Searching for the Schooner *Rob Roy*: An Historical Archaeological Analysis of a Civil War Blockade Runner

by

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May 2020

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The American Civil War spanned four years of bloody fratricide that divided the country. During those years, President Lincoln declared a blockade on all Southern ports hoping to cut supplies to the Confederacy in an attempt to shorten the conflict. As a result, blockade running became a lucrative career, and several captains, who held no allegiance to the Union or Confederacy, took advantage of the potential profits. One such captain, William Watson, successfully ran the blockade from 1863 to 1865 with the assistance of the eight-man crew on the centerboard schooner *Rob Roy*. On 2 March 1865, *Rob Roy* was intentionally run aground and burned in Deadman’s Bay off the coast of Florida to avoid capture. This thesis seeks to contribute to the overall understanding of blockade running in the Gulf of Mexico during the American Civil War by looking at the political, economic, and social relationships between people interacting with *Rob Roy* by completing a historical, archaeological analysis of sail versus steam in the Gulf of Mexico. If found during the search, the theoretical concept of agency and artifact biography would have been utilized to understand the interactions between people and *Rob Roy*. Artifact biography studies recognize the undeniable relationship between people and objects and the vital role an object plays in understanding the cultural past of humans.
This thesis utilizes both primary and secondary historical sources to analyze the unique role Rob Roy played in the American Civil War while comparing its success to other blockade runners of the Gulf of Mexico. The archaeological fieldwork conducted for this research provided additional information that contributed to the overall understanding of social interactions in ports along the Gulf Coast. Ultimately, the main question is, “what contribution does the study of one blockade runner have on the general understanding of the interaction of ports in the Gulf of Mexico during the American Civil War?”
SEARCHING FOR THE SCHOONER *ROB ROY*:
AN HISTORICAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF A CIVIL WAR BLOCKADE RUNNER

A Thesis
Presented to the Faculty of the Program in Maritime Studies Department of History
East Carolina University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in Maritime Studies

by
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May 2020
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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my grandparents, Laura and Myron Schultz

for always encouraging me to follow my dreams,

and finally, to my dearest friend, mentor, and teacher Bobbie Lovett.

You may all be gone, but you are forever in my heart.

I hope I make you proud.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis was made possible with the support of several individuals and institutions. Research completed in 2012 for the Rio Grande Civil War Trail inspired this thesis and my dive into maritime archaeology. To the two schemers Dr. Christopher Miller and Dr. Russell Skowronek, I am grateful for the opportunity and for the faith you held in me to assist on that rather ambitious project. With their continued support and funding from the CHAPS program at UTRGV, along with the unwavering support of my thesis advisor Dr. Jennifer McKinnon and funding through ECU, this project was able to be completed.

While on this journey at ECU, I have made countless friends whose support and patience have pushed me. To Olivia and Jessica, thank you for helping me complete my prospectus and get this thesis started. To Katrina and Tim, thanks for providing shoulders to cry on. To Sara, Slim, and Maddie, thank you for reminding me to laugh instead of cry. To George and Paul, thank you for the courage to move forward. To Aleck and Jeremy, thank you for joining me on a cold dive in Florida and almost getting hypothermia. To Kristin, thanks for all the adventures. Without the support of y’all, this thesis would never have been completed.

Finally, I would like to thank my family. Uncle George and Uncle Bob, for funding my first adventure in underwater archaeology and continuing to provide support as I moved forward in the field. To my mother, for reminding me that I am loved and that I can do anything, I set my mind to. To my father for the monetary and academic support and having discussions about theory. To my sister, for reminding me to never be afraid to be myself. Above all, I would like to thank my partner Joel for being my rock when I felt the world was crumbling under me and my light when the darkness consumed me. I am forever grateful for the support and sacrifices you have made to help me reach my goals. I love you.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The study of Civil War blockade runners is not a new concept. Several archaeologists and historians have contributed to the historical record by following the life of blockade runners and their subsequent shipwreck sites. One of the most well-known examples of this is J. Barto Arnold’s work on the Civil War-Era steamer Denbigh. Denbigh was a British-owned steamer that successfully ran several blockades between Havana and Mobile. The information Arnold has been able to collect for just this blockade running vessel has added to the understanding of economic and social conditions for blockaders and business owners during the Civil War (Arnold 2011:13). Gordon Watts, another Civil War historian, and archaeologist has conducted extensive work researching Mobile Bay and its subsequent shipwrecks. His work encompasses both Union blockaders and Confederate blockade runners. The remains of the ironclad vessel USS Tecumseh and blockade runner Ivanhoe have added to the understanding of ship construction and the historical record of the American Civil War (Watts 1998).

Blockade running, by trade, connects people of many walks of life across large geographical areas that may never have interacted were it not for times of war. Vessels like Denbigh and Modern Greece, another British-owned steamer and blockade runner researched by East Carolina graduate Chelsea Freeland, are crucial in viewing these connections (2014). The case of Rob Roy is unique in that it combined history and archaeology since most of its life as a blockade runner was narrated by its owner and captain, William Watson. As such, Rob Roy’s past should provide sociocultural information about the relationships of individuals within the Gulf of Mexico during the American Civil War, as told through the eyes of its owner and captain.
The history of an object like a seagoing vessel is like that of a historical account of a person. Essential elements pulled from the history of a ship include construction, purpose, use, and impacts within the region of use. Through a comprehensive study of the history of a vessel, one can better understand the international, national, regional, and local “platforms creating a holistic approach to studying and assessing historic shipwrecks” (Colwell-Pasch 2014:8). Through the same study, a blockade runner’s role in the Civil War can be better understood.

The significance of this research is multi-faceted. It will add to the history of blockade running during the American Civil War within the Gulf of Mexico. It would have contributed to the first application of the concept artifact biography to a Civil War blockade runner to further explore the agency of Rob Roy if the vessel had been located.

**Research Objectives and Questions**

The primary purpose of this thesis is to add to the general understanding of blockade running in the Gulf of Mexico during the American Civil War by investigating and interpreting the life of Rob Roy. The Gulf of Mexico is a maritime cultural stage for the Civil War blockade runner Rob Roy. This vessel will tell a story of the political, economic, and social relationships of the peoples that interacted and continue to interact with this vessel.

*Primary*

- What contribution does the study of one blockade runner have on the general understanding of the interaction of ports in the Gulf of Mexico during the American Civil War?

*Secondary*

- What is the artifact biography of Rob Roy?
- What can the archaeological investigation of the proposed location of *Rob Roy* reveal about its final demise?

**Justification**

The use of artifact biography approaches gives life to an artifact by expressing within a human cultural setting the dynamic interactions an object can have in social, political, and economic situations. Artifacts can evoke another time and, in turn, carry encounters of their own, between creator, owner, and researcher (Philip 2007:3). The blockade runner, *Rob Roy*, was an agent of change in the Gulf of Mexico during the American Civil War. As an entity that can create change, an artifact is no longer merely an object, therefore, *Rob Roy* should be investigated in the historical context of the American Civil War, ship construction, and shipwreck studies. *Rob Roy* provides a gateway to understanding ports along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico that are glossed over in history books.

The captain of *Rob Roy* kept a diary of his life on board the vessel. Still, the time frame only spans from the ship's entry into blockade running in 1863 to the sale of the ship in Spanish Havana thirteen days before it was intentionally scuttled and burned off the Gulf Coast of Florida in 1865. It is unclear when the ship was built and where it was first acquired; Watson only provides information about where the vessel was registered under its new name in the Crown colony of British Honduras (modern Belize) in 1862 and the sale of the vessel in Havana, Cuba.

**Civil War Blockade Running**

On 19 April 1861, the eighty-sixth anniversary of the Battle of Lexington that sparked the American Revolution, Abraham Lincoln introduced Proclamation No. 81, which declared a
blockade on all ports in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas (Hall 2014:21). Known as the “Anaconda Plan,” Lincoln and his advisers hoped to squeeze the life out of the Confederates States gradually. Unfortunately, the United States Navy underestimated how difficult it was to blockade ports in the Gulf of Mexico (Hall 2014:54). When the proclamation was first announced, not much changed in Texas since the season for cotton trade had just ended, and few large seagoing vessels were in the harbors (Hall 2014:24). The Texas coastal defense was almost non-existent as there was little to no heavy artillery available. By June 1861, Captain of Engineers W.H. Stevens, CS Army, had outlined defense plans of the Texas coast, which included Galveston, the only major seaport in Texas, as the central focus of protection (Underwood 2003:78). By the end of the year, “other artillery units were concentrated in the vicinity of Matagorda Bay and Corpus Christi, Caney Creek, and Sabine Pass” (Underwood 2003:79).

The blockade itself was a political maneuver, and neither Navy truly considered what it would take to operate the blockade efficiently. The Union's goal was to maintain the blockade, and the Confederate Navy would need to figure out how to break it or circumvent it (Anderson 1962:13). Not only would it be difficult for the divided forces of the United States to maintain their cause, but it would also be difficult for the countries involved in ongoing trade with the US to maintain their business. England issued its proclamation within a month of the Union declaring their neutrality in the struggle between the two powers because “there were several million dollars [sic] worth of English owned goods in Southern ports” (Anderson 1962:13). English leaders wanted to place formal protection over them as soon as possible. Several European nations followed England with proclamations of their own, yet most favored the Union despite their neutrality (Anderson 1962:13). Mexico, neighbor to the United States and bordering
Texas, was another neutral nation, which in turn made the Rio Grande a neutral zone. According to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Rio Grande was deemed a neutral zone one mile north and south for both Texas and Mexico (Wise 1988:88). “The American blockade was not to be imposed on any neutral nation because the Lincoln administration felt the U.S. had insufficient resources to engage in another conflict in addition to the Civil War” (Underwood 2003:67).

Blockade running was dangerous, but essential for the Confederate States to maintain their war economy through the import and export of goods. In the South, “blockade running was not regarded as either unlawful or dishonourable, but rather as a bold and daring enterprise” (Watson 2001:34). It was, however, in the Union considered an act of war and, therefore, subject to the laws of war. Running was not necessarily carried out by experienced merchant seamen and officers at the beginning of the conflict, but rather anybody who wanted to make a windfall profit. Blockade runners were paid the highest rate wages, and bonuses were given after every trip, ranging from 100 to 500 dollars (Watson 2001:35). Ships were often privately owned, though most ships were under British or foreign registry to maintain the semblance of neutrality when in international waters.

“With the Confederate domestic production never reaching 50 percent of military needs, goods brought in by blockade runners were essential to the Southern war effort” (Tucker 2006:110). Without the blockade runners bringing in arms, medicines, clothing, and other essential war materials, it is unclear whether the Confederacy could have survived as long as it did. Most historians argue that the eventual collapse of supplies to the Confederate military was not due to the failure of blockade runners, but instead the collapse of the Southern railroad system (Tucker 2006:110). The change in trade due to the blockade disrupted normal patterns
and increased the burden on the Southern railroad network. Overall, historians agree that the Union blockade of southern ports was an effective use of Northern resources. If the Union ground forces were as committed to the blockade, the warships of the blockade would have had an even more substantial contribution to the defeat of the Confederate States (Underwood 2003:112).

The main item exported from Southern ports was cotton. After the blockade took effect, overland routes sprang up between Texas towns and Mexican cities, such as the one between Matamoros and Brownsville (Hoekstra 1951:20). “The South counted on what the period newspapers called *King Cotton Diplomacy,*” where cotton bonds became essential for Confederate efforts abroad (Whisker 2002:16). The port of Tampico was a point of entry for arms and munitions that were hauled by wagons into Texas (Thomason 1968:16). Shipments of goods such as cotton went through Eagle Pass to Monterrey and then to Matamoros or Veracruz (Hoekstra 1951:20). Trade routes between London and Matamoros, as well as New York and Matamoros, were established. Cotton, goods, and ammunition made their way back and forth between Europe and Mexico, and even between the North and South. The South was not able to supply their soldiers with sufficient enough arms and munitions, therefore, supplies were purchased overseas, including Enfield rifles made at the London Armory Company and Austrian Lorenz rifles (Whiskers 2002:24-5). Due to the nature of the blockade, common and luxurious goods became more expensive (Thomason 1968:3).

Profits of vast proportions could be made by blockade runners, who purchased cotton along the Rio Grande for six to ten cents a pound and then sold it in Europe for fifty to sixty cents a pound (Whisker 2002:17). The Enfield rifles, manufactured and purchased in Britain, originally cost around twenty-one dollars. Still, the Confederacy was forced by the blockaders to
purchase them for fifty dollars, and buyers in Matamoros were charged up to sixty dollars (Irby 1977:17). Prices of goods were extremely high in Texas and the South; flour cost as much as twenty-two dollars per pound, tea was four to five dollars per pound, coffee was one dollar per pound, sugar was twenty-five cents per pound, black pepper was one dollar per pound, rice was forty cents per pound and five pounds of potatoes was one dollar (Thomason 1968:20). These goods were affected directly by the costs of war. For example, a dollar in January 1860 would have gone as far as 100 dollars in January 1865 (Shughart 2005:243).

Rob Roy

After setting the blockade on all rebelling states made by President Lincoln in 1861, it became difficult for northern mills to receive southern produced cotton (Hall 2014:21). The Gulf of Mexico held a leading role in the transfer of goods from north to south during the Civil War. The blockade created a lucrative business for those not loyal to the causes of the American Civil War. Both the Confederates and Union supporters needed supplies that they no longer could easily access. Blockade runners, such as Rob Roy, became significant contributors to the continued business between the north and south.

Rob Roy was a centerboard schooner most likely built on the Eastern seaboard of the United States following specifications that would allow it to be both seaworthy and stable (Watson 2001:4). Rob Roy was 78 feet in length, had a beam of 22 feet 6 inches, depth of hold 6 feet, a draft of 13 feet when the centerboard was down, and 4 feet 9 inches when the centerboard was up (Watson 2001:4). Its centerboard construction allowed for it to navigate the rough and sometimes shallow water of the Gulf Coast region of Texas and Mexico. The shallow depths and large sandbars created a treacherous environment for all ships, including blockade runners. Still,
if they were able to navigate these surroundings, the shoals would also protect the blockading US Navy (Watson 2001:4), whose ships generally drew more than 6 feet of water.

Many historians (Hall 2014:38; Underwood 2003:57; Cotham 1998:170; Cochran 1958:202) argue that Rob Roy was one of the most successful blockade runners. The ship was able to maneuver the waters of the Gulf and carry cotton, weapons, and other hard to acquire provisions (Hall 2014:36). Some of the most frequented ports included Havana, New Orleans, Galveston, and Matamoros (Watson 2001:vi). Blockade runners also frequented several small inlets that lay along the coast of Texas. The Rio Grande was one river that played an essential role during the Civil War as it was a neutral zone bordering Mexico and the Confederacy (Wise 1988:88). Blockade runners and European businesses found the trade along this zone extremely lucrative.

Rob Roy evaded Union capture from its first to its last voyage under the command of Captain William Watson. It successfully transported cotton and other goods to and from Galveston on three separate occasions. It also survived several storms, was even sunk, and later raised before it turned over to a new owner. Rob Roy was intentionally burned to avoid capture less than a month after being sold (Watson 2001:286).

The life and death of Rob Roy is not the end; like any other agent, this Civil War blockade runner has its back story and journey. This detailed historical, archaeological study of Rob Roy demonstrates that this vessel has more to add to the historical understanding of the Gulf of Mexico and blockaders during the Civil War. According to Union reports (Stewart 1903:825), Rob Roy wrecked in Dead Man’s Bay near Steinhatchee River (Figure 1.1) along the Gulf coast of Florida.

Deadman’s Bay, Florida
Florida borders a large portion of the Gulf of Mexico, along with several other southern states. This research focuses on a section of the Gulf Coast in Florida, specifically Deadman’s Bay, which is located at the mouth of the Steinhatchee River and is approximately 55 kilometers in length (Trimble et al. 1999:187). In 1528 Steinhatchee was referred to as *Istenhatchee*,...
translation *river of man*, by its inhabitants (Briggs 2010:6). Prehistoric archaeological remains from this period are in the form of processed bones and stone tools. Other archaeological sites of the region range from the Archaic period to the early-modern period (Ellis et al. 2001:26). Cultures that fall within this range include Deptford, Weeden Island, and Alachua cultural traditions, which depended heavily on maritime resources of the area (Ellis et al. 2001:32-33,35).

Steinhatchee River first appeared on Spanish maps during the early 1500s and was crossed by the Spanish conquistador Panfilo de Narvaez in 1529 (Florida Department of State 2017). It was passed again by Hernando de Soto in 1539 (Florida Department of State 2017). According to some accounts, the area was frequented by pirates from the sixteenth century into the eighteenth century because it’s remotely located along the Gulf of Mexico (Florida Department of State 2017).

During the early 1800s, the river played a role in the First Seminole Wars when Andrew Jackson crossed it in 1818 on his way to disperse Seminoles who were raiding settlements on the border of Georgia and Spanish Florida (Briggs 2010:6). In 1838 General Zachary Taylor crossed the river to intervene in the continuing skirmishes of the Second Seminole War and, within that same year, established Fort Frank Brooke which was only in operation for a short time and by 1840 was abandoned (Briggs 2010:6).

With the outbreak of the Civil War, Steinhatchee River and Deadman’s Bay were destinations of blockade runners, though the area was not frequented by many broad or deep draught vessels because of its shallow depths. The proclamation of President Lincoln focused blockading efforts on larger ports like Galveston and New Orleans, left smaller ports like Deadman’s Bay available for blockade runners to access more freely (Wise 1988:34). It is
known that at least two blockade runners wrecked in Deadman’s Bay while avoiding capture by the Union Navy.

The first occurred on 5 June 1862 when *Havana*, a Confederate screw steamer, was set afire to prevent capture by USS *Isilda*. The vessel had already been unloaded except for its remaining cargo of ten tons of lead and cotton (Gaines 2008:41). After its abandonment, Union sailors were able to salvage two chain cables, the jib, anchor, and three lead pigs (Gaines 2008:41). The second vessel lost in Deadman's Bay was the centerboard schooner, *Rob Roy*. *Rob Roy* was purchased from its original captain and owner, William Watson, in Belize, Honduras. After less than a month under new ownership, the vessel was purposefully run aground and burned while being chased by USS *Fox* (Watson 2001:246). The new crew was attempting to find the mouth of the Suwannee River but instead ended up in Deadman’s Bay with a cargo of mechanical farming equipment and cavalry sabers. Crew members were captured, and some of the cargo was saved before the vessel was set on fire to avoid capture (Gaines 2008:44).

**Methodology**

Primary source research was conducted threefold. The original research leading to the inquiry of this thesis started with access to the personal journal of a blockade runner, Captain William Watson (2001). This journal was first accessed in 2012 at the University of Texas Pan-American using the library’s Special Collections while completing research for another project (Rio Grande Valley Civil War Trail Project, conducted by the University of Texas Pan-American, 2012). This information contributed directly to all other historical and archaeological research completed on this project.
While analyzing the journal of William Watson, it was deduced that further archival research would need to be conducted at the National Archives Research Center in New Orleans as well as in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. The internet was used as an additional source for primary materials, specifically the NOAA database of historical maps.

The visit to the Notarial Archives Research Center in New Orleans was completed in January 2018. While visiting the archives, ship logs and purchasing logs from between June to August 1863 were reviewed in order to identify the origins of the vessel. In each of these logs dimensions and ship names were recorded.

