BRITISH REACTION

TO THE

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA CRISIS OF 1908

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by

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William Keefer Brumbach, Jr. BRITISH REACTION TO THE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA CRISIS OF 1908. (Under the direction of Dr. Kathleen E. Dunlop) Department of History, June 1969.

The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the role of the British government in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis of 1908 and the reaction of the British people through the British Press. The involvement of Great Britain in this Crisis came not as a result of any pre-arranged imperialistic desire to colonize the area but rather as a consequence of pro-Turkish sentiment in England and the desire of the British Foreign Office to assist the recently established government of the Young Turks in creating an operative government in Turkey.

Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the British had followed the policy that the Turkish Empire must be kept intact. The fulfillment of this aim necessitated British intervention in Balkan affairs throughout the nineteenth century in order to curb imperialistic aspirations of Russia, Serbia, and Montenegro. However, due to the rise of nationalism among the Balkan nationalities and due to the misgovernment of the Porte, this policy became difficult to follow. The impossibility of maintaining this policy finally became evident in 1908 when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. The British Foreign Office protested this change in the status quo because it was a deliberate violation of the thirty-year-old international Treaty of Berlin.

After several diplomatic protests attempting to persuade

Austria-Hungary to withdraw the annexation proclamation, Britain became involved in the serious crisis which followed. Britain adopted the policy of trying to gain concessions for both Turkey and Serbia. This policy was only partially successful due to the fact that direct negotiations between Turkey and Austria-Hungary settled their differences, but Serbia became so incensed that Britain and Russia were forced to withdraw their support in order to prevent her from perpetrating a European war.

As a result of the increased European, and especially British interest in the crisis, it came to a peaceful climax and Serbia was forced to demobilize her troops and to renounce her claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the crisis, Sir Edward Grey, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, did all that was humanly possible to encourage a peaceful and just settlement for both Turkey and Serbia and to prevent this European conflict from erupting into a general war.

During the seven months of the crisis the stability of European diplomacy hung on a thread. Any wrong move or harsh discourse could have converted a tinderbox into a roaring fire. Great Britain was very instrumental in adverting the flames, but she had become involved in a crisis which she should have avoided owing to the fact that she was not willing to support her sentiments with force. Consequently, when the smoke cleared, Britain found that her efforts had been instrumental in maintaining peace, but the animosities which the crisis had created were

by no means stifled and Britain found herself drawn into a close friendship with France and Russia.

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Grateful acknowledgment is made to my parents, Dr. and Mrs. W. K. Brumbach for their encouragement and financial assistance. Also, I wish to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to Dr. Kathleen E. Dunlop of the East Carolina University faculty for her untiring efforts in supervising this thesis. Her advice, time, guidance and constructive suggestions have been indispensable and have made the completion of this thesis possible.

PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to show the role of the British Government in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis of 1908-1909 and the reaction of the British people through the British press to the event. The involvement of Great Britain in this crisis came not as a result of any prearranged imperialistic desire to colonize the area but rather as a consequence of pro-Turkish sentiment in England and the desire of the British Foreign Office to assist the recently established government of the Young Turks in making for an operative government in Turkey. The English desired peace in the Balkans to protect their interests there, in Turkey, and in the Middle East. Then, too, peace was necessary in that part of the world because it was too close to one segment of England's life line to India. A war in the Balkans could easily spread to the Middle East, and disrupt navigation in the Mediterranean and close the Suez Canal. Worse still, such a crisis could easily become the spark to set off a world war.

The thirty years following the Congress of Berlin had seen Austria-Hungary occupying the Turkish owned provinces. The provinces had not suffered from this arrangement and the remaining European nations, Turkey, and even the provinces themselves, had accepted this occupation.

In October 1908, however, as a result of the successful overthrow of the Turkish government of Abdul Hamid by the Young Turks and

the subsequent promises by this new government to reform both Turkey and the provinces, this area was formally annexed by Austria-Hungary. Following from this annexation, Great Britain took the lead in attempting to placate matters between Turkey and Austria-Hungary and to arrange a settlement which was equitable to the Young Turks. The fact that a war was averted and that a settlement between the two countries was eventually arranged was due largely to the efforts of the British Foreign Office under the leadership of Sir Edward Grey.

British foreign policy since the 1890's had been one of continuity regardless of the political party in power. The Times (London) has long been considered the authoritative source of all information coming from the government, including the Foreign Office, and, therefore, much reliance has been placed upon it. During the first decade of this century, it was not uncommon for the other British newspapers to rely at least in part on the coverage given by The Times to foreign affairs, and consequently The Times is the dominant British newspaper utilized.[1]

In addition to The Times the author used numerous contemporary sources such as newspapers, periodicals, documents, memoirs, monographs of the period as well as most of the secondary sources available.

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[1] "Because of its completeness and authority the Times' foreign news service was held in higher regard than that of any other paper. The Foreign office and everyone interested in high politics followed its reports closely; they were quoted and referred to on occasion by every paper in the country." See Oron James Hale, Publicity And Diplomacy, 1890-1914 (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1940), p. 20.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, 1908

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

Austria-Hungary had been granted the right to occupy the Turkish Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 under conditions set forth in Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin.[1] Included in this article was a further provision guaranteeing to Austria-Hungary the right to maintain garrisons in the Sanjak of Novi Bazar[2] which was considered to be the door to the riches of the Near East and the first step towards an expansion of Austro-Hungarian influence southward into the Balkan area.[3]

Austrian Administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1878-1908.

For thirty years following 1878, during which time Austria-Hungary governed the provinces, she appointed a series of wise Magyar governors who did excellent constructive administrative work. The Austrians had organized an efficient administrative system. There was little doubt that the provinces were better governed under the Austrians than they had been governed during

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[1]See Appendix #1, p. 100 for Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin.

[2]The Sanjak of Novi Bazar was a small mountainous region lying to the east of Montenegro which Austria used as a buffer between Montenegro and Serbia to prevent the two Serb states from uniting and bringing into being a greater Serbia that might menace Austrian influence in the Adriatic Sea.

[3]Alfred F. Pribram, Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908-18 (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1923), p. 23. (Hereinafter referred to as Pribram, Austrian Foreign Policy.)

the preceding centuries of Turkish domination.[4] The Austrians built up the area by constructing railways, setting up forestation and agricultural research institutions, establishing flourishing mining, timber, and chemical industries. Improvements were made in communications, and telephone and postal services were started.

Preparation for Annexation

Count Alois von Aehrenthal, Austrian-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs since October, 1906, felt the responsibilities of his government were to safeguard international interests and to maintain Austria's position as one of the great powers. He realized as early as 1907 that the internal affairs of the Turkish Empire were becoming more and more critical and he recognized this as a threatening foreign danger to the maintenance of Austria-Hungary, and to her interests in southeast Europe. In his mind the Balkans promised rich ends, but the price of taking these riches was the cost of Russian hostility.[5] Aehrenthal, however, was convinced that Russia had not recovered sufficiently from her shocking defeat during the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War to engage actively in another conflict with Austria.[6] Aehrenthal possessed no great sympathy for Britain, and he was secretly pleased at the collapse of British influence in Turkey. In addition, he did not

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[4]A. W. Chilton and L. H. Holt, The History of Europe from 1862-1914 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918), pp. 445. (Hereinafter referred to as Chilton, History of Europe.)

[5]Pribram, Austrian Foreign Policy, p. 23.

[6]Ibid., pp. 29-30.

inform Germany of his intention to annex the provinces, but he felt certain that she would give diplomatic support to Austrian expansion in the Balkans.[7] Aehrenthal realized there were many dangers confronting Austrian expansion in the Balkans, but he felt that if his country were to maintain her position as a world power, she must be willing to accept any risk that might be involved. He wanted to insure the possession of the provinces which Austria-Hungary had been governing and occupying for thirty years and for which his nation had done much in the way of improving the provinces' material and cultural conditions.[8]

Shortly after he had assumed office, the relations between Austria and Serbia took a decisive turn for the worse. In March, 1906, an impasse developed over the negotiations for the renewal of the Austro-Serbian trade agreement which had been in effect since 1881. Serbia then turned to Bulgaria and concluded an economic pact. Austria feared that this pact might eventually lead to a united Serbo-Bulgarian state which would be strong enough to block Austrian influence in the Balkans. Austria violently opposed this Serbo-Bulgarian agreement and consequently closed her frontiers to Serbian livestock. This

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[7]R. W. Seton-Watson, "The Role of Bosnia in International Politics (1875-1914)," Proceedings of the British Academy, XVII (March, 1931), 335-368. (Hereinafter cited as Seton-Watson, "Role of Bosnia," Proceedings.)

[8]Pribram, Austrian Foreign Policy, p. 25.

move precipitated the "Pig War."[9]

In January, 1908, Count Aehrenthal announced his government's intention to build a railway through the Sanjak of Novi Bazar toward Saloniki. The purpose of this railroad was to drive a wedge between Serbia and Montenegro, where anti-Austrian agitation had been growing rapidly since the advent of the Karageorgevich dynasty in 1903. Alexander Izvolsky, the Foreign Minister of Russia, resented this move. He claimed the construction of such a railroad violated the Austro-Russian Entente of 1897. He brought forward a rival scheme for a railroad to be built from the Danube to the Adriatic. The British were also disturbed by the Austrian step, which they regarded as a bribe by Turkey to Austria to induce the latter to oppose further reforms in Macedonia.[10]

The Young Turk Revolt of 1908 offered Aehrenthal the immediate occasion for putting his plan to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina into effect. There had been organized within the Turkish Empire in 1905 a secret political-military organization which wanted constitutional government from its autocratic sultan,

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[9]The Austrians refused to accept Serbian livestock and agricultural products, forcing Serbia to look for other markets. She was successful in doing this, and relations returned to normal in July, 1910, when another customs pact was agreed upon. This pact resulted in Serbia's exporting to Austria approximately 30% of her products, whereas before the conflict she had exported approximately 90%.

[10]A. J. Grant and Harold Temperley, Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 1789-1939 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1940), p. 360.

Abdul Hamid. This organization could trace its beginnings back to the 1860's when a group of western minded newspaper writers were forced to flee the country. From exile they continued journalistic attacks on the Ottoman Government and they acquired the name "Young Turks" because of their relatively young age.[11] In the ensuing years, Moslems as well as Christians who had been exiled from Turkey joined the ranks of this organization. There were various attempts by these exiles to organize a common front against the Turkish government, but by the turn of the century it became obvious that the various groups within this organization agreed on nothing except their mutual dislike for the sultan. While these exiled groups were attempting to join forces, a group of Turkish army officers took the name of their organization, and organized a secret military society to oust Abdul Hamid. The organization had followers throughout the empire and many discontented army officers constituted its leadership and strength. These practical revolutionists quietly strengthened their underground force and decided to act in midsummer of 1908. There were several reasons for their choosing this particular time. One reason was the fact that the sultan's agents were beginning to infiltrate the organization, and another was because the powers were considering intervening in Macedonia following a British proposal for an autonomous regime for Macedonia in March, 1908.

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[11] L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 389. (Hereinafter referred to as Stavrianos, Balkans Since 1453.)

Saloniki, Macedonia had become the headquarters of the Young Turks. The immediate cause for their revolt against the established government of Abdul Hamid was the announcement that the British and Russian monarchs would meet at Reval, Estonia on June 10 to discuss conditions in Macedonia and what steps should be taken to restore peace. The Turkish conspirators, fearing partition of the Ottoman Empire to be imminent, decided to act at once and did. The coup d'etat was successful and the news of the sultan's capitulation brought wild rejoicing to some parts of the European continent.[12] Great Britain was very pleased at this change in administration in Turkey. Sir Arthur Nicolson, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, commented on this event by stating that for the moment it appeared as if the Balkan question had solved itself, and the concert of Europe desisted with a sigh of relief.[13] Sir Edward Grey described the change as being marvelous and stated the policy of his country would be one of welcome and encouragement to the new regime.[14] The British had been adamantly opposed to the regime of Abdul Hamid and hoped that the new regime would change the policy of the government and grant reforms to the Christian peoples of the Balkans. Austria-Hungary and Germany were not pleased with the changing political situation in Turkey.

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[12] Ibid., p. 526.

[13] Harold Nicolson, Lord Carnock (London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1930), p. 277. (Hereinafter referred to as Nicolson, Carnock.)

[14] G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds.), The British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928), Vol. V, #207. (Hereinafter referred to as British Documents.)

In spite of the fact that all the Powers expressed sympathy with the new Turkish regime, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria were apprehensive that a free and powerful Ottoman Empire would not prove as amendable to their desires as the preceding despotism.[15]

Austria was prompt to capitalize on this opportunity as now was the time to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina. Aehrenthal decided to take advantage of the confusion surrounding the overthrow of autocratic government in Turkey and the initial weakness of the newly constituted government of Abdul Hamid. In addition, he realized that Russia was still recovering from the disastrous 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War and could hardly send troops into the western Balkans, and Izvolsky was bargaining with Austria to get the Straits opened to Russian warships.

Count Aehrenthal and the Russians

In this same month of July, 1908, Izvolsky was attempting to secure passage through the Turkish Straits for Russian warships. Izvolsky realized approval for this might be extremely difficult to obtain, so he began negotiations to bring about a formal understanding with the individual powers, the first of which was Austria-Hungary.[16] To achieve this aim, Izvolsky sent a memorandum to Aehrenthal which guaranteed Russian approval for the annexation of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novi Bazar in return for Austrian support of his cause.

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[15]The Annual Register, 1908, p. 309.

[16]Pribram, Austrian Foreign Policy, pp. 25-26.

Aehrenthal accepted this offer insofar as it applied to Bosnia and Herzegovina but he requested that Russia guarantee not to take Constantinople until an international conference should be convened to sanction it. In return for this, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister stated he was willing to give up the right of military occupation of the Sanjak and all so-called Austrian rights in Montenegro.[17] Aehrenthal naturally welcomed Izvolsky's offer and with this assurance of Russia's conditional assent, he became determined to carry out the annexation with the least possible delay.[18]

First, however, Aehrenthal intended to obtain permission of the major European powers for the annexation. He thought he would begin by securing the formal consent of Russia and Italy, whom he considered would be the most likely to object, and then turn to France and Germany, whom he believed would offer no great objections. He felt that Great Britain would not oppose the idea since he believed she was wholly uninterested in the matter, and because Britain's new ally Russia had agreed to offer no opposition. Russia would receive compensation through the opening of the Straits. Aehrenthal was willing to pay compensation for the annexation and to cede the Sanjak back to Turkey.[19]

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[17] Ibid., pp. 26-26

[18] G. P. Gooch and A. W. Ward (eds.), The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923), III, 402. (Hereinafter referred to as Gooch, Cambridge History.)

[19] E. J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs," The Contemporary Review, XCV (May, 1909), 624.

To seal the bargain that had been made with Russia, Aehrenthal met Izvolsky in Buchlau, Moravia on September 16, 1909. After lengthy discussions Russia agreed not to oppose the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in return Austria agreed not to oppose the opening of the Straits to Russian warships. An international conference would be held to give sanction to these arrangements and modifications which were to be made in the Berlin Treaty.[20]

Because of the informality of the Buchlau agreement, a very serious diplomatic controversy arose from the failure of Izvolsky and Aehrenthal to establish an exact date for the annexation. Apparently, Izvolsky assumed the annexation would occur much later, and so he left Buchlau for a very short vacation with the intent that soon afterwards he would begin a leisurely tour conferring with the dignitaries of the various European capitals for the purpose of setting the scene for an international conference, and in the meantime tentatively obtain the permission of the powers to make changes in the regulations pertaining to the Straits.[21] Much doubt still remained concerning what transpired at this meeting, but two things are certain. The first is that Izvolsky committed himself to Aehrenthal to an extent which he never dared to disclose either to his own people or to the governments of France and Britain. The second matter which is certain is that Aehrenthal, realizing that Izvolsky's lips were sealed, proceeded

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[20]Pribram, Austrian Foreign Policy, p. 27.

