

John A. Lovier, Jr. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF JAMES I, 1603-1618. (Under the direction of Dr. Bodo Nischan) Department of History, August 1996.

The purpose of this thesis is to show that the foreign policy decisions of King James I of England were influenced by four factors: James' concerns for the Protestant religion; the paucity of the Royal Treasury; the king's dynastic interests; and an inclination towards peace. By examining James' record from his arrival in England in 1603 until the defenestration of Prague, it will be possible to see that James a) tried to balance the four factors (often unsuccessfully), and b) that James was not going to support Frederick V of the Palatinate's bid for the Bohemian crown.

While a stout Calvinist, and leader of the European Protestant movement, James was willing to forsake his son-in-law because he endangered the fragile peace between Protestants and Catholics in Germany. Even if James had wanted to aid Frederick, he did not have the ability to do so, since he had no standing army and was on the verge of bankruptcy, owing his creditors nearly £1,000,000. The only reason James even considered coming to Frederick's rescue was to protect the birthrights of his grandchildren and potential heirs. Yet balanced against that was James' conceit that he would be able to negotiate a solution to the dilemma that would guard the Palatinate from harm, while increasing his own prestige.

Therefore James' actions in 1619-1620 were actually foreordained by the realities of James' personality and his economic situation by 1618. He would not and could not get involved in the start of the Thirty Years' War.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF JAMES I
1603-1618

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of History
East Carolina University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Masters of Arts in History


by
John A. Lovier, Jr.
August 1996

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF JAMES I
1603-1618

by
John A. Lovier, Jr.

APPROVED BY:

DIRECTOR OF THESIS


Dr. Bodo Nischan


COMMITTEE MEMBER


Dr. Michael Carrafiello


COMMITTEE MEMBER


Dr. William Cobb

COMMITTEE MEMBER


Dr. Brian Harris

CHAIR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY


Dr. Roger Biles

DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL



Dr. Thomas Feldbush

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
I. Europe in the Seventeenth Century	5
i. Germany	6
ii. Spain and the Dutch Republic	12
iii. France	15
iv. Elizabethan England	17
II. Domestic Policy of James I	29
i. James' Character and Style of Government	30
ii. James and the English Parliament	48
iii. The Personalities	61
III. Jacobean Foreign Policy	70
i. Religious Controversy	71
a. The Puritans	71
b. The Recusants	77
ii. Mechanics and Strategy of Jacobean Foreign Policy	84
iii. Early Foreign Policy, 1603-1609	91
iv. Kleves-Julich	98
v. The Intermezzo	106
vi. The Bohemian Crisis	113
IV. Conclusion	121
V. Endnotes	133
VI. Bibliography	154
VII. Appendix: "Table of Jacobean Royal Finance, 1603-1621"	168

Introduction

It has been the trend in Anglo-American historiography to separate the history of England from the history of the European Continent. Such eminent historians as S.R. Gardiner, G.R. Elton, and Thomas Macaulay have pre-supposed the development of England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as being isolated from events across the Channel. In particular, English writers saw the Thirty Years' War as an event that happened in Germany, a minor distraction from the true issue of the day: the Parliamentary opposition to the Stuart bid for an absolutist monarchy. Similarly, Continental historians of the Thirty Years War portrayed England as a bit player who was too involved in domestic intrigues, and too weak militarily to be worth more than minor consideration. This very narrow, and small minded view is typical of historians who are trying to compartmentalize and isolate their particular fields of study.¹

Until Conrad Russell's ground-breaking *Crisis of Parliaments* appeared in 1971, most historians assumed that all England was concerned about in the first half of the seventeenth century was the difficulties between King and Parliament. It was Russell who first successfully proposed that England might not only have been aware of Continental affairs, but actually saw herself as a major participant in seventeenth-century Europe.² It is into that breach that this thesis will forge, in an attempt to show that Jacobean England was a "player" in European politics, and to examine the hows and whys of the actions that James took abroad. My contention is that England was an important factor in Continental affairs, especially in the events leading up to the Thirty Years' War. However, during the war, due to an empty treasury, a conflict of interest and the decline of their king, England failed to follow through and act in any manner that would have been beneficial to its allies.

What we see at the start of the seventeenth century was that western Europe was in transition. The feudal economies of the past were being swept away by the age of commerce and mercantilism.³ Additionally, there was a gradual economic shift from the Mediterranean to the nations north of the Alps, which was neither easy nor constant. Instead this evolution occurred in cycles of expansion and stagnation, marked by periods of intense inflation and tremendous dislocation.⁴ No part of European society was immune to this dislocation, which effected the aristocracy as well as the poor. Merchants and financiers, following the Italian model, were able to parley accumulated wealth into power and status. Conversely, those tied to the land found their status and livelihoods threatened as technology and growth forced new ties and allegiances.

In England, landless farmers were routed by enclosure, just as peasants on the Continent were pummeled by periods of religious warfare. Even the nobility was challenged to remain afloat amid the torrents of change, as monarchies demanded the presence of their notables at Court, as means of both control and surveillance. This forced the aristocracy to spend greater and greater resources to maintain themselves away from their lands, and thus increased their dependence upon grants and monopolies from the crown. In Germany and France this would lead to unrest and rebellion as the aristocracy struggled to retain autonomy over their hereditary demesnes, while in England, the changing economic reality led to a rift between the country gentry and those at Court.

It was amid such strife that James VI of Scotland became James I of England. As the successor to Elizabeth I, who had ruled England for forty-five years, James was faced with numerous challenges, many of which he was unable to handle. One of these "failures," so labeled by many historians, was James' lack of support for his son-in-

law, Frederick V, the elector Palatine, when Frederick foolishly chose to oppose Archduke (and later Emperor) Ferdinand's inheritance of Bohemia in 1619. It was this confrontation between Protestant (Frederick and his allies) and Catholic (the forces of the Habsburg family) which would initiate the Thirty Years' War. James' critics contend that had England acted decisively in 1618-1620, the war may have been averted, or at least not grown into the cataclysmic event it became. It is this argument that this thesis will investigate, exploring James' real ability to assist Frederick, had he wanted to. That is the important question, since James was opposed to Frederick's usurpation of the Bohemian crown.

To prove this point it will be necessary to paint a broad canvas, so that James' actions may be taken in the context of his world, not ours. To do this, it will first be necessary to explore the relationship between the major powers that were involved in the build-up to the Thirty Years' War. By doing so, James' relative position as king of England and leader of the pan-Protestant movement can be put into the proper perspective. Additionally, it is important to examine England prior to James, to see the evolution and growth of English influence and power upon the Continent, as well as to frame some of the internal problems, such as religious controversy, that would hinder James' freedom of action in the critical years of 1618 and 1619.

The next step in the accurate portrayal of the first Stuart is an investigation into James' domestic policies, particularly his relationship with Parliament. It comes as no surprise to any student of the seventeenth century to hear that James was hamstrung by lack of finances and an often bitter relationship with the House of Commons, but how true and to what extent are those stereotypes legitimate? While this may seem to wander from this thesis' goal of analyzing Jacobean foreign policy for some readers, it is critical to remember that such simple considerations, such as a lack of a standing

army, shortages in materiel, or an empty treasury, had as much to do with the shaping of foreign policy as did international concerns.

With a general understanding of what was taking place in England, it is then possible to establish the role religion played in English politics and in English ties to the Continent, because religion would be a determining factor in both James' policies and public/Parliamentary support. James' stance on religion had much to do with the formulation of his foreign policy. It is also important to discuss the mechanics of that policy, since the king's decisions were often formulated by the information passed on to him by diplomats abroad. So an understanding of how this intelligence was disseminated is needed to comprehend what other factors affected the king's decisions.

All of these areas help to build a vantage from which James' actions might be better examined. From this vista, each of James' encounters builds up a history and a pattern of conduct which enables both the researcher and the reader to better grasp at what James wanted to do as well as, and more importantly, what he was able to do. Once this point is reached, it will become evident that by 1618-1619 James had run out of options, and that there was little chance that he would support Frederick. In actuality, it devolved to a point of ethics and morality- should he have helped? From the point-of-view of what was best for England, the answer ends up being no, but let us examine the facts before we pass any more judgments.

1. Europe in the Seventeenth Century

The first step towards understanding Jacobean foreign policy is a knowledge of the political landscape in Europe in the early seventeenth century. Foreign policy, for the purpose of this paper may be construed as the actions that one nation takes to forestall or to respond to the actions of another. King James I of England's policies towards Protestant Germany make little sense without a general understanding of German Imperial politics or the religious settlement that underscored it. Yet any direction that James might have taken also affected the actions of France, Spain, and the Netherlands. This formula also worked in reverse, so that any initiative on the Continent had to be taken into account before the appropriate English response could be devised. To facilitate comprehension, this first chapter will discuss the political and religious make-up of each of the primary nations involved, namely: the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, the Netherlands, and France.

Another influence upon the foreign policy decision making of James (and his advisors) would be the precedents established by his predecessor, Elizabeth I. Despite any of James' prepossessions concerning royal prerogative, the first Stuart monarch was limited in his actions by the various policies enacted by Elizabeth, since any foreign venture required financial support from Parliament, and Parliament was inclined to follow what had worked (or appeared to have worked) before. As a result, the last part of this chapter will briefly explore Elizabeth's religious and foreign policies, with an emphasis upon her role in Continental affairs and what that would mean to James later on.

It is important to keep in mind that the relations between all of the nations involved were fluid and shifting, as allies in one crisis could easily be opponents in the

next. Matters such as religion and trade, as well as the emergence of the early nation-state all helped to initiate conflict. Of all of Europe, the spot where this antagonism was most likely to start a war was the Holy Roman Empire.

The Empire was a tinderbox, awaiting a fateful spark, as the animosity between Protestants and Catholics rose to a crescendo during the first part of the seventeenth century, and only the reluctance of the outside powers (Spain, France, the Netherlands, and England) prevented the eruption of general warfare during the Kleves-Julich crises. Thus it is important to explore what motivation drove these nations from the brink in 1610 and 1614, but which had changed by 1619 to allow the commencement of that fateful cataclysm known as the Thirty Years' War.

i. Germany

Of all the continental powers, none were as complex and volatile as the Holy Roman Empire. There an assortment of German states teetered on the brink of civil war.¹ The Holy Roman Emperors, Rudolph II (1576-1612) and his brother, Matthias (1612-1619), had little actual authority over the two hundred states, principalities, and Imperial "Free-Cities" that made up the legacy of Charlemagne. The emperorship was actually an elected position, not hereditary, even though a Habsburg had been emperor since 1438. This domination by a single family was directly related to the size and wealth of the Austrian-Habsburg patrimony. The Habsburgs' control of Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary gave them tremendous financial and military resources to draw upon, enough to be recognized as one of the foremost powers in Germany. Despite their resources and power, the Habsburgs did not have absolute authority over the sprawling empire.

While the Emperor was the titular head, true power resided with the Imperial Diet. This body was made up of all the various principalities, free-cities, and knightly estates. The Diet was led by the seven electors from the Palatinate, Saxony, Brandenburg, Bohemia, Mainz, Cologne, and Trier (with the last three being ecclesiastic princedoms), as well as by the largest of the Princely Estates, such as Austria, Bavaria, Hesse, and Wurttemberg. The combination of traditional political rivalries, coupled with open confessional enmity between Catholics and Protestants, made the threat of a civil war very strong, and induced a massive arms race between the various German princes. Maurice, Landgrave of Hesse-Kassel wrote to Louis XIII of France in 1615 that:

I am very much afraid that the states of the Empire, quarrelling fiercely among themselves, may start a fatal conflagration embracing not only themselves... but also all those countries that are in one way or another connected with Germany. All this will undoubtedly produce the most dangerous consequences, bringing about the total collapse and unavoidable alteration in the present state of Germany.²

Of all the different factors that divided the Empire, by far the greatest cause of tension and conflict was religion. The fabric of Germany had been tenuously bound together by the Peace of Augsburg (1555) after decades of religious strife. The Peace allowed for the existence of the Lutheran faith in the Empire (though not any of the other Reformed faiths, such as Calvinism), following the principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* (whose region, his religion). Thus the religion of a principality was determined by the religion of its prince. For the Imperial Free-Cities, religious tolerance was

based upon maintaining the existing balance of Protestant and Catholic faith within the various cities.

This was not a perfect arrangement. Both Protestant and Catholic leaders looked for loop-holes and ways around the Peace. One of its greatest shortcomings was that it did not anticipate the possible conversion of an ecclesiastic prince to an evangelical faith. Conflict arose around whether these territories should become secularized, or whether the Emperor and the Catholic church had the right to name a replacement (the *reservatum ecclesiasticum* clause of the Peace). Beyond the simple control of territory, the status of the ecclesiastical princedoms also had great political ramifications, such as with the selection of new emperors. In 1612-13, after the death of Rudolph II, three of the seven electors were Protestant (the Electors Palatine and Brandenburg were Calvinists; that of Saxony, Lutheran). The fourth, non-ecclesiastic elector was the king of Bohemia, an elected position then in the hands of the Austrian-Habsburgs. Bohemia and the three ecclesiastical electors placed Matthias on the throne, but the vote was four to three. It was very apparent that in order to insure that the Holy Roman Emperor would remain Catholic, it was imperative that Catholic control be maintained over the remaining Electoral seats.

The fear that the Protestants might one day be able to place one of their own on the Imperial throne helped the pope and the Catholic hierarchy assert greater control over the Church in Germany. Even before the Imperial election of 1612, the Church had been on the offensive. Spearheaded by the Society of Jesus (the Jesuits), the Catholics were in the midst of the Counter-Reformation, and were actively engaged in attempts to suppress the heretical faiths. To many Catholics, it did not matter whether submission to the Holy Mother Church was by choice or by the sword. The extent of this crusade is illustrated by the events of the summer of 1606, when an outbreak of the

plague chased Rudolph II and his court out of Prague. Rudolph, at the behest of his advisors (many of whom were Jesuits), declared that the epidemic was the result of God punishing the Habsburg family for making concessions to Protestants the previous winter.³ Incidents such as this further divided the Empire, pushing the various states into armed camps.

The event that helped to trigger the final split was the siege and capture of the free-city of Donauworth by Maximillian, the Catholic duke of Bavaria, in 1607. Maximillian's actions were not wholly unmitigated, since the Protestants within the city had openly defied the Emperor. Rudolph II subsequently gave Maximillian permission to force the city to submit to the Imperial will. When the Emperor gave the city to Maximillian, as compensation for the costs of the invasion, the Protestant states organized for their own defense. The result was the Protestant Union, a compact between the Palatinate, Neuberg, Wurttemberg, Ansbach, Kulmbach, and Baden-Durlach. Led by the Elector Palatine and his advisor, Christian of Anhalt, the Protestant Union (or simply the Union) attempted to gain support against the Habsburgs and the Counter-Reformation from James I of England, Henri IV of France, Christian IV of Denmark, and the Dutch Republic.