Additionally, it was necessary to research and analyze geographical information of the rumored wreck site of *Rob Roy*. The most prominent source of information for this phase of primary source research was the NOAA Historical Maps and Charts Collection. There, several maps and charts created over several years were analyzed and overlaid in GIS to corroborate historical records and oral histories of the area.

*Secondary Sources*

Broader topics needed to be addressed while conducting historical research as well. The most prevalent were the American Civil War, as well as the involvement of the two states discussed in this thesis: Texas and Florida. Blockade running was another topic researched both generally and specifically to the Civil War. Under the research umbrella of the Civil War, other related issues included blockade running, the people involved in blockade, and the tools used to complete these tasks. This led to a search of vessels used for blockade running in the Gulf of Mexico, as well as the geographical features of the area that would have affected the ability to successfully run a blockade. Other research included oceanographic; bathymetric data of the Gulf of Mexico and
how it might affect vessel construction. Weather patterns in the Gulf of Mexico were also researched to better understand the effects of storms on shipwrecks.

Next, historical research of Rob Roy and other centerboard schooners was conducted. As the project progressed, it became necessary to delve further into the construction of shallow draft vessels. Similar vessels used in the region were also researched. This was completed to narrow down the possible origins of Rob Roy. All historical research was completed using East Carolina University’s Joyner Library.

Steam boilers were researched as a result of the Fall 2018 fieldwork. First, a general understanding of the types and uses of steam boilers during the Civil War was reviewed. Then, boiler use in Florida and salt works along the coast were investigated.

Additional research was completed at the Museum of Florida History in Tallahassee. This provided more information about previous wrecks found along the west coast of Florida, as well as maps of Civil War vessels. A critical secondary source used in this project was the field report completed by students and staff from East Carolina University in the Spring of 2017 (McKinnon 2017). Their report provided additional historical information about the possible wreck site of Rob Roy.

Archaeology Methods

For this thesis, several archaeological methods were used for collecting relevant data. The first phase of surveys was conducted before this thesis using side scan sonar and oral histories as the primary sources of information. The second phase of the archaeological survey carried out for this thesis analyzed the side scan sonar data by diving on previously located targets. On those targets, a photographic survey was conducted along with the creation of mud maps. Once the data was collected, further research was conducted to understand better the information found
during phase two. ArcGIS was employed to georeferenced maps of the archaeological site to give more understanding of where the remains of Rob Roy might have been located.

**Thesis Outline**

This chapter introduces the topic of this thesis. Artifact biography and its role in providing a background of an artifact’s life and agency are discussed. Research questions with justifications are also offered. Finally, a brief introduction to the ship, blockade running, and previous research is presented as well as the methods used for research, including historical and archaeological.

Chapter two provides a historical background of the role blockade running has held through time. It also discusses the history of blockade running during the American Civil War, particularly within the Gulf of Mexico, and it provides a brief history of the vessel, Rob Roy.

Chapter three outlines the methodology used to gather information for this thesis. Fieldwork methods and spatial analysis methodologies are discussed in detail. Finally, the archaeological investigation and results are discussed. Observations are presented, including sketches, photos, and charts.

Chapter four presents and analyzes the data collected during this thesis. A historical, archaeological analysis of the vessel during its life as a blockade runner is presented along with charts created to understand the historical analysis and its results better.

Chapter five completes this thesis, culminating in final thoughts and conclusions. Primary and secondary questions are answered as a result of the observations made in the previous section. Finally, the limitations and future research on this topic are proposed.

Following the conclusion is the appendix, which reviews literature pertinent to the study of agency and artifact biography in archaeology. It then discusses how the two concepts can be
used when researching the life of a vessel such as *Rob Roy* in maritime archaeology. This information would have been used in the instance of finding any archaeological remains of *Rob Roy*. 
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY OF CIVIL WAR BLOCKADE RUNNING IN THE GULF OF MEXICO

At the onset of the American Civil War, President Lincoln was faced with several complicated decisions and hoped to bring the Union back together efficiently and as quickly as possible. Protecting and defending the coast would become extremely difficult as the nation was about to defend their country from an enemy within. To secure the coastal boundaries, Lincoln and his cabinet enacted the Anaconda Plan, which would squeeze the South from their economic success through the coastal waterways. To understand this military tactic, one must understand the purpose of a successful blockade and what it entails. Most simply described, a naval blockade is an attempt by one power to cut off all overseas communication and trade to enemy ports and coasts. Though a blockade is meant to cut the enemy off from an economic source, there are still costs for blockading that must be accounted for when planning. These costs include the employment of sailors, procurement of patrol vessels, and the potential costs of damage during coastal defense (Davis and Engerman 2006:4).

To enact a successful blockade with the optimum results, a planner must consider certain things; after all, a blockade will not only affect the two main parties involved but will also affect neutral countries. A blockade must have the appropriate manpower and vessels available to be successfully carried out, not to mention enough funds to repair any damage as well as to maintain the crews’ wages and living expenses. Other things to consider, to defend the boundaries successfully, including any interactions with neutral powers, this entails the recognition of international law.

Blockades have been used as an official military tactic between great powers from as early as 1584 when the Dutch were conducting operations against Spanish held ports. This, of
course, was not the first time a blockade had been used during the conflict, but before this, there were few international standards set for nations to follow on the ocean. The Dutch, who were leaders of maritime trade, established treaties on traded goods and, in 1630, laid the Dutch Proclamation, which created basic principles on neutral vessels involved in blockades (Davis and Engerman 2006:6). As time progressed and the ocean became a frequent place for trade, interaction, and military conflict, nations began to set standard laws and regulations for those not involved in the conflict to remain unaffected from a blockading force.

Due to an increase in trade between countries and across oceans, it became clear to leading powers that some laws could not extend or be defended at specific points on the ocean, therefore, laws would need to be created for international waters. During the Crimean War in the 1850s the legality of blockades became an issue and the very first international laws on the subject were declared at the 1856 Congress of Paris. There were four major rules put in place “to define the interests of both belligerents and neutrals:

1) “Privateering is and remains abolished.”

2) “The neutral flag covers enemy’s goods, with the exception of contraband of war. (‘Free ships’ make ‘free goods’.)”

3) “Neutral flags, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under an enemy’s flag.”

4) “Blockades, in order to be building, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of an enemy.” (Davis and Engerman 2016:8).

Overall a blockade needed to be established by a formal declaration that would define its geographical limits and grace period. It required to notify all nations affected by this blockade. It
also needed to be regularly enforced, and all limitations must be known, so no neutral nation could be kept from carrying out trade (Speller 2014:117).

With a better understanding of blockades, it is essential to note that the blockade of the American Civil War was unique; it no longer followed the standards set aside by all previous blockades. Instead, the blockade initiated by Abraham Lincoln issued under Proclamation No. 81 became a new form of both military and economic endeavor.

As often as blockades have been used as a military tactic, so has the practice of blockade running. The running of blockades is a natural response for individuals to take when the importation and exportation of goods are being affected. Blockade running is carried out by those either directly affected by the blockading force or by those interested in the economic benefits of increased costs associated with the altered exchange of goods. The blockade of the American Civil War not only affected the standard enforcement of all previous blockades but also altered the standards of blockade running. Those vessels running the Union blockade in the Gulf of Mexico were uniquely designed to maneuver the rough waters and shallow coasts. To better understand the difficult task a blockade runner faced, it is important to first comprehend the unique history of the blockade in the during the American Civil War.

**Civil War Blockade**

A series of declarations first issued by Lincoln and then in response by Davis led to the final proclamation for a Union blockade on all Southern ports in April of 1861 (Anderson 1962:12). And so, on 19 April 1861, Lincoln passed Proclamation No. 81 that declared a blockade on all ports of the rebelling states. This included the Confederate states of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas (Hall 2014:21). The rules of the blockade
stated that the Union could search vessels attempting to cross the blockaders. Any vessel that was carrying contraband would be seized and eventually sold in a prize court where crew members of the blockading force involved would receive half of the proceeds (McNeil 2003:17).

The purpose of the blockade, referred to as the Anaconda Plan, was to prevent the Southern states from exporting cotton or other products in exchange for the importation of war products (McNeil 2003:15). It was the hopes of Lincoln and his advisors to squeeze the economic life out of the Confederacy gradually. Unfortunately, the United States Navy underestimated how difficult it was to blockade the ports in the Gulf of Mexico (Hall 2014:54).

The blockade itself was a political maneuver, and though it shared similarities with the blockades of the Union predecessors, the Northern blockade was offensive as opposed to defensive (Davis and Engerman 2006:109). At its inception, the blockade was nothing more than a “paper blockade” “-a blockade by proclamation alone or with an inadequate number of ships to enforce it” (Tucker 2006:79) and as the blockade was put into action neither Navy truly considered what it would take to control or bypass the blockade efficiently. The Union's goal was to maintain the blockade, and the Confederate Navy would need to figure out how to circumvent or breakthrough (Anderson 1962:13). To manage Union naval strategy, a committee, referred to as the Blockade Board, was set by the Commission of Conference on 27 June 1861. They decided that for the blockade to become effective, the Union navy would have to carry out considerable operations along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts (Tucker 2006:81).

Not only would it be difficult for the divided forces of the United States to maintain their cause, but it would be difficult for the countries involved in ongoing trade with the States to maintain their business. England issued its own decree within a month of the Union. They declared their neutrality in the struggle between the two powers because millions of dollars’
worth of English owned goods were stored in Southern ports, and English leaders wanted to place formal protection over them as soon as possible (Anderson 1962:13). “Other European nations followed with similar proclamations and, in the long run, European neutrality tended to favor the Union” (Anderson 1962:13). Mexico, neighbor to the United States and bordering Texas, was another neutral nation, which in turn made the Rio Grande a neutral zone. According to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the Rio Grande was deemed a neutral zone one mile north and south for both Texas and Mexico (Wise 1988:88). “The American blockade was not to be imposed on any neutral nation because the Lincoln administration felt the U.S. had insufficient resources to engage in another conflict in addition to the Civil War” (Underwood 2003:67).

To order a blockade is completely different than putting a squadron together, and because the nation's resources were divided between the North and South, it meant that the Union and Confederacy would need to make drastic changes. For the United States Navy, this meant a quick expansion of the Navy, which caused issues with the new fleet. When the proclamation was made, the Union had 90 vessels, of which only forty-two were in commission (Browning 2002:7). This meager navy would be unable to defend over thirty-five hundred miles of coastline and 189 river mouths and harbors, ranging from Virginia to the Rio Grande (Buker 1993:1). The only ships immediately available to enforce the blockade were seven steamers, five sailing ships, and a tender. Most of these vessels were recalled from stations around the world. Although several of the Union naval vessels were intimidating, they would not be effective as blockaders because of their deep draft (Browning 2002:7). With the few ships made available to them, the Union set the first blockade of New Orleans and the mouth of the Mississippi River on 26 May 1861, and in June of that same year, Union ships were organized into the Gulf Coast Blockading
Squadron (Tucker 2006:185) (Figure 2.1). By 1862 four squadrons had been created and were assigned coastline to maintain. The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron was stationed off the coasts of Virginia and North Carolina. At the same time, the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron was assigned the coasts of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida up to the south Cape. The Gulf Blockading Squadrons were separated into East and West, covering the coasts from Florida to the Rio Grande (Buker 1993:2) (Figure 2.2). Even though the navy was aware of the large expanse it was expected to defend; leaders initially felt they would easily find a way to manage them. What they did not consider was the unique geography of the southern shoreline and the additional complications this placed on outfitting the navy with sufficient force (Browning 2002:8).

FIGURE 2.1. Map of Blockaded Ports (http://usnlp.org)

To properly defend the blockade during expansion, the Navy was forced to charter or purchase any vessel they could, including ferry boats and merchant ships. The most sought-after vessels were New York ferry boats because they had strengthened decks and were able to “steam in either direction” (Underwood 2003:26). Any blockade runners that were captured would be added to the blockading fleet because they were well suited for chasing Confederate ships (Underwood 2003:27). The U.S. Navy began contracting private shipbuilders at the same time. The fleet expanded quickly. By August of 1861, the Federal Navy had doubled to 180 vessels and by the following year to 264 vessels. “By the end of the war, the Navy Department had purchased 313 steamers and 105 sailing craft and had commissioned a total of 670 warships, about 500 of which were on blockade duty” (Underwood 2003:27). From 1861 to 1865, the
number of officers in the Union navy increased from 1,300 to 6,700, while the number of sailors
grew from 7,500 to 51,500 (Tucker 2006:1).

Even though the Union was able to expand its navy quickly, they still faced logistical
issues. As stated earlier, when planning, the unique geography of the southern shores was not
taken into consideration. Nor was the realization that refueling and repairs on vessels would have
to be done in ports either neutral to the Union, captured by the Union, or still under Union
control. Fortunately for the Union, the Confederate coastline was also far too long for the South
to properly defend as they were forced to limit defensive forces to critical locations along the
coast. Once the North was able to secure the coast and the Confederate enclaves, they would
have an advantage. “Not only would these provide bases and coaling stations at shorter ranges
for the blockading warships, but the enclaves could be jumping-off points for future advances
inland” (Tucker 2006:81).

The Confederacy, on the other hand, had to create their navy from scratch essentially.
This meant that they would face issues with funding as well as collecting enough supplies and
personnel (Luraghi 1996:32). The goal of the Confederate navy was twofold; they needed to be
able to breach the Union blockade, and also run necessary supplies inland (Tucker 2006:10). To
thwart the Union forces, the Confederate navy would need to acquire ironclads, but that would
take time and supplies. Therefore, until the South could create their fleet, they were forced to
repurpose “old sailing vessels and small schooners” for blockade running and acquire warships
from America or Europe (Strickland 1957:85). Not only would the South need to create their
navy from the ground up, but they were also allotted only four percent of the Confederate
military budget. This meant that the navy would be small, and at its strength, it only employed
750 officers and 4,450 enlisted sailors (Tucker 2006:8-9).
Several of the seceding states seized vessels from the Union before the war, including lighthouse tenders, revenue cutters, and coast survey ships. Individual state navies began to build suitable warships, and by July of 1861, parts or all their fleets were turned over to the central government of the C.S.A. (Underwood 2003:29). The division of state navies created tension and petty jealousy during the creation of a Confederate fleet. Still, a nucleus for the navy was formed and used to incorporate state vessels. By March of 1861, the construction or purchase “of ten gunboats, propelled by steam, and displacing from 750 to 1,000 tons” were authorized (Underwood 2003:29). In the latter part of 1862, the C.S.A. Navy Department had bought or constructed 68 vessels and had 32 more under construction. “Some of these were formidable vessels and were covered with railroad iron, but most were small craft ideal for work in harbors or rivers” (Underwood 2003:29). The Confederate government also resorted to privateering, employing about 20 privateers in total (Underwood 2003:29). Blockade runners, like William Watson, evaded the Union blockades and maintained cotton trade and correspondence between Confederate and European businessmen.

Gulf Coast Blockade

As the Union navy expanded and became better at setting the blockade, the Confederate navy was forced to find exciting ways to break through to import and export goods for the war effort. The Union forces were eventually split into four squadrons, two for the Atlantic coast and two for the Gulf coast. The West Gulf Squadron and the East Gulf Squadron defended the coastline from the Rio Grande to Cape Florida. The coastline of Texas and Florida would prove to be the most difficult to defend as they are both expansive and relatively shallow close to land, making the Gulf of Mexico, especially along the coasts of Texas and Mexico, tricky waters to maneuver. The coast of Texas is over 300 miles long and includes several freshwater inlets. Parts of the
coast are guarded by offshore barrier islands and can be at a distance ranging from a couple of hundred yards to five miles from the mainland. The waterways and bays vary in depth and can be extremely shallow in some locations. Galveston Bay would be twelve feet at depth, and other smaller inlets would range from ten feet to eight feet at low tide (Underwood 2003:5-7). The coast of Florida has about fourteen hundred miles of coastline, but the western coast of Florida is a desolate shore with few exceptions (Buker 1993:6).

To better defend the expanse of the Gulf Coast, the Blockade Strategy Board divided it into six zones according to the importance of military defense. The most important area ranged from the Mississippi Delta to New Orleans. The following two were Mobile Bay and the Florida Keys. The fourth and fifth were the west coast of Florida from Cape Sable to Cedar Key and from there to Perdido River. The area considered to be the least important for the Union navy to defend was the west coast of Louisiana and the entire coastline of Texas (Buker 1993:6). Though the Gulf Coast covers a large area, it still did not receive as much traffic as the Atlantic Coast did during the war. Not only was it more difficult to defend for the Union, but it was also more difficult to maneuver for blockade runners. Beyond that, government policy favored the eastern ports (Wise 1988:167).

As stated above, the port of New Orleans was one of the most important to defend along the Gulf Coast. “New Orleans was the largest cotton port in the world, serving as the focal point for the tremendous commerce that funneled down the Mississippi valley” (Wise 1988:74). New Orleans was a hub for coastal trade as well as trade inland by way of its well-established railway system. The city was situated in a central location for trade within the Confederate States and housed foreign investors, two major steamship firms, and local businessmen that invested in blockade running. On 25 April 1862, just over a year after the blockade declaration, New
Orleans was captured by the Union Naval Forces. The Union victory at New Orleans caused the Confederacy a great loss as not only its largest city but its largest port. Before New Orleans fell, fewer than thirty vessels ran the blockade (Wise 1988:80).

Mobile Bay was considered the next most important port for the Union to capture, and because it was the closest inlet to the Mississippi River after the fall of New Orleans, that importance increased. The relationship that Mobile and New Orleans held before the war meant that Mobiles traffic would increase after 1862. The major difference between these two ports is the maneuverability of blockade runners. “If the blockade runners survived the trip to Mobile, they had their choice of three entrances into the harbor” (Wise 1988:169). The blockade runners were dependent on the Confederate fortifications that surrounded the entrance of the bay, and if they held, it would be difficult for the Union to overcome. Through the course of the war, Mobile saw steady traffic of blockade runners, eventually becoming an important center for Confederate imports. Mobile fell to Union forces on 5 August 1865, though the loss of this port was nowhere as costly to the South as ports along the East Coast. From the beginning of the war until the capture of Mobile, the bay saw about almost a hundred blockaders break the Union blockade (Wise 1988:180).

Situated less than 600 miles from the ports of Mobile and New Orleans is the Spanish island of Cuba. Though it was not in the jurisdiction of the Union blockade, it was an important contributor to the flow of trade within the Gulf of Mexico. Havana was utilized by blockade runners for refueling as well as changing titles to more easily circumvent the blockade. The large deep-water harbor lay 540 miles from the mouth of the Mississippi River, 590 miles from Mobile, and 850 miles from the Texas port of Galveston. Though much of trade into Havana was carried out by southern states, the North utilized the convenient location of this island for
themselves by exchanging goods for their well-being alongside southern investors (Wise 1988:76).

