ABSTRACT


The purpose of this thesis is to examine the position of Captain of the Port of New York during World War I. This work also discusses the man who held this position, Capt. Godfrey L. Carden. During World War I the U.S. Coast Guard was responsible for overseeing the loading and handling of munitions leaving the Port of New York. The job of the Captain of the Port was to oversee the various anchorage areas, especially and including those anchorage areas that dealt with the loading of munitions bound for the European front. In New York this responsibility fell on Captain Carden who, as the division commander of New York, commanded the largest Coast Guard unit during the war. Carden was able to achieve this goal with a perfect safety record, no major incidents occurred in his area of responsibility and no lives were lost. This work discusses Carden’s Coast Guard career, illustrating how his previous assignments led him on a path that would eventually make him the choice candidate to become the Captain of the Port of New York. The thesis also clarifies the office of the Captain of the Port and Carden’s role in developing the port security program of the Coast Guard.
CAPTAIN GODFREY CARDEN AND THE COAST GUARD’S CAPTAIN OF THE PORT
OF NEW YORK IN WORLD WAR ONE.

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Introduction

When I began researching this topic, Capt. Godfrey L. Carden and the U.S. Coast Guard’s Captain of the Port in New York during World War I, I freely admit I made numerous assumptions. Only a few secondary sources examine the Coast Guard in World War I. Johnson’s *Guardians of the Sea* discussed the Captain of the Port for two pages and only generally. Browning’s *Captains of the Port*, a December 1993 insert in the *Commandant’s Bulletin*, focus on the captains of the ports in World War II. Larzelere’s *The Coast Guard in World War I* discuss port security and the Captain of the Port, but this was mostly rehashed from secondary sources. An unpublished manuscript compiled in 1922 by Commodore R.O. Crisp, *A History of the United States Coast Guard in the World War*, is one of the best secondary sources of information on the Coast Guard during this time period. In what I have read online, it appears that most of the information was taken from these sources. The information I read from this material, especially Larzelere, Johnson, and Crisp, shaped my understanding of New York’s Captain of the Port in the Great War.

I was under the impression that the Captain of the Port, Capt. Godfrey Carden, was a stern but innovative commander, and that his work as Captain of the Port of New York was revolutionary. The Coast Guard Historian’s website, states that Carden’s work in New York “defined the Coast Guard's port security mission for the next 60 years.”¹ I thought, perhaps he devised some type of new system that more efficiently or safely loaded ordnance. I anticipated something new and innovative, and my prospectus reflects these assumptions. I was planning to

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look deeper and discover details on Carden’s command of the New York division, hoping that his personal papers, one of the main sources of this thesis, would provide these details.

Instead I discovered something different from what I been led to believe. The information in his papers told me that a portion of what has been written on Carden was correct. He was indeed a contentious personality in New York, especially among the maritime community, and was known to be rude and curt with anyone. His short temper flared easily and he was demanding of the men under his command. However his papers also illustrated that Carden was not the pioneering port security revolutionary that had been portrayed in several historical sources.

Therefore the topic of my thesis shifted, moving from an examination of the port security system that Carden did not develop, to a discussion of both the position and the man who held it. Based almost entirely on primary source documentation, Carden’s papers and his extensive service record, this thesis will examine the Captain of the Port of New York during World War I and clarify some of the misinterpretations that have been made on this subject.

Carden’s unique career, and undoubtedly his personality, were assets when he was tasked with overseeing the largest ammunitions shipping port in the United States during World War I. While he may not have instituted a groundbreaking port security system, he did perform his job expertly. With at least 75 percent of munitions being shipped out of New York, the unglamorous wartime job of supervising munitions loading at this port was strategically important for the war effort. Carden kept this logistical machine running smoothly.

I also came to realize that one of Carden’s strengths, and also a weakness, was his character. His brusque and demanding personality nearly got him relieved of duty. But these same characteristics made him the perfect choice for this type of work. In a job where being late
could mean a vital ammunitions shipment does not arrive in time, or when an accident could cost thousands of lives, Carden’s personality was a definite boon. Additionally, his career experiences had direct bearing on his job as Captain of the Port. Because of this, a thorough discussion of his career is included in this thesis.

Chapter one briefly discusses the Coast Guard in 1917, its organizational structure, and various missions and duties in the war. Chapter two begins with a summary of the Halifax incident and discusses Carden’s career up to December of 1917. Chapter three discusses Carden and the New York Captain of the Port office during the war. Chapter four begins with the end of Carden’s Coast Guard career and discusses how the office of the Captain of the Port was one among several that used, and abused their expansion of powers during wartime. It concludes with a brief history of the office of the Captain of the Port up to modern times.
Chapter 1

In 1915, the Revenue Cutter Service was merged with the Life Saving Service to create the U.S. Coast Guard. The legislation mandated that, during peacetime, the service would operate under the Department of the Treasury, but during wartime, or when so directed by the President of the United States, the Coast Guard would operate under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Navy. Foreseeing that the hostilities that had engulfed Europe since 1914 would spread across the Atlantic, Captain-Commandant Ellsworth Bertholf made preparations to merge the service under the U.S. Navy. He issued Confidential Order No.2, entitled “Mobilization of the U.S. Coast Guard When Required to Operate as Part of the Navy,” a twelve-page booklet passed out to officers outlining how the Coast Guard would integrate into the Navy’s organizational system. With the United States declaration of war on 6 April 1917, Bertholf sent a three-word message, “Plan One. Acknowledge,” mobilizing the Coast Guard under the Navy Department. At the time of mobilization, Coast Guard Headquarters was located in Washington, D.C. and was commanded by Captain-Commandant Bertholf who reported directly to Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo. As with the other American military services, Congress determines the number of personnel billets. As of 1917, the Coast Guard had an authorized strength of 270 commissioned officers and 4,897 warrant officers, petty officers, and men.¹

Coast Guard cutters were assigned to a field Division or listed as independent with specific cruising limits. The Pacific coast was divided between the Northern Division, with six cutters assigned, and Southern Division, with four cutters. A senior officer was in charge of each Division, based in Seattle and San Francisco. The East coast was separated into the New York Division, with seven cutters assigned to it, and the Eastern Division, responsible for New

England waters with five cutters based out of Portland, Maine and Boston and Woods Hole, Massachusetts. The Bering Sea Patrol Fleet consisted of cutters reassigned each year from the Pacific Coast Northern and Southern Divisions, operating between May and October of each year. A number of independent cutters were not assigned to a specific Division but instead had predefined areas of responsibility. Most were stationed along the east coast, but they also were assigned duty in the Gulf of Mexico, or the Great Lakes, and off Puerto Rico and Hawaii. Each district had a mix of cruising or harbor cutters depending on the needs and duties of that district. For example, the New York Division had seven cutters but only two of those, the Seneca and Mohawk, were cruising cutters. The other five cutters assigned to the New York District were harbor cutters, whose primary duties were enforcement of the Espionage Act, maintain harbor security, and supervision of loading and shipping of munitions. As this was the primary duty of the New York Division, it is easy to comprehend the large force of harbor cutters stationed there.²

In addition to the cutter fleet, the Coast Guard had 272 stations divided geographically into thirteen Districts. Each District had a Superintendent in charge, responsible for the maintenance of the station, its equipment, personnel, and operation. Even though the Coast Guard was a military force, the fusion of the Revenue Cutter Service and Life-Saving Service was still in progress. Surfmen tended to keep to their stations and cuttermen to their cutters. There was little movement between the two distinct cultures. The Superintendents held various ranks, equivalent to third lieutenant to captain, but these men were not commissioned officers.³

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² Ibid., 64-65.
³ Ibid., 53.
With the mobilization, the bulk of the Coast Guard’s operations came under U.S. Navy control. Some internal administration remained in effect; Captain-Commandant Bertholf was still in charge of the Coast Guard but reported to Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. Most of the officers from Coast Guard Headquarters were reassigned to field duty, in essence leaving only a skeleton crew to see to the significantly diminished administrative duties left to the Coast Guard, such as managing pay and rations for Coast Guard personnel. Most shore-based Coast Guard units saw a reduction in their forces and duties. The New York division and its operations with regard to the shipping of munitions and supervising the anchorages was the exception.

With many of their personnel reassigned, the Coast Guard division commanders simply did not have anyone to command. Small boat and rescue stations continued their normal operations, assisting mariners in distress. They continued to submit reports up their chain of command to the Coast Guard Superintendents of their district, who in turn continued to report directly to Coast Guard Headquarters. One notable change for station personnel while under Navy control was in matters of discipline. The Coast Guard fell under Navy regulations. As such, the Navy’s authority superseded that of the Superintendents, who formerly had the ability to make disciplinary decisions. Aside from any direct orders from their respective Naval Division commanders and in judicial matters, small boat stations operated much as they had before the United States’ declaration of war.  

According to the *Annual Report of the United States Coast Guard For The Fiscal Year Ending June 30 1917*, the general duties of the Coast Guard were as follows:

- Rendering assistance to vessels in distress and saving life and property
- Destruction or removal of wrecks, derelicts, and other floating dangers to navigation

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• Extending medical aid to American vessels engaged in Deep-Sea fisheries
• Protecting the customs revenue
• Operating as part of the Navy in time of war or when the President shall direct
• Enforcement of law and regulations governing anchorage of vessels in navigable waters
• Enforcement of law relating to quarantine and neutrality
• Suppression of mutinies on board merchant vessels
• Enforcement of navigation and other laws governing merchant vessels and motor boats
• Enforcement of law to provide for safety of lie on navigable waters during regattas and marine parades
• Protection of game and the seal and other fisheries in Alaska, etc.
• Enforcement of sponge-fishing law
• International ice patrol of the Grand Banks

With the declaration of war against Germany and immediate mobilization of the Coast Guard under the Secretary of the Navy, the Coast Guard’s humanitarian missions ceased to be the primary concern for the service.5

The vast majority of munitions shipped overseas from the United States to the European theater originated in New York. Reviewing the geography of the area, it is easy to see why. The New York area has miles of extensive shoreline and well-protected bays, allowing for a vast network of docks and ports for large vessels. With several large munitions operations located across the harbor in New Jersey, this was a perfect situation for quickly shipping munitions across the Atlantic. Unfortunately, such large munitions depots are also exceedingly dangerous areas if an accident occurs. Two such incidents, one on Black Tom Island, New Jersey and one

5 U.S. Coast Guard, Annual Report 1917, 48.
at the Canadian Car and Foundry Company, also in New Jersey, illustrated the need for increased security.

