

Cicero and Caesar: A Turbulent *Amicitia*

by

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Though some study into the relationship between Cicero and Caesar has occurred, it is relatively little and the subject warrants more consideration. This is a significant gap in the historiography of late republican history. This thesis examines and attempts to define their relationship as a public *amicitia*. By looking at the letters of Cicero, his three Caesarian speeches, and his philosophical dialogue *de Amicitia*, I show that the *amicitia* between these two men was formed and maintained as a working relationship for their own political benefit, as each had something to gain from the other.

Cicero's extant letters encompass a little more than the last twenty years of Cicero's life, when some of the most important events in Roman history were occurring. In this thesis, I examine selected letters from three collections, *ad Quintum fratrem*, *ad Familiares*, and *ad Atticum* for clues relating to Caesar's *amicitia* with Cicero. These letters reveal the tumultuous path that the *amicitia* between Cicero and Caesar took over the years of the mid-50s until Caesar's death, and, surprisingly, show Cicero's inability to choose a side during the Civil War and feel confident in that choice. After Caesar's victory at Pharsalus in 48, the letters reveal that Cicero hoped that Caesar could or would restore the republic, and that as time passed, he became less optimistic about Caesar and his government, but still maintained the public face of *amicitia* with Caesar.

Cicero's three Caesarian speeches, *pro Marcello*, *pro Ligario*, and *pro Rege Deiotaro*, which he gave with Caesar in attendance, reveal that Cicero's hope for Caesar peaked in *pro Marcello* and that Cicero and Caesar were working together for *pro Ligario*. By the time that *pro Rege* was given however, Cicero was far more disenchanted with Caesar and his government, and his speech is more forced than his previous ones, which read as more sincere. The tenor of these orations fit with those of Cicero's letters; a similar pattern in Cicero's attitude towards Caesar can be seen in both the letters and speeches.

The final source that is examined in this thesis is Cicero's *de Amicitia*, which is a piece of his *philosophica* that examines *amicitia* (friendship) in the Roman world. This is the only text written after Caesar's death that is examined in this thesis, and I believe that if it is read with an eye towards the *amicitia* between Caesar and Cicero, this treatise, which devalues ordinary political *amicitia*, gives the reader clues about the problems caused by political *amicitia*. While the majority of this treatise deals with a more warm kind of *amicitia*, I do not believe that this is what Cicero had with Caesar. They had neither a friendship nor an alliance but a forced cordial relationship that dipped into elements of friendship and alliance whenever strategically possible. Because of the necessity of their maintaining good relations, they formed this peculiar but extremely important variety of *amicitia*. Based on the evidence in this thesis, there was some kind of public *amicitia* between the two men, even after Caesar crossed the Rubicon, and especially after the Caesarian victory at Pharsalus in August of 48; that *amicitia* lasted down almost to the death of Caesar on March 15, 44.



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by

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To Mom, Dad, and Amy,  
I would not be where I am, or who I am, without your love and support.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFATORY PAGES	i-vii
Introduction .....	1
CHAPTER 1: Cicero's Letters: Working out <i>Amicitia</i> .....	9
Considerations Reading the Letters .....	11
Cicero and Caesar's Letters .....	17
<i>ad Quintem Fratrem</i> .....	19
<i>ad Familiares</i> .....	22
<i>ad Atticum</i> .....	30
CHAPTER 2: Cicero's Caesarian Speeches: The Final Problem.....	42
<i>pro Marcello</i> .....	50
<i>pro Ligario</i> .....	55
<i>pro Rege Deiotaro</i> .....	58
CHAPTER 3: Cicero's <i>de Amicitia</i> .....	63
Conclusion .....	74
Appendix I: <i>Amicitia</i> and Modern Theories.....	77
Appendix II: Timing of <i>de Amicitia</i> .....	79
Ancient Authors and Works.....	83
Works Cited .....	84

## Introduction

In 63 BC, the people of Rome elected a *novus homo* (new man) consul in his first year of eligibility. With his election, he had gained the most important and powerful political position in Rome. The Romans were fortunate that they elected such an intelligent and capable man this year, as the republic would be threatened by a coup. Ultimately, the revolt was crushed because of the consul's leadership, influence, and speaking ability. The survivors of the conspiracy were dangerous men, and the consul put to the senate the question of how they should be punished. According to Sallust, the consul pushed for the execution of these conspirators. The senate was unanimous in their agreement until one patrician rose to speak. This patrician had worked his way up the *cursus honorum* as well, and was further given the honor of being *Pontifex Maximus*, and was well loved by the masses. The patrician pleaded to the other senators for leniency and clemency for the conspirators, as it was not the Roman way to execute citizens without trials. The consul was understandably annoyed, and became more so as senators joined with the patrician until another respected senator spoke last and swayed the body to move for execution. As far as historians know, this was the first public but indirect conflict between the consul Marcus Tullius Cicero and the patrician Gaius Julius Caesar. Cicero won the day, but he also saw the potential power that Caesar could harness.

Historians have all but exhausted the study of Cicero and Catiline, and his feud with Publius Claudius (Clodius) Pulcher is also well known. Furthermore, Beryl Rawson has detailed Cicero's relationship with Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, but no one to this point has examined the *amicitia* between Cicero and Caesar in any significant depth. The purpose of this thesis is to begin to fill this historiographical gap by examining the attitudes of Cicero towards Caesar from

Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon to Caesar's assassination. Scholars have (accurately) painted Cicero as a supporter of the republic and thus have agreed that the actions of Caesar disgusted Cicero.<sup>1</sup> Yet they have ignored the nature of the relationship that Caesar and Cicero established while the former was in Gaul, and overly simplified the social dynamic between the two men. I do not question that Cicero was unhappy with the tyranny that Caesar attempted to maintain. There can be no doubt about this. My purpose with this thesis is to investigate and attempt to discern the more subtle aspects of Cicero's attitudes towards Caesar to determine whether Cicero was able at times to overlook their political differences and remember Caesar as a man with whom he shared a working political relationship (*amicitia*); to say "friendship" in a personal sense would be to step too far. Cicero was certainly happy that the tyrant of Rome was dead, but I demonstrate that he also remembered that a former colleague had been assassinated as well. A study such as this can tell us more about Cicero, but it also has the potential to reveal more about Roman political culture as well. Though I will not dwell on this point, and for the most part leave any indications one way or another for future research, further study should be done to discover what role politics played in establishing and maintaining *amicitia* in Rome.

The late republic was a turbulent time and events can easily become jumbled and confused. Because of this potential for confusion, I will attempt to set out a brief and clear timeline for the reader that will encompass the events mentioned in this paper; in no way is it exhaustive, nor is it meant to be. In order to obtain his consulship in 59, Caesar bribed many men and spent excessively, so that by the time his consulship was over, he was heavily in debt.

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<sup>1</sup> I do not read German at present and am unable to consult the following works: Matthias Gelzer, *Cicero und Caesar* (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1968); Friedrich Lossmann, *Cicero und Caesar im Jahre 54; Studien zur Theorie und Praxis der romischen Freundschaft* (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1962); and Ulrike Riemer, *Das Caesarbild Ciceros* (Hamburg: Kovač, 2001). However, as I pursue this topic further in the Ph. D. program (Classics) of the University of California at Santa Barbara, I will acquire German and be able to include these works and others in my work. Meanwhile, I have included the main aspects of their problematic *amicitia* in this M.A. thesis.

This was not uncommon and consuls usually became governors of provinces to recoup these losses. Caesar had it arranged that he could become governor of Gaul in 58 for an unprecedented ten years and quickly began to conquer the territory tribe by tribe. Meanwhile, Cicero went into exile in 58 because of a law aimed directly to force him out of Rome but was able to return in large part because of the influence of Pompey in 57. In 51, he (begrudgingly) accepted the governorship of Cilicia, since there was a shortage of candidates because of a law that required five years between a consulship and governorship, from which he returned in 50. It was at this time that the senate denied Caesar's request to run for consul in absentia. In Caesar's public career, he had angered many senators and aristocrats, but they could not charge him with a crime while he held public office. Having been denied the right to run for consulship, and with his rule in Gaul expiring, Caesar was forced into a corner. Pompey and the senate ordered Caesar to disband his army and return to Rome. Caesar agreed with the caveat that Pompey too must disband his. Pompey refused. As Caesar crossed the Rubicon in January of 49, Pompey and the majority of the senate fled south to Brundisium where he then fled to Greece, and was eventually followed by Cicero. After marching to Spain and defeating Pompey's men there, Caesar returned to Italy and pursued Pompey to Greece. Caesar was nearly defeated in July of 48 at Dyrrhachium, but managed to escape where he routed Pompey at Pharsalus on August 9, 48.

After Pharsalus, Pompey fled to Egypt and was assassinated by the men of Ptolemy XIII. Cicero realized the cause was lost, and began to establish peace with Caesar, which Caesar accepted. Caesar pursued Pompey and while in Egypt, established Cleopatra on the throne in 47 after a prolonged siege of Alexandria. After this, Caesar mopped up the rest of Pompey's forces in the Mediterranean and returned to Rome in 46 where the senate appointed him dictator for ten years. Caesar was forced to march to Spain in 45 to deal with Pompey's sons. Caesar returned

to Italy in September of 45 and began trying to reform many of the problems that plagued Rome. During this time Caesar seemed to be leaning towards establishing himself as a dictator, and was declared dictator in perpetuity (*dictator perpetuus*) in February, 44 after serving defined terms as dictator in 49, 48, 46, and 45. On March 15, 44, a group of conspirators, which did not include Cicero, assassinated Caesar. Despite the expectations of men like Brutus and Cassius, this assassination only led to more chaos and the rise to power of Mark Antony and Octavian. Cicero was killed on December 7, 43 under an agreement between the two triumvirs.

### *Amicitia*

It is important to discuss the problematic Roman term for “friendship,” *amicitia*, and its implications. The Latin *amicitia* shares its root with other words associated with affection, such as *amicus* (friend) and *amare* (to love), so English speakers have the tendency to associate *amicitia* with personal friendship, which is not entirely accurate. The translation of *amicitia* as friendship is not inaccurate, but the Romans used this word to describe other relationships as well, such as political alliances. English speakers have the option of describing a close relationship with different words that all possess unique connotations: friend, associate, pal, business partner, and so on. The Romans likewise had a similar range of words (*familiaris*, *comites*) but could also use *amicus* to describe all of these relationships; this polyvalence creates complications. The range of meanings presents problems for the historian; *amicitia* can mean personal friendship and political alliance. This problem is inherent in the historiographical use of the term. In an effort to be more accurate I will simply use *amicitia* for Roman political contexts in this essay.

Historians typically saw *amicitia* not as a bond between friends, but essentially as a political alliance that held very little, or perhaps no, personal affection. In 1939, for example,

Syme stated, “Family wealth and influence did not alone suffice...*amicitia* was a weapon of politics, not a sentiment based on congeniality.”<sup>2</sup> Many historians did not consider *amicitia* as a form of what we call “friendship”. Rather, *amicitiae* were informal alliances and promises made by politicians to support one another regarding political issues on which they agreed. For the most part, this was the accepted opinion of historians until P.A. Brunt put Roman *amicitia* in a new light.<sup>3</sup> Unlike previous historians who either had ignored Cicero’s *de Amicitia* or did not find it a reliable source, Brunt worked directly with this essay to show that, at least according to Cicero, *amicitia* could be much more than a simple political alliance, and that political alliances grew from feelings of good will, not vice versa. As a result, scholars in diverse fields, such as sociology, political science, and history, have warmed to Brunt’s definition of *amicitia*.<sup>4</sup> These arguments still do not solve the riddle of translating *amicitia*. The term can mean political alliance or bosom friendship, and all the minute shades of difference between these extremes. In the end, I will look at *de Amicitia* for help in understanding Cicero’s attitude towards political *amicitia* at the time he was writing that work. The term *amicitia* complicates the relationship between Caesar and Cicero. The initial reaction for some historians might be to use the word in the more modern sense, that is, a personal friendship. But there is little evidence to suggest that Cicero and Caesar were personal friends. From their initial conflict during the Catilinarian conspiracy to Caesar’s assassination, their relationship was tenuous. It is incorrect then to state that the two were personal friends. Simultaneously, the two were rarely ever on the same side politically, so it is equally difficult to say that their *amicitia* was for a political alliance. We must look between the two extremes. The *amicitia* between Caesar and Cicero was one of necessity; Cicero needed to please Caesar because of his power, while Caesar needed Cicero’s support to

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<sup>2</sup> Syme, (1939), 12.

<sup>3</sup> Brunt, (1988), 352-381.

<sup>4</sup> Rawson, (1978), 3; Von Heyking and Avramenko, (2008), 84-85; Wood, (1988), 182-183; Burton, (2011), 28-32.

legitimize his own actions. Caesar's rise to power created an unprecedented political situation, which strained established social and political relationships: Cicero was searching for a new social/political form of *amicitia* to fit the new situation. As we will see later, they are able to get along when discussing topics such as literature, but when trying to maintain their pleasantries they avoided discussing politics.<sup>5</sup> Their *amicitia* was strong in that it lasted through such existential threats to both men's lives and careers, even if the political dimension of it was sustained through the appearance of elements of personal friendship based on things like literature.

Cicero left three forms of his writings for posterity, his letters, speeches, and *philosophica*, and it is with these documents that I have endeavored to discover the nature of the relationship between Cicero and Caesar. Each can be useful but also present unique challenges. Cicero's letters are perhaps the least problematic of the group, as many of them were written to close friends, and Cicero was able to be rather open regarding his inner thoughts. I believe that from these letters we will see Cicero at his most candid and can remove the veneer of politeness and reverence to discover the thoughts that were coursing through Cicero's head regarding Caesar. This will not be the first study on Cicero's letters, as several books, such as Peter White's *Cicero in Letters*, have examined the letters for the information regarding epistolary trends in Rome.<sup>6</sup> While this is an excellent book, it does not focus on the study of Cicero as a person and his relations with anyone in particular, but is more interested in Rome itself. There have also been other articles or chapters relating to Cicero and Caesar's letters, but again they do not focus on the relationship between the two men.<sup>7</sup> This absence leaves a good deal of work to

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<sup>5</sup> I do not rule out the possibility that there was a closer *amicitia* between the two, but there is little evidence to support such a hypothesis, and it can never be proved.

<sup>6</sup> White, (2010).

<sup>7</sup> See Pauli (1958), 128; White, (2003).

be done and many questions to be asked. There are difficulties in examining these letters that must be considered however. For instance, the sheer quantity makes it impossible, in a space such as this, to examine them all as closely as they deserve. There are also issues of sincerity and interception that the researcher must remember.

Cicero was the greatest orator of his time, and it is fortunate that Caesar was aware of his reputation and subsequently took advantage of Cicero's notoriety. Three speeches in particular are relevant to this thesis, the so-called three Caesarian speeches that Cicero delivered in 46 and 45 to Caesar. Although they are generally full of praise for Caesar, there is certainly reason to doubt Cicero's sincerity. Scholars have debated Cicero's genuineness in these speeches for decades, with Harold Gotoff supplying the most in-depth work on all three speeches.<sup>8</sup> But for the most part, they have been studied as individual units and not as a united series, though they are often grouped together. By studying these three speeches in chronological order, one can find a change in tone from the first speech to the last.

### **Hypothesis about Reading the *de Amicitia***

The final source that I will interrogate here will be Cicero's philosophy of *amicitia*. Following the death of the republic and Tullia, his daughter, Cicero devoted himself almost entirely to philosophy. Because Cicero wrote so many *philosophica*, much of which does not pertain to this topic, I will examine one aspect only of the *de Amicitia*. Cicero's treatise will reveal what Cicero considered important for friends, and his thoughts on how personal friendships are formed and destroyed. From this information, we can discern whether or not Cicero would have considered Caesar a friend. Cicero also wrote this treatise within six months of Caesar's death, and may have subtly reflected on the issues that bore on his relationship with

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<sup>8</sup> Gotoff, (1993).

Caesar. There are of course hazards to this approach, primarily that the text was not meant to be read biographically, and doing so has the ability to mislead the reader. But it was a document written by Cicero about *amicitia*, and if he was sincere, then some of his reflections can be brought to bear to understand his relationship with Caesar.

All of these sources have their limitations, but collectively they have the potential to illuminate Cicero's attitudes towards Caesar during the important years of his rise to power. They all present their own unique vantage points to view the relationship between Cicero and Caesar, and some in fact are contradictory at some places and coherent in others. It is often difficult to reconcile these problems without reverting to the all-too-easy excuse that Cicero was conflicted in his attitudes towards Caesar, yet this is precisely what I hope to show. Previous scholars have turned Cicero into a figure who saw the world in extremes, and had no love for the man who toppled the republic. Yet this thesis will show that Cicero was a more complicated man than that, and that his *amicitia* with Caesar remained in Cicero even after he had given up hope for a rebirth of the republic.

## Chapter 1: Cicero's Letters: Working Out *Amicitia*

In Rome, many letters, even private ones, were written for public consumption by friends with the knowledge that they may fall into the hands of enemies. This can be problematic for historians analyzing personal relationships, no matter who the correspondents are. The problem is even more difficult if the writer, addressee, or subject is the powerful general and politician, who would become dictator, Caesar. That so many letters of Cicero still exist is rather astonishing. An astounding 900 survive. If not for these letters, Cicero, his contemporaries, and his time would be much less clear to us. More importantly for this chapter, his personal thoughts on public matters would be lost. Cicero's superficially favorable disposition towards Caesar declines during the civil war, temporarily rises, then plummets after Caesar's assassination, leaving Cicero in a complicated state of mind.

Many of Cicero's letters after Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 have some mention of Caesar or the tumultuous political situation in Rome. I cannot analyze them all in this chapter (and thesis), and so I have chosen particular letters that appear to reveal the most about Cicero's attitudes towards Caesar. There are many more letters than the ones I have selected that deal with this topic, but I have chosen those that I believe contain the most information regarding their *amicitia*. In doing so, I have tried to establish the fluctuations in *amicitia* between the two men, and show Cicero's personal conflict. There is still more work to be done in this area and more study of these letters is suggested for future research.

Before continuing, I must establish the basic facts surrounding these letters. About 900 of Cicero's letters are still extant, and they are divided into four groups, *ad Atticum* (68-44), *ad Familiares* (62-43), *ad Quintum fratrem* (60-54), and *ad Brutum* (43) (*To Atticus, To Friends, To*

*Quintus*, and *To Brutus*.) It is impossible to know how many letters have been lost, but Pauli lists several other books that ancient authors mentioned: *ad Senatum*, *ad Ciceronem*, *ad Caesarem*, and *ad Caesarem iuniorem* (*ad Caesarem* was at least three volumes).<sup>9</sup> Given the number of these collections, it is likely that more volumes existed in the past but have been lost. This chapter will focus on *ad Quintum Fratrem*, *ad Atticum* and *ad Familiares* (*ad Brutum* falls outside of the scope of this thesis). In the following pages, I will examine select letters in *ad Quintum*, *ad Familiares*, and *ad Atticum*. In order to preserve the epistolary narrative that underlies the letters to each group of recipients, I will present the collections separately, noting some internal references to one another. This approach will allow the reader to understand better the complicated and constantly changing views that Cicero held towards Caesar beginning from Caesar's time in Gaul in 58 until his death in 44. The majority of letters to Quintus, Cicero's brother who served in Gaul under Caesar and thus was close both physically and personally, fall outside of the period of this paper but are included to establish the degree of *amicitia* between Caesar and Cicero. *Ad Familiares* offers an interesting viewpoint that the other two collections lack; it contains letters to a diverse group of people, some whom Cicero considered close friends, others merely associates. Cicero's enthusiasm, sarcasm, and sincerity differ depending on the letter's recipient and his sincerity needs to be gauged when we read these letters. Finally, Cicero's letters to Atticus may be the most revealing of all. Atticus was Cicero's closest friend throughout his life, and therefore the person with whom Cicero was probably the most candid. With Atticus, Cicero had no secrets and nothing to lose; his comments with Atticus are the least likely to hide his thoughts.