A second crisis quickly followed - the succession of the duchy of Kleves-Julich in 1609. Although the territory at stake was relatively small, the succession quickly flared into an international fracas involving all the major powers in Europe. To understand the tremendous amount of confusion involving a minor Rhineland duchy, it is critical to understand one of the geo-political realities of the early seventeenth-century, the "Spanish Road."

The Spanish Road was an attempt by Spain to have a land bridge from its possessions in Northern Italy to its territories in Northern Europe. The Spaniards had

found that sea-borne transportation to the North Sea/ Baltic area was exposed to the depredations of English and Dutch privateers. Hence it became a strategic necessity to supply the Spanish army in Flanders over land. Starting in Genoa, the Spanish Road led through Milan, around the Swiss cantons, into Lorraine, Luxemburg, and finally Flanders.

The territories embodied in the Kleves-Julich duchy flanked this Spanish lifeline. The duchy also sat astride the flank of both the Dutch and Spanish armies which faced each other across the borders so recently drawn by the Truce of Antwerp (1609). The duke of Kleves-Julich was an ardent Catholic until mental illness ended both his effective rule of the duchies, and any chance for an heir. Without a clear-cut successor, the duchy became a pawn of Imperial and international politics. The major claimants were Protestant, thus Spain saw Kleves-Julich as a flash-point, which, if it fell into Protestant hands, might make the Spanish position in Flanders untenable. Likewise, the Dutch saw an opportunity to not only remove an obstacle, but to gain a strategic advantage over the Spanish.

When coupled with the obvious strategic value of Kleves-Julich, the duke's infirmity complicated the diplomatic situation in Europe. Zorzi Giustinian, the Venetian ambassador to England, reported that, " The Duke of Cleves has no heir ... After the Duke's death we may look for trouble here."⁴

The threat of military action by both Protestant and Catholic forces increased in the early 1600's. The duke of Bavaria reacted to the Protestant Union with a Catholic Union (or simply the League). The creation of the League gave Maximillian of Bavaria, already one of the most powerful men in Germany, access to the coffers of the ecclesiastic princes, including the electors of Trier, Mainz, and Cologne. The development of yet another religious-military alignment noticeably increased the

tensions over the fate of Kleves-Julich, and made the possibility of a European-wide war very real. Outside parties such as France, Spain, England, and the Dutch Republic prepared to enter the fray as well.

Trapped between the Union and the League were several moderate princes, led by Duke Christian II of Saxony, who also had a claim to the duchies. These men, mostly Lutherans, believed that they owed allegiance to the emperor, but were not willing to wage war on fellow Protestants. The moderates were caught between the Union, which saw a Catholic plot behind every diplomatic maneuver, and the Leaguers, who wished to extend the Counter-Reformation and the Catholic faith throughout Germany. Each of them watched the events unfold carefully, but refused to take any action other than to step-up their own defensive preparations.

The crisis over Kleves-Julich reached its peak when Rudolph sent his cousin, Archduke Leopold, to take possession of the duchies, negating a negotiated settlement by the two major claimants. As a result, Henri IV of France declared his intention to intervene on the behalf of the Protestant claimants to the duchy. This movement of Catholic France against the Catholic emperor caused the Kleves-Julich succession to become an international incident. Spain, ruled by Philip III (a Habsburg and a Catholic), had just signed the Truce of Antwerp (1609) with the Protestant Dutch Republic, yet both parties were prepared to resume the conflict if war was precipitated by France. The assassination of Henri IV in May, 1610, temporarily defused the situation, while the Emperor was momentarily forced to accept the Protestant claimants when French, Dutch, and English troops expelled Leopold from the duchies. The Kleves-Julich succession was emblematic of the problems that faced the Empire, and in many ways, to the problems of Europe as a whole. Issues of land, religion, power, and family all contributed to the crisis which faced all of Europe.

ii. Spain and the Dutch Republic

Ironically, while churchmen pushed for battle, warriors pursued peace. Spain had been at war with the Dutch rebels since 1568. Spanish armies had seen almost constant action in the forty years preceding the Kleves-Julich succession. Spain was by far the richest and most powerful nation in Europe. The Spanish Empire ranged from possessions in the Far East, to northern Italy to Central and South America. To preserve that far-flung assortment of territories Spain was forced to maintain troops and garrisons around the world. As a result, despite the wealth in silver and gold that was arriving from the Americas, the Spanish crown was approaching financial insolvency from the cost of extended military operations.⁵

Forty years of war with Dutch rebels and intermittent battling with France, England, Venice, and Savoy had resulted in mounting fiscal problems for Spain, while victory seemed as far away as ever. In the same period, the Dutch Republic grew ever stronger as money, men, and materiel poured in from England, France and Protestant Germany. Dutch shipping prowled amidst Spanish territories in both the Far East and the West Indies, while English privateers seized Spanish galleons bringing the bounty of the colonies home. The economy of Flanders (the part of the Netherlands still under Spanish control) was in shambles from supporting four decades of campaigning troops, and the Spanish army in Flanders was owed back pay. The solution was both obvious and difficult to accept; Spain needed a respite in which to stabilize its economy and re-think its strategies.

The greatest difficulty in Spanish acceptance of a peace proposal was the implied recognition of the independence of the Dutch Republic. Not only was this a blow to the prestige of the Spanish crown, but a defeat for the Church. The king of

Spain took great pride in his claim to be the leader of all Catholicism. To allow the Dutch rebels to halt, even temporarily, the Counter-Reformation was a serious loss of face. Yet the Spanish accepted peace because it was necessary. The Spanish also professed a belief that they would eventually win the war and restore Spanish rule and the Church to the rebel provinces. Part of the Spanish mentality was that time was "calculated by generations and centuries," allowing them a degree of patience.⁶ The acceptance of a peace, which would only last for twelve years, was amenable as a necessary respite during a conflict which might last decades. This was accomplished with the Truce of Antwerp (1609), which inaugurated the Twelve Year Truce.

The signing of the long-term cease-fire between Spain and the Dutch happened at the worst time for the king of Spain's uncle, the Holy Roman Emperor, who was confronted with the outbreak of the Kleves-Julich succession crisis. The Dutch and Spanish had just finished negotiating the treaty, and neither party wanted to endanger the truce through a rash action. Despite this both nations remained very interested in the disposition of the Kleves-Julich patrimony, since the lands in question were poised on the flank of the Spanish defensive line in Flanders. King Philip III of Spain was also cognizant that his uncle, Rudolph II, had given little assistance to the Spanish effort in the Netherlands. Obviously, family ties between the two branches of the Habsburg family were not as close as they might have been.

A complication in Spain's foreign policy throughout the period was the perception within Europe of a Habsburg family plot. It was naturally assumed by most parties that the Emperor and the King of Spain were in close communication and agreement on most issues. Hostile observers placed both branches of the Habsburgs in a conspiracy where:

... All our peace, our warre, our treaties, marriages, and whatsoever intendment else of ours, aimes at this principall end, to get the whole possession of the world, and to reduce all to unitie under one temporal head, that our King may truly be what he is stilled, the catholick and universal King.⁷

The effect of these suspicions placed the rest of Europe on guard. It had only been two generations since Philip III's grandfather (Rudolph II's uncle), Charles V, was both Holy Roman Emperor and king of Spain. The memory of one man ruling most of Europe was a constant reminder of what Habsburg power could do. Yet Spain had reached its peak, and the Habsburg control over the Empire was being strongly contested. The great bugaboo of Europe was a hollow threat, as the oncoming war was soon to prove.

The one nation that saw the weakness of Spain was the Dutch Republic. After forty years of fighting against Europe's foremost power, the Dutch nation was still in existence; a fact that proved both the strength of Dutch perseverance and the declining power of the Spanish crown. Not only did the Dutch survive the onslaught, but they were able to force Spain into a lopsided peace. The Truce of Antwerp was representative of how weak the Spanish position actually was. The Dutch were allowed to maintain their blockade of Flanders' main port, Antwerp, and to aggressively compete with Spanish and Portuguese colonies in the Far East. In return, the Dutch conceded nothing to Spain. Thus the Dutch were able to continue to increase their domination of the open seas, while Spain was able to gain twelve years respite on a long, expensive, and draining war. It came as no surprise that Spain was not interested in renewing the truce in 1621.

While the Dutch were able to perceive that Spain was not all that it appeared, very few other states in Europe were also able to see the implications of Spanish

policy. England and France were both prone to overestimating the power of Spain. The English remembered the Great Armada of 1588, and the several other failed invasion plans that Philip II and Philip III had thrown at the English and Irish coasts. For France, Spain was the mortal enemy. Henri IV had barely survived the "War of the Three Henries," and had seen open Spanish support for the Guise clan. The fact that Henri was a former heretic, with a history of recanting, did little to endear him to Spain.

iii. France

The France of 1609 was a far cry from that of twenty years earlier, when Henri of Navarre seized the throne after three decades of civil war, and had become Henri IV. By returning to the Catholic Church (1593), by granting civil rights to the Huguenots (the French Calvinists) in the Edict of Nantes (1598), and by making peace with Spain in the Treaty of Vervins (1598), Henry returned France to a semblance of peace and prosperity.⁸

Despite his conversion to Catholicism, Henri was still looked upon by many Protestants as one of their own. This explains the offers to him from the Protestant Union for an alliance against the Emperor. To a large extent, Henri encouraged the rapport that existed between the German Protestants and France, and tried to get the various principalities to cooperate and present a united front against the Habsburgs.⁹ This was a necessary political move, for even if Henri was sincere in his Catholicism, there remained the issue that many of the radical Catholics in France had greater allegiance to Madrid than to Paris. This was not to be unexpected after the turmoil that had ravaged France, but it was yet another excuse for the king to detest Spain. Added to this was the simple fact that France was the traditional enemy of Spain and the

Habsburgs. With control over Flanders, the "Free County of Burgundy" (Franche-Comte), and Spain, the Spanish monarchy was poised on all three of France's landward flanks.

It was this geographic reality that forced Henri and his successors to be very wary of Spain. This was especially true to the north, where Spain's most competent commander, Ambrogio Spinola, and the Army of Flanders lay entrenched against the Dutch. It was recognized by all parties that the Army of Flanders could just as rapidly attack France, or several of the Protestant states within Germany, as it could the Netherlands. The near-bankruptcy of France was another weakness with which Henri had to contend. It was his prime motivation for negotiating a peace with Philip II of Spain, ending the costly and intermittent wars between the two powers.

Yet Henri soon faced other crises, such as Spanish sponsored intrigues within France and the Kleves-Julich succession. As a result, the French king chose to intervene on behalf of the Protestant Union, perhaps believing a swift attack might defeat his Habsburg foes and stabilize the French border with Germany. Before Henri could act, he was assassinated by a Catholic extremist in May, 1610.¹⁰

The consequence of Henri IV's demise was felt immediately. Henri's son, Louis XIII, was not yet nine, and thus it fell to the Queen Mother, Marie de Medici, to serve as regent until her son's majority. Marie was Florentine, virulently Catholic, and had strong Habsburg ties. It soon became apparent that France was going to shift directions in its foreign policy. While Marie did send a small force to assist Union troops besieging Julich, it was not the army of 30,000 men that Henri had proposed. It was a credit to Marie that she attempted to keep intact the alliance her husband had signed. Yet in other matters, the Queen Regent quickly showed her bias and

ineptitude, as she severed marriage negotiations with England and dismissed Henri IV's Protestant finance minister, Maximilian de Bethune, the duke de Sully.¹¹

Louis XIII assumed personal rule in 1617 when he seized power from his mother, banishing her and ordering the murder of her chief minister, Concino Concini. The overall effect of the regency, and the first decade of Louis XIII's personal rule, was to force France to concentrate on internal problems at the expense of foreign involvement in Germany (or any other type of opposition to Spanish hegemony). France would not return as a major force in Continental politics until the fall of La Rochelle (1629). Once that last bastion of Huguenot resistance to Louis and his chief minister, Armand-Jean du Plessis, cardinal de Richelieu, was crushed, Louis and Richelieu would preside over a relatively pacified French nation. With few distractions at home, France could once again assert its power abroad. For the members of the Protestant Union, the death of Henri IV meant that they were left without the assistance of a major power in their fight against the Habsburgs and the League.

With a general understanding into what was happening on the Continent, and some of the problems that James would have to face there, it is now necessary to explore how England came to be involved in Continental politics as it did. It is also possible to identify the beginnings of many of the internal problems that James would eventually have to face, all of which would influence the options available to the king to address the various foreign dilemmas which occurred during his reign.

iv. Elizabethan England

The English, in their own way, have always held the view that they were both a part of and separate from the continent of Europe. An obvious result of being an island away from Europe itself, the English have projected, at times, an aloofness from the

problems faced by their Continental neighbors. At the same time, the English have always felt vulnerable, both militarily and economically, to forces from across the Channel. Of all the forces at work on cross-Channel relations, the strongest in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was religion, especially the plight of Protestant co-religionists.

To grasp these ties that the English people, and the Puritans in particular, felt towards the Continent, it is necessary to reexamine the political contexts of the English Reformation. Henry VIII's original break with Rome had been rooted in dynastic, financial, and national interests. Through division, Henry expediently gained his divorce, money from the sale of church lands, and independence from Rome in legal, clerical, and theological matters. It was a religious *coup d'état*. In 1558, when Elizabeth succeeded her half-sister, Mary (1553-1558), as queen of England, the nation had experienced eleven years of religious tumult.

Under the regency of Edward VI (1547-1553), the Church of England went from Henry VIII's very Catholic national church (with a royal supremacy) to a vigorous Evangelical faith. Led by the duke of Northumberland and Thomas Cranmer, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Church of England became an amalgam of European Protestantism. In 1552, Cranmer produced the Protestant Forty-Two articles, which defined the English church under Edward. Yet all the changes put forth by Cranmer were a doubtful legacy, since Edward was but a sickly child, and his sister and heir, Mary, was a devout Catholic.

Any hedging about the permanence of the English Reformation proved to be correct when Edward died in 1553, and Mary assumed the crown of England. Mary placed Cranmer in the Tower of London, where he was burned as a heretic in 1556. She promptly began to restore the Catholic faith in England with the support of her

husband, Philip II of Spain. But Mary was as hindered in making long term changes, since she was, "a single woman of 36 and her heir was a sister reputed to be a Protestant."¹² With Mary's death in 1558, her sister Elizabeth gained the throne and followed what historians like to refer to as a "*via media*." This middle road was an attempt by Elizabeth to achieve a compromise within the Church of England that the followers of both the Reformed and Catholic faiths could tolerate. Her goal was outward conformity.