[21]Stavrianos, Balkans Since 1453, p. 529.

to what can only be described as blackmail.[22]

Because of the Young Turk Revolt and its success, Aehrenthal thought it probable that Turkey would reassert her claims of sovereignty over Bosnia and Herzegovina if he did not act immediately.[23] There were claims by the leaders of the Young Turks that the provinces should be included in the election of the proposed Turkish Parliament. This provided extra incentive and a convenient cause for nationalistic agitation in the two provinces. Aehrenthal came to the conclusion that the whole matter could best be silenced by proclaiming formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[24]

Aehrenthal's plan to formally annex the provinces became a reality when on September 23, 1908, Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria visited Budapest. It is generally believed that at that time Aehrenthal gave his approval to Prince Ferdinand of an eventual declaration of Bulgarian independence. Both Austria and Bulgaria felt threatened by the announcement of the Young Turk regime to summon delegates from Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria to the new Turkish Parliament.[25]

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[22]Nicolson, Lord Carnock, p. 278.

[23]Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), p. 22. (Hereinafter referred to as Churchill, Crisis.)

[24]Seton-Watson, "Role of Bosnia," Proceedings, p. 361.

[25]Bernadotte E. Schmitt, "The Bosnian Annexation Crisis," Slavonic Review, XXVI (December, 1930), 332-333. (Hereinafter referred to as Schmitt, "Bosnian Annexation Crisis," Slavonic Review.)

Ending his vacation Izvolsky, on September 26, met the German Foreign Minister, Baron Schön, at Berchtesgaden in southern Germany near the Austro-Hungarian border. Schön agreed to the Russian proposition with the understanding that Germany should receive some type of compensation. The exact nature of the compensation was not spelled out, but it was thought to concern the Baghdad Railway concession.[26]

Two days later, Izvolsky met with the Italian Foreign Minister, Tommaso Tittoni, at Desio, a small Italian city north of Milan.[27] It was thought that the Italian minister accepted the Russian program in return for promises of support for the Italians eventually to take Albania in the Balkans and Tripoli, in North Africa. Izvolsky left for Paris and when he arrived in early October, he received a letter from Aehrenthal announcing the coming annexation decree.[28]

Aehrenthal was forced to hasten his plans for annexation because of rumors spreading that a general uprising was pending in Serbia for the avowed purpose of annexing the provinces of this country. There was some truth to this rumor, for in 1907, approximately 15,000 Mauser rifles and bombs were carried by Serbian conspirators to the frontiers of Bosnia and there stored in

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[26]Ibid., p. 329.

[27]British Documents, #293

[28]Schmitt, "Bosnian Annexation Crisis," Slavonic Review, XXVI (December, 1930), p. 330.

warehouses. Rumors were rampant, too, that Serbian officers and soldiers were being sent to the borders of the provinces with orders to create discord and to spread the spirit of revolt.[29] Serbian hopes for an uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina were so well advanced that organizational plans had been drawn up for administering the districts.[30] Montenegro was in sympathy with Serbian aspirations as she was deeply interested in uniting with Serbia for the purpose of forming a national state.

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[29]Emil Reich, "The Crisis in the Near East: The Austro-Hungarian Case," The Nineteenth Century and After, LXIV (November, 1908), 715. (Hereinafter referred to as Reich, "Crisis," The Nineteenth Century.)

[30]Ibid.

CHAPTER II

BRITAIN AND THE ANNEXATION

The news of the Austro-Hungarian desire to annex the provinces began to circulate in Britain towards the end of September, 1908. The immediate reaction was one of regret and disbelief on the part of members of both the Foreign Office and the Press. Neither had been informed earlier of the Austrian desire and the sudden knowledge of the annexation was received with great suspicion. The press began to speak out against Austria-Hungary and her actions. The Times' editorial of September 28 stated that "the past actions of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans has not created confidence in her good intentions or dispelled the suspicion that she cherishes selfish ambitions there."[1] As more information became known, the denunciation in the press for this anticipated move began to increase. The Times of October 1, 1908, predicted that the reopening of the Bosnian question involves "untold development" in the whole Balkan problem.[2] The Times' editorial of the following day stated: ". . . we can hardly believe that a power which has been so anxious for the cause of peace in the past now really contemplates taking . . . steps which would assuredly jeopardize the tranquillity of Europe . . ."[3]

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[1]The Times (London), 28 September 1908, p. 9. (Hereinafter referred to as The Times.)

[2]Ibid., 1 October 1908, p. 5.

[3]Ibid., 2 October 1908, p. 9.

News of the proposed annexation caused a great deal of discontent in Great Britain. The Times reported that the news of the annexation would be received with great regret and even greater indignation. The newspaper further stated that the annexation did not make any drastic material changes, but it was an unnecessary occurrence which would weaken public belief in European statesmanship and cause people to lose respect for international treaties. If the annexation occurred without the consent of European powers, it would very likely result in a European war.[4]

The Daily Express predicted that the constitutional difficulties involved in the annexation would be great. The Daily Express further stated that Austria would not derive any additional advantage from annexing the provinces which she did not already enjoy. Such a step would mean an almost certain end to Pan-Serbian dreams, and it was likely to provoke a Serbian uprising as well as claims for compensation.[5] The Westminster Gazette reported that Austria-Hungary would add nothing to her practical power by abolishing the ". . . shadowy rights of the Sultan over Bosnia and Herzegovina, and might easily by the same stroke bring Russia on to the scene and set up claims for compensation on the part of all her neighbours."[6]

Initial Reaction of the British Government

It had been rumored that the Austro-Hungarian government

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[4]Ibid., 5 October 1908, p. 9.

[5]The Daily Express, 1 October 1908, p. 1.

[6]The Westminster Gazette, 3 October 1908, p. 1.

had formally sounded out the powers with regard to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was stated that during several past meetings between King Edward, Emperor Francis Joseph and Izvolsky that this matter was fully discussed, but that it was made clear that both Great Britain and Russia opposed such a proposal.[7]

The first official news the British Government received of the proposed annexation was on October 3, when the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to London, Count Mensdorff, called at the Office of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Charles Hardinge, and presented him a letter from Count Aehrenthal about the proposed annexation. The letter related the fact that in 1878 Lord Salisbury had proposed the occupation by the Dual Monarchy in order to establish there a strong and stable administration. Aehrenthal's letter assured the British that in the light of the proposed annexation, "it will be easier for us than it has been up to the present to act in concert with the other cabinets in the East."[8] He also assured Hardinge that Russia and Italy would have no objections to annexation. Hardinge expressed the opinion that "it is not so much the proclamation of annexation which we should fear, but its consequences."[9] Mensdorff then proceeded to present the letter to King Edward VII. The King received the news from him with great coolness and dismissed

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[7] The Daily Express, 1 October 1908, p. 1.

[8] British Documents, #288.

[9] Ibid., #287.

Mensdorff with a few formal and unconciliatory words.[10]

Lord Redesdale, a close friend of King Edward's, was present when the King received the news and he described His Majesty's reactions after Mensdorff left as follows:

> . . . no one who was there can forget how terribly he was upset. Never did I see him so moved. He had paid the Emperor of Austria a visit at Ischl less than two months before . . . and the King left Ischl in the full assurance that there was no cloud on the horizon. Now, without a word of warning, all was changed. The King was indignant, for nobody knew better than he did the danger of tampering with the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, and he saw that to make any changes in the Turkish province was to light a fuse which, sooner or later, was bound to fire a powder magazine.[11]

In October, Sir Edward Grey stated the position of the British Government to the Turkish Ambassador when he said that England could not allow any power to change an international treaty without the consent of all the signatory powers to that treaty and that Britain would therefore refuse to recognize what was done until the views of the other powers and especially of Turkey were known.[12]

The Turks were grateful to the British for their support. The Turkish Ambassador to Britain, Rifaat Pasha, stated that he was glad to state on behalf of his government the fact that the whole Turkish nation had been touched by the attitude of the British Government and by the concern shown by the people and the

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[10]Sidney Lee, King Edward VII, A Biography (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), II, 633. (Hereinafter referred to as Lee, King Edward VII.)

[11]Lord Redesdale, Memories (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1916), I, 178-179.

[12]British Documents, #296.

press of England to the situation.[13]

After officially learning of the annexation, a note was sent to the Porte relating the sentiments of the government and this note created a very favorable impression in Constantinople. This support of the British greatly strengthened the new cabinet by inspiring the populace with confidence in the good faith of Europe.[14]

Two days earlier The Daily Express had attempted to summarize their feeling concerning the annexation. The paper stated:

> The outlook is divided about the question of peace or war. Can war be prevented? There is now an indication that Austria is prepared to surrender the garrisons in the Sanjak of Novibazar /sic/ as compensation to Turkey, but Bulgaria has nothing to offer to save Turkey's face, and it is feared that the Young Turks will not be able to withstand the double blow. A counter revolution seems under these circumstances almost inevitable.[15]

Dr. Emil Reich, a special correspondent of The Daily Express, flatly predicted that "there will be no war." He believed that Turkey might make a show of hostilities, but that she was not willing to engage in a war.[16]

Throughout the period of the crisis, Sir Edward Grey in the name of the British Government delcared opposition to the annexation until the powers agreed to the change. The British Foreign Minister sent to the British Ambassador to Vienna, Sir Edward

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[13] The Westminster Gazette, 8 October 1908, p. 7.

[14] The Daily Express, 8 October 1908, p. 1.

[15] Ibid., 6 October 1908, p. 1.

[16] Ibid., 6 October 1908, p. 4.

Goschen, a message to convey to the Austrian government that his government would recognize no change in the administration of Bosnia and Herzgovina until all the concerned powers agreed to a change. In it he stated:

> You should remind H/is/ E/xcellency/ of the protocal of Jan/uary/ 17, 1871 attached to the Treaty of London, to which Austria-Hungary is a party, in which it was laid down that no Power can break its treaty engagements or modify their stipulations except by friendly agreement and with the assent of the Contracting Powers. H/is/ M/ajesty's/ G/overnmen/t could not approve of an open violation of the Treaty of Berlin nor recognize an alteration of it when the other Powers and in this case especially Turkey have not been consulted. You should make repres/entatio/ns in this sense to the Austrian Gov/ernmen/t and urge strongly upon them the necessity of reconsidering their decision to annex the two occupied provinces.[17]

This protest, when received by Aehrenthal caused him to express extreme astonishment and regret that the British Government would regard his action as a violation of the Treaty of Berlin. Aehrenthal stated it was a painful surprise that he received a protest from England.[18]

Bulgaria and Independence

During this same week of October, 1908, rumors began to circulate that the Bulgarians were seriously considering declaring their independence from the Ottoman Empire. When these rumors reached the British Foreign Office, Sir Edward Grey gave assurances to the contrary to inquiring members of the press that nothing like Bulgarian independence would occur. Shortly afterward, both

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[17] British Documents, #302

[18] Nicolson, Lord Carnock, pp. 279-280.

British and French agents in Sofia received information that this action was soon to be taken. Great Britain then appealed to the Austro-Hungarian government to "use all their influence with the Prince of Bulgaria to discountenance the idea."[19] Aehrenthal took no notice of this appeal, and he encouraged Bulgaria to declare her independence. Aehrenthal knew what he was doing, because in the declaration of independence Bulgaria would become the first country to violate the Treaty of Berlin, and thus he was assured of having an ally on his side, for his proposed treaty violation.[20] On October 5, 1908, Prince Ferdinand proclaimed the existence of the independence of Bulgaria from Turkey.

Announcement of Annexation

On account of the prior agreement between Austria and Russia, Aehrenthal carried through his plans for the formal annexation and had Emperor Francis Joseph publicly announce the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 6, 1908.[21] The Emperor stated that Austrian troops would be withdrawn from the Sanjak of Novi Bazar. This removal of troops would serve as proof that Austrian policy was not aimed at territorial expansion beyond her

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[19]Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia, 1908-1909 (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1937), pp. 31-33. (Hereinafter referred to as Schmitt, Annexation.)

[20]The Times, 3 October 1908, p. 5.

[21]See Appendix #4, p. 104 for Francis Joseph's Proclamation of the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

present possessions in the Balkans.[22]

The formal annexation exploded into the Bosnian Crisis when objections to it were raised by most of the European Powers. War seemed imminent in the Balkans and Great Britain took upon herself as an interested outsider the task of preserving peace among the powers. She was instrumental in calming the discontented nations during the ensuing months of the crisis.

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[22]The Times, 3 October 1908, p. 5.

CHAPTER III

REACTIONS, SOLUTIONS AND INTRICACIES TO SETTLEMENT

The attitude of the people of Great Britain to the proclamation of annexation by Francis Joseph was one of dismay and regret. Had the Young Turk Revolt not occurred four months earlier, it is conceivable that such a move would not have bothered Britain. The reason for this is simple. Britain had opposed Turkey before the Young Turk Revolt. Prior to 1908, Turkey was a country having "palace rule" under Abdul Hamid and his government was renowned for its atrocities, its massacres, its espionage, its corruption, its internal decay, and its pro-German leanings. To the British the Young Turk Revolt brought the prospects of a marked change in governmental policies from one of autocracy to one of democracy. Great Britain supported the liberal constitutional government which was believed to have replaced the tyrannical rule of Abdul Hamid.

The annexation by Austria-Hungary of the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a decisive blow to the new government and the British stated from the very beginning they intended to support Turkey. The news of the annexation brought fear not only to Britain, but to the entire European continent. Winston Churchill, in describing the annexation, wrote: "It was a bombshell. Every chancellory in Europe recognized it as an aggressive act done in an ill conditioned manner."[1]

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[1]Winston S. Churchill, The Unknown War, The Eastern Front (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), p. 22.

To complicate the crisis even more, on October 7, 1908, Crete proclaimed union with Greece, which further reduced the territorial extent of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and in the Mediterranean. Britain adopted the same attitude with regard to Crete as she had in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Grey telegraphed the British Representative at Canea to inform the Cretan Government that Britain would not allow or admit a treaty of independence and union with Greece without the consent of the British Government and that of the other powers, because such unilateral action was a violation of an international treaty. As Britain had troops stationed on Crete, their concern was for their safety and, subsequently, warships were dispatched to the island.[2] The Times interpreted this as a sign that the government was aware of the gravity of the situation.[3]

British Official Reaction

Accusations and counter-accusations both from the British and foreign press and from all diplomatic circles filled the air in the days immediately following the annexation. All British leaders denounced the action of Austria-Hungary in speeches after the event. The Prime Minister, Herbert H. Asquith, reiterated the British policy before the House of Commons when he stated that Britain would not recognize an alteration to an international

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[2]British Documents, #349.

[3]The Times, 10 October 1908, p. 11.

treaty without the consent of the other parties concerned.[4] Asquith further declared that any settlement should show due regard to the interest of Turkey or any state which may have been prejudiced by the recent changes. He said his government hoped for a settlement that would be both peaceful and equitable.[5]

Asquith later summed up the British attitude in a speech when he explained that the hope of Britain was to maintain peace in the Balkans and to provide an atmosphere for the Young Turks in which their government could succeed. He stated:

> We are entirely disinterested in the Near East. We ask nothing for ourselves. Our sole objects are to maintain the public law of Europe, to secure a fair chance for the new regime in Turkey, and to promote the adjustment of conflicting interests.[6]

The Times of October 13 commented on Asquith's speech saying that the prime minister recognized the annexation as a serious blow to the new regime in Turkey, for although it had not caused material damage, it was affecting the prestige of the new government. The Times' writer added that if Turkey's prestige were destroyed, she no doubt would become involved in another bloody revolution.[7]

The annexation was condemned by Sir Edward Grey. This Austrian-Hungarian move greatly upset Grey because this bold move

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[4]Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 4th. Ser., vol. 194(1908), p. 38.

[5]The Times, 13 October 1908, p. 6.

[6]Gooch, Cambridge History, III, 405.

[7]The Times, 8 October 1908, p. 9.

clashed with many of his principles of foreign policy. Grey's feelings were described by Sir Winston Churchill who stated, "The Whig statesman, the monitor of public law in Europe, the English gentleman and public schoolboy--all these elements in his powerful character were equally affronted."[8] In a later speech, Grey related that the Austrian action occurred at a moment when it appeared as if the political affairs of the Balkans and the Near East were more hopeful for settlement than at any time during the last thirty years.[9] He stated that the action by Austria-Hungary was quite arbitrary since Turkey had not been consulted, nor was she asked to consent and the change was, therefore, a blow to Turkish prestige.[10] However, Grey felt that since the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been under Austrian administration before, the mere fact that she had announced her intentions of taking them over permanently did not make for any great material or practical change.[11] He did not believe the annexation would lead to a disturbance of peace, but the manner in which it occurred was irregular and abrupt.[12] Both the press and public officials

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[8]Churchill, Crisis, p. 42.