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<sup>9</sup> Pauli, (1958), 128-29.

## Considerations Reading the Letters

Cicero's letters present many problems of authenticity and interpretation, and it is important to examine and understand some of these analytical problems before continuing on to the letters themselves. Scholars have studied the letters extensively, and by analyzing them as a unit, they have found common occurrences and themes. One of the most important works on the topic of Cicero's letters is Peter White's *Cicero in Letters*.<sup>10</sup> This book tackles many important questions when examining letters, such as bias, currying favor, and giving advice. Amanda Wilcox takes a less general approach and looks at friendship in select letters.<sup>11</sup> Other scholars, most notably Shackleton Bailey, have used the letters to create biographies of Cicero.<sup>12</sup> There are more important works that will be discussed, and much of the research has dealt with important but peripheral questions. Without these works, the task of analyzing these letters would be exceedingly difficult. The topics that I will examine are the initial publication of the letters viewed by modern historians, the role of the letter, and sincerity and privacy in letters.

We do not know who originally collected and publicly circulated Cicero's letters, but we can tell, to some extent, who did not. Logic dictates that Atticus had some role in their publication, since Cicero addressed a vast amount of them to him, and in one such letter he indicated Atticus's interest in collecting and publishing them. Yet, there is no firm evidence that Atticus actually published them, and there is even evidence that by 30 BC they were still unpublished; Cornelius Nepos could only see them when he visited Atticus's home. The first solid evidence of the publication of at least some of Cicero's letters occurs in Seneca the Younger's *de Brevitate vitae* (58 AD), in which he quotes them and examines the presence of the

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<sup>10</sup> White, (2010).

<sup>11</sup> Wilcox, (2012).

<sup>12</sup> Shackleton Bailey, (1972).

word *semiliber* (half free), and then later he again cites them in his *Epistulae morales*.<sup>13</sup> A more likely scenario for the publication of the letters is that Cicero's freedman Tiro was responsible for their dissemination. As Cicero's secretary he was in a unique position to organize and maintain the letters of his former master. That book XVI of *ad Familiares* is exclusively devoted to the letters Cicero wrote to Tiro is further evidence for this idea, since these letters were not numerous and they could easily have been placed elsewhere in the collection.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, these letters do not contain much pertinent information regarding Cicero; many of them are simply Cicero expressing concern for the health of Tiro. Generally, scholars agree that Tiro was likely the first to publish Cicero's extant letters, though in truth we can never know for sure.

Mary Beard offered an interesting insight into the reading of these letters. Instead of looking at them as mere correspondence, she reads them as literature and examines how their publication affects the way in which they are read, from the original publications that are divided into multiple volumes by subject, to the modern editions that organize the letters chronologically, an approach followed by G.O. Hutchinson as well.<sup>15</sup> Note also that the intent of the publisher, that is, publishing his letters as examples of literary style or as records of Cicero's life in politics, may have affected which letters or parts of letters were selected for publication (and which suppressed). Furthermore, the ordering of letters could have a significant effect on how the reader receives them vis-à-vis their historical interpretation. Beard contends that by ordering the letters chronologically, readers lose the "episodic narrative" that the original publication created.<sup>16</sup> She contends that the greatest problem with the new organization occurs in *ad*

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<sup>13</sup> Nicholson, (1994-1995), 66, 69, 71.

<sup>14</sup> Beard, (2002), 131.

<sup>15</sup> Beard, (2002); see Hutchinson, (1998), 4.

<sup>16</sup> Beard, (2002), 125.

*Familiares* where letters are jumbled and it is difficult for the reader to keep the events straight, unless cross references in the edition allow the reader to follow the chain of correspondences and mitigate this problem. This confusion is less of a problem with *ad Atticum* as those letters are directed to one person and there is a linear narrative. When trying to construct Cicero's views, it is a hard task to keep track of all his related thematic statements and compare each narrative to another.

For Roman politicians, socializing was an important and necessary aspect of their day for several reasons. While present in Rome, lower ranking senators were expected to visit their patrons and prominent senators every morning to show their support and try to establish a certain level of *amicitia* for themselves in the hopes of furthering their own careers as well as supporting those of their patrons. These lower ranking senators could also meet in the forum, attend dinner parties, and appear at a variety of other social occasions.<sup>17</sup> When Cicero went into exile, or served as proconsul in Cilicia, these avenues of socialization were unavailable, but he did not want to see himself forgotten by his colleagues in Rome nor lose contact with his friends or loved ones. The letter was an important device for maintaining contacts, not only for Cicero, but also for Romans in general, and it had to serve several purposes, some of which were difficult to balance.

Cicero's formal public *amicitia* with Caesar reached its apogee when Caesar was in Gaul. Letters sent to one another, full of compliments, unite them on the surface.<sup>18</sup> Letter writing is a way to build and maintain *amicitia*, as Cicero later writes to Quintus in September, 54, "ego vero nullas δευτέρως φροντίδας habere possum in Caesaris rebus. ille mihi secundum te et liberos nostros ita est ut sit paene par" ("Really I am not able to have any 'second thoughts' in matters of

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<sup>17</sup> White, (2010), 18.

<sup>18</sup> For instance see *ad Att.* II.13.3, III.1.17

Caesar. To me he is second to you and our children, so that he is nearly equal [to them].”<sup>19</sup>

Though Caesar was absent from Rome for nearly a decade, Cicero built an *amicitia* with him that appeared to equal that of his closest confidants and loved ones. There is room for doubt however. In an era with no postal service or laws prohibiting the reading of another’s letter, privacy in letter writing was a constant question. It is necessary to address whether Cicero was simply trying to curry favor with Caesar by managing public opinion through his letters, which he expected to be read by more than just the addressee.

The time between the writing and receiving of a letter was a period in which the letter could be read and disseminated by any interested party, which raises the question of sincerity in letters. Cicero was less likely to be candid in his letters if he knew that important or damning information in them could be intercepted. As internal evidence in his letters reveals, Cicero was indeed aware of this possibility, and took several measures to prevent it. His first option was to use letter carriers (called *tabellarii*) that he could trust, either in his own employ or in that of his correspondent. The lack of reliable messengers is something Cicero often lamented, “*obsignata iam epistula superiore non placuit ei dari cui constitueram quod erat alienus. itaque eo die data non est.*” (“Now with the previous letter sealed, it did not please me for it to be given to the man whom I had decided on because he was an outsider. Therefore it was not sent that day.”)<sup>20</sup> Trustworthy messengers were also somewhat rare, as Cicero complained to Atticus, “*paucis diebus habebam certos homines cui darem litteras.*” (“Within a few days I would have trustworthy people to whom I could give the letter.”)<sup>21</sup> Cicero is apparently able to find reliable messengers at times, since letters do get sent to Atticus and other friends. When Cicero wanted to send a letter to Quintus who was encamped with Caesar, or to Caesar himself, the process was

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<sup>19</sup> *ad Quint.* III.1.18

<sup>20</sup> *ad Att.* 10.11.1; for a brief discussion of messengers see Jenkins, (2006), 38.

<sup>21</sup> *ad Att.* 5.17.

both simpler and more complicated. As John Nicholson explains, it was difficult for Cicero to send a letter to a party that was constantly on the move, perhaps a reason why Cicero was so eager to use the messengers of Caesar when they were in Rome.<sup>22</sup>

Simply because messengers were trusted however did not mean that the messages were safe. Spying and privacy were issues of which Cicero was certainly aware. In a letter to Quintus in September of 54, Cicero writes, “De publicis negotiis, quae vis ad te Tironem scribere, negligentius ad te ante scribebam, quod omnia minima maxima ad Caesarem mitti sciebam” (“Regarding the public business, which you want Tiro to write to you, I previously used to write to you less attentively, because I knew that everything great and small was being sent to Caesar.”)<sup>23</sup> This awareness should not be too shocking, as this letter was written to Quintus while he was in Caesar’s camp. It is perhaps not surprising that Caesar would have men inspecting letters. This level of espionage apparently continued into the civil war as well, as Cicero tells Atticus in 49, “et res ipsa monebat et tu ostenderas et ego videbam, de iis rebus quas intercipi periculosum esset finem inter nos scribendi fieri tempus esse” (“The situation itself advised it, you had showed it, and I saw that the time for writing between us was at an end concerning those matters which would be dangerous to have intercepted.”)<sup>24</sup> Caesar had “ears” out during his fight against Pompey, though they were not an organized body, but informal spies. Cicero’s solution to this problem was not to lie, but to omit the information in his correspondence with Atticus, a practice he mentioned earlier in a letter to Quintus.<sup>25</sup> We may assume then that most, if not all, praise that Cicero gives to anyone, including Caesar, in his letters is what he chose to write, however guardedly, just as when he occasionally tried to send

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<sup>22</sup>Nicholson, (1994-1995), 33-54; Jenkins (2006), 40.

<sup>23</sup>*ad Quint.* 3.1.10.

<sup>24</sup>*ad Att.* 10.8.1.

<sup>25</sup>*ad Quint.* 3.7.3.

private messages. What we cannot know is how much and what Cicero felt but did not write, or to what extent he censored himself.

Scholars such as Nicholson have posited that Cicero used Greek in his letters to deal with the problem of his letters falling into hostile hands.<sup>26</sup> While that inference may be correct to some extent, I cannot believe that Cicero relied on this method as a secure way to keep secrets. Greek was well-known during this period, and his use of Greek words and phrases is stylish and adds grace notes to his letters, similar to French in English letters in past centuries. Not only were elite Romans educated in Greek, but also many slaves (and couriers) were often native Greeks. If information in Greek needed to be translated, it would not be difficult for an elite Roman or someone close to him to do it. More pointedly, Caesar knew Greek. His messengers or his other staff could easily decipher any messages in Greek, as Cicero surely knew. There is another possible reason for Cicero's use of Greek however. Cicero may have used Greek to allude to works of Greek literature and philosophy discussed in his circle of intellectual friends. This would provide a layer of meaning inaccessible even to those who might pick up on the reference. That is, even if Caesar knew the Platonic dialogue from which an allusion came, he would have to guess how Cicero's friends thought about the scene. Even if he had his ideas about that, it would give plausible deniability to Cicero.

Cicero was aware that if he wrote something in a letter, it was likely that someone could read it and potentially use it against him. For the most part his solution to this problem was relatively simple: he did not write anything that could be used against him, and only gave important messages to people whom he trusted to deliver them. This solution seemed to work

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<sup>26</sup> Nicholson (1994), 43. A number of these have been written on the use of Greek in Cicero's letters, see R. B. Steele, "The Greek in Cicero's Epistles" ; Charles Henry Saylor, "A Comparative Scheme of the Moods and Tenses in Cicero's Translations from the Greek ..." (J.H. Furst Co., 1911); John F. MacCall, *The Syntax of Cicero's Greek in His Letters*, (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Univ. Microfilms Internet., 1982).

for him, as he was only identified as a criminal by Publius Clodius Pulcher, a personal enemy (*inimicus*), after Cicero executed the conspirators in the Catilinarian conspiracy, and by Antony as vengeance for the *Philippica*. Cicero's enemies were only able to prosecute him for his public deeds, not private correspondence. There is no evidence of him stating anything falsely or contradicting himself in his letters. Cicero seems to have lived by the creed to only say nice (but likely sincere) things until he was able to speak out publicly against someone or something.

### **Cicero and Caesar's Letters**

Despite the survival of over 900 of Cicero's letters, the greatest tragedy for this thesis is the loss of *ad Caesarem*. What we know of these letters comes from the writings of Nonius Marcellus. It is impossible to estimate accurately how many letters the two sent to one another, but we have evidence of approximately thirty-four letters.<sup>27</sup> Many of Cicero's letters to Caesar in Gaul were merely praise or treated casual matters, though he frequently sent Caesar news and talk of other affairs, as Cicero acknowledged.<sup>28</sup> Two letters that Cicero wrote in 45 still survive, and both are letters of recommendation. Letters from Caesar still exist as well, as Cicero either preserved them or copied a few of them in letters to Atticus (he almost always mentions that he is attaching a letter even when the attachment has been lost).<sup>29</sup> The first of these letters has Caesar writing to Cicero that he is looking forward to hearing his advice and wisdom on the ensuing civil war; the second has Caesar thanking Cicero for his kind words regarding his policy of clemency and again expresses a desire to hear his counsel. Caesar wrote the third as he was marching to Spain, telling Cicero to stay out of the political fray and lie low and not do anything contradictory to Caesar's wishes. These letters are predictably full of warm, cajoling sentiments

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<sup>27</sup> Pauli, (1958), 128.

<sup>28</sup> *ad Fam.* VII.17.2.

<sup>29</sup> *ad Att.* 9.6a, 9.16.2-3, 10.8b.

for Cicero, and Caesar obviously considers Cicero an important associate, or at least is trying to portray that image. This warmth did not fool Cicero. He seems to have read into each word that Caesar wrote, as a series of letters show.<sup>30</sup> After Cicero received Caesar's letter in *ad Att.* 9.6A, he questioned Caesar's phrasing. In this letter Caesar says, "...ut te ibi videam, ut tuo consilio, gratia, dignitate, ope omnium rerum uti possim" ("...that I will see you there [Rome], so that I will be able to employ your counsel, grace, dignity, and help in all matters"). Cicero did not know if this was a summons or simply a suggestion, and thus he reveals a level of fear of Caesar's power.<sup>31</sup>

Cicero's few surviving letters of recommendation to Caesar later read as cold and detached, which does not mean that their *amicitia* had ended entirely. When Tullia died in 45, Caesar sent a letter of condolence to Cicero expressing his sadness, and later he sent another complimentary letter praising one another's opposing works on Cato.<sup>32</sup> By 45, little veneer of support for Caesar's rule by Cicero remained. Peter White questions the sincerity of these letters. In his essay on the Caesarian letters, White argues that they show how Caesar used and manipulated both Cicero and Roman politicians in general; not only Caesar used this veil of warmth and kindness to his advantage. White points out that Cicero had complimented Caesar in order to get what he wanted: his return to Rome and the return of those whom Caesar exiled.<sup>33</sup> In support of this interpretation, it may be noted that Cicero was aware of what Caesar could do to help him. Favors were simply a formal part of *amicitia* in Rome. Cicero (and likely Romans in general) did not see this exchange of favors as manipulative in any negative sense but as one

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<sup>30</sup> See *ad Att.* 9.6, 9.6a, 9.7, 9.7a, 9.7b, 9.11, 9.11a. The last of these is a direct letter to Caesar from Cicero asking him for clarification.

<sup>31</sup> See *ad Att.* 9.6.6 for Cicero's concerns.

<sup>32</sup> *ad Att.*, 13.20.1, 13.46.2, 13.50.1. This is an interesting point itself; the two are directly arguing against one another, yet are showcasing some semblance of *amicitia*, or perhaps merely politeness, in their exchange.

<sup>33</sup> White, (2003), 69.

of the reasons for *amicitia*.

### *ad Quintum fratrem*

While Caesar was serving in his second five-year term in Gaul from 53-49, Cicero remained in either Rome or Cilicia and was beginning to focus on his literary pursuits. The existence of *amicitia* between the two men at this point then might seem unlikely, but *amicitia* did in fact grow between them during this period. I have not yet discussed the intricacies. Beginning with a letter dated approximately February 10, 54, Cicero began to discuss his relationship with Caesar while he was in Gaul, and though *amicitia* does appear between Cicero and Caesar, there is a distinct air of building upon that *amicitia* for purely political and tactical purposes.<sup>34</sup> Cicero describes his conversation in a letter to Caesar as conducted, “familiariter et cum dignitate” (“...familiarily and with dignity...”)<sup>35</sup> His express tone, therefore, contrasts with his real reasons for his seeking/perpetuating *amicitia*, that is, his purely political reasons. It is interesting that Cicero included *dignitas*. *Dignitas* is not always the most important personality or social trait to establish between friends. While Cicero was enforcing his public appearance of *amicitia* with Caesar he also wanted to appear as a strong political figure in his own right. Whatever the case, Cicero’s next letter, written February 13, 54, to his brother expresses a more functional closeness between himself and Caesar, “de Pompeio adsentior tibi, vel tu potius mihi. nam, ut scis, iam pridem istum canto Caesarem. mihi crede, in sinu est neque ego discingor” (“Regarding Pompey I agree with you, or rather you agree with me. For, you know, I have long been singing about that Caesar of yours. Believe me, he is in my heart, and I am not removing

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<sup>34</sup> I am using the dates put forth by Shackleton Bailey.

<sup>35</sup> *ad Quint* II.11.4.

him.”)<sup>36</sup> It is necessary to remember the circumstances of Cicero’s writing. This letter was sent to Caesar’s military camp, a place where Caesar had *imperium*, and may well have been made aware of all the most important events and news in the camp. It is possible that Cicero expected agents to intercept this letter and report its contents to Caesar. Cicero also reveals in another letter that he has lost popularity with some senators for the development of his connection with Caesar.<sup>37</sup>

In *ad Quint.* II.14, dated as early June 54, Cicero begins, “*accepi tuas litteras datas Placentia, deinde alteras postridie datas Blandenone cum Caesaris litteris refertis omni officio, diligentia, suavitate.*” (“I received the letter you sent from Placentia, then a second sent a day later from Blandeno<sup>38</sup> together with Caesar’s letter filled with all dutiful, diligent, and pleasant attention.”) and goes on to state (rather poetically) , “*sic ego, quoniam in isto homine colendo tam indormivi diu te mehercule saepe excitante, cursu corrigam tarditatem cum equis tum vero, quoniam tu scribis poema ab eo nostrum probari, quadrigis poeticis*” (“Thus, because in cultivating that man’s friendship, I have so long been asleep, by Hercules, with you often trying to rouse me, I will fix my slowness with horses at the gallop, well, really by a poetic four horse chariot, because you write that my poem is approved by him [Caesar].”)<sup>39</sup> Though Caesar is not in Rome, Cicero plans to use the medium of a letter (and poetry) to build upon his fledgling *amicitia* with Caesar, while also keeping in contact with his brother. Cicero’s use of *isto* however does reveal that he still sees a separation between himself and Caesar. While *isto* is the

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<sup>36</sup> *ad Quint.* II.12.1. Shackleton Bailey, (1980), 194., translates this as “and I am not loosening the knot.” Whatever the translation, it is clear that Cicero is not willing to let his *amicitia* with Caesar fall apart. The Latin may suggest a more graphic meaning.. *Sinus* (here *sinu*) can sometimes mean the lower torso and even the genitals, so this could be interpreted as Caesar has a dangerous grip on Cicero and that Cicero.