Neighboring Cuba lay the western coastline of Florida, an area sparsely populated and weakly defended by the East Gulf Coast Blockading Squadron. This area was difficult to navigate and therefore received less traffic during the war (Buker 1993:6). Pensacola to the Cedar Keys along the same coastline saw most traffic likely due to the location of the railroad system. During the Civil War, blockade running, and salt production were common endeavors in West Florida and off duty blockaders would set up small scale salt works with just a handful of men (Wynne and Crankshaw 2011:16). One of the final tasks of the East Gulf Coast Blockading Squadron was to locate these small-scale operations and terminate them (Wynne and Crankshaw 2011:16). Near the Cedar Keys lays the Suwannee River, and about fifty miles north of that, the Steinhatchee River located at the mouth of this river and about fifty-five kilometers in width is Deadman’s Bay (Trimble et al. 1999:187).

The area considered the least necessary to defend by the Blockade Strategy Board was the entire coast of Texas, an area that turned out to receive more traffic than the Union thought it would. The main port along the Texas coast at the start of the war was Galveston located on a barrier island, Galveston Island, connected to the mainland by a peninsula (Underwood 2003:5). Northeast of Galveston is Sabine Pass, a port that would be utilized by blockade runners, but never to the extent of Galveston. The other ports along the Texas coast south of Galveston were Matagorda Bay, Corpus Christi, and Brazos Island, a small sandbar island at the southernmost end of Brazos Santiago.

“The Rio Grande empties into the Gulf of Mexico at the southern tip of Brazos Island; this location is named Boca Chica. Because of numerous sandbars at the
entrance of the river, all but shallow draft vessels were prevented from entering
either Texas or Mexico by way of the Rio Grande. Most traffic went through
Brazos Santiago and Point Isabel. The Rio Grande itself was something of a wild,
uncontrolled river, flooding often and sometimes shifting course. Upstream thirty
miles or so are the twin cities of Brownsville, Texas, and Matamoros, Mexico”
(Underwood 1993:9).

The Union spent little time blockading the Texas coast, and when they tried to overtake
Galveston in 1862, they failed. After Galveston was compromised, blockade running increased
further down the Texas coast and into the Rio Grande.

As the war progressed, both the Union and Confederate Navy’s adjusted their fleets
according to circumstances as they arose. To maintain a successful campaign in the Gulf of
Mexico entailed further adjustment on both sides. The South incorporated the use of more
steamships as well as any shallow draft vessels made available to them. Once the Union caught
these blockaders, they would be utilized as blockade runners that could better maneuver the
unique geography of the Gulf of Mexico. As the navies slowly grew, so did independent
blockade running by sympathizers of the Confederacy or those simply looking to make a profit
on the increased trade within the region. Most blockade runners ran the blockade off the east
coast, but many functioned in the Gulf of Mexico and experienced their unique adventures.

**Blockade Running**

Blockade running was dangerous, but it was essential for the Confederate States to maintain their
war economy through the import and export of goods. “Blockade running was not regarded as
either unlawful or dishonourable, but rather as a bold and daring enterprise” (Watson 2001:34). It
was, however, considered an act of war and, therefore, subject to the laws of war. It did not need to be carried out by an experienced merchant; seamen and officers who ran a blockade were paid the highest rate, and wages and bonuses were given after every trip, ranging from 100 to 500 dollars (Watson 2001:35). Ships were often privately owned, though most ships were under British or foreign registry to maintain the semblance of neutrality when in international waters. As blockade running increased, so did the occurrence of companies dedicated to the lucrative opportunities of the new venture. These companies would often invest in part of a vessel as well as the value of the cargo on board. Companies were started along the East coast, at various ports along the Gulf coast, and even in England and Mexico. Blockade runners were not the only individuals to grow wealthy when a vessel would be captured the Union forces involved would receive compensation based on the value of the ship and its load which added more incentive to the capture of a blockade runner (Horner 1968:8).

“With the Confederate domestic production never reaching 50 percent of military needs, goods brought in by blockade runners were essential to the Southern war effort” (Tucker 2006:110). Without the blockade runners bringing in arms, medicines, clothing, and other essential war materials, it is unclear whether the Confederacy could have survived as long as they did. Most historians argue that the eventual collapse of supplies to the Confederate military was not due to the failure of blockade runners, but instead the collapse of the Southern railroad system (Tucker 2006:110). The change in trade due to the blockade disrupted standard patterns and increased the burden on the Southern railroad network. Overall, the Union blockade of southern ports was an effective use of Northern resources (Underwood 2003:112).

As stated earlier, the vessels used as blockade runners varied greatly, and as the war progressed, modifications were made to navigate the blockade more efficiently. A blockade
runner needed to be able to outrun a Union blockader, carry a heavy load, and often maneuver through rough, shallow waters. Both sailing and steam vessels were used throughout the war, but as the war progressed, several innovations would be made to steamships forever altering the world of shipping. Small sailing vessels were used at the beginning of the war and were able to withstand the dangers of blockade running longer than some steamships because of the harsh environment in areas like the Gulf. A majority of these successful sailing vessels were schooners; they had a shallow draught. They were generally very weatherly better suited for the harsh environment of the Gulf of Mexico (Cochran 1958:202). As the Union blockade became more effective, sailing vessels, like schooners, would be replaced with steamships. Steamships offered a blockade runner the ability to travel without having to worry about wind as well as more cargo hold. Unfortunately, the quest for profit would lead several steamship operators to become reckless, often burning fuels other than coal, which in turn would cause boilers to explode, losing both life and profit (Roberts 2004:107).

The primary item exported was cotton, and many overland routes sprang up between Texas towns and Mexican cities, such as the one between Matamoros and Brownsville (Hoekstra 1951:20). “The South counted on what the period newspapers called King Cotton Diplomacy,” where cotton bonds became essential for Confederate efforts abroad (Whisker 2002:16). The port of Tampico was a point of entry for arms and munitions that were hauled by wagons into Texas (Thomason 1968:16). Shipments of goods such as cotton went through Eagle Pass to Monterrey and then to Matamoros or Veracruz (Hoekstra 1951:20). Trade routes between London and Matamoros, as well as New York and Matamoros, were established. Cotton, goods, and ammunition made their way back and forth between Europe and Mexico, and even between the North and South. The South was not able to supply their soldiers with sufficient enough arms
and munitions; therefore, supplies were purchased overseas; these included Enfield rifles made at the London Armory Company and Austrian Lorenz rifles (Whiskers 2002:24-5). Due to the nature of the blockade, common and luxurious goods became more expensive (Thomason 1968:3).

Profits of vast proportions could be made by blockade runners, who purchased cotton along the Rio Grande for six to ten cents a pound and then sold it in Europe for fifty to sixty cents a pound (Whisker 2002:17). The Enfield rifles, manufactured and purchased in Britain, originally cost around twenty-one dollars. Still, the Confederacy purchased them for fifty dollars, and buyers in Matamoros were charged up to sixty dollars (Irby 1977:17). In Texas and the South, prices of goods were extremely high; flour cost up to twenty-two dollars per pound, tea was four to five dollars per pound, coffee was one dollar per pound, sugar was twenty-five cents per pound, black pepper was one dollar per pound, rice was forty cents per pound and five pounds of potatoes was one dollar (Thomason 1968:20).

During the Civil War, salt became increasingly difficult to come by for both Union and Confederate forces. In response to this, saltworks began to appear along the coastlines that were difficult for Union blockaders to patrol. Salt was another popular exported item, especially along the coast of Florida. Before the Civil War, most Southern salts came from Virginia, Kentucky, Florida, and Texas, but only 0.1 million bushels came from the Florida coastline (Buker 1993:47). Salt was so desperately needed that entrepreneurs would aim to control salt production and therefore raise the prices to obscene levels. The south counted on Texas and Florida for salt production after the fall of other southern states such as Louisiana. To derive salt from natural sources was labor intensive and weather dependent. Boiling salt down from saltwater was achieved without having to sink a well or worry about impurities forming on the surface of salt.
ponds like that of El Sol del Rey in Hidalgo County in Texas. According to Lonn (1965:30-31), no other state played such a large part in the enterprise of salt as did Florida because of the many miles of protected and secluded bays, poverty, cheap fuel from brush, and access to brine without the labor of digging wells. Saltworks would vary in tools and style, but most often boilers, kettles, and pans would be used to gather and boil down water for salt (Bacha-Garza, Miller, and Skowronek 2019:191).

There were several ways of extracting salt, and seawater was the easiest to access from within surface waters along Florida’s extensive shoreline dotted with secluded inlets and bays, which were difficult for larger vessels to navigate (Buker 1993:47). In fact, “one man succeeded in getting a ‘corner’ on all available salt in West Florida in 1861” and sold it for high prices (Lonn 1965:36). By mid-1863, Florida had several saltworks installations between St. Andrew Bay and Deadman’s Bay, which became a target for East Gulf Coast Blockading force (Buker 1993:49) (Figure 2.3).

FIGURE 2.3. The Salt Coast, St. Andrew Bay to Deadman’s Bay (Buker 1993:48).
Blockade Running in the Gulf of Mexico

The Rio Grande, bordering Texas and Mexico, flowed into the Gulf of Mexico. It was not navigable; however, the mouth of the river was blocked by sandbars, and it was too shallow for vessels to cross them and travel up river for trade. To sail a vessel through the shallow waters of the ports along the Gulf coastline blockade runners, like the Scotsman Captain William Watson, were forced to modify the construction of their sailing vessels. It was important that the vessels were fast, had shallow draught, and were seaworthy. The model schooner was referred to as “flat-sharp” and was an adaptation of centre-board construction (Watson 2001:4). The proportions needed to be strictly followed for it to be both stable and seaworthy. A schooner built with these modifications was able to withstand shallow waters and high seas without capsizing. Watson’s schooner, Rob Roy, was built to these specifications and well suited to cross the shallow waters, sandbars, rivers, and shallow bays along the Texas and Mexican coasts. Rob Roy was twenty-two and a half feet wide and seventy-eight feet long with schooner rigging (Underwood 2003:57). His crew included four seamen, a cabin boy, a cook, mate, and of course, the captain himself (Watson 2001:6).

Rob Roy was of British registry, registered in British Honduras, and had no hailing port (Watson 2001:11-12). Any vessel that was not commissioned by the Confederate or Union Navy was likely to have a higher risk at sea and, therefore, would fly their vessels under foreign flags, usually the British flag (Watson 2001:13). On its first voyage, Rob Roy was loaded with cargo and a couple of passengers from New Orleans and headed for the port of Belize than to Matamoros (Watson 2001:14). The journey from Belize to Matamoros took a total of six days, and because this was early in the war, Watson and his crew were not interrupted by the Union blockade as they sailed into the Rio Grande (Watson 2001:16). The Federal forces were not yet
aware of the vulnerability the Rio Grande was to their cause. The major ports within the Confederate States were firmly blockaded, and it was dangerous for vessels to break through, though some were successful (Watson 2001:19).

According to Watson, no vessel drawing more than four and a half feet could enter the mouth of the Rio Grande. *Rob Roy*, drawing four feet with cargo, was able to anchor within ferry distance of Matamoros. Once a port charge and a duty of twelve and a half percent were paid on all the imported cargo to the Mexican Government, then Watson or any other blockade runner could unload their vessels. The goods would be discharged in Matamoros, where the Mexican Government would charge another twelve and a half percent for the exportation of goods and then ferried across the Rio Grande to Brownsville, Texas. Once the cargo had reached Brownsville and was officially in the Confederate States, they would be transported hundreds of miles to either Austin or Houston. This was a treacherous route, and many lives and cargo would be lost along the way. Despite the cost and labor, it took for goods to travel this route “the demand for goods in the Confederate States, and the still greater demand for cotton outside, was so great that the quantity of goods imported and cotton exported by this route was incredible” (Watson 2001:21).

The route to the mouth of the Rio Grande held its dangers and was difficult to cross successfully, but entering other ports along the Texas coast could be even more treacherous. Another blockade runner, Thomas E. Taylor and captain of *Banshee II*, provides an understanding of the dangers faced when breaking past the blockade and entering Galveston. *Banshee II* was a steamer purchased by the Confederate forces to run blockades and was unfit for its duties. The vessel was a second-hand Irish cattle boat, and its condition at the time of purchase was deplorable. “Her [sic] boilers were nearly worn out; her engines had been sadly
neglected; and added to this, she drew far too much water from the hazardous entrances of blockaded ports” (Taylor 2015:9).

On a run from Havana to Galveston in January 1865, *Banshee II* was caught in a hurricane. As they made their way through torrential rains and black skies in the darkness, they found themselves amidst a blockading squadron (Taylor 2015:48). To avoid capture, several blockade runners would travel in darkness or paint their ships white to camouflage them. When *Banshee II* made a second attempt at entering Galveston, they were faced with treacherous waters of the Texas coast. The ship only lay three fathoms above water and could not lay anchor as it would not stick. The shallow waters caused damage to their vessel, and they were forced to return to deeper waters. *Banshee II*, a steamer, had used too much fuel to be able to return to Havana and was forced to make port in Galveston. By their third attempt, the blockading squadron was aware of their presence and began firing upon them. A narrow shoal between *Banshee II* and the squadron meant that they had at least a half mile between them. The shoal and the wind allowed *Banshee II* to escape though they had received damage and had at least one wounded crew member. The worst was to come as they entered the white waters and bumped through the shallows. This would be Taylor’s last run at the blockade as the war was winding down, and it was clear that *Banshee II* was not a safe vessel to maintain many more successful campaigns.

*Rob Roy* would continue to run successful blockading campaigns until the end of the war. In 1865 Watson sold *Rob Roy* to a new captain in Havana for a total of 3,500 dollars. This new captain intended to continue blockade running as *Rob Roy* was perfectly adapted to the treacherous waters of the Gulf of Mexico. In 1865 months after the purchase, Watson would learn of *Rob Roy*’s capture and destruction (Watson 2001:284-5). Watson served the remainder
of his time in the war in the service of the Confederate Navy aboard the steamer *Phoenix* which was stationed in Galveston (Watson 2001:288).

**Schooners of the Nineteenth Century**

In June of 1863, the Gulf Coast was populated by blockade runners that were either privately owned or hired by the Confederate government to carry goods from port to port and defend the Southern cause against the superior Union Navy. Though the Union Navy lacked effectiveness at the outbreak of the war, by the time *Rob Roy* embarked on its career in 1862, the Anaconda Plan was in full effect for almost two years, and the Union blockaders were well versed in the capturing of blockade runners. Though blockade runners came in all shapes and sizes, it was easier for smaller sailing vessels to navigate the rough, shallow waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Some of the best suited vessels were coasting centerboard schooners. Near the end of the war, however, these small sailing vessels would be replaced by steamships that traveled at faster speeds and moved without depending on the weather.

Schooners have a long history of maneuvering well in shallow waters in various environments, whether that be in the Great Lakes, along the Atlantic coast, within the Gulf of Mexico, or the Caribbean Sea. A schooner-rigged vessel is perhaps one of the most used and, in turn, the most developed. “No one knows how many schooners have existed or how many variations have been developed for different trades and waters” (Cullen 1974:140). Once a vessel was in use, it was often shifted from trade to trade as economic interests changed, all the while modifications would be made as necessary. This was the case with *Rob Roy*. *Rob Roy* “had the appearance of an ordinary trading schooner of the clipper build” (Watson 2001:6) and was 78 feet long, 22.5 feet wide, with a depth of hold at about 6 feet. Initially, schooners were used as
yachting vessels. Still, over time they became cargo vessels as they were light, shallow drafted, and able to maneuver quickly on inland waterways as well as out in the open ocean (MacGregor 1997:12).

The term schooner was first used to define a small, easily handled vessel and is rumored to have appeared in about 1713 when a vessel was launched, and someone yelled: “Oh, how she [sic] scoons!” (MacGregor 1997:17), “scoon” being a Scots word meaning to skip along the surface of the water. Eventually, a schooner was identified by the placement of its sails and a smaller hull, which of course, varied greatly. The schooner is identifiable by its distinct masts, which rake aft. Schooners have two masts, and the types vary based on their sail configuration (MacGregor 1982:10-11) (Figure 2.4).

The schooner is thought to originate from both sides of the Atlantic, in England and colonial America. American and British schooners can be further classified into two separate groups within each country. The two types in the American tradition were the ocean-going schooner and the smaller inshore craft (MacGregor 1997:21). The British tradition shared similar classes of the vessel; the smaller of which would be referred to as shallop on both sides of the Atlantic. The main difference between the American and British shallop type was that the latter were generally smaller, but both types were “rigged with gaff sails or spritsails, and with the foremast stepped right up in the eyes of the boat” (MacGregor 1997:21). The larger schooners were similar in both boat building traditions; they were more substantial with the addition of square topsails and topgallant sails used both fore and aft (MacGregor 1982:32).
FIGURE 2.4. Labeled sails of a schooner type vessel (MacGregor 1997:49).

The American tradition evolved slightly over time, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century, a standard proportion of length to beam was identified as successful for coastal and inland waterway sailing. By the mid-1800s, steamboats had taken over as packet vessels, and two- to three-masted schooners were used for freighting (or fishing) with a fore-and-aft rigging, as was preferred by coastal vessels because they could be sailed by smaller crews and in quicker times. These fore-and-aft schooners were rare in Great Britain but were almost preferred on the East Coast of North America (MacGregor 1997:70). Some of the earliest built clipper schooners were designed for fisheries and were keel schooners often fit with centerboards (Chapelle
The first recorded account of a vessel fitted with a centerboard (Figure 2.5) was in New Jersey in 1811 (Barkhausen 1990:9).

FIGURE 2.5. Centreboard Construction Plan for Clipper City (Barkhausen 1990:12).

The centerboard was placed off the center of the keel and hung on a bolt four-fifths from the aft-end, which allowed it to pivot on a fixed point that kept it from getting caught when it struck bottom (Barkhausen 1990:9). A good example of a successful clipper-built flat-bottomed centerboard schooner used in intercoastal waterways is Sunny South, 1855 (Figure 2.6).
FIGURE 2.6. Sunny South, oyster schooner, 1855, half model (Chapelle 1973:85).

Sunny South was registered as 71 feet long, 22.33 feet wide, and 5.25 feet depth of hold, and represented stock version of future oyster schooners along the East and Gulf coasts. Sunny South was rumored to be a very fast boat with “a small sheer, straight keel with small drag, moderate rake of sternpost, round tuck, upper-and-lower transom square stern, the stem curved, raking and flaring of the rabbet” (Chapelle 1973:83-86). The flat-bottom design allowed the vessel to sit shallow in the water, adding to its speed and maneuverability in inland waterways. For a flat-bottomed vessel to function successfully, it must have a longer length to width ratio, with enough flare on the sides to keep it from capsizing in rough waters (Chapelle 1973; Culler 1974; MacGregor 1997; Watson 2001). This specific design became popular for blockade runners because of maneuverability and the type of water in which they operated.

Conclusion
A blockade is a military tactic used for hundreds of years, and though its use was not unique, the way the blockade was carried out during the American Civil War was. The war was fought between brothers and was a struggle within a nation that shared numerous borders. Not only was it difficult to defend the borders from within, but once the blockade was declared, it was difficult for both the Union and Confederacy to establish a naval force big enough to defend their own causes. The United States had a meager navy at the onset of the war and, through the four bloody years, were able to establish a strong naval force. Once the Union was able to defend Lincoln’s Anaconda Plan, it became the goal of the South to find a way to break the blockade and continue trade with outside investors to fund their war efforts. As a result, blockade running became a lucrative business for outside investors and an integral part of the Confederacy’s ability to withstand the blockade for so long.