[9]Sir Edward Grey, Speeches on Foreign Affairs, 1904-1914 (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1931), p. 109. (Hereinafter referred to as Grey, Speeches.)

[10]Sir Edward Grey, Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925), I, 169. (Hereinafter referred to as Grey, Twenty-five Years.)

[11]The Daily Express, 8 October 1908, p. 1.

[12]The Manchester Guardian, 8 October 1908, p. 6.

expressed full confidence in Grey's ability to cope with the situation. The Spectator asked the question, "What course should Britain take?" In the paper's opinion,"it was correctly outlined by Sir Edward Grey in his wise, firm, and yet conspicuously moderate speech. . . ."[13] In a public address, Secretary of State for War Richard B. Haldane stated that it would be wise to leave to Sir Edward Grey the management of the Balkan Crisis as he was very competent to deal with the situation.[14]

King Edward was also very disturbed by the annexation and in particular by Emperor Francis Joseph's lack of frankness towards him. Edward's displeasure was evidenced by the fact that for several weeks after the annexation he refused to discuss political matters with Count Mensdorff, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to London.[15]

Asquith made the remark that the policy of the Government is approved by the whole nation with unanimity and without distinction of political party.[16] This feeling of unanimity was likewise expressed in Parliament. Lord Fitzmaurice, the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was asked by a member of Parliament whether the British people supported the

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[13]The Spectator, 10 October, 1908, p. 528.

[14]The Manchester Guardian, 7 October 1908, p. 7.

[15]André Maurois, The Edwardian Era (New York: Appleton-Century Co., 1933), p. 325. (Hereinafter referred to as Maurois, Edwardian Era.)

[16]The Times, 12 October 1908, p. 7.

policy which Grey was following. He replied that the general public endorsed the policy and that he had learned that the members of the House of Lords endorsed it, too. He followed this up by stating that this was an encouragement to the Government to know that they had behind them, not merely the voice of their own Party, but, they believed, the confidence of the entire nation.[17] The British Stock Exchange viewed the situation as requiring a united effort on the part of the powers to patch up some type of arrangement between Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria.[18]

Press Reactions

On October 10, The Economist expressed a desire for peace and moderation in this crisis on the part of the British, and requested that they work for peace. The Economist's statement was:

> The greatest of British interests is peace. The happy tradition of our foreign policy is the fixed determination not to embroil ourselves in the affairs of other countries. Let us exert our influence and authority . . . on behalf of peace and justice.[19]

A number of Englishmen believed that Bosnia and Herzegovina would have been better dealt with by leaving their status as it was. As it was, a foolhardy mistake had been made. In a letter to the editor of The Times, someone wrote in:

> It is only the act of a madman to wake up a sleeping dog. The question of Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of these dogs which ought not be wakened up by anybody, least of all by Austria-Hungary.[20]

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[17]Great Britain. Parliament, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 4th ser., vol. 194 (1908), p. 19.

[18]The Daily Express, 6 October 1908, p. 4.

[19]The Economist (London). LXVII (Oct., 1908), 659.

[20]The Times, 7 October 1908, p. 7.

Not all the British were sympathetic with the Turks. The Westminster Gazette stated that the Turks may protest, but they are not going to jeopardize their recovery by plunging into a violent conflict. After all the Turks must keep in mind that if they lose these provinces, it was because in past times they failed to govern them properly. Misgovernment was a cause of the present situation.[21] Turkey could not have thought that Austria-Hungary would have abandoned the provinces to make room for her to occupy and again govern them. Their complete absorption by Austria was actually little more than the sealing of a long accomplished fact.[22] Austria must be acquitted of charges of deliberately wishing to discredit the reform movement in Turkey. This may have been one of the effects of the recent Austrian annexation, but it was not the motive.[23] The Spectator reiterated these sentiments by stating that it did not desire to condone or excuse the powers concerned in the annexation, but the fact remains that "little or no substantial injury has been done to the material interest of Turkey."[24] The Westminster Gazette stated that the business of the British government was to ". . . do everything in our power to help the Turks to strengthen and consolidate what they have and can keep, provided their Government is efficient and honest."[25]

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[21]The Westminster Gazette, 7 October 1908, p. 1.

[22]The Manchester Guardian, 7 October 1908, p. 6.

[23]Ibid., 12 October 1908, p. 6.

[24]The Spectator, 10 October 1908, p. 525.

[25]The Westminster Gazette, 7 October 1908, p. 1.

It continued by saying that the business of the British was to keep the smaller nationalities within the Balkans from forcing a situation which the Turks themselves desired to keep within bounds.[26]

An editorial in the Westminster Gazette related that the events of recent days should teach the country that the only true reliance is upon Britain's own strength. "Our safety rests alone in our strong right arm, and in our honest determination neither to do wrong to other Powers nor to suffer them to do wrong to us."[27]

Reactions of other Governments to Annexation

The reaction of the other powers to the Bosnia-Herzegovina annexation soon became known to Britain. Germany quickly decided to stand by Austria-Hungary, but this announcement was not made until after the annexation had occurred. The German Government was formally told of the annexation on September 29, 1908, when William II received a letter from Francis Joseph informing him of the approaching annexation.[28] William II did not reply to this letter until October 14, but his response was one of approval and this was encouraging to the Austrians.[29]

A representative of the German Emperor presented to Francis Joseph the letter expressing William's approval of the annexation

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[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid., 5 October 1908, p. 3.

[28]See Appendix #2, p. 101, for copy of letter.

[29]See Appendix #3, p. 103, for copy of letter.

and assured Austria-Hungary of German support in the present situation.[30]

Such short notification of the intended annexation placed the German Empire in a most difficult position with Turkey. The British Foreign Office stated that Germany was thus placed in a position of great embarrassment as she was forced to choose between her ally Austria and her friends, the Turks. However, since the Alliance with Austria had been instrumental in keeping the peace for thirty years, Germany could not do otherwise than support her ally.[31]

Emperor William II had no choice but to accept the inevitable, and he deeply regretted it because of a fear that the Turks would desert the Germans and seek greater economic and moral support from the British. The Emperor's feeling on this was portrayed in a letter to Bülow. In this letter he wrote:

> I only regret that the fearful stupidity of Aehrenthal has got me into the dilemma of not being able to protest and support our friends the Turks, as it is my ally who had wronged them. Instead, I have to see England counselling and befriending the Turks in place of myself and doing so with arguments . . . taken out of my very mouth. And so my Turkish policy built up laboriously for 20 years goes smash! A great score over us for Edward VII! . . .[32]

Germany made no public display about the annexation. She kept quiet as she was determined not only to keep the peace, but also not to lose status with Turkey. Both Emperor William and

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[30] The Westminster Gazette, 17 October 1908, p. 9.

[31] British Documents, #316.

[32] Lee, King Edward VII, II, 638.

the German Foreign Office were originally in favor of dissociating Germany from the Austrian actions. According to Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British Foreign Office informed Nicolson that the action by Austria had placed Germany in a position of great embarrassment as she was forced to choose between her ally Austria and her friend the Turks.[33]

Somewhat later the Emperor William II revealed the fact that Germany would work with her allies to promote a just solution to the whole affair. A few days after the annexation the Emperor made a statement to the press concerning Germany's attitude and stated that the recent events in the Near East attracted the attention of Europe and that these events demanded serious consideration. In view of this "the German Empire will, in loyal union with its allies, promote a just solution to the present difficulties."[34]

The British hoped that Germany, who was continually assuring Turkey of her support, would use her influence to induce Austria-Hungary to meet the desires of the Porte for a peaceful settlement. During the early weeks of the crisis, however, there was little to indicate that she was using her influence in this way.[35] Germany would protect Turkey's interests insofar as they did not alienate Germany's relationship with Austria-Hungary.[36]

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[33]Nicolson, Carnock, p. 281.

[34]The Times, 21 October 1908, p. 7.

[35]Ibid., 21 November 1908, p. 11.

[36]Ibid., 16 October 1908, p. 7.

The annexation crisis aroused great turmoil in Russia. The event caused great fear in Slavic nationalist circles, but, of course, the members knew nothing about Alexander Izvolsky's deal with Aehrenthal. The Russian Prime Minister, Peter Stolypin, immediately wrote Izvolsky instructing him to oppose the annexation, and it was this which primarily caused Izvolsky to repudiate his Buchlau agreement by stating that he had been misled by the Austrian Foreign Minister. The Russian people exhibited great concern for their fellow Slavs who were now under Austro-Hungarian rule, and this prompted Stolypin to further instruct Izvolsky to take the lead in championing the Serbian claims.[37]

Izvolsky arrived in London on October 9, still hoping to secure support for his Straits' program. Upon meeting Izvolsky at the Foreign Office, Grey described his appearance in a vivid passage: "Directly I began to speak to him his eyes became very dull and defensive."[38] Grey was able to sidetrack the issue of the Straits by stating that Britain would not oppose the program if the Straits were opened to all nations on terms of perfect equality and if Turkey would consent.[39] The British could ill afford to sacrifice the newly acquired friendship of the Young Turks over a matter granting such a concession to Russia.

This same opinion was shared by Sir Charles Hardinge. He wrote to Arthur Nicolson that "It is evident that we must do our

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[37]Schmitt, "Bosnian Annexation Crisis," Slavonic Review, XXVII (Jan., 1931), 650-651.

[38]Nicolson, Carnock, p. 282.

[39]British Documents, #377.

best to support him, such as he is." Izvolsky's request for the right of egress from the Black Sea for Russian ships did not include the right of ingress for foreign vessels, and the former could not be favorably considered in view of the situation in Turkey.[40] The inability to get the Straits opened to Russian warships caused Izvolsky to agree to the necessity of convening a European conference of which Britain had been in complete agreement all along. Grey was successful in keeping the friendship of Izvolsky and was able to persuade him that the question of the Straits should not be brought up at a conference primarily dealing with Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the matter could be brought up at a later date at a future conference.[41] The government decided that King Edward should write to Emperor Nicholas stating that the British would give support to the Russian proposals for an international conference to decide the Straits question.[42]

In England the people's attitudes were divided in feelings toward Russia and the Straits and, thus, the British Government was placed in an extremely delicate position. The Spectator saw no objections to reopening the question of the Dardanelles provided that Turkey was willing and provided they would not consider that they were being prejudiced thereby. If Russia were to propose

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[40]Nicolson, Carnock, p. 282.

[41]British Documents, #377.

[42]Nicolson, Carnock, p. 283.

that the Dardanelles be opened to war vessels of all nations, Britain ought not to object.[43] Many other Britishers believed the Straits' problem should be solved to Russia's satisfaction; and yet, at the same time, there were many influential sections of the British population who were avowedly antagonistic towards Russia and asserted that the interests of Great Britain and Russia in the Near and Middle East were irreconcilable.[44]

Before the Russian left London, these two foreign ministers agreed on an agenda for a conference. Izvolsky then went to Berlin. When he presented his Straits program to the Germans, they offered no objections, provided, of course, they were given some type of compensation.

The French were annoyed because Grey would not console Russia and end the whole business by conceding the opening of the Straits.[45] Throughout the crisis very little else was heard on this matter from France. At this time she was too busily involved in domestic affairs and the Moroccan dispute with Germany. Then, too, she had no genuine interest in the Balkans. She realized that if she antagonized Austria-Hungary, the latter might throw her weight behind Germany and this would mean an adverse settlement for France in the Moroccan Crisis. Great Britain had had enough near

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[43] The Spectator, 10 October 1908, p. 528.

[44] "The Crisis in the Near East," The Quarterly Review, CCXVII, 297.

[45] George Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1937), p. 255. (Hereinafter referred to as Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon.)

clashes with France over Turkish possessions and was glad that Bosnia and Herzegovina would not be numbered among them. However, there were conversations with the French over this matter. Grey, in a conversation with the Russian Ambassador Benckendorff, asked him what he believed France would do if Austria and Russia came to war over the Balkans and Germany supported Austria. Benckendorff replied that France would be brought in and all four powers would be involved. He added that should such a crisis arise, he was optimistic enough to think that decisive action by Britain would keep the peace.[46]

The Turkish Government vigorously protested the action of Austria-Hungary in annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina on the grounds that the terms set down at the Congress of Berlin declared the occupation was provisional.[47] Since the British very quickly let their sympathies for Turkey on this matter be known, Turkey became very dependent upon Great Britain throughout the crisis and she refused to recognize the annexation until equitable settlement was made. In this matter the Turkish Government placed its confidence in Great Britain more than in any other Power, and it would not make any decisions concerning the crisis without asking for British advice.[48]

Serbian-Montenegrin Reaction

The gravest reaction to the annexation came from the two small Balkan countries of Serbia and Montenegro. For many years

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[46] Nicolson, Carnock, pp. 285-286.

[47] British Documents, #339.

[48] Ibid., #406.

these countries had desired to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, but since 1878 with the occupation of the Sanjak of Novi Bazar by Austrian troops this had been impossible. Serbia and Montenegro had desired the annexed provinces because of their strong Serbian blood ties and the desire to create a bigger Serbia or a bigger Montenegro. The announcement of the annexation by Austria-Hungary and of Bulgaria's independence caused great anger and anti-Austrian demonstrations took place. These demonstrations were intense enough for the government to regard the situation as critical.[49]

These countries realized, however, that they were not strong enough to attempt direct annexation because such a move would have meant war with Austria-Hungary. Both countries realized that annexation prevented the merging of their blood and nationalistic ties in addition to its further contributing to economic isolation for them. This staggering blow to the nationalistic aspirations of Serbia and Montenegro was quickly met by formal protests and military preparations by both countries. Negotiations also were initiated with the hope of establishing a Turkish-Serbian-Montenegrin-Greek alliance against Austria. This proposed alliance was strongly supported by Izvolsky and Britain, but nothing came of it because of the difficulty of adjusting the Serbian and Bulgarian claims in the Turkish province of Macedonia and because of Turkey's insistence on an offensive as well as a defensive alliance.[50]

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[49] The Daily Express, 6 October 1908, p. 1.

[50] British Documents, #432 and # 560.

Encouraged by sympathy given to her by Great Britain and Russia, Serbia consequently sent a formal protest to the powers demanding autonomy for the provinces. Since Austria-Hungary showed no intention of considering this proposal, Serbia began to increase her military forces.[51] The powers did not pay very much attention to the Serbian protest, since she had not been a signatory to the Treaty of Berlin and, besides, her demands for territorial compensation were of too great a magnitude. Great Britain and Russia knew, too, Austria-Hungary would never concede such a demand. Serbia knew her demands could only be acquired by war and this would ordinarily mean utter ruin for her unless she received aid and support from another western European power or powers.

In Montenegro, feeling was as hostile as that of the Serbians towards the Austro-Hungarian action. In the capital of Montenegro, Cetigne, a public meeting was held to protest the annexation and many shouts of "War with Austria-Hungary" were heard. The national assembly passed a resolution requesting the government to invite Serbia to join with them to protect the interests of all Serb nations.[52] The government sent a note of protest to Great Britain stating that the annexation was a violation of the Treaty of Berlin. Grey acknowledged the note by replying that Great Britain regarded the annexation as a violation of the Treaty

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[51]Emil Reich, "The Crisis in the Near East: The Austro-Hungarian Case," The Nineteenth Century and After, LXIV (November, 1908), 772.