Black Tom Island was located near Liberty Island in New York Harbor. It was the site of a large collection of warehouses, piers, and railroad tracks. The Lehigh Valley Railroad Company had built these facilities, using them primarily for the loading and shipping of munitions to the European theater. On the night of 30 July 1916, a variety of munitions at the warehouses was waiting to be sent overseas. Of the thirty-four carloads of munitions on Black Tom, eleven were of high explosives, seventeen of shells, three of nitro-cellulose, one of TNT and two of combination fuses. At about 2:08 AM, a series of explosions occurred, detonating about 2,132,000 pounds of explosives at Black Tom. The force of the explosion shattered windows in Jersey City, Manhattan, and Brooklyn and was heard as far away as Philadelphia and Camden. The explosions devastated the facility, costed millions of dollars in damages, and were attributed to German saboteurs.  

Another incident occurred at the Canadian Car and Foundry Company in New Jersey. Based in Montreal, the company had contracted with the British and Russian governments for artillery shells. By 1915, it had secured a contract of $83,000,000 to produce five million shells for the Russian government. The company incorporated in New York and built a shell manufacturing facility in Bergen County, New Jersey near Kingsland. The facility was referred to as the Kingsland plant. On 11 January 1917, a fire started in one of the assembling sheds and quickly spread throughout the facility. Damages were estimated at $17,000,000 and the Kingsland plant was a total loss.  

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7 Ibid., 92-93.
One of the first, obvious questions to ask regarding these two incidents was: were they caused by sabotage? Several published works on the subject indicate that German saboteurs were involved in both incidents. Though the German government never admitted guilt, it did pay reparations to both the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company and the Canadian Car and Foundry Company. Regardless of whether these were actual cases of sabotage, these two incidents were a reminder of the dangerous job of munitions manufacturing, handling, loading, and storage. After the United States entered the war, the country was in need of legislated authority to protect the nation from foreign or domestic enemy agents. On 15 June 1917, Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1917. The bulk of the act prohibited interference with military operations. Additional provisions in the act transferred authorities from the War Department to the Treasury, specifically the Coast Guard, relating to vessel anchorages. This will be discussed in detail in chapters three and four.\footnote{Espionage Act of 1917, § 792-799.}

Coast Guard personnel were assigned as Supervisors of the Anchorages for those waters under their jurisdiction. The ports of Philadelphia, Norfolk, Sault Ste. Marie, and New York were major maritime waterways that required additional safety measures. In New York Harbor, this duty fell to Captain Horace B. West in June of 1917. He held the position until events in Halifax, Nova Scotia necessitated a change in the leadership of the New York Division.
Chapter 2

During World War I Halifax, Nova Scotia was a major center of maritime activity. The sizable natural harbor provided deep-draft vessels with an anchorage. To the northwest of the harbor lies Bedford Basin, an enclosed bay large enough to hold dozens of vessels. In order to reach Bedford Basin, ships must first travel through the Narrows, the most constricted portion of the waterway between the basin and harbor. As the German submarine fleet was a constant threat, the convoy was the standard method of crossing the north Atlantic. Under the protection of vast nets that guarded the entrance into Halifax harbor, merchant and military vessels could gather in Bedford Basin and form the extensive convoys that would make the journey from North America to the European theater.

On 5 December 1917, the 3,121-ton French-registered SS Mont Blanc, out of New York, approached Halifax. Due to the lateness of her arrival, she was ordered to remain overnight in the examination anchorage at Fort McNab, an island to the southeast of the harbor. Commanded by Captain Aimé Le Médec, the Mont Blanc was transporting almost three thousand tons of mixed explosives, including, TNT, gun cotton, and wet and dry picric acid.¹

On the opposite side in Bedford Basin was the SS Imo, a Norwegian registered vessel chartered by the Commission for Relief in Belgium to ferry supplies for the civilian population there. Carrying ballast, she was waiting on the coal necessary to make her ninth trip, from Halifax to New York for cargo, and then on to Belgium. She was, however, forced to remain in Bedford Basin as the protective nets had been closed for the night before the coal was loaded.²

² Ibid., 30-31.
The next morning, 6 December 1917, at 0730, the Mont Blanc was granted authorization to leave the examination anchorage and enter Halifax harbor on her way to Bedford Basin. Traveling at four knots, she had an anticipated travel time of 1.5 hours to the basin. At 0810, the Imo left Bedford Basin and began steaming toward the Narrows. As the Imo entered the Narrows, she was traveling at roughly seven knots and swung in close to the Dartmouth shore, the east side of the channel. The Mont Blanc was also close to the Dartmouth shore, forced to move into shallower waters to maneuver around HMS Highflyer. At this point, the two vessels were in sight of each other in the Narrows and on course to collide. A series of horn blasts from both ships stated they both were going to remain on course. With a collision imminent, both ships made emergency maneuvers but were unable to prevent the incident from occurring. At approximately 0845 while both ships were near mid channel, the Imo’s bow sliced into the starboard side of the Mont Blanc.³

The collision resulted in a fire on board the Mont Blanc and 20 minutes later her cargo exploded. To say the effects of the explosion were catastrophic is an understatement. Over 1600 people were killed with thousands wounded. The force of the explosion destroyed the Mont Blanc, sending pieces of her everywhere. A portion of her anchor shaft weighing 1140 pounds was thrown over two miles. The Imo was tossed onto the Dartmouth shore, by either the blast, the resulting tide wave or both. This unprecedented man-made explosion devastated Halifax harbor and the surrounding area.⁴

The Halifax explosion was a painful reminder of the danger of shipping and handling munitions, which was not lost on the U.S. Coast Guard. If such an incident were to occur in

³ Ibid., 34-35.
New York harbor the result would be far deadlier. According to the 1920 census, New York was the most populous state at the time, with the New York City area and its five boroughs having the largest concentration of people. The three boroughs that would be most affected by an accident involving munitions were Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Staten Island, which accounted for approximately 40 percent of the state’s ten million-plus population, (while this data is from the 1920 census, it is applicable to the population of New York from 1917-1919.)\(^5\) With this threat in mind, a change in the leadership of the New York Division was required. On 12 December 1917, Captain Godfrey L. Carden, in addition to his current duties as a recruiting officer, was appointed Division Commander, New York Division and Supervisor of Anchorages, New York harbor effective immediately.\(^6\)

Godfrey L. Carden was born in Bangkok, Siam (now Thailand) on 28 July 1866. His father, P.L. Carden, was an American Presbyterian missionary stationed in Siam when Godfrey was born. On 17 May 1883, he was appointed a cadet in the U.S. Naval Academy. He subsequently resigned on 5 February 1884, was reappointed on 19 May 1884, and resigned again on 3 October 1884. According to the U.S. Naval Academy Annual Register 1885-86, Cadet Carden was found deficient, allowed a re-examination, and was again judged deficient. It was recommended that he be dropped. While the U.S. Navy was not a fit for Carden, he was destined for a maritime career.


\(^6\) Orders from Captain-Commandant Ellsworth.P. Bertholf to Captain Godfrey L. Carden, 12 December 1917, Godfrey L. Carden Collection, U.S. Coast Guard Historian’s Office (hereafter cited as Carden Collection).
Figure 1. U.S. Naval Academy class of 1888 on the deck of the U.S.S. Constitution, 20 July 1885. Carden is number 13, first standing row 4th from the left. Carden Collection
Figure 2. Naval Academy gun crew. Carden is lying on his side, lower left. Carden Collection.
On 4 June 1886, he was appointed a cadet in the Revenue Marine Service.\(^7\)

After two years as a cadet and several training cruises on board the Revenue Cutter *Chase*, Carden was commissioned a 3\(^{rd}\) Lieutenant and ordered to report to the Revenue Cutter *Bibb* on 18 August 1888. The next few years for Carden consisted of serving on a variety of units, mostly vessels, with the occasional shore assignment. From the *Bibb*, he was sent to temporary duty on board the Revenue Cutter *Manhattan* at New York. On 4 April 1890, he received instructions to report to the Revenue Steamer *McLane* at Key West, Florida. After a nine-month stint on board the *McLane*, Carden was assigned to the Revenue Cutter *Morrill* at Charleston, South Carolina on 8 January 1891. By April 1892, he was eligible for promotion and was traveled to Washington D.C. for examination on the first of that month. After serving a short three-month assignment at the Department in Washington, D.C., Carden was again ordered to serve at sea, on the *Manhattan*. On 19 April 1893, he was promoted to 2\(^{nd}\) Lieutenant. From the *Manhattan*, Carden was assigned to the Revenue Cutter *Grant*, reporting to that vessel on 24 November 1893. Shortly thereafter the *Grant* was sent to Port Townsend, Washington. After being outfitted for a Pacific cruise, she left New York on 6 December 1893, and arrived in Barbados the next day. From there the *Grant* travelled south along the South American coast, stopping at Bahai, Brazil and Montevideo, Uruguay, then rounding Cape Horn, making her way to Valparaiso, Chile and eventually arriving at Port Townsend on 23 April 1894.\(^8\)

\(^7\) D.B. Bradley, *Bangkok Calendar For The Year Of Our Lord 1861, Corresponding To The Siamese Civil Era 12222-3, And Nearly So To The Chinese Cycle Era 4498, Being the 58\(^{th}\) year Of The 75\(^{th}\) Chinese Cycle of 60* (American Missionary Association, 1861), 118; Annual Register of the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1886), 28-29, 35.