Yet theologically in 1558, Protestant England was less Protestant than Catholic France.¹³ France was rife with Calvinism that had spread throughout the country and even into the nobility and Court (witness the prince de Conde, Admiral Coligni, and, of course, Henri of Navarre). The English Church was mildly Lutheran at best, as Henry's own blend of Catholicism had been pulled first one way (by Cranmer in Edward VI's reign) and then the other (by Mary and Philip).

Thus the Elizabethan settlement, which adopted the Protestant call to arms of "justification by faith" (versus the Catholic belief in "justification by works"), also continued with traditional Catholic vestments, the use of the term "priest," and the acceptance of confession and absolution. Thus Elizabeth created a church that was moderately Evangelical in doctrine, but which remained very Catholic in ritual. It was this church, framed by the Thirty-nine Articles (1563), which James I attempted to maintain when he was coronated in 1603.

Resistance to the Elizabethan church came from both sides, as many Catholics became "recusants" and refused the compromise, while many of the Reformed clergy openly spurned the settlement as a desecration of God's will.¹⁴ In this vein, John Jewel, the Bishop of Salisbury wrote to the Evangelical theologian, Peter Martyr, that:

The scenic apparatus of divine worship ...those very things which you and I have so often laughed at, are now seriously and solemnly entertained by certain persons (for *we* are not consulted) as if the Christian religion could not exist without something tawdry.¹⁵

It was amid this ultra-orthodox Reformed camp, which had strong ties to the Continental Calvinist movement, that the Puritan faction began, dedicating itself to freeing the English Church from the taint of Popery that they believed Elizabeth maintained.¹⁶ The more moderate Edwardian Lutherans took advantage of Elizabeth's desire for congruity and, led by John Whitgift, the Archbishop of Canterbury (1583-1604), attacked Puritanism as elitist and schismatic. The Puritans responded vigorously with the charges that the conservatives were crypto-Catholics and scripturally unsound.¹⁷

This fracturing of the English Church was countered by the tempest of the Counter-Reformation. Throughout Elizabeth's tenure, England was theologically and militarily besieged by Catholic plots and plans to overthrow the Protestant queen. This only fueled English resentment towards Spain and the papacy. Ennobled by Foxe's *The Book of Martyrs* and Elizabeth's steadfast stand, the Evangelical cause gained in strength and vibrancy, challenging the loyalty of English Catholics to the crown and nation. Catholicism was attacked as an outside device, a foreign intrusion that destroyed English unity. Reformed ministers, such as John Donne, popularized the use of Catholics as political, economic, and religious enemies to the English nation, rallying support for a unified English Church.¹⁸

Religious debate and rancor not only caused internal dissension, but increased international tensions as well. Forced by the political realities of being a Protestant nation in a climate dominated by two Catholic powers (Spain and France), the

successors of Henry VIII were cognizant that England's safety lay in the preservation of an equilibrium between those powers.¹⁹ To protect herself, and the Protestant cause, in Europe as well as England, Elizabeth began making contact with various princes that belonged to the Evangelical faith, such as Count John Casimir of the Palatinate.

The purpose of such communication was to explore the feasibility of a Pan-Protestant union. It was the belief of many within the Evangelical faith, including the intellectual Hubert Languet and the poet Philip Sidney, that the future of their religion lay in forming "a Protestant League to oppose future aggression by the Pope and the kings of France and Spain."²⁰ While Sidney found Germany too fractured in 1577, with the Lutheran and Calvinist princes distrusting each other as much as they did the Catholics, the idea remained potent to Elizabeth.

Throughout the period relations between Spain and England remained strained. Philip conveniently ignored the Catholic plotting and plannings against Elizabeth, while Elizabeth coyly declared her innocence regarding the raids conducted by English "pirates" upon Spanish shipping. Yet neither monarch wanted a costly war, especially while France still remained a possible threat to both nations. The true crisis between England and Spain began with the death of Francois, the duke of Alencon, and the assassination of William of Orange in 1584. Alencon, a former suitor of Elizabeth's, was the heir to the French throne and the chief supporter of the Dutch Rebellion. Alencon's death left a vacuum in French politics, as the next closest heir of Henri III (who was not inclined to have any children) was Henri of Navarre, who was a Protestant. To prevent France from falling to the Huguenots (among other reasons), Henri, duke of Guise, rallied ultra-Catholic forces to oppose Navarre's succession. Divided along lines of religion, France descended into civil war.

The loss of Alencon was quickly followed by the murder of William of Orange (William the Silent). William had been the architect behind the Dutch Revolt, and was instrumental in holding the various provinces together. With his death, a Spanish victory in the Low Countries looked inevitable.²¹ Thus in a dramatically short period of time the Netherlands lost two of the men it could least afford to lose.

For England, Alencon's death marked the end of hope for a religiously moderate France. The ultra-Catholic Guise clan, with Spanish support, quickly seized the upper hand in their war against the Huguenots. A by-product of the Guise-Spanish alliance was that Henri III was convinced by the Guise (through the presence of their large private army, as well as by their overwhelming support in Paris) that Protestantism at home and abroad must be extirpated. Plans to cooperate with the Spanish and crush the Dutch Revolt were therefore drawn up.

The English were at a loss of what to do in order to support the Dutch. England had no standing army. Despite an outpouring of moral support, the English were reluctant to put troops on the ground in Europe - the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis (1559) and the loss of Calais were all too recent. But Elizabeth realized, with a push from her Privy Council, that civil war in France would destroy the balance of power in Europe, and leave Spain predominant.²² "If the nation of Spain," she remarked, "should make a conquest of those [Low] Countries... in that danger ourself, our countries and people might shortly be."²³ Elizabeth went on to declare that France (Henri of Navarre) should be supported as well, to counter-balance Spain, "Whenever the last day of France came it would also be the eve of destruction of England."²⁴

As a result, Elizabeth signed the Treaty of Nonsuch (1585) which promised the Dutch Republic 6000 soldiers under the command of Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester. This open hostility towards Spain caused Philip to impound English vessels trading with

Spain. This in turn provoked an increase in English privateering. The escalation forced Philip to re-evaluate his policies towards England and to consider a direct attack on England.²⁵ This is the origin of the ill-fated Spanish Armada in 1588 and the ensuing fifteen years of open war between England and Spain. In the process Spain became England's arch-enemy, replacing (while not erasing) centuries of English enmity towards Scotland and France with a dread of a Spanish/Catholic dominated continent.

The Catholic/Protestant religious identification worked to foment public support for Elizabeth's foreign policy. Broadside of the period reported that Sir Francis Drake, the most dashing and famous of the English privateers, always carried a copy of Foxe's *Book of Martyrs* on his voyages. Thus to seize a Spanish treasure ship meant not only wealth for the privateers, but trumpeting the glory of God's righteous church. Sir Walter Raleigh described it as striking a blow, "against the ambitious and bloody pretences" of Madrid, which sought to, "devour all nations" and subject them to the Catholic religion.²⁶

The failure of the Armada, and the apparent success of English Naval policy lead Elizabeth to a conflict, this time between her own councillors. The issue was the necessity of deploying and maintaining English troops on the Continent, particularly in the United Provinces. The issue was debated hotly between those who supported Sir John Hawkins and the supporters of Sir Francis Knollys. Hawkins had ambitious plans for a maritime blockade of Spain and his urgent recommendation, "that we have as little to do in foreign countries as may be (but of mere necessity) for that breedeth great charge and no profits at all." While Knollys believed that, "the avoiding of Her Majesty's danger doth consist in the preventing of the conquest of the Low Countries betimes."²⁷

The merit of Hawkins' plan laid in its cost to the treasury: nothing. To establish a blockade of Spain and, more importantly, Spanish shipping lanes, all Elizabeth had to do was to give "letters of marque" to independent privateers. English merchants would outfit their own ships, and prey upon Spanish shipping. The privateers' motivation was the silver and gold plundered from Spanish treasure ships sailing from Havana to Cadiz. As a matter of course, the queen would receive a share of all prizes taken by the privateers. Hawkins' idea hinged upon the ability of English ships to cut Philip off from his financial lifeline in the Americas, following the general theory that a bankrupt king cannot support an army in the field. Additionally, a successful privateering campaign could actually provide much needed income for the royal treasury.

The obvious weakness to Hawkins' concept was that it wholly depended upon the interception of the annual treasure flotillas, the *Flota*. This was a literal "hit-or-miss" proposition, a point that Elizabeth was well aware of. Unfortunately the queen had few options. England did not have the resources, in either money or men, to directly challenge Spain on the Continent proper. Yet England had to prevent Spain from gaining absolute control of the coasts facing Britain, which would facilitate a Spanish invasion of the island nation. This could only be achieved by having troops on the ground. Therefore Elizabeth felt it imperative to maintain as large a presence across the Channel as possible.

It should be no surprise that Elizabeth chose a blend of maritime and continental policies. This policy plagued the Spanish and sapped enough of their strength to force a peace during the first years of James reign (Treaty of London, 1604), yet only after fifteen years of often unpopular war. It is important to recognize that the war was never fought with the intention of defeating Spain. Instead it was an attempt to

forestall Spanish ambition of a unified, Catholic Europe. It was understood by the queen's (and later the king's) councillors that the Spanish war had not been as much a victory as an avoidance of defeat. The lesson had been learned that,

the surest way to avoid the burden and strain was to keep an ever watchful eye on the continental powers, to see that the balance never swung too sharply towards either [France or Spain], above all to keep the coast between Brest and Emden from falling under a single master.²⁸

Yet this lesson was lost upon many outside Elizabeth's (and James') Privy Councils, who only remembered that Gloriana had kept England safe from the Spanish devil. Many would fondly look back to the rein of Elizabeth when faced with the troubles arising in those of James and Charles. An example was this doggerel penned by a Puritan minister in 1631:

Witnesse, o ever witnesse, may those dayes,
Those Halycon-Dayes of sweet Eliza's Raigne;
Eliza, worthy Englands endlesse praise,
That Friend to Faith, That Scourge to Rome, & Spaine:
All present, past, and future Ages Glorie,
Worthy prime Place and Grace in datelesse Storie.
By whom, the Lord so many wonders wrought,
To whom the Lord so great deliverance gave;
For whom in their owne Snares hir Foes he caught,
In whom his Church (poore Church) he oft did save:
By wondrous, glorious, world-admired protection,
Such was to Hir and Hirs, Heavens firme affection.²⁹

It is ironic that the same Puritans who so opposed Elizabeth over the *via media* compromise would wistfully reminisce over her "enlightened" leadership when James tried to enforce the same rules that Elizabeth had originally established. It does demonstrate how much James was despised by those who had originally viewed him as a salvation from Elizabeth's heresies. As for Elizabeth's foreign policy, it is possible throughout the Tudor period to see the unfolding of England's *potential* to become a great maritime power. A general shift in the European balance of power had occurred. The Atlantic and Low Countries replaced the Mediterranean as the economic and political focal points. England was now placed at the center of affairs, rather than on the periphery. Yet Elizabethan foreign policy had drained the resources of the English crown, and created for her heir a number of financial, political, and social problems.³⁰

All of this had an impact upon James. In perspective to this analysis of Jacobean foreign policy, it is now possible to see some of the inherent (as well as inherited) problems that the Scottish monarch of England would have to face. As a Protestant king, James would have to defend his religion from the Counter-Reformation, which was led by the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs. Yet throughout James' reign there would be no consensus among Protestant states, instead there was constant acrimony. In the face of this discord James was confronted with the might of Philip III of Spain which while fading was still, by far, the mightiest nation in Europe; as well as the chicanery of Henri IV, as Henri sought a way to diminish the power and prestige of Spain.

The void left by Henri's assassination and France's temporary departure from Continental politics defused the first Kleves-Julich crisis, and allowed both Protestant and Catholic leaders to negotiate a compromise. The assassination also reinforced the position of James I of England as Europe's leading Protestant prince, a mantle which

he assumed from Elizabeth I. Yet it was a station fraught with danger, for England had not yet developed the economic and military strength that would play so important a role in the "Wars of Empire" of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Elizabeth had gained some success by following a policy which blended the limited use of ground troops with an aggressive naval stance, which was effective in protecting an island nation and its very maritime ally (the Dutch). As a result, the English people, Parliament in particular, were convinced that a naval response was the correct military solution to any situation which might arise.

Not quite powerful, nor altogether helpless, England was at a crossroads. Many in England felt a concern for what was happening on the Continent. The English, in general, were very cognizant of events transpiring in Europe; This was especially true of the regions of northern Europe, where Englishmen acknowledged a kindred spirit in religion and culture.

Additionally, England was tied economically to the world beyond the Channel. The Age of Commerce was at hand, and while the English still lagged behind the Dutch commercially, there were a growing number of English factories in ports around the world. Working with these merchants were the royal diplomats and statesmen, who carried communiques, negotiated settlements and gathered intelligence from places as close as the Hague, to as far away as the court of the Great Mogul Emperor in India.³¹

While it would be wrong to claim that all of England was preoccupied with events taking place on the Continent, it is certain that most Englishmen were aware of the situations and problems in Germany. The sermons of Puritan divines, such as Thomas Gataker, the fiery rhetoric within the pamphlets of John Taylor and Thomas Scott, as well as the well-heeled gossip from English travellers abroad acquainted the English with Continental affairs.³²

It cannot be overemphasized that this was an era of intense devotion to religion, and that the conflict unfolding between Protestants and Catholics in Germany had immediate ramifications upon English Protestants. If the Catholic Emperor and the Most Catholic King of Spain could extinguish the Evangelical faith in Europe, then would not England be next? Spain had already tried several times to invade England and her colonies in Ireland. If the Netherlands were removed as an English ally, the future of England would be uncertain indeed.

II. The Domestic Policy of James I

It was as Elizabeth I's chosen successor that James VI of Scotland became James I of England. His accession brought expectations that the centuries of strife between the neighboring nations would end. Yet to do so, James would have had to overcome generations of hatred and racism by the English towards the Scots. Thus we must look at the role of English enmity towards the many Scots whom accompanied James south to see if their supplantation of Englishmen did not cause undue animosity and hardship for their king.

It is also necessary to understand that James whole-heartedly believed in his divine appointment as king and benefactor to his people. His training as a scholar and theologian only reinforced his views. Yet these views long held as king of Scotland would immediately cause conflict with Parliament, where some of the members held the belief of a contractual monarchy. This difference in interpretation would aggravate James' relations with Parliament and would hinder the effectiveness of James' ability to raise the funds so critical to the maintenance of successful domestic and foreign policies.

Beyond these discordances, which must be taken into account to understand some of the more basic difficulties that James faced, we must not forget that the most essential elements in James decision making process as king of England were his experiences as king of Scotland, where he had been king for thirty-six of his thirty-seven years. It is with that in mind that we should study his actions in England. Many of James' actions, in his relationship with Sir Robert Cecil or with his dealings with Parliament, can be traced directly back to what worked or did not work for him in Scotland.