<sup>37</sup> *ad Quint.* II.16.1.

<sup>38</sup> Where Blandeno is located is still unknown because the name is corrupted in the manuscript tradition.

<sup>39</sup> *ad Quint.*, II.14.2 The allusion to rousing and horses is either to the opening of Aristophanes' *Clouds* or to the goad of Plato's *Apology*. There is some irony at work with either allusion.

ablative of *iste*, translated as “that”, when used addressing someone else it can often mean “that man of yours.” This allows the reader to realize that there is still a gap between the speaker, and the subject, in this case Caesar. Caesar belongs (for lack of a better word) to Quintus at this point in time, not Cicero. Yet the two were forming a public *amicitia* that other Roman politicians were talking about by December of 54.<sup>40</sup>

The most interesting aspect of this series of letters however, is the mutual interest that Caesar and Cicero share in one another’s literary work. *Ad Quint.* II.16 (August, 54) contains the first mention of their literary works, but this theme is surprisingly prevalent throughout their correspondence, even later when Caesar became dictator. Cicero is interested in Caesar’s critique of his writing, saying, “quo modo nam, mi frater, de nostris versibus Caesar? Nam primum librum se legisse scripsit ad me ante, et prima sic ut neget se ne Graeca quidem meliora legisse; reliqua ad quondam locum ῥαθυμότερα (hoc enim utitur verbo)” (“For how, my brother, is Caesar about my verses? For he wrote to me before that he had read the first book, and with the result that he says that he had not read better introductory parts even in Greek. The rest he had read to a certain spot, ‘rather modest’—for he uses this word.”)<sup>41</sup> There is no other mention of shared verses between Cicero and Caesar, but as time continued, the two became more dependent on their literary ties as the expression of their public *amicitia*; because they belonged to different factions, politics was not possible. Cicero expresses distress at the death of Caesar’s daughter Julia in 54, and later in the year he claims that Caesar is the only man who cares (“amaret”) for him.<sup>42</sup> Though scholars doubt the sincerity of Cicero’s feelings, Shackleton Bailey believes, as do I, that Caesar’s desire to establish a public *amicitia*, if not a true, personal

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<sup>40</sup> *ad Fam.* 1.9.4.

<sup>41</sup> *ad Quint* II.16.5. Shackleton Bailey (1980), 202-203., suggests that his verses refer to Cicero’s *de Temporibus Suis* and that the best translation for ῥαθυμότερα is “mechanical.”

<sup>42</sup> *ad Quint* III.1.17, III.5.4.

*amicitia*, was sincere.<sup>43</sup> From these letters it seems that by the time that Cicero left for Cilicia in 51-50, he and Caesar were maintaining their public *amicitia*, and yet this could all be mere posturing since Cicero's letters were sent to Quintus in Caesar's camp, and he expected the *imperator* either to read them, or have their contents reported to him. It is important to reiterate here that these letters to Quintus are dated to the mid to late fifties and therefore belong to the period not long before the Rubicon and its aftermath, which is our primary concern.

### ***ad Familiares***

Cicero's letters to Quintus present problems for this paper. In addition to posing valid questions about Cicero's sincerity, the time span of these letters (60-54) is relatively short and does not encompass the time up to Caesar's death. Both *ad Familiares* and *ad Atticum* avoid these problems of interpretation to some extent, though questions of sincerity must arise with these letters too. There are exceptions, but Cicero rarely discusses Caesar directly in *ad Familiares*; he mentions him in passing when describing events in Rome. This arrangement allows him to express himself more candidly than was possible in his letters to Quintus. The first few letters under consideration give information about the impending civil war but have little to do with Caesar and more to do with Pompey. In *ad Fam.* II.8 Cicero writes to M. Caelius and praises Pompey's patriotism ("civem egregium esse Pompeium" "Pompey is a distinguished citizen") but in *ad Att.* VIII.11 (February 27, 49) states,

dominatio quaesita ab utroque est, non id actum, beata et honesta civitas ut esset. nec vero ille urbem reliquit quod eam tueri non posset nec Italiam quod ea pelleretur, sed hoc a primo cogitavit, omnis terras, omnia maria movere, reges barbaros incitare, gentis feras in Italiam armatas adducere, exercitus conficere maximos. genus illud Sullani regni iam pridem appetitur...uterque regnare vult.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Shackleton Bailey, (1977), 218-219.

<sup>44</sup>*ad Att.* VIII.11.2

Mastery has been sought by both [Caesar and Pompey]; that was not done so that the state is taken care of. Neither indeed did he abandon the city because he could not protect it nor Italy because he was driven from it, but from the beginning he thought to move all land and sea, to incite barbarian kings, to induce the wild and armed tribes against Italy, to procure the greatest armies. For a long time that kind of Sullan rule was sought...both want to be king.

Cicero was not thrilled with the idea of either combatant winning the war, which makes more tolerable Caelius Rufus's doubts about Pompey's ability as a politician ("solet enim aliud sentire et loqui neque tantum valere ingenio ut non appareat quid cupiat...")<sup>45</sup> "For he is accustomed to feel and speak something else yet he is not so clever that what he wants does not appear."<sup>45</sup> Cicero supplied news to his friends about events in Rome, yet provides very little of his opinions on Caesar's actions at this point.

When Caelius Rufus writes to Cicero discussing Caesar, he expresses confidence in Caesar's judgment, and he does not make explicit his fear that Caesar will lead the republic into civil war when he says in 51, "itaque iam, ut video, alteram utram ad condicionem descendere vult Caesar, ut aut maneat neque hoc anno sua ratio habeatur aut, si designari poterit, decedat."<sup>46</sup> ("And so now, as I see, Caesar is willing come down on one or the other agreement, either to remain [in Gaul] and his vetting will not be held this year, or if he can be elected, to step down [from command].")<sup>47</sup> A few lines earlier he states that this is the general opinion throughout the senators and that Caesar was working for a peace with Pompey. It is possible, even probable, that Cicero too hoped that Caesar might still not plunge the republic into civil war. This is a revealing point. Cicero, whatever his politics, was a staunch supporter of the republic and of maintaining the constitution that had helped Rome become great. He hoped that Caesar would not betray the

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<sup>45</sup> *ad Fam.* VIII.1.3.

<sup>46</sup> Shackleton Bailey (1977), 407, points out that according to Adcock "si designari poterit" signifies not Caesar's ability to win the election, but the willingness of the senate to ignore the law requiring ten years between consulships. The law was ignored for Pompey's consulship in 52, so the flaunting of it here would not be particularly significant.

<sup>47</sup> *ad Fam.* VIII.8.9.

republic. To some extent, hope shows the limits of the *amicitia* Cicero expressed in the letters to his brother. Cicero was anxious to avoid the civil war that now seemed imminent.

By August of 50 Cicero was worried regarding the events taking place in Rome. In a letter to Caelius Rufus, whom Cicero had defended in the past, he stated his position plainly, “Res publica me valde sollicitat. Faveo Curioni, Caesarem honestum esse cupio, pro Pompeio emori possum, sed tamen ipsa re publica nihil mihi est carius; in qua tu non valde te iactas. Districtus enim mihi videris esse, quod et bonus civis et bonus amicus es<sup>48</sup>.” (“Politics worries me very much. I favor Curio, I want Caesar to be upright, I can die for Pompey, but nevertheless nothing is more dear to me than the republic itself; you do not talk very much of yourself in it. For you seem to me to be pulled in different directions, because you are a good citizen and a good friend [*amicus*].”)<sup>49</sup> Cicero imagines Caelius to be torn, and he himself must be feeling similarly. As we have seen, there was to that point some veneer of *amicitia* between Cicero and Caesar. In this passage Cicero states his vain hope for Caesar and his loyalty for Pompey. This passage marks the depth of Cicero’s internal conflict, even when he is still proconsul in Cilicia leading his troops. In the next letter, written to M. Caelius on the Nones of May 49, Cicero details both his inner turmoil and his decision-making process more overtly:

Sic illi amores et invidiosa coniunctio non ad occultam recidit obtrectationem, sed ad bellum se erumpit. Neque, mearum rerum quid consilii capiam, reperio—quod non dubito quin te quoque haec deliberatio sit perturbatura—; nam mihi cum hominibus his et gratia et necessitudo; tum causam illam, non homines odi. Illud te non arbitror fugere, quin homines in dissensione domestica debeant, quamdiu civiliter sine armis certetur, honestiorem sequi partem, ubi ad bellum et castra ventum sit, firmiorem, et id melius statuere, quod tutius sit. In hac discordia video Cn. Pompeium senatum quique res iudicant secum habiturum, ad Caesarem omnes, qui cum timore aut mala spe vivant, accessuros; exercitum conferendum

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<sup>48</sup> Here Cicero means that Caelius Rufus is a good friend to him, not necessarily to Caesar whom he is a supports. Caelius seems to be moderating his actions based on Cicero. See Shackleton Bailey, (1977), 427

<sup>49</sup> *ad Fam.* II.15.3.

non esse.<sup>50</sup>

So, that love of theirs, their hateful union, has not subsided into secret caviling but is breaking out into war. Nor can I find what plan I should make for my own actions--as for this, I don't doubt but that this [same] choice is going to upset you. For I have favor and a tie with these people. But then I hate that cause of theirs, not the people. I do not think you are avoiding the following consideration, that in domestic discord so long as the fighting is civil and without arms, people ought to follow the more upright party, but the stronger one when it has come to armed warfare and to consider as better that which is safer. In this disagreement I see that Cn. Pompey will have with him the senate and those who judge trials, and that everyone who lives in fear and with depraved hope will go to Caesar; [I see] that his army is incomparable.

Cicero is convinced that Pompey's cause is the just one, but that his forces lack strength.

In January of 49, Caesar crossed the Rubicon and, by decree of the senate, became an enemy to Rome. Later on, in a letter to Tiro written in 49 while Cicero waited outside of Rome for his triumph, and called Caesar's action shameless (*impudens*), and also refers to Caesar (ironically) in apposition as "amicus noster" ("our friend").<sup>51</sup> Yet a few days later Cicero still discusses hopefully the prospect of peace between the two factions.<sup>52</sup> But Cicero then describes to Tiro the abandonment of Rome as "urbem reliquimus" ("we abandoned Rome"); the use of the first person plural is significant here. Pompey's forces are no longer *they*, but *we*.<sup>53</sup> A letter from Caelius Rufus on the Ides of March, 49, may indicate that confidence was lacking in Pompey, as Caelius calls him a "hominem ineptiorem," ("a rather inept human being").<sup>54</sup> Caelius is using provocative language to upset Cicero. In another letter to M. Caelius, dated the Nones of May, 49, Cicero implies that Caesar is the rising sun, while Pompey is a sun that is setting or has already set

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<sup>50</sup> *ad Fam.* VIII.14.2-3.

<sup>51</sup> *ad Fam.* XVI.11.2.

<sup>52</sup> *ad Fam.* XVI.12.3.

<sup>53</sup> *ad Fam.* XVI.12.1.

<sup>54</sup> *ad Fam.* VIII.15.1.

ut existimares aut me tam improvidum qui ab excitata fortuna ad inclinatam et prope iacentem desciscerem, aut tam inconstantem, ut conlectam gratiam florentissimi hominis effunderem a meque ipse deficerem et, quod initio semperque fugi, civili bello interessem.

...so that you would think me either so thoughtless as to withdraw from the awakened fortune for the fortune that is in decline and nearly is dead; or so inconsistent as to throw out the acquired favor of a singularly flourishing person, to forsake myself, and to participate in a civil war, that I have avoided continually from the beginning.<sup>55</sup>

Cicero could see his options logically and know that Caesar, in the long run, was a better choice for victory, but also knew this choice to be less morally sound. In August of 47, after Caesar had defeated Pompey and was mopping up throughout the Mediterranean, Cicero writes to Cassius, saying of the republic, “ego autem ex interitu eius nullam spem scilicet mihi proponebam, ex reliqui<i>s magnam.” (“But for my part I imagined of course no hope from its [the republic’s] ruin but from its remains great hope.”)<sup>56</sup> By 47, though skeptical, Cicero can perhaps see some kind of benefit for the fall of the republic, and by June of 46 Cicero seems to be in Caesar’s camp, writing to Varro:

non enim est idem ferre si quid ferendum est et probare si quid non probandum est. Etsi <ne> quid non probem quidem iam scio, praeter initia rerum ; nam haec in voluntate fuerunt. Vidi enim (nam tu aberas) nostros amicos cupere bellum, hunc autem non tam cupere quam non timere.<sup>57</sup>

For it is not the same to endure what must be endured and to approve what must not be approved. Yet now I don’t even know what I should not approve, except the beginnings of the events [the civil war]; for these things were voluntary. For I saw (since you were away) that our friends desired war, but this fellow did not so much desire war as not fear it.

In this letter, Cicero goes on to express disappointment in his own camp. The republicans were just as prone to violence and excess as Caesar’s side. This sentiment explains what he means by

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<sup>55</sup> *ad Fam.* II.16.1.

<sup>56</sup> *ad Fam.* XV.15.1.

<sup>57</sup> *ad Fam.* IX.6.2.

implying that his friends were too eager for war, while Caesar was ready for war if it came.

Shackleton Bailey goes even further, saying that Caesar could not even be held solely responsible for the war and that he had no real choice in the following events.<sup>58</sup>

In the same letter to Varro, Cicero goes on to say that he only supported the republicans for the cause and not for Pompey as leader, saying, “nunc vero, si essent nostri potiti, valde intemperantes fuissent.” (“But now if our side had got control, they would have been very unrestrained.”)<sup>59</sup> He sees the outcome with Pompey as leader negatively as well. But by mid-July a letter to Papirius Paetus shows a great deal of doubt and resentment in Cicero’s mind, calling Caesar “omnis potestas” (“all powerful”). This remark, coupled with Cicero’s observation that Caesar is becoming more powerful, indicates that if Cicero wants to speak out against Caesar in any way, he will have to be subtle. He mentions how many wise men lived under tyrants in Athens and Syracuse and maintained their freedom, and therefore Cicero should be able to as well.<sup>60</sup> He is aware of how volatile the future could be and he is aware that he must be careful to stay in Caesar’s good graces. Cicero’s relationship with Caesar was undoubtedly politically motivated. Caesar was the “All Powerful,” and Cicero would have been foolish not to attempt to curry favor with him.

Until this point, Cicero had been warily optimistic of Caesar’s rule. In mid-October of 46, Cicero indicates an important point, namely the clemency that Caesar showed to Marcellus, a man who had opposed Caesar for years.<sup>61</sup> Cicero says to Servius Sulpicius Rufus, “ita mihi

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<sup>58</sup> Shackleton Bailey (1977), 317. Caesar may not have wanted war, but he wanted to be recognized for his accomplishments in Gaul and to be allowed to reshape Rome like a king. Had the senate handed over sufficient power to him to reshape the empire without a fight, war might have been avoided. The level of deference he would have required hardly makes him a lover of peace.

<sup>59</sup> *ad Fam.* IX.6.3, 2.

<sup>60</sup> *ad Fam.* IX.16.3,6.

<sup>61</sup> Shackleton Bailey (1977), 362, suggests that Caesar’s forgiveness of Marcellus was necessary; for Caesar to have refused the senate’s first request would have sent an ominous message. See the next chapter for more on Marcellus and Cicero’s speech *pro Marcello*

pulcher hic dies visus est ut speciem aliquam viderer videre quasi reviviscentis rei publicae” (“This day seemed so beautiful to me that I seemed to see some semblance of a virtually reviving republic.”)<sup>62</sup> From this point, Cicero accepts the possibility of postponing his literary pursuits for a partial return to politics, as he believed that Caesar might establish a constitutional government. Yet this letter is full of contradictory statements. Early in the letter he says, “...tu quid doleat scribere audes, nos ne id quidem tuto possumus” (“you dare to write what is painful, we [I] indeed cannot do even that with safety”). He lives in an environment where they are too afraid to speak freely, yet Cicero ends this thought saying, “nec id victoris vitio, quo nihil moderatius, sed ipsius victoriae” (“Nor is it the fault of the victor, than whom nothing could be more than moderate, but of the victory itself”). This is a strange juxtaposition. Cicero is not safe to write his true sentiments (which, ironically, he writes) but follows this by absolving Caesar. It is certainly possible that Cicero included the latter section in case the letter was intercepted, but if he thought the letter would be disseminated, it is doubtful that he would have included his exact fear. Similarly, Cicero says that they must do only what they believe Caesar wants (“nihil ut faciamus nisi quod maxime Caesar velle videatur” “That we do nothing except what in particular Caesar seems to want”), then later says that Caesar is the best thing about the situation in Rome (“...nihil melius ipso est...” “nothing is better than the man himself”).<sup>63</sup> Exactly what Cicero is trying to express is difficult to discover.<sup>64</sup>

This does not mean that Cicero is entirely happy. Writing to P. Figulus in *ad Fam* IV.13, dated around August of 46, Cicero reveals that alongside Rome’s political turmoil, he is

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<sup>62</sup> *ad Fam.* IV.4.3.

<sup>63</sup> *ad Fam.* IV.4.2. There is another interpretation of this line. This is a line that admits of a wonderful ambiguity and Cicero clearly exploits its ironic possibilities. “Nothing in the city is any better than our situation with Caesar.” I.e., everything in Rome is colored by our living under tyranny. There are no bright spots.

<sup>64</sup> For more of these sentiments see *ad Fam.* XIII.68.2. Writing to Servilius Isauricus, Cicero expresses the same opinions above, and also places them next to one another, giving credence to the idea that Cicero was simply trying to throw Caesar off in case a letter was reported to him.

experiencing a kind of survivor's guilt despite--or perhaps because of--Caesar's willingness to help him.

tamen nihil iis conficior curis ut ipsum quod maneam in vita peccare me existimin. careo enim cum familiarissimis multis, quos aut mors eripuit nobis aut distraxit fuga, tum omnibus amicis quorum benevolentiam nobis conciliarat per me quondam te socio defensa res publica, versorque in eorum naufragiis et bonorum direptionibus<sup>65</sup> nec audio solum, quod ipsum esset miserum, sed etiam id ipsum video, quo nihil est acerbius, eorum fortunas dissipari quibus nos olim adiutoribus illud incendium exstinximus; et in qua urbe modo gratia, auctoritate, gloria floruimus in ea nunc his quidem omnibus caremus.<sup>66</sup>

Nevertheless I am in no way consumed by those cares so that I think I myself am doing wrong because I remain alive. For I am deprived both of many intimates, whom either death has snatched from me or flight has pulled to different places, and of all the friends whose good will the defense of the republic had once united to our cause through me with you as my associate. I live amid their shipwrecked lives and stolen goods. I not only hear, which would be miserable in itself, but I also see the very fact (than which nothing is more bitter) that the fortunes are being scattered of those men with whose help in times past we put out that well known fire: in that city, in which I just recently flourished in esteem, influence, and glory, I now am deprived in fact of all these things.

Cicero is aware that he was exceedingly fortunate and likely (though perhaps begrudgingly) was thankful to Caesar, and yet he felt some kind of pull from his previous allies.