While in Port Townsend, Washington 2nd Lieutenant Carden was reassigned to the Revenue launch Scout on 10 May 1895. He was temporarily reassigned to Seattle, Washington to investigate and examine the various “ship chaundlery” to be used in the Revenue Cutter Grant’s upcoming cruise to the Bering Sea. He was to make arrangement so that all of these stores could be quickly loaded on board the vessel when she arrived in Seattle, Washington on her way to the Bering Sea, where she was charged with protecting the salmon fisheries and assisting vessels, primarily whaling ships, in distress.9

Carden moved back and forth between commanding two small launches, the Scout and Guard, both assigned to the Grant. In December of 1896, he was relieved from launch duty and again sent to the Manhattan for temporary duty as the executive officer. A department telegram dated 25 March 1898 detached 2nd Lieutenant Carden from the Manhattan and reassigned him to the Revenue Cutter Manning. This posting would alter the course of future assignments and his Revenue Cutter Service career. On 24 March 1898, by Executive Order, the Manning was directed to operate under the department of the Navy in preparation for hostilities with Spain. Revenue cutters began to mobilize and were eventually deployed to several different fronts, including blockade duty in various locations in Cuba as well as working with the U.S. Army in home water and assisting with guarding and patrolling minefields. The Manning was ordered to blockade and guard duty off Bahai Honda and Daiquiri, respectively. During her tour in the Caribbean Capt. Fred M. Munger commented several times on the excellence of the gunnery work of the Manning. In an action on 26 June 1898, when the Manning was guarding a supply base off of Daiquiri, Capt. Munger and the crew of the Manning repelled a Spanish attack on the

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9 Record of Movements, 239.
Figure 3. 3rd Lieutenant Carden commanding a gun crew on board the Revenue Cutter *Morrill* at Charleston, South Carolina, 1892. Carden Collection.
Figure 4. RC Manning near Cuba, 12 May 1898. Carden Collection.
Figure 5. RC Manning engaging enemy forces at Cabanas, Cuba, 12 May 1898. This is one of the earliest images of Revenue Cutters engaged in combat. Carden Collection.
base. During the engagement, “the shots were placed in the enemy’s position with precision and deliberation,” with 2nd Lieut. Carden in charge of the second division of guns, which included two 4-inch rapid fire guns and two 6-pounders. Carden was later in charge of a detachment of personnel from the Manning that augmented the shore guard at Daiquiri.10

Shortly after the cessation of hostilities between the United States and Spain, Carden was assigned to two short Revenue Cutter tours, one on the Manhattan and, for a few days, as the commanding officer of the Revenue Cutter Calumet. On 1 October 1898, 2nd Lieut. Carden and Capts. Louis Stodder and S.B. Maguire were constituted as a board to evaluate the possibilities of increasing the quality of fresh meats and vegetables without substantially raising the cost of these rations. After this special assignment, Carden returned to his duties on board the Manhattan, where he stayed for the next nineteen months.11

At this point in time, Carden’s career made a sudden change, moving from primarily sea-based duty to consecutive special assignments largely unrelated to the Revenue Cutter Service’s primary mission. April of 1900 saw Carden temporarily detached from the Manhattan and ordered to the manufacturing facilities of the American Ordnance Company in Bridgeport, Connecticut to inspect ordnance purchased by the Treasury Department for the McCulloch. Shortly after returning to the Manhattan, Carden was again reassigned on another temporary assignment for three months to the Pan-American Exposition, where he was placed in charge of the ordnance exhibits. On 17 September 1900, Carden was informed that his temporary tour,

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10 The United States Revenue Cutter Service in the War With Spain 1898 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1899), 32; Record of Movements, 360.

11 Orders to Captains Louis Stodder and Maguire and 2nd Lieut Carden from Assistant Secretary W.B. Howell, 1 October 1898, Carden Collection
which was to last but three months, would be extended, “until otherwise directed.” A month later, he was permanently detached from the Manhattan. ¹²

Over the next five years Carden’s main duties centered on ordnance exhibits at the Pan-American Exhibition in Buffalo, New York. In 1901, at the request of exhibition president David Francis, he continued that role at the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition in St. Louis, Missouri. Carden did have several small breaks during this period for additional duties: delivering a lecture at the Naval War College in August of 1900 and promotion examinations in New York in November of the same year, but his main assignment was to be in charge of the artillery and munitions displays at the New York and Missouri exhibitions. ¹³

One of the presentations at the American Exhibition in Buffalo focused on the field of ordnance. Carden was appointed Superintendent of the Ordnance Exhibits and gathered displays that spanned the Pan-American countries, detailing army and naval munitions. While limited to the Americas, the exhibition did spark the interest of European governments, several sending military members to view and report upon the exhibits shown. ¹⁴

After the American Exhibition in Buffalo concluded, Carden was detailed to the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition, also known as the St. Louis World’s Fair. Carden had a far more involved role in this exhibition and his work expanded in scope to include not only ordnance but also all manner of machinery. In April 1902, Carden was promoted to 1st Lieutenant and, in conjunction with his duties at the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition, began traveling overseas, attending ordnance tests and exhibitions in Germany. He was to observe and report upon these

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¹² Orders to 2nd Lieut. Carden from office of Assistant Secretary of Treasury, 3 April 1900, 2 July 1900, 17 September 1900, Carden Collection.

¹³ Orders to Lieut. Carden from office of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, 1 August 1900, 17 September 1900, 29 October 1900, and 19 November 1900, Carden Collection.

tests and exhibits as well as forge contacts with various European machinists and mechanical engineers for possible participation in the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition. Carden was also asked to make contact with representatives of the Krupp family, one of the largest ammunition and ordnance producers in Europe, and inquire as to their interest in participating in the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition. It was believed that the most effective means of capturing the interest of foreign governments in participating in the exhibition was first to interest the people and potential exhibitors. Once they became aware of and eager to contribute in the exhibition, their respective governments tended to acquiesce to their citizens’ desires. Exhibition President David Francis stated that, initially, Belgium and Holland had declined the exhibition’s invitation to participate, but eventually, in no small part due to the influence of the two countries’ artists and manufacturers, both countries reexamined their positions and subsequently decided to become involved.15

By March of 1905, 1st Lieutenant Carden’s work with the exhibitions came to a close. On 16 March 1905, he was ordered to investigate and report upon methods for derelict destruction, specifically with regard to the use of explosives. Several days later, on 22 March 1905, he received further instructions ordering him to limit the amount of travel for this project. On 4 April 1905, due to the lack of appropriations, his original orders were cancelled completely. On 18 May 1905, Carden was sent to the Mohawk, his first sea duty assignment in almost five years. Promoted to Captain on 2 September 1907, Carden was again placed on special assignment shortly after his promotion. He was, in essence, loaned to the Department of

15 David R. Francis, “A Tour of Europe in Nineteen Days,” World’s Fair Bulletin 4, no. 10 (1903): 6, 9. Carden’s title changed several times during the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition. The reason for this is unknown. He is given these various titles in the World’s Fair Bulletins: 1901-Chief Government Ordnance, August 1902-Superintendent of Arsenal Tools Department of Machinery Exhibits, June 1903-Expositions Division of Exhibits, August 1903-Special Commissioner for Machinery Department, January 1904-Machinery Department.
Commerce and Labor on 4 December 1907 to investigate the manufacture and use of machine tools in Europe. Initially Carden was ordered to various cities in New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania and given the discretion to omit stops as needed. While in these states, Carden consulted with staff members at various manufacturing facilities to assess the foreign markets, from an American viewpoint, and determine how best to increase sales of American manufactured goods to overseas markets. After traveling to the United Kingdom and various other countries in Europe, Carden’s assignment was extended for an additional six months in December of 1908 to 1 June 1909, and again in May until 31 December 1909.\footnote{Ibid.}

Carden’s special duty assignment was not extended for a third time. After returning to New York, he was detached from his duty in connection with the Department of Commerce and Labor and, on 14 January 1910, was given command of the Manning out of Astoria, Oregon. From 20 May to 21 October 1910 the Manning was part of a Bering Sea cruise fleet, which included the Revenue Cutters Commodore Perry, Bear, Rush, and Tahoma. Carden and the crew of the Manning were able to assist with the evacuation of the ship’s crew from the Commodore Perry after she hit a reef at Tonkin’s Point, St. Paul Island in the Pribilof Islands, on 27 July 1910. The crew was dispersed and housed on board the other four cutters in the fleet for the duration of the cruise.\footnote{Orders to Capt. Carden from Captain-Commandant Ross, 14 January 1910, Carden Collection; Record of Movements, 258-263; Commodore Perry Cutter File, U.S. Coast Guard Historian’s Office.}

After a one-year assignment to the Manning, Carden applied for and was granted a period of extended leave during which he would not be paid any compensation by the Revenue Cutter Service. During this time, he continued the work he had begun while on loan to the Commerce
Department, but with a notable difference; he was employed by the Allied Machinery Company of America. Instead of working for the benefit of the United States as a whole, his job was to assist with the development and introduction of new markets for American business interests overseas. Carden’s involvement with the various expositions and his work while on loan to the Commerce Department made him an ideal candidate for this position. His original period of leave was for one year. That was later extended for an additional six months with the caveat that no additional leave would be granted and that Carden must either resume his duties as a Revenue Cutter Service office or resign from the service. The additional extension may have allowed Carden to finish his work for the Allied Machinery Company of America, but it was not granted. Following his first extension, a period of 18 months detached from the Revenue Cutter Service, Carden was ordered to report for duty. At this time, various individuals with political connections began petitioning President Taft to grant yet another extension. Ex-Representative Olcott and William Barnes Jr., chairman of the New York Republican Party, contacted President Taft and asked for his assistance in granting Carden a second extension. Though pressured by the president, Secretary of Treasury Franklin MacVeagh denied this request, citing the previous agreement for the initial extension and also reminding President Taft that the legal authorization for the Revenue Cutter Service was only thirty-one captains. Captain Carden was needed for duty in accordance with his rank.18

Returning to active duty in August of 1912, Captain Carden was assigned as the commanding officer of the Revenue Cutter Seminole, operating out of Wilmington, North Carolina. Nearing the end of this tour, the crew of the Seminole effected the rescue of the

18 Letter from Secretary of Treasury Franklin MacVeagh to President Taft 4 October 1912; Telegram from William Barnes Jr. to President Taft 4 October 1912; Memo from the Executive Clerk of the White House Rudolph Forester to Secretary of Treasury Franklin MacVeagh 4 October 1912; Carden personnel file, National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis (hereafter cited as Carden personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis).
schooner *William Thomas Moore*, which had become stranded inside Little River Inlet Bar, South Carolina. Under orders from Carden, and with the assistance of personnel from the Oak Island Live Saving Station, the crew of the *Seminole* attempted to free the stranded vessel. The *Seminole* was unable to get much closer than a mile. Three days were spent in an attempt to free the ship by kedging, from 28-29 March and 31 March 1914 (the documentation does not state why the crew did not work to free the ship on 30 March). A portion of her cargo was jettisoned in order to lighten the vessel, with the crew having to work in the breakers. As the kedging was unsuccessful, Carden left the area and returned on 8 April. Utilizing the powerboat and crew from the Oak Island Life-Saving station, the joint team was able to run a hawser over three quarters of a mile long from the *Seminole* to the stranded schooner. Eventually, over a two-day period, the schooner was pulled free of the bar and the *Seminole* towed her to Wilmington, North Carolina. A letter to the Secretary of the Treasury on behalf of the owners thanked and commended Carden and the crew of the *Seminole* for their “capable and persistent endeavors in the face of apparently insurmountable impediments,” noting that, without their assistance, the “vessel and her cargo would have been a total loss.”