With these faulty preconceptions, James was bound to encounter resistance and confrontations, especially within the House of Commons, which plagued his reign and would eventually hinder James ability to act abroad when he needed to do so. Since this tumultuous association would play such an important role in James' foreign policy, it must be explored in depth, so that when we arrive at the discussion of James' foreign relations, it will become more evident why James often chose the direction he did. To accomplish this, we shall briefly look at James' tenure in Scotland, and the establishment of certain patterns in the king's behavior that would be repeated in England.

In the course of discussion, this chapter shall also focus on four additional areas. First upon Sir Robert Cecil, the man whom engineered James peaceful succession to the throne, as well as his chief minister for the first nine years of James' reign. This will appropriately lead to an examination of royal finances, and to James inability to manage Parliament. Finally, this section will close with an examination of James unusual closeness to his favorites, Esme Stuart, Robert Carr, and George Villiers. All of which when tied together should allow the reader to grasp the difficulty James was going to have in formulating his foreign policy.

i. James' Character and Style of Government

One of the problems in analyzing the foreign policy of James I of England is trying to ascertain where James VI of Scotland leaves off and James I of England begins, for how can you separate the two? James was thirty-seven when he arrived upon the English throne, having already been a king for thirty-six years. He certainly was not some young and inexperienced prince being handed the reigns of power for the first time, but rather an experienced and proven monarch with an extremely successful

record transferring from one neighboring nation to another. So to make any grasp at understanding the decisions James would make as king of England, it is first necessary to discover who and what James was as the king of Scotland.

Charles James, prince and steward of Scotland, duke of Rothesay, earl of Carrick, lord of the Isles, and baron of Renfrew was born 19 June 1566, the only child of Mary Queen of Scots, who was also a dowager queen of France. Thirteen months after his birth, James was crowned king, following his mother's forced abdication for, among other reasons, involvement in the murder of James' father, Henry Stewart, Lord Darnley. The new king was quickly placed into the care of the elderly earl of Mar, while the king's uncle, the earl of Moray, was chosen Regent. Thus started the turbulent life of James VI of Scotland.

From a young age James was rigorously trained in languages, philosophy, and theology. His tutor, the humanist George Buchanan, relentlessly pushed James in the academic pursuits, while attempting to instill in his young charge the radical philosophies that a king was subordinate and responsible to his people, who were truly sovereign, and that the Scottish constitution placed formal checks on the power of the Crown.¹ Both of which the king would forever bitterly contest as unscriptural and inflammatory demagoguery.

It was as a reaction to Buchanan's teaching's that James formed his own views of kingship, which were carefully defined in two publications penned by James, *The Trew Law of Free Monarchies* (1598), and *Basilicon Doron* (1599). The *Trew Law*, which was released anonymously, amounted to a very classical definition of absolutism, including the premise that the king received his power directly from God, and it could not be impinged upon by any earthly source without the king's voluntary acquiescence.

In addition, the king's subjects were obliged to obey his "commands in all things, except directly against God."²

The second work, *Basilicon Doron*, was dedicated to Prince Henry as a study guide for the governance of Scotland. It laid out, among other things, James' detestation for the Presbyterian element of the Scottish *kirk*, which had assisted in the overthrow of his mother, and which vocally opposed any attempt by James to assert himself in that rather broad area of Scottish religious policy. Both of these volumes are critical in gaining insight into James' attitude and understanding of the role of a monarch, all of which was grounded upon his encounters as a ruler north of the Tweed, yet that experience would be the basis of his decisions as king of England.

One of the greatest lessons James learned in Scotland was the importance of an independent king, free from the control and threats of an unruly aristocracy, an obstinate church, and outside intervention. This reality was solidly drilled into James' thinking as the result of six successful coups against James' governments from 1578-1585. In that period of James' minority, control of Scotland lay in the physical possession of the young king, pitting the former supporters of Mary Queen of Scots against a loose alliance of the *kirk*, the Protestant nobility, and Elizabeth I. As soon as one faction was temporarily ascendant, a coalition of dissidents would unite and plan the capture of the king, for once he was in their possession, they could effectively rule in his name.

Nowhere was this more apparent than in the overthrow of Esme Stuart, the seigneur d'Aubigny and the eventual duke of Lennox. D'Aubigny was a close relative of James, who had lived in France, and who was the same age of James' mother, Mary. Sweeping into Court in 1579, in an attempt to sway James to assist the return of his mother, d'Aubigny quickly won the king's favor and heart. By treating the young

monarch as an adult, building his self-confidence and encouraging the king's views on absolutism, d'Aubigny was instrumental in establishing the style James would develop for ruling his kingdoms. As a testament to James, d'Aubigny abandoned his Catholic faith, telling his Protestant examiners that James had enlightened him as to the error of his ways. In return, the new convert was made first earl, then duke of Lennox, and became the center of the king's attention and affection, as well as his chief advisor.

D'Aubigny's meteoric rise was greeted with resentment among many in the Scottish nobility (for his elevation over them) and great suspicion in England (where his ties to Mary, the French Guise, and Catholicism were questioned). Additionally, the "healthiness" of James' relationship with his cousin caused concern within the *kirk*. It was the new duke of Lennox who had also nourished James' passion for the hunt, telling his young king that he could easily handle the workload of governing with minimal effort given his God-granted genius. All of these factors motivated increasing resistance to the king and his beloved favorite.

As a result, James found himself captured by the "Ruthven Raiders," and imprisoned at Gowrie castle. The whole operation had been coordinated in England with a great deal of support from Elizabeth and the Scottish *kirk*. With Lennox in exile, and with himself under tight constraint, the king was forced to accept this humiliation, although he was able to eventually plan his own escape. But the lesson was brought home to the young James. He realized that he was vulnerable, and he understood very clearly, from his perspective, from where the threats to his kingship arose.

Once free of the Ruthven faction, James fell under the spell (and possession) of the ruthless and ambitious Captain James Stewart, the earl of Arran. Arran had ties to the Catholic highlanders, and was quickly opposed by the Protestant nobility and the

kirk. Once again the coalition which had deposed Lennox was reunited, and with assistance from England, they moved against Arran. Yet Arran was aware of the coalescing rebellion, and made sure that the Gowrie Conspiracy was crushed, with many of the nobles involved paying with their lives. Arran also acted to restrict the power of the *kirk* with the "Black Acts," which asserted the king's dominance over the church (in addition to the state). Finally, in 1585, with hostilities mounting between Spain and England, Elizabeth was able to inspire Arran's overthrow, which led to James ruling Scotland independently.

The reason that James never directly confronted Elizabeth over her involvement in Scottish politics was his claim to the English throne. Elizabeth had no heir, and refused to name one. By the rules of primogeniture, the next in line was James, as a descendant of Henry VII. To prevent Elizabeth from obstructing his claim, James was obliged to follow Glorianna's lead to a point. That juncture being the forestallment of Catholic opposition to James' succession.

To balance between the opposing forces James chose a middle path. He signed the Anglo-Scottish alliance in 1586, securing Elizabeth's northern flank, while at the same time he maintained clandestine contacts with Catholic Europe, holding out the possibility of a conversion to Catholicism. As a result of the alliance, Elizabeth did indeed stop meddling in Scottish politics, but she spurned any attempt to name him heir to her throne. To counter Catholic resistance to his dream of ruling a united Scotland and England, as well as to insure that channels to Catholic Europe remained open, James kept the Catholic noble George Gordon, the earl of Huntly, close to him, despite Huntly's involvement in coups and conspiracies against the Crown.

While Huntly's constant plottings without punishment were an outrage to the *kirk*, and of great concern to Elizabeth, it allowed James to build a counter-weight to

the more radical, Presbyterian elements within the *kirk*, as well as an example of James' leniency towards Catholics - which was intended to quell Catholic fears on the Continent and within England. James also used Huntly to oppose Francis Stewart, the earl of Bothwell, the "terror" of James' reign. From 1591-1595, James was obsessed with Bothwell, who had once tried to use witchcraft to kill his king, and who chased James throughout Scotland, at one point trapping James in his own privy. The threat from Bothwell was finally ended when Bothwell tried to ally himself with Huntly, which led to the defeat and exile of both (although a "repentant" Huntly reappeared a few years later, forgiven by James).

Out of James' recognition that he needed to be independent from any faction came the understanding that opposition to the Crown arose from three places. First, there was the threat from outside intervention, be it the Jesuits inspiring the Catholic Highlanders, or Elizabeth spurring on the Protestant lords and gentry. Then there were the two areas that could be incited to provide resistance: the *kirk* and the nobility. So for domestic tranquility, James needed to watch for instigation abroad, and agitation among the clergy and the aristocracy, at home. To achieve these goals, it would be necessary for James to remain at peace and in good standing with all nations, so as to limit support for foreign provocation.

With the threat of outside interference removed, James could then deal with his internal aggravations. For the nobility, it would involve breaking their independence, much along the lines of the successful Tudor policy in England, and encouraging a reversal of dependence.³ Throughout the early portion of James' reign in Scotland, he was dependent upon the nobility - for their cooperation with the royal agenda, for monetary support for his household, and for force to prevent uprisings. Instead, James needed to make the nobility dependent upon the Crown. Through the offering of titles

and positions, which he could easily revoke, and by intervening and forcing settlements in feuds and rivalries, James was able to harness his Scottish aristocrats. He made them realize that it was easier to work with the king (and much more profitable) than to organize against him (which ran the risk of losing one's head).

For James, gaining control over the *kirk* was much more difficult to arrange. Led by radical Presbyterians, such as Andrew Melville, the *kirk* was increasingly antagonistic toward James. But by patiently biding his time, James was able to exploit missteps by the extremists to alienate Melville's faction from the rest of the church. When one of the Melvillian radicals "called Elizabeth an atheist and all kings devil's children, and declared that 'the devil was in the court, in the guiders of the court, and in the head of the court,'" James had his opportunity.⁴

When the offending minister, David Black of St. Andrews, was ordered to appear before the king and his council, he promptly denied the king's power to judge him for his actions, since as an ambassador of God's kingdom, only the representatives of God could judge him.⁵ When members of the General Assembly of the *kirk* (who represented all the various presbyteries) decided to support Black against the king, James was able to divide the Melville's followers from the more moderate majority within the *kirk*. In doing so, James turned the incident into a demonstration for the need of greater hierarchy within the church - to prevent any further outbreaks of such scurrilous irresponsibility from the pulpit. This would eventually lead to the imposition of a diocesan episcopacy, where royally appointed bishops could maintain discipline within the ranks. By the time James left for England in 1603, he had firmed his control over the Scottish *kirk*.

The one last point that needs to be addressed from James' Scottish experiences was the development of his style of government. Beyond James' views on kingly

power and prerogative there was the actual application - how the king actually governed his kingdom. James had learned from Lennox that he was more talented than other men, so therefore, in his mind, he needed to spend less time than other men in dealing with the mundane world of running a government. To liberate himself from the ordinary, time-consuming details of day-to-day governance, James turned over responsibility to a favorite. Although this was not without its risks, as James learned with Arran. For during Arran's tenure the question had arisen, that given the earl's policies and possession of the king, whether Arran ran the government for James, or whether James was simply the instrument for Arran to run the government for himself.

Yet James felt that despite Arran's apparent power over him, it was better to have a favorite whom was totally dependent upon the king, than to depend upon one of the peers of the realm for, "he had not wished ever to advance any earl or lord, but only simple soldiers and gentlemen like the said Arran ... whom he could always ... ruin ... as easily as he had made them."⁶ This was repeated in the career of Sir John Maitland.

Maitland was of the gentry and a supporter of Mary, who had been forced to flee Scotland during Lennox's rise. He returned and offered his services to James following Arran's overthrow. Maitland's rise was part of James harnessing of the aristocracy, for James encouraged Maitland to fill important positions within the government with gentry and the lesser nobility - more men who owed less to the powerful aristocracy than to the king for their placement and position. Maitland himself bore the title Lord Chancellor, which had long been a perquisite of the greater peers, which was one of the factors that drove the earl of Bothwell into rebellion.

Because he pushed against the status quo, Maitland had few friends among the church or the nobility, and it was plainly evident that he served at the pleasure of the

king. Even then James felt he accumulated too much power through the loyalty of the new *noblesse de robe*, so when Maitland died in 1595 James refused to appoint a successor, relying instead upon a committee of Secretaries (the Octavians) to run the bureaucracy of state.

It would be from these experiences that James would base his decisions in his new kingdom, and by looking at these actions that James undertook as the young king of Scotland it is possible to see a foreshadowing of what paths James would follow in England. For in each area James was successful: he bridled the nobility, he gained control over the *kirk*, he used ministers to run his government, and he was able to keep foreign intervention to an all time low. At the same time James was able to solidify his grasp upon the English throne, while preventing the Catholic powers from building a more suitable candidate in his place. All in all, James did an amazing job, considering the dearth of resources in his native land.

Out of these rather successful campaigns emerges England's new king, a proven monarch who has tried and true strategies for dealing with any problem. The one important detail that seems to have escaped James was that what worked in Scotland might not work in England. It was an important difference, and when James did try to solve problems in his new kingdom using old solutions the outcome was invariably worse than the king expected.

The individual who should have alerted James to the differences between his old kingdom and his new one was the man most responsible for James peaceful accession, Sir Robert Cecil. Starting in early 1601, following the execution of the earl of Essex (whom James had been using to promote the Stuart succession) for treason, James was contacted secretly by Cecil, who was Elizabeth's Principal Secretary. Cecil's father was William Cecil, Lord Burghley, who had been among Elizabeth's most capable and

trusted advisors, as well as the Lord Treasurer and Secretary of State. Robert Cecil followed in his father's path, assisting him in his later years, and eventually succeeding him upon his death in 1598.

The correspondence primarily dealt with the day-to-day occurrences in both nations and what impact they might play upon English popular opinion of James as Elizabeth's successor. The context of this contact also allowed Cecil, and his chief ally, Lord Henry Howard, to feed James information that would cast the two in the best possible light, while poisoning James to their enemies, such as Sir Walter Raleigh and the earl of Northumberland. What was surprisingly lacking in the letters of Cecil and Howard was any type of instruction or guidance as to what the king would need to know about his future kingdom. The only one to give James any useful information about England was Henry Percy, the earl of Northumberland, who was already the victim of Cecil's invective and therefore whose advice most likely fell upon deaf ears.

Maurice Lee, one of the preeminent Jacobean scholars, theorized that Cecil and Howard intentionally kept James in the dark about what to expect in England. The argument being that if they left James in the proverbial "dark," they would insure their own value to James and hopefully be left to administer the king's affairs as they saw fit.⁷ This fit perfectly into James' plans, who was, "intent, not upon learning the thoughts and problems of his new kingdom, but upon his entry into his personal inheritance."⁸ Thus the two courtiers were easily able to convince James to leave most of Elizabeth's advisors and officers in place, and when he rode south in 1603, Cecil was reconfirmed as Secretary, and Henry Howard was appointed earl of Northampton and Lord Privy Seal.