By the end of 46 however, Cicero's affection, if that's what it was, for Caesar was beginning to fade; he writes to A. Torquatus "tamen mihi dubium non est quin hoc tempore bono viro Romae esse miserrimum sit." ("Yet I have no doubt that at this time it is most wretched for a good man ["bono viro"] to be at Rome.")<sup>67</sup> Rome was no longer the place for Cicero, a *bonus vir*, to be. He had realized that Caesar was not going to institute a republic and wanted no part of Rome. Previously, in October, 46, though there was no hope of reestablishing a republican

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<sup>65</sup> Shackleton Bailey (1977), 391, affirms that these losses were confiscations.

<sup>66</sup> *ad Fam* IV.13.2.

<sup>67</sup> *ad Fam*.VI.1.1.

constitution, Cicero was confident in his own safety, though not the safety of Rome.<sup>68</sup> By August of 45 Cicero has completely abandoned any support for Caesar, referring to his "royal" shows ("munerum regiorum") and warning other people, in this case D. Brutus and Cassius, to stay away from Rome.<sup>69</sup> In a letter written to Cassius on the Nones of May, 44, only a few weeks after Caesar's assassination, Cicero states, "manabat enim illud malum urbanum et ita corroboratur cottidie ut ego quidem et urbi et otio diffiderem urbano." ("For that well known evil in the city used to trickle and is now getting so strong each day that I indeed despaired both for the city and for peace in the city.")<sup>70</sup> In these letters, Caesar goes from a hawk, to a dove, to a cancer spreading throughout Rome and therefore throughout the empire.

### ***ad Atticum***

Though not as difficult as the letters in *ad Quintum fratrem*, those in *ad Familiares* do present their own problems. Cicero sent these letters to a number of people with varying levels of trust—he had no way to know whether his letters would remain confidential, so he had to operate coyly and carefully. Whether they would be intercepted is another matter entirely. With *ad Atticum*, this guardedness is less of a problem. Cicero and Atticus had been close friends for decades by the time the civil war occurred, so the problems of privacy and sincerity in *ad Familiares* and *ad Quintum fratrem* are mostly absent from this collection of letters. The two wrote to one another often, sometimes daily, and their discourse runs from 68 to late 44, providing an ongoing narrative of the events of Rome for over two decades. While Cicero does employ some basic tools to remain enigmatic (using Greek phrases, thinly veiled nicknames, and so on), the *epistulae ad Atticum* reveals the most candid portrayal of Cicero. For instance,

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<sup>68</sup> *ad Fam.* VI.6.3.

<sup>69</sup> *ad Fam.* VI.19.2 ("munerum regiorum"), VII.30.1 ("manabat enim.").

<sup>70</sup> *ad Fam.* XII.1.1.

Cicero was distraught when his daughter Tullia died, but his depression reveals itself more in *ad Atticum* than in any other letters. Thus, greater weight accrues to his opinions and words in these letters than any others.

The formal *amicitia* that existed between Caesar and Cicero while the former was in Gaul has already been discussed, and Cicero's letters to Atticus contain evidence of the same, so I will examine this collection beginning at the turbulent time immediately prior to the civil war. In his letter to Atticus of October 16, 50, Cicero expresses his dilemma regarding which party to support in an electoral conflict. The conflict is not the war itself, but whether to allow Caesar to run for consul *in absentia* and keep his legions in Gaul, and it appears merely as a simple senatorial debate. As Cicero notes, both Pompey and Caesar believed him to be on their side, and even to Atticus Cicero gives little indication as to whom he would support. The only hint is when he discusses what would happen if the dispute came to war: "video cum altero vinci satius esse quam cum altero vincere." ("I see it is preferable to be conquered along with the one than to win with the other.")<sup>71</sup> Cicero preferred a Pompeian victory. Cicero managed to avoid this debate in the senate by waiting outside the gates of Rome for his own triumph that would never come. While he was certainly disappointed by his inability to celebrate a triumph, he was apparently grateful to miss the senate debate.

In the ensuing months, Cicero complained about the faults of both Pompey and Caesar, saying for instance that Caesar had not treated him kindly enough, or blaming Pompey for giving Caesar additional legions and therefore making him stronger.<sup>72</sup> As the letters continue, it is nearly impossible to identify a side that Cicero was convinced was absolutely the correct one. One letter, written in Athens in October, 50, laments that if the conflict comes to war, whoever

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<sup>71</sup> *ad Att.* VII.1.4.

<sup>72</sup> *ad Att.* VII.3.3, VII.6.2.

won would turn the republic into a tyranny.<sup>73</sup> Cicero pleaded for peace because peace was the best choice, though, according to him, no one had been listening to his entreaties.<sup>74</sup> He remained indecisive even after Caesar had crossed the Rubicon and Pompey had abandoned Rome and fled to southern Italy. He tells Atticus in a letter from February 8, 49, that Caesar continued to ask Cicero to maintain his neutrality and expressed his satisfaction with what Cicero had been doing. Cicero was at somewhat of a loss because he had been excluded from so much planning on the republican side.<sup>75</sup>

Cicero remained neutral for a number of months, partially because he was torn by his loyalty to Pompey and his *amicitia* with Caesar. In mid-February of 49, Cicero wrote rather indignantly that “qui, cum omnes Caesarem metuebamus, ipse eum diligebat; postquam ipse metuere coepit, putat omnis hostis illi esse oportere” (“This man himself [Pompey] loved him when we all feared Caesar; after he himself began to be afraid, he deems it necessary for all of us to be public enemies [“hostes”] to that man.”)<sup>76</sup> Here Cicero complains about the lack of planning on Pompey’s side and about Pompey seeking a safe haven. Yet on February 17 of 49 Cicero joined Pompey, though he explains to Atticus that he is joining him only to work towards peace, not to help in war.<sup>77</sup> Cicero finishes his letter asking “...si de bello, quid ego?” (“...if war, what will I do?”) which Shackleton Bailey understands to mean that if there is a war, Cicero does not believe that he belongs in the military camp.<sup>78</sup> As time passes, Cicero becomes decidedly more negative towards Caesar. He bemoaned Caesar’s popularity because of his clemency while the masses hated Pompey even though, according to Cicero, he was fighting the

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<sup>73</sup> *ad Att.* VII.5.4.

<sup>74</sup> *ad Att.* VII.12.3.

<sup>75</sup> *ad Att.* VII.21.3.

<sup>76</sup> *ad Att.* VIII.1.4.

<sup>77</sup> *ad Att.* VIII.2.4.

<sup>78</sup> Shackleton Bailey, (1965), 328.

just cause.<sup>79</sup> Cicero recognized the brilliance of Caesar’s strategy, though. On March 1, 49, Cicero wrote a letter in which he again relates his sentiments, describing Caesar in these words, “sed videsne in quem hominem inciderit res publica? quam acutum, quam vigilantem, quam paratum?” (“But do you see to what kind of man the republic has fallen? How sharp, how vigilant, how prepared?”)<sup>80</sup> Cicero was not blinded by hatred or anger. He acknowledged Caesar’s genius at gaining favor, and Pompey’s fumbling of the entire civil war. Even more harshly, he said of Pompey on March 4, 49, “quem ego hominem ἀπολιτικώτατον omnium iam ante cognoram, nunc vero etiam άστρατηγητότατον. non me igitur is ducit sed sermo hominum qui ad me <a> Philotimo scribitur; is enim me ab optimatibus ait conscindi.” (“This man I long ago had recognized as ‘most unpolitical’ of all, but now I recognize him also as most ‘ungeneral-like’. Therefore he does not lead me, but the talk of people that is described to me by Philotimus does lead me. For he says that I am being cut to pieces by the optimates.”)<sup>81</sup> At this point his concern is not for Pompey, not even for the republican cause, but for his own reputation among his peers.

Throughout Cicero’s inner debate on whether to join with Pompey or to stay in Rome, Cicero and Caesar were writing one another letters, though the tone was no doubt less friendly than the letters we examined in *ad Quintum fratrem*.<sup>82</sup> Eventually, the two men met at Cicero’s villa in Formiae on March 28, 49. The letter of that date opens with Cicero crowing that he spoke respectfully but honestly, and that Caesar was probably not pleased with him. Cicero details the conversation:

damnari se nostro iudicio, tardiores fore reliquos, si nos non venerimus, dicere. ego dissimilem illorum esse causam. Cum multa, 'veni igitur et age de pace.'

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<sup>79</sup> *ad Att.* VIII.9a.1.

<sup>80</sup> *ad Att.* VIII.13.2.

<sup>81</sup> *ad Att.* VIII.16.1

<sup>82</sup> Cicero included Caesar’s letter in *ad Att.* IX.16, and there is mention of other letters throughout.

'meone 'inquam 'arbitratu?' 'an tibi' inquit 'ego praescribam?' 'sic' inquam 'agam, senatui non placere in Hispanias iri nec exercitus in Graeciam transportari, multaque , inquam 'de Gnaeo deplorabo.' tum ille, 'ego vero ista dici nolo.' 'ita putabam , inquam; 'sed ego eo nolo adesse quod aut sic mihi dicendum est multaque quae nullo modo possem silere si adessem aut non veniendum.' summa fuit, ut ille quasi exitum quaerens, 'ut deliberarem.' non fuit negandum. ita discessimus.<sup>83</sup>

If we do not come, he said that he was damned by my decision, that the others would be slower [in joining him]. I said the cause was different for those men. After much talk he said ‘Then come and talk about peace.’ I replied ‘On my own terms?’ ‘Would I prescribe to you?’ he asked. I said, “Then I will talk this way: that it does not please the senate for you to go to Spain, nor for the armies to be transported to Greece; and I will lament many things regarding Gnaeus.’ Then he replied ‘I really do not want these ideas of yours to be said.’ ‘I suspected that.’ I said. ‘But I do not want to be there, for the reason that I either must say them and many things which I can in no way keep silent about if I were there, or else I must not come.’ The chief point was that he asked as a virtual escape ‘That I consider it’. I did not have to refuse. So we parted.

A number of points can be discerned from this letter. First, Cicero was certainly not afraid of Caesar. Though he was polite and respectful, he was also honest and true to his principles (this kind of political behavior is the basis of the institution of *amicitia*). Second, for Cicero to tell a man as powerful as Caesar that he would openly defy him in the senate, there must be a level of mutual respect built into that *amicitia*. Caesar still respected Cicero, and *vice versa*, as indicated by their meeting in person and Cicero’s speaking his mind. Third, Cicero was concerned about upsetting Caesar in the senate. Cicero spoke with Caesar in private with no repercussions, but knew that if he said the same thing in the senate, Caesar would probably take retribution. This letter is invaluable. It shows that even at this tumultuous time, there was still some kind of formal *amicitia* between the two, enough so that Cicero felt safe in refusing Caesar.

That interview was a dividing line in Cicero and Caesar’s *amicitia*. Only a few weeks later, Cicero recognized Caesar as “tyrannus” and later stated that he was only being forgiving to

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<sup>83</sup> *ad Att.* IX.18

win favor with the people.<sup>84</sup> Despite his anger with Caesar, Cicero still saw a victory by Pompey to be similar to a victory by Sulla, rife with proscriptions and tyrannical rule, but as a letter written May 2, 49, predicted, this outcome would be better than what would occur if Caesar were to win: “nam caedem video si vicerit et impetum in privatorum pecunias et exsulorum reditum et tabulas novas et turpissimorum honores et regnum non modo Romano homini sed ne Persae quidem cuiquam tolerabile” (“For I see gore if he wins, and an attack on private money and the return of the exiles, and new laws, and offices for the most shameful, and a monarchy bearable neither for a Roman nor even for any Persian.”)<sup>85</sup> As time passed, communication between Caesar and Cicero continued to deteriorate. Caelius, a supporter of Caesar and friend to Cicero, warned Cicero on April 16, 49 that if he did not stay neutral, Caesar’s policy of clemency would not hold for him, and that he would endanger his life.<sup>86</sup> In a conversation that Cicero mentions in a letter dated May 19, 49, Balbus, another strong supporter of Caesar, told Atticus that Caesar was angry with Cicero (at the time Cicero was traveling to Greece to join Pompey’s camp).<sup>87</sup> This letter is Cicero’s last to Atticus regarding Caesar or the war until he returned to Rome after Pharsalus. The few intermediary letters all say that the courier delivering the letter will tell Atticus about the state of the army. There is only silence on Caesar until Cicero returns to Brundisium on November 4, 48.

The divide between Cicero and Caesar before Pharsalus was apparently bridged by the time that Cicero returned to Italy (that he was allowed to return to Italy is proof). Cicero wrote to Atticus that Balbus and Oppius had promised to support Cicero in his efforts to return to Rome, and that Caesar would oblige, saying that “Caesari non modo de conservanda sed etiam

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<sup>84</sup> *ad Att.* X.4.2,8.

<sup>85</sup> *ad Att.* X.7.1; *ad Att.* X.8.2. Shackleton Bailey (1965), 408, extrapolates from this that Cicero believes it would be better to leave Italy now that Caesar is unsure of his victory in Spain than to remain.

<sup>86</sup> *ad Att.* X.9a.1.

<sup>87</sup> *ad Att.* X.18.2.

de augenda mea dignitate curae fore.” (“Caesar’s concern will be not only about maintaining my reputation (*dignitas*), but also about increasing it.”)<sup>88</sup> The question here is Caesar’s motivation. Caesar’s decision reflected his general policy of *clementia*, but it also provided a basis on which to build their *amicitia*. Cicero was an optimate and a highly respected member of the senate where he was known for his uprightness and commitment to justice, which would help validate Caesar if Cicero supported him. Caesar’s eagerness to grant Cicero clemency owed something to their previous working relationship under *amicitia*. With the civil war virtually over (Caesar could not have known about the revolts in Spain), the political matters that separated the two were no longer relevant in the same way they had been, and the time was right to restore some semblance of their formal *amicitia*, even if Cicero was opposed to Caesar’s new government. Cicero’s letters reveal only his hopes for Caesar’s *clementia*. In fact, the next few years of letters give very little information regarding Caesar or his policies. A letter from August 15, 47 shows Cicero doubting Caesar’s commitment to clemency, and notes that just as he can grant *clementia*, he can take it away as well.<sup>89</sup>

From 47 to 45, there is a distinct lack of letters relating to Caesar, and those that do mention him are particularly blasé and do not provide any insight into their *amicitia*. A letter written on September 1, 47 tells of Caesar’s plan to visit Cicero, but Cicero offers no opinion and only asks Atticus how he should handle the situation.<sup>90</sup> Another discusses how best Cicero should settle his outstanding debt to Caesar.<sup>91</sup> Neither of these letters expresses any opinions about Caesar. They simply indicate that he exists and has dealings with Cicero (though his desire to get out of debt to Caesar is interesting to note). There are perhaps several reasons for

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<sup>88</sup> *ad Att.* XI.6.3.

<sup>89</sup> *ad Att.* XI.20.1.

<sup>90</sup> *ad Att.* XI.22.2.

<sup>91</sup> *ad Att.* XII.3.2.

this lapse. The most obvious explanation is that Cicero's liberty depended upon his silence on the subject of Caesar. Caesar did not spare him unconditionally, but rather with the understanding that if his taking up arms at Pharsalus was to be spared, the price was an absence of criticism. Another explanation is that Cicero did not want to write down anything that would be offensive to Caesar in case it was intercepted or reported. While there was a drought of letters about Caesar from 47 onwards, Cicero begins criticizing Caesar in the spring of 45. There is the unlikely possibility that Cicero found nothing to complain about or praise in this period. Cicero, known for his witticisms, would surely have found *something* to complain about or praise. The topic of Caesar may have been a sensitive issue between Cicero and Atticus. As we will see in the *pro Marcello* and *pro Ligario*, in 46 Cicero enthused over Caesar's potential to restore the republic. But like Cicero during the war, Atticus was a Pompeian and may have avoided talk of Caesar for his own political reasons, which might have created tension between the two as Cicero tried to steer his own political course. I find this a compelling and interesting point of view, though there is no evidence to refute or support it.

By May of 45 Cicero returned to abusing Caesar, though this was not his primary purpose for writing. In February of that year Cicero's daughter Tullia had died and her passing devastated her father. Many of his letters to Atticus in 45 deal with Tullia's death. In March of the same year Cicero reveals his sense of devastation about both his daughter's death and the republic, "quid ipsa domo mihi opus est carenti foro? occidimus, occidimus, Attice, iam pridem nos quidem, sed nunc fatemur, postea quam unum quo tenebamur amisimus. itaque solitudines sequor."<sup>92</sup> ("What need have I of my very house, if I lose the forum? I am ruined, I am ruined, Atticus, I have long been ruined in fact but now I admit it after I have lost the one thing by which

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<sup>92</sup> *ad Att.* XII.23.1

I was held together. And so I pursue isolation.”)<sup>93</sup> He is distraught because of the death of his daughter, but perhaps for the death of the republic as well, so he avoids the forum and politics in general, as he sees no reason to continue going on.<sup>94</sup> In another letter he further laments the state of the government: “fuit meum<sup>95</sup> quidem iam pridem rem publicam lugere, quod faciebam, sed mitius; erat enim ubi acquiescerem, nunc plane non ego victum nec vitam illam colere possum, nec in ea re quid <aliis> videatur mihi puto curandum; mea mihi conscientia pluris est quam omnium sermo.”<sup>96</sup> (“Indeed it has long been my role to grieve for the state, which I was doing, but rather mildly. For it was where I might find comfort. Now I clearly cannot cultivate either nourishment or life nor do I think I should take care of what seems good in that arena; my conscience is of more value to me than the gossip of all.”) The death of Tullia aggravated Cicero and at the same time he could not tolerate supporting a state which he could not morally abide. This appears to be the moment when Cicero fully accepts that Caesar is beyond reach and that there is no chance for anyone to revive the republic. Cicero is experiencing his darkest period here, and that he was hopelessly despondent over the state should be no surprise. There is, however, an important distinction to recognize. Though Cicero is no longer willing to work with Caesar politically, they still seem to have some degree of *amicitia*, though perhaps no more than ordinary courtesy. For instance, in August of 45 Caesar sent Cicero a letter discussing and praising many aspects of Cicero’s *Cato*.<sup>97</sup> Similarly, Cicero read Caesar’s *Anti-Cato* and praised it himself.<sup>98</sup> Outside of politics, they could write on opposite sides of the same topic and be able

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<sup>93</sup> Shackleton Bailey (1965), 319, prefers “lonely places” to isolation. This is a subtle difference; isolation is a mental state, lonely places physically exist and are less apt to change.

<sup>94</sup> *ad Att.* XII.21.5.

<sup>95</sup> Shackleton Bailey translates this as “my duty” as opposed to my own translation of “my role.” He implies then that Cicero no longer believes it is his duty to protect and work for the state.

<sup>96</sup> *ad Att.* XII.28.2.

<sup>97</sup> *ad Att.* XIII.46.2.

<sup>98</sup> I reject the idea that he had to praise it to Caesar because he did not want to anger him. He could have said nothing at all, which seems to be Cicero’s preferred option throughout the letters.

to congratulate one another on well-written work.