[52]The Times, 9 October 1908, p. 5.

of Berlin and that she could not allow any power to alter a treaty without the consent of the powers signatory to the treaty concerned.[53]

British Support for Serbia and Montenegro

Britain as a result became the first power to make her voice heard in defense of the Serbian race against a violation of the Treaty of Berlin. This acknowledgment caused great satisfaction when it was announced at a subsequent public meeting in Cetigne.[54] The British Government was willing to listen to the protests of Montenegro and of Serbia, but it indicated to them that it would be most difficult to induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to abandon territory which she had already annexed.[55]

Proposed Conference on Annexation

Immediately after the annexation became known to the countries of Europe and to England, there were demands that a conference of the powers, who were signatories to the Treaty of Berlin, be held to resolve the crisis. On October 6, the day the annexation officially was announced, the British Foreign Office learned that Russia intended to propose a conference of the Berlin Treaty powers. The Russians stated that they would prefer such a proposal for a conference be made by Russia, France, and Britain acting together.[56] The British, however, would not agree to the

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[53] British Documents, #348.

[54] The Westminster Gazette, 12 October 1908, p. 7.

[55] British Documents, #356.

[56] Ibid.

holding of a conference until all preliminary negotiations had been worked out.

The British press had definite ideas about the convening of a conference. The logical conclusion of the protest by the powers was a conference, according to the Manchester Guardian. It would be easier for Turkey to accept a change at the hands of the collected powers in conference, than a change which had been forced upon her by the individual powers of Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary. There was the possibility that a conference might offer her some slight compensation.[57]

The Spectator did not think that Austria-Hungary would refuse a conference because such action would mean that one of the Great Powers regarded a formal document which was formally binding on all the signatories as "not worth the paper it is written on." Such a conclusion by Austria-Hungary would set civilization back by nearly a hundred years.[58]

The Westminster Gazette went even further in its attitude towards a conference.

> It is not for the British Government to propose a conference, nor unconditionally to decline a conference. A conference with clearly defined programs may be useful, but it is no business of the British Government to propose anything at the present stage.[59]

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[57]The Manchester Guardian, 6 October 1908, p. 8.

[58]The Spectator, 24 October 1908, p. 618.

[59]The Westminster Gazette, 7 October 1908, p. 1.

This paper realized the importance of Britain standing beside Turkey. It stated that if the affair is to be concluded without serious trouble it would be necessary for the powers to jointly treat the Turkish point of view as of primary importance in arranging a conference and ". . . to set their wits to work to find ways of compensating Turkey and assisting her government to go ahead with the work of reform and consolidation."[60] Still further opinion was stated in The Daily Express.

> Britain has not committed herself either one way or another in regard to a European conference on the Eastern Crisis. Great Britain cannot agree even in principle until the exact scope of the proposed conference is clearly defined.[61]

Being influenced by the press, Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir F. Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris, that before going into any conference, there should be a preliminary agreement as to what subjects should be discussed, how they should be dealt with, and in what form Turkey should be compensated for advantages gained by other powers at her expense.[62]

The chief exponent of holding a conference was Alexander Izvolsky, who arrived in London on October 9 and discussed with Sir Edward Grey proposals to be presented. Izvolsky and Grey agreed on a Nine-Point program.[63]

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[60] Ibid., 10 October 1908, p. 1.

[61] The Daily Express, 9 October 1908, p. 1.

[62] British Documents, #321.

[63] Nicolson, Carnock, p. 283.

Among the points within this Nine-Point program that could come up and could be considered were the following:

(1) Bulgaria, her judicial status and her financial obligations to Turkey;

(2) Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(3) Sanjak of Novi Bazar;

(4) Stipulations of Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin concerning the European province of Turkey;

(5) Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin concerning the Armenian provinces;

(6) Stipulations of Article 29 which limited the sovereign rights of Montenegro.[64]

The British Foreign Office then issued a statement declaring that the exchange of views between Izvolsky and Grey had resulted in complete agreement. The Foreign Office felt that a conference would be necessary but would confine itself to questions arising from the violations of the Treaty of Berlin and the first object of the conference must be compensation for Turkey.[65]

The British felt that the fewer points submitted for discussion, the better the chances would be for success at the conference. The British people felt the government should not be a party to the admission of any compensation to any country to which Turkey objected. Great Britain would not use pressure on Turkey to accept any demands, nor force her to reject any proposals which Turkey could support.[66] Great Britain's most important concern was to

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[64] British Documents, #321.

[65] The Spectator, 17 October 1908, p. 569.

[66] The Times, 14 October 1908, p. 11.

obtain some compensation for Turkey in rectification of frontiers from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that Turkey should not lose further territory or sovereignty in Europe. From this point on Grey tried to insist that the breach of the treaty over Bosnia should be regulated by an international conference but with little help from Izvolsky, he found himself practically alone in his efforts to help Turkey.[67]

Grey sent the following dispatch to Sir G. A. Lowther, British Ambassador at Constantinople:

> I am sure that the wise course for Turkey is to give up what are purely points of form in return for a settlement, which would give her some substantial pecuniary compensation. . . . We shall do our utmost at any conference to ensure that Turkey shall get as much substance as possible, and we have it a condition that any rectification of frontier . . . shall come from Bosnia or Herzegovina if at all, and not from Turkey.[68]

Soon after the annexation, Turkey formally stated that she was willing to submit to a conference of the powers over the crisis if "the terms of reference can be limited to the Bosnian and Bulgarian question."[69] The Turkish acceptance of a conference was largely the result of the fact that she was assured of British support. Because of the Nine-Point program, Britain could now support Russia in the calling of a conference.

On October 22, Sir Edward Grey explained the situation concerning the proposed conference to the House of Commons. He

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[67]Trevelyan, Grey of Fallodon, p. 255.

[68]British Documents, #388.

[69]The Times, 10 October 1908, p. 7.

stated that the present object of communications among the Powers was to contain the disturbance and to secure the interests of Turkey. Grey stated that the purpose of the conference was to

> . . . secure some agreement on a programme which, without widening the area of disturbance, shall arrive at a settlement of the difficulties. . . . As Turkey is the Power most adversely affected by what has taken place, His Majesty's Government trust that the first object of the Powers will be to secure compensation to Turkey, to safeguard her interests, and to strengthen the new regime. . . .[70]

To hold an international conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina required not only the consent of all the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin but all had to agree on the terms for discussion, but Austria-Hungary did not want to give her consent to this. The Austrian government did not refuse to agree to such a conference but stated that "we have nothing in principle against a conference if the programme is definitely fixed in advance and corresponds with our views."[71] Austria would not recognize the right of the powers to discuss the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[72] She also objected to territorial compensation in the Balkans being given to other powers as a buffer to her acquisition of the two provinces.[73] In fact, Aehrenthal flatly stated that there could be no question of any territorial compensation to either

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[70]Great Britain. Parliament. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 4th ser., vol. 194 (1908), p. 1353.

[71]The Times, 23 October 1908, p. 7.

[72]Nicolson, Carnock, p. 287.

[73]The Daily Express, 9 October 1908, p. 1.

Serbia or Montenegro.[74]

After further conversations with Aehrenthal, the British Ambassador in Vienna wrote that Aehrenthal did not insist that the provinces should be excluded from the program, but Aehrenthal did state that while the Austrian government would not allow them to be discussed, the government would agree to the calling of a conference. The British Ambassador wrote to Grey that while

> . . . the Austrian Government could not allow the annexation to be called in question or made subject of discussion, they do not object to the Conference taking act /sic/ of it and noting abrogation of Article dealing with provinces and sanjak in general revision of Treaty.[75]

Austria-Hungary then demanded that Turkey submit a written recognition of the annexation as a preliminary to the holding of a conference. She soon changed this demand and stated that she would be content with a verbal assurance of Turkey's recognition of the annexation and that she would not raise the matter at the conference.[76]

Following Russia's and Great Britain's calling for a conference, lengthy discussions and diplomatic exchanges ensued among the powers, and all clearly expressed their views. On one side favoring a conference discussing the Nine-Point program were Great Britain, Turkey, France, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, while on the other side opposing the conference was Austria

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[74]Nicolson, Carnock, p. 287.

[75]British Documents, #413.

[76]The Times, 27 October 1908, p. 5.

supported to a large degree by her ally, Germany.[77]

Germany hoped to play a dual role in these proceedings by supporting Austria-Hungary while at the same time appearing to be a friend of Turkey's. On several occasions German diplomats more or less inferred to British representatives that the wish of their country was to preserve peace, to maintain the Turkish Empire intact and that Germany would support efforts to secure compensation for Turkey. Grey replied to this inference by stating that to maintain the Turkish Empire, compensation must be given by Austria-Hungary and only then could the discussion of annexation be excluded from the conference. If such compensation were given and accepted, then the conference might meet to give the powers' approval to what Austria-Hungary had done.[78] The Spectator reiterated this feeling of the German Government when it stated that the German Emperor's desire for the tranquillity of Europe could not demonstrate itself better than in giving good advice to Austria-Hungary as to the necessity of joining in the conference. The German Emperor is in a better position than anyone to point out to Austria-Hungary that if the invitation to a conference were declined, "the heaviest blow at public confidence would have been struck that any living person can remember."[79]

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[77] The Daily Express, 7 October 1908, p. 1.

[78] British Documents, #380.

[79] The Spectator, 24 October 1908, p. 618.

Despite the best efforts of Grey and Izvolsky to have a conference, Austria-Hungary would not agree with the other powers on the points necessary to convene the conference. The Times was very concerned about this and pointed out that every day's delay increased the danger of the situation.[80]

Before the annexation officially was declared, Austria-Hungary had been prepared to demilitarize the Sanjak of Novi Bazar as her way of compensating Turkey for the provinces. This offer to demilitarize the Sanjak as full compensation for the provinces was not even sop for annexation, because Austria-Hungary was still in possession of the area, and she had no intentions of leaving. The Berlin Treaty had given Austria-Hungary the right to garrison the area, but otherwise she had no claim to this mountainous region, even though she was in full possession and had been since 1878.[81] Therefore, the offer to demilitarize the Sanjak was not considered adequate compensation and therefore compensation must be given.

Another newspaper related that Turkey had gained territory with the annexation since she would resume complete sovereign rights over the "not inconsiderable piece of territory" known as the Sanjak of Novi Bazar. Austria-Hungary has made a great deal of her self-sacrifice and of her good feelings towards Turkey with this act of renunciation. However, Austria-Hungary's evacuation

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[80] The Times, 21 October 1908, p. 5.

[81] See Appendix #1, p. 100.

of this area was because her military advisors told her she must evacuate. The presence of Austrian garrisons in this area would be suicidal if joint action between Serbia and Montenegro occurred.[82]

Sir Edward Grey realized at the time of annexation that territorial compensation to Turkey was impractical and consequently, before the controversy erupted, he had suggested to Turkish officials that monetary compensation might be desired.[83] Austria-Hungary at that time was quick to acknowledge the fact that compensation in addition to the withdrawal of Austrian troops from the Sanjak of Novi Bazar was called for, and a government official said that his government considered Turkey the only country entitled to compensation and that Austria-Hungary would do her best to secure it for her.[84]

Proposed Austria-Hungary-Turkey Negotiations

As talk began to circulate that a conference would have to be held, Austria-Hungary's Ambassador to Constantinople, Baron Heinrich von Calice, told the Young Turks that a direct settlement between the two governments would be preferable to submitting their demands to a conference.[85] Talks had no sooner begun between the two governments than they suffered an almost immediate rupture because Aehrenthal demanded that Turkey first recognize the annexation before negotiations could begin or before a monetary

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[82]The Spectator, 10 October 1908, p. 525.

[83]British Documents, #317.

[84]The Times, 10 October 1908, p. 11.

[85]Ibid., 19 October 1908, p. 11.

settlement could be reached. Aehrenthal required that the Porte send a written statement recognizing the annexation as a first move toward a settlement. The Porte refused to do this and as a result the talks were abandoned by October 23.[86]

The Spectator stated that no one expected it to be possible to reverse the annexation by Austria-Hungary, but Austria-Hungary ought to be asked to pay something. The reason Turkey has not asked for compensation is that such would be as good as a formal recognition of the annexation. Turkey naturally does not wish to prejudice herself by making that admission in advance.[87]

The Vienna press attributed the Porte's refusal to deal directly with Austria to the British influence and these attacks culminated with an accusation that the Turks had accepted a British bribe of £50,000,000.[88] The British had been accused of taking advantage of the Turkish Government's pecuniary difficulties by offering full moral and financial support to the Young Turks. In an issue of the Manchester Guardian in October it was stated that the German Neue Freie Presse declared that British policy was responsible for inflaming the Near East and for the continued strife among the European nations.[89] The British Foreign Office denied these statements by the Austrian and German

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[86]Ibid., 24 October 1908, p. 13.

[87]The Spectator, 21 November 1908, p. 822.

[88]The Times, 25 October 1908, p. 11.

[89]The Manchester Guardian, 26 October 1908, p. 7.

press that the British had advised the Porte to break off direct negotiations with Austria.[90]

Grey did not attach much importance to these charges of deliberate malevolence brought against England. Grey stated:

> They are sheer inventions; and the harm they do is not so much in the resentment caused here /England/ as in the fact that until they are not only discontinued, but disbelieved in the country of their origin they create a state of feeling there which is a barrier to cordial relations between the public opinion of the two countries--a barrier which it is not in our power, but only in theirs, to remove.[91]

The Austrian Foreign Office then had a rather abrupt change of heart and offered a statement to the effect that they were convinced that Britain desired, rather than objected to, a direct understanding between Austria and Turkey. Consequently, it was believed that negotiations between Austria and Turkey would be resumed and would probably be successful.[92]

Serbian Military Build-up and Demands

During the ensuing months while the crisis between Austria-Hungary and Turkey raged, further complications in the whole situation arose from the protests of Serbia. Much of the turmoil regarding the crisis came from Serbian protests against the annexation and it was believed that this was the result of moral support extended to her by Great Britain, France, and Russia. Serbia as a result demanded territorial compensation

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[90] Ibid., 27 October 1908, p. 7.

[91] The Spectator, 30 January 1908, p. 166.

[92] The Daily Express, 28 October 1908, p. 1.

from Austria-Hungary when there were no legal grounds on which to base her claims. Serbia had not signed the Treaty of Berlin and as a result she had no reasons for complaint. Serbia refused to accept the annexation as final because she had regarded Bosnia and Herzegovina as her rightful heritage. At the announcement of the annexation she began to build up her military forces and directed her soldiers to guard the roads and bridges on the Bosnian frontier against a possible Austrian attack.[93] This Serbian mobilization was quickly followed by an Austrian mobilization. On October 9, Austria dispatched troops to the districts of Bosnia and Herzegovina bordering on Serbia.[94] Following the call-up the Austrian government refused to release men from the military whose terms of service had expired, and she also called out reserve units. In addition to the regular army being fully mobilized, the manufacturers of ammunition and military ordinance were ordered to increase their production. Austria was careful to explain to the powers that the measures she was taking were defensive and should not be interpreted as an intention to declare war on Serbia.[95]

Britain and the Serbian Crisis

The British viewed the situation with anxiety and extended their sympathies to the Serbs, but Grey quickly let them know that

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[93] Ibid., 7 October 1908, p. 1.

[94] The Daily Express, 9 October 1908, p. 1.

[95] British Documents, #345.

Britain would not support them to the point of a declaration of war. Britain warned the Serbs that in view of the crisis they must avoid everything and anything which would make the existing situation more difficult.[96]

Following this warning to Serbia, Grey suggested to Italy, Germany and France the possibility of making a joint representation at Vienna to the effect that an attack on Serbia might lead to a European war. Aehrenthal was to be asked to state his grievances against Serbia and the Powers would then use their best efforts at Belgrade to remove the causes of complaint. Aehrenthal, however, informed Bülow that Austria preferred to deal with the matter by herself, even if it meant war.[97]

Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy then made representations in Belgrade urging the Serbian Government to impress upon the populace the necessity for restraining national excitement.[98]

The Serbian Government, acting on the advice of the powers, issued the following communique:

> Serbia has no intentions of declaring war against Austria-Hungary or of offering provocation to that Monarchy. Serbia has taken every step to protect the interests of Austrian commerce and Austrian subjects. It has stopped

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[96]"Concerning the Responsibility of the Authors of the War," German White Book, trans. by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 76.

[97]Nicolson, Carnock, pp. 297-298.

[98]The Daily Express, 10 October 1908, p. 1.