The blockading force was broken into four sections, two along the Atlantic Coast and two along the Gulf Coast. The massive extent of the southern coast was difficult for the Union forces to defend, but through a focused defense of important ports, they were able to hold their own. Those blockade runners willing to risk it all for the hope of profit found creative ways to circumvent the blockading force. In the Gulf, this meant that blockade runners would utilize small sailing vessels that could enter shallow ports along the coasts of Texas and Florida. Other ports along the coast like New Orleans and Mobile were essential to the success of the South but were also better defended by Union forces.

One of the most successful blockade runners in the Gulf of Mexico was Captain William Watson, who captained the centerboard schooner, Rob Roy. Schooners were effective vessels in maneuvering the blockade in the Gulf of Mexico. Under his command, this small vessel was able to enter several ports along the Texas coast and even Mexico. Rob Roy successfully evaded
capture on two separate occasions transporting various war goods like weapons, cotton, and medical supplies. From 1863 until *Rob Roy* was scuttled and burned off the coast of Florida, the vessel was able to run the blockade successfully thirteen times.
CHAPTER THREE: ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHODS AND SURVEY

According to Watson, Rob Roy was scuttled and burned on 2 March 1865 in Deadman’s Bay, Florida. Beginning in 1864, navigational charts of the area indicate that there were remains of shipwrecks, including an “old boiler”. In 1978 salvagers collected items from a wreck site in this region and claimed it to be from Rob Roy (Barnette 2003:124). Subsequently, researchers from East Carolina University conducted work on two sites within this region. Is one of these sites the remains of Rob Roy or another Civil War vessel? Do the artifacts recovered by the sports divers correspond with the vessels of this era? The methodology for answering these questions includes historical, theoretical, and archaeological investigations. Here the archaeological methods are briefly discussed along with the results of the archaeological survey.

Archaeological Survey Methods

Two stages of fieldwork were conducted for this project. The first stage of fieldwork data was collected by East Carolina University’s Advanced Methods Class in March 2017 (McKinnon 2017). That original data influenced the second stage of fieldwork conducted in November 2018. The primary goal of the 2018 fieldwork was to dive on targets identified during the preliminary survey using the 2017 magnetometer and side scan sonar data. After verifying which sites were most relevant to this thesis, it was roughly mapped and photographically documented.

Preliminary Survey

The goal of the preliminary survey completed in 2017 was to reassess two anomalies from a survey completed in 2016. The two anomalies included “Target 0284 and Target 0285” (Figure 3.1), which were loosely identified with what NOAA charts referred to as “old boiler” or “obstruction” (Figure 3.2). The two anomalies were chosen after oral reports, and Barnette’s
(2003:124) compilation of wrecks in Florida suggested that treasure hunters in 1978 had identified Rob Roy and sold artifacts from the wreckage found in Deadman’s Bay. According to these reports, Rob Roy was located between markers #4 and #5 at the mouth of the river, where small sections of the wooden hull, brass spikes, pottery, a single porthole, and lead ballast was recovered (Barnett 2003:124).

FIGURE 3.1. Targets 0284 and 0286 (McKinnon 2017).
Remote sensing for the preliminary survey was conducted in the Steinhatchee River channel that opens into Deadman’s Bay. The field crew used ECU’s 24ft Carolina Skiff, *Flounder*, and gathered side scan and magnetometer readings (McKinnon 2017:8). The magnetic data was gathered with a Geometrics G882 cesium magnetometer utilizing Hypack 2015 Hydrographic Survey software. The positional data was collected with a Trimble AcGPS unit. The lines were spaced evenly at about 10-meter intervals or about 33 feet. The survey was run in both North/South and East/West patterns to complete a full grid of the area surrounding the designated targets. The vessel towed the magnetometer at about 12 meters behind, maintaining a
speed of approximately 3-4 knots. As the water was rather shallow, the magnetometer was floated using a mixture of foam materials attached with duct tape. The resulting data gathered was run through both Hypack and Magpick software and resulted in a shaded relief map with gradient colors (McKinnon 2017:10).

The sonar data was gathered with a side-scan sonar unit, the Marine Sonics 600kHz, and processed information through SeaScan PC and SonarWiz5 software. The sonar was mounted on the same side as the magnetometer (starboard) and remained approximately 0.6 or 2ft above the ocean floor. The lanes were spaced equal 10-meter distances like the magnetometer, and the sonar was run at about 2.5 knots. The results, like the magnetometer data, were exported into ArcMap, and both sets of data were overlaid to gain more information.

The results of side scan and magnetometer surveys showed three main anomalies, two of which were congruent with the known magnetic anomalies of the 2016 survey work and the “old boiler” or “obstruction” identified in the NOAA charts. Of the contacts provided in the 2017 report, Contact 0002 (Figure 3.3), Contact 0005 (Figure 3.4), and Contact 0007 (Figure 3.5) would become the targets of interest for the 2018 field survey.
FIGURE 3.3. Contact 0002 from side scan sonar survey 2017 (McKinnon 2017:32).
FIGURE 3.4. Contact 0005 from side scan sonar survey 2017 (McKinnon 2017:34).
FIGURE 3.5. Contact 0007 from side scan sonar survey 2017 (McKinnon 2017:36)
Diving the Side Scan Targets

Diving on previously collected targets and completing a site survey were prioritized due to adverse weather conditions and time constraints. The data from the Spring of 2017 fieldwork was referenced, and three points were chosen for investigation. These three points, Contact 0002 (Figure 3.3), Contact 0005 (Figure 3.4), and Contact 0007 (Figure 3.5), were chosen because of their congruence with historical research. The next phase was diving on the targets chosen from the side scan sonar data. This was carried out using self-contained breathing apparatus (SCUBA) following the ECU Dive Office safety rules and regulations. The three targets were investigated to decide if they were relevant to this study and to gather detailed data. After each target was reviewed, Contact 0002 and Contact 0007 were deemed unnecessary for this thesis because Contact 0002 had no artifacts present, and Contact 0007 was a different view of the third contact. The third, Contact 0005, required further investigation, and additional data was gathered.

Photographic Survey

A photographic survey was conducted on Contact 0005 of the side scan targets to better document the details found. As Green states in his technical handbook, photography is a practical method for recording detailed information underwater (Green 2004:217). Photographs were gathered with an Olympus Tough TG-3 waterproof camera, and video was recorded using a GoPro Hero3 first edition. A thirty to forty-minute dive was dedicated to gathering photographic data. All photos included a one-meter scale for reference. Due to diving conditions, the photographic survey proved to be of poor quality and could not provide clear information for this project (Figure 3.6).
FIGURE 3.6. One-meter scale photography of Contact 0005 (Photo by Bernard, 2018).

Survey Map

Along with photography, site plan surveys play an essential role in understanding and recording an archaeological site. Site plan survey maps are dependent on on-site conditions (Green 2004:88). Unfortunately, diving conditions were not favorable during the survey, with below sixty-degree air and water temperatures. As such, a rough site plan, or mud map, was drawn in place of a scaled site drawing. The rough field map includes measurements of the span of the wreck site, as well as measurements of distinct features that would help in the identification and analysis process (Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8).
FIGURE 3.7. Rob Roy Sketch (Drawn by Raupp, 2018).
FIGURE 3.8. Boiler Site Sketch (Drawn by Borrelli, 2018).

The Archaeological Investigation

According to Watson`s memoir, Rob Roy ran aground and was scuttled near Suwannee River while other reports suggest the vessel was run aground and burned near Steinhatchee River; however, all sources agree the final resting place of Rob Roy is somewhere within Deadman’s Bay Florida (Watson 2001:286; Stewart 1903:825; Bukuier 1993:38, 95-97; Singer 1998:241; Barnette 2003:124; Gaines 2008:41, 44). Field investigations conducted by students of ECU’s Program in Maritime Studies of Steinhatchee in previous seasons found anomalies in magnetometer data that suggested evidence of a possible wreck site associated with Rob Roy or
Havana, another Civil War blockade runner. One anomaly was referred to on several renditions of NOAA charts as an “old boiler” (Figure 3.9) and deserved further investigation. The anomaly was investigated in November 2018 to determine if it was associated with Rob Roy. Upon completion of the field work, the object was confirmed to be a boiler of some kind. Still, its actual character had to be determined before the association, or lack of association with Rob Roy could be confirmed. Rob Roy was a sailing vessel and was not equipped with a boiler at the time of sinking though it was carrying farm equipment, therefore, the boiler could have still been associated with the vessel. The other vessel, Havana, was a Confederate screw steamer measuring 115 ft 4 inches in length with a beam of 22.5 inches and was reportedly carrying lead and cotton when it was captured (Gaines 2008:41). It was, therefore, necessary to investigate the size and structure of the boiler to identify if it held any association with the vessels.

FIGURE 3.9. NOAA Chart of Deadman’s Bay 1971.
During the field portion of this thesis, video, and photographs, as well as sketches with rough measurements, were taken. The boiler was observed in a shallow environment, and because it is placed near the mouth of Steinhatchee River as it flows into Deadman’s Bay, the water was rather choppy. The choppy water created low visibility, which made it challenging to gather clear photos. The sketch (Figure 3.10) is a plan view of the boiler wreckage, which had little to no visible debris field. The debris field appeared to span less than a few feet from the bulk of the boiler. No probing was conducted in the area, and so it is unclear if the wreck site spans further than what is presented in the sketch.

![Sketch of Boiler in Deadman’s Bay](image)

FIGURE 3.10. Sketch of Boiler in Deadman’s Bay (Drawn by Jason Raupp, 2018).

The wreckage measured 5.6 meters (approximately 20 feet) in length and about 3.6 meters (approximately 12 feet) wide. The exterior of the boiler was broken away, exposing what appeared to be several fire tubes, a steam tube, and the firebox measuring 1.4 meters
(approximately 5 feet) by 1.1 meters (approximately 4 feet). Four fire tubes were defined, and partial pieces of a fifth were exposed. A small lead lined pipe lay at the southeast corner of the wreck with a rope attached. The rope appeared to be relatively modern, and it was unclear if the pipe was once a part of the wreckage. Surrounding the boiler within a few feet were pieces of metal plating that appeared to have broken off from the boiler. At the southwest corner of the wreckage, the circular end of the cylindrical section of the boiler lay vertical to the sea floor and appeared to rise approximately 3 ft from the sea floor with a diameter of 4 to 5 ft. Also exposed in the wreckage were rivets (Figure 3.11), and a section in the lower part of the boiler appeared to be charred.

FIGURE 3.11. Photograph of Boiler Rivets in Deadman’s Bay (Taken by author, 2018).
The most defining features of this boiler is its smaller size, the presence of rivets, and the type of metal used. Based on the appearance of the metal, including its rather rough texture and the way in which the metal was rusting, the boiler appeared to be made of wrought iron, but without further testing, this cannot be stated with total assurance. The presence of rivets and the material used places this artifact within a possible time frame conducive to the Civil War.

A steam-boiler is identified by both form and construction; they include stationary, locomotive, and marine boilers (Peabody and Miller 1910:1). Boilers vary in size and internal structure; they can be horizontal or vertical and become more complex over time. By the 1860s, the two most common boilers for marine applications were the tubular boiler and return flue boiler (Bisbee 2018:16). Due to the qualities of the boiler located in Deadman’s Bay, certain types of boilers are ruled out, including Locomotive-boilers and Scotch Boilers. The most defining characteristics of locomotive boilers are their small tubes with diameters of 2 or fewer inches, allowing for a closer grouping and increased number of tubes within the cylinder (Peabody and Miller 1910:19). Scotch Boilers (Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13) were standardized over time and included somewhere between 300 to 330 tubes with 2.5 inches to 3-inch diameters (Meyer 1920:A117). In the boiler located within Deadman’s Bay, only four tubes and part of a fifth were exposed, each of which had a 4 to 6-inch diameter.

Cylindrical Tubular Boilers (Figure 3.14) consist of a cylindrical shell enclosed at each end with flat tube-plates and have several fire-tubes with 3 to 4-inch diameters. They are equipped with a manhole on top and a hand-hole near the bottom to make cleaning easy. The placement of the feed-pipe varies as does the blow-off pipe. The front of these boilers are often made with cast iron, and there are large doors that open to the smokebox (Peabody and Miller 1910:2-6). The main difference between the Cylindrical Tubular Boiler and the Cylindrical Flue-Boiler (Figure 3.15) is the replacement of dozens or hundreds of small fire-tubes with fewer large flues. Flue-boilers are generally larger than the tubular boiler, which was more compact, but their exteriors looked similar (Peabody and Miller 1910:5-6; Bisbee 2018:16-17). The flue boiler was most common during the Civil War while the tubular boiler “was just coming into its own” (Bisbee 2018:17), but both were utilized in Confederate ironclads.

Boilers of this era were held together with rivets; the type of rivet would vary from boiler to boiler. The rivets found on the “old boiler” had a dome shaped head like pressure and button rivets as well as those especially designed by the International Engineering Company. Rivets used in boilers had to be designed to withstand high pressure. According to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, certain rivet heads were created to best suit high pressure conditions (Figure 3.16). Cone head rivets were the most common commercial rivets which came directly from a manufacturer while Steeple head rivets were the usual form of hand-driven rivets (Haven and Swett 1923:86). Pressure head rivets were most widely used in machine riveting, and the rivet designed by the International Engineering Company was created for their boiler shop. The button head rivet was the most common form of structural rivet heads. When spacing, the structural space was limited full countersunk, and flat countersunk rivets would be used instead. If a rivet were to be subjected to extreme vibration, a swell neck would be used while straight neck rivet heads were most suited to pre-drilled holes. The flat head rivet would be used in close quarters and could not be exposed to external heat (Haven and Swett 1923:88-89). As this list illustrates, a rivet head would be chosen based on the need for construction. Structures designed
to be under high pressure would best be constructed using a dome shaped headed rivets such as found within the “old boiler.”

The archaeological investigation of the “old boiler” suggests that the object is not clearly associated with the wreck of Rob Roy and closely resembles the structure of flue boilers commonly used during the Civil War. It is not clear if the boiler is associated with the wreck of Havana or possibly associated with the many salt works that were set up along the coast during the Civil War. There is no historical evidence providing the type of boiler used aboard Havana. Reports simply refer to the cargo aboard the vessel, including the 10 tons of lead that melted and sank along with the steamer (Stewart 1903:262). The absence of melted lead surrounding the “old boiler” rules out the possibility of it being associated with Havana.

Given the small size of the boiler, it could have been used by one of the many saltworks set up along the coast during the Civil War (pers.comm. Saxon Bisbee November 2018). During the Civil War, salt became increasingly difficult to come by for both Union and Confederate forces. In response to this, saltworks began to appear along the coastlines that were difficult for Union blockaders to defend. Salt became so desperately needed that entrepreneurs would aim to control salt production and therefore raise the prices to obscene levels. In fact, “one man succeeded in getting a “corner” on all available salt in West Florida in 1861” and sold it for high prices (Lonn 1965:36). This is, of course, only one account, but like blockade runners, salt workers were willing to make a profit from the sale of contraband materials. The boilers used for saltworks varied according to what was made available. Without further investigation, the identification of the boiler and what it is associated with will remain unclear.

**Post-Survey Analysis**

Following the results of the 2018 fieldwork, it was deemed necessary to complete an additional phase of research and analysis. The collected data could not conclusively identify the wreckage
as Rob Roy nor could it be associated with the steamer Havana, therefore a spatial analysis was conducted. The goal of the spatial analysis was to create a predictive modeling map of the West Coast of Florida as well as a visual representation of the movements of Rob Roy to assist in an historical, archaeological analysis of the vessel as a blockade runner.

*Geographical Information System*

The use of ArcGIS has become a common tool amongst archaeologists as it provides a way for geographic information to be processed and displayed in a clear manner. The tool can be used to create maps of archaeological sites prior to and after archaeological investigations. In *Spatial Technology and Archaeology: The Archaeological Applications of GIS*, Wheatley, and Gillings (2002:177) discuss the use of georeferencing as a successful predictive modeling tool. In this thesis, georeferencing was used as a post-survey method to provide possible explanations for the discrepancies in the historical record.

*Maps and Charts*

The US Coast Guard began recording the coastline prior to the American Civil War. The first chart utilized was NOAAs “United States-Gulf Coast Florida, Horseshoe Point to Rock Islands 1985 (Figure 3.17),” which was the basemap for the georeferencing project; this map was closest to the reported salvage of Rob Roy. Four other maps and charts were used to overlay the 1985 chart. These included: United States Coast and Geodetic Survey “Coast Chart No.180 Cedar Keys to Deadman’s Bay Florida 1864” (Figure 3.18), Department of Commerce chart “United States-Gulf Coast Florida Horseshoe Point to Rock Islands”(Figure 3.19), Department of Commerce chart “United States-Gulf Coast Cedar Keys to Deadman’s Bay Florida 1935”(Figure 3.20), and finally the United States Coast Survey Office “Northern Part of Florida 1864”(Figure 3.21). These maps and charts were used to provide a wide variance of time and encompass the
desired geographical locations used to create a georeferenced map.

FIGURE 3.18. Coast Chart No.180 Cedar Keys to Deadman’s Bay Florida 1864 (NOAA 2018).
FIGURE 3.20. Gulf Coast Cedar Keys to Deadman’s Bay Florida 1935 Chart (NOAA 2018).

*Georeferenced Map*

To complete a successful georeferenced map, nautical maps of the Florida West coast were collected. To create the most accurate representation of the changes in the coastline, it was important to have geographic maps of the area the Civil War up to the present. Once the maps were located, they were georeferenced and used to analyze the possible wreck site of *Rob Roy*.

The first step in creating a georeferenced map is finding a base map for the overlay maps to georeference accurately. The first map from 1985 was uploaded into the program as a JPEG file and referenced to the North American 1927 (NAD27) datum (Figure 3.22). Following this procedure, the oldest chart dating to 1861 using bathymetric data was georeferenced to the
original map (Figure 3.23). This was completed by adding control points to the original JPEG. Control points were more accurately placed using the Georeferencing toolbar and image viewer. At this step, it was important to ensure that data points were placed in areas that would be less affected by geological changes through time. Once the second map, the oldest map, was georeferenced to the first map, the most recent, three more maps dating from 1930, 1950, and 1864 were georeferenced using similar procedures (Figure 3.24, Figure 3.25, and Figure 3.26). The final map was the only one used in this process that did not utilize bathymetric data to create; because of this, it was the most difficult to georeference and required additional steps to add (Figure 3.26).

FIGURE 3.22. Setting Datum Points and Georeferencing the Basemap from 1985 (Taken by Bernard, 2018).
FIGURE 3.23. Georeferencing the 1861 Chart to the Basemap (Taken by Bernard, 2018).

FIGURE 3.24. Georeferencing the 1950 Chart (Taken by Bernard, 2018).
FIGURE 3.25. Georeferencing the 1930 Chart (Taken by Bernard, 2018).

FIGURE 3.26. All Charts and Maps Georeferenced to the Basemap (Taken by Bernard, 2018).
Conclusion

It was necessary to employ various methods to gather the best and manage the information found during the archaeological investigation and historical research. The historical, archaeological, and geospatial information employed in this thesis required various levels of application. The results of the applied methodology are provided in the following chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORY OF GULF BLOCKADE RUNNING

SAIL VS STEAM

This study examines the life and times of Rob Roy, a Civil War blockade runner through archaeological and historical research. This analysis provides a discussion of Rob Roy as a blockade runner, including a comparative analysis of the vessel’s relative success within the Gulf of Mexico. In addition to the analysis, this section will review the archaeological data collected during the fieldwork at Deadman’s Bay.