While Cicero may have spoken well of Caesar's literary work, he did not approve of Caesar's government. There is a saga in Cicero's letters of 45 regarding a certain "letter of advice" (συμβουλευτικόν) that seems to be a letter in which Cicero would have advised Caesar on political affairs.<sup>99</sup> Cicero first mentions this letter on May 9, 45. The contents of the proposed letter of advice are still a mystery, as Cicero never sent it to Caesar or talked about it explicitly, nor were drafts published in these collections. But a good deal can be pieced together from information surrounding it, which then tells us more about Caesar and Cicero's *amicitia*. In this letter Cicero mentions that he is using Aristotle's and Theopompus' letters to Alexander but finds them useless because they were meant to praise Alexander.<sup>100</sup> It can be inferred then, that his advice to Caesar was meant to be useful but not adulatory. On May 20 both Atticus and Cicero himself think he should send the letter as a good citizen, but that first Balbus and Oppius should read it to approve of it, since they are close to Caesar and Atticus and could act as intermediaries.<sup>101</sup> The letter, then, must be phrased correctly so as not to offend or upset Caesar. On May 25 Cicero writes that he received the advice from Balbus and Oppius and that since they offered so many changes Cicero decided not to send it at all: "ubi enim ἐπίτευγμα magnum nullum fieri possit, ἀπότητευγμα vel non magnum molestum futurum sit."<sup>102</sup> ("In fact, when no great 'victory' can be done, then 'defeat' will be no great trouble.") Finally, on May 28th, Cicero discusses Caesar's plan to go to Parthia when things are resolved in Rome, as Cicero said he would have suggested to Caesar.<sup>103</sup> Cicero would have offered political advice to Caesar but

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<sup>99</sup> For all the letters see *ad Att.* XII.40.2 (May 9), XIII.26.2 (May 14), XII.51.2 (May 20), XII.52.2 (May 21), XIII.2 (May 24), XIII.27 (May 25), XIII.31.2 (May 28).

<sup>100</sup> *ad Att.* XII.40.2.

<sup>101</sup> *ad Att.* XII.51.2.

<sup>102</sup> *ad Att.* XIII.27.1.

<sup>103</sup> *ad Att.* XIII.31.2.

did not want to appear disloyal or raise Caesar's ire. He would have advised Caesar to first resolve the problems in Rome. The letter of advice was probably dangerous though Cicero believed he might get away with it because of their *amicitia*. Indeed, on May 28, 45 Cicero also remarks that Caesar could do whatever he wanted about Rome and Parthia and still claim he was acting on Cicero's advice. This hyperbole exaggerates of course, but another letter may also suggest that Cicero still has a public role to play.<sup>104</sup> Simultaneously, disparaging remarks about Caesar begin to fill the letters, saying that he is too big for Rome, or that Brutus told him Caesar had joined the honest men.<sup>105</sup>

Cicero's conflicted *amicitia* reveals itself in a letter dated December 19, 45. Caesar and two thousand soldiers stopped at Cicero's house for dinner. This would be a terrible imposition to put on anyone, but Cicero only had pleasant things to say about the event. Cicero opens the letter ironically, saying, "O hospitem mihi tam gravem ἀμεταμέλητον! fuit enim periucunde!" ("A guest so burdensome was 'unregrettable' for me! For it was quite delightful!") Describing the meal and the events thereafter, Cicero said, "homines visi sumus. hospes tamen non is quoi diceres, 'amabo te, eodem ad me cum revertere.' semel satis est. σπουδαῖον in sermone φιλόλογα multa. Delectatus est et libenter fuit." ("We appeared as real gentlemen. Nevertheless my guest is not the type of person to whom you would say 'please, come to me again' Once is enough. In our conversation there was 'nothing serious' but much 'that was literary.' He was delighted and it was pleasing.")<sup>106</sup> This letter reveals that while Cicero could bear Caesar's superficial company, he still did not want to be near him. Furthermore, it shows that the two could still meet and be congenial, as long as the conversation did not veer towards politics, as both parties appear to have been aware.

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<sup>104</sup> See *ad Att.* XIII.9.2.

<sup>105</sup> *ad Att.* XIII.35-36.1, XIII.40.1.

<sup>106</sup> *ad Att.* XIII.52.2.

This was the last letter that Cicero wrote regarding Caesar while the dictator was alive. As a whole, Cicero's letters reveal a man whose formal *amicitia* was precarious because of the general political environment. Cicero remained politically embittered and angry towards him in the remaining years, but Cicero's letters show that while he rejected Caesar's politics he could still discuss literary matters within the bounds of civility. After Caesar's assassination, Cicero quoted Gaius Mattius to Atticus on April 7: "nihil perditius; explicari rem non posse. 'etenim si ille tali ingenio exitum non reperiebat, quis nunc reperiet?' quid quaeris?' perisse omnia aiebat (quod haud scio an ita sit; verum ille gaudens)" ('Nothing more depraved; [he said] the problem cannot be untangled. 'Indeed if with such ability that man [Caesar] could not discover a way out, who will find one now? What are you looking for?' He said all [hopes] have perished (I really don't know whether this could be so; but he was rejoicing')<sup>107</sup> Cicero recognized Caesar's abilities, and seems to have understood that even with Caesar gone, republican Rome would never recover. Cicero could still manage to socialize with the man, but he despised Caesar's politics. The veneer of *amicitia* continued to work even when the underlying reason for it was gone

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<sup>107</sup> *ad Att.*XIV.1.1.

## Chapter 2: Cicero's Caesarian Speeches

### Cicero's Rhetorical Background

The previous chapter analyzed Cicero's private letters in the hope of discerning Cicero's attitude regarding Caesar. Without probing his personal letters more in depth and in different ways, it would be impossible to know his deeper private thoughts. I laid a foundation for understanding the evolution of Cicero's attitudes towards Caesar based on his letters which reveal the vicissitudes of his relationship with Caesar. But his public works will show how Cicero acted in front of large audiences to appease Caesar. After Pharsalus in 48 and Cicero's subsequent return to Rome, the orator thought himself to be retired from politics. He retreated into his philosophical discourses and remained absent from the forum. With Caesar as dictator, there was very little room for political debate. Yet in 46, only two years after Caesar's victory over Pompey, Cicero returned to the stage in which he had gained his great fame and political notoriety. Cicero would deliver three speeches, *pro Marcello*, *pro Ligario*, and *pro Rege Deiotaro*, all of which supported the end of exile for the three men that he defended, all of whom fought against Caesar in some way in the past. While topically the speeches are similar, each speech possesses its own subtle nuances that shed a great deal of light on Cicero's attitude toward Caesar at the time. These are the last public speeches (*pro Rege* was given in Caesar's home in a private audience, so whether it was truly public is debatable) that Cicero gives during Caesar's rule until Caesar's death in 44 when he delivered the *Philippica* against Marcus Antonius. It is important to keep in mind when analyzing these three speeches that Caesar ruled for another two years, and it is possible for Cicero to have altered his opinion of the man in this period, especially as it became more certain that Caesar had no intention of restoring a republic

to Rome.

In Rome speaking before a crowd was not simply a job, it was an art. Modern politicians often blunder through their speeches or improvise their thoughts in attempts to appear clever and witty. To Romans this approach to public speaking would be both foolhardy and amateurish. The Romans deemed public speaking to be one of the most important skills a man could possess, and the ability of the orator could significantly affect his political career. This was true for any would-be politician at the time; even Caesar, who was deemed as second in oratory only to Cicero, began his career in the forum arguing cases, along with almost every other politician. But for *novi homines* like Cicero, who had little taste for military service, his ability to speak in the forum was his way of advancing. Before beginning the analysis of Cicero's Caesarian speeches then, it is important to understand the role that rhetoric played both in Cicero's education, and in his own life, and that political speeches in Rome had a far greater significance than in the modern era. Fortunately Cicero left a good deal of information regarding oratory and rhetoric in Roman society.

We know little about Cicero's childhood and upbringing, and what we do know comes from Cicero's own letters and the biography of Plutarch. According to Cicero, he was raised in an environment of intellectuals who emphasized the importance of education. Cicero describes his father and paternal uncle as "prudentissimi viri" ("very wise men") who frequently conversed with Lucius Crassus, one of the main speakers of Cicero's *de Oratore*.<sup>108</sup> While Cicero debated with himself whether a great orator came from talent or training, he apparently displayed a talent for oratory when he was just a child. Plutarch tells us very little of the education of Cicero but shows that from his boyhood he was recognized as a prodigy, "διὰ εὐφυΐαν ἐκλάμψας καὶ λαβῶν ὄνομα καὶ δόξαν ἐν τοῖς παισίν" ("shining because of his natural talent and getting a

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<sup>108</sup> *de Orat.* 2.2.

name and reputation among the boys...”).<sup>109</sup> While this description could very well be true, there may be some hyperbole to Plutarch’s quotation, as it follows a passage in which Plutarch describes Cicero’s birth as painless, and reports a fortune teller who said that Cicero would perform great acts for Rome. Nevertheless, what we do know of Cicero’s education points to his natural ability and the encouragement of his father for Cicero to train in the art of oratory in which he clearly excelled.

As Rome had no formal education system, the training of an orator varied from pupil to pupil. This is not to say that there were no similarities. For the most part, the type of education that Cicero received was reserved for the elite members of society who could afford not to have their sons performing physical labor, probably because they owned slaves. Not all slaves were used for physical labor however; many Romans tasked some slaves to teach the children of wealthy Romans the Greek language and Greek rhetorical techniques, since many of the slaves had come from Greek speaking areas.<sup>110</sup> By the end of the Macedonian wars in the second century BC and in large part because of the Scipionic circle, the Romans were familiar with the Greek lifestyle and had already begun importing Greek language, rhetoric, and philosophy. By the time that Cicero was educated in the early first century BC, Latin rhetorical training was nascent and most serious orators would have learned by imitation in the forum, or if studying it as a discipline, through Greek models; Suetonius relates how Cicero was forbidden to attend a school teaching rhetoric in Latin, even though the popularity of these schools was increasing.<sup>111</sup> Besides these factors, any other commonalities in the education of students in Rome are obscure.

Fortunately Cicero was never shy in discussing himself, and because of that scholars know more about his education than that of other Romans at the time. Cicero was skilled in his

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<sup>109</sup> Plut. *Cic.* 2.2

<sup>110</sup> Corbeill, (2007), 70.

<sup>111</sup> May, (2002), 51; Corbeill, (2002), 27.

knowledge of the law in Rome. In *de Legibus*, he states, “Discebamus enim pueri duodecim ut Carmen necessarium, quas iam nemo discit” (“In fact from boyhood we used to learn the twelve tables as compulsory reading, which now no one learns”).<sup>112</sup> While Cicero was versed in Roman law, there is little evidence to suggest that he or other orators frequently cited and used the law in their speeches. Cicero himself states that most orators of the time did not know the law, and that this reason, more than their speaking style or any other factor, was why orators lost their legal cases.<sup>113</sup> Additionally, as we will see from the *pro Marcello*, not all cases were strictly legal. Legal facts and technicalities were often secondary features in a speech. The orator was more likely to use impassioned pleas or discuss his own excellent character and achievements than cite the legal issues on which the case centered.<sup>114</sup> Cicero himself was even guilty of this practice. In his *pro Archia*, in which the citizenship of his client is called into question, he spends only two chapters out of thirty-two discussing the legality of Archias’s citizenship.<sup>115</sup> The rest states the extent that Archias has contributed to the education of Cicero, and extolls the merits of a poet. Yet Cicero does focus on law, and even quotes the law directly. Plutarch also briefly mentions Cicero’s education in the law, stating, ἄμα δὲ τοῖς περὶ Μούκιον ἀνδράσι συνῶν πολιτικοῖς καὶ πρωτεύουσι τῆς βουλῆς εἰς ἐμπειρίαν τῶν νόμων ὠφελεῖτο (“Spending time among politicians and leaders of the Senate around Mucius Scaevola, he benefited in gaining experience with the laws”).<sup>116</sup> Cicero had some legal training, which Plutarch felt compelled to mention in his biography.

Another facet of Cicero’s education in rhetoric was to go to the forum daily to watch the best orators of his day speak in both prosecutions and defenses. Cicero states that “reliqui qui

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<sup>112</sup> *de Leg.* 2.59.

<sup>113</sup> *de Orat.* 1.167

<sup>114</sup> May, (2002), 50.

<sup>115</sup> *Arch.* 6-7.

<sup>116</sup> Plut. *Cic.*3.1.

tum principes numerabantur in magistratibus erant cotidieque fere a nobis in contionibus audiebantur” (“I have relinquished those who at that time were esteemed first among the magistrates and were heard by me in the assemblies nearly every day”).<sup>117</sup> A large part of his education was in observation. But just as internships in the modern era create connections, his time in the forum allowed him to establish relationships with the politicians of the day through the system called *tirocinium fori*, which was a relationship between established speakers and young men in training. Anthony Corbeil explains that in this relationship the elder statesmen were able to teach through mock trials and situations and judge the youths’ ability for themselves. They would then promote their top students and help to propel their careers.<sup>118</sup> For Cicero, this mentor was Quintus Mucius Scaevola the augur. Cicero says in the opening lines of *de Amicitia* that Scaevola taught him the laws of Rome and that he rarely left Scaevola’s side.<sup>119</sup> While Cicero received an excellent education in rhetoric, he was unlikely to have access to any rhetorical tricks or techniques that his peers, such as Julius Caesar, would not know. This means that Cicero would have found it difficult to subtly insult Caesar in his speeches without him understanding.

Before moving onto the three speeches that Cicero delivered in front of Caesar it is important to examine some assumptions as to why Cicero gave these speeches. Scholars have often looked upon Cicero’s Caesarian speeches as mere attempts to earn favor with Caesar after Cicero returned to Rome following the civil war. This conclusion is logical, but it is also too simplistic. Some very simple analysis of the characteristics of Caesar and the situation cast shades of doubt upon this theory. Caesar was forgiving and conciliatory to his enemies; he

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<sup>117</sup> Cic. *Brut.* 305.

<sup>118</sup> Corbeil, 2007, 71.

<sup>119</sup> Cic., *de Amic.*, 1-3.

spared entire legions and allowed them to join him in Spain.<sup>120</sup> While he did execute some supporters of Pompey, many supporters, such as Cicero, were forgiven and invited back to Rome (what percentage of senators received this clemency is impossible to know). If Caesar valued Cicero enough to give him clemency once, Caesar was unlikely to banish him for a few comments that irked him. Caesar recalled Cicero for his usefulness. Cicero could lend an air of credibility to Caesar's rule and, if necessary, Cicero may have been willing to speak for Caesar. It was important for Caesar to stay on good terms with Cicero just as Cicero probably wanted Caesar to see him in a positive way. Caesar would have to be pushed far to damage his relationship with Cicero. Another problem was what kind of punishment Caesar would have doled out. During the Catilinarian conspiracy, Caesar pleaded with the senate not to execute the guilty, but to put them under house arrest and give them a fair trial. It is not impossible to think that this would be his opinion in the case of the Pompeians. Regardless, before continuing onto the Caesarian speeches, it is important to establish whether Cicero was one to bow to the power of a dictator. Fortunately Cicero delivered a speech during Sulla's dictatorship that answers this question.

Cicero was not afraid to challenge the desire of a dictator, which can be seen in one of Cicero's first speeches, the *pro Roscio Amerino* of 80. In this speech, Cicero defended Sextus Roscius, who was accused of patricide. Cicero detailed the facts of this case in his speech and demonstrated that Roscius was innocent. Sextus Roscius the younger was at the family's farm in Ameria when his father, Sextus Roscius the elder, was in Rome at the time when he was murdered. Sensing an opportunity for profit, Chrysogonus, a leading citizen in Rome, arranged for the elder Roscius to be placed on Sulla's proscription lists post-mortem, despite Sulla having abandoned this practice. Sulla then sold this farm to Chrysogonus for two thousand sesterces

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<sup>120</sup> Raaflaub, (2009) 177.

even though it was believed to be worth approximately six million sesterces. When Roscius had his farm taken away from him the people of Ameria were outraged. They banded together to meet with Sulla but were blocked by Chrysogonus, who promised that he would speak to Sulla for them. This did not happen. Cicero attests that at this point Chrysogonus and his followers became nervous and decided that Roscius had to be eliminated. Roscius hid, but was found, arrested, and put on trial for the capital charge of murder.

This was Cicero's first major defense and despite Chrysogonus's influence in Rome, the orator, who was young and hardly known in the forum, triumphed. For any orator a victory in these circumstances would have brought fame and notoriety, but also danger because he was challenging the dictator Sulla. Cicero believed that the only reason he was able to defend Roscius was that the other speakers, apparently all of them, were too afraid of Chrysogonus, and more notably of his friend Sulla, whom the senate had appointed to the office of dictator without a term limit. If Cicero were afraid of angering Sulla, as many propose he was of angering Caesar, this speech would logically anticipate the Caesarian speeches in Cicero's praise for Sulla.<sup>121</sup> Yet it does not. This is not to say that Cicero brazenly attacked Sulla. He says repeatedly throughout the speech, "Haec omnia, iudices, imprudente Lucius Sulla facta esse certo scio" ("I am certain, judges, that all of this happened without Lucius Sulla's knowledge").<sup>122</sup> The frequency with which Cicero expresses this sentiment shows the reader that he was attempting to exculpate Sulla from any blame and save himself from the ire of Sulla. Cicero still manages to drop thinly veiled insults and criticisms of Sulla however. Early in the speech he remarks:

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<sup>121</sup> Cicero's style could have changed over the intervening years, but I believe such a drastic change on such a similar topic is unlikely. He would have drawn on previous experience.

<sup>122</sup> *pro Rosc. Am.* VIII 21-22.

Ego si quid liberius dixero, vel occultum esse, propterea quod nondum ad rem publicam accessi, vel ignosci adolescentiae poterit; tametsi non modo ignoscendi ratio, verum etiam cognoscendi consuetudo iam de civitate sublata est.<sup>123</sup>

If I speak too freely, either it can be covered, because I have not yet entered into public business, or my youth can be forgiven; although not only the rationale of pardoning but even the habit of inquiring about the state has now been abolished.

This passage is rife with potential problems for Cicero. The opening line hints that Cicero dislikes Sulla's regime and harbors discontent in his mind; he knew that if he voiced his opinions too often and too loudly, he might have a very short career indeed. He continues to attack the regime, noting the current reduction of civil liberties in Rome. Cicero peppers his speech with dissident comments, such as saying that those proscribed "qui adversarii fuisse putabantur" ("who were deemed to have been opponents") belonged to Sulla's opposition or that Sulla was incapable of knowing and controlling all that was occurring in Rome because he was not a god (insinuating that only gods could rule everything).<sup>124</sup> The entire speech teems with Cicero's feeling that Sulla and his companions are too powerful and too confident. Cicero's victory made him an immediate star, and the influx of work apparently wore him out.<sup>125</sup> Soon afterward, he made a trip to Athens to recover his health. According to Plutarch, Cicero went to Greece to flee Sulla, though he does admit that at the time Cicero was very thin, had a weak stomach, and his voice was becoming scratchy and high-pitched.<sup>126</sup> For whatever reason he went to Greece, he was not afraid to make a dictator unhappy. If he could speak out when no one would miss him, then he very well could speak out when he was the preeminent orator in Rome.

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<sup>123</sup> *pro Rosc. Am.* I 3-4.

<sup>124</sup> *pro Rosc. Am.* VI 16, XLV 131

<sup>125</sup> Everitt, (2001), 61, 64.