> the anti-Austrian demonstrations, in spite of the fact that Austria-Hungary had mobilized her forces all along the Serbian frontier, and had prevented merchandise, as well as war material from reaching Serbia, although ordered months ago.[99]

The Serbs, however, failed to follow up on the communique. Even though they realized that their army would be unable to offer sufficient resistence to Austria-Hungary, the Serbs continued to mobilize their military forces on the frontier and to prepare for war. The hopes of this small country rested on the assumption that she could get Russia on her side in the conflict and, therefore, she would not stand alone. Russia previously had exhibited war sympathies toward the Serbs, and she even now seemed willing to offer them moral and diplomatic support.[100] As the situation became acute, Sir Edward Grey decided that Britain should use her good offices to try to bring a peaceful solution to the situation. As a result, Grey's original sympathies for the Slavs changed, and now he believed that Serbia's best interests lay in peace and in the hope that Turkey again would become strong. Grey stated that he did not have much sympathy with the clamors of Serbia and Montenegro for territorial compensation and that if they were afraid of the Austrian advance, "they had better sit still, put their own houses in order, make friends with Turkey," and hope that the latter would get strong under the new regime.[101]

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[99] The Westminster Gazette, 3 November 1908, p. 9.

[100] The Times, 3 November 1908, p. 8.

[101] British Documents, #412.

Nevertheless, Grey could not completely turn his back on Serbia because of his desire to remain on friendly terms with Russia. Grey readily realized the positions that the various powers had taken on the annexation, and he desired to keep as many allies as possible for Britain. The British Foreign Minister declared that he did not desire to ignore Izvolsky on the Serbian question and that he would do his best to support him.[102] Grey thus summed up the British attitude toward Serbia:

> English feeling was not specially the champion of Serbia, though if Serbia, a small country, was attacked by Austria, British sympathies might be with the small country, as was usually the case. As for Russia, we were not standing in the way of anything which Russia was prepared to do: that was her own affair.[103]

In England itself public opinion was divided on the question of compensation to Serbia. Many Englishmen felt that the annexation had not violated any treaty rights possessed by her. Among them it was agreed that annexation affected her interest only in Slavic sentiment, but not in territory.[104] There were others who felt that Serbia's demands were purely ridiculous and that Austria could not be expected to give in to these claims.[105] Still others believed that Austria had treated Serbia in the matters unfairly and should compensate her. The Times of February 20 stated that

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[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid., #770.

[104] The Times, 20 February 1909, p. 11.

[105] Ibid., 25 February 1909, p. 11.

a great power like Austria-Hungary could afford to show a little more magnanimity than it had hitherto displayed toward its Serb neighbors.[106] Whatever the British attitude was, by late February, the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia had reached such a high state of war fever as to constitute a serious menace to the peace of Europe. Many European people, including Englishmen, considered that the relations of Austria-Hungary with this fourth-class power appeared to govern the issue of European peace or war.[107]

The thought of war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was "utterly hateful" to the British, but the British were absolutely confident that their sense of national honor and their instinct of self-preservation would, if the occasion arose, make the country virtually unanimous in its determination to maintain the Triple Entente and to face the consequences that might result.[108]

The policy the British Government adopted was one of attempting to appease Austria and Serbia, while at the same time aiding Turkey in every way possible without going to war. The British government considered the settlement between Turkey and Austria-Hungary to be the first and most important step in solving the problem of the crisis, and once this problem was resolved, a settlement between Austria-Hungary and Serbia could be considered.[109]

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[106] Ibid., 20 February 1909, p. 11.

[107] Ibid., 26 February 1909, p. 5.

[108] The Spectator, 20 March 1908, p. 443.

[109] British Documents, #412.

Austro-Hungarian-Turkish Negotiations and Settlement

While Britain was working toward formulating rules for a conference, she was encouraging direct negotiations between Austria-Hungary and Turkey. The Foreign Office adopted the strategy that it was Turkey's decision whether or not she would accept any compensation and should she choose to come to a direct settlement, this decision would be welcomed by them.[110] Grey stated that his government had no prejudice against or preference for any particular method by which a settlement might be reached.[111] Britain's foreign minister believed that a satisfactory direct agreement between Turkey and Austria-Hungary would pave the way toward a general settlement, but it was for Turkey to decide whether compensation would be acceptable.[112]

Turkey was on the defensive in these discussions, but shortly after the crisis began the Turks put into effect a boycott of all Austrian goods coming into the country and hand-bills were posted within Constantinople not to purchase Austrian, German or Bulgarian products.[113] In the beginning this move was scoffed at by Austrian officials, but after a brief period of time the boycott began to be felt by Austrian industries, especially in the manufacturing of fezzes.

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[110] Ibid., #402.

[111] The Times, 7 April 1909, p. 11.

[112] Ibid., 24 October 1908, p. 9.

[113] The Manchester Guardian, 12 October 1908, p. 7.

The boycott of Austrian goods was carried to the extent that the Turks totally abandoned the traditional red fez manufactured in Austria and adopted the white variety of that characteristic headgear.[114]

The Turkish boycott, according to The Spectator, appeared to be more effectual than would have been supposed. No violence ensued, but some Austrian firms trading in Turkey faced bankruptcy. The Austrians wondered if the shadowy advantages of annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina compensated for the material losses.[115]

In November, Aehrenthal stated that his country could not negotiate with Turkey over the matter so long as the boycott continued.[116] This additional requirement of Aehrenthal's was interpreted by Britain as being intended to create embarrassment for the new regime.[117]

However, the Turkish boycott continued and caused great annoyance and alarm in Austrian commercial and financial circles, where the losses already suffered were estimated to be millions of British pounds.[118]

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[114] The Westminster Gazette, 17 October 1908, p. 9.

[115] The Spectator, 17 October 1908, p. 570.

[116] The Times, 21 November 1908, p. 11.

[117] Ibid., 30 November 1908, p. 11.

[118] The Westminster Gazette, 24 November 1908, p. 9.

The Spectator reported that the Austrians began to make strong protests at Constantinople against the boycott of their goods and a rumor was heard that the Austrian Ambassador would be recalled unless the Turkish Government took measures to stop the boycott.[119]

Baron Aehrenthal repeatedly let the Turkish diplomats know that he was anxious to resume direct negotiations, but he refused to relinquish the original conditions which he had imposed and, in addition, now he directed Austria to refuse to offer Turkey any monetary compensation for her recognition of the annexation. By November 30, tensions between the two countries assumed a serious character. The Times of London predicted that soon there would be complete cessation of negotiations and the newspaper attributed the blame for this to Austria.[120]

By early December the boycott of Austrian goods into the Turkish Empire was felt even more than previously by Austria-Hungary and as a result, it brought about a change in the attitude of the Austrian Foreign Office toward the crisis.[121] The newly appointed British Ambassador to Vienna, Sir Fairfax Cartwright, continually suggested to Austrian officials that Austria would be wise to give a generous monetary offer to Turkey as compensation for the loss of Turkey's sovereign rights over the two provinces.[122]

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[119]The Spectator, 28 November 1908, p. 861.

[120]The Times, 30 November 1908, p. 11.

[121]The Economist (London), LXVII (December, 1908), p. 1063.

[122]British Documents, #475 & #484.

The Spectator commented that a way out of the difficulty could be found if Austria would reverse her position of absolutely refusing to accept financial liabilities in regard to the provinces.[123]

On December 9, 1908, it was reported that negotiations were ready to be reopened between Austria and Turkey, and that Austria was offering an indemnity of £2,000,000.[124] Commenting on this news, The Spectator stated that if Austria would stop attempting to pick a quarrel over the boycott, and would agree to a reasonable monetary compensation, a better understanding would soon be achieved. Generally speaking, everything depended on Austria.[125] At the same time, the boycott continued and even ammunitions for the Turkish Government arriving in Austrian steamers remained undisturbed.[126]

On December 13, Austria-Hungary declared herself ready to resume negotiations with Turkey,[127] thus waiving the condition that the boycott of Austrian goods must cease before negotiations would be resumed.[128] Upon learning that negotiations were to be resumed, the British Government's influence upon both Austria-Hungary

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[123] The Spectator, 5 December 1908, p. 925

[124] The Westminster Gazette, 9 December 1908, p. 9.

[125] The Spectator, 12 December 1908, p. 977.

[126] The Westminster Gazette, 10 December 1908, p. 9.

[127] The Times, 14 December 1908, p. 11.

[128] British Documents, #509.

and Turkey once again became evident. The suggestions from Sir Fairfax Cartwright coupled with similar suggestions from Sir Edward Grey to Turkish officials were finally heeded. The Times of December 21 reported that it was believed that Turkey was asking £3,000,000 in compensation, whereas Austria-Hungary was offering around £2,000,000.[129]

The amount of money which Austria-Hungary offered was not adequate compensation for Turkey, but Austria-Hungary was successful in forcing Turkey to yield on this. Turkey was demanding £3,000,000 while Austria was offering only £2,000,000. An English newspaper reported that if this information was well founded, ". . . there will be little difficulty in concluding a compromise and in finding an acceptable method of payment."[130]

Austria-Hungary now offered in addition to the money compensation to give other compensations. She offered an increase in the rate of custom duties between the two countries from eleven percent to fifteen percent, the right to establish a monopoly on cigarette paper and matches, and the right to examine the possibility of abolishing foreign post offices within her empire.[131] Turkey wanted Austria-Hungary to accept a part of the Turkish debt which was refused, and with that demand the Austro-Hungarians withdrew their original offer of financial compensation. As a

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[129]The Times, 21 December 1908, p. 5.

[130]The Westminster Gazette, 21 December 1908, p. 8.

[131]The Times, 23 December 1908, p. 7.

result, Turkey turned down the terms of settlement.[132]

After a short lapse of time negotiations were again resumed and revolved around the amount of material compensation that would be given to Turkey. Turkey was more interested in monetary compensation than in other provisions. Financial compensation was considered to be the "soul of reform" in Turkey as she was in dire need of money. The Times predicted that as soon as Austria-Hungary recognized the principle of monetary compensation, the progress of bargaining would sooner or later come to an end.[133] By January 11, Austria-Hungary decided to grant such compensations and to increase the original amount by £500,000, making the total compensation £2,500,000. Thus, there was removed the major barrier which now would make possible a satisfactory settlement.[134] The final agreement made between the two countries not only consisted of the indemnity of £2,500,000 but in addition, a four per cent increase in Turkish-Austro-Hungarian custom duties, and the establishment of Turkish governmental monopolies of cigarette paper and matches.[135] The information later became available that payment of the indemnity by Austria-Hungary to Turkey for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

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[132] Ibid., 24 December 1908, p. 7.

[133] Ibid., 6 January 1909, p. 4.

[134] Ibid., 11 January 1909, p. 7.

[135] British Documents, #662.

would be made in one sum fourteen days after the formal ratification of the Austrian-Turkish agreement.[136] The agreement between Austria and Turkey brought an almost immediate calm to their differences. By January 16 the boycott was officially brought to a halt and the Turkish Government took steps to enable Austrian vessels to unload at Turkish ports. The general feeling was that the Austrian-Turkish trouble was losing its bitterness.[137] The agreement later was signed on February 26, 1909, and ratified on April 5 by the Turkish Chamber.[138]

British attitude toward the final Austro-Hungarian offer was reported by the influential London Economist as one of intense satisfaction for all concerned. The Economist stated:

> Austria has offered the Young Turks what they want most, cash, and the Young Turks have had the good sense to accept the very satisfactory and substantial sum of two and a-half million Turkish pounds without undue haggling.[139]

In truth, Turkey's acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian offer was totally unexpected. Shortly before the news reached Vienna, a telegram from Constantinople to Vienna announced that Aehrenthal's most recent offer of financial compensation had been refused. In spite of the official announcement that Turkey had

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[136]Pall Mall Gazette, 2 February 1909, p. 1.

[137]Ibid., 16 January 1909, p. 7.

[138]A. W. Chilton, L. H. Holt, The History of Europe from 1862-1914 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918), p. 450.

[139]The Economist (London). LXVIII (January, 1909), 103.

accepted the offer, there were many who refused to believe it.[140] The English were among those who did not accept the news as being fact immediately, but on January 13, The Times reported that it appeared "tolerably certain that direct negotiations . . . have at last led to a satisfactory result, or, at all events, that they are reasonably certain to lead to it in a very brief period."[141]

When the news was verified, Sir Edward Grey said that he could not let the occasion pass without expressing relief and satisfaction that an agreement between Austria and Turkey had been reached.[142]

Aehrenthal's offer and acceptance of financial compensation was significant because it represented a definite departure from what his position was after Serbia protested the annexation. At that time he declared the matter concerned only his country and the annexed provinces and that he would not consider a demand for financial compensation to Turkey. The English were glad he had, as they believed this averted a way in which the powers could have become involved.

The English Contemporary Review congratulated Austria for this. It stated:

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[140] Ibid., p. 169.

[141] The Times, 13 January 1909, p. 9.

[142] Ibid., 23 January 1909, p. 12.

> To have climbed down from this position and met Turkey halfway was a praiseworthy if not a heroic act. It testifies to Austria's desire to contribute to the cause of peace!![143]

It was the opinion of The Economist that it was well the settlement was made, as Bosnia and Herzegovina could not have been returned to Turkey. The Economist iterated that no one, either in Turkey or out of it, wished or thought it possible that Bosnia and Herzegovina could ever again be under the Sultan.[144]

The Pall Mall Gazette expressed great satisfaction with the Austro-Turkish entente, but the paper stated that the settlement of this claim by no means insured a peaceful solution of the present problems in the Near East.[145] The Spectator also expressed its great satisfaction that the most dangerous and difficult of the problems connected with the crisis had been settled.[146]

Settlement of the Serbian Crisis

As a result of the settlement, diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary and Turkey returned to normal. Now, Grey was free to try to bring about a settlement of the differences which existed between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Mobilization of the military forces of Austria-Hungary and Serbia seemed to be bringing Europe to the brink of war. Grey, realizing the gravity of the situation, tried but unsuccessfully to make overtures to Germany

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[143]D. J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs," The Contemporary Review, (February, 1909), 245.

[144]The Economist (London). LXVIII (January, 1909), 109.

[145]Pall Mall Gazette, 13 January 1909, p. 7.

hoping that their two governments could act jointly to influence Austria and then they could turn toward a peaceful solution with Serbia.[147] At this same time, the Austrians believed that Russian moral and diplomatic support for Serbia was raising the latter's hopes to a dangerous level and would eventually precipitate a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.[148] The remaining problem between Austria and Serbia was more menacing than was the problem between Austria and Turkey. Many people believed that a settlement with Turkey was a deliberate Austrian design against the Serbs, leaving them as the only party with a grievance. However, on the other hand, many preferred to interpret Austria's settlement with Turkey as implying a general desire on her part to preserve the peace.[149]

Grey believed that unless Serbia renounced her claims for territorial compensation, war was imminent[150] and that Russia held this fate in her balance. She must decide whether or not she would offer armed support to the conflict.[151] Early in March, Izvolsky realized that if Austria-Hungary presented Serbia with an ultimatum, Russia would be caught in the middle and forced into either a very embarrassing position or into a war to support Serbia, which she certainly did not want at this time. Therefore, Izvolsky advised Serbia to drop her territorial claims.[152] Serbia had no other

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[147] British Documents, #'s 600-610.

[148] The Times, 3 November 1908, p. 5.

[149] Pall Mall Gazette, 14 January 1909, p. 7.

[150] British Documents, #611.

[151] Ibid., #621.

[152] Ibid., #619.

choice and agreed to withdraw her claims for territorial compensation and to demobilize her troops on the condition that Austria, too, would demobilize her forces on the Bosnian frontier.[153]

At this time Grey opened direct negotiations with Aehrenthal in the hope of finding a formula which both Vienna and Belgrade would accept. It appeared probable that the crisis would be settled by Anglo-Russian intervention at these two cities, and this prospect was most unwelcomed to the German Foreign Office. The Germans were not at all inclined to allow Grey and Izvolsky to score a diplomatic success. Neither did Germany wish Aehrenthal to attain his objective independent of German assistance.[154] Aehrenthal took advantage of the situation and requested from Serbia a note specifying a complete renunciation of her claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina, recognition of the annexation, and a statement that she would adopt a friendly attitude toward Austria-Hungary.[155] Izvolsky, having previously consulted Great Britain, France, and Germany, realized that compensation for Serbia would be impossible to obtain because these nations would not support it, and advised Serbia to respond to the Austrian note. He suggested Serbia state her desire to be a good neighbor with Austria, drop all territorial, political, and economic claims and

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[153] The Times, 5 March 1909, p. 11.

