully Agree': The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Polarization." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1): 128–45.

Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. "Patterns of Congressional Voting." *American Journal of Political Science* 35(1): 228–78.

Sunstein, Cass R. 2018. *#Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Theriault, Sean M. 2008. *Party Polarization in Congress*. Cambridge: Cambridge University