It is paramount to have a comprehensive history of the artifact to understand how Rob Roy (Figure 4.1) influenced socioeconomic interactions and contributed to the overall understanding of blockade runners within the Gulf of Mexico during the Civil War. Rob Roy became a blockade runner after several Confederate ports were already captured and controlled by Union forces. By the spring of 1862, ports along the southern coast captured by Union forces were lost, including Beaufort, South Carolina, Jacksonville and St. Augustine, Florida, and Brunswick, Georgia (Wise 1988:63). Other southern ports, including Savannah and New Orleans, were starting to feel the grip of the Anaconda Plan. As the grip tightened, blockade runners were forced to look elsewhere along the coastline to transport much needed Confederate goods. Ports that held no direct ties to Confederate or Union causes remained neutral and were accessed by blockade runners and investors of all nationalities. These ports included Spanish Havana, and British Bermuda and Nassau. Blockade runners that joined in the lucrative and dangerous enterprise at the beginning of the war were forced to enter the “backdoor” around the time that Rob Roy became involved.

At the outbreak of the war, the Union navy was not well equipped to enforce the blockade, and the Confederacy was not equipped to break through. Each side was forced to
employ and convert older vessels to serve their cause. The most common vessel used to break
the blockade was small coasting centerboard schooners, but by the end of the war, it was more
common to see steamers used for blockade running. As the war came to an end, it became
increasingly difficult for blockade runners (Table 4.1) and especially for sail as the seas were
filled with faster, better made steamers (Table 4.2) (Lebergott 1987:873).

![Figure 4.1. Sketch of Rob Roy (Watson 2001:162).](image)

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TABLE 4.2 BLOCKADE RUNS AND CAPTURES
(Lebergott 1981:879)

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<td>Attempted Runs to and from C.S.A.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steam</td>
<td>1,693</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sail</td>
<td>3,898</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Captures: Percent with Cotton Cargo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steam</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sail</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Cargoes: Successful Outward Runs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steam</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sail</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rob Roy as a Civil War Blockade Runner**

*Rob Roy*’s construction is reported to be sometime in June of 1863. One source cites the origins of the vessel as Norwich, Connecticut, but without historical, archaeological evidence, this is just conjecture, and the origins of the vessel remain unknown (Barnette 2003:124). What is known, is a detailed account of the time the vessel was held under the command of William Watson as well as the capture of *Rob Roy* by the Union blockading force at Deadman’s Bay in Florida. The first introductions to the vessel follow Watson’s purchase in 1862 and renaming of the vessel as it traveled to Belize, Honduras. Watson’s (2001:6) account outlines that the vessel was a flat-sharp centerboard clipper-built schooner, which made it very seaworthy. The centerboard was in line with the keel and held in place by a strong king pin like *Sunny South* (Figure 4.2). *Sunny South*, which has no known association with *Rob Roy*, was a construction model built in 1855 and represented a model developed between 1830-1835, which maneuvered best in New England bays (Chapelle 1973:86). Though centerboard schooners lay shallow in the water, with cargo,
they functioned well and were useful when entering the shores of Southern States, especially along the Gulf of Mexico (Watson 2001:4-6).

FIGURE 4.2. Sunny South (Chapelle 1973:85).

The vessel carried a crew of eight, including a captain, mate, cook, cabin boy, and four seamen, the perfect proportion of two men to a mast. Watson (2001:6) described the schooner as an “ordinary trading schooner of clipper build.” These clipper-built schooners were popular as North American fishing vessels because they were fast and allowed ample deck space for working (Chapelle 1973:74-75). When the vessel was loaded, it had a draught of 4 feet 9 inches and 13 feet when the centerboard was down. Watson (2001:6) states that the vessel shared similarities with schooners found on the American side of the Atlantic. The vessel was equipped with a trunk cabin, which rose about two feet above the main deck and was accessed through stairs facing the stern (Watson 2001:6). Schooners of this build were successful in shallow environments, especially within bays, and as a result, the design remained the same for about seventy years into the 1920s (Chapelle 1973:86).
As the vessel traveled to British Honduras from New Orleans in 1862, it encountered the Confederate steamer *Alabama* (Figure 4.3). It exchanged information regarding the safety of the port with the steamer’s crew. CSS *Alabama* was a large wooden steam screw sloop sunk by USS *Kearsarge* on June 19, 1864, and though it served a successful career as a Confederate commerce raider, it only survived for two years (Gaines 2008:36). The officer on board *Alabama* recognized the schooner as a vessel that had served the Confederate cause in Mobile, Alabama, several times before. *Rob Roy* continued its journey from New Orleans with a couple of passengers and a small cargo to sell in British Honduras.

In British Honduras, the schooner was renamed *Rob Roy* and registered as a British vessel. There is no clear documentation that provides historical evidence of what the vessel was named before it became *Rob Roy*. With its new identity in place, *Rob Roy* acquired a light freight and another passenger in addition to the two previous ones and made its way to Matamoros, Mexico. Thanks to its shallow draught and fair winds, it took only six days to travel from Belize to Matamoros. Matamoros, about 26 degrees N latitude, was on the edge of the trade winds making it a rather turbulent coast for vessels to rest (Watson 2001:17). Because the port of Matamoros lay further inland on the southern side of the Rio Grande, even shallow-drafted vessels had to be pulled across the sandbars by a smaller boat. Anything destined for Matamoros or Brownsville would have to be unloaded at the Brazos Santiago port because there was not enough water to allow ocean going vessels to cross at the mouth of the Rio Grande (Underwood 2003:67).
As *Rob Roy* waited for its next cargo, Watson traveled to the port of Bagdad off the coast of Texas (Figure 4.4), paid port duties, and discussed the cost of cotton with the Cotton Bureau as well as current affairs on both sides of the river. In 1863 Bagdad had become a destination for individuals to share in the profits of the current trade—far change from the fishermen shanties that populated the town before the outbreak of the American Civil War (Irby 1977:6). After gaining its first cargo in Bagdad, *Rob Roy* would serve as a blockade runner under the command of William Watson. The vessel’s first run was from Matamoros to the Brazos River, which empties into the Gulf of Mexico near Brownsville on the Texas coast.
FIGURE 4.4. South Texas Coast from Cedar Bayou to the Rio Grande (Underwood 2003:9).

Watson referred to each of his investors using initials. To assist in clarification within this chapter each investor will be referred to using a pseudonym (Table 4.3).
TABLE 4.3 INVESTOR CHART INCLUDING APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGE OWNED BY EACH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investor</th>
<th>Pseudonym</th>
<th>Located</th>
<th>Percentage Owned</th>
<th>Sum</th>
<th>Ship Or Cargo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>Brownsville, TX</td>
<td>50% -- 12.5% -- 50%</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messrs. M. and Co</td>
<td>Mathews and Co.</td>
<td>Columbia, TX</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>13,500+</td>
<td>Cargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. and D.G.M and Co.</td>
<td>Martin and Co.</td>
<td>Houston, TX</td>
<td>75% -- 0%--50%</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Ship—Ship--Cargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. R.M. Senior partner of R. and D.G.M and Co.</td>
<td>Mr. R. Martin</td>
<td>Havana</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Ship--Cargo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To make its first run, *Rob Roy* had to gain a cargo, a new crew, and in turn, a new investor who became a partial owner of the vessel. The crew who first journeyed with *Rob Roy* from New Orleans were not the type to be involved in the “bold and daring enterprise” (Watson 2001:34) of blockade running and, therefore, were replaced. To pay the passage of each crew member, their wages, and provide an advance in payment for the new crew was more than Watson could provide without selling the cargo, therefore, he accepted an offer from his first investor, a gentleman from Brownsville. The vessel and its cargo were now co-owned (Watson 2001:35). With a new crew and captain, *Rob Roy* began its first adventure as a blockade runner heading for the Brazos River. While on its maiden voyage, the vessel met the three-masted schooner *Kittitinie* (or *Kittatinny*), a Union navy blockade vessel (Watson 2001:41). On September 24, 1863, the schooner *Kittitinie* was instructed to watch the Texas ports at Brazos River, Pass Cavallo, and Aransas for blockade running vessels filled with cotton (Stewart 1987:602). Fortunately, *Rob Roy* was able to avoid capture and safely made its way to the Brazos...
River and 30 miles up the river to Columbia, Texas, the acting port in the area. It is here that *Rob Roy* received its first injury as a blockade runner.

*USS Virginia* was given the same duty station as *Kittatinny*, placing the screw steamer along the Texas coast at the same time as *Rob Roy* (Stewart 1987:602). As *Rob Roy* neared the Confederate forts on the shores of the Brazos River, a large steamer similar to *USS Virginia*, bore down on the ship from about four miles to the east, unable to drift into the shallow waters it fired at *Rob Roy*. At first, a warning shot was fired, which fell short of the vessel. As the steamer approached *Rob Roy*, it continued to shoot and, as far as the crew aboard *Rob Roy* could tell, miss. *Rob Roy* was pulled over the sand bars by a small pilot vessel. When *Rob Roy* finally made it to shore, the crew realized that the vessel was struck on the starboard side, but at a point that kept the shot-hole above water. The vessel was careened, and the hole was filled with tarred oakum and covered with a strong tarred canvas, which was nailed on to stop the leak (Watson 2001:47). Due to the leak, several items in the cargo, including cotton, were damaged, and because there was no way to ensure a blockade runner, it was an economic loss for the crew and owners. The surviving cargo included salt pork, crates of earthenware, nails, and ironmongery (Watson 2001:48).

Following this close call, *Rob Roy* underwent some repairs carried out by a local carpenter that once served in the Confederate forces with Watson. Both Watson and the carpenter were members of the Confederate Army serving in the same brigade at Corinth, Mississippi, after which the carpenter was taken prisoner in Vicksburg and unable to serve again. The carpenter shortened the masts of the vessel by creating a new heel for the keelson, wedging the slackened deck, and lightly wedging the masts. Finally, *Rob Roy* was re-rigged and loaded
with compressed cotton purchased from Houston. Lying nearby were three or four blockade-running schooners waiting on similar tasks to be completed (Watson 2001:52).

By September 1863, several schooners that served as blockade runners had been captured or sunk by Union forces while trying to run the blockade along the Texas coast (Powel, Cordon, and Arnold 2012:332-333). Even with these losses, the port Sabine Pass was defended successfully by the Confederate forces giving the locals in Columbia cause to reinforce the Brazos River. To do this, the Confederate government impressed *Rob Roy*, even though several other suitable vessels were nearby. During its short impressment, *Rob Roy* reinforced the Confederate position at Fort Velasco by driving piles and placing obstructions throughout the river. While the vessel was employed, Watson headed to Houston to urge General Magruder to remove *Rob Roy* from impressment. Below are sections of the correspondence that followed Watson's visit to General Magruder:

*Letter from Major-General Magruder, C.S. Army, to the Confederate commissioner at London, transmitting copies of correspondence with the British consul at Galveston.*

_Hqrs. District of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona_  
_Houston, Tex., October 22, 1863._

_Sir:_ I send you for your information a copy of a letter to the British consul at Galveston, in answer to one from him, a copy of which is also enclosed. The consul is so unfair in his statements as to justify on my part the belief that he is trying, out of small things, to create mischief. In case this correspondence is brought to the notice of the English Government, I beg that you will make such use of my letter as may seem best.

_Very respectfully,_  
J. Bankhead Magruder,  
_Major-General, Commanding._

_Hon. James M. Mason,_  
_Confederate States Commissioner, London, England._

_[Enclosures.]_  
_Her Majesty’s Consulate, Galveston, October 3, 1863._

_General: I herewith transmit for your consideration a copy of a letter which was yesterday placed in my hands by Mr. Watson, the owner of the *Rob Roy*, a British vessel, which has lately entered the port of Velasco…"
…I have also to direct your attention to the condition in which the crew of Rob Roy are now placed. From the treatment to which British seamen, who have found themselves in this state, have hitherto been exposed, I must infer that but slight regard will be paid to their rights as neutrals…I now learn that they have been forcibly impressed on board the gunboats at Shreveport…I consider it proper to state to you that it has been my duty to report to her Majesty’s Government that my remonstrances have been fruitless to effect a due observance of the rights of British subjects in this State.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
Arthur T. Lynn,
Her Britannic Majesty’s Consul.

Major-General J. B. Magruder,
Commanding District of Texas, etc.
Hdqrs. District of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona,
Houston, Tex., October 21, 1863.

…The schooner Rob Roy was released as soon as she was ascertained to be a British vessel. She was seized as a military necessity, to aid in constructing defenses at the mouth of the Brazos, in which river she was then lying. Some damage he is informed, may have been done her bulwarks in preparing her for the service. Colonel Bates, the officer making the impressment, has been directed to send these headquarters for payment any just account which may be incurred by the captain for such repairs as may be necessary to replace her in precisely the same condition as she was in before the seizure and which may be presented by the captain…

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Stephen D. Yancey,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Arthur T. Lynn, Esq.,
Her Britannic Majesty’s Consul, Galveston, Tex. (Stewart 1987:842-845).

In the short time Watson was gone, the schooner completed its role as Confederate vessel and was towed up to shore, apparently meeting with an accident along the way. The rails were cut on both starboard and port to allow the pile driver to rest on the deck. While traveling up the river, another vessel collided with Rob Roy causing the pile driver to pull the railing away up to the stern, damaging the stanchions (Watson 2001:59). The Brigadier-General stationed in Houston gave permission to the locals to provide the sturdy oak needed to replace the railings. It was only because of Watson’s service in the Confederate army and connections with some of the local officials that permission to attain the oak was granted.
Once again, when Watson returned to repair the schooner, *Rob Roy* met with another unfortunate fate, sinking in the harbor with only the top rails showing. Fortunately, the vessel had no iron ballast weighing it down, which would make raising it much easier. Though the new captain promised he did what he could to save the vessel and even removed the sails, he took it upon himself to get the schooner surveyed and find its worth. This captain was quickly asked to leave the service of *Rob Roy*, while Watson and some captains of fellow schooners found a way to raise the vessel from the depths. With the additional investment of Martin and Co. Watson was able to afford the costly raising and pay Captain S (another schooner’s captain) to provide the labor and tools needed. In late November, strong north winds were blowing, which lowered the river allowing for a smoother extraction of the vessel from the depths. Within two days, *Rob Roy* was raised, creating a second lease on life as a blockade runner. The cause of the sinking was discovered by the third day when all the cargo was removed. One of the screw jacks from the cotton bundles had pushed into the hull, causing a seam in the centerboard casing to open, but the cotton soaked up the water keeping the vessel afloat longer. To repair the hull, a deck beam was pounded on with a heavy weight until the board was put back into place and the seam was caulked up (Watson 2001:80).

*Rob Roy* was thoroughly cleaned, dried, and refitted with fresh mattresses and bedding, all very expensive, but made possible by the new owners Mathews and Co. The vessel remained under the control of Watson even though it was under new ownership. *Rob Roy* was being returned to a functioning state; federal forces managed to attack the nearby forts, causing a need for the service of schooners sitting in port. As Mathews and Co were unable to provide a cargo load for some time, *Rob Roy* returned to the Confederate service. *Rob Roy* carried timber and other provisions from Columbia to Fort Velasco during its service with the Confederacy (Watson
Though the vessel was shot at by Union steamers, it was able to finish its duties for the Confederate forces unscathed. Near the end of 1863, the Union Navy continued to struggle with around the clock blockading of the Brazos, which led to a steady flow of blockade runners even until the end of the war (Hall 2014:38).

After traveling up and down the Brazos River for so long, the vessel became fouled by barnacles. The ship was careened along the sandbanks where the tides would not come in for 24 hours, providing enough time to clean and coat the hull with a tallow mixture. Torches were used to kill the roots of the barnacles attached to the hull. The mixture was prepared by heating two pounds of white lead into three pounds of tallow to 150 degrees Fahrenheit. After the mixture was applied, the vessel was left to dry and turned to repeat the process (Watson 2001:86). Once cleaned, Rob Roy sailed lighter and smoother, making its way to a local sugar plantation for cargo. Nearby, another schooner Exchange would be captured by Union blockader USS Antona off Velasco, Texas, as it headed into port (Powell, Cordon, and Arnold 2012:335). The Acting Master reported to Welles, Secretary of the Navy:


USS Antona,
Off Galveston, December 25, 1863.

Sir: I have the honor to report that on the 24th instant, on my way from Pass Cavallo to this place, I captured the British schooner Exchange for attempting to violate the blockade. At the time of capture we were in 8 fathoms of water, Velasco bearing west, true, distant 10 miles. The schooner was first seen at 8:30 pm bearing E by N, distant 5 miles, and steering about W by N...Exchange, from Nassau, bound for New Orleans...Her cargo consists of coffee, nails, tin plates, cotton goods, acids, iron wire, gunny cloth, cotton baling, rope, cases of boots and shoes, cases, contents unknown, and a quantity of liquors...

…I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Alfred L.B. Zerega,
Acting Master, Commanding USS Antona.

Hon. Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C.
The next day *Rob Roy*’s crew traveled another 22 miles to a nearby plantation where Christmas celebrations were held. While the crew celebrated, *Rob Roy* waited to load its new cargo of cotton, sugar, poultry, venison hams, and a cask of wine from the plantation. Following the holiday, *Rob Roy* was reevaluated after the repairs and loss of cargo. Martin and Co paid all the accounts of the vessel and fixed the worth of cotton to 14 cents per pound at any neutral port (Table 4.4). This new arrangement meant that William Watson was one-eighth the owner when only six months prior, he was the full owner (Watson 2001:94). Before *Rob Roy* could return to sea, it needed permission to leave the port, which Watson attained by General Magruder. Meanwhile, the ship took on a new crew and towed another schooner out of danger from the Union blockade. General Magruder granted *Rob Roy* permission to exit the port and employed the vessel to carry a packet of papers to Havana. In February that same year, *Rob Roy* made its way back into the Gulf loaded with important legal documents as cargo (Watson 2001:106).

**TABLE 4.4 COTTON: BLOCKADE MARGIN IN TEXAS, 1864**
(Lebergott 1981:864)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Market price in CSA (Houston, Galveston)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Value of export permit</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Transport: interior to Rio Grande</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. CSA export duty</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.00125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Mexican import duty</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Smuggling cost</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Market price in Tampico, Mexico</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Mexican export duty</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Market price in Havana</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Reshipping cotton in Havana</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Transport to Liverpool</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Market price in UK</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Market price in NYC (Gold)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$0.558</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As *Rob Roy* ventured back into the Gulf from Columbia, Texas bound for Tampico, it was joined by two other schooners, *Mary Elizabeth* and *Hind*. *Hind* fell behind and was most
likely captured while *Mary Elizabeth* and *Rob Roy* were able to continue. Both got caught in a storm bringing a gale that cracked the strop, which held the topmast staysail in place. Once the storm passed, *Rob Roy* lost sight of *Mary Elizabeth* and did not come in contact until the following morning where they found *Hind* captured by Union forces. The same Union forces attempted to capture them, but the weather favored *Rob Roy*, allowing it to escape; the fate of *Mary Elizabeth* remained unknown until later.