<sup>126</sup> Plut. *Cic.* 3.6

### *pro Marcello*

It is now time to turn to the Caesarian speeches and attempt to extract some indication of Cicero's attitudes towards Caesar at the time. In the recent decades little work has been done on these orations as a unit, the most in depth treatment of them being Harold Gotoff's *Cicero's Caesarian Speeches*. While his rhetorical analysis is useful and laced with pertinent historical information, Gotoff's purpose was to create a stylistic commentary, not an historical analysis. While Gotoff does not state openly whether or not he believes the *pro Marcello* (given in 46) or any other speech to be sincere, he does say, "a close reading of *pro Marcello* and the other *Caesarianae* reveal Cicero adopting attitudes that are anything but fawning and abject".<sup>127</sup> There is the possibility that Cicero's views are not entirely sincere, but some scholars, such as R.R. Dyer, take this sentiment to the extreme. Dyer believes all of *pro Marcello* is a veiled attack on Caesar. According to Dyer, Cicero's discussion of Caesar's clemency is housed in the idea that the need to give clemency was all a result of Caesar's civil war and his tyranny (Pompey and other senators are apparently blameless), and that Cicero's goal was to create jealousy towards Caesar in the senate and rouse up opposition to him, perhaps even propose assassination.<sup>128</sup> While Dyer makes some interesting and accurate points, his greater argument is overly cynical and ignores the positive statements Cicero makes about Caesar in his personal letters. Furthermore, Michael Winterbottom points out that there is evidence within Cicero's letters that he was pleased with Caesar at this point, although he concedes that Cicero was likely trying to make the best of a bad situation.<sup>129</sup> There are further stylistic reasons to believe Cicero was sincere in his comments. Michael von Albrecht identifies many aspects of this speech that occur

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<sup>127</sup> Gotoff, 1993, xxxii

<sup>128</sup> Dyer,(1990), 17-30.

<sup>129</sup> Winterbottom (2002), 28, 33

within epideictic speeches and that Cicero himself identifies within his own *Orator*.<sup>130</sup> Thus, while Cicero may be sincere in his praise, it is likely that his sincerity is couched in an unhappiness about political affairs, but a recognition (and perhaps appreciation) that the situation could be even more dire.

Marcus Claudius Marcellus began the *cursus honorum* (the series of offices a Roman politician had to hold to become consul) in 65, and reached the consulship in 51. In these fourteen years, Marcellus never appeared to be a supporter of Caesar but did appear as a faithful ally of Cicero, even training as an orator under him. Marcellus's consulship came at a difficult time in Rome. Caesar's *imperium* in Gaul would end in 49, and even if Caesar were to be elected consul for 48, he would have had ten months in which he was vulnerable to prosecution by the senate. While ten months was apparently too much for Caesar, it was too little for Marcellus. In 51 he proposed that Caesar's *imperium* in Gaul end prematurely, as Caesar had already attained victory and he was no longer needed to pacify the Gallic tribes. He also opposed Caesar's plan of running for consul *in absentia*, which would have granted him immunity from prosecution if elected.<sup>131</sup> Marcellus was no supporter of Caesar.

Perhaps Marcellus's persistent contempt is why Cicero was hopeful when Caesar yielded to the wishes of the senate to grant him clemency and end Marcellus's exile from Rome; it showed that there was hope for a republic. In a letter to Servius Sulpicius Rufus, Cicero states, "Noli quaerere: ita mihi pulcher hic dies visus est, ut speciem aliquam viderer videre quasi reviviscentis rei publicae" ("Do not ask. Today seemed to me so beautiful that I seemed to be seeing some semblance of a virtually reviving republic").<sup>132</sup> He expresses no regret at his supposition and speaking in praise of Caesar, only that his speaking may have inadvertently

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<sup>130</sup> Albrecht, (2003), 164-168.

<sup>131</sup> Gotoff., xxx.

<sup>132</sup> *ad Fam.* 4.4

caused him to become a public figure once again and leave less time for his *philosophica*, yet he states that this occasion was so magnificent that he had to speak for Caesar.<sup>133</sup> Cicero describes Caesar as magnanimous and is impressed with Caesar's choices to be forgiving as a dictator; his praise was made to encourage the dictator to maintain his forgiving ways and not become the more severe tyrant that Romans feared. Still, Cicero is not completely content with the political situation in Rome. He urges Rufus to stay away from Rome because of the political situation, though he adds that "Res sunt eiusmodi, ut, si Romae sis, nihil te praeter tuos delectare possit; de reliquis, nihil melius ipso est"<sup>134</sup>... ("Matters are of such a kind that, if you should be in Rome, nothing could please you more except your own [friends and family]. Regarding the rest, nothing is better than the man [Caesar] himself").<sup>135</sup> Cicero dislikes the tyranny, but believes that Caesar may yet restore something of a republic to Rome.<sup>136</sup>

As Gotoff notes, the *pro Marcello* is named poorly.<sup>137</sup> By the time of the speech, Marcellus had already been granted clemency and no argument was needed on Cicero's part. The purpose of the speech is to praise Caesar for his clemency and, I believe, it served as a public message from Cicero for Caesar to keep up the good work and restore the republic.<sup>138</sup> Though Cicero was hyperbolizing his praise, his sentiments were likely sincere because he also mentions events that would be awkward for Caesar and the present senators, "ipsam victoriam vicisse videris, cum ea, quae illa erat adepta, victis remisisti; nam cum ipsius victoriae

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<sup>133</sup> Krostenko, (2005), 279.

<sup>134</sup> This line is ambiguous and can have two meanings, the one that I put forth, or a darker meaning that Caesar is awful and nothing is any better than his level of awfulness.

<sup>135</sup> *ad Fam.* 4.4. The problems mentioned in the previous chapter regarding letters and their interception should be kept in mind with these letters as well. Some of this praise could simply be to appease Caesar if this letter was reported to him. I doubt this conclusion because if Caesar had any suspicion, he would likely have acted on it.

<sup>136</sup> Or, if the reader is more apt to believe the other interpretation, that Caesar's forgiveness is the only positive in Rome. I am disinclined to believe this however.

<sup>137</sup> Gotoff, 1993, 11-12.

<sup>138</sup> Albrecht, (2003), 170. For how the structure of the speech emphasizes this point, see Winterbottom, (2002), 31; for Cicero's style in support of this speech, see Krostenko, (2005).

condicione omnes victi occidissetis, clementiae tuae iudicio conservati sumus” (you seem to have won the very victory, when you gave back to the conquered those things which it [the victory] had obtained; for when by the condition of the very victory we all, having been conquered, would have been killed, we were saved by the policy of your clemency.”)<sup>139</sup> In referring to the above passage, Krostenko highlights that “in structure almost all of the sentences seem to have been deliberately designed to heighten the appearance of paradox and contrast” to create a sense of Caesar’s strength of character.<sup>140</sup> Cicero openly states that Caesar conquered them, a word choice that makes Caesar seem tyrannical and makes plain the political situation. Caesar’s power came from force and not the will of the people, but by giving the senate what they wanted, Caesar appears to be willing to listen to the senate and does not appear as a tyrant. Still, Cicero openly calls Caesar a tyrant but one who has the best interest of the people at heart. Cicero continues to make similar comments, stating that if Caesar’s opponents had not died in the civil war (that he caused) Caesar might have become friends with them, or that some people will still find fault with Caesar until he ends all the chaos that the civil war started.<sup>141</sup> In keeping with this, Cicero says:

Omnia sunt excitanda tibi, Gaius Caesar, uni, quae iacere sentis, belli ipsius impetu, quod necesse fuit, perculsa atque prostrata: constituenda iudicia, revocanda fides, comprimendae libidines, propaganda suboles, omnia, quae dilapsa iam diffluerunt severis legibus vincienda sunt.<sup>142</sup>

All the things that you perceive lying flat, smashed and strewn by the onset of the very war that was necessary, must be roused up by one man, you, Gaius Caesar; courts must be established, credibility must be recalled, licentiousness must be suppressed, offspring must be propagated, all these things that have now collapsed and gone away must be bound together by strict laws.

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<sup>139</sup> *pro Marc.* 4.12.

<sup>140</sup> Krostenko, (2005), 291.

<sup>141</sup> *pro Marc.* 7.22; 9.29.

<sup>142</sup> *pro Marc.* 8. 23-24.

Cicero boldly blames Caesar for the terrible state of Rome, but expresses confidence that a man as great as Caesar can (and will) fix these problems. It should also be noted that Cicero places a good deal of pressure on Caesar here, and attempts to guide him regarding the correct path to fix the republic and win back the faith of the senate. If Cicero's goal was to subvert Caesar by veiled comments while superficially praising him, this would not be the best approach. Openly criticizing Caesar while simultaneously praising him creates an air of sincerity and allows Cicero to express his displeasure at the political situation while simultaneously expressing his confidence that Caesar is trying to help the people and restore a republic.

Previous scholars, such as Gotoff and Dyer, have doubted Cicero's sincerity in this speech, but a different reading reveals that while some of his comments may have been exaggerated, he not only praises Caesar but also offers sincere criticism. Caesar is blamed for the civil war, impugned for killing other senators, and tasked with fixing the broken state of Rome. If Cicero's speech were cloyingly sweet then much of it would have been a veiled criticism of Caesar and his regime. But Cicero introduces other elements in *pro Marcello* that grounds the oration in reality, and also strongly contrasts this speech with *pro Roscio*. At this point Cicero could not have known that Caesar had no intention to restore the republic. As far as Cicero knew, the clemency of Marcellus was a positive step toward attaining the restoration of the republican government that Cicero loved. The *pro Marcello* was an opportunity to praise Caesar's good deeds and subtly urge him to continue acting nobly and not as a dictator.

## *pro Ligario*

While *pro Marcello* was not a traditional defense but a praise of Caesar's clemency, *pro Ligario* (delivered in 46) sees Cicero returning to more familiar rhetorical purposes to convince Caesar to grant Ligarius clemency. Some specifics about this case make it particularly interesting. *Pro Ligario* is a judicial speech in which Cicero admits his client's guilt quickly and uses the rest of the speech to plead to Caesar to grant Ligarius clemency. Cicero was indeed beseeching Caesar for clemency because Caesar had begun to use his dictatorial powers. In this particular case Caesar had the trial set in public in the forum. Christopher Craig, among other scholars, believes that Caesar did all of this to publicize his generosity and tendency to favor clemency.<sup>143</sup> This is a likely scenario, especially in light of Plutarch's anecdote in which Caesar is purported to have said, τί κωλύει διὰ χρόνου Κικέρωνος ἀκοῦ λέγοντος, ἐπεὶ πάλαι κέκριται πονηρὸς ὁ ἀνὴρ καὶ πολέμιος ("What prevents [me] from hearing Cicero speaking at this time, since long ago the man [Ligarius] was judged as a criminal and public enemy").<sup>144</sup> If the public knew Caesar's preconceptions about Ligarius, then his decision to acquit the defendant would seem even more merciful and extraordinary to Caesar's audience, not to mention bolster Cicero's reputation.

The events leading to this speech once again center on opposition to Caesar during the civil war. In his opening, Cicero explains the proceedings that led to Ligarius's prosecution. Ligarius traveled to Africa as a legate for the governor Gaius Considius. When the time came for consular election, Considius left Africa and during his absence put Ligarius in charge. When the civil war broke out, Publius Attius Varus was sent out by Pompey to take control of the province,

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<sup>143</sup> Gotoff, 1993, xxxiv; xxxv; Craig, (1984), 195. For other scholars see G. Walser, "Der Prozess gegen Q. Ligarius im Jahre 46 v. Chr.," *Historia* 8 (1959) 90-96; K. Kumaniecki, "Der Prozess des Q. Ligarius," *Hermes* 95 (1967) 434-57.

<sup>144</sup> Plut. *Cic.* 39.6.

which he did. Ligarius continued to serve under Varus and fought against Caesar at Thapsus, where Caesar captured him and subsequently released him into exile. Cicero brushes over these details and states that no crime relevant to the case was committed in these events, since Ligarius had been given clemency for these actions.<sup>145</sup> At this point information regarding the case becomes sparse because Cicero does not mention the charges presented against Ligarius by Quintus Aelius Tubero. Fortunately Quintilian states that Tubero charged Ligarius with not merely remaining a Pompeian, but with defecting to Juba (the king of Numidia) and the Africans who were enemies of Caesar and closely tied with the cause of Pompey.<sup>146</sup> Thus, Ligarius was not put on trial for fighting against Caesar (for which Cicero was close to convincing Caesar to grant him clemency), but for allying himself against Rome, which all Pompeians did.<sup>147</sup> In his opening remarks, Cicero admits Ligarius's guilt and does not attempt to refute the claim.

Cicero's argument throughout this speech is that Ligarius was only guilty of being in Africa and a supporter of Juba. As Craig points out, this speech forces Cicero to balance the legality of the case with the mercy of Caesar. Cicero knows that his client is guilty, and admits it. Yet to have Ligarius acquitted and make the case more important, there must be some legal necessity since Ligarius's joining with Juba puts him in a different situation than other Pompeians. Caesar must adhere to existing laws while simultaneously delivering forgiveness, all while maintaining his dictatorial image.<sup>148</sup> This precarious situation underscores that Cicero's speech was propaganda, and suggests that Caesar and Cicero were using each other to some extent.<sup>149</sup> Perhaps to divert attention from this working relationship, Cicero asserts that much of Caesar's clemency is designed for him to simply look good to the Roman people and make his

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<sup>145</sup> *pro Lig.* 1.2-2.5.

<sup>146</sup> Quint, *Inst.* 11.80

<sup>147</sup> *ad Fam.* vi.14.

<sup>148</sup> Craig, 1984.

<sup>149</sup> May, 1988, ch. 5 n. 35, identifies this as a common conclusion among scholars.

tyranny seem less severe:

si in hac tanta tua fortuna lenitas tanta non esset, quam tu per te, per te, inquam, obtines—intellego qui loquar—acerbissimo luctu redundaret ista victoria

If in such great fortune as yours there were not such great leniency which you hold onto by yourself, by yourself, I say—I who am speaking understand—this victory of yours (*ista*) would overflow in a very sharp lamentation.<sup>150</sup>

He states overtly that Caesar is pandering to the people, which most informed Romans probably knew. But that Cicero willingly said it before Caesar in public helps to veil the connection of the two men. He continues to criticize the clemency displayed by Caesar, since the Pompeians whom Caesar had exonerated were not criminals in the first place; Cicero even says that he does not think he is indebted to Caesar for his own life because he does not consider himself a criminal.<sup>151</sup> Cicero's attitude here creates an air of independence from Caesar, claiming that Cicero is still very much his own person and realistically owes nothing to Caesar. Cicero ends the speech arguing that Caesar must show kindness towards Ligarius if he wishes to win the people over and make them happy, "Nihil est tam popolare quam bonitas, nulla de virtutibus tuis plurimis nec admirabilior nec gratior misericordia est"<sup>152</sup> ("nothing is so popular as benevolence, not one of your many virtues is more admirable nor more pleasing than your mercy"). By publicly identifying Caesar as trying to manipulate the minds of the people, the words of Cicero appear more sincere. The goal is to convince the people that even if they cannot trust Caesar, they can trust Cicero, and that when Cicero praises Caesar, he is sincere in his praise.

Because of Cicero's admission of his client's guilt, and the public spectacle made from the whole trial, it seems that the verdict of the case was never in doubt. Caesar acquitted Ligarius and allowed him to return from exile. Ligarius was resentful, not grateful, that he even

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<sup>150</sup> *pro Lig.* 5.15

<sup>151</sup> *pro Lig.* 6.18-19.

<sup>152</sup> *pro Lig.* 12.36. Another less favorable interpretation of this is that there is nothing except Caesar's mercy that is admirable about him.

had to be given clemency by a dictator.<sup>153</sup> By allowing Ligarius to live, Caesar created and freed another enemy, who would later repay Caesar with a knife.

### *pro Rege Deiotaro*

Cicero delivered *pro Marcello* in front of the senate after Caesar had granted Marcellus clemency; he delivered *pro Ligario* in the forum with Caesar as sole judge, jury, and potential executioner. Both men had been former supporters of Pompey and Caesar acquitted both. Cicero's third Caesarian speech is drastically different from the others. While Marcellus was a prominent Roman politician and Ligarius was a relative nobody, Deiotarus was the king of the client kingdom of Galatia. This trial represented a particular challenge for Cicero. As in the case of Ligarius, Caesar was again the sole judge. Unlike the other speeches however, this oration was delivered in Caesar's home with an extremely limited audience.<sup>154</sup> Cicero hardly seems to take this oration seriously. It is full of flippant wit and severe language for the prosecution, and of course praise for the judge. Yet the praise is more restrained than previous compliments. Cicero's positive comments about Caesar are sparser, and any criticism of him is all but absent. The change in tone of this speech from the previous two indicates Cicero's dawning awareness of the inevitable fate of the *res publica*. He may have understood that his pleading would be irrelevant, since whatever Caesar wanted to do, he would do. There would be few people in attendance, so those absent might reasonably think that Cicero did not present a convincing argument. Cerutti points out that in the *pro Roscio Amerino* Cicero states his doubt as to whether judicial process could occur under Sulla, and that nowhere is this expressed in *pro*

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<sup>153</sup> Plut. *Brut.* 11.1.

<sup>154</sup> Gotoff, 1993, xxxvii

*Rege*, which Cicero delivered in the autumn of 45.<sup>155</sup> I disagree with his conclusion that this was done because of Cicero's faith in Caesar. Rather, I think it is more accurate to state that by mentioning his trepidation in *pro Roscio*, he purposefully made fairness a point in the minds of his listeners. With Caesar in his home and with few others in attendance, Cicero probably understood fairness was a moot point. The setting of the speech alone was cause enough for Cicero to be suspicious; that the process was aimed at a king who by all indications was entirely innocent only bolstered this suspicion.

As with the other Caesarian speeches, Cicero was speaking on behalf of a former ally of Pompey, who had fought against Caesar at Pharsalus and retreated to Galatia after the battle. Deiotarus had been a strong ally of Rome throughout his rule of approximately forty years. He had helped Pompey combat Mithridates (and was rewarded with land from Pontus) and had helped Cicero in his minor military campaigns (for which Cicero was hailed as *imperator*) while he was governor of Cilicia. Naturally for a man so far removed from Rome and loyal to the status quo, Deiotarus decided it was best to side with Pompey. Leaving Egypt, Caesar soon traveled to Galatia where Deiotarus entreated him for, and received, Caesar's forgiveness, with slight subtractions from Deiotarus's kingdom for his disloyalty. According to the prosecutor Castor, Deiotarus's grandson, it was Deiotarus's plan to murder Caesar as he stayed in his palace but it was ultimately unsuccessful because of the luck that allegedly clung to Caesar throughout his life. Cicero refutes this charge rather soundly. This speech places Caesar in an uncomfortable position. He is not dealing with a mere supporter of Pompey, or even a former consul, but a king. If Caesar dismissed the charges, even if Cicero's side of the events was accurate, Caesar may have appeared weak to other provincial leaders, and quickly found himself confronting a widespread revolt. Conversely, if Caesar found Deiotarus guilty, he would appear

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<sup>155</sup> Cerutti, (1996), 145.

tyrannical and cause others either to fear him or to revolt. Perhaps this was why Caesar chose to hear the speech in his own home with a limited audience.<sup>156</sup> He would be able to decide the case without the public having knowledge of the arguments. It is likely that Caesar would have been happier if he did not have to hear the case, but it was Caesar's decision to allow the case to continue (again, perhaps because he felt concern about appearing weak). It is no surprise then that Caesar forestalled his judgment. Caesar had planned to go to war with Parthia and perhaps wanted Deiotarus to be a little nervous as he traveled east with several Roman legions. The Ides of March came sooner than Caesar's departure to Parthia, and thus Caesar's verdict on the case will remain unknown.