[154] Nicolson, Carnock, p. 298.

[155] British Documents, #659.

express her willingness to leave her case in the hands of the powers.[156]

Rather than to give in directly to Austria-Hungary, on March 10 Serbia sent a circular note to the powers in reply to Austria-Hungary's demand and in it she disclaimed any warlike intentions towards Austria-Hungary, expressing friendliness toward her, and that she exhibited a desire to continue neighborly and friendly relations with her. The note declared that the annexation of the provinces did not alter the previous relations of Serbia toward Austria-Hungary and consequently she was asking for no compensation in either territorial, economic, or political areas.[157] Austria-Hungary refused to accept this circular note as a way out for Serbia's dilemma in her relations with her. According to The Times of March 15, Aehrenthal scrutinized the language of the note "like a conveyancer seeking to pick holes in a title,"[158] and he refused to accept it on the grounds that Serbia made no mention of her agreeing to disarm.

Under this refusal and at Grey's request, Sir Fairfax Cartwright asked Aehrenthal to present his requirements for a Serbian note that would be acceptable. Aehrenthal agreed, and did this. Grey was informed that Aehrenthal expected the reply to be in the form of an apology, and that the apology was to be given

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[156] Ibid., #661.

[157] The Economist (London). LXVIII (March, 1909), 559.

[158] The Times, 15 March 1909, p. 11.

first to Austria-Hungary. Grey stated that Aehrenthal requested both an apology, which would be humiliating to Serbia, and a recognition by Serbia of Austro-Turkish protocol in advance of the powers, which would be especially humiliating to Russia.[159] Grey, through Cartwright, attempted to persuade Aehrenthal to tone down his demands.

On March 17, the German Foreign Office learned that the Russian Crown Council and Czar Nicholas had decided under no circumstances would Russia go to war. With this definite information the Germans decided to inform Izvolsky that the idea of a conference ought to be dropped and that the Powers should recognize the annexation by an exchange of notes.[160]

On March 22, Izvolsky received a note from Germany which stated that, unless Russia along with other powers were willing to accept the cancellation of Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin, Germany was planning to cease being a restraining force and would allow the crisis to proceed along its natural course. In diplomatic language the note stated:

> The German Government is glad to note that the Russian Government recognizes the friendly spirit of Germany's step, and that the Powers seem inclined to accept the proposal. It is ready to suggest to the Vienna Cabinet to invite the Powers, while notifying them of the Austro-Turkish Agreement, to assent formally to the cancelling of Article XXV of the Berlin Treaty. Before doing so, however, it wishes to be sure that the Russian Cabinet is ready to accept the Austrian proposal and to give its unconditional consent. It expects a precise answer,

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[159] British Documents, #739.

[160] Nicolson, Carnock, p. 295.

> Yes or No, and any ambiguous reply would be regarded as a refusal. We should then withdraw and allow things to take their course.[161]

In this note Germany presented a demand and inferred coercion for Russia to sanction an abrogation of Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin. Izvolsky felt an negative reply would result in an Austrian attack on Serbia. This communique threw Izvolsky into a panic. Izvolsky sent for Sir Arthur Nicolson who found him in a condition bordering on hysteria.[162] After relating to Nicolson the contents of the note, Izvolsky informed Nicolson that a Cabinet Council had been called, and they had decided to accept the demand. Nicolson tried to induce him to delay an answer until France and England had been consulted, but Izvolsky said he must send his reply that same day.[163]

Izvolsky consented to recognizing the annexation without consulting first with either London or Paris.[164] When Great Britain and France heard about it, they were irritated with Russia for having agreed to the note without consulting them. Sir Arthur Nicolson, British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, expressed his displeasure when he wrote that after this easy victory he should not be too surprised if greater demands were later made on Russia.[165]

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[161] Ward, British Foreign Policy, III, 409-410.

[162] Nicolson, Carnock, p. 296.

[163] Ibid., pp. 301-302.

[164] British Documents, #764.

[165] Ibid., #764.

Izvolsky replied to this and said that had he waited to consult with the two governments, Austrian troops would probably have crossed both the Serbian and Russia frontiers.[166] Nicolson later informed Czar Nicholas II that his government felt no remorse in regard to the matter where Russia was concerned. Nicolson's remark to Nicholas II was that

> . . . the position of M. Izvolsky had been a very delicate one, and but little time had been left to him to come to a decision. . . . In any case, I could assure His Majesty that my Government felt no resentment at all in the matter.[167]

Later Nicolson wrote to Grey saying this German action practically amounted to an ultimatum and, therefore, constituted a hard pill for Russia to swallow. He said this Austro-German plan had been skilfully conceived and the proper moment carefully chosen.[168]

A few days later, the German Ambassador to Great Britain, Count Metternich, requested that Britain recognize the annexation. Grey, still angered by the prompt reply Germany had received from Izvolsky, stated that it would be impossible to do so until a solution of the Serbian question had been found and then not until it was certain that Montenegro would be treated fairly.[169] Grey further said that British recognition of the annexation would follow and not proceed an Austro-Serbian settlement.[170]

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[166] Ibid., #775.

[167] Ibid., #835.

[168] Nicolson, Carnock, p. 303.

[169] Lee, King Edward VII, II, 647.

[170] British Documents, #799.

The intervention by Germany quickly forced Russia to withdraw her support from Serbia. This loss of Russian support forced Serbia to back down and then all that remained to settle the crisis was for Serbia to comply with Austria-Hungary's earlier demand to compose a note informing Austria-Hungary of Serbia's willingness to disarm and to recognize the annexation. Sir Edward Grey became the chief advisor and negotiator for Serbia. Grey accepted the responsibility of composing a Serbian Note which would be acceptable to Aehrenthal. Grey and Aehrenthal deliberated the contents of such a note, and on March 27 an agreement was reached which was slightly less humiliating to Serbia than what Aehrenthal had originally demanded because it made no mention of Serbian recognition of the Austro-Turkish protocol. The note was drawn up, and Serbia now formally had to submit it to Austria-Hungary, have her accept it, and it was hoped that this would resolve the crisis.[171]

All the concerned powers had their ministers in Serbia urge the Serbian government to send the proposed note to the Austro-Hungarian government. On March 31, a Serbian official informed the British Ambassador to Vienna, Sir Fairfax Cartwright, that the note which Grey had done so much to compose would be presented to Aehrenthal that same day.[172] The following day, April 1, Aehrenthal accepted the note. Aehrenthal stated that he

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[171] The Times, 29 March 1909, p. 7.

[172] British Documents, #799.

regarded the Serbian note as

> having put an end to the differences between Austria and Serbia, and as having re-established relations of good neighbourliness.[173]

British Acceptance of Annexation

The British waited several days before officially recognizing the annexation. On April 16, 1909, Grey telegraphed to Cartwright that he should notify Aehrenthal that Britain would consent to the abrogation of Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin.[174] The next day, McKinnon Wood, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in Parliament that Britain did not approve of Austria-Hungary's violation of Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin but the government was recognizing its abrogation. Mr. McKinnon Wood's statement was as follows:

> On 17th April His Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna addressed a note to the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, informing His Excellency of the assent of His Majesty's Government to the abrogation of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. This action does not involve His Majesty's Government's assent to the violation of the Article in question. It was taken because the Two Treaty Powers most directly interested had come to an agreement on the subject, all the Powers Signatory of the Treaty of Berlin were unanimous in making the alteration desired in the Treaty, and the conditions which seemed to us--as one of the Treaty Powers--to be essential had been secured.[175]

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[173] Ibid., #819.

[174] Ibid., #839.

[175] Great Britain. Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser., vol. 3 (29 Mar.-23 Apr., 1909), p. 1507.

CHAPTER IV

AFTERMATH OF ANNEXATION

At the outbreak of the crisis in late September, 1908, only a small number of people on the continent knew of Bosnia. According to Arthur May, a European historian, Europe in general cared little and knew less about Bosnia and Herzegovina. News that Austria-Hungary had annexed the forgotten provinces brought them into the very spotlight of European high politics.[1] The fact that this area had been annexed by a major power mattered little, but the significance of the annexation in the Balkans mattered much. Great Britain, France, and Russia desired to prevent further Austro-Hungarian expansion into the Balkans, and there was the question, too, of the sanctity of international treaties. There was no doubt that Austria-Hungary had violated the Berlin treaty and, as the intensity of complaints from Turkey and Serbia began to increase, the ensuing crisis almost erupted into full scale war. Underlying this deliberate infringement of a European treaty was the principle which, if logically applied, could undermine the community of European nations.[2] Britain, France and Russia were forced to resist the annexation. Had they not done so, it might have been possible that Austria-Hungary again would have within a short

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[1]Arthur J. May, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 410. (Hereinafter referred to as May, Hapsburg Monarchy.)

[2]E. J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs," The Contemporary Review, XCV (February, 1909), 251.

period of time precipitated another crisis in her efforts to expand southward into the Near East. Britain, France, and Russia were anxious to maintain the status quo in the Balkans and, consequently, opposed the Austrian expansion. These three nations adopted the principle that an international treaty could only be changed with the consent of the signatories, a principle long established but seldom if ever enforced. It was as though might made right.

Britain never lost sight of the fact that her interests in the Near and Middle East had to be maintained and Austrian expansion in this direction was viewed as a potential threat. By protesting, Britain was able to let Austria know that she would not stand idly by while British interests were being endangered. Thus, the sanctity of treaties which Britain espoused had other underlying motives.

Criticism Toward the Handling of the Crisis

In England there were divergent opinions concerning the roles which individual countries and their diplomats played in the crisis. Following the peaceful conclusion European historians and journalists began to throw criticisms in all directions and at various times practically all countries and all diplomats connected with the proceedings were both adversely critized and praised.

Sir Arthur Nicolson declared that both England and Germany desired a peaceful solution to the dispute, and yet neither of them dared to speak with any firmness either at St. Petersburg or at Vienna.[3] Further criticism followed from Andre Maurois, who

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[3]Nicolson, Carnock, p. 297.

declared that "England was firm in her speech, but, as usual, vague in her plans."[4] Another author declared that in the Bosnian Crisis, Great Britain played "little effective part. She did not regard the Anglo-Russian Convention as involving her in the affairs of Europe."[5]

Sir Charles Dilke, an imperialist and a republican and a former Cabinet Minister under Lord Salisbury who once was considered a leading liberal candidate for prime minister, was critical of the course the British government had followed. Dilke said the Treaty of Berlin had been violated many times before and that this took much strength away from the Russian and British protests. Since no informed person could have seriously believed that the turning over of the provinces to be administered by Austria-Hungary in 1878 had been anything other than permanent, how could Britain protest when Austria-Hungary had taken over the provinces on a proposal by Great Britain herself? The interest of Britain alone was not sufficient to cause her to play a leading role in the negotiations to lead to a successful conclusion of the affair, or to allow Russia to force her to interfere in a situation in which nothing could be changed.[6]

Sidney Lee, author of the definitive work on King Edward VII, stated that throughout the crisis, Britain maintained her position

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[4]Maurois, Edwardian Era, p. 327.

[5]William Strang, Britain in World Affairs (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1961), p. 260.

[6]Ward, British Foreign Policy, III, 411.

in order that the special interests of Serbia and Montenegro would have to be considered.[7] Great Britain maintained this futile position of pleading for the two countries, but, finally, she had to follow Russia and abandon the unassailable position of the supporter of the sacredness of treaties and the advocate of an international conference. This proved to be an unconditional surrender all around for Britain.[8]

Further criticism of the British government in the whole matter was forthcoming. A writer for the Fortnightly Review, Cecil Battine, agreed in part with Dilke and Lee when he stated that Britain must refrain from meddling in matters which did not concern her. She must stop taking an aggressive lead when her interests are not dominant and she must refrain from diplomatic hostility when she is not prepared to back this up by force.[9] Even King Edward VII's part in this crisis was criticized. After the King's death in 1910, Sir William Blunt, British author, traveler, former diplomat to the Near and Middle East, wrote that Edward's only notable failure as King was in the affair of Bosnia, but that the people in England knew too little of the conditions to understand how great a failure it was.[10]

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[7]Lee, King Edward VII, II, 647.

[8]E. J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs," The Contemporary Review, XCV (May, 1909), 635-636.

[9]Cecil Battine, "The Power of Austria," The Fortnightly Review, LXXXVI (Oct., 1909), 975.

[10]W. S. Blunt, My Diaries (London: Martin Secher, 1932), p. 722. (Hereinafter referred to as Blunt, Diaries.)

The German Chancellor, Prince von Bülow, too, was critical of Edward and accused him of pouring oil onto the fire because of a fear of drawing together Germany and Russia.[11]

Bülow was not at all pleased at the stand which Great Britain took and was vindictive towards the British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, Sir Arthur Nicolson. Bülow accused him of inciting the Russian government against Austria-Hungary and Germany, and charged him with having done everything possible to make German efforts towards a peaceful solution appear suspectful.[12] The British Minister of Foreign Affairs did not escape without his share of criticism. Sir W. H. Blunt declared that Grey had made a mess of things. Grey's support of the Young Turks was justified, but he should have gone further and told Austria-Hungary that Britain would allow no infringement of the Treaty of Berlin, and then held his ground. He believed that if the government had made a firm stand, Austria-Hungary would have been forced to give in.[13] Grey was further criticized because at the beginning of the crisis he stated that the annexation would not be a cause of war for Britain.[14] It was believed this statement greatly weakened Grey's bargaining position. Grey was adversely criticized for always keeping the public well informed of what was

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[11]Prince von Bülow, Memoirs of Prince von Bülow, trans. by F. A. Voight (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1931), II, 465.

[12]Ibid., II, 464-465.

[13]Blunt, Diaries, pp. 632-633.

[14]R. W. Seton Watson, "British Policy in the Near East, 1900 to 1909," The Contemporary Review, CXXXV (January, 1929), p. 706. (hereinafter referred to as Seton Watson, "British Policy," Contemporary Review.)

going on. However, he would at other times readily yield to the pressure of the public for information.[15]

On the other hand, the British Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, praised Grey for his role in the crisis and for his efforts at trying to keep the peace. The Prime Minister told the members of the House of Commons that he was not using the language of flattery or exaggeration in saying that no man in Europe had worked more assiduously at that difficult and beneficial task to keep the peace than Sir Edward Grey.[16] Praise for Grey's role in the whole affair came from Scotland. He was cited for his judgment and ability in the Edinburgh Review. This journal summed up Grey's performance by saying that Grey had given ample proof of a calm penetrating insight into the intricate problems raised by the present conditions of foreign affairs and that he deserved the entire confidence of his countrymen in his judgment and ability.[17]

R. W. Seton-Watson, noted British historian, lauded Grey for his handling of the situation when he wrote that his attitude concerning the crisis was perfectly logical, and was determined above all by fear for Turkey. Seton-Watson continued by further stating that Grey's high purpose, moderation and straight dealing were

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[15]A. J. Grant and Harold Temperly, Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century (1789-1939) (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1940), p. 431.

[16]Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser., vol. 1 (16 Feb.-5 Mar., 1909), p. 40.

[17]"The Political Scene in Europe," The Edinburgh Review, CCIX (Feb., 1909), 266.

evident at every turn of the event.[18] The Times expressed its attitude toward Grey by stating that throughout the crisis, he followed a policy of defending the sanctity of treaties, of giving loyal support to Russia and of securing as far as possible fairplay for Serbia.[19]

The newspaper further stated that the Italian press had written that the credit for bringing the crisis to a halt was attributed to the actions of Grey and to the intervention of the British government.[20] Sir Edward Grey was alone in showing some measure of firmness against Izvolsky and saved Serbia from total humiliation by obtaining for her, in exchange for her adherence, a vague commercial treaty.[21]

The British government, too, received praise for its stand in the crisis. A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, highly competent British historians, agreed that British intervention had not been fruitless. They wrote:

> Had England taken a less decided line, would the compensation for Turkey have been so peacefully arranged? Partly as the result of our action, patience, restraint and commonsense had prevailed, and a peaceful settlement was secured.[22]

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[18]Seton-Watson, "British Policy," Contemporary Review, p. 702.