Sometime within the month of February 1864, *Rob Roy* reached longitude 97 approximately 40 miles east of Tampico. Within hours the vessel dropped anchor at the port of Tampico. During its voyage from Columbia on the Brazos River to Tampico, *Rob Roy* appeared to be leaking. It was soon discovered that not having the cotton packed tightly caused the ship to sail less smoothly, allowing water to wash over the sides. While in port, part of the cargo was consigned to Gomez, a party designated by Mathews and Co, and the vessel was entered at the custom house. With the French in control of Tampico, import and export prices were reduced, and the freight due was only $13,500 while the cargo was valued at $30,000 (Watson 2001:126). After these investors took a share of the profits, *Rob Roy* sat and waited for departure as paperwork took longer in Mexico. By this point in the war, these exchanges in Mexico were complicated by the presence of French troops and internal disputes (Underwood 2003:108).

*Rob Roy* departed Tampico March 1864 in the direction of Havana with the same 21 bales of cotton and water casks serving as ballast because it was difficult to obtain ballast at the time (Watson 2001:137). The crossing from Tampico to Havana was uneventful, and the schooner was able to reach Havana by mid-March. *Rob Roy* was one of the many blockade runners flocking to Havana for its economically beneficial role during the Civil War. Here new cargo was acquired, cotton was sold, and William Watson settled debts with the vessels’
investors Martin and Co (Watson 2001:140). *Rob Roy* was valued at $4,000, but after all the debts were paid, Watson was still only half owner with Brown, who took no active part with the vessel while in port. Watson was left with a profit of $2,000 after all debts were settled and cargo was sold (Watson 2001:141).

Watson searched for a new cargo while *Rob Roy* was sent to the shipyard for cleaning and general repairs. Mr. R. Martin found him and offered to consign on a profitable cargo whose destination was Texas along the blockaded ports. With this exchange, *Rob Roy* became a courier of 200 Enfield rifles with bayonets, 400 cavalry swords, 400 Belgium muskets with bayonets, six cases of saddlery, 25 boxes of ammunition, and other goods needed by the Confederate forces. *Rob Roy* was again employed as a courier for important dispatches to return to General Magruder (Watson 2001:149). The Enfield rifles alone brought in a 50-60% profit when sold to the Confederacy or other buyers in Matamoros (Irby 1973:17).

It was now April 1864, and *Rob Roy* began another journey, this time to Galveston. *Rob Roy* was legally cleared for Belize, Honduras, and ventured out from Havana towards Galveston, its true destination, along with Captain Dave commander of another unidentified blockade runner. Within the first night, *Rob Roy* lost sight of Captain Dave’s vessel, and for the first few weeks, the vessel crept along with low sails to avoid capture. About 120 miles from Galveston, the crew aboard *Rob Roy* met with a possibly dangerous event. They passed and were ignored by a Union steamer and then narrowly escaped *Sylvia*, a blockade runner that had been captured as a prize ship and used as bait for further captures.

On April 19, 1864, another schooner like *Rob Roy* was captured by USS *Owasco* off Velasco, Texas. This vessel, *Fanny*, was a small sailing schooner captained by a Robert B. Wilson of Dublin. *Fanny* provides an example of blockade runners captured with full cargo and
auctioned as prize ships. Aboard *Fanny* was a cargo worth $2,222, including a case of Enfield Rifles, smooth bore muskets, and sabers, which were categorized as “Munitions of War” (Powell, Cordon, and Arnold 2012:109). This vessel was structurally able to maneuver in the Gulf of Mexico and survived less than a month as a blockade runner (Powell, Cordon, and Arnold 2012:251).

In June 1864, *Rob Roy* docked safely in Galveston Bay and delivered the cargo to the Confederate forces and documents to General Magruder. For two months, the vessel was idle while Watson and Brown discussed the next voyage. While waiting, the schooner was careened, cleaned, and repaired. In 1864 the blockade tightened along several Southern ports, many of which were sealed. In August, Mobile Bay was lost to the Union, and more blockade running shifted in the Gulf of Mexico to the Texas ports (Roberts 2004:119).

In August of 1864, *Rob Roy* was finally loaded with a cargo of cotton, half of which belonged to Martin and Co (Watson 2001:190), and sweet potatoes, poultry acquired from a nearby farm, and barrels of oysters gathered from the shoals the night before. Unfortunately, the vessel could not depart from Galveston until September because a crew member fell ill with yellow fever. Galveston had just suffered a harsh winter followed by food shortages and an outbreak of disease like yellow fever (Cotham 1998:162). While waiting *Rob Roy* narrowly escaped another Confederate impressment and by September was finally given clearance to leave Galveston. Before heading to sea, the captain dragged the base of the hull over low, soft, and shelly sandbars to clean the barnacle growth (Watson 2001:199).

On 12 September, the vessel was finally cleared and ready to run the blockade just outside of Galveston. *Rob Roy* and *Mary Elizabeth* exited the bay around the same time, but by the time *Rob Roy* cleared the blockade, they lost sight of their fellow blockade runner. It was not
until very early the following morning that any other vessel was spotted. The crew identified this vessel as a Union blockader *John Anderson* which chased them once before. As they maneuvered away, avoiding capture again, they set eyes on *Mary Elizabeth*. Soon the blockader would be the least of their worries as a storm washed through, causing them to lose sight of each other yet again, as well as causing damage to *Rob Roy’s* boom.

The following day *Rob Roy* made it to Tampico, where other small schooners were docked, but *Mary Elizabeth* was nowhere in sight and, according to Watson, never documented again. The storm that trapped the two schooners at sea was one of the heaviest recorded (Watson 2001:215). This storm was one of four tropical cyclones documented during the hurricane season of 1864 and reportedly affected the travel of several vessels along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts (Fernandez-Partagas and Diaz 1995:54-55). Unfortunately, as the vessels waited to be pulled into shore, another storm began forming off the coast of Tampico. With careful movements and all crew on deck, Watson was able to maneuver *Rob Roy* through the shallow channels without the aid of a pilot avoiding destruction (Watson 2001:219).

After the cotton that needed to be unloaded in Tampico was landed, Watson was visited by representative Franks (Table 4.5), and the consignee Gomez (Table 4.6) who took half of the cotton. Having unloaded the cargo, *Rob Roy* was ready to complete the journey to Havana. Watson attempted to gather more supplies, but with the French presence in Tampico, there was not much in store. He was able to pick up an additional passenger as well as some barrels containing fine beef and pork. With business completed and new cargo, including Watson’s half of the original cotton, *Rob Roy* set sail for Havana in the first half of October 1864 (Watson 2001:230).
When *Rob Roy* arrived in Havana, it was busy with trade as always, but now the consulate moved, which changed the flow of business. Watson attempted to dissolve his partnership with a member of Mr. R. Martin, a member of Martin and Co. but instead cosigned on a new cargo deal. After the vessel was logged and discharged, the new cargo of potato seed for the farmers in Texas were placed on the ship. This cargo load included additional goods needed by Texas citizens, destined for Galveston. As things took longer to process in Havana, *Rob Roy* underwent needed maintenance until the vessel was cleared for Galveston (Watson 2001:237).

In early December 1864, with a new foresail, *Rob Roy* was ready to sail for Galveston. As the vessel departed, they were under close eye of two Union steamships, neither of them followed (Watson 2001:249). According to Union reports, several blockading vessels were placed in the region when *Rob Roy* traveled to Havana, including *Nita, Stars and Stripes*, and *Hendrick Hudson* (Stewart 1903:778-780). *Rob Roy* cleared the steamships; the vessel was
chased by another steamship while caught in bad weather. The storm blew *Rob Roy* off course for a while, and the crew was forced to lay anchor. As the storm finally passed, *Rob Roy* was in six feet of water, closer to the port than expected. With some assistance of four oarsmen on board, the boat was pulled over the sandbar and passed the blockading force (Watson 2001:257).

As soon as the vessel made port in Galveston and unloaded the cargo, Watson went about finding the parts to replace the main boom that was damaged during the storm. He tried to use his connections with General Magruder, but the general was not in Galveston. When Watson described his predicament to Commodore Smith of the Marine Department, he was able to find the parts and services necessary (Watson 2001:259). In fact, the main mast was replaced with one of the spars from *Harriet Lane* (Figure 4.5). *Harriet Lane* was a successful war vessel that began service in 1857 as an African-slaver and rum-runner but had been captured by the Confederates at the battle of Galveston New Year’s Day, 1863. *Harriet Lane* was a two-masted side-wheeled steamer (Trexler 1931:109) almost twice the size of *Rob Roy* and was dismantled and stored in one of the Transport Sheds in Galveston. After its capture, *Harriet Lane* served as a blockade runner for the Confederacy under the name *Lavinia* (Hall 2014:51). As repairs were completed, Watson found more cargo for *Rob Roy* to transport to Vera Cruz or Tampico, whichever was more easily accessible.
The time was now January 1865, and Rob Roy headed to Vera Cruz with a cargo load of 54 pressed cotton bales. The vessel made its way through the channel and was fired at by a nearby gunboat. The larger vessel approached Rob Roy, stopped firing, and attempted to come alongside. Luckily, Rob Roy was drawing about four feet of water, and it was too shallow for the larger gunboat. Soon after the Union sailors placed a boat hook on Rob Roy pulling it towards them, the wind picked up, and acting quickly, Watson cut the rope and escaped. At first, the men in the gunboat shot at the schooner, but the wind was on their side, and none of the shots reached Rob Roy. The weather remained in favor of Rob Roy and was able to quickly outrun the Union forces continuing their way to Vera Cruz (Watson 2001:275).

By February 1865, the danger of blockade running was increasing, and merchants were getting desperate to sell their goods quickly. The Union also received wind of the trade occurring
along the Mexican coast and were frequenting the area more. Running the blockade into
Galveston and Mexican or Cuban ports increased as late as the spring of 1865 (Cotham
1998:168). Other successful blockade runners, including *Will-o’-the-Wisp* and *Banshee II* that
had spent their time on the Atlantic coast, began traveling to the Gulf of Mexico. Steamers such
as *Denbigh*, which had successfully run the blockade into Mobile since late 1863, began running
into Galveston as it was one of the only remaining ports of entry (Arnold 2011:15).

At Vera Cruz, forty-five of the bales of cotton aboard *Rob Roy* were sold, and 28 were
reshipped under new bills of lading for the return trip to Havana (Watson 2001:279). Watson
made sure to leave Vera Cruz quickly and made the trip to Havana in only eight days without
bad weather or Union cruisers in sight. Upon his arrival at Havana, Watson found that his
previous exchange with investors had been disputed. Mr. R. Martin convinced the Provost
Marshal’s Department to hold *Rob Roy* until the business dispute could be agreed upon by all
parties (Watson 2001:283). Unfortunately for Watson and *Rob Roy*, the proceedings were not in
favor of Watson’s ownership, and so *Rob Roy* was auctioned to the highest bidder. Watson
placed a $3,500 bid but lost to an unknown British gentleman who bid $3,600. It was on this day,
18 February 1865, that *Rob Roy’s* fate was changed. Within only days of new ownership, *Rob
Roy* was run aground and burned as reported to Watson from one of his past crew members.
Reports suggest that the final journey as a blockade runner was from Havana to Florida with
(according to the reports Watson received) an abundance of cotton onboard. Before *Rob Roy*
could reach its destination along the Suwannee River (Figure 4.6), it was spotted by a Union
gunboat, *Fox*, and purposefully run aground and burned by the crew to avoid capture (Watson
2001:286). Though William Watson no longer owned *Rob Roy*, he continued to serve as a
blockade runner and ran one last successful campaign into Galveston Bay. On 1 March 1865, he served on board the 445-ton single-screw steamer *Pelican* (Underwood 2003:58).

Lieutenant John Sherrill of USS *Stars and Stripes* reported to Gideon Welles the acting secretary of the Navy that the schooner *Fox*, tender to the USS *Stars and Stripes*, located and captured the crew and partial cargo of *Rob Roy* along the south side of Deadman’s Bay on March 12, 1865 (Stewart 1903:825):

*Report of Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Sherrill, U.S. Navy, commanding USS Stars and Stripes, regarding the running ashore and firing of the schooner Rob Roy by her won crew.*

_USS Stars and Stripes,_
_St. Marks River, March 12, 1865._

Sir: I have the honor to report that the schooner *Fox* (a tender to this vessel), while lying at anchor at Deadman’s Bay on the 2d instant, discovered a strange schooner at anchor on the south side of the bay near the shore. An armed boat was sent to attempt her capture, from which she endeavored to escape; but unable to effect this, was run ashore and fired by her crew. The flames spread with such rapidity and had obtained such a control by the time the boat’s crew got alongside that it was found impossible to extinguish them. She proved to be the *Rob Roy*, of Belize, Honduras. A small portion of the cargo was saved in a damaged condition. The saved portion consisted of a lot of cavalry sabers and farming and mechanical implements. The *Rob Roy* was of about 60 tons burden.

The articles saved will be sent to the prize court at Key West for adjudication. I enclose herewith a complete list of the officers and crew entitled to share in the above capture.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

John Sherrill,
_Acting Volunteer Lieutenant, Commanding._

Hon. Gideon Welles,
_Secretary of the Navy._

Discussion

Historians emphasize certain elements that make a blockade runner successful, including: vessel type, distance traveled (Figure 4.7), runs without capture, the lifespan of a vessel while blockade running, and net profit of the investment. As a blockade runner *Rob Roy* had several successful runs in the Gulf of Mexico during its almost two years of service. *Rob Roy* was but one of many successful blockade runners; of those serving in the Gulf of Mexico along the Texas coast under sail, it is referred to as one of the most successful. Other well-known blockade runners of the
area include *Denbigh, Will-o’-the-Wisp, and Banshee II*, all of which were steamers, some of which were designed purely for the act of blockade running. *Denbigh* (Figure 4.8) spent most of its career running the blockade to Mobile and following the fall, to Galveston. *Denbigh* was built by Laird, Sons & Co., Birkenhead, and registered in Liverpool, London. The side-wheel steamer was first launched in August 1860 and measured 182 feet in length with a 22-foot beam and a hold depth of 8.7 feet. It was able to reach a speed of 13.7 knots and, as a blockade runner, made 13 successful round trips between 1863 and 1865 (Table 4.7) (Arnold 2011:14).

![Confederate Coast and Blockade-Running Ports](image)

FIGURE 4.7. The Confederate Coast and Blockade-Running Ports (Glover and Arnold 2015:13).
FIGURE 4.8. Computer rendered portrait of *Denbigh* created by Andrew W. Hall (Powell, Cordon, and Arnold 2012:12).

TABLE 4.7 STEP BY STEP JOURNEY OF *DENBIGH*  
(Arnold, Oertling, Hall 2001:5-6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month/Year</th>
<th>Origin and Destination</th>
<th>Notes on Denbigh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1863</td>
<td>Nassau to Havana</td>
<td>Introduced to <em>Denbigh</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1863-January 1864</td>
<td>Havana to Mobile</td>
<td>A year passes without documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb/March 1864- April 1864</td>
<td>Mobile to Havana</td>
<td>First run as blockade runner and makes two round trips back to Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1864 – June 1864</td>
<td>Mobile to Havana</td>
<td>Acquired a new master and makes four round trips to Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1864</td>
<td>Mobile to Havana</td>
<td>Last vessel out before the capture of Mobile Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1864</td>
<td>Havana to Galveston</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1864</td>
<td>Galveston to Havana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1864</td>
<td>Havana to Galveston</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September/October 1864 – April 1865</td>
<td>Galveston to Havana</td>
<td>Acquired a new master and makes five round trips to Galveston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1865</td>
<td>Havana to Galveston</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 May 1865</td>
<td>Galveston</td>
<td><em>Denbigh</em> is grounded, shelled, and burned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Denbigh ran the Gulf Coast blockade successfully under the command of three separate captains and during its time as a blockade runner transported cotton and other cargo to three different ports (Table 4.8). As a blockade runner on the eastern side of the Gulf of Mexico, it ran a rather successful campaign, and thanks to the extensive research of Barto Arnold, there is countless documentation to show the overall success and economic impact the vessel held for its investors and the Confederacy. Denbigh successfully ran the blockade along the Texas coast on seven separate occasions, but due to its size, it was unable to maneuver the smaller inland ports. As a blockade runner of the Gulf of Mexico, Denbigh is one of the most successful. Two other successful blockade runners of the Gulf of Mexico include Will-o’-the-Wisp and Banshee II; both were manufactured for the purpose of running the Civil War blockade.

**TABLE 4.8 THE DENBIGH’S COTTON CARGO FOR THE MOVILE TO HAVANA LEG (Arnold 2011:22)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voyage</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>McNevin</td>
<td>McNevin</td>
<td>Godfrey</td>
<td>Godfrey</td>
<td>Godfrey</td>
<td>Godfrey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># Bails</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weight in Lbs.</td>
<td>249,658</td>
<td>201,600</td>
<td>212,760</td>
<td>210,992</td>
<td>224,544</td>
<td>218,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value in $^8</td>
<td>$124,729</td>
<td>$151,111</td>
<td>$153,365</td>
<td>$105,496</td>
<td>$112,272</td>
<td>$124,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Duty @</td>
<td>311.82</td>
<td>252.00</td>
<td>266.00</td>
<td>263.74</td>
<td>280.68</td>
<td>223.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Market Value per Lb.</td>
<td>50 cents</td>
<td>75 cents</td>
<td>72 cents</td>
<td>50 cents</td>
<td>50 cents</td>
<td>57 cents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchaser price $ @ 6 penc/lb. (12cents/lb.)</td>
<td>$26,959</td>
<td>$24,192</td>
<td>$25,531</td>
<td>$25,319</td>
<td>$26,945</td>
<td>$26,267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit in Mobile at purchase</td>
<td>416%</td>
<td>625%</td>
<td>600%</td>
<td>416%</td>
<td>416%</td>
<td>475%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Banshee II (Figure 4.9), designed after Banshee I, a successful blockade runner of the East Coast, measured 252 feet long with a beam of 31 feet, a depth of 11 feet, and had a registered tonnage of 439 (Cochran 1958:87). The steel-hulled paddle steamer represented a successful Clyde built steamer that was originally designed to maneuver along the coastline of the United Kingdom and across the Irish Sea (Hall 2014:66). The design suited blockade running for shallow inland waterways and long-distance travel across the treacherous Atlantic. Banshee II was captained by the experienced blockade runner Thomas Taylor who invested in constructing vessels to run the blockade and successfully captained the original Banshee I (Table 4.9). Banshee II was launched at Glasgow in 1864, constructed for the Anglo Confederate Trading Company, and in March 1865 ran the blockade from Havana to Galveston (Hall 2014:66; Underwood 2003:57). The vessel was able to bring in a profit from its trip into Texas, but it never ran the blockade into Galveston again (Table 4.10) (Taylor 48).