Captain Carden commanded the *Seminole* until 9 September 1914, when he was detached from her and assigned to the Revenue Cutter *Mohawk*. He remained captain of that vessel until in October 1916, he was appointed the recruiting director in New York City. In December 1917 Carden was assigned duty as the Captain of the Port of New York and the surrounding area, he retained his previous duties as recruiting officer during this time.

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19 Letter from John M.C. Moore to Honorable William McAdoo, Secretary of the Treasury, 13 July 1914, Carden Collection.

20 Carden Personnel File, U.S. Coast Guard Historian’s Office.
For the first decade of the twentieth century, Captain Carden’s career consisted of roughly eight years of special duties and only two years assigned to a Revenue Cutter. In the modern Coast Guard, there are a variety of career paths that would allow one to serve a minimal amount of sea time. Aviator, marine inspector, lawyer, and IT specialist are just a few of the positions one can hold in the Coast Guard and expect to spend most of one’s time assigned to a shore-based unit. Even those at small boat stations may only spend a short amount of time on the water, responding to emergency situations as they arise. At the headquarters level, policy and program managers, as well as those serving in Districts and Sectors, are not necessarily operators in the field in the same sense that cutter crews are. Before the creation of the Coast Guard, the Revenue Cutter Service’s missions were far fewer, and sea time was expected. There were no small boat stations to manage; the Life Saving Service handled that mission. The Bureau of Navigation and Steamboat Inspection was, during Carden’s time, part of the Commerce Department and, for the purpose of this thesis, outside the purview of the discussion. While Revenue Cutter personnel may have worked with these other agencies, their primary area of responsibility was at sea.

After reviewing Carden’s career, it is easily understood why he was assigned to the position of Captain of the Port. His assignments as an ordnance officer and later in connection with exposition work with ordnance necessitated that Carden become an expert on the subject, a benefit when managing the largest munitions shipping area in the United States during WWI. Additionally, his special duty and sea going assignments within the United States and abroad afforded him the opportunity to engage with private citizens, businessmen, and official government representatives from a variety of countries and cultures. These experiences no doubt enabled Carden to conduct the business of Captain of the Port more efficiently and
professionally; from interacting with the various ships and crews in the harbor, to understanding business interests of the vessel owners, and most importantly understanding the grave responsibilities associated with supervising the loading and shipping of munitions.

Carden also spent the majority of his sea time on harbor duty. According to the 1917 Coast Guard Register of Officers, Carden’s career to the printing of that publication consisted of five years assigned to harbor duty in New York. In fact, the only other assignments at which Carden had spent more time were special duties such as exposition work and international travel to investigate manufacturing. These assignments amounted to seven years and three months of his Revenue Cutter/Coast Guard career. Carden had two years and two months more harbor duty and special duty then any other officer with the rank of Captain in the Coast Guard.21

An additional factor that undoubtedly influenced Captain-Commandant Bertholf to assign Carden to the position of Captain of the Port of New York was the behavior of Carden’s predecessor, Captain Horace West. In a letter dated 20 February 1918, from Secretary of War Newton D. Baker to Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo, Secretary Baker stated that Captain West as Supervisor of the Anchorages permitted dangerous activities that eschewed the regulations with regard to handling and shipping munitions. The explosion at Halifax must have been an explicit reminder as to the inherent dangers of the job, as well as providing the necessary impetus to replace Captain West with an officer who would enforce the regulations properly.22

21 Register of the Officers, Vessels, and Stations of the United States Coast Guard (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1917), 8-9. It was not until the early 1920’s that the Coast Guard adopted the same ranking system as the U.S. Navy. Captains in the Coast Guard were considered equivalent to Lieutenant Commanders in the Navy, which was the rank at which Carden retired.

22 Letter from Secretary of War Newton Baker to Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo, 20 February 1918, Carden Personnel File, NPRC, St. Louis.
Per his orders, Captain Carden relieved Captain West and assumed command of the New York Division as Division Commander and Supervisor of the Anchorages on 12 December 1917, at which point his responsibilities dramatically increased from his previous duty as recruiting officer. It is important to know that, while the Coast Guard, and earlier the Revenue Cutter Service, had enforced the anchorage rules and regulations, these protocols were written by other federal entities including the Departments of Commerce, War, and Treasury. On 4 March 1915, congress passed the Rivers and Harbors Act, which transferred the authority to establish anchorage rules and regulations from the Department of Commerce to the War Department. The Revenue Cutter Service was still charged with enforcing these rules. With the passage of the
Espionage Act, the power to prescribe the rules of anchorages was transferred to the Coast Guard. With this change, the Coast Guard became the sole authority for writing anchorage regulations as well as enforcing them.¹

The functional relationship between the positions of Division Commander and Supervisor of Anchorages was complex. The role of the Division Commander, under the Navy Department, was to supply the resources to allow the Supervisor of Anchorages, under the Treasury Department, to enforce the rules and regulations pertaining to the anchorage and movement of vessels in their area of responsibility. According to a letter from Captain-Commandant Bertholf to the Bureau of Navigation, these two positions had been entrusted to a single individual for thirty years prior to his letter dated 10 October 1918. Therefore, this complex situation was made less so by vesting one individual with both positions, negating the need for the Supervisor of Anchorage to petition the Division Commander for the necessary resources to perform the former’s duty assignment. As the Division Commander of the New York Division, Carden reported to the Third Naval District, but as the Supervisor of the Anchorages, he reported directly to Coast Guard Captain-Commandant Bertholf.²

On 26 February 1918, the Coast Guard formally took over these duties. Carden received orders reaffirming that the existing anchorage regulations were in effect and designating him as Captain of the Port for the harbor of New York and the nearby area. There was no change in duty between 12 December 1917, when Carden assumed command of the two positions, and 25

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¹ Letter from Captain-Commandant Bertholf to Bureau of Navigation, 10 October 1918, Carden Personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis

² Letter from Captain-Commandant Bertholf to Bureau of Navigation, 10 October 1918, Carden Personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis
February 1918 when the existing regulations were reaffirmed and the name of the position changed from Supervisor of the Anchorages to Captain of the Port.³

Carden’s geographical area of responsibility encompassed areas of New York’s and New Jersey’s harbor, as well as various bays and the Hudson River. There were fifteen major anchorage locations: East River Anchorage; South, Middle, Upper and Naval Anchorages in the Hudson River; West Anchorage Upper Bay; Eastern Anchorage Upper and Lower Bay; Staten Island Anchorage; Sandy Hook Anchorage; Kill Van Kull Anchorage; Newark Bay Anchorage; Arthur Kill Anchorage; Raritan Bay Anchorage; and Sheepshead Bay Anchorage. Within these regions, there were individual mooring and docking locations for specific types of vessels. For instance the Eastern and Staten Island Anchorages featured locations specifically for warships, temporary, and quarantine anchorages. The general anchorage area was subdivided into places for sailing vessels, barges, and civilian steamers.⁴

Precise anchorage areas were also established only for ships transporting or bound to transport munitions. Within all of the New York/New Jersey navigable waters, only four areas permitted the loading and storing of munitions on ships. Anchorage area 27A was the second smallest anchorage area, east of Rikers Island near the East River (Figure 7). Area 27B, located in the Western Anchorage Upper Bay south of Bedloes Island and north of the Greenville Channel, was the largest of the four munitions anchorages (Figure 8). The other two areas, 27C and 27D, were in the Lower Bay and Sandy Hook Anchorages, with 27D located west of the Swash and Main Channel with the Old Orchard Shoal Lighthouse delineating the northeastern

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³ Letter from Secretary of Treasury McAdoo to Collector of Customs and others concerned, 25 February 1918, Carden Collection. According to my research, this letter is the first instance that the term Captain of the Port is used. It designated Captains of the Ports for New York and the Norfolk/Hampton Roads areas.

most point. The last and smallest area, 27C, was in Gravesend Bay northeast of Coney Island (Figure 9).  

These four areas were the only locations where munitions loading was permitted. Within them, strict rules for the movement and placement of these ships were continuously enforced, with each anchorage ground having its own set of rules regarding how close ships could anchor to each other. For example, the anchorage near Rikers Island permitted vessels carrying explosives to anchor within 500 feet of each other, while the grounds in Gravesend Bay near Coney Island had more stringent placement regulations. Only three vessels were allowed in this anchorage at any one time and they had to remain at least 1600 yards from the shore with a minimum distance of 400 yards between them. These more stringent regulations were due to the small size of the anchorage, its proximity to the shoreline, and most importantly, this anchorage, along with Raritan Bay, acted as the main anchorage grounds for ships carrying high explosives in bulk. Therefore, these rules for Gravesend Bay, with the increased distance between ships carrying high explosives in bulk, were prudent.

The term “high explosive in bulk” was defined as:

…high explosives packed in boxes, barrels, or kegs and not loaded in ammunition or shells….High explosives are all explosives more powerful than ordinary black powder, except smokeless powder and fulminates. Their distinguishing characteristic is their susceptibility to detonation by blasting cap. Examples of high explosives are the dynamites, picric acid, picrates, chlorate powders, nitrate of ammonia powders, dry trinitrotoluol, dry nitrocellulose (gun cotton), and fireworks that can be exploded en mass.

The above regulations were just the tip of the iceberg. The numerous anchorages in New York and New Jersey had twenty-one standing rules and regulations promulgated in the

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5 Ibid., 15, 19, 21.
6 Ibid., 8.
7 Ibid.
Anchorage Grounds for the Port of New York and Rules and Regulations Relating Thereto

manual. Most were simple, common sense regulations to prevent serious harm and loss of property. For instance, ships wishing to berth in the anchorage areas perpetually, or with pseudo-permanent mooring locations, had to apply for permits to be supplied by the Supervisor of Anchorages/Captain of the Port. Vessels were required to moor only in those anchorage areas defined by the aforementioned manual, as it was necessary for these ships to keep the channel and other navigable areas clear.  

Regulations for ships carrying explosives were far more involved, but necessary given the cargo and potential for disaster. The loading of munitions was to be done in accordance with these regulations. For instance when utilizing mattresses or chutes to transfer the cargo from the munitions barge to the ship’s hold, standing regulation thirteen stated that:

When an inclined chute is employed, such chute shall be constructed of 1-inch planed boards with side guards 4 inches high, extending 3 inches above top face of bottom of chute and throughout its length fasten with brass screws. D-shaped strips or runners not more than 6 inches apart and running lengthwise of the chute must be fastened to the upper surface of the bottom part by means of glue and wooden pegs extending through the bottom part and runners. Chutes must be occasionally wiped down with waste moistened with machine oil, when dynamite packages are being handled. A stuffed mattress 4 feet wide by 6 feet long and not less than 4 inches thick, or a heavy jute or hemp mat of like dimensions, must be placed under the discharging end of the chute. The incline of the chute should be such that the velocity of the packages sliding will not be great enough to cause violent shock when coming in contact with other packages or when reaching bottom of slide, or men must be stationed alongside the chutes to retard the velocity of the packages and prevent violent shocks when packages come in contact with each other or reach bottom of chute.  