By retaining the position of Secretary, Cecil remained the most powerful person, after the king, in England. The job description of Principal Secretary was an

extensive one, including the responsibility of conducting all of the civil administration for the kingdom, the maintenance of foreign relations through the various ambassadors, as well as being alert to any plots or conspiracies against the government.

Additionally, it was the role of the Secretary to be the intermediary between Parliament and the king, so it fell to Cecil to convince the House of Commons of the Government's positions, respond to any objections, and obtain James' approval of any modifications.⁹

It was a position with tremendous power, for in the various responsibilities came great opportunities for patronage, which was the key to building a political empire. Yet the role of Secretary was also onerous, and difficult in the best times, so Cecil faced a task which would have challenged the best of men, which unfortunately he was not. S.R. Gardiner makes an interesting and telling comment about Robert Cecil, "Himself without the spark of genius, he was not likely to be able to detect it in others... Other men of less ability have left their mark upon history."¹⁰ Cecil was the prototypical bureaucrat: he was hard working and unimaginative, but loyal to his king, despite the disparagement James heaped upon him. In his own unoriginal way Cecil ran England, and while his administration lacked any renowned success, it also avoided any catastrophic failures.

James appeared quite content to accept the services of Cecil. After serving under James' notoriously fickle predecessor, Cecil was accustomed to playing upon his monarch's vanity, and developed great patience for tolerating rebukes, for he was always cognizant that he served at his master's pleasure. To maintain his preeminence, Cecil was diligent in maintaining James's trust, quick to attack rivals, and would often give way to James' desires against better judgment. All of this facilitated the king's intended lifestyle, as well as following a proclivity for allowing others to govern in his

name. James simply copied the precedents of Lennox, Arran, and Maitland, and gave full reign to his "little beagle."

Yet James made the task of Cecil and his fellow councilors much more difficult by the "nervous and perpetual wanderings of this peripatetic Prince."¹¹ As the king was partial to journeying from estate to estate, to enjoy the country air and to hunt, Cecil was forced to run the government from London, using the post and special couriers to maintain contact with the king. Letters from his councillors would arrive daily and the king would dictate the necessary responses to secretaries. Even the king's greatest critics admit that James demonstrated great shrewdness and ability, as well as, "his capacity to grasp a situation swiftly and to reach a prompt decision, traits without which government by correspondence would have broken down at once."¹² It was not the most efficient way to run a nation, yet James and Cecil were able to make it work.

Of all the tasks assigned to him, there was only one area where Cecil was unsuccessful, and where his short-comings as an administrator were most notable, and that was in the realm of finance.

In the early seventeenth century, monarchies were expected to follow the mediaeval concept that kings lived off the income of their own estates. For James, in 1603, this amounted to £88,000.¹³ From his predecessors, he was also entitled to collect a Paliament-approved list of customs duties, which varied from year to year depending upon the economy and the efficiency of the collectors. Out of this total of £247,000 in 1603, Cecil and Lord Treasurer Thomas Sackville, earl of Dorset, were expected to pay all of the expenses of the royal household, provide for the upkeep of the Royal Army and Navy, and to maintain agents and ambassadors throughout Europe. Additionally, after years of penury in Scotland, James wanted to enjoy the "richness" of England by living in a relatively extravagant manner and by being free with presents

and annuities to those who pleased him. So he continued to spend as he saw fit, forcing Cecil and Dorset to somehow cover the expenditures.

Even the frugal Elizabeth was unable to avoid deficits, leaving James some £400,000 in debt (most of which was from the war with Spain) as well as having sold off £372,000 worth of Crown lands between 1598-1603. After fifteen years of rather inconclusive conflict with Catholic Spain and decades of tremendous inflation neither Parliament nor the cities were enthusiastic about granting new subsidies, which forced Elizabeth to sell off portions of the royal demesne to simply get by. With the accession of James, and the prospect of peace with Spain, it was hoped by all that there would be a return to "normalcy," which would obviously include the new king living within his means.

As a result, it was quickly apparent to Cecil that Parliament was not about to solve the budget crisis by providing additional revenue. With little assistance coming from James, as far as the reduction of spending, and small hope of Parliamentary rescue, it fell upon Cecil to devise ways to meet the shortfall. While it was Dorset's direct responsibility to cover the shortage of funds, it fell upon the Privy Council and the Principal Secretary (Cecil) to insure that the government remained solvent. Therefore Cecil asserted as much power financially as Dorset.

Before the first session of Parliament in 1604, the Privy Council revealed the first of its "solutions" for raising royal revenue, the Great Farm of Customs. By selling the right to appropriate customs to business men for a fixed rent, James was provided a stable source of income. Despite widespread opposition, Cecil strongly supported customs farming for a number of reasons. The greatest of these was simple efficiency. Economic historian Robert Ashton points out that Cecil and Dorset were faced with a paradox, namely that James did not have the financial ability to enact

needed administrative reforms that would enable the Crown to efficiently collect tariffs and duties. Since there was little money in the treasury to pay customs officials sufficiently, any duties gathered suffered from "peculation."¹⁴ It was far easier for Dorset to calculate the estimated net worth of the expected customs and receive that as rent from the farming corporations, who had the impetus and capital needed to reform the system so that it would remain profitable.

A secondary benefit of the Great Farm was the creation of these numerous corporations which just happened to be cash rich and obliged to maintain the good will of their sovereign (and more importantly his Lord Treasurer and Principal Secretary). It was to the customs farmers that Cecil turned most often for loans to keep the government running, since they could not say no and expect to retain their contract. Even after providing notes for the Crown, there was still profit in customs farming, so much so that Cecil, at several points, actually raised the rents due the king during the middle of the contracts, which once again were impossible to refuse.

While the Great Farm stabilized customs income and provided sources for loans, it was not enough. James was still spending much more than he could bring in from the rent of royal lands, customs farming, and wardships. Cecil began to look for alternative sources of revenue, and proposed to James the trading of certain royal prerogatives to Parliament for a steady stipend, to which the king agreed to, and which became embodied in proposals that were defeated in 1604 and 1610 (see below).

By 1607, it was apparent to Cecil that there was a great need to find something different, for despite a relatively generous Parliament in 1606, which granted the king £453,000 over four years, James' annual deficits continued to climb. Fortunately for Cecil, the Crown was given a new means of raising monies by the Court of the Exchequer - impositions. Impositions were customs duties over and above the rates set

by Parliament, which were "imposed" as a means of regulating trade, not for raising income. But in 1607 a merchant challenged the practice, claiming it was a form of revenue. The courts ruled instead that since foreign trade was regulated by prerogative, and impositions were part of those regulations, the king was free to levy the duties without Parliamentary assent.¹⁵ As soon as Cecil was named Lord Treasurer, following Dorset's death in 1608, he used the decision to place new impositions on all manner of goods, hoping to produce £60,000 in much needed annual revenue.

There was an immediate reaction against Cecil's policy by Parliament, as well as by the merchant community. Some members of Parliament feared that if the king could arbitrarily raise income, then what need would he have in calling Parliament? Yet Cecil tried to assuage all concerned parties that his actions were indeed to regulate trade, so therefore perfectly legal, and in no way harmful to the power of Parliament. Cecil's arguments convinced no one except the king, who became enamored with the idea of a new form of revenue based on prerogative, not on Parliamentary generosity. To quell the protests, Cecil began to offer up other parts of royal prerogative which were almost as unpopular as the impositions, but which generated less income for the Crown. This trading would become the basis of Cecil's failed Great Contract in 1610.

The effort in 1610 to provide James with a normal income was Cecil's last serious attempt at reforming the state of the royal finances. By 1608, Cecil had realized that James would tolerate no infringement of what he thought of as kingly rights, including the ability to spend as he thought fit.¹⁶ While James frequently promised to be more responsible financially, he would quickly lapse into old habits, claiming that any and all expenses were either necessary or prerogative, or both.¹⁷ To meet the king's expenditures, Cecil assembled the Great Contract, which entailed James

trading prerogative for income. In return for the annual receipt of £200,000, the king would abandon the practice of purveyance (where royal food purveyors could buy for less than market price) and relinquish Crown control of wardships. Additionally, the king was to receive £600,000 for the release of debts owed to the Crown for the reigns of Henry VII to Mary.¹⁸ None of this was novel, as a similar proposal had been offered in 1604, but had been sidetracked by other issues. Yet in 1610, the Contract appeared to have solid support in the Commons, and its passage would have been a great success for Cecil. Unfortunately for Cecil and James, it failed.

The fate of the Great Contract will be discussed in greater detail below, but its failure brought about more than fiscal restraints, it marked the end for Cecil. With the dissolution of Parliament in January, 1611, it became apparent that Cecil had overextended himself. The king blamed his "little beagle" for the rupture between himself and the House of Commons, and James was encouraged in that belief by an array of anti-Cecil/ anti-Howard foes. Led by Sir Robert Carr, Viscount Rochester and the king's newest favorite, a coalition was formed to oppose the power that Cecil and the Howards wielded.

Immediately following the fiasco of 1610, Cecil found his influence in decline, usurped by Carr, who was awarded the peerage in 1611 and a spot in the Privy Council in 1612. Already in poor health and now discredited, Cecil was able to gain a Forced Loan from the city of London in 1611 (for £116,000) which was only a stop-gap measure, and no solution to the worsening crisis. The last idea generated by Cecil was the sale of titles. The position of baronet was created solely for the purpose of the sale. The only problem with the plan was that the titles flooded the market and forced the price down. After the institution of the sale Cecil quietly wasted away until his death in 1612.

With Cecil's departure James entered a new period of rule. Having soured on Cecil and his ability towards the end, James did not rush to replace him with another first minister. Instead, James left the positions of Secretary and Lord Treasurer open, nominally taking the duties upon himself, but more often than not, the king farmed out specific tasks to members of the Privy Council. This was a dramatic shift, for the government went from being run by a single administrator to an often haphazard assortment of Councilors, whose portfolios changed with their popularity. This change in the style of governing was also visible with a transformation of the Privy Council itself.

Prior to the failure of the Great Contract, Cecil chaired the council meetings. There was a defined hierarchy with Cecil at the top, surrounded by Henry Howard and his family. When Cecil died James intentionally left a vacuum at the top, allowing the council to divide into two factions, one centered around Lord Henry, the other around Carr, with neither in ascendance. As a result, any guidance given to the king by one party was opposed by the other. Given James predilection towards ignoring the more mundane affairs of state (such as the plight of the Exchequer), and unwillingness to designate anyone to succeed Cecil, the government of England fell into a period of "political drift."¹⁹

It was during this time frame, from 1612-1618, that James' financial situation went from bleak to absolutely desperate. Lacking anyone to press for fiscal restraint as Cecil did, and being encouraged by both camps of the Privy Council to be generous to their followers, James' expenditures began to climb dramatically. By 1614, the king's ordinary expenses surpassed £522,000, while his income had increased by less than £30,000 from additional impositions and a renegotiated Great Farm.²⁰ In response to

the crisis James was forced to appoint Theophilus (Thomas) Howard, earl of Suffolk, as Lord Treasurer.

Unfortunately for James, Suffolk had less skill than Cecil and half the integrity. At no time did the new Lord Treasurer emphasize debt reduction, rather he relied upon the sale of royal lands and the pressuring of lenders to extend the Crown new loans or find that the old notes would be simply "put aside."²¹ Suffolk was also known to profit personally from his position. As he was responsible for deciding which loans might be repaid and when, it became commonplace for lenders to "encourage" Suffolk to prioritize the loan portfolio in their favor.²² It was in response to business practices such as that, along with the recurring insinuations about his loyalty to the Church of England, that forced Suffolk to resign in disgrace in 1618.

The key point to keep in mind was that as financially strapped as James was under Cecil, the situation went from bad to worse after his death. This forced the king to call a Parliament in 1614 for the sole purpose of issuing funds, which he did not get. Until the second treasury commission of 1619, and the arrival of Lionel Cranfield, James would be plagued by insolvency, which would consequently hinder the ability of James to respond to events on the Continent, as well as pose a continuous point of friction between king and Parliament.

Finances would become the central issue between Crown and Commons, and every time James' ministers would find a way to circumvent the power of Parliament the ante would be raised a notch higher. As the king got deeper and deeper in debt, the generosity of the English people became smaller and smaller. It was the start of a never-ending spiral that, lacking any major reforms, would lead to the tragic divisions of 1640.

ii. James and the English Parliament

The make-up of the House of Commons in the early seventeenth century has been written about extensively, with traditional English historiography describing the evolution of the "modern" Commons from the simple instrument of Henry VIII to the executor of Charles I. Even though a haze has been cast upon the period by the dissension between Revisionists and post-Revisionists, it is generally accepted that Parliament, the House of Commons in particular, had begun to assert itself in the reign of Elizabeth. Good Queen Bess was forced to cajole, threaten, and even rant at Parliament at times, in an endless struggle that lasted her entire reign. Throughout that period, Parliament grew in stature, being contested less and less as a partner in the governance of England, and developing a sense of self as a "Parliamentarian" class.

These men were aggressive in the assertion of their rights and privileges, both as legislators and Englishmen. Generally, as the stereotype goes, they were the newly wealthy country gentry, who had profited from the dissolution of the monasteries and the general decline of the nobility under Elizabeth (who had refused to expand the aristocratic ranks, despite their dwindling numbers through both natural and royal attrition). Marxist historians, such as Christopher Hill, point to this period as the great expansion of the bourgeoisie, where these new "capitalists" began to replace the feudal aristocracy as the source of power. Above all, the parliamentarians expected to be treated with respect. When Elizabeth tried to manipulate Parliament, she had been subtle, granting the occasional concession to gain what she believed necessary. This changed with James.

In Scotland, the Parliament had been the proverbial "rubber stamp" for James' desires, as opposition had come primarily from the rebellious northern lords and from the *Kirk*. James became accustomed to using his Scottish Parliament to shore up his

actions against the frequent uprisings in both the pulpit and the Highlands. James was unprepared for the reverse being true in England, where the English Church was biddable and the aristocracy depended upon the king for maintenance and advancement, but where Parliament felt obliged to debate the merits of any and all royal initiatives.

It was obvious, according to the traditional "Whig" view, that a conflict between king and Commons was, if not inevitable, more than likely; and what was amazing was that the English government actually functioned under James at all. Time and time again, James was faced with a seventeenth-century version of "gridlock," as Parliament questioned the use of allocated funds, which the king viewed as royal prerogative. An example would be one of the most controversial issues: James' gifts of stipends and rewards to his favorites, which many historians have descried as symptomatic of the financial chaos of James' reign. This practice was fervently defended by both the king and Salisbury, as illustrated by Cecil's speech to Parliament in 1610, where the charge that the "Kinge gives much," is answered, "He gives *de proprio*, and bounty is an essentiall vertue of the Kinge."²³ What was most surprising about that dialogue was the fact that the Parliamentarians conceded the point! Similarly, on another occasion, when the king's Privy Council remonstrated to James about the need for greater economy, they took care to emphasize that:

... they do not wish the King to live with Clean handes, Considering that the greatest and wisest princes have and more maintaine their peoples Love and services by such courses... Liberality to well deserving Subjectes doe multiply and Confirme affection and duty to Princes.²⁴

It was accepted as the norm for seventeenth-century monarches to bestow gifts for services rendered.