TABLE 4.9. BLOCKADE RUNNER PROFITS: STEAMER *BANSHEE I*  
(Lebergott 1981:871)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Investment in vessel</td>
<td>$168,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Gross earnings: Inward</td>
<td>$130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Outward</td>
<td>$120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$250,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Expenses: Pilot and Crew</td>
<td>$23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Refitting</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Coal</td>
<td>$3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$28,000</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Net Return:</td>
<td>$221,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Rate of Return on Successful Round Trip</td>
<td>132 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4.10 STEP-BY-STEP JOURNEY OF *BANSHEE II*  
(Wise 1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month/Year</th>
<th>Origin and Destination</th>
<th>Notes on <em>Banshee II</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1864</td>
<td>Bermuda to Wilmington</td>
<td>Introduced to <em>Banshee II</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1864</td>
<td>Wilmington to Nassau</td>
<td>Thomas Taylor takes over as captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1864</td>
<td>Nassau to Wilmington</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1864</td>
<td>Wilmington to Nassau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1864</td>
<td>Nassau to Wilmington</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1864</td>
<td>Wilmington to Nassau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1865</td>
<td>Havana to Galveston</td>
<td>Thomas Taylors first and last run into the Texas port.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1865</td>
<td>Galveston to Havana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1865</td>
<td>Havana to Liverpool</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Will-o’-the-Wisp* (Figure 4.10) was constructed by the same company as *Banshee II* for the sole purpose of running the blockade and lived a short yet profitable career. *Will-o’-the-Wisp* was a steel-hulled Clyde built steamer measuring 209.5 feet long by 23.2 feet wide with a length-to-beam ratio of nine to one (Hall 2014:66). This type of steamer had a long hull and shallow draft, making it well adapted for running and even protecting blockaded ports. The vessel was launched in 1863 from Renfrew, leaking through its maiden voyage to Nassau. Taylor took command of *Will-o’-the-Wisp* after its maiden voyage successfully running the blockade into Wilmington even though the vessel continued to leak (Cochran 1958:90). Taylor eventually sold
the vessel to a new buyer, which proved to be detrimental to the life of the vessel. In December 1864, under the command of Abner M. Godfrey, *Will-o’-the-Wisp* ran the blockade into Galveston. The vessel successfully entered the port, but as it attempted to exit the blockade destined for Havana in early February 1865, it was shot and eventually ran aground several miles south of Galveston Island (Table 4.11) (Hall 2014:68,86-87).

![Digital Reconstruction of the Blockade Runner Will-o’-the-Wisp](image)


**TABLE 4.11 STEP-BY-STEP JOURNEY OF WILL-O’-THE-WISP** (Wise 1988)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month/Year</th>
<th>Origin and Destination</th>
<th>Notes on Will-o’-the-Wisp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1863</td>
<td>Renfrew to Nassau</td>
<td>Maiden voyage of vessel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1864</td>
<td>Nassau to Wilmington</td>
<td>Crashed on a sandbar on way into Cape Fear River</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1864</td>
<td>Wilmington to Nassau</td>
<td>Upon arrival to Nassau vessel sunk and was raised by Taylor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1864</td>
<td>Nassau to Wilmington</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1864</td>
<td>Wilmington to Nassau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1864</td>
<td>Nassau to Wilmington</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1864</td>
<td>Wilmington to Nassau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1864</td>
<td>Nassau to Wilmington</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1864</td>
<td>Wilmington to Nassau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1864</td>
<td>Nassau to Wilmington</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Rob Roy may not have shared structural similarities with the previous vessels, but as a blockade runner in the same region frequented by Denbigh, Will-o’-the-Wisp, and Banshee II, it was able to hold its own and prove itself successful as a West Gulf Coast Blockade runner. The importance this vessel held in the Gulf of Mexico during the Civil War, the economic success of the vessel, and what role its construction played in its success, will be discussed with the assistance of the following charts. The first table (Table 4.10) provides simplified documentation of the various journeys taken by Rob Roy. The second table (Table 4.11) provides a clarified description of the various cargo the vessel transported while in service. The third table (Table 4.12) provides the estimated profit of Rob Roy created by Lebergott (1981) in his economic study on the profitability of cotton smuggling during the Civil War. The fourth table (Table 4.13) provides a comparison of the vessels discussed in this section, including the five categories that makes a blockade runner historically successful. The final chart (Figure 4.11) provides a brief history of Rob Roy from its start as a blockade runner to its final destination in Deadman’s Bay.

**TABLE 4.12 STEP-BY-STEP JOURNEY OF ROB ROY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month/Year</th>
<th>Origin and Destination</th>
<th>Notes on Rob Roy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1863</td>
<td>New Orleans to Belize</td>
<td>Introductions to the vessel. Transports passengers and unknown cargo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July/August 1863</td>
<td>Belize to Matamoros</td>
<td>Gathers investors and supplies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1863</td>
<td>Matamoros to Columbia</td>
<td>Makes first run as a blockade runner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month/Year</td>
<td>Origin and Destination</td>
<td>Notes on <em>Rob Roy</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1864</td>
<td>Columbia to Tampico</td>
<td>Narrowly escapes the Union blockade and impressment by the Confederate Navy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1864</td>
<td>Tampico to Havana</td>
<td>Delivers cotton and federal papers from General Magruder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1864</td>
<td>Havana to Galveston</td>
<td>Delivers supplies for Confederate forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1864</td>
<td>Galveston to Tampico</td>
<td>Delivers cotton, but half remains onboard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October/November 1864</td>
<td>Tampico to Havana</td>
<td>Delivers cotton.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1864</td>
<td>Havana to Galveston</td>
<td>Transports cotton and potato seed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1865</td>
<td>Galveston to Vera Cruz</td>
<td>Transports cotton and narrowly escapes Union capture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1865</td>
<td>Vera Cruz to Havana</td>
<td>Delivers cotton to Havana.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 February 1865</td>
<td>Havana</td>
<td>Auctioned and under new ownership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1865</td>
<td>Havana to Florida</td>
<td>Transports cotton.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 March 1865</td>
<td>Deadman’s Bay, Florida</td>
<td>The vessel is run aground and burned, avoiding Union forces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4.13 CARGO CARRIED BY *ROB ROY*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>Worth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Columbia, Texas</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampico, Mexico</td>
<td>Cotton, Confederate documents</td>
<td>30,000 dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havana, Cuba</td>
<td>21 bales of cotton, Confederate documents</td>
<td>13,500 dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galveston, Texas</td>
<td>200 Enfield Rifles, 400 Belgium Muskets, 400 Cavalry Swords, Six Cases of Saddlery, Blankets, Clothing, Hardware, Tea, Coffee, Cheese, Spices, Liquors, Needle and Thread, Confederate dispatches</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tampico, Mexico</td>
<td>198 Bales of Cotton</td>
<td>6000 dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havana, Cuba</td>
<td>25 Bales of Cotton, Barrels of Salt Beef &amp; Pork,</td>
<td>500-1000 dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galveston, Texas</td>
<td>25 Tons of Bar Iron, Ironmongery, Crates of</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destination</td>
<td>Cargo</td>
<td>Worth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vera Cruz, Mexico</td>
<td>Earthenware, Stationary, Tea, Coffee, 40 Barrels of Potato Seed, 30 Bales of Army Blankets and Tent Cloth, Gun Powder, Other Groceries</td>
<td>124 Bales of Cotton 3000-4000 dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Havana, Cuba</td>
<td></td>
<td>146 Bales of Cotton 3000-4000 dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suwannee, Florida</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cotton Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4.14 BLOCKADE RUNNER PROFITS: SCHOONER ROB ROY
(Lebergott 1981:870)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Investment in vessel</td>
<td>$5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Net return on vessel, Brownsville – Havana</td>
<td>$5804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rate of return on successful: outward voyage</td>
<td>116 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4.15 COMPARISON OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS OF GULF COAST BLOCKADE RUNNERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Rob Roy</th>
<th>Denbigh</th>
<th>Banshee II</th>
<th>Will-o’-the-Wisp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vessel Type (Year Began as Blockade Runner)</td>
<td>Two-Masted Flat-Bottom Centerboard Clipper-Built Schooner (1863)</td>
<td>Side-Wheel Steamer (1863)</td>
<td>Clyde-built Steel-Hulled Paddle Steamer (1864)</td>
<td>Clyde-built Steel-Hulled Paddle Steamer (1863)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runs Without Capture/Total Runs</td>
<td>12/13</td>
<td>26/27</td>
<td>8/8</td>
<td>12/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifetime as Blockade Runner</td>
<td>21 months</td>
<td>16 months</td>
<td>9 months</td>
<td>13 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Profit (Approximate)</td>
<td>120%</td>
<td>500%</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance Traveled (Approximate)</td>
<td>9,000 miles</td>
<td>15,000 miles</td>
<td>5,000 miles</td>
<td>8,000 miles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The success of Rob Roy as an agent of change was directly correlated with controlled and uncontrolled variables. The crew and weather often varied, while the hull of the vessel remained relatively unchanged, with structural modifications as necessary. The flat-bottomed centerboard design of Rob Roy afforded it opportunities that other blockade running vessels and often the Union blockaders were incapable of doing. In fact, it is because of its design that the schooner was suited to the shallow inland waterways and rough waters along the gulf shelf. Areas like the Yucatan Peninsula, Galveston Bay, Rio Grande, and west Florida coast were only maneuverable by shallow-droughted vessels like the centerboard schooner. Its smaller size and sailing abilities kept it from capture and allowed it to be rowed if necessary. As a carrier of goods, Rob Roy held a shallow draught when fully loaded without capsizing in turbulent waters. The vessel was seaworthy and still managed to function in the shallow bays and riverways in blockaded regions.
The overall success of William Watson, other investors, and crew can be directly credited to Rob Roy’s abilities as a blockade runner and William Watson as a captain. A vessel’s success in blockade running was linked to the construction as well as the skill of the individual maneuvering the vessel. For example, Will-o’-the-Wisp was successful under the command of Taylor, but after a new individual captained it, it was quickly run aground. Rob Roy was successful under the command of Watson, but once it was sold, it was run aground and burned.

The cargo carried by Rob Roy added to the overall economic success of the Confederacy, investors in Civil War trade, the livelihood of the vessel’s crew and captain, as well as overall well-being to those who used the cargo. The cotton was, of course, considered the true source of revenue of the Confederacy and, therefore, the funding force during the war. Other items, such as the munitions and supplies transported from Havana to Galveston, directly influenced the economic success of the Confederate forces along the coast of Texas. Specialty items such as cheese, coffee, and even alcohol were difficult for many to come by, so when Rob Roy was able to transport them into ports, these items were considered a luxury and would often be received with much gratitude.

This discussion about Rob Roy during its use as a blockade runner can explain only a short period of time in the life of the vessel. Without further investigation and eventual identification of the physical remains of Rob Roy, there can only be a historical understanding of the interactions held prior to this vessel becoming a blockade runner and after its untimely loss near Florida. The following section will discuss the archaeological survey of the area where Rob Roy was reported (Stewart 1903:825) to have ended its career as a blockade runner.

Conclusion
Rob Roy was a successful blockade runner of the Gulf of Mexico during the American Civil War. The vessel served 21 months and contributed to the lives of investors and crew members. Accounts of the vessel’s final journey vary, but it is historically recorded that the vessel was run aground and burned within Deadman’s Bay. According to magnetometer recordings of Steinhatchee River and the historical record of the area, there was a possible association with Rob Roy, and the wreckage found there. After the investigation, the wreckage was clearly identified as a boiler, ruling out the site as the resting place of Rob Roy. The “old boiler” identified in Steinhatchee shared qualities with boilers utilized during the Civil War and still may be associated with salt works along the coast of Florida. The artifact biography of Rob Roy, as well as that of the “old boiler,” will remain unfinished without further investigation. Upon the conclusion of the field work, the location can now be eliminated, opening other possibilities for further investigation.
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

This chapter will apply the knowledge gained from the research of the blockade runner Rob Roy to the primary and secondary research questions. Finally, it will discuss questions raised from this thesis for future research and limitations faced during the research process.

Answering the Primary Research Question

- What contribution does the study of one blockade runner have on the general understanding of the interaction of ports in the Gulf of Mexico during the American Civil War?

Though the historical account written by Watson was vague at times, it proved the vessel was an important player in the success of the confederacy as well as those involved in trade. This vessel is one of many involved in blockade running during the Civil War, but this vessel was unique because of the accounts presented by the captain. There is countless history written on the exchange of cotton between ports during the American Civil War, but this account adds to the overall understanding that those involved in the transport and trade of this contraband material were willing to take a risk for the economic gain as well as the adventure itself. The act of blockade running directly affected the success of ports as well as the chance that those ports would become targets for Union blockades and battles.

A blockade runner such as Rob Roy provided monetary gain for those involved and an increase in trade between ports that were less frequented before the war. Key examples of these forts are Brownsville, Matamoros, and Baghdad, all of which grew exponentially after blockade running became common place. The Rio Grande and bordering cities profited after the outbreak of the Civil War because this borderland became one of the only roads for transporting
Confederate cotton overseas. Four separate nations sent their armies and navies to take control of the neutral zone, including Mexico, France, the Union, and Confederacy (Irby 1977:7). Cotton would be transported from Galveston to Brownsville, then be transferred to the small island of Baghdad, then be taken to Matamoros from where cotton and other goods would be shipped. *Rob Roy* was one of the few blockade runners that were able to interact with these three ports. The movements of *Rob Roy* were essential for discussing the social economic interactions when the vessel made port within the Gulf of Mexico. The commercial role *Rob Roy* played during the war could not be separated from the military importance of blockade running and justifies Gould’s (2011:269) interpretation of the social history of blockade-runners during the American Civil War. Gould (2011:280) suggests that there is a direct relationship between the success of a vessel that went to war during the Industrial Revolution and the sociocultural process of the time, including technology, labor, and risk. The study of *Rob Roy* provides evidence that the success of blockade runners included several factors such as distance traveled, time spent as a blockade runner, profit made by investors, and the type of vessel being used. After a thorough analysis of *Rob Roy* alongside other vessels considered successful within the same time and local, *Rob Roy* proved to be an important contributor to the overall success of blockade running during the American Civil War within the Gulf of Mexico especially within the smaller inlets less frequented by steamers and larger vessels.

**Answering the Secondary Research Questions**

In addition to the primary research question, this thesis sought to understand three secondary questions which were intended to provide a particularist perspective while completing the
primary research goal. This section will recall those questions, provide a brief summary, and reference the appropriate section for a clearer understanding.

- What is the artifact biography of Rob Roy?

The origins of the flat-bottomed centerboard schooner are unknown, but the history of Rob Roy as a Civil War blockade runner is clear. The vessel began its adventure in September of 1863 after William Watson purchased it in New Orleans and had it refitted and renamed as Rob Roy in Belize, Honduras. It was not until Rob Roy’s first journey into Matamoros that it started working as a blockade runner under that name. On its first interaction with running the blockade into Sabine Pass, Rob Roy was struck on the starboard side, nearly missing a worse fate. After the hole was patched and the vessel rigged it was impressed into service for the Confederacy. While in service Rob Roy’s railings were damaged and repaired. While waiting for its next adventure, full of cotton, Rob Roy sank in the Sabine River near West Columbia. With the help of another vessel, Rob Roy was pulled from the murky river, dried, and repaired. Following its rise from the river, Rob Roy assisted the Confederacy with barricading the river to withstand Union forces, and all that time in the river made the hull fowled. The vessel was turned on its side, cleaned, and re-tallowed. As Rob Roy traveled from Columbia to Tampico, it was caught in a storm, and the strop cracked. Upon arrival in Havana, following its stop in Tampico, the vessel underwent repairs. After a stop in Galveston, Rob Roy set out on a return trip to Tampico and was caught in another northerner causing damage to the boom of the ship. Some repairs were made in Havana, including replacement of the foresail, but it was not until a trip into Galveston that Rob Roy had its boom repaired. Once in Galveston, Rob Roy’s boom was replaced with the help of the Confederacy, who used the spars from the captured Harriet Lane. Unfortunately for Rob Roy and Watson, the final trip to Havana leads to the loss of Rob Roy. The vessel was
auctioned and taken under new ownership. Only days after *Rob Roy* safely avoided capture, it was run aground in Deadman’s Bay by its new captain and burned to prevent Union capture. Unfortunately, *Rob Roy* has not been located, but the historical, archaeological analysis of this vessel outlined within this thesis provides great promise for the possible identification of and archaeological investigation of potential shipwrecks.

- What can the archaeological investigation of the proposed location of *Rob Roy* reveal about its final demise?

According to the historical record of William Watson and Union records, *Rob Roy* was scuttled and burned. Previous investigations conducted by treasure hunters reported the resting place of the remains of *Rob Roy* within Deadman’s Bay. The archaeological investigation conducted for this thesis explored an area near the reported resting place, a location known to hold an “old boiler” thought to be associated with *Rob Roy* or another blockade runner *Havana*. The investigation of this site did not provide adequate information to name the remains associated or not associated with *Rob Roy*. The investigation provided data to support that the artifact shared qualities with Civil War era boilers. Upon preliminary investigation, the boiler was composed of wrought iron and was fastened with rivets. The internal components included characteristics shared with flue boilers. Due to the small size and other features, this boiler could have been used for several functions, including salt works or farm work. The boiler was not big enough to power a vessel and was not used on board *Rob Roy* for any known reason. Without further investigation of the proposed site, it will remain unclear if the boiler is associated with *Rob Roy*. The archaeological investigation of the proposed resting place of *Rob Roy* created more questions than there were before.
Suggested Research

After completing this project, there are several questions that remain unanswered and new locations left to explore. The original questions posed for this project were answered to an extent, but they can still be expounded upon. To properly record the life cycle of the vessel Rob Roy and contribute further to the primary question, more archaeological research needs to be conducted. After completing the research for this thesis, the anomalies investigated within Steinhatchee River can be eliminated, but much of Deadman’s Bay remains unexplored. The results of this thesis and the knowledge of the nearby river pose new questions. What is the resting place of Rob Roy? What were the specific modifications of Rob Roy and how did they influence the success or failure of the vessel? What is the “old boiler”?

Limitations

While conducting research for this project, there were several factors that limited the accessibility of information. Though accessibility was an issue during the research phase of this project, it did not keep the author from answering the primary questions for this thesis. While completing archival and historical research, several factors limited access to information, including access to primary source materials. The most accurate source of information for understanding the life of Rob Roy is a private journal of the captain William Watson (2001); unfortunately for history, he was discreet when discussing individuals involved in the illegal aspects of blockade running during the Civil War. Because this journal is a contemporary account, he protected the identity of those involved, and there is currently no way of identifying the individuals. Access to historical documentation was also limited because of the government shutdown. During the research period of this project, the United States government went through
two government shutdowns in one year (Science News Staff 2018). The first occurred in January and the second in December during the visit to the archives.

Conclusions

This thesis demonstrated the importance one vessel’s historical archaeological investigation could play in the grander history of Civil War blockade runners. Even though the artifact biography was confined to the brief time Rob Roy worked as a blockade runner, its interpretation and the information found at the archaeological site researched in this thesis was paramount to understanding the overall social economic history of exchange during the American Civil War. The cotton referred to as the lifeline of the Confederacy and the interaction with blockade runners, crew, and economic investors have proven to be important in the overall history of the American Civil War. Not only did this vessel provide a means of transportation of goods, but also transportation of information and therefore history itself.
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APPENDIX: AGENCY AND ARTIFACT BIOGRAPHY

In maritime archaeology, studying a shipwreck as a single artifact can often be difficult. A shipwreck can be considered both a site comprised of artifacts, as well as an individual artifact. One useful approach to the dilemma of site versus artifact is the application of “artifact biography” (Gosden and Marshall 1999, Schiffer 1967). Artifact biography is an approach employed for understanding the relationships between people and things. As Gosden and Marshall (1999:169) stated, it has become a crucial aspect of all social sciences to understand the complex connection between objects and the people that interact with them. The concept of artifact biography has only recently been applied to shipwrecks. This thesis utilizes artifact biography to explore how Rob Roy is both a single artifact, particularist in nature, and a vector for sociocultural connections between individuals and places associated with the Civil War within the Gulf of Mexico. Sources of agency theory, artifact biography are reviewed, and used together in maritime archaeology, as well as discuss similar theoretical concepts that have been used when pieces of an artifact’s biography are missing.