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8 Ibid., 11.

9 Ibid., 12-13.
Figure 7. Munitions Anchorage Area 27A. Anchorage Grounds for the Port of New York and Rules and Regulations Relating Thereto.
Figure 8. Munitions Anchorage Area 27B. Anchorage Grounds for the Port of New York and Rules and Regulations Relating Thereto.
Figure 9. Munitions Anchorage Area 27C and 27D. Anchorage Grounds for the Port of New York and Rules and Regulations Relating Thereto.
Figure 10. Gravesend Bay. 2008.0459, Carden Collection. Figures 10-18 are original pen and ink drawings from the Carden Collection and were drawn during Carden’s tenure as Captain of the Port. Most of them have his hand written notations on the back of the drawing, captioning the scene. Many of these were published in an article authored by Carden, see Godfrey Carden, “Handling of High Explosives in War Time,” *Engineering and Mining Journal* 109, no. 1 (1920): 17-22.
Figure 11. New York Division personnel at muster. 2008.0456, Carden Collection.
Figure 12. Munitions loading, armed Coast Guard personnel in attendance. 2008.0448, Carden Collection.
Figure 13. Overseeing the loading of munitions. 2008.0457, Carden Collection.
Figure 14. Armed patrol overseeing munitions loading. 2008.0445, Carden Collection.
Figure 15. Stevedores preparing to load munitions. 2008.0449, Carden Collection.
Figure 16. Patrol boat passing by a powder barge. Note the armed Coast Guardsman on board.
Figure 17. Armed Coast Guard patrol boat. 2008.0454, Carden Collection.
Additional rules regarding shipboard fires were in effect, prohibiting unnecessary fires and forcing the ship’s crew to constantly supervise any essential fires. Blasting caps were to be stored in different areas of the ship with at least twenty-five feet between them and any explosives. A ship had to fly a red flag of no less than sixteen square feet at her masthead to inform others that she was carrying or loading explosives.  

Though cumbersome, these rules could still be called common-sense regulations. Men loading munitions were forbidden from smoking, carrying matches or firearms, or having any type of metal tools on their persons for fear of a spark. Individuals under the influence of alcohol were forbidden to be on board or near any vessel carrying or loading explosives. Any alterations or carpentry work that the ship needed and repairs or changes to interior hold areas could not be conducted while explosives were being loaded. A striking hammer could easily cause a spark, leading to a disaster.

In addition to regulations pertaining to the loading and carrying of munitions, the anchorage manual afforded the Captain of the Port with wide-ranging authorities. Of particular

10 Ibid., 12.

11 Ibid., 12-13.
note was regulation nineteen of the manual. This provided the Coast Guard with the authority to move any vessel within or outside of the anchorage areas at any time if the maritime or commercial interests of the United States necessitated such a move. This broadly worded regulation applied to any vessel, no matter their country of origin, and gave the Captain of the Port unquestionable authority to move these ships at will if he felt it was in the best interests of the United States. These regulations, in conjunction with the Espionage Act of 1917, provided the Captain of the Port with nearly unlimited power to safeguard lives and property in the New York harbor. This was the realm that Carden took charge of in December 1917.\footnote{As the distinction between Supervisor of the Anchorage and Captain of the Port has been explained at the beginning of this chapter, the position will from here be referred to as Captain of the Port unless it is appropriate to refer to its previous designation as Supervisor of the Anchorage.}

When Carden took over as Division Commander in New York, the personnel strength was incredibly inadequate to properly execute his duties to safeguard the port of New York and maintain a flow of munitions to Europe for the war effort. As of 13 December 1917, his command consisted of two commissioned officers, the crews of two motor craft, and a single tug. With the Halifax incident fresh in their minds, Captain-Commandant Bertholf promised Carden as much manpower and equipment as could be spared. Over the next several months Carden’s command rapidly grew. By July 1918, he supervised a personnel force of 1644 men. Eventually, the number of watercraft assigned to him grew to upwards of a dozen motor craft, including tugs and harbor cutters: \textit{Hudson, Calumet, Mackinac, Patrol, Coquet, Guide, Caswell, Ross, Takana,} and \textit{Wissahickon}. Carden’s command became the largest in the Coast Guard during World War I.\footnote{Annual Report of the Captain of the Port for the Harbor of New York and Vicinity for the Period February 26, 1918 to June 30, 1919 with further data covering the antedating period subsequent to December 13, 1917, Carden Collection; Memorandum to Mr. Faust dated 21 Nov 1921, Carden Collection.}
While in command of the New York Division, Carden promulgated a wide variety of orders in addition to those already in effect regarding munitions loading. Some were relatively simple, but most if not all were fastidious. One of the earliest was on the subject of messing. He was intent to ensure that proper bookkeeping was kept regarding the meals that were provided to the servicemen by their caterer. The Officer of the Day was not only to prepare a signed statement of the actual number of meals served, but to indicate by name who ate and what meal he was served: breakfast, lunch, or dinner. The report was to be made in triplicate.\textsuperscript{14}

On 28 January 1918, General Order Number 17 was issued, stating that all companies were to muster no less than twice a day. Men were to be marched to meals by company and there should be a muster before and after each meal; the frequent mustering would certainly assist with the aforementioned meal counting order. Fortunately, the orders stated that it was sufficient for the Officer of the Day to observe the men entering the restaurant; he was not forced to watch the men eat and later certify this observation in triplicate.\textsuperscript{15}

Other orders that Carden issued were more focused on the safety and security of the munitions loading operations. His General Order Number 10 in essence reaffirmed the rules and regulations already in effect, but emphasized that safety was far more important than the speedy loading of explosives. He expected his men to enforce the rules and regulations rigidly, making intelligent decisions always erring on the side of safety and not expediency. If loading gear was seen to be weakened or compromised, all loading activities must be halted until the gear had been replaced. Moving ships in and out of munitions anchorages was to be accomplished with efficiency and speed, but the rate of loading explosives was always subservient to safety

\textsuperscript{14} Orders from Captain Carden to Executive Officer, New York Division, 3 January 1918, Carden Collection.

\textsuperscript{15} Order Number 17, to Executive Officer, New York Division, 28 January 1918, Carden Collection.
concerns. Carden also reminded his men that their actions might produce detrimental consequences, not only for the stevedores and coastguardsmen on munitions barges but those fighting overseas: “The loss of a shipload of munitions might mean the loss of a battle, it might affect a campaign-results far more wide-reaching than the mere loss of a ship or those on board.”

Carden decided that barrels of high explosives were to be hoisted and lowered onto barges in lieu of using chutes. Barrels of wet picric acid were usually rolled from point to point. Carden felt this was an unnecessary hazard, given the jolts to which each barrel was subject to when another was rolled next to it, and the possible friction between the iron hoops of barrels. This was a much slower means of loading explosives but, in Carden’s view, a far safer one.

Anyone wishing to enter the barge office was to have a pass or otherwise had to prove to the guard of the day that he had legitimate business. Officers and enlisted men of the Coast Guard in uniform did not need passes. These passes were also necessary in order to go on board a ship carrying or loading munitions. The officer in charge of Gravesend Bay anchorage was instructed to arrest any individual found to be on board any such vessel without a pass.

Even after the Armistice was signed and wartime operations were slowing down, Carden continued to maintain high safety standards at his command. On 20 December 1918, 150 men were honorably discharged from his command, leaving him with a force of about nine hundred. Even with the New York Division’s diminished numbers, Carden and his men continued to perform their assigned duties. Though the Armistice had been signed, safeguarding munitions

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16 General Order Number 10, 10 Jan 1918, Carden Collection. This sentence refers to a proverb titled For Want of a Nail, and discusses how a small action or omission may result in unforeseen large-scale consequences.

17 Order Number 11, Carden to Executive officer, 17 Jan 1918, Carden Collection.

18 Order Number 25, Carden to Aid to Supervisor of Anchorages, Officer and Guard of the Day, 14 February 1918, Carden Collections; Order Number 29, 14 March 1918, Carden Collection.
continued to be their primary objective. After several munitions barges dragged their anchors, indicating insufficient anchorage for these ships, Carden increased the standards to at least equal to that of Lloyd’s standards of the United States Navy. Officers were instructed to accept only munitions barges that could furnish permits from the office of the Captain of the Port, proving they had complied with the increased anchor standards. As the Coast Guard, along with the rest of the United States military, was beginning to demobilize, Carden reminded the men of the New York Division that high explosives are dangerous even during peacetime. Strict adherence to the rules and regulations was required.19

Carden’s official duties were to the Port of New York and the navigable waters in the immediate vicinity. This did not stop him from assisting with the response to the two serious munitions explosions in 1918. The first incident transpired on 26 March 1918 in Jersey City, New Jersey. A gas explosion struck the Jarvis warehouse near the Erie Railroad tracks. 1st Lieut. Lloyd T. Chalker assembled seventy-five men and, within fifteen minutes, they were en route to the scene via the Hudson. At the request of the local police, Coast Guard personnel took charge of the situation, securing the area and removing explosives that were in danger of catching fire and detonating. Personnel from the New York Division remained on scene until noon of the next day. The Director of Public Safety expressed his appreciation to the Coast Guardsmen of the New York Division, praising their promptness and willingness to assist with this situation.20

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19 Orders from Captain of the Port to officer in charge of explosives anchorage areas, 12 January 1919. Carden Collection; Order Number 64, Carden to company commanders and commanding officers of vessels attached to New York Division, Coast Guard, 8 January 1919, Carden Collection.

20 Carden, Annual Report of the Captain of the Port, 1919, 11.
The second incident occurred several months later. At about 7:40 pm on 4 October 1918, a munitions explosion occurred at the T.A. Gillespie plant in Morgan, New Jersey. The Gillespie plants focused mostly on filling shells with high explosives. As soon as the first explosions were heard and seen, as in the case of the Jersey City explosion, personnel from the New York Division immediately mobilized to assist. Men were pulled from barge guard duty and several watercraft were sent to investigate and support first response actions. Men responding to the scene reported that, at multiple times, they had to find cover due to the large amount of metal shrapnel flying about; “dodging behind trees, laying down anything to escape flying steel. Keeper Hearon reports that while talking to a man this man was beheaded by a piece of flying steel.”