This follows the logic which has become more evident through the re-examination of the Stuart period, by Revisionist and post-Revisionist historians alike, that the great confrontation between James and the House of Commons was, in reality, very different than it has been portrayed in the past by the likes of D.H. Willson or Wallace Notestein. While there were legitimate concerns about absolutism, such as those generated with Richard Knolles translation of Jean Bodin's *Six livres de la Republique* in 1606, a careful reading of contemporary sources show that in most situations, king and Parliament worked together in attempts to solve their differences.²⁵

What the evidence does demonstrate is that members in the House of Commons prized consensus with the king, and that they were ready to scorn those members whom Sir Thomas Wentworth described as, "the distempered heads ... [who] have of late very far endeavored to divide."²⁶ In fact, the debate over royal finance was not focused solely on the willingness of Parliament to grant subsidies, but was also centered around what was the most effective way of keeping the king out of bankruptcy.

James had two choices to become fiscally sound. The first was to increase revenue, which the king and Cecil unsuccessfully tried. The second was to cut back on his expenses, which was improbable given James' temperament. In the king's favor, historian G.L. Harriss points out that disputes over royal extravagance and the necessity of Parliament to financially support the king raised no new constitutional principles. Nor did they incite any more damaging disagreements than the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had witnessed.²⁷ Unfortunately for James, that did not mean that the House of Commons was overjoyed at the prospect of granting relief to their overindulgent monarch based upon the precedent of the embattled Yorks and Lancasters

who followed Edward III. Never the less, all parties recognized that royal insolvency would bode ill for the nation at-large.²⁸ A member of the 1628 Parliament warned that if, "monarches wanted the absolute love of their subjects, they should stay out of necessity."²⁹ And there was a great deal of advice given by both legislators and Privy Councilors alike on how the king might reduce his expenditures, which was largely ignored by James.³⁰

While the members of the House of Commons debated the merits of the various ways to resolve the king's financial crisis, the debts continued to pile up, with incessant increases in both the principal and interest owed. One of the fundamental problems that James faced was not of his making - a simple shortfall of "ordinary" revenue. Even with the strictest economy (which James would never have tolerated), the "ordinary" expenses would have exceeded "ordinary" revenue by some £27,000 in 1603 alone.³¹ It must be remembered that, unlike Elizabeth, James was married and had a family. In addition, Elizabeth had left a substantial deficit, a result of "extraordinary" expenses such as the Spanish war, involvement in Ireland, and Elizabeth's own funeral costs, which had not been fully covered by the little "extraordinary" income actually granted by subsidies. Elizabeth was also guilty of selling-off portions of the royal demesne, which would affect the ordinary revenue available to James. Yet these extenuating factors aside, the main blame for the desperate financial situation necessarily falls upon James and his Court. By 1610, James's spending was double his annual "ordinary" income. To cover these liabilities, the crown was forced to establish the pattern of short-term deficit finance and customs impositions implemented by Cecil.

Part of the effort to support such improvidence was the bridging of the difference between spending and income. This entailed the securing of as much money

through loans as possible to cover immediate expenses, while pledging future revenue as collateral, with any differences being covered by leaving some bills unpaid. The next step was managing this continually increasing royal debt, which forced the Jacobean Lord Treasurers (in succession : Dorset, Salisbury, Suffolk, Mandeville, and Cranfield) to resort to borrowing more money to cover loans that had come due, and by pressuring lenders to turn short term notes into long term ones. The net result was the placing of the royal finances into an increasingly perilous situation, as those who would actually lend to the crown were able to demand exorbitant interest rates, while many others simply demurred. By 1618, the debt had reached £ 900,000.

In effect, James was on the brink of bankruptcy, and in order to gain a measure of liquidity, James was forced to grant concessions at less than market values (such as the Great Farm of Customs), impose constitutionally-questionable tariffs (the impositions) and to sell off portions of the royal demesne, all of which then reduced the amount of ordinary income available to the crown.³² It would fall to Parliament to bail out James.

While the House of Commons might agree on the precedent, it was seen as a dubious practice at best to simply give James money. The legislators had given Elizabeth little enough money during the Spanish war, and were not likely to grant a generous supply to a king whose destitution was due to a shortage in covering "ordinary" expenses. Sir Edward Coke told the Commons in 1625 that, "Ordinary charges the Kinge should beare alone: but *ubi commune periculum, commune auxilium* [but where there is a common danger, common help]. In extraordinary he may require releife."³³ Instead, Coke proposed "acts of resumption," which would re-establish an inalienable royal demesne, so that the king might once again be able to live 'within his means.' In return, the king would have to forsake the practice of impositions, which

was the crown's only reliable source of income - through additional customs farming. Thus it was that the mediaeval concept that the entire government must be run off the monarch's personal resources was difficult to dispel and discredit, despite visible evidence from the Continent in multiple Spanish bankruptcies.

As discussed above, the central conflict between the House of Commons and their monarch (which would last throughout James' reign) revolved around the issue of finance. By 1604, the English people had been forced to pay subsidies and taxes for sixteen years of war with Spain. The Commons, while unhappy with the warmth of James' relations with the Spanish, were inclined to accept peace for fiscal reasons alone. Yet James recognized that he needed additional subsidies to pay off his inherited debt and to meet the outlay of "ordinary" household expenses (versus the "extraordinary" costs of war). Under the English constitution, Parliament controlled the power of taxation, so James was forced to deal with the assembly to get the money he needed to pay off his debts.

In James' first parliament in 1604, Cecil made the first attempt to trade some of the royal prerogatives (such as wardships and purveyance) for a set annual income. While attractive to many in both the upper and lower chambers, the offer died without fanfare due to two other issues: the union of England and Scotland and the question of dissent within the Church of England.

Of all the concerns of a monarch in early modern Europe, the greatest, by far, was the peaceful succession of the throne to a designated heir, preferably male, and of one's own line. For James I, this was no exception. James was an outsider, a foreigner, a Scot, and that fact did not escape notice. His first goal upon arriving in his new kingdom was to establish an official union between the nations whose crowns

he wore, to ease some of the tensions between the two ancient foes, and to firmly establish the Stuart line as master of both.

The Union was among James' highest priorities - to gain equality for his native countrymen within the new nation that he ruled. Yet James faced stiff opposition, and the measure was defeated, due to age-old animosity between England and Scotland. The English feared an unstoppable wave of immigrants from the north, who would receive patronage from the king, and who would displace their "betters" at Court.³⁴ In an attempt to gain more support for the Union, James had Cecil drop any requests for subsidies, hoping that this would swing some members of the Commons over to his side.

Amid the struggle on the issue of the Union, James was faced with an unexpected confrontation over the Church of England. As the participants became increasingly polarized, settlement appeared less likely, and discord between the legislature and the king intensified. Ironically, James had attempted to settle the problem through Parliament - a "reformation by degrees"- but saw his efforts scuttled from a surprising direction. This was not the result of radical Puritans or outlaw Catholics, or even the king's own intransigence, but the work of the Church itself, most notably Archbishop Bancroft.³⁵ At the Hampton Court Conference (1604), James had assigned the bishops the task of enforcing uniformity within the Church of England, the most obvious targets being several outspoken Puritan ministers. Upon elevation to archbishop, Bancroft pursued his mission with a vengeance, removing any clergy who refused to conform with the rules established by the episcopacy.

The second session of James' first Parliament was to have opened 5 November 1605. It was also on that day that Catholic plotters planned to seize control of England by detonating a bomb underneath the convocation, which would have killed the king

and all the members of Parliament assembled. In the ensuing months, all of England was caught up in the trial and execution of the conspirators. Initially Parliament acted with an air of calmness and restraint, but reconvening in January, 1606, the House of Commons quickly ordered that the "5th of November be set apart as a day of Thanksgiving."³⁶

In the months that followed, Parliament passed a series of new recusancy laws, which increased the persecution of Catholics in England. The most famous of these was the Oath of Allegiance, where English Catholics had to renounce the pope's power to depose a monarch. In February, 1606, with Parliament still amazed at their deliverance from treachery, Cecil brought forward a proposal of royal supply. Led by Sir Francis Bacon, who was campaigning for the vacant office Solicitor-General, the Commons approved three subsidies and six fifteenths and tenths, which would provide the king £453,000 over four years.

As happy as James was over receiving the much needed grants, he was frustrated that the session ended (May, 1606) without ever discussing the proposed Union. The money was necessary to run the government, but the king believed that only the Union would insure the prosperity of his dynasty. James' obvious impatience over the issue was met by a vague promise by members of the Lower House that the question would be discussed the following winter. While not the overwhelming success that James had hoped for, he had gained breathing room from his mounting creditors, and had rising hope that the next session would be even more productive.

As positively as the second session of James' first Parliament had gone, the third was bound to disappoint the king, because the Union was not seen by the English as the universally beneficial goal that their monarch proclaimed. From the beginning there was opposition to the implementation of universal naturalization among the

citizens of both nations. At stake for the English was the possibility of James appointing Scotsmen as the principal officers of state. Also at risk, from the English view, was the influx of Scottish goods and merchants into the already competitive London market. During one discussion, an irate member of the Commons stood up and proclaimed that,

As all Scots are beggars, rebels, and traitors, and that there has not been a single King of Scotland who has not been murdered by his subjects, it is as reasonable to unite Scotland and England as it would be to place a prisoner at the bar upon an equal footing with a judge upon the bench.³⁷

Therefore it should come as no surprise that when the Commons decided to vote on the Union, the topics of commerce regulation and naturalization were held over for another time, which effectively tabled the bulk of the issue for that Parliament.

The Commons also began to attack James' foreign policy with Spain, citing the plight of English merchantmen being wrongly impounded by the Spanish fleet. For James, enough was enough, and he had Parliament prorogued until the following November. When the House of Commons still refused to consider what James saw as an inevitable and natural step, he prorogued Parliament indefinitely.

S.R. Gardiner writes in his history of England that this was the critical juncture in the relationship between James and Parliament, saying, "Every attempt to move forward in such a way is accompanied by some amount of friction, and there had already been too much friction in the relations between James and the House of Commons."³⁸ This was echoed by Parliamentary historian R.C. Munden, who points out that the initial breach in trust between king and Commons occurred in 1607-1608, when the House of Commons killed the proposed Union.³⁹

It has been stated earlier that the problems between James and Parliament arose because of James' money troubles - it did. The Commons was frustrated with James' inability to live within his means. But, until 1607-1608, while there were definite differences of opinion, the government and the assembly functioned together. With the defeat of the Union, James no longer saw the Commons as a friend that occasionally needed to be convinced which route to the same goal was better. Instead, the Commons became a force that continued to oppose the royal will; an opponent that had to be nullified in order for the government's initiatives to succeed.

The members of Parliament saw the abandonment of the Union as a way to forestall a massive influx of Scots that was universally unpopular in England. It was not intended as an act of resistance; but James, with his inability to accept a more conservative compromise that the House of Commons offered, and incessant complaining about the slowness of Parliament's deliberations on the implementation plan, made it very easy for the Commons to say no. Once the legislators had spurned the king, the Rubicon, as they say, had been crossed, and James was less likely to heed their advice or to be pushed any further to gain their cooperation.

With the breach made, James had no desire to summon another Parliament. Unfortunately, he did not have a choice. With the Treasury empty, Cecil convinced James that reforms were needed to cover the annual shortfall of funds, and that the only way to address this was by summoning Parliament. Thus the fourth session of James' first Parliament was called in early 1610. At the outset, Cecil made clear that the primary mission of this term was a solution to the king's financial difficulties. After letting the House of Commons discuss the problem for few days, Cecil presented his answer, The Great Contract.

Initially, Cecil received a fair amount of support from both James and the Commons for this program, but as the session wore on, difficulties began to crop up. First, Parliament wanted the king to redress certain grievances, such as feudal tenures, before they would discuss the topic of support. When James acceded, the House of Commons promptly offered half what Cecil had originally asked for, which was refused by the government. With the proposal on the verge of defeat, it was withdrawn, but the Commons was not yet finished with their deliberations on royal finance, and they turned to the subject of impositions. After some posturing, James retreated, and allowed the Commons to openly debate the practice of impositions. In return, the lower chamber offered to reconsider Cecil's contract.

The deliberations were staid contests which witnessed involved legal arguments on the precedent of impositions. The outcome of the disputation was moot, since almost no member of the House of Commons would concede to the king the right to tax without their approval. When the discussions were complete James took the matter under consideration. He responded with a compromise, offering to accept a bill that would prohibit the monarchy from imposing new tariffs without Parliamentary assent. In return, Parliament would concede the current duties and not contest the right of impositions to exist through prerogative.

It appeared that a solution had been reached, and that the Great Contract was agreed upon. Then everything changed. A last pair of grievances were brought forward by members of the Commons concerning religion. The first was the reinstatement of the Puritan clergy who had been dispossessed for refusal to comply with the doctrines and practices of the Church of England. The second, not stated, but implied, was against any canons of the church not approved by Parliament.⁴⁰

This was too much for James. On Cecil's prodding he had been patient and flexible with the Commons endless list of grievances, but to have Parliament question the king's control over the church was the final straw. James refused to give in. Additionally, several opponents of Cecil, led by Robert Carr, took this opportunity to poison James to the whole concept of the Contract. They questioned whether it was kingly for James to "haggle with his subjects like a merchant."⁴¹ Then, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Julius Caesar, warned James that the income under the Contract would not be sufficient in the face of inflation. As a result the Contract died and James, believing that Parliament was not to be trusted and that they would continue to demand more and more of his God-given powers, ordered that Parliament was to be dissolved.

It would be four years until James called another Parliament, when occasioned by the dire need to gain new subsidies. The decision was not supported by all within the government, as Henry Howard, earl of Northampton, feared that the gathering of a Parliament would unite the forces which opposed the Crown. Since James had no intention of backing down to the demands of 1610, Lord Henry accurately foretold the failure that was to come. Yet James required funds, and the action was encouraged by Carr, the newly made earl of Somerset, who believed that the "right" people could successfully manage Parliament to the king's benefit.⁴² The result was the infamous "Addled Parliament" of 1614.

From the beginning, things did not go as Somerset had planned. The government's campaign to produce a Parliament that would be sympathetic to the king brought instead accusations of political skullduggery, which produced a House of Commons that was immediately hostile and suspicious towards the Court and Crown.