Agency

An interest in agency increased in the 1980s and 1990s within academia, including archaeology. Archaeologists became interested in the relationship between agency and material things. The aspects of agency and archaeology research encompassed political power as well as the social structure of a society. Most agency theorists subscribe to four general principles derived from Karl Marx. These include “the material conditions of social life, the simultaneously constraining and enabling influence of social, symbolic and material structures and institutions, habituation, and beliefs; the importance of the motivations and actions of agents; and the dialectic of structure
and agency” (Dobres and Robb 2000:8). In, *Agency in Archaeology*, Dobres, and Robb (2000) compiled several authors’ interpretations of agency in archaeology. In this compilation, Ian Hodder defines agency as a post-processual archaeological process where the individual acts and contributes directly to the social structure through the creation of material objects (Dobres and Robb 2000:22). John Barret agrees, but states that agency must be conceptualized within a specific time and space; agency is historically specific (Dobres and Robb 2000:62). Arthur Joyce reflects on these ideas of agency but emphasizes that it cannot be thought of separately from the social context in which an actor acts (Dobres and Robb 2000:72). John E. Clark goes as far as describing agency as “an inter-subjective social phenomenon” (Dobres and Robb 2000:96).

Agency is facilitated by political power as objects are created and manipulated within a social structure (Dobres and Robb 2000:232). Kenneth Sassaman suggests that as agency is facilitated by power it can be unique to individuals as they live within a similar social structure (Dobres and Robb 2000:149). Agency cannot be clearly defined, but most theorists agree that there is a connection between agency and social structure.

Agency theorists also struggle with scale: can agency refer to more than the individual? “Is it enough to talk vaguely about generic actors and agency, or do we need to consider multiple styles or varieties of agency within a society, such as those associated with gender, age, race, class, or other culturally recognized forms of subjecthood?” (Dobres and Robb 2000:11). A difficult aspect when using this theory is analyzing agency through material culture (Dobres and Robb 2000:12). To better understand the various ways agency is utilized the remainder of this section will explore uses of agency within both terrestrial and maritime archaeology.

Shanks and Tilley (1987:173) elaborate on agency in archaeology when deciphering the social meanings behind beer labels and advertisements in England and Sweden. Beer agencies
use advertisements to connect with the consumer market and the need of the companies (Shanks and Tilley 1987:236). Three key points are made by Shanks and Tilley about agency in archaeology. First, “all action is social action” (Shanks and Tilley 1987:124). This means that an individual's action is always made within a given social construct. Second, social action is made purposely in response to the social construct surrounding the actor. Therefore, an individual knows that they are making an action based on the structure of which they are part, but they may not understand why they are making that action, unconsciously conscious. Finally, “all social actions are determined actions” (Shanks and Tilley 1987:124) because they are influenced by fear, from ideologies, from habit, or from personal values or desires. A consumer may choose a beer based on their own preferences and/or because of the influences an advertisement has on their decision-making process.

Pauketat and Alt (2005) apply agency theory to archaeology in their research of the physicality of the “lowly” postmold. A postmold, of course, is the fossilized remnants of a deteriorated wooden pole placed in the ground by past humans. This remnant is often overlooked as it is considered nothing more than a mundane part of culture. Pauketat and Alt choose to look more closely at the implications a postmold can hold for understanding human behavior. In their eyes, “a single postmold embodies at least one short-term event or specific cultural practice, and possibly a sequence of such events or practices that are readily recovered by archaeologists through detailed field observations of postmold and post hole stratigraphy, superpositioning, and sedimentology” (Pauketat and Alt 2005:215). They explored the possible implications a postmold has for human behavior using three anecdotes. What they found was that the placement of a post hole was not culturally neutral. The cutting of the pole, the digging of the earth, the placement and later removal were consciously made and culturally specific (Pauketat and Alt
A post represents multiple levels of human interactions from labor, to social and political structure, to interactions with landscapes. Pauketat and Alt (2005:218) argue that a postmold embodies every dimension “of the fundamental physicality of the process of cultural construction.”

Richards and Staniforth provide an overview of abandoned watercrafts in Australia in their article on the Abandoned Ships’ Project. If agency theory is applied to this research, it becomes apparent that these discarded ships directly reflect changes within cultural behavior. “Deliberately abandoned ships are watercraft discarded by their owners in a purposeful, non-catastrophic manner” (Richards and Staniforth 2006:84). This process of discard is a conscious decision of an actor and has unconscious effects on their social structure. A ship or watercraft is not simply an object to be documented and added to data but instead, like the postmold, is a direct representation of technology, hierarchy, political structure, and even identity of the human agents and objects in the network. Ships “are objects sensitive to cultural conditions and cultural transformations and have traits that illustrate their diachronic nature” (Richards and Staniforth 2006:86). This study of deliberately abandoned ships brings the many meanings of agency full circle. The ship is an object to which an action is taken, the individual or group of individuals make a conscious decision to abandon their watercraft, the ship becomes a part of the maritime cultural landscape, an object that is neither natural nor social. This action becomes an ingrained part of the social structure of which an actor is a part. After this practice occurs regularly, it becomes a social norm and is carried out as an act of unconscious change.

In maritime archaeology, researchers go a step further when considering the agency of people and objects, using actor-network theory (ANT), introduced by Bruno Latour in 2005. ANT is difficult to explain, but as Latour (2005: 9) writes, it is “sociology of the social,” the
“sociology of the associates,” and “sociology of translation.” “Actor Network as a theory is concerned with how networks get established and maintained, how phenomena get constructed and de-constructed and who in the network gets to speak on behalf of the rest” (Tuddenham 2010:9). In his article on maritime cultural landscapes, Tuddenham addresses the difficulty associated with maritime studies, the dichotomy between land and sea. He uses the term *maritimity* as a category for understanding and purifying the process that takes place within the network (Tuddenham 2010:8). He emphasizes that all knowledge within the ANT is of the same kind; the only thing that differs is stability and length. The materials within a network are considered quasi objects and are representative of the phenomena occurring within a system (Tuddenham 2010:10). Tuddenham (2010:11) looks to Christopher Westerdahl considering the idea that perhaps the quasi objects within a network and the way in which those objects are defined are the most challenging elements of understanding and defining maritime cultural landscapes.

**Artifact Biography**

The original concept of artifact biography stems from the theorist Igor Kopytoff (1986:90) who based his ideas on the “Durkheimian notion that a society orders the world of things on the pattern for the structure that prevails in the social world of its people,” and that societies hover over these two worlds simultaneously as they create artifacts using the same patterns. Though his theories are based in sociology, he realized that the things (artifacts) in a society are as integral to the livelihood of a culture as the people that own and make them. According to Kopytoff (1986:67) “biographies of things can make salient what might otherwise remain obscure.” In other words, by identifying the intricate interactions an object has during its lifetime, the
importance of the artifact is better understood. As in any biography, certain questions would need to be answered about the artifact, such as: Who made this object, and where does it come from? What has it been used for, and what do people consider important about that type of use? What time period does the life of the object fit into? How does the use of the object change during its lifetime, and what happens when it is no longer considered important? (Kopytoff 1986:66-67). In complex societies, artifact biographies will reveal that within a world of uniform objects, a biography of a single artifact becomes unique (Kopytoff 1986:90), and as an object changes hands, gaining new classifications, so does its importance change which is directly reflected in its use.

Objects continually gather new connections and meanings as they are never in a state of stasis (Gosden and Marshall 1999:170). An object moves between people and places and accumulates its own unique biography while adding to that of the people with whom it interacts (Gosden and Marshall 1999: 176). It is not enough to simply define the biography of a person or the biography of an object; to successfully portray an artifact biography, one must understand the relationships between both. After all, artifacts do not identify the individuality of a person, but rather a person and an artifact share a biography that will be specific to their individual culture (Gosden and Marshall 1999:173).

Though Gosden and Marshall (1999) lean more heavily on life-history theory, first introduced by Ruth Tringham (1994), their approach shares similarities with examining the biographical background of an artifact and how important it is in analyzing social and cultural interaction. They also lean on the original notion of Kopytoff, who felt that to understand something one must understand all life stages fully. As they state, “if we consider material culture and its different moments of production, exchange and consumption, then little is left out,
especially once each of these is set within its social context and consequences” (Gosden and Marshall 1999:169). In their article, they reference an artifact from the Pitt Rivers Museum, neck ornamentation from Fiji made from whale teeth and coconut fibers (Gosden and Marshall 1999:170). By providing the complex background of the object and the various people whose hands once interreacted with the object, they displayed how a seemingly static object is capable of having various life-histories encompassing an artifact’s made connections, meanings, and stories.

The biography of an object can be found within the careful analysis of the item, how it looks, its wear and tear. It is through this lens that the story of an object comes to life. Several researchers have used the approach of artifact biography to explore the life of items ranging in size, shape, and history. In their article “Beyond Consumption: Functionality, Artifact Biography, and Early Modernity in a European Periphery,” Herva and Nurmi (2009) discuss the functionality and biographies of artifacts in the context of historical archaeology. Their argument is that researchers have spent too much time focusing on the symbolic representation of artifacts instead of understanding the everyday life of artifacts. Herva and Nurmi (2009:167) use artifact biography to explain the history of an artifact assemblage located within the city of Tornio, country. Their research identified examples of repair and recycling of artifacts, including pottery and pipes that had been broken but were re-purposed. The act of repairing and recycling is proof that those associated with an object hold a certain bond with it, and by employing these techniques, they intend to extend the life of the object (Herva and Nurmi 2009:175). According to historical records, Torrio was experiencing economic decline during the last half of the seventeenth century, which correlates with the need to recycle and repurpose. However, as the authors point out, the labor devoted to the recycling and repurposing of these objects would have
been intense. As such, this activity might be viewed as an expression of importance for items in the culture. Therefore, when an object is repurposed, especially during a period of economic strain, it suggests that that object may be worth the extensive time and labor.

As we learn through the process of biographical research, life does not necessarily follow a singular path (Joy 2009:543). As an object lives out its individual life, it “can die a number of times,” and it can lead “simultaneous lives” (Joy 2009:543). In her research on a British Iron Age mirror, Jody Joy (2009) discusses many social relationships the mirror accumulated over its life. She uses biography to consider the materials used in the process of creating the object such as metal for smelting and the charcoal or wood used to melt the metal. After a close analysis of the object, the implications of this fine metalworking provided an example of the important skill an individual might have needed in order to create this object. Not only is this mirror representation of the fine artists and work necessary in the Iron Age, but it also shows what type of social influence the people who made it had on the rest of their society. Her analysis of the mirror and its biography directly relate to the relationships created surrounding the object itself, whether that be past or present. For example, to have a mirror is for the inspection of self and to monitor personal appearance, ensuring that one might fit within certain cultural aspects or ideals of one’s time. The other inferences she makes when looking at the fine details of this artifact is that the care that was provided to this object over such a long time means that the importance of it not only changed but strengthened through time. Through her analysis, she created a flow chart to demonstrate the biography of the object (Figure 3.1).
FIGURE 3.1. Stages in the construction of the Portesham mirror (Joy 2009:547).

While employing artifact biography, a writer must understand that they are actively adding to the interactions of that artifact. Pantaloney (2011) addresses this reality when examining the Thermatron Junior, an X-ray machine from Canada’s atomic age, on display at the Canada Science and Technology Museum. In his article, he stated, “that there are facts (and artifacts) we choose to emphasize and those we choose to leave out” (Pantaloney 2011:54). This suggests that the biography of an object is being added to as it is being written. Therefore, it is in the responsibility of an interpreter to review all aspects of an artifact. As such, his reexamination of the radiotherapy machine began with an analysis of where the Thermatron Junior was manufactured, followed by its use, its role in society when during its time in the limelight, and its role in the museum. The way the object was displayed in the museum suggested an idealized version of the object’s role instead of providing its audience with a detailed interpretation of the life history of the object. His purpose in completing a historical analysis of the Thermatron was
to emphasize that taking an object at face value is not enough, and a researcher must be open to all interpretations of an object. An artifact biography must be conducted with an objective approach and allow the object to tell its own story. After all, the biography of an object is a representation of all its social relationships (Cooper 2011:256).

**Agency and Artifact Biography in Maritime Archaeology**

In her thesis *From Shipyard to Seabed: A Multiphasic Vessel Biography of Leven Lass [1839-1854]*, Chelsea Colwell-Pasch (2014:27) uses a biographical approach to discuss *Leven Lass*. She cites the common approach of anthropologists and archaeologists use when studying the relationship between people and objects. Though she centralizes her research on the Wessex Archaeology BULSI system (Build, Use, Loss, Survival, Investigation), she references other theoretical archaeological concepts including artifact biography, use-life, life-cycle, and *chaine opérette* all of which accent the relationships between human beings and things. The BULSI system stems from the idea of artifact biography that several sociologists and archaeologists have used to tell the story of various objects. Within her thesis, she provides a table that provides a synopsis of similar concepts to the BULSI system, such as artifact biography (Table 3.1). Her goal, like this thesis, was to describe and explain a ship’s multilevel ability to be viewed as an individual object and as a member of an assemblage of artifacts.
**TABLE 3.1 THE EVOLUTION OF ARTEFACT/OBJECT LIFE HISTORY CONCEPTS OVER TIME (Colwell-Pasch 2014:30)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Formative Years</th>
<th>Foundations</th>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Traditional Use</th>
<th>Synopsis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>chaine opertoire</em></td>
<td>Early 1960s</td>
<td>Sociology, Anthropology, Archaeology</td>
<td>Processual</td>
<td>Lithic</td>
<td>The manufacturing use and disposal of artefacts follow a sequence of social acts, hence the translated term “operational sequence.” The sequence does not have to be linear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use-life</td>
<td>1960s – 1970s</td>
<td>Prehistoric Archaeology</td>
<td>Processual</td>
<td>Lithics, pottery</td>
<td>The time of artefact/object use before discard; focusing on the morphological/functional characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life history model</td>
<td>Early 1970s</td>
<td>Behavioral Archaeology</td>
<td>Processual</td>
<td>Lithics, pottery (assemblages)</td>
<td>Based on understanding site formation processes, the events leading up to, during, and after an objects/artefacts use are considered. This approach is non-unilinear or universally applicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biographical approach/ artefact biography</td>
<td>Late 1980s</td>
<td>Archaeology, Historical Archaeology</td>
<td>Processual or Post-processual</td>
<td>Manufactured artefacts or monuments</td>
<td>A Framework used to understand the multivariate lifeways of an object/artefact through a reconstruction of its ‘social life.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULSI system</td>
<td>Late 2000s</td>
<td>Maritime Archaeology, Commercial Archaeology</td>
<td>Processual</td>
<td>Vessels, shipwrecks</td>
<td>The Build, Use, Loss, Survival, Investigation (BULSI) System methodology was developed from standardized, comprehensive historic shipwreck studies within consultancy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Colwell-Pasch draws on the previous work of Schiffer, Trigger, and Kopytoff in her exploration of life history models. Colwell-Pasch (2005:30) uses BULSI to conduct a full history
of *Levin Lass*, which provides a processual life history with sociocultural implications. The BULSI system was developed by Wessex Archaeology (2006a:25) and utilized in their coastal and marine division centers around the career or life-cycles of a vessel, including its build, use, loss, survival, and investigation. Wessex Archaeology was employed by the English Heritage organization to create a methodology for assessing of shipwrecks (Colwell-Pasch 2014:31). Colwell-Pasch makes use of the Wessex system because it was created specifically for shipwrecks and because it has ambiguous enough categories that can be manipulated with various types of data (Table 3.2).

**TABLE 3.2 OUTLINE OF THE BULSI SYSTEM OF LEVEN LASS**
(Colwell-Pasch 2014:45)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Wessex Archaeology</th>
<th>Minimum Data Needed</th>
<th>Data Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Build</td>
<td>Interest arising from the vessel as built, rebuilt, fitted, refitted, and so on. Including design, construction, materials, technologies, propulsion, fixtures, and fittings, armament, etc.</td>
<td>Date and place of construction, companies and individuals involved, refits, vessel design, dimensions, materials used, technology.</td>
<td>Shipyard history, owner’s history, Lloyd’s Registers, archived newspaper articles, shipwreck databases, archaeological record.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use</td>
<td>Interest arising from the vessel as used, including cargo, personal possessions, trade links, wars, life aboard, social organization, etc.</td>
<td>Vessel use over time, registration, nationality information, associated companies and individuals like managers, owners, crew and passengers, cargo type, ports of call.</td>
<td>Lloyd’s Register, archived newspaper articles, insurance records, shipwreck databases, archaeological record.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>Interest arising from the circumstances of the vessel’s demise, including last voyage, last action, cause of loss, acts of loss, etc.</td>
<td>Close calls, date, place and reason of loss, loss of life, loss of cargo.</td>
<td>Lloyd’s Register, archived newspaper articles, shipwreck databases, archaeological record.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival</td>
<td>Interest arising from the wreck’s incorporation into the seabed, both to date</td>
<td>Rescues, cargo salvage, history and survival as a wreck, site formation</td>
<td>Lloyd’s Register, archived newspaper articles, insurance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Colwell-Pasch participated in both archaeological and historical investigations of *Leven Lass*, allowing her to identify all levels of the vessel’s life-cycle. The operations of *Levin Lass* led to several sociocultural interactions in Australia and various nations between individuals and even objects. For example, in 1848, *Leven Lass* traveled to a total of four separate ports carrying rum, sugar, and molasses as cargo. During that time, *Leven Lass* underwent serious repairs (Colwell-Pasch 2014:54). This provided a basis for the interaction of several individuals. Whether that be between the dock workers and sailors or between the dock workers and merchants. That vessel’s one year of service provides a multitude of human-object relationships, all resulting in individualized agency.

In the investigation of the complete life-cycle of a single 19th-century Clyde-built brig, Colwell-Pasch contributes to the overall history of Australian shipping, Clyde-built construction, trade, and varying levels of human-artifact interaction. Using her work as a basis, I will establish
the biography of an artifact, *Rob Roy*. I will not utilize the BULSI system but will pull from the concepts of other theorists and archaeologists that concentrate on the sociocultural interactions of humans and objects and the underlying belief in agency as the cause of these interactions.

**Conclusion**

The agency of an object and its resulting biography will not always be immediately present upon the first review of said object. Like the story of a person, one cannot take an object at face value but needs to delve deeper. To find the missing pieces of an object’s life story, you begin with what you know. As Schiffer (1972) suggests, an object like a human is born, and through its life, it has several beginnings and endings, this biography of an artifact can link both people and things. This thesis stands on the understanding that “no one theory will ever be adequate to understand all circumstances” (Gosden and Marshall 1999:172). However, it is the goal of this thesis to complete an artifact biography of *Rob Roy* with historical and archaeological research because, as Kopytoff (1986:67) states, “biographies of things can make salient what might otherwise remain obscure.”