Of particular note were the actions of 1st Lieut. Joseph E. Stika. He and the men under his command moved a train loaded with high explosives that, at any time, could have engulfed the train and men in fire, detonating the explosives. Carden nominated Stika for the Navy Cross, which he was subsequently awarded. In all, approximately ninety people died in the munitions explosions at the Gillespie plant. This was also the largest loss of munitions in the area during the war.

As if Carden’s duties and responsibilities were not trying enough, in September 1918 he was called before a Navy Board of Investigations to defend his conduct while in command of the New York Division. One of his subordinates, Acting Master’s Mate Eric Larsson, brought up claims of oppression, favoritism, and conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.

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21 Ibid., 14.
22 Ibid., 13-16. On 3 June 1975 shortly before his death, retired USCG Senior Chief Dennis Noble interviewed VADM Stika and when discussing his actions at the Gillespie plant, VADM Stika remarked several times how he did not deserve the Navy Cross. He felt that those on the front lines were more deserving of recognition then he. It is unusual to be awarded the Navy Cross without being engaged with actions involving an enemy of the United States. Oral history is located at the U.S. Coast Guard Historian’s Office.
Additionally, the board was investigating how these charges had been made public via an article in the *New York American* newspaper. A wide variety of individuals testified, including not only Coast Guard enlisted personnel, warrants, and officers, but also private citizens. Of particular note were the various individuals representing or associated with merchant shipping interests that were part of the proceedings. Every individual from the shipping lines that testified (Neptune Line, Moran Towing and Transportation, and the New York Boat Owner’s Association among others) had negative comments regarding Carden’s personality. They claimed to have been treated in an uncouth and impolite manner.

Several of the enlisted personnel who testified also felt that they had been treated unfairly or too harshly, while some of his more senior officers testified to the contrary. Captain of Engineers J.W. Glover, when asked if he had heard officers being reprimanded by Carden, replied that it was a manner of opinion; one man’s reprimand was another’s warning. He consistently stated that he felt that these were, from his point of view, merely stern words coming from a commanding officer, not a formal reprimand or dressing down as others may have taken them.23

Most of the proceedings consisted of testimony on various incidents that those testifying felt showed the Carden was a gruff, impolite person who repeatedly flaunted his authority and made threats. Several individuals, military and civilian, stated that Carden had informed them that, if they did not instantly comply with his orders, they would be arrested. Senior enlisted and junior officers felt their own authority was diminished when Carden reprimanded them in front of the men under their command.

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23 Record of Proceedings of the Permanent Board of Investigations in regarding Charges preferred by Acting Master’s Mate Eric Larsson, U.S.C.G. against Captain C.L. Carden, U.S. Coast Guard, and the unauthorized divulging of information relative to said charges to a newspaper, 1918, 161-163, Carden Collection.
The board, all retired Navy commanders, found that, while Carden had in no way shown favoritism against Acting Master’s Mate Larsson, he was guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman and suggested he be removed as division commander of the New York Division. The board had no authority to remove him as Captain of the Port, as that was strictly a Coast Guard position, reporting directly to the Captain-Commandant.

Any removal of Carden likely would have benefited the commercial shipping interests in the area. Carden’s predecessor, Captain West, had permitted numerous violations of the rules and regulations for the port of New York. Thomas Gibbons of the French Steamship Company testified that, prior to Carden’s tenure, the line’s ships had been in the habit of allowing carpenters to be working during munitions loading. U.S. Naval Reserve Lieut. Ernest Stavey, who participated in the proceedings as the Secretary of the Boat Owner’s Association, stated that Captain West had permitted the positioning of boats that he knew violated the prescribed rules and regulations. With the removal of Captain West and Carden’s rigid enforcement of the rules, these practices ceased.24

From all indications, Carden was indeed a “no-nonsense” type of commanding officer. It is easy to imagine his demeanor coming across as rough and impetuous to most people, especially to the enlisted men and junior officers under his command. Barking orders rashly and quickly without fully investigating the entire situation may not have been the most tactful approach to command, but it was Carden’s style. In his testimony, Captain Glove acknowledged that Carden was impulsive, but he also stated that he made allowances for this. While many of those who testified against him only made negative comments, some provided the opposite. Byron Newton, Collector of Customs for the port of New York, stated that while he was

24 Ibid.,19-20, 61-62.
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, any time that he needed a” clean man, a good officer, and a forceful executive” he thought of Carden, and that in his present position, Carden’s conduct had not changed Newton’s opinion of him.25

Carden certainly had his supporters, who no doubt influenced the aftermath of the investigation. As previously stated, the board recommended that Carden be removed as division commander. Since Carden played the dual role as division commander and Captain of the Port, a change in one would necessitate a change in the other. This was not a situation the Coast Guard wanted to be in. Correspondence from Captain-Commandant Bertholf to the Judge Advocate General, Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretaries of War and the Navy, on the matter discusses the necessity of maintaining a single individual to be vested in both positions. While the Navy agreed with the board of investigations and asked the Treasury to reassign Carden to a different position, Captain-Commandant Bertholf and Secretary McAdoo did not concur. Both rightfully claimed that, while Carden may have not been the most tactful of commanders or performed his duties with the eloquence of a diplomat, one could not find fault in his execution of this incredibly dangerous and necessary job. They also reminded both departments of a letter dated 20 February 1918 from Secretary of War Baker to Secretary McAdoo praising Carden. Carden’s intelligent enforcement of the rules, Baker wrote, had suppressed prior activities that ran counter to the regulations, placing lives and property in danger. Another letter, dated 30 August 1918, mere days before the board’s conclusion, from Secretary McAdoo to Carden, discussed how pleased McAdoo was with the job Carden was doing, acknowledging that, while it was not glamorous work, it was still necessary for the war effort. As the Treasury could find no fault with Carden’s command, and at its insistence that one person be vested in both positions,

25 Ibid., 163, 204.
Carden was not relieved and was permitted to continue as Captain of the Port and division commander of New York.  

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26 Letter from Secretary of War Newton Baker to Secretary of Treasury William McAdoo, 20 February 1918, Carden personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis; Letter from Secretary McAdoo to Carden, 30 August 1918, Carden personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis; Letter from Secretary of the Navy to the Commodore Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, 9 January 1919, Carden personnel file, NRPC, St. Louis.
Chapter 4

After surviving his court martial proceedings Carden continued in his capacity as Captain of the Port and Division Commander through the end of the war. After the Armistice was signed on 11 November 1918, ending the four years of fighting, Carden prepared his command for the inevitable demobilization. On 20 December 1918 he gathered the men in his command, approximately nine hundred, and proceeded to march from Washington Square through Fifth Avenue and West Fourteenth Street to the 9th Regimental Armory (see figure 19). Here his unit submitted to an inspection by Leo S. Rowe, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, accompanied by Captain-Commandant Bertholf and the Honorable Byron Newton, Collector of Customs, as well as countless citizen spectators. In his statement to the crowd, Assistant Secretary Rowe commented on how the ordinary citizen did not realize the important duties that were being performed by the unit:

Those who were not close to the situation did not realize the difficulties, the delicacy of the task, did not realize the man obstacles that had to be overcome before this great port could be thoroughly safeguarded. Those on the outside did not realize that is required great firmness on the part of your officers, a readiness to refuse all special privileges, a willingness to reject all demands for special favors, and a firm determination to enforce the Regulations in order that the people of this great community might be properly safeguarded.¹

On this same day, approximately 150 men were honorably discharged and sent home, beginning the division’s post-war demobilization.

With the reduced peacetime munitions shipping, one would expect the rest of Carden’s tenure in New York to be more relaxed. Carden still maintained the same rigorous standards, albeit with fewer personnel. In late 1919, another board of inquiry was convened to investigate

¹ Speech given by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Rowe to the New York Division on 20 December 1918; Carden, Captain of the Port Annual Report, 1919, 17.
Figure 19. New York Division, 20 December 1918. Carden Collection.
charges made against Captain Carden by Captain of Engineers J.I. Bryan. The findings of the board of inquiry stated that, on 20 August 1919, Captain Bryan had reported to Carden in what appeared to be a state of intoxication. Bryan had been admonished by Carden and this incident had become part of Bryan’s permanent personnel file. Captain Bryan claimed that this minor disciplinary incident would damage his chances of being promoted to Engineer-in-Chief, asserting that Carden had done this to impair his promotion. Again, the U.S. Navy lashed out at Carden, with Rear Admiral James H. Glennon, Commandant, Third Naval District citing Carden’s actions as “very reprehensible.”

In a striking retort, Collector of Customs Newton wrote to W.B. Kilpatrick at the Treasury Department, not only refuting these allegations, but taking a firm stance in defending all of Carden’s actions while in charge of the New York Division, stating:

This whole proceeding of holding a court of investigation upon an officer for doing his plain duty would be most extraordinary were it not for the fact that it is quite in line with the course that has been followed here in the direction of attempting to crucify Carden because he has performed his duty through a trying time and with a rather firm hand. On one occasion he was hauled up on charges because he refused to permit a certain corrupt lighterage company to have its own way in riding roughshod over all other interests in this port.

The last sentence refers to Carden’s previous bout with the Navy board of inquiry. Newton continues that Captain Bryan was never a serious contender for the position, and was known to drink to excess. He also reiterates that Carden, in performing his duty, insisted on absolute compliance with the rules and regulations, efficiency and intense attention to detail among his subordinates when executing their assigned responsibilities. Carden was known to be

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2 Statement from Rear Admiral J.H. Glennon, Commandant, Third Naval District regarding the proceedings and investigation concerning charges brought against Captain Godfrey Carden, 12 September 1919, Carden personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis.