In an attempt to pacify the Commons, James chose Sir Ralph Winwood as Secretary, whose job it would be to represent the government's opinion to the gathering assembly.

Winwood was an ardent Protestant, with close ties to those who supported the Puritan ministers, but was otherwise a poor choice. As an ambassador, Winwood had spent most of James' reign abroad in France and the Netherlands, so he was out of touch with popular sentiments. He had also no experience in Parliament, or in the machinations of the Privy Council, and it was up to him to convince the Lower House to satisfy the king's needs without giving in to any of the concessions that the legislators would demand.

When the inexperienced Winwood brought up supply as the first issue, he was greeted with demands to re-examine the practice of impositions and the ecclesiastic grievances from 1610. The Commons quickly asserted the positions of that earlier session and asked that the House of Lords confer with them, so that all of Parliament might act in concert to gain the king's acquiescence. When the Lords refused, a bitter rift was formed between the two branches, forcing James to dissolve Parliament. In the two months that they had met, no bills had received the Royal Assent, and James gained no reprieve from his mounting debts. Nor would he. After the fiasco of 1614, it would be seven years before James would again summon a Parliament. It would be a long seven years.

It was apparent after the failure of the Great Contract in 1610 that dramatic changes were going to be necessary if the English monarchy was going to stay solvent. None were forthcoming. Instead of addressing the crisis, James ignored it. Without Cecil to admonish him otherwise, James was able to disregard the state of the Exchequer and occupy himself with the three areas that appeared more suited to his

temperament: the hunt, religion, and foreign affairs. Cecil's departure also initiated something new, the placement of favorites within the government.

Until 1610, Cecil had been able to keep James' pretty, young boys, such as John Digby and James Hay out of the limelight. Yet with Cecil's decline also went his ability to prevent James' from flaunting his "toys," leading to the rapid rise of a pair of favorites, Robert Carr and George Villiers. Both of these men would have an impact upon James and the decisions that he would make from 1612-1618.

iii. The Personalities

There is the necessity, when exploring the career of James I, to account for the people and personalities that surrounded the king, especially those that played a critical role in the decisions of state. Each of these men had an impact upon James, although through different roles. Both Cecil and Maitland were trusted advisors, upon whom James depended to keep the machinery of government moving. The dukes of Lennox and Buckingham, as well as the earl of Somerset, were different in that their looks and affection towards the king was more important than any competence. The ability of these men to affect the actions of their sovereign were as fluid as James' mercurial temperament, and has affected how posterity has viewed the first Stuart monarch of England. Each had a different relationship with the king, some professional, some with homosexual undertones, yet all of them were forces in the development of England's foreign and domestic policies.⁴³

The basis for James attachment to his "favorites" was from the king's early years in Scotland. The result of growing up without a family or any sort of love or warmth, James was vulnerable to the affection and approval that these men offered. When Esme Stuart appeared in Scotland, he was the answer to young James' prayers.

Lennox was the first person to whom James could bestow the familial love that was repressed within him. In return, Lennox showed James how to rule and how to enjoy being king. When Lennox was stripped away from James it only served to emphasize how alone the king actually was, which led him to search for a substitute, someone new with whom he could share his life.

Immediately after freeing himself from the Ruthven Raiders, James came under the sway of James Stewart, the earl of Arran. Arran was dashing and bold, and quickly began to assert control over the king, yet James' relationship with Arran lacked any of the joyous boyhood affection that so marked the king's behavior with Lennox. When Arran was overthrown in 1585, James showed little regret, appearing ready to rule on his own.

This was an important difference between the early favorites and the ones at the end of his career. Lennox arrived when James was thirteen. Although technically king, James was unable to actually rule Scotland, so it was necessary to find a regent or favorite to rule in the king's name. This was the role that both Lennox and Arran fulfilled. When Somerset and, then later, Buckingham, made their appearances James was a reigning monarch, capable of ruling on his own. That is why Maurice Lee goes to such length to make the distinction between the likes of Lennox (and Arran) and the pretty, young men that James expresses such fondness for later in his career.⁴⁴

Separating the periods of rule by favorite, James found the use of a chief minister to be expedient. Both Maitland and Cecil shared a great deal in common, as they faithfully handled all the king's more onerous tasks, ran the government, and freed James to devote time to his passions. They were also able to insure that James' flames remained apolitical, away from the halls of power where they might endanger the power of the first minister or the reputation of the king. The greatest difference

betwixt the two was that when Maitland died, James assumed the reigns of government in his own hands, while at Cecil's death, Somerset was already on the Privy Council, his prestige and power on the rise. Though this had as much to do with party politics as any intention of James.

Somerset's rise was orchestrated by a faction that saw an opportunity to loosen Cecil's stranglehold on patronage. Led by Sir Thomas Overbury, the group perceived that by providing Somerset with good advice they might ride his coattails into the upper reaches of the government. When James lost faith in Cecil following the failure of the Great Contract, the trap was sprung, and James was suddenly faced with a divided Council, as the supporters of Somerset (which included Overbury, Sir Ralph Winwood, and Lord William Herbert, earl of Pembroke) challenged Cecil and the Howards for control of the government. With Cecil's death, a scramble arose for his offices, causing James to decide to leave them vacant. Therefore, as the result of the squabbling of his advisors, James went without a Secretary or a Lord Treasurer!

The situation changed when Somerset switched sides. In 1614 Somerset married into the Howard clan, by wedding the earl of Essex's wife, Frances Howard. The grounds for the divorce between Essex and his wife were contrived, but James approved of the scheme as a way to neutralize the split of the Privy Council. Unfortunately for Somerset, the same act that epitomized his peak was the grounds of his downfall, for his former handlers were outraged that their protege would desert them, and when Sir Thomas Overbury threatened Frances Howard with exposure, he was murdered. By 1616, Robert Carr was sentenced to die, his life eventually spared by the king, despite the fact that Carr had tried to blackmail James after his indictment.

In the intervening years, Somerset played a large role in James's governing of England, including convincing the king that calling a Parliament in 1614 was a good

idea. For his role in that debacle, Somerset was promoted to Lord Chamberlain and Lord Privy Seal, while his father-in-law, the earl of Suffolk, was appointed Lord Treasurer. The change in faction also changed Somerset's politics, as he reversed his initial anti-Spanish attitude and adopted the strong pro-Spanish policy of his Howard in-laws. It was this change, and the disgruntlement of the earl of Pembroke, that led to the investigation of Overbury's murder, and Somerset's disgrace.

As Somerset was relishing his arrival at the peak, his replacement had already caught James' eye. Once again the wheels of faction politics would move to gain advantage of a weakness of James, as Pembroke, Winwood, and the Archbishop of Canterbury, George Abbot pushed young George Villiers towards the king. Where Carr was arrogant and shallow, Villiers was charming and humorous. So when Winwood presented James with evidence of Carr's involvement in the murder, Villiers was able to swiftly step into still warm footsteps. By 1616 Villiers was, in succession, Master of the Horse, a Knight of the Garter, and then a viscount. In January, 1617 he became an earl and a member of the Privy Councils of both England and Scotland.

In the process, Villiers became indispensable to James, as he took over various responsibilities, such as carrying on correspondence with England's ambassadors and conveying official messages to foreign ambassadors in London. Even though he owed his initial success to the anti-Spanish faction, and was instrumental in destroying the political might of the Howards, Villiers remained on open terms with Gondomar. It must be accounted that, more than anything else, Villiers was a servant of the king. If the king liked Gondomar, then Villiers liked Gondomar. As Villiers acquired rank and titles on his way to becoming the duke of Buckingham, he was always conscious that James had made him, and could just as easily break him. Of course the example of Carr was there to remind him, in case he forgot.

One thing that history cannot fault Buckingham on was the diligence to which he attended to his duties. He handled all the work that James handed down, and unlike Cecil, was unafraid to appoint qualified ministers to government posts, provided they remained loyal to the favorite. The best example would be Lionel Cranfield, who reorganized the financial morass of the navy, and would eventually become James' Lord Treasurer. Buckingham's efforts enabled James to survive the worst penury of his reign, and in more ways than one, he was the replacement to Esme Stuart that the king had always wanted.⁴⁵ In addition, Buckingham befriended the young prince, Charles, and was almost accepted as one of the family by the queen.

As positive as all of this had been, the duke possessed a flaw. Buckingham's weakness was in his judgment, such as his involvement with Charles in their escapade to entice the Infanta of Spain into marriage. It was a half-baked scheme that was destined for failure and which ignored the geo-religio-politics at stake. Then, with his pride hurt, Buckingham convinced Charles that England needed to go to war with Spain, which drove James to the verge of apoplexy. Buckingham had gone from the executor of the king's policy to the initiator of his own, wherein lied his demise.

Of all his favorites, two had the greatest impact upon English affairs: Cecil and Buckingham. One was the drab hunchback who quietly ran England for eight years, the other a bold and beautiful youth who captivated his lord's attention and love. Both tried to serve their master to the best of their abilities, and in the end, both failed him. Cecil failed to find a workable solution to James financial disarray, while Buckingham would lead James' son into a foolish war and lay the groundwork for what would happen in 1640.

In the end, the job of favorite, while lucrative for a time, was a sure path to a miserable end. All of James' favorites ended their lives in discredit, disgrace, or in

exile. It was the nature of the beast. If one person received the bulk of the king's attention, than there were bound to be others who wished to supplant him. There was the rise of Carr as a tool against Cecil, and then the rise of Villiers to defeat Carr.

History has judged James a poor king, with one of the main criteria being his dependence upon favorites. Yet Buckingham, who has gotten the foulest press, probably was James' best minister. That is not saying much, but who else was the king to turn to? Was he to run the entire government by himself? No, of course not, and while James may be blamed for doing too little, there really was not anyone in England on the level of a Richelieu or Olivares to pick from.

What can be brought from this discussion of James' domestic policy is that James was going to have great difficulty affecting a foreign policy. This can be drawn from a simple tally of the ledger sheets - James was broke. The reasons behind the Crown's impoverishment are what tie this chapter together. Everything begins with James' experience in Scotland.

As a result of the *kirk*'s constant criticism of the young king, and the push by Knox and Melville to create a Scottish version of Geneva, it was no wonder that James grew to hate and fear Presbyterianism. This in turn fueled the king's belief in an absolute monarchy. After being the victim of six coups, and periods of varying captivity, James had little trust in the nobility. Against the lords and the ministers James was able to use the Scottish Parliament as a bludgeon.

All of this boded ill for the English Parliament, which was supportive of ardent Calvinism, and beginning to expect that it would have a say in the making of policy as a partner to the king. This was the same Parliament that failed to provide Elizabeth with enough funds to wage a war of self-defense. There were expectations in England of a new Solomon, who would wisely rule as the head of the Pan-Protestant movement.

Raised in relative destitution, James dreamt of the day when he would triumphantly enter into England, to live a life of luxury and ease amid the riches of that great nation south of the Tweed. For already he had been king for thirty-six years, and there was little to governing that he did not know, so it would only take a little of his time (and brilliance) to administer a nation such as England, leaving plenty of time for games and merriment.

Yet within his new land there were those who had already begun plotting. Some, as will be discussed in the next chapter, opposed James on religious grounds. Others saw the new king as an opportunity for the personal advancement of wealth and power. So as each gathered supporters around themselves, James was proclaimed and marched south. For those who were able to make gains, such as Cecil or the Howards, the rule of the first Stuart was good. From those who went away unsatisfied, there would be trouble. It was a blueprint for disaster.

Given all of the false expectations, it was actually quite surprising that James' reign was as peaceful as it was. It was also inevitable that James would come into conflict with Parliament, especially the House of Commons. This is not to say what occurred in 1640 was predestined, but rather that either James or the Lower House were going to have to retreat from their positions, and since it was James that had to go to Parliament for money, he was in the worse predicament.

There were no easy solutions to James' financial predicament. Even if James had been more willing to reduce his expenditures, it was doubtful if he would have made out any better. England was on the brink of a major change. The king could no longer afford to run the government off his personal income, yet neither the country at large, nor the House of Commons in particular were prepared to recognize what was happening.

To add to James' difficulties, the appearance of the royal favorites, starting with Carr, and especially with Villiers, undermined the moral stance of the Crown. The Court began to be perceived as corrupt and un-English, leading to the development of a "country" faction, which emerged in the Parliamentary elections for the 1614 session. James' close relationship with Sarmiento increased the unease about the nature of the Court, pushing James further away from public support.

So time after time, James went to Parliament for funds, and after being granted a subsidy in 1606, the king went empty handed in 1610, even as English troops acted in defense of Kleves-Julich, and was forced to dismiss Parliament in 1614 before they ever got around to debating monies. In all, James received only one other award of supply, that in 1621, which fell far short of the nearly £ 1,000,000 owed by the royal household to various sources.

By a simple examination of the circumstances, both domestically and abroad, it was obvious that James would be constrained in his actions. Any sort of adventurous foreign policy was out of the question due to fiscal constraints, while any alliance would face opposition by either the Puritan or recusant factions. In a manner, the king was doomed to failure - not out of necessity, but due to lack of character. James did not have the ability to sway the nation with personal magnetism and charm, and lacked the fortitude and direction to try, even if he could. Constrained by the memory of a great queen, held suspect by his inherited subjects, and plagued by an empty treasury, James was forced to try and make do as best he could.

III. Jacobean Foreign Policy

To monarchs in the sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, foreign policy was more than just diplomatic relations with the various political entities that made up the European community. It also involved, after the Reformation, contact and confrontation with the divided branches of the Christian church. For James I, his role as "Defender of the Faith" was an integral part of what it meant to be king of England, and each and every decision concerning the Continent had to be judged by both its religious and political impact.

It is therefore at this juncture that an examination of the two opponents of the Church of England and its *via media* compromise must be made. Both the Puritans and the recusants affected James' relations with the Continent, and conversely, certain nations on the Continent attempted to influence James' treatment of what he viewed as a domestic matter. By exploring who made up each of these sects, and what they represented, both real and imaginary, it will be possible to see another aspect of James' relationship with Parliament, and how the combination of Parliament, Puritanism, and recusancy would shape the formation of the Jacobean course of action.

Once that is taken into account, we will be able to examine the particulars of James' foreign policy, which has been divided into four different sections. The first shall explore the first seven years of James' reign, when his policies abroad were the most successful, and the importance of Henri IV of France in that success. We shall then move on to the Cleves-Julich succession, which provides an example of James' strategy for dealing with his more powerful brother monarches, as well as his penchant for playing the gifted mediator between the various political and religious camps. By emphasizing what James did during the Cleves-Julich crisis, we shall see a mirror of

what James later attempted in 1618-19 with the Bohemian defenestration and Frederick's usurpation of that throne.

To build on this, we shall touch upon James' relations with the other nations of Europe as James established ties with Germany through the marriage of his daughter, the increasing competition with the Dutch and the attempts to find a suitable bride for Prince Charles. Throughout this middle period, which bridges Cleves-Julich and Bohemia, it is very evident that James' influence was waning, from a variety of factors.