The interpretation of *pro Rege Deiotaro* is more complex than the previous Caesarian speeches. There is a change in tone, difficult to describe without reading the three speeches consecutively. *Pro Marcello* praised Caesar almost excessively but also contained jabs at Caesar. *Pro Ligario* appeared to be more of a precise dance between the two men, with Cicero walking a line between propaganda and reality. The *pro Rege Deiotaro* lacks these distinct features. This is not to say that the speech is dull. It is full of Cicero's mocking wit to the grandson of Deiotarus and the runaway physician/slave who testifies against his former master. Throughout the speech, Cicero states that testimony from a slave is illegal, and asks, "Quae crux huic fugitivo potest satis supplicii adferre?" ("what cross can bring sufficient punishment to this fugitive slave?"). He insults Castor as a bloodthirsty ambitious degenerate who simply could not wait for his turn on the throne.<sup>157</sup> Indeed, it is an entertaining speech but lacks the *gravitas* of his former speeches. Perhaps Cicero finally began to realize both that Caesar was truly a dictator

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<sup>156</sup> Another point here is that Caesar could have been using Diotarus as an example for other Parthian kings—that their fate is in his personal hands. Also it makes Caesar seem to exercise royal prerogative, to serve as judge and jury.

<sup>157</sup> *pro Deiot.* 9.26; 11.30

and that his arguments would be inconsequential. By the time that Cicero delivered this speech, the praise that he gave so enthusiastically a year before had faded; Cicero had sufficiently beaten the dead horse that was Caesar's penchant for clemency. The orator hardly praises Caesar for anything else in this speech, which reads as both unenthusiastic and repetitious. When Caesar is accused in a letter of being a tyrant because he erected a statue of himself with the kings of Rome, Cicero redirects the topic, saying, "Nam de statua quis queritur, una praesertim, cum tam multas videat?" ("for who laments about the statue, one in particular, when he sees so many?"). Instead of trying to defend the action, he simply states that it is one of many statues.<sup>158</sup> This is a halfhearted defense by Cicero, especially since he had complained about either the same statue or a similar one to Atticus, stating, "De Caesare vicino scripersam ad te quia cognoram ex tuis litteris. Eum σύνναον Quirino malo quam Saluti. ("About your neighbor Caesar, I wrote to you because I learned of it from your letter. I prefer his "sharing a temple" with Quirinus rather than Salus.")<sup>159</sup> Shackleton Bailey explains this comment: "The Senate had voted to set up a statue of Caesar entitled 'To the undefeated God' in the temple of Quirinus (Romulus), which was near Atticus' house."<sup>160</sup> Cicero can only muster these lame defenses of Caesar in his final Caesarian speech.

Because Cicero has a difficult time defending Caesar publicly (an obligation of formal *amicitia*), he becomes more comfortable at expressing his realization that Caesar was indeed a king or tyrant. *Pro Rege* contains several statements from Cicero that could easily be construed as calling Caesar a king, that is, a tyrant. One of the first and more brazen statements Cicero makes is to praise Pompey in the house of Caesar. Cicero celebrates Pompey as a hero of Rome who was famous for a whole list of virtuous traits. Caesar was indeed forgiving and if accounts

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<sup>158</sup> *pro Deiot.* 11.34

<sup>159</sup> *ad Att.* 12.45.3.

<sup>160</sup> Shackleton Bailey, (1998), 16.

are to be believed, Caesar was bereft at the death of Pompey.<sup>161</sup> Yet to praise Caesar's enemy in Caesar's own home is a daring act. Cicero also lists several traits of a king, "fortem, iustum, severum, gravem, magnanimum, largum, beneficum, liberalem: hae sunt regiae laudes" ("strong, just, strict, serious, generous, kind, liberal: these are the praises for a king").<sup>162</sup> These are all qualities for which Cicero also had praised Caesar in the previous speeches. While defending Deiotarus, he further states that if Deiotarus had killed Caesar, he would have been acting like a tyrant because of this murderous impulse.<sup>163</sup> Cicero is implying that if Caesar has Deiotarus executed, he will cross into the ranks of tyranny. Cicero was no longer even a reluctant supporter of Caesar.

In the late autumn or early winter of 45, Cicero, completely disenchanted with Caesar, knew that the man he hoped would restore the republic had instead established himself as tyrant. As we saw in the previous chapter, Cicero's personal letters took a distinctly anti-Caesarian tone at this point. These three speeches show the consequences of the same slow and steady change in Cicero's perception of Caesar that also appeared in his letters. While Cicero believed that Caesar might in fact restore some semblance of the republic, as time passed, Caesar's heavy handedness was destroying his hope, and his disillusionment became a more and more frequent theme in his speeches.

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<sup>161</sup> Plut. *Pomp.* 79-80.

<sup>162</sup> *pro Deiot.* 9.26

<sup>163</sup> *pro Deiot.* 5.15

### Chapter 3: Catharsis, Caesar, and *de Amicitia*

Both Romans and Greeks recognized the importance of *amicitia* (or φίλια). Cicero, perhaps following the example of Aristotle, wrote his own treatise *de Amicitia*. Historians such as Syme and Brunt have examined this work for Cicero's interpretation of *amicitia* in a Roman context, but in this space I will explore selected ideas of Cicero's as they apply to the *amicitia* between himself and Caesar. *De Amicitia* suggests that Cicero, perhaps using his *philosophica* as a form of therapy, explained and organized his feelings on the death of Caesar. I believe that the downside of political *amicitia* with Caesar weighed heavily on his mind after the assassination.

*De Amicitia* defines *amicitia* in many ways that could not apply to Caesar and Cicero. In fact, *de Amicitia* idealizes the personal aspects of true *amicitia* and vitiates the claims of pure political *amicitia* of the type that Caesar and he had constructed. Thousands of people had died in the civil war that brought Caesar to power, and the assassination of Caesar marked the ultimate failure of Rome's political culture. What is worse, with Caesar slain, civil war was again brewing with the potential loss of thousands more to bloodshed. The political circumstances called into question the role of political *amicitia* in determining the overall course of events. Cicero, always the staunch supporter of the republic, was undoubtedly relieved at the removal of a tyrant. Cicero was not obsessing over Caesar's death, but was troubled by its violence and its meaning. We can see that the *amicitia* between Cicero and Caesar, which has been established in the previous chapters, was contrary to Cicero's idealized views of true and abiding *amicitia*. For the purposes of this thesis, I examine and focus on only the selected psychological issues raised in this particular treatise as they bear on the working of political *amicitia*.

Like most philosophical dialogues, *de Amicitia* takes place as an imagined conversation, in this case between the statesmen Gaius Laelius, Quintus Mucius Scaevola, and Gaius Fannius. Though the latter two men are present in the conversation, most of the treatise is the monologue of Laelius, detailing his thoughts on his *amicitia* with Scipio Aemilianus, because it was the most famous (“familiaritatem fuisse”) of *amicitiae*.<sup>164</sup> When Cicero begins to discuss what is necessary for *amicitia*, he states that true personal *amicitia* can only exist between good men (“boni viri”), whom he describes as “Qui ita se gerunt, ita vivunt, ut eorum probetur fides integritas aequitas liberalitas, nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas libido audacia, sintque magna Constantia.” (“They conduct themselves in such a way, they live in such a way, that their trustworthiness, integrity, and generosity may be demonstrated and that no avarice, lust, or recklessness may be in them, and that they may exist with great constancy.”)<sup>165</sup> The good man has to be almost entirely selfless and rational and must not be a slave to his own urges, and this is the way optimates viewed themselves. Even Cicero himself, a *novus homo*, displayed considerable ambition, and arguably may not have been the most sincerely loyal of men (recall his waxing and waning feelings for Pompey and Caesar at the beginning of the civil war). Cicero undoubtedly considered himself a good man however. He is famous for his pride and fancied himself the savior of the Republic; after his victory over Catiline in 63, he punctuates his speeches with this event, and within his *de Domo sua* he essentially claims that his return to Rome would bring stability to the city. By definition as an optimate, he was a *bonus vir*. It seems unlikely that he would consider Caesar a good man since his personal ambition and pride caused the death of thousands of Romans and led to a tyranny within Rome. Logically, if two good men are required for a true personal *amicitia*, then the *amicitia* between Cicero and Caesar

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<sup>164</sup> *de Amic.* 1.4.

<sup>165</sup> *de Amic.* iv. 18-19.

could only have been a pragmatic (political) relationship between one *bonus vir* and one purely politically motivated politician, exactly the type of relationship that Cicero distances himself from in *de Amicitia*.

Cicero notes that friends are likely to choose those who are similar to themselves in politics (though this is not indispensable), where they are from, and so on.<sup>166</sup> Though Cicero did not note the habit of people in specific social classes sticking together, other Romans supported this concept.<sup>167</sup> Cicero and Caesar were very different men with very different backgrounds and political views. Cicero was an *eques* and a plebeian, while Caesar was a *nobilis* from an aristocratic senatorial family and a patrician. Both orders, equestrian and senatorial, had wealthy members with political power. In general, *equites* were rich plebeians, but as a *novus homo* Cicero had to claw his way to the top of the political arena because he was looked down upon by the senatorial elite. Caesar was a patrician however and his family background provided more opportunity for a political career than Cicero's. Politically, the two were also at opposite ends of the spectrum. Cicero believed in the strength of the republic and was a supporter of the optimates, while Caesar used the people to his advantage and saw the republic as an outdated system that was adequate for a city but not an empire. Political *amicitia* was possible as long as each gained from it.

Cicero devotes a large amount of space to the idea of reciprocity in friendship, that is, what friends are supposed to do and feel for one another. This topic interested not only Cicero, but also modern sociologists and psychologists, who have discovered a good deal about the

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<sup>166</sup> *de Amic.* 19-20

<sup>167</sup> For instance, historian Paul Burton, in his analysis of Plautus, shows that within Plautus's plays we find characters of the same class, age, and gender becoming *amici* (Burton, 2004, 215). In this case, Plautus seems to have anticipated Cicero's thoughts on friendship; these ideas were apparently common enough for a comic playwright to use the trope in his own works. Modern psychology has shown this to be a common occurrence as well, since friends with similar lives and viewpoints reinforce an individual's own values and therefore affirm that individual as a person. (Burton, 2011, 46.)

societal expectations of “friendship” in the modern world.<sup>168</sup> As stated in the introduction, scholars have long believed that *amicitia* in Rome was simply a political alliance, ignoring Cicero’s belief that, “Amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est ad benevolentiam coniugendam” (“For love (*amor*), from which *amicitia* is named, exists first to join together good will (*benevolentia*).”)<sup>169</sup> The speaker makes it clear, then, that before anything, *amicitia* must derive from a feeling of affection, which is impossible to prove between Caesar and Cicero.

But *amor* in Roman society is very different from “love” in our own. *Amor* is a much more pragmatic, utilitarian relationship. It can involve something like what we call “love” but its primary function is to bind people together based on *benevolentia*, not on passion, intimacy, or congeniality. (Think of the public political role of a marriage like Pompey’s with Caesar’s daughter Julia or Marc Antony’s with Augustus’s sister Octavia.) What I want to draw attention to here is not the origin of *amicitia* in *amor*, but that *amor* is based on *benevolentia*. Nowhere is this connection more obvious than in political *amicitia*. The two friends do not have to agree on everything, but the public positions they take on each other’s behalf have to be based on *benevolentia*; that is, the public position in support of a political friend has to be just that, supportive, and hopeful for the success of the other at least on the policy or issue in question.

Cicero presupposes that the two people who will become friends knew each other previously, perhaps from politics or other social events (Cicero, after all, belonged to a somewhat exclusive club of elites). In the dialogue, Scipio wanted to befriend Laelius for his good character, and Laelius wanted to befriend Scipio for his virtue.<sup>170</sup> While this arrangement may have been ideal, Cicero was very much aware that *amicitia* could be created for personal

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<sup>168</sup> See Appendix I.

<sup>169</sup> *de Amic.* 26.

<sup>170</sup> *de Amic.* 9.

gain, as was his goal when befriending Pompey and Caesar to gain political support.<sup>171</sup> It is agreed upon by historians that Cicero and Caesar maintained their *amicitia* for the trading of favors and help.

Cicero discusses the role of politics in *amicitia* as well. The majority of his sentiments state that friends agree on almost everything, because a friend is a mirror of oneself. Yet disagreement in political matters did not preclude *amicitia*. In two letters, Cicero and Matius discuss their differences in political views, and how they do not allow their political differences to affect their *amicitia*.<sup>172</sup> The first half of Cicero's letter recalls their more personal *amicitia* since its beginning, with a great deal of emphasis on their enduring *amicitia* despite their political differences. Matius was a great friend of Caesar, and although it does not appear he was enthused by Caesar's potential tyranny, Matius remained a loyal friend to both Caesar and Cicero and played an important role, based on his own good will (*benevolentia*) in reconciling them after the civil war. From these letters, it appears that Matius supported a proposed law (what the proposal entailed is unknown) and grieved at the death of Caesar, for which many people treated him unkindly. Cicero assures Matius that he still supports him politically because of their *amicitia*, and that Matius's grief for a dead friend is a testament to his moral fiber. Though Matius was a staunch supporter of Caesar, Cicero remained loyal to Matius, showing, at least in this case, that politics affected *amicitia* only as much as Cicero would allow.

The question becomes how much Cicero's and Caesar's politics affected their *amicitia*. It is clear that Cicero had more doubts about Caesar once he crossed the Rubicon in January of 49. That he needed to be reconciled with Caesar by Matius shows two points, the first being that they *had* to be reconciled, and the second that they *were* reconciled, at least superficially.

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<sup>171</sup> Everitt, 84-85.

<sup>172</sup> *ad Fam.* 348-349.

Furthermore, Caesar's political ambitions were more far reaching and, in Cicero's view, damaging than those of Matius. It would be easy to overlook differences with just another Roman senator like Matius, but Caesar's actions were difficult to ignore, and thus put a great strain on his public *amicitia* with Cicero.

Though Cicero believed that true *amicitiae* were created by sincere reciprocity, he also acknowledged that once *amicitia* had been established, friends should help one another in any way possible, and that it was indeed expected for them to do so, but a mutual affection must be felt first:

Atque haud sciam anne opus sit quidem nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis. Ubi enim studia nostra viguissent, si numquam consilio, numquam opera nostra nec domi nec militiae Scipio eguisset? Non igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est.<sup>173</sup>

And by no means should I know whether it is necessary, in fact, that anything at all ever be lacking between friends. Where indeed would my exertions have flourished if Scipio had never needed my advice, never needed my service, either at home or at war? Therefore it is not that *amicitia* comes from usefulness, but usefulness comes from *amicitia*.

While friends must base their relationship on *amor* (love), Cicero believes that *amicitia* could not arise without one or both of the involved parties assisting the other in times of need. Friends should give small favors, such as advice or perhaps even loans, without the slightest apprehension. This is not to say that a friend should do whatever his comrade desires. Cicero strongly affirms that no one should ever ask a friend to do service that could be considered dishonorable or harmful either to oneself or to the *patria* ("fatherland") such as instituting a tyranny nor should a friend, if asked, feel obligated to do a dishonorable service, especially one that does harm to the *patria*.<sup>174</sup> Cicero is discussing what constitutes an ideal *amicitia*, but he

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<sup>173</sup> *de Amic.* 51.

<sup>174</sup> *de Amic.* 40.

highlights a dishonorable service, which needs to be considered a problem in the abstract, but which also poses a very real problem for political *amicitia* on the mundane level. As a practical matter, Cicero had to question anything and everything he did that could benefit Caesar and further Caesar's personal political agenda.

*Amicitia* was obviously important to Cicero, and the politics of late republican Rome demanded political *amicitia* and alliances. His speech *de Provinciis consularibus* (On the Provinces of the Proconsuls) offers singular insight into Cicero's willingness to end or begin *amicitiae* for the benefit of the state. In this speech, in the late spring of 56, Cicero made a public declaration of his support for Caesar and the so-called "first" triumvirate as a whole. Cicero's relationship with Caesar was rocky until this point, as only a few years previously Caesar had spoken out against the execution of Catiline and his conspirators. Yet this speech is Cicero's (successful) attempt to convince the Senate to allow Caesar to continue his conquest of Gaul. Both the political pressure from Pompey and Cicero's realization that being on the good side of the triumvirs could benefit him led to this speech. Whether this speech led directly to *amicitia* between Cicero and Caesar is unknown, but even if this speech were only given because Cicero felt that it was necessary to appease Caesar, the delivery (and subsequent publication) of the speech would have pleased Caesar regardless of the circumstance. With Cicero cowed and Caesar pleased, a formal and public *amicitia* could begin. Therefore, the oration cannot be written off as a mere result of political pressure because it had effects on their interactions.

Cicero puts his dislike for Caesar aside because he recognized that Caesar's conquest of Gaul was best for Rome.<sup>175</sup> The Gauls had repeatedly invaded Roman territory for centuries, with the most notable invasion culminating in the sack of Rome in 390 (or 387). Since then, the

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<sup>175</sup> *ad Fam.* 1.9.9.

Gauls were a persistent fear and source of anxiety for Romans, and their pacification would at the very least ease this fear. Cicero says, “Ergo ego senator, inimicus, si ita vultis, homini, amicus esse, sicut semper fui, rei publicae debeo” (“Therefore I, as a senator, should be an enemy (*inimicus*) to the man [Caesar] if you like, but I should be a friend of the state, just as I always have been.”)<sup>176</sup> Cicero uses the word *inimicus* (“not an *amicus*,” therefore a personal enemy) to show that personal issues must be put aside (an attitude that will be rectified eventually, if only superficially) because his duty to the state comes first. Later in the speech Cicero talks about forging a friendship with Caesar for the good of the state: “Quod volent denique homines existiment, nemini ego possum esse bene merenti de re publica non amicus” (“Finally let men suppose what they want, I can be an opponent to no one who does well for the republic.”)<sup>177</sup> The use of “non amicus” here is significant. The difference in meaning between *inimicus* and *non amicus* is slight, but important. *Inimicus* usually is translated as “enemy”, while *non amicus* literally translates as “not a friend”. Cicero, then, is saying that he cannot *not* be a friend to someone who helps the state. At the time, Caesar’s conquest of Gaul was seen as an effort to help guard Rome against the Gauls, hence Caesar was helping Rome. This makes Caesar a (political) friend by default. Cicero is, therefore, *required* to be a friend. Even if Cicero’s sentiments were insincere, his assertions were made publicly with the purpose of showing the triumvirate that his public opposition was over; Caesar would have been pleased.

Just as Cicero established *amicitiae* with those who benefited the state, so too did he end *amicitiae* with those who attempted to destroy Rome. When speaking of the Catilinarian conspirators in this same speech, he notes:

Etenim, si iis, qui haec omnia flamma ac ferro delere voluerunt, non inimicitias solum, sed etiam bellum indixi atque intuli, cum partim mihi illorum familiares,

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<sup>176</sup> *Prov.* viii. 20.