3 Letter from Byron Newton to W.B. Kilpatrick, 16 December 1919, Carden Collection.
gruff at times, but Newton states that no man in his position could do otherwise, that this job of overseeing munitions necessitated someone who would at times be less than cordial.⁴

According to Newton, Captain Bryan was among the many Coast Guard officers who were publicly advocating remaining with the Navy Department. According to the act that created the Coast Guard, the agency would serve under the Navy Department in times of war. Elements of the Navy wanted to absorb the Coast Guard permanently. Many coastguardsmen agreed, as the Navy pay system was superior to that of the Coast Guard. Newton speculated that as Bryan was among those wanting to stay under the Navy, this might have been a factor in this “most extraordinary proceeding.”⁵

On 28 August 1919, President Wilson signed Executive order 3160, formally transferring the Coast Guard from the Navy back to the Treasury Department. The Navy no longer had jurisdiction on this case and the matter was dropped. It would seem that elements within the U.S. Navy did not approve of Carden, twice trying to have him removed from his position or otherwise disciplined for performing his duty.⁶

Carden was relieved by Captain Byron Reed on or around 6 October 1919 and placed on waiting orders. In January 1920, Carden was loaned to the U.S. Shipping Board to establish a general agency at Buenos Aires for the management of various Shipping Board vessels, interests, and ports in the vicinity. This was his last assignment in the Coast Guard, and he remained in Buenos Aires until September 1921. On 31 August 1921, Carden sent a letter to Secretary of Treasury Mellon requesting that he be allowed to retire. Under the 1915 act that created the

⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Statement from Rear Admiral J.H. Glennon, Commandant, Third Naval District regarding the proceedings and investigation concerning charges brought against Captain Godfrey Carden, 12 September 1919, Carden personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis.
Coast Guard was a provision permitting a commissioned officer with thirty years of service to retire. This was his third application for retirement. He had submitted the first on 18 April 1916, but with the prospect of war approaching, he withdrew his application on the assurance that once hostilities had ended he would be permitted to retire. Again, in March of 1921, he requested to be permitted to retire, but Commandant William E. Reynolds was unaware of the previous verbal arrangement and the request was denied. Carden’s third request in August of 1921 was approved and he was placed on the retired list on 29 December 1921.7

There was confusion regarding Carden’s request for retirement. In a letter to Commandant Reynolds dated 31 August 1921, Carden requested thirty days of leave, with permission to request any additional leave due him, to be followed by retirement under the thirty-year provision of the 1915 act that created the Coast Guard. On 2 September 1921, Carden sent another letter stating that, if his request for permission to apply for additional leave followed by retirement could not be granted, he wanted his original letter withdrawn. Several days later, on 9 September 1921, Carden was informed that he had made a suitable request for retirement. The letter reaffirmed that he had served at least thirty years in accordance with the thirty-year provision, and that he would be placed on the retired list as of 29 December 1921. Several pieces of correspondence from Commandant Reynolds informed Carden that, at any time before his retirement, he had the privilege to apply to withdraw his application. That however, was not entirely true. It appears that once Secretary of Treasury Mellon approved Carden’s application, by direction of the President, Carden no longer had the legal ability to withdraw his request for

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7 Letter from A.D. Lasker, Chairman U.S. Shipping Board to Secretary of Treasury Andrew Mellon, 6 August 1921, Carden personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis; Letter from Commandant Reynolds to Lieutenant Commander Carden, 19 March 1921, Carden personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis; Letter from Captain Carden to Secretary of Treasury, 18 April 1916, Carden personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary Clifford from Coast Guard Commandant Reynolds regarding retirement of Lieutenant Commander G.L. Carden, 9 September 1921, Carden personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis.
retirement. Only the authority that approved his retirement, in his case the Department of the Treasury, had the ability to reverse its decision.

The documentation in Carden’s personnel file suggests that he had enemies within the Treasury. Upon hearing of his retirement situation, Assistant Secretary Edward Clifford penned a memorandum to Secretary Mellon stating that Carden was a “brilliant man, but has been of no use to the Coast Guard for ten years, as he has a way of getting outside duty.” Clifford proceeded to inform Mellon that he should be aware of this situation as Carden had “powerful friends who may intercede for him.” Later, in a last-ditch effort to remain on the active list, Carden wrote to the Treasury and, since his record might create the impression that he had not accumulated enough time at sea to warrant retirement. He requested that his application for retirement be revoked and orders for sea duty be issued to him. Clifford’s response was nothing less than a slap in the face to Carden. Clifford stated that since Carden’s sea service was not even a factor in his retirement, he would be placed on the retired list as previously stated. Clifford’s response was dated 29 December 1921, the very day that Carden was to be placed on the retired list.

Clifford was correct in stating that Carden had influential friends. As Carden was unable to reverse the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury, he was informed that the only way to reinstate him would be by special legislation in Congress. In a letter to the Commandant of the Coast Guard, RDML Reynolds, dated 14 April 1924, Congressman Clarence Lea informed Reynolds of his intent to propose legislation that would return Carden to active duty status.

Congressman Lea wrote to request the name of the officer who was immediately above Carden

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8 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Treasury Edward Clifford to Secretary of Treasury Mellon, 12 November 1921, Carden personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis; Letter from Lieutenant Commander Carden to Secretary of Treasury, 22 December 1921, Carden personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis; Letter from Assistant Secretary Edward Clifford to Lieutenant Commander Carden, 29 December 1921, Carden personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis.
in the order of precedence, in order to determine Carden’s placement. The bill authorizing the restoration of Carden to the active list for the Coast Guard was submitted in April 1924 to the House of Representatives. Unfortunately for Carden, the bill either died in committee or was never passed by both chambers of Congress. Carden remained on the retired list.9

It is difficult to ascertain exactly what was going on between Carden, Commandant Reynolds, and personnel at the Treasury. Certainly there was some type of animosity between Carden and Clifford, but for what reason it is impossible to say, especially since initially during this situation Clifford appeared to be working in Carden’s best interests. In August 1921, Carden was informed that he was to be issued sea-going orders after his stint with the Shipping Board. However, in November of 1921, while his retirement drama was unfolding, the Office of the Bureau of the Budget requested that Carden be assigned to that office, effectively getting him out of another sea assignment. It seems that Clifford was willing to work with the Bureau of the Budget and task Carden to it, but as he was already slated for retirement an interesting method to retain him was proposed. Carden would be retired, placed on the retired list, but then called to active duty. He would have lost his position in the order of precedence, but at a minimum Carden would still be employed by the Coast Guard. It is unknown whether Carden or someone else decided not to go this route, but it did not happen. After this, it looks like Clifford pressed to keep Carden from returning to the Coast Guard.

As exemplified in the statements made during the board of inquiry in 1918, Carden was not a particularly well-liked individual. He was rude, brash, and probably more then a bit arrogant. He used his position’s power and authority granted under the Espionage Act to bend

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9 Letter from Congressman Clarence Lea to Rear Admiral W.E. Reynolds, 14 April 1924, Carden personnel file, NPRC, St. Louis; Bill to Authorize the Restoration of Lieut. Commander Godfrey L. Carden, Now on the Retired List of the U.S. Coast Guard, H.R. 8747, 9 May 1924 Committee on Naval Affairs, House, Congress Session: 68-1 (1923) bill number: 68 H.R. 8747, CIS no: 68 HN-1.166.
anyone to his will, not especially caring what the situation was as long as people did what Carden told them to do. He was tireless and unyielding when it came to enforcing the rules and regulations for anchorages and the loading and movement of high explosives. His strict interpretation of these rules and his uncompromising nature almost cost him his position, as private special interest groups pushed for Carden’s removal and a return to the days under Captain West. In a letter to Carden, Brig. Gen. Theodore Bingham summed up the issues that Carden had to face while in command of the New York Division:

It was interesting to read over the account of those anxious days—and particularly of your own work which was the hardest of all. You had a task which was hard enough and difficult enough in itself—I mean in its physical difficulties—to be burden of one man. But in addition you had to encounter all the opposition, open and underhand—the trickery, the greedy and unscrupulous chicanery, of utterly selfish and aggressive interests, yelling patriotism and practicing hypocrisy—and you live through it—and accomplished the real work of doing for the country what was needed, in spite of all attempts to undermine you.\(^\text{10}\)

Regardless of how anyone felt about Carden, in the Treasury, the U.S. Navy, or private business, no one can deny his record of success. He was brought in to command the New York Division with the primary mission of preventing another Halifax-like incident from occurring on American soil. In this he was entirely successful. From the period of time that Carden was in command at New York, 13 December 1917 to 30 June 1919, a total of 1698 vessels carrying 345,602,570 tons of high explosives passed through the New York Port. The total value of the explosives managed was $547,953,143.32. Not a single life was lost, nor did any major incidents occur. In fact, the only munitions-related incidents in the area were the Jersey City and

\(^{10}\) Letter from Brig. Gen Theodore A Bingham, United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation to Captain Godfrey Carden, 19 Dec 1919, Carden Collection.
Gillespie plant explosions previously discussed. These did not occur within Carden’s area of responsibility.\textsuperscript{11}

In the years preceding America’s entry into World War I, anti-German movements became particularly active. With events such as the Black Tom explosion and other incidents in which German nationals attempted either to sabotage or to otherwise interfere with the delivery of war goods to allied forces in Europe, the stage was easily set for the passage of the Espionage Act and the later amendment to it known as the Sedition Act. This legislation included a number of provisions. The transfer of authority of prescribing the rules and regulations pertaining to the movement and anchorage of vessels to the Coast Guard has already been discussed in detail. The main intent of the act, however, was to provide the American government with the authority to prosecute any individual who interfered with the operation of the nation’s military or promoted the success of her enemies. During wartime, the act forbade actions to disrupt the recruitment of military members or the fostering of insubordination, disloyalty or mutinous behavior. The Sedition Act went a step further in minimizing civil liberties, stating no one “shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States…or the military or naval forces of the United States”\textsuperscript{12}

Carden was not the only government official who used these expanded powers to safeguard American lives and property. One of the most notorious individuals who liberally exercised this authority was Postmaster General Albert Sidney Burleson, who made it his mission to expunge those publications that, in his narrow view, violated the Espionage Act or

\textsuperscript{11} Carden, Annual Report of the Captain of the Port, 1919, 1.

were otherwise anti-American. Burleson wielded this power copiously, targeting a variety of publications from those that advocated anti-war or pro-German interests to those who nonchalantly slipped in information that, in his eyes, violated the Espionage Act. Many of these smaller publications relied on the second class permits issued by the postmaster general. The Classification Act of 1879, requires permits for second class publications to be regularly issued at least four times a year. In one instance, Burleson revoked the permit of the publication *Masses* because he found it to contain distasteful content. The publishers sought to appease the postmaster general and informed him they would alter their publication to comply with Burleson’s interpretation of the law. Burleson informed them that, as they had missed an issue, they could no longer be defined as a regular publication and their permit was not reinstated. Thus was Burleson’s circular logic.  

With the passage of the Trading with the Enemy Act, foreign language newspapers were required to submit their material to the post office prior to publication for review. Those publications that could prove their loyalty were granted waivers, but this expensive and time-consuming process in essence shut down many small-scale publications. Those that continued changed their content to become overtly pro-American.  