[19]The Times, 27 March 1909, p. 9.

[20]Ibid., 24 March 1909, p. 5.

[21]Maurois, Edwardian Era, p. 328.

[22]Ward, British Foreign Policy, III, 411.

At first England was made the scapegoat for the general indignation expressed in Europe at the arbitrary breach of the Treaty of Berlin, but it was later recognized that it was largely due to her efforts that peace was preserved.[23]

The Turkish government was fully aware of the British role in the crisis. In a speech to the representatives of the Powers in Constantinople, the Turkish Sultan mentioned the friendly attitude of the powers and especially the attitude of Great Britain. It was stated that under the old regime of Turkey's despotism, England had shown no sympathy; but from the moment of the establishment of the Turkish constitution she had proved her friendship by both word and deed.[24] Not all the Turks were pleased with the support which the British rendered. One disappointed Turk expressed his sentiment concerning Britain when he said, "A harmless enemy is as useful as a useless friend." This individual went on to say that disappointment existed throughout Turkey that Britain had not backed up her protests in some more vigorous way. The British protest had raised the hopes of the Turks, and most Turks felt that Britain was prepared to take steps to enforce the recognition of it, but none were forthcoming.[25]

Britain and the Balkan Countries in the Crisis

The integrity of the Balkan countries was of prime concern to the British government in determining policy. Of all the powers,

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[23]The Annual Register, 1909, p. 316.

[24]The Economist (London), LXVIII (January, 1909), 104.

[25]The Westminster Gazette, 20 October 1908, p. 9.

only Britain gave the appearance of having been genuinely interested in the autonomous development of the Balkan peoples.[26] The Times agreed with this observation and stated that from the beginning of the negotiations, Great Britain had taken into consideration the feelings of the Serbians and Montenegrins, and that she was willing to support any practical scheme for the satisfaction of their legitimate desires. However, Britain could not support these countries' independence at the expense of the Balkan part of the Turkish Empire being dismembered. On the same plane, she could hardly support any extravagant or impracticable demands made by the Serbs, or for that matter, could she entertain demands unreasonable in themselves, which would involve further prejudices to Turkey.[27] Much of Britain's concern for the Balkan countries necessitated her maintaining close relations with Russia. Many people, however, did not realize the importance of Britain's maintaining friendly relations with the Russians. As was pointed out during the crisis,

> Great Britain followed Russia loyally, and played the game with absolute fairness and a chivalrous . . . fidelity to the Tsardom which if results are a symptom, was neither reciprocated nor rated at its full value.[28]

Role of Russia in the Crisis

The role of the Russian government in the crisis was disputed in the British press. The press for the most part had been highly

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[26]Mason W. Tyler, The European Powers and the Near East, 1875-1908 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1925), p. 192.

[27]The Times, 4 November 1908, p. 13.

[28]E. J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs," The Contemporary Review, XCV (May, 1909), 632.

critical of the sudden Russian recognition of the annexation,[29] but a part of the press took a different view. The Times stated that the Russian Czar and his government had acted with unquestionable wisdom in recognizing the annexation and promptly transmitting the news to Austria-Hungary and Germany. Had she adopted any other course, she would have run the risk of involving Russia in a war which she was not prepared to meet.[30] A few days later The Times mentioned that the recognition probably would lead to a total absence of Russian influence in the Balkans for several years. The recognition, however, may have saved both Russia and Serbia from a disastrous war.[31] The Spectator endorsed the praise of The Times for the way the Russian Czar and the Russian Government acted in the crisis. Both of them exhibited '. . . wisdom and great moral courage which was necessary to acknowledge and to act upon the hard realities of the situation.[32]

Actually Nicolson was somewhat relieved that Izvolsky had not thought fit to consult England and France before deciding upon acceptance. Such a request for advice would have been difficult to evade. Afterwards, Nicolson confessed he was puzzled as to what to say to Izvolsky when Izvolsky informed him of the terms of the Russian capitulation. He admitted that he would like to have said a good deal on what appeared to him to be a surrender on Russia's

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[29]British Documents, #764.

[30]The Times, 26 March 1909, p. 9.

[31]Ibid., 29 March 1909, p. 11.

[32]The Spectator, 27 March 1909, p. 481.

part. As it was, Nicolson was able to indulge in vague expressions of regret.[33]

Sir Edward Grey was critical of Russian policy. He thought that had Russia told Serbia in the beginning that she must not expect more than economic concessions from the annexation, the situation would not have become so volatile. Grey stated that "Russia was stiff for a time" in her support of Serbia, and then she suddenly "threw up the sponge and collapsed unconditionally."[34] Earlier in the crisis the British were gravely concerned that Russia might attempt to demand her share of the spoils of the annexation. Had Russia pursued a course of attempting to acquire the right to send warships through the Dardanelles, grave difficulties would have been encountered in bringing the crisis to a peaceful conclusion.[35]

The result of the annexation upon Russia was not without its heartaches. Russia had watched her great rival Austria-Hungary increase her power and influence in the Balkans. Russia had lost the opportunity to secure the Straits at that time, and for which she had consented to the annexation. She had failed to secure an international conference, and she had been forced to admit to Serbia and the Slavs throughout the Balkans that she was not strong enough to defend their interests.[36] She had, too,

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[33]Nicolson, Carnock, p. 302.

[34]Grey, Twenty-five Years, II, 181.

[35]The Manchester Guardian, 8 October 1908, p. 6.

[36]G. P. Gooch, History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922), p. 424.

suffered psychological embarrassment, and the indignation aroused in Russia by Germany's action was too intense to permit further capitulation to Berlin.[37] Arthur Nicolson at St. Petersburg witnessed this and believed the humiliation was great. He wrote Grey that he had been assured by those who have seen many various phases in the recent history of Russia, that there had never previously been a moment when the country had undergone such humiliation and had been forced to submit to the diction of a foreign power.[38]

British reaction was varied to the role which Alexander Izvolsky played in the crisis. Earlier in the crisis when the Russians and Grey were attempting to formulate basic agreements on which to hold a conference, The Times had high praise for Izvolsky. At that time this London newspaper wrote that the ability and political honesty which M. Izvolsky displayed in his attitude towards this question during his visits to the various chancelleries helped greatly to enhance the reputation of contemporary Russian statesmanship in western Europe.[39] Following the crisis, The Spectator also praised him. It stated that to M. Izvolsky was owed not only the gratitude of Europe, but of Russia, and of the Slav race.[40] The fact that Izvolsky advised the Serbian Government not to persist in her demands for territorial compensation from Austria-Hungary,

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[37] Nicolson, Carnock, p. 309.

[38] British Documents, #801.

[39] The Times, 24 October 1908, p. 13.

[40] The Spectator, 27 March 1909, p. 481.

or for the autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is its own tribute to both his and Russia's desire for peace. It was not an easy thing for him, representing a nation which had traditionally been the protector of the Southern Slavs, to end the ambition of that little state which is standing for the Slavonic idea in the Balkans.[41]

However, several British journalists blamed Izvolsky for the crisis. One stated that it was his neglect and lack of foresight which allowed the crisis to happen. Izvolsky had heard Aehrenthal relate his plans for annexing the provinces and he had not raised a single word of protest. Therefore, he was the responsible individual since he had allowed himself to be maneuvered into a position where he had no other choice but to give in.[42] Sir Arthur Nicolson was led to believe that, because of this, Russian public resentment against Izvolsky was severe.

Nicolson, writing to Grey about the feeling in Russia for Izvolsky, stated that it is considered that he had inflicted on Russia the greatest humiliation possible.[43] Nicolson also felt that until the Bosnian Crisis, Izvolsky may have been hesitant whether an understanding with the Central Powers might have better suited his ideas, but from the crisis on he was completely committed to the Entente.[44] Izvolsky seriously considered resigning his position.

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[41] Ibid., 6 March 1909, p. 366.

[42] E. J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs," The Contemporary Review, XCIV (Dec., 1908), 762.

[43] British Documents, #796.

[44] Nicolson, Carnock, p. 314.

The British Foreign Office, however, did not want this to happen. Sir Edward Grey believed that Izvolsky only did what he had to do, and that if Izvolsky resigned it would be regarded as a victory for Germany and would encourage Germany in the future to a repetition of her role. Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir Arthur Nicolson to say that the British government had, as probably M. Izvolsky would admit, loyally supported him throughout the recent crisis, and that this support would be maintained. It would be most unfortunate if Izvolsky resigned his position as that would no doubt be regarded as a further triumph for Germany.[45]

Izvolsky never forgave Count Aehrenthal for his diplomatic victory in securing the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he continued to remain hostile to Austria and Germany.[46]

British Attitude toward Austria-Hungary in the Crisis

There was British resentment toward the Austrian role in the crisis. This resentment, however, took the attitude that most Britishers did not condemn Austria-Hungary for annexing the provinces, but instead condemned her for the methods she used to bring about the annexation. E. J. Dillon, foreign analyst for The Contemporary Review, stated that many high ranking statesmen felt that she could have attained her aims more easily and more inexpensively by having consulted with the signatories of the Berlin Treaty before she attempted to annex the provinces.[47] The same attitude was

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[45]British Documents, #818.

[46]The Spectator, 20 March 1909, p. 443.

[47]E. J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs," The Contemporary Review, XCV (January, 1909), 125.

expressed by Sir Edward Grey. In his Twenty-five Years, Grey stated:

> To us the territorial changes were indifferent: it mattered not to us that Austria should annex instead of merely occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina; but besides sympathy with the new hope in Turkey, we felt that the arbitrary alteration of a European Treaty by one Power without the consent of the other Powers who were parties to it struck at the root of all good international order. We therefore took a very firm stand on principle, and said that though our interests were not involved, we would not recognize Austria's action . . . till all the other Powers, who were parties to the treaty, were ready to do so.[48]

The Spectator compiled a political balance sheet showing the consequences of the Austrian annexation. On the debit side of the balance sheet the following were listed:

1) Virtual breakup of the Triple Alliance and [illegible]ge-ment not only of the Italian people, but al[illegible] the Italian government;

2) A marked cooling of previous friendly relations between Britain and the Dual Monarchy;

3) Deterioration of relations with France;

4) Antagonism of Slavonic feeling throughout Southeastern Europe, both inside and outside dominions of the House of Hapsburg;

5) Direct, if for the moment passive, hostility of Serbia and Montenegro;

6) Possibility of a secret understanding inimical to Austro-Hungarian interest being reached between Serbia and Bulgaria;

7) Evacuation of the Sanjak with its strategic consequences;

8) Severe military strain caused by the partial mobilization of the Austrian army, and financial burden involved thereby;

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[48]Grey, Twenty-five Years, I, 169.

9) Likelihood of grave domestic troubles both in the Hungarian and in the Austrian Parliaments owing to the exasperation of Slavonic opinion;

10) Acceptance of obligations from Austria's German ally, of so momentous a kind that Austrian freedom of action may some day be compromised by the necessity of meeting those obligations;

11) Internal difficulties caused by the necessity of deciding to which half of the Dual Monarchy the annexed provinces are ultimately to be attached;

12) Cost of the Turkish boycott of Austrian goods and cash payments to Turks in respect of the annexation.

On the credit side of the political balance was the following:

1) The formal annexation of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[49]

The Austrian annexation was obtained at the cost of a large indemnity to Turkey, of heavy losses caused by the boycotting of Austrian goods, of the mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army, of the alienation of most of the European Powers by the breach of the Berlin Treaty, and finally of a heavy obligation to Germany for saving Austria-Hungary from a war by her intervention at St. Petersburg.[50]

In the August, 1914, issue of The Contemporary Review it was stated that Austria-Hungary did not go far enough in the annexation. The author of this article stated that it was obvious from the beginning that active interference on the part of the powers to the annexation would not be forthcoming. Britain and France would not be willing to fight, and Russia and Italy were not strong enough to fight. Thus, Austria-Hungary had a free hand

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[49] The Spectator, 13 March 1909, p. 409.

[50] The Annual Register, 1909, p. 319.

to arrange the affair as she wished. She should have shown Serbia that such a small and weak state could not stand up to a power possessing the status of Austria-Hungary. In other words, he inferred that Austria-Hungary should have annexed Serbia, too. He stated that Austria-Hungary had the right to do this since it was really the only way to silence "this troublesome and impudent brawler."[51]

The former counselor in the German political department, Friedrich von Holstein, was critical of the Austrian move. Holstein thought that Austria's success in the crisis had been achieved at immense cost in international goodwill and thought the exertion of pressure far greater than the issue warranted. Since Austria already occupied the provinces, the annexation was an unnecessary and irresponsible move undertaken almost entirely for the sake of enhancing her international image.[52] The crisis had exhausted the last energies of the Monarchy and thereafter the Austrians lost the initiative in both foreign and domestic affairs.[53]

Other observers took an entirely different view of the annexation. One writer described the annexation as a bold, brilliant venture on the part of Austria-Hungary. This writer was willing to

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[51]Theodor von Sosnosky, "The Balkan Policy of the Habsburg Empire," The Contemporary Review, CVI (August, 1914), p. 218.

[52]Norman Rich, Friedrich von Holstein (Cambridge: University Press, 1965), II, 831.

[53]A. J. P. Taylor, The Hapsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1952), p. 220. (Hereinafter referred to as Taylor, Hapsburg Monarchy.)

admit that Austria-Hungary had violated the Treaty of Berlin by not obtaining the consent of the Powers, and even if she had done this, it would not have made her actions correct, but it would have added a formal correctness to the annexation.[54] Still another stated that by annexing the provinces, Austria-Hungary had prevented Serbian domination and had chosen the lesser of two evils as the way to bring about the greatest and fastest improvement in the political stability of the area.[55]

When Russia was forced by the German ultimatum to recognize the Austrian annexation, it became useless for Serbia to oppose the wishes of Austria-Hungary that she recognize it also. Being left without support, she accordingly accepted the formula devised by Sir Edward Grey and presented to her by Britain, France, Russia, and Italy. Austria-Hungary, having obtained recognition of the annexation, had no further interest in putting pressure on Serbia. After Serbia's recognition of the annexation, the situation needed no further sanction from Europe and this practically absolved Austria-Hungary from having to excuse her abrogation of the Treaty of Berlin without having obtained the assent of the Powers.[56]

One result of the annexation was that regardless of the way in which one viewed the situation, Austria-Hungary and Germany had bound themselves ever more tightly together and that they stood

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[54]E. J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs," The Contemporary Review, XCIV (December, 1908), 763.

[55]Reich, "Crisis," The Nineteenth Century and After, 711.

[56]The Spectator, 3 April 1909, p. 520.

more firmly together with greater alacrity and strength than before the crisis.[57]

The Nineteenth Century and After of November 1908, reflected that Aehrenthal had done in 1908 what the Congress of Berlin more or less provided for in 1878. He had entered on the register the results of historic forces.[58] According to The Contemporary Review, he had been very bold and daring in the crisis and he had succeeded in extending the frontier and territorial extent of the Monarchy farther out into the Balkans and he had deprived Russia of prestige in the area. He had belittled the pacifist powers before Europe and the world, in freeing Austria from German leadership and in strengthening friendship between Austria-Hungary and Germany.[59] Aehrenthal had suddenly taken rank as a great statesman and Austria-Hungary was something more than a satellite of Germany.[60] The London Times was not very critical of Aehrenthal in his dealings over the Bosnia and Herzegovina crisis, and it actually complimented him in a minor way concerning his dealings with Serbia. This newspaper stated that during the crisis the British government only could have hoped to mitigate to some extent the bitterness of Serbian humiliation. In this respect Baron von Aehrenthal helped in making

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[57]The Times, 31 March 1909, p. 5.

[58]Reich, "Crisis," The Nineteenth Century and After, 717.

[59]E. J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs," The Contemporary Review, XCV (May, 1909), 636.