<sup>177</sup> *Prov.* x. 24.

partim etiam me defendente capitis iudiciis essent liberati, cur eadem res publica, quae me in amicos inflammare potuit, inimicis placare non possit?<sup>178</sup>

As a matter of fact, if I have proclaimed and brought not only personal enmities (*inimicitias*) but also war on those men who wanted to destroy everything by fire and sword, although of them are my friends (*familiares*), although some have been freed on capital charges even by defense, why should the same state, which was able to inflame me against friends (*amicos*), not be able to reconcile me with personal enemies (*inimicis*)?

This passage, perhaps more so than any other, defines how Cicero viewed *amicitia* in the political sphere, and what he was willing to do both for and against friends. He was willing to hunt down and perhaps execute those friends of his who wished to see the destruction of Rome if they could not be reconciled to the state. Yet, as we have seen in the Caesarian speeches, Cicero still worked to appease Caesar and maintain an air of public *amicitia*, which implies that Cicero recognized that while Caesar's tyrannical ambitions threatened the state, Caesar was also trying to end the chaos of the previous century, and for a brief moment Cicero could believe Caesar was trying to preserve the republic.<sup>179</sup> This conflicted feeling makes their *amicitia* even more ambivalent, since Cicero was intelligent enough to see shades of gray between the black and white of republic and tyranny.

*De Amicitia* may have been a piece of introspection that allowed Cicero a means to deal with his complicated feelings about *amicitia*, life, and politics in the aftermath of Caesar's death. Many scholars now agree that Cicero's philosophical writing was not just intended to transfer the wisdom of the Greeks to the Romans, but also was intended as a kind of therapeutic exercise for his own benefit.<sup>180</sup> Yelena Baraz emphasizes that in addition to occupying his time, Cicero wrote many of his philosophical treatises for ameliorative purposes as a response to the death of his

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<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

<sup>179</sup> *ad Fam.* IV.4.3.

<sup>180</sup> See Baraz, 2012, 44-95.

daughter Tullia. She also observes, however, that some scholars have been too quick to attribute all of his philosophical writings to his grief for Tullia, and that Cicero expresses grief on other subjects as well, including the plight of the republic.<sup>181</sup> There is sufficient evidence to suggest that *de Amicitia* was perhaps a means for Cicero to express, in a therapeutic manner, his reflections about the ongoing political upheaval in Rome. Cicero disapproved of the one-man rule that Caesar was attempting to establish, but perhaps his murder caused Cicero to question their previous *amicitia*.<sup>182</sup> Thus, Cicero ruminated on what *amicitia* meant to him and to Roman society as a whole. In *de Amicitia*, Cicero does not mention any Greek writers, thereby suggesting that Cicero took this particular topic more personally than topics in other treatises.<sup>183</sup>

While discussing *amicitia* and its function in the state, Cicero says that a tyrant cannot overthrow a state without friends, and that no man should give *amicitia* to someone who desires to overthrow the state for his own advantage.<sup>184</sup> Further on he states that

Haec enim est tyrannorum vita, nimirum in qua nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis benevolentiae potest esse fiducia, omnia semper suspecta atque sollicita, nullus locus amicitiae.<sup>185</sup>

So this is the life of tyrants, in which undoubtedly there can be no loyalty, no affection, no reliance on unwavering good will, everything is suspect and agitated. There is no place for *amicitia*.

The tyrant is unable to have true friends, because his position rests within a world of duplicitous relationships and implicit distrust. The implications of that circumstance call into question how Caesar's tyranny affected the former political *amicitia* of the two men. While their *amicitia* began to fail once Cicero supported Pompey in the civil war, Caesar seemed open enough to

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<sup>181</sup> Ibid., 87-88.

<sup>182</sup> See Appendix II

<sup>183</sup> Nicgorski, 90 in Von Heyking and Avramenko, 2008.

<sup>184</sup> *de Amic.* 42.

<sup>185</sup> *de Amic.* 52.

Cicero after Pharsalus. One letter that Cicero wrote after Pharsalus shows his reaction at having Caesar (and his legions) visit his estate though he does not want it to happen again (as his sarcasm shows). Throughout Caesar's coup d'état, Cicero had conflicted feelings towards Caesar—he had sent laudatory letters about the general only months before, but now this same general was attempting to destroy the republic. Even if Cicero wanted to continue their *amicitia*, which is doubtful, he is convinced that it was politically impossible.

For Cicero, true, personal *amicitia* was a rare occurrence and an almost sacred bond between two people. For most, *amicitia* was short-lived and not a true *amicitia*, since many were formed for political reasons focused on mutual giving and taking. But true friends, which Cicero believed were rare, were almost mirror images of one another. They often shared the same ideas, were fiercely loyal to one another, and more than anything were good righteous men. Though they may not always agree on politics or ways to resolve a problem, these differences can be overlooked for the joy that their *amicitia* brings. Friends complement one another. Where one might lack a certain attribute, the other might have a surplus of it, and thus the two men are better for it. All of these characteristics of true (personal) *amicitia* are the inverse of the *amicitia* between Caesar and Cicero. Scholars have recently paid more attention to *de Amicitia*, and a close analysis suggests that Cicero may have been attending to his own needs, perhaps licking his wounds and disentangling complicated emotions after the death of the tyrant Caesar. In any case, the horrors of civil war and its violent consequences caused Cicero to rethink his attitude to political *amicitia*, which had been the foundation of his entire political career and of his attempts to regain his political standing after his return from Cilicia in 50 and after the republican loss at Pharsalus in 48.

## Conclusion

Cicero and Caesar were both prominent in the Roman republic, and their *amicitia* had the potential to shape history. Because of this potential, it is important to understand the nature of the relationship between the two men. The relationship, however you define it, was complicated. More complication arises because Caesar's thoughts about it are generally lost. Caesar's letters were never compiled like Cicero's, and his letters to Cicero have largely been lost. Furthermore, any clues that Caesar may have given in his speeches have also been lost. The characterization of their relationship then must come exclusively from Cicero's perspective. In contrast, a plethora of Cicero's works survive, and many give conflicting messages regarding Caesar.

Scholars have long assumed that, because Cicero was a staunch supporter of the republic and republican ideals, and Caesar effectively ended the republic, the two were enemies. Yet this explanation is simplistic and presupposes that Cicero knew what Caesar's rule would bring. There is no direct evidence that Caesar planned to install a monarchy when he took power, and there is no evidence that Cicero knew for certain what Caesar intended. This explanation also assumes that the two had no positive relationship before Caesar took power. Life is not so black and white, and the two were colleagues in an elite political group that necessitated working with the opposition in order to succeed. Both were cunning politicians who recognized the necessity of compromise. To say that Cicero simply wrote Caesar off is too crude. Perhaps it is true that Cicero felt disdain for Caesar, but the two still had a working relationship that the Romans would define as *amicitia*.

Cicero's letters offer as much clarification as they do distortion. As we have seen, the letters in *ad Quintem fratrem* establish the beginning of their *amicitia* and show how it grew

between Caesar and Cicero. Yet in spite of expressions of concern, there is a decidedly political and polite tone of formality in the letters. Cicero was trying to curry favor with Caesar, and recognized that he would benefit from an *amicitia* with the general. Yet there is no way to tell how sincere Cicero was in his praise and the expressions of his feelings for Caesar. Cicero's sincerity in his letters is a topic which must be researched further. In Cicero's letters to his friends and to Atticus, he reveals that, far from being on Pompey's side of the civil war, he is conflicted regarding which faction to support. It was not an easy decision for him, and it seems that he was never satisfied with that decision. There is no doubt that Cicero wanted to see the republic restored, which begs the question of why he took so long to decide whom to support. After the civil war Cicero saw Caesar as the last hope for possibly restoring the republic.

Cicero's Caesarian speeches help to show Cicero's changing attitude in the period that they were delivered (early-mid 40s). While Cicero may have exaggerated his praises in delivering *pro Marcello*, he offers Caesar advice on how to repair the republic and praises him for his clemency and the kindness that he has shown his enemies in the aftermath of the civil war. He also is sure to critique Caesar about where he could improve, and he blames Caesar for the condition of Rome. While he works with Caesar for *pro Ligario*, by the time that he is called upon to defend King Deiotarus, he is more ambivalent about the rule of Caesar. At this time, Cicero's letters start attacking Caesar again and it is clear that Cicero has given up hope about Caesar restoring the republic. But this does not necessarily mean that he was elated about Caesar's assassination. While writing *de Amicitia*, he seems to reflect by omission on the nature of political *amicitia*, and though in this treatise he does not define what the two had as *amicitia* at all, nevertheless Roman society did define it as *amicitia*. *De Amicitia* leaves the reader with the impression that, near the end of his career and of his own life, Cicero had serious second

thoughts about one major aspect of Roman political life.

How should scholars view the relationship between Cicero and Caesar? That question is just as complicated now as when I began this work. I hope that I have proved that there were more significant nuances in the *amicitia* of Cicero and Caesar than is usually recognized. The two men had a working *amicitia* of the political type for their own mutual benefit. Both of these men needed one another in the public arena because of power, in the case of Caesar, and credibility, in the case of Cicero. The two were not *amici* like Cicero and Atticus. They did not let their personal feelings intrude on the public utility of the *amicitia* that they had fostered since Caesar's time in Gaul, and had rebuilt after Caesar's victory. The two eventually had established a utilitarian political *amicitia*, and neither for a long time was willing to lose that relationship.

## Appendix I: *Amicitia* and Modern Theories

It is important to understand the causes, reasoning, and expectations associated with companionship and intimacy, all of which also bear on the meaning and functions of *amicitia* in any given context. Philosophy helps, but ultimately this form of investigation is introspective and subjective; modern social sciences offer the objective research that philosophy can never offer. Unfortunately, the ancients did not perform psychological and sociological studies to examine how and why *amicitia* emerged, existed, or ended. Historians today use social scientists' understanding of "friendship" and interpersonal relationships.<sup>186</sup> Caution is necessary. Ancient culture was very different from our own, so normative behavior in Rome may have been radically different from modern normative behavior.

Let us look briefly at some common findings in modern psychological and sociological studies of friendship to provide some background and comparison for Cicero's own philosophical ideas. Researchers have theorized four models for friendship: reinforcement, exchange and equity, cognitive consistency, and developmental theories.<sup>187</sup> Reinforcement theory supposes that people are more likely to build friendships with those they feel give them rewards, and are more likely to connect with those that they have a positive association with. Exchange and equity theory is also associated with rewards, but focuses more on the results of the friendship. If everyone involved feels the friendship is producing positive results, then the friendship persists. Cognitive consistency theories suppose that humans expect balance in their relationships, and seek to balance the people around them with themselves and the objects in their world. Finally, developmental theories examine friendships in stages and the feelings

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<sup>186</sup> In this appendix, I use "friendship" only to refer to modern theories of the phenomenon.

<sup>187</sup> For a more detailed analysis of these theories, see Derlega and Winstead, 1986; for a more basic study of friendship, see Grunebaum, 2003; for friendship and patronage in the ancient world, see Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984; for friendship for life, see Duck, 1983.

associated with these stages.

These theories are far more complex than I can explain here, but the basic similarities show common themes between modern friendships and Roman *amicitia*. One of the first commonalities is personal gain. Though Cicero states that *amicitia* comes first from personal warmth (more associated with developmental theory) he does say that mutual gain is important to *amicitia* and that *amicitia* could not exist without gain from one another. This gain is not always material however. Emotional gains and personal balance are all important.<sup>188</sup> Only the developmental theories establish the reasoned justification for friendships changing as the relationship continues over time. All theories address personal fulfillment both emotionally and materially, topics that Cicero discusses and for the most part considers meaningful. In the context of this thesis however, we must think of Cicero's and Caesar's public relationship as one of equity and exchange; Cicero and Caesar both invest in the relationship only to get positive outcomes for developments that they support. Cicero was able to gain from Caesar some stability in his own political career, showing that the most powerful man in Rome supported him. For Caesar, *amicitia* with Cicero provided him the veneer of legitimacy in his rule, since Cicero's high moral standards were beyond dispute at the time. We can see then, that their *amicitia* was one of gain, and was not meant to provide the kind of fulfillment true personal *amicitia* provides. Theirs was a political *amicitia*.

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<sup>188</sup> Cic. *Amic.* 9.30.

## Appendix II: Timeline of *de Amicitia*

The first significant datum is the very timing of the writing and publication of the work. Cicero is believed to have written *de Amicitia* in 44, because Cicero had not mentioned it in *de Divinatione*, also written in 44, when he recounted his philosophical works, but did so in *de Officiis*, which was finished by November of 44. Therefore *de Amicitia* ought to have appeared somewhere between the publication of the two works, that is, in the late summer or early autumn of the same year, the year of Caesar's assassination.<sup>189</sup> The prolific pace at which Cicero wrote his philosophical treatises is well known. Cicero published eleven philosophical works within a period of two years. Assuming that he wrote these treatises at an even pace, Cicero would have required approximately two months per treatise. Cicero certainly had enough time to write *de Amicitia* between *de Divinatione* and *de Officiis*. The timing of the publication puts it in the middle of the political crisis after Caesar's death.

Cicero opens the work with the death of a friend. This seems an odd choice in that *amicitia* joins two people together and death separates them. In his opening, Cicero addresses Atticus several times, as if this were a private letter between the two. It is plain that Cicero dedicated the text to Atticus. Nonetheless, the critic must ask why Cicero chooses to begin with death in this way.

It is interesting that in *de Amicitia* many of the traits and occurrences associated with Scipio reflect issues that affect other great men, including Caesar. These include the acquisition of material wealth, fame, and the desire for immortality. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which Caesar would, or even could, want more fame and money than he had already taken. He was enormously wealthy, a favorite of the *plebs*, a renowned general, and of course, at the end of

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<sup>189</sup> Falconer, (1979), 103; Griffin (1997) points to the timing of Caesar's death coinciding with the *de Amicitia*, though she does not investigate the implications of this timing.

his life, the leader of the most powerful empire in the known world (with the arguable exception of Parthia). Cicero himself states in *pro Marcello* that Caesar had gained sufficient glory and notoriety, and that he was satisfied in his life.<sup>190</sup> Caesar was certainly ambitious, but it is hard to imagine wanting more than what he possessed when he died, except power.

It is also true that no one would have called Caesar niggardly; he is well known for being open handed with money, hosting lavish festivals as aedile, giving out massive loans to friends (such as Cicero), and the generosity he displayed in his will.<sup>191</sup> Cicero also emphasizes the role of the people in the funeral of a beloved figure.<sup>192</sup> Plutarch notes the crowds and fervor present during the funeral of Caesar, and describes their enthusiastic destruction of objects in the Forum to build Caesar's pyre.<sup>193</sup> Not only does Cicero speak of the funeral, but also the swiftness of Scipio's death and the people's perception of it.<sup>194</sup> Caesar's own ending was sudden. Cicero also mentions the suspicious circumstances around the death of Scipio, a fact that he could easily have ignored if he desired.<sup>195</sup> Finally Scipio's mortal egress is described as, "ut ex tam dignitatis gradu ad superos videatur deos potius quam ad inferos pervenisse" ("such that from a position of so much merit, he seems to have reached the gods on high rather than the gods of the underworld.")<sup>196</sup> This sentence feels strange. Scipio was not deified after his death, merely celebrated, but talk about Caesar being deified already may have begun in mid-44, and many Romans may have believed he really was a god.

Cicero's word choice and use of language also need to be explored in order to discuss underlying issues. I am not suggesting that Scipio is a metaphor for Caesar, but that the issues

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<sup>190</sup> *pro Marc.* 8.25

<sup>191</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 68.1.

<sup>192</sup> *de Amic.* 11.

<sup>193</sup> Plut. *Caes.* 68.1.

<sup>194</sup> *de Amic.* 12

<sup>195</sup> *de Amic.* 12

<sup>196</sup> *de Amic.* 12

Cicero frames for Scipio may correspond in some way to questions surrounding Caesar and his assassination. According to Suetonius, as Caesar's first attackers approached and grabbed him, Caesar cried, "Ista quidem vis est!" ("Indeed this is violence!")<sup>197</sup> Does Laelius's use of *vis* when his acolytes pressed him to speak more on *amicitia*, "Vim hoc quidem est afferre" ("Indeed this is to impart violence") really echo Caesar's declaration?<sup>198</sup> Elsewhere Cicero also employs phrases and ideas he has uttered previously. When discussing the advantages of *amicitia*, Cicero states, "Verum etiam amicum qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui" ("he who looks upon a true friend, also looks upon him as a kind of example of himself.")<sup>199</sup> Years earlier during the Gallic campaigns in 54, Cicero, paraphrasing Aristotle, opens a letter to Caesar saying, "Vide quam mihi persuaserim te me esse alterum, non modo in is rebus quae ad me ipsum sed etiam in iis quae ad meos pertinent" ("See how I could persuade myself that you are another me, not merely in matters that pertain to me myself but even in those matters that pertain to my associates.")<sup>200</sup> His *amicitia* with Caesar had all but disintegrated by 44. It is certainly possible that Cicero forgot what he had written a decade earlier to Caesar, but at the very least, this letter shows that at one time Cicero considered Caesar a political *amicus*, and at the most, that he remembered his *amicitia* in this manner.

Was Caesar a dead friend, a former friend, or no friend? Perhaps Cicero believed Caesar to be an example of what a friend was not. Cicero points to several reasons why *amicitiae* end, some of them natural such as a growing apart in regards to outlook on the world, or because of a geographic separation. But Cicero cites some interesting, specific reasons as to why some *amicitiae* end. *Amicitia* is often ruined by the struggle for office or power, and this is a primary

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<sup>197</sup> Suet. *Jul.* 1.82.

<sup>198</sup> *de Amic.* 26.

<sup>199</sup> *de Amic.* 23.

<sup>200</sup> Aristot. *Nic. Eth.* 1170b7; *Fam.* 7.5.1.

reason why childhood *amicitia* tends to fail: quests for political office and differences in political opinion.<sup>201</sup> He adds that for most men the pursuit of money often ends *amicitia*, and so does “in optimis quibusque honoris certamen et gloriae” (“the struggle for honor and glory in all the best men.”)<sup>202</sup> Questing for glory was essentially a career for Caesar and Cicero. I layout these interpretative ideas here to show the importance of *de Amicitia* in Cicero’s re-thinking of the role of political *amicitia* in the aftermath of Caesar’s assassination.

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<sup>201</sup> *de Amic.* 10.33.

<sup>202</sup> *de Amic.* 10.34.

## Ancient Authors and Works

### **Aristotle:**

*Ethica Nicomachae*

### **Cicero:**

*Brutus*

*de Amicitia*

*de Legibus*

*de Oratore*

*de Provinciis Consularibus*

*Epistulae ad Atticum*

*Epistulae ad Familiares*

*Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem*

*pro Archia*

*pro Ligario*

*pro Marcello*

*pro Rege Deiotaro*

*pro Sexto Roscio Amerino*

### **Plutarch:**

*Brutus*

*Caesar*

*Cicero*

*Pompey*

### **Quintillian:**

*Institutio Oratoria*

### **Suetonius:**

*Divus Iulius*

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<sup>203</sup> See also above, p. 2, note 1.

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