Another individual who encouraged extensive enforcement of the Espionage Act was Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory. Like Burleson, Gregory advocated the enthusiastic enforcement of the Espionage Act. He used his position as attorney general to sway public opinion as well as to rebuke those members of the judiciary that opposed him, while

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congratulating those that did not. According to David Kennedy, Gregory publicly chastised a federal judge for instructing a jury to acquit a man charged with calling the President a “Wall Street Tool,” and later declared his approval of the Illinois State Bar Association for condemning as unpatriotic an attorney who was to take a draft resister as a client. Gregory found that the Espionage Act did not go far enough in providing the government with the authority it needed to prosecute people who spoke out against the war. He sought an amendment to the Espionage Act, later passed and known as the Sedition Act, granting him the ability to prosecute people based on unpatriotic speech.\footnote{Kennedy, \textit{Over Here}, 78. The Sedition Act was later repealed.}

There are obvious similarities between the actions of Carden, Burleson, and Gregory. In the course of their duties, they all voraciously wielded the powers granted to them from the Espionage and Sedition acts. Clearly they did so with different goals in mind. Burleson and Gregory made it their mission to expose individuals and organizations that they deemed unpatriotic, even treasonous. Burleson’s fight against anti-war newspapers and Gregory’s struggle against citizens voicing anti-American opinions were certainly necessary in their perception of how to protect the United States. Most modern American citizens would not agree with their actions. Carden’s use and sometimes abuse of his power, however, did not spring from some perceived notion of what must be done to protect American society. It came from a real threat, quite noticeable after the Halifax incident. Carden may have been as narrow-minded as the Postmaster and Attorney General, but his provinciality focused on enforcing those rules and regulations that would protect and save lives.
These are just a few examples of wartime actions that restricted liberty and increased government power, authority, and control over citizens’ everyday lives. While modern American society would likely fight to prevent the extremes to which these liberties were restricted, the United States of 1917 was a different place. For example, this was a society that created and officially endorsed organizations such as the American Protective League. The APL was an organization affiliated with and funded by the Bureau of Investigation, which later became the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), whose charge was to spy on American citizens. These volunteers kept watch on their friends, neighbors, and co-workers, looking for any actions or speech that were anti-American, anti-war, or pro-German. In a time that produced organizations such as this, infringements on civil liberties were perceived as normal. In 1917, about a third of the population of the United States was either foreign born or had at least one parent who had been born outside the United States. With so many potential alien influences and saboteurs around every corner, the Wilson administration pushed legislation aimed at rooting out disloyal speech and behavior. Fear is a powerful motivator, and the parallels between these actions and the passage of the Uniting and Strengthening American by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, commonly known as the PATRIOT Act, are not hard to discern.\(^\text{16}\)

The office of Captain of the Port not only continued past the end of World War I but also expanded. After the official end of World War I, on 3 March 1921, the authority of prescribing the rules and regulations pertaining to anchorages and movement of vessels reverted back to the War Department. The Treasury, through the Captains of the Ports, still continued to enforce these regulations as they had before the war. With munitions loading no longer a chief concern, though explosives still transited through the New York waterways, the Captain of the Port

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 81-82. Portions of the Espionage Act exist today and are codified under 18 U.S.C Chapter 37.
focused mostly on the safe movement of merchant vessels, pleasure craft, their proper anchorage, enforcing quarantines, ice breaking, and assisting with the occasional regatta. By 1939, there was an increase in the number of areas where the Coast Guard was charged with overseeing anchorage and ship movement regulations. New York and the Hampton Roads/Norfolk area of course remained within its jurisdiction, which expanded to ports in Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Maryland, the District of Columbia, South Carolina, Florida, Illinois, and California. In addition to these harbors, the Army Corps of Engineers enforced waterway regulations in ports in Georgia and Florida. Between 1915 and 1939, the increase in tonnage from the Coast Guard supervised areas increased from 220,948,000 to 623,911,000. This not only accounts for the year-to-year shipping growth, but also the increased number of areas of responsibility the Coast Guard acquired.  

With the beginning of hostilities in Europe, the Captain of the Port program once again began to expand. Signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 18 September 1939, Executive Order 8254 authorized an increase in personnel for the Coast Guard. Also in September of 1939, the Coast Guard, through the Captains of the Ports, began to monitor and transmit reports to the White House and Departments of State, the Treasury, and the Navy on the movement of foreign merchant vessels, public ships, and aircraft within American ports. This was later expanded to include domestic ships as well. Reports would contain a dossier of the vessel’s nationality, name, location, cargo, dates of arrival and departure, and armament.  

The Coast Guard Reserve Act of 23 June 1939 established an all-volunteer force consisted of boat owners that the Coast Guard could draw on in order to promote safety and

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18 Ibid., 4.
security, both on the water and on shore. These volunteers eventually assisted with the establishment and maintenance of port security, augmenting the military members of the Coast Guard. Later, on 19 February 1941, the Coast Guard Auxiliary and Reserve Act repealed the original June 1939 act and established the Coast Guard Reserve as a military reserve element of the Coast Guard with the Auxiliary as the civilian volunteer force.\textsuperscript{19}

By presidential proclamation, and in conjunction with the 1917 Espionage Act, the authority to stipulate rules and regulations concerning anchorages and movement of vessels was transferred back to the Coast Guard in June 1940. By November 1940, twenty-nine key ports had designated Captains of the Port. The organizational structure became more complex with the creation of Headquarters Ports within each Coast Guard district. The aforementioned twenty-nine ports, as well as seven additional ones became Headquarters ports. Smaller “sub-ports” were given Assistant Captains of the Port. With this increased coverage, the vast majority of the United States’ navigable waters were under the jurisdiction of a Captain or Assistant Captain of the Port. This organizational structure was used until 1941, when, between 21 July and 3 September, the port system was realigned. Each Coast Guard district was assigned a Captain of the Port with aides working under him stationed at vital waterways.\textsuperscript{20}

The port security program in New York established a program whereby longshoreman were identified by nationality, fingerprinted, and issued permits to work in the port. As before in World War I, tighter controls over the movement and loading of munitions were put into effect, with additional regulations put in force by the Treasury and Commerce Departments. Civilian boats were conscripted from the Coast Guard Auxiliary and used in harbor patrols. In general, the Captain of the Port expanded to meet new and old responsibilities in conjunction with the

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 4, 9.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 5, 8.
war effort as well as peacetime duties: guarding harbor facilities, fire fighting and prevention, enforcing neutrality laws, sealing of radios, enforcement of the navigation and customs law, and, as in World War I, supervising the loading and movement of munitions. The Captain of the Port program in World War II was extensive; an entire body of work could focus exclusively on this subject.21

In 1942, by Executive Order 9083, President Roosevelt transferred the duties of the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation to the Coast Guard. This transfer was made permanent in 1946. With these additional functions, the Coast Guard had within its jurisdiction all functions pertaining to maritime safety and security, permitting the Coast Guard to approach these duties from a holistic perspective.

With the end of World War II, the Captain of the Port and port security program continued, albeit with less rigid standards of security now that the wartime obligations had diminished. The Coast Guard, in conjunction with the International Maritime Organization, began steadily working to develop international standards that would be applied to the world’s seagoing countries. This eventually led to what is known as the Port State Control program which focuses on the inspection of foreign vessels visiting international ports. After the World Trade Center attacks on 11 September 2001, the Coast Guard was moved from the Department of the Treasury to the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, and again began to revitalize the maritime security component of its mission. With the passage of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Coast Guard was instructed to conduct security and facility assessments and identify any weaknesses in the physical security of ships and facilities.

21 Ibid., 6.
The act also called for a National Transportation Security Plan for deterring and responding to security-related incidents.\textsuperscript{22}

The World Trade Center attacks also precipitated a change in the organizational structure of Coast Guard field units. Previously, these units were organized according to mission. The new organization, called Sector Commands, realigns personnel under a single umbrella instead of multiple commands. These new areas of responsibility were based on the Captain of the Port operational zones. With this consolidation of power, the Sector Commander serves as the Captain of the Port, Federal Maritime Security Coordinator, Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection, Search and Rescue Coordinator, and Maritime Federal On Scene Coordinator.\textsuperscript{23}

The position of Captain of the Port of the U.S. Coast Guard has advanced and expanded to meet an ever-changing world. From humble beginnings of supervising anchorages and vessel movements to managing munitions in wartime, directing vessel inspections, and more recently working to strengthen security and safety in our new global climate, the office has evolved. With the sustained use of navigable waterways for maritime transportation and trade, the office of the Captain of the Port will continue to protect the maritime interests of the United States and the safety of its citizens.

As stated in the introduction, there are several assumptions based on the secondary source material available when this research first began. One of these was that Carden was responsible for instituting a series of regulations that made him unpopular with the New York maritime community. All of the regulations in place before and during Carden’s tenure as Captain of the Port were specifically detailed in the \textit{Anchorage Grounds for the Port of New York and Rules}


and Regulations Relating Thereto manual, not by Carden. His job was to enforce these rules. While he did produce dozens of orders for the division, the overwhelming majority of these dealt with administrative functions. Some detailed how often patrols needed to be in specific anchorage grounds or situations, others discussed matters of administration and record keeping, as previously discussed with his superfluous orders on recording meals.

Carden’s General Order Number 10 was one of the few orders found that detailed specifics on munitions loading and handling. However when compared to the Anchorage Grounds for the Port of New York and Rules and Regulations Relating Thereto manual, his order was just a simplified version of the manual. Nothing extraordinary or unprecedented, though he made certain to include a copy of the order within the Annual Report of the Captain of the Port for the Harbor of New York and Vicinity for the period February 26, 1918 to June 30, 1919.24

Another point of clarification is the first usage of the term Captain of the Port. All the sources utilized, including volume eighteen of the Coast Guard at War series, state that Carden was the first Captain of the Port. While this is true for New York, the Captain of the Port for Norfolk, Hampton Roads, and the vicinity was also designated at the same time as the New York Captain of the Port. While this may be simply a matter of semantics, it is important to note. These two positions were designated simultaneously per a document penned by Secretary McAdoo and approved by President Wilson on 25 and 26 February 1918, respectively.25

Captain Carden was the first Captain of the Port of New York. He was strict to a fault, rude in his interactions with the maritime community of New York as well as his subordinates, and unwavering in his enforcement of the anchorage and munitions regulations. He

25 Letter from Secretary of Treasury McAdoo to Collector of Customs and others concerned, 25 February 1918, Carden Collection.
undoubtedly made enemies during his career because of this temperament. However, if one were to try to gauge how Carden performed his duty, one only needs to look at his record. Not a single life was lost, nor did any major accidents occur. It is clear that, in the work of loading and handling munitions, the only possible measure of success would be the safety record, and Carden’s was exemplary. He may not have been an innovator or even a good person, but he did his duty in safeguarding lives and property, and kept munitions shipments moving across the Atlantic.
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**Articles**