[60]E. J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs," The Contemporary Review, XCIV (November, 1908), 530.

possible Sir Edward Grey's urgent representations.[61]

The Spectator thought that Emperor Francis Joseph was persuaded against his better judgement to consent to the annexation. The Spectator asked the question, "Who was responsible for Austria-Hungary's recklessness?" This it answered by saying that Aehrenthal was the man who was "the exponent of the annexation policy and that he must be held to be its author." Aehrenthal would not have identified himself with the annexation if he thought support for it would have ceased with the death of the aged emperor.[62]

During the crisis there were many write-ups in the Vienna and Berlin newspapers that attempted to present Britain as having played a Machiavellian part in the crisis by saying that Britain desired the ruin of Austria-Hungary as a nation. The Spectator answered this by stating that neither the British public nor the British government were hostile to Austria-Hungary. Instead, they were most friendly and knew the part the Empire played in keeping the balance of power on the continent of Europe. The paper stated: "We do not want to see the Dual Monarchy injured, and look with alarm upon the terrible risks to which it is being subjected owing to the infatuated policy of Baron Aehrenthal and those who stand behind him."[63]

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[61]The Times, 1 April 1909, p. 11.

[62]The Spectator, 12 December 1908, p. 981.

[63]Ibid., 2 January 1908, p. 2.

British Attitude Toward Germany in the Crisis

The British were more bitter with Germany over the matter than they were with Austria-Hungary. Sir W. S. Blunt, author and former British diplomat to the Near and Middle East, declared that the annexation and Bulgarian independence were in actuality a plot instigated by Emperor William in which Austria, Germany, and Italy participated. The plot had as its objective to bring about the overthrow of the constitutional party at Constantinople, or perhaps, to bring about a partition of Turkey.[64] The British Foreign Office thought that Germany was behind the Austrian move and that she was prepared to back her by force if it had become necessary.[65] The English believed that this diplomatic support gave Aehrenthal and Austria-Hungary the assurance and inspiration to make the bold annexation move.[66]

The situation may well have been that the men who controlled the affairs of Germany came to the conclusion that they must choose, and do so irrevocably, between friendship with Austria-Hungary and friendship with Russia, and that, after reviewing the circumstances, they chose friendship with Austria-Hungary. This decision that was made favoring Austria-Hungary placed her under obligations which could not be disavowed; and for that time, and probably for years

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[64] Blunt, Diaries, p. 629.

[65] British Documents, #829.

[66] E. J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs," The Contemporary Review, XCIV (December, 1908), 758.

to come, Germany and Austria-Hungary would have to be regarded from the military, diplomatic, and naval point of view as one.[67] After the annexation, however, Germany was anxious to avoid war at all cost, and used her influence to prevent Austria from making any further irrevocable mistake and worked for the maintenance of peace at both St. Petersburg and Constantinople.[68]

British policy to some extent was determined by suspicion of Germany. British officials were convinced that Austrian policy followed that of Germany and that Germany was merely aiding the Hapsburgs to accomplish their goal. In this manner it was easy for the British to explain the annexation of Bosnia.[69] The British criticized the two leading German statesmen of the day, Emperor William II and Prince Bülow. Herbert Asquith stated that the annexation was a shameless breach of the public law of Europe and that the Emperor and Prince Bülow were equal to the occasion.[70] Throughout the crisis German policy was directed by Bülow, and his plan of playing the brilliant second to Austria-Hungary resulted in uniting the mighty and prosperous German Empire more firmly to the collapsing and ramshackle Hapsburg Monarchy.[71]

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[67] The Spectator, 3 April 1909, p. 524.

[68] The Westminster Gazette, 9 December 1908, p. 524.

[69] May, Hapsburg Monarchy, p. 417.

[70] Herbert Henry Asquith, The Genesis of the War (New York: George H. Doray Company, 1923), p. 76.

[71] Ian F. D. Morrow, "The Foreign Policy of Prince von Bülow, 1898-1909," Cambridge Historical Journal, IV (January, 1933), 88.

Sir Arthur Nicolson was of the opinion that Germany and Austria had schemed and staged the annexation to weaken Britain and her allies in the Entente and to strengthen Germany and her allies in the Alliance.[72] However, most British statesmen adopted the philosophy of hoping for the best in regard to the situation and of not preparing for the worst. In spite of the adverse criticism toward Germany, a few Englishmen refused to recognize the militant German action. There were several journalists who believed that Germany's intentions were honorable, that her political plans were peaceful and that English political policy could be safely based on her candidness.[73]

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[72]Nicolson, Carnock, pp. 305-306.

[73]E. J. Dillon, "Foreign Affairs," The Contemporary Review, XCV (May, 1909), 621.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Political relations between Great Britain and Austria-Hungary did not change very much as a result of the crisis. Austria-Hungary went to great lengths to alleviate the ill feelings which had arisen between the two countries during the crisis. It was the ardent desire of Aehrenthal to arrange a public display that good feelings still existed. He felt that in order to accomplish this end, a meeting between King Edward VII and Emperor Francis Joseph should be arranged for in August of 1909 at Ischl, a southern German town near Munich. Such a meeting would indicate to the public that the crisis was over and that the relations between the two countries had not been impaired.[1] However, the advantages to Great Britain of such a visit were not as great as the advantages which would be afforded to Austria-Hungary and since Edward VII adamantly refused the invitation, the visit to Ischl never took place.

Edward's resentment over Austria-Hungary's behavior was so strong that there was great doubt as to whether he would make his annual visit to Marienbad, Austria, in September, 1909. The British Ambassador to Vienna, believed that the King's visit and presence would ease the situation between the two countries and as a result the King was persuaded to visit Marienbad. Cartwright tried to

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[1] British Documents, #861.

persuade his King to meet with Aehrenthal and to congratulate him upon his being raised to the rank of Count, an honor which was bestowed upon him by Francis Joseph for his success in the annexation of the two provinces. Sir Fairfax Cartwright used the argument that Aehrenthal was very anxious to be on good terms with the King and that he was eager for good relations to continue between his country and Great Britain. However, in the meeting King Edward showed his contempt for Aehrenthal by refusing even to mention or to extend congratulations for his recent elevation to the rank of count.[2] In spite of this attitude on the part of the king, Aehrenthal considered the king's visit as again solidifying good relations between the two countries.[3]

Later in the month of September, Aehrenthal let Cartwright know that he was quite pleased in regard to the improvement in political relations which were taking place between Austria-Hungary and Great Britain which he believed resulted from the King's visit. He expressed his wish that relations should continue to improve and that all his efforts would be directed to bringing this about. Aehrenthal felt that the friction which had been generated between their two countries over the Bosnian question was attributed mainly to misunderstandings which had been increased by the agitation of the press on both sides; but, since the crisis, the press in both countries had been moderate in criticizing each other's policies,

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[2]Lee, King Edward VII, II, 649.

[3]British Documents, #868.

which was a good sign for the future. Aehrenthal expressed his agreement with British policy of giving full moral support to Turkey, and he stated that he desired to do nothing which would in any way injure the real interests or even the prestige of the Ottoman Empire.[4] In actuality, Aehrenthal had not been successful in convincing King Edward, but he was most successful in wooing Sir Fairfax Cartwright. In the summer of 1909, Cartwright wrote that it was his belief that Aehrenthal was desirous of establishing closer relations with Britain and France and at a later date with Russia in matters which pertained to the Balkans.[5] Several months later Cartwright reaffirmed this opinion by stating that he was convinced that Count Aehrenthal was determined to do all that he could to maintain peace in the Balkans.[6]

Major Consequences of the Annexation

Britain learned a great deal diplomatically from the conflict. The Times stated that the one lesson which the events taught the nation was that it would be vain for a nation like the United Kingdom to trust implicitly the stipulations of international agreements or to try to adhere to smooth phrases of ceremonious diplomacy.[7] The British came to depend more on the importance of establishing protective alliances.

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[4] Ibid.

[5] British Documents, #861.

[6] British Documents, #876.

[7] The Times, 1 April 1909, p. 11.

Britain knew that the annexation had the greatest effect on Russia. This was in spite of the fact that the annexation resulted in only a legal change in the governmental status of the two provinces. At any rate, the annexation tended to restore Russian interest in the Balkans.[8] Thus, Russia and Austria-Hungary became engaged in a duel for influence in the peninsula and Russia began earnestly working to organize a Balkan League to serve as a barrier against Austria-Hungary.[9]

The importance of the annexation was very great. The preponderance of the German-Austrian block in continental questions was clearly manifested. Russia saw herself driven more than ever to lean on the Western powers and from that moment she regarded the consolidation of the Entent as a matter of life and death.[10] Czar Nicholas told Sir Arthur Nicolson that the only result of the crisis had been the strengthening of the Anglo-Russian understanding.[11]

As a result of the Crisis, according to Arthur Nicolson:

> The Central Powers had scored a resounding diplomatic victory, but, as is the nature of diplomatic victories, it was of the Pyrrhic variety. They had succeeded in humiliating Russia, Serbia, France and England. But what had they gained? Austria had secured the de jure occupation of two provinces which she possessed already.

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[8]Taylor, Hapsburg Monarchy, p. 218.

[9]Stavrianos, Balkans Since 1453, p. 531.

[10]Nicolson, Carnock, p. 313

[11]Maurois, Edwardian Era, p. 329.

> On the other hand she had created a Balkan block under Russian auspices. Germany had led the Dual Monarchy to regard themselves as indispensable, and to expect further favours to come, and further blank cheques. Italy, the third partner in the Triple Alliance, was indignant at having been ignored. And Russia found herself irrevocably committed to France and England.[12]

Germany and Austria-Hungary had come closer together politically. The crisis had clarified and committed the German policy towards the Hapsburg Monarchy.[13] Because of the universal hostility which Austria-Hungary incurred in the Balkans in the future, it was felt that she would only be able to count on the friendship of Germany.[14] These two nations had been allied since 1879, but this crisis was the first true test of the stability and sincerity of that arrangement.

In several ways Britain benefited from the crisis. She finally came to the realization of the importance of reversing her outdated policy of splendid isolation for a system of alliances with other friendly powers. This was very evident in her dealings with various nations and in particular with France and Russia. Britain also benefited from the strengthening in the principle of the balance of power. The annexation had done nothing to strengthen the position of Germany, but it tended to increase the prestige and resources of Austria-Hungary in Europe.[15] Thus, Austria-Hungary

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[12]Nicolson, Carnock, p. 313.

[13]Lawrence Lafore, The Long Fuse (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1965), p. 162. (Hereinafter referred to as Lafore, Long Fuse.)

[14]British Documents, #803.

[15]Reich, "Crisis," The Nineteenth Century and After, p. 707.

rose to the forefront which provided another power to help maintain the stability of Europe.

Another result of the crisis was the intensification of conflicts and dangers of the European situation and the bringing of Europe to the verge of a war that was averted only by the painful retreat and humiliation of two of the parties to the controversy.[16] Probably the main reason war was averted was because of the unpreparedness of Russia and the unwillingness of France and Great Britain to go to war over the issue.[17] Neither of these nations desired to become involved in the crisis to the point of war, and both let this be known early in the conflict.

The Bosnian crisis brought to the surface the southern Slav Question and so strained relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. An international problem of the first rank occurred and resulted in a whole series of later crises until it at last served as the spark which resulted in the first world war.[18]

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[16] Lafore, Long Fuse, p. 151.

[17] G. Lowes Dickinson, The International Anarchy, 1904-1914 (New York: The Century Company, 1926), pp. 179-180.

[18] R. W. Seton-Watson, Sarajevo (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1926), p. 36.

APPENDIX # 1*

Article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin

The Provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary. The Government of Austria-Hungary, not desiring to undertake the administration of the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar, which extends between Servia and Montenegro in south-easterly direction to the other side of Mitrovitza, the Ottoman Administration will continue to exercise its functions there. Nevertheless, in order to assure the maintenance of the new political state of affairs, as well as freedom and security of communications, Austria-Hungary reserves the right of keeping garrisons and having military and commercial roads in the whole of this part of the ancient Vilayet of Bosnia. To this end the Governments of Austria-Hungary and Turkey reserve to themselves to come to an understanding on the details.

*From: Sir Augustus Oakes and R. B. Mowat, The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 345.

APPENDIX # 2*

Letter from Francis Joseph to William II announcing the intent of Austria-Hungary to annex the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina--September 29, 1908.

My dear Friend:

The recent events in Turkey leading to the establishment of a constitutional state have not been without effect upon the provinces, Bosnia and Herzegovina, administered by my Government.

While these provinces, which have progressed culturally and materially in so gratifying a manner, have expressed a desire for some time to establish a constitution, these aims now, because of the altered state of affairs in the Ottoman Empire, have asserted themselves so vigorously that my Government no longer feels that it can oppose them, especially if the peaceful development of affairs on the southern borders of the monarchy is to be free of disturbances.

Since a constitution can be granted only by a sovereign power, I shall find myself forced to announce the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We shall inform the Ottoman Empire of this and at the same time shall notify it, as proof of our policy of peace and our rejection of any thought of acquiring territory in the Balkans, we shall withdraw our troops stationed in the Sanjak and in the future shall renounce the privileges granted to us in the Sanjak by the Treaty of Berlin.

I am reporting this matter to you immediately since I owe that to the close relationship which unites us as friends. I am certain that you will judge this with friendly good-will and that you will not fail to understand that we are acting under the pressure of urgent necessity.

Your faithful friend,

/s/FRANCIS JOSEPH

*From: Louis L. Snyder, Historic Documents of World War I (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1958), p. 38.

APPENDIX # 3*

Letter from William II to Francis Joseph acknowledging receipt of earlier letter informing him of proposed annexation. October 14, 1908.

My Dear Friend:

Heartiest thanks for your friendly letter, in which you did me the courtesy of informing me of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I appreciate indeed the reasons that have moved you to take this important step. In this matter you can count on my firm personal friendship and respect as well as the close friendship that unites our Empires as Allies. Certainly the annexation will prove to be a blessing to the two provinces, which have progressed so admirably under your administration.

I consider it wise that you have decided at the same time to withdraw your troops from the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar and in the future renounce the exercise of the privileges you acquired in the Sanjak by the Treaty of Berlin. I cannot fail to agree. This step will certainly have a good effect, since it bears out your peaceful intentions and makes it easy for Turkey, whose kindly treatment and strengthening are likewise in the interest of our Allied Empires, to agree to the new state of affairs.

Your faithful friend,

/s/ WILLIAM

*From: Louis L. Snyder, Historic Documents of World War I (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1958), pp. 38-39.

APPENDIX # 4*

Francis Joseph's Proclamation of the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

We, Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, and Apostolic King of Hungary, to the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

When a generation ago our troops crossed the borders of your lands, you were assured that they came not as foes, but as friends, with the firm determination to remedy the evils from which your fatherland had suffered so grievously for many years. This promise given at a serious moment has been honestly kept. It has been the constant endeavour of our government to guide the country by patient and systematic activity to a happier future.

To our great joy we can say that the seed then scattered in the furrows of a troubled soil has richly thrived. You yourselves must feel it a boon that order and security have replaced violence and oppression, that trade and traffic are constantly extending, that the elevating influence of education has been brought to bear in your country, and that under the shield of an orderly administration every man may enjoy the fruits of his labours.

It is the duty of us all to advance steadily along this path. With this goal before our eyes, we deem the moment come to give the inhabitants of the two lands a new proof of our trust in their political maturity. In order to raise Bosnia and Herzegovina to a higher level of political life, we have resolved to

grant both of those lands constitutional governments that are suited to the prevailing conditions and interests, so as to create a legal basis for the representation of their wishes and needs. You shall henceforth have a voice when decisions are made concerning your domestic affairs, which, as hitherto, will have a separate administration. But the necessary premise for the introduction of this provincial constitution is the creation of a clear and unambiguous legal status for the two lands.

For this reason, and also remembering the ties that existed of yore between our glorious ancestors on the Hungarian throne and these lands, we extend our suzerainty over Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is our will that the order of succession of our House be extended to these lands also. The inhabitants of the two lands thus share all the benefits which a lasting confirmation of the present relation can offer. The new order of things will be a guarantee that civilization and prosperity will find a sure footing in your home.

*From: Louis L. Snyder, Historic Documents of World War I (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1958), pp. 39-40.

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