Finally, there was the crisis over Frederick V's assumption of the Bohemian crown, which was strongly supported in England, but which was stridently opposed by James. In one step, Frederick forced James to choose between his family, his faith and his entire definition of kingship and what was divinely ordained. As a result James stalled and delayed, hoping that his attempts to mediate a peaceful resolution to the crisis would both resolve his internal dilemma as well as restore some of his faded luster.

What we can see, by taking each event, step-by-step, was that each event fits into place. When mixing the situation on the Continent, James current standing at home, and the forces at play around the king, each action that he took followed a certain pattern, so that by 1618, the outcome was predetermined.

i. Religious Controversy

a. The Puritans

Among the greatest thorns in James' side was the Puritan faction of the Church of England, who were still unsatisfied with many of the symbolic elements retained from the Catholic church in Elizabeth's *via media compromise*. After years of

repression under Elizabeth, James accession brought optimism to the Puritans, since he had been raised in the Presbyterian-Calvinist church. Soon after his arrival in England they presented James with the Millenary Petition, a set of demands, supposedly signed by a thousand ministers. This petition called for alterations in the practices of ceremonial worship and prelacy within the Church of England, which these ardent Calvinists found unscriptural, and therefore unfounded. While James did concur with several of the points raised by the Puritans during the Hampton Court Conference (1604), he was hesitant to break from the *via media* compromise that Elizabeth I had imposed upon the English church.¹

Why did James turn away from the Puritans? On the surface, it would seem a perfect match, at least doctrinally. James had on several occasions defended the Reformed faith, and had even "won" a disputation against the Jesuit James Gordon.² The best source for an answer may lie in James' childhood.

While it was true that James was raised in John Knox's Presbyterian Church, the Reformed Scottish *Kirk*, and was a stout Calvinist, the evidence shows that James did not accept all of the doctrines proposed by Knox, or his successor, Andrew Melville. For young James, "chafed and railed against the ministers,"³ because of the constant criticism that he received from the pulpit. Knox, who had led the Scottish revolt from Rome in 1560, and who inspired the Scottish nobility's deposing of James' mother, Mary, preached that the laws of God superseded the laws of men. Knox believed it was these laws, interpreted by the *Kirk*, that were to rule the State. Continuing in the same vein, Knox held that kings who opposed the *Kirk* should be brushed aside.⁴

Obviously Knox was attempting to impose a theocracy, based on Jean Calvin's Geneva, in Scotland, and it was this idea that James grew to abhor. Knox's

revolutionary theology was also a concern of Elizabeth's, who continually urged James to suppress Knox's more radical Presbyterian followers, out of fear that they would strengthen opposition to the Church of England.⁵ It might be hard to say what frightened James more, losing the Scottish crown to the Presbyterians, or losing his chance at the English crown through Elizabeth's displeasure. Either way, James tried to clamp down on his ministers in a continuous struggle between church and state that would last throughout James' tenure in Scotland.⁶

Therefore, when James arrived in England he saw many of the more radical Puritans as being a threat to his kingship, much as the Scottish *Kirk* had been. The conundrum as King of England (and therefore now the head of the English Church), was that James was faced by an increasingly bitter Puritan sect as well as a sizeable Catholic minority. As a result, James attempted to maintain Elizabeth's *via media* compromise between the Catholic and Protestant faiths. It was a middle road that James wanted to spread throughout Europe, for James, while a Calvinist doctrinally, saw himself as an irenic, who wished to restore the *respublica christiana* on the model of the early (pre-500 AD) Church.⁷ To the Puritans, who never felt comfortable with the Elizabethan compromise in England, all of this smacked of popery. When James later attempted to marry his son to a Catholic princess, it only confirmed their suspicions.

James was not only plagued by problems with the Puritans, but within the Church of England as well. For the church itself was far from harmonious. At the Hampton Court Conference in 1604, the new king attempted to mediate between the factions and bring order to the English Church. Unfortunately for the Puritans, James was not as orthodox a Calvinist as they had hoped, as he refused to implement many of

their modifications, such as the end to the prelacy (where James declared his famous "No bishop, no king!").

Yet James' rationale in these matters had more to do with the desire for a uniform, catholic Church of England, than with theological opposition to the views of the Puritans. Like Elizabeth, the king wanted acquiescence. This demand for uniformity was enforced by both of his Archbishops of Canterbury, Richard Bancroft (1604-1610), and George Abbot (1610-33), although Abbot favored a more stringent Calvinism and was sympathetic to the Puritan cause. The *via media* position became the royal party line. Ministers who wished patronage and advancement were expected to support the compromise, no matter what their opinion. Despite this orthodoxy, the Church of England gradually became increasingly Calvinist (though not Presbyterian) throughout James' reign. This was largely due to the influence of Abbot, and the closer ties between England and the Protestant states of Europe which encouraged the exchange of ideas between Protestant divines.

This movement towards a more orthodox Calvinism was anchored in two, seemingly minor, interrelated influences on Jacobean England. The first was the political situation created by the first Kleves-Julich succession crisis (1609-10). The second was the rise of the Remonstrant/Arminian sect in the Netherlands. The Kleves-Julich affair, and James' subsequent actions, forced the king to fan Pan-Protestant sympathies in England to garner support for his policies abroad. Once initiated, James had no other option but to ride popular sentiment until the crisis was settled. This enabled the Puritans to gain both political and popular favor for their attacks upon Catholicism and any of its supporters. Certain Puritans, such as Sir Ralph Winwood, were able to make personal gains, through their ability to work with the continental Calvinist leadership, including Prince Maurice of Orange and Christian of Anhalt.

With the satisfactory outcome to the Kleves-Julich crisis, James was unwilling (or unable) to alter his policies, and allowed the Puritan advances to remain.

This lean towards Calvinism was reinforced by the Vorstius affair (1611-12) and what was to be James' ensuing role as a mediator in Dutch politics, culminating with the Synod of Dort in 1619. The Vorstius affair involved Conrad Vorstius and his succession of Jacobus Arminius as a professor of divinity at Leiden. James became involved when a Jesuit, Martin Becanus, in an argument over the legitimacy of the Oath of Allegiance, used one of Vorstius' more heterodox essays as proof that James was both a heretic and an atheist. James responded by blocking Vorstius' appointment to Leiden and renewing a campaign to prove the legitimacy of both his personal faith and the canons of the Church of England.

By doing so, James (with tremendous encouragement from both Archbishop Abbot and Sir Ralph Winwood) was forced to side against the Dutch "Remonstrants" who had sponsored Vorstius, despite the fact that James was actually more sympathetic to the Remonstrant-Arminian position than he was to the ultra-orthodox Calvinists of the "Anti-Remonstrants."⁸ By publicly siding with the Anti-Remonstrants James was obliged to concede ground domestically to the Puritans. This expanded the ability of Abbot and Winwood to increase their influence over the course of the Church of England and English foreign policy.

In the end, it became a question of keeping the Provinces together as a single political entity. The Remonstrants (or Arminians) favored toleration of differing views, which James did approve of in a limited fashion. But in a nation where Catholics made up a sizeable percentage of the population, and which also lacked the structure of a dominant, central church, it appeared the path of disaster. Additionally, James was wary of Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, the Advocate of the States of Holland,

whom Ralph Winwood portrayed as being very pro-French. Oldenbarnevelt backed the Remonstrants - not out of any religious loyalty, but because the Arminian faith they represented appeared more acceptable to the Dutch populace - thus the Remonstrants were guilty by association. This led James to tender support for Prince Maurice of Orange (who in return had become more pro-English) and the anti-Remonstrants.⁹

This trend climaxed with the Synod of Dort (1619) where James openly favored Maurice against the Remonstrants and Oldenbarnevelt. This ultimately led to Oldenbarnevelt's overthrow, and eventual execution, in order to preserve Protestant and Dutch unity in the face of the forthcoming conflict over Bohemia.¹⁰ The Synod was also a great victory for the Puritans, because James was forced to concede ground domestically - for how could he support the Anti-Remonstrants abroad, yet oppose their policies at home?

Thus, it becomes evident that England, and the Puritans in particular, were deeply enmeshed in events occurring away from the British isles. The greatest concerns were for events occurring in the United Provinces, the Palatinate, and wherever the Evangelical church might be challenged, both politically and theologically. Indeed, the common response was not against support abroad, but against the slowness of James to initiate such measures. This is attested to in public complaints and petitions for action, such as Puritan divine Thomas Gataker's appeal to the lawyers of the Sergeants Inn in London:

Can we heare daly reports of our brethren in foraine parts, either assaulted, or distressed, or surprised by Popish forces, and a main breach made into the state of those that are by bonds, civill and sacred, so nearely knit to us, and yet esteeme all is nothing, or thinke that we have no just cause to mourne and lament? Neither let any man say; What is their affliction to us? What are

those parts to these ? What is France or Germanie to England? For What was Jerusalem to Antioch? What was Judah to Joseph?¹¹

Additionally, ambassadors to various parts of Europe, such as Sir Ralph Winwood and Sir Dudley Carleton, were constantly receiving mail from friends in England desiring the latest information regarding negotiations and rumors of war. Demand for this information was such that *Coryat's Crudities*, which was first published in 1611, went through seven editions by 1620.¹² While the Puritans were only a minority, albeit a very vocal one, it was very evident that they identified with the Reformed church on the Continent, and were sensitive to its plight. It is not difficult to grasp why the Puritans were quickly exasperated by James' constantly fluctuating and ineffective foreign policy, and his continued friendliness with the Catholic Spain and France.

b. The Recusants

Yet it is also important to remember that there were others who had a much different outlook on English foreign policy. Most notably were those who still acknowledged the Church in Rome as the only correct path to eternal salvation - the English Catholics, or recusants. The recusants were loosely divided into three major groups. The first was made up of an assortment of openly Catholic lords and gentry from the conservative north and west of England, most notably the earls of Worcester and Northumberland. The second was assembled around the Howard clan. The third group of recusants were the led by the Jesuits, who secretly encouraged Catholicism in the more Protestant areas of southern and eastern England.

The essential difference between the parties was in their political outlook and public perception. The earls of Worcester and Northumberland were loyal to England and the monarchy and had served on Elizabeth's Privy Council. Worcester was respected, despite his religion, and accepted that Catholics were a minority in a Protestant nation. Those associated with Worcester were the "respectable" Catholics, who paid their fines and worked for toleration, not revolt. Northumberland, head of the Percy clan, acknowledged his recusancy, and was an openly avid supporter of English Catholics until his confinement in the Tower of London, a result of possible ties to the Gunpowder Plot.¹³

The Howard family also tried to work within the bounds of the law and were the most powerful sect of English Catholics. While it has not been proven conclusively that all or any of the Howards in James' reign were Catholics (the family did attend the Anglican service), contemporaries and historians have concluded that "where there is smoke, there is fire." This is based, among other reasons, on the fact that the Howards were pro-Spanish, anti-Puritan, and received large subsidies from the Spanish crown.¹⁴ The Howards, like the Percys, fit comfortably into the recusant camp, and while they expressed loyalty to James, they were seen as opportunists and thus suspect (by all but the king).

The remaining group was a broad category that encompassed the various plotters and schemers (including the various hidden Jesuits) that hoped to restore Catholicism to England, as well as the many secret Catholics that lacked the status and wealth to openly acknowledge their faith.¹⁵ It was this group that would endure the greatest hardships, fearing exposure and arrest, as anti-Catholicism swept England at various points in James' reign. This hysteria was often brought upon their own heads due to failed conspiracies, such as the Guy Fawkes Plot (Gunpowder Plot), or as in

Watson's Plot. This reflects poorly upon the great majority of recusants who, despite their religion, remained loyal to king and crown.

For the purposes of this paper, the last two groups are the most important, due to their impact on James. The Jacobean Howards were led by Lord Henry Howard. Lord Henry was able to secure the friendship and support of Robert Cecil at the end of Elizabeth's reign, and gain entrance into the Jacobean court. As a prominent courtier he earned both an earldom (Northampton) and the position of Lord Privy Seal, which entailed a modicum of protection for himself and his family. Around the Howard banner were Lord Henry's nephews, the earls of Arundel (who was restored to his family's estate by James) and Suffolk (who became Lord Treasurer in 1614, as well as head of the family following Northampton's death in the same year), in addition to the earls of Nottingham (who was also Lord Admiral), and Surrey.

The Howards' power base was in their influence with James and ability to procure patronage. While many suspected that they remained loyal to the Church in Rome, the Howards tried to not provoke the ire of their Protestant peers. The Howards had the advantage of wealth and status and were able to constantly expand under James. In fact they became the strongest faction in the English government until the downfall of Suffolk as Lord Treasurer in 1618, combined with the meteoric rise of George Villiers.

While ascendant, the Howards advocated a "pro-Spanish" foreign policy. They urged James to accept the friendship of Philip III and his ambassador, Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuna, the eventual count of Gondomar, and to follow a path of peace with Catholic Spain.¹⁶ Though diametrically opposed to the dominate Protestant demands for hostilities against the Spanish, this appealed to James' pacific nature. It was with Howard support that Gondomar gained the friendship and trust of James, and

it was Gondomar's inveigling which led to James restraining his pro-Puritan statesmen, effectually paralyzing English foreign policy. The Howard camp was also where support for a Spanish match for Prince Charles was first born, and the Howards were foremost among those who encouraged James to rule without calling a Parliament in the seven years after the "Addled" Parliament of 1614.

For English Catholics who lacked the aegis of a Worcester or a Howard, life was filled with fear of discrimination and persecution. Under Elizabeth the saying of a mass was a treasonable offense, and the penalties extended to any who sheltered a priest. Ecclesiastical courts could issue an excommunication for recusancy or lack of attendance at the legally established church, while Civil courts were empowered to imprison any recusant until their sworn submission. In addition to these threats, recusants were liable for a fine of £ 20 per month, and any who could not pay were forced to forfeit two-thirds of their lands (which the Crown conveniently rented out) until conformation to the approved doctrine. While only sixteen Englishmen qualified for (and paid) these fines in 1603 (Worcester, Northumberland and their followers), the Catholic poor were subject to the seizure of all goods and chattels.¹⁷

Moreover, all recusants and suspected Catholics were subject to having their homes searched for hidden priests. It was commonplace for local officials, "under the pretense of discovering concealed Jesuits and fugitives... [to] wantonly destroy the furniture or carry off valuable property."¹⁸ Most Catholics silently endured this vandalism, out of fear of prosecution for recusancy. As a result of this disquietude and discrimination, some became the pawns of conspiracy. Ironically this led to increased penalties and persecution for all English recusants alike, further augmenting the temptation of revolt.

Upon achieving the throne, James only feebly attempted to follow through with many of the promises he had made in Scotland to prevent Catholic opposition to his succession. By November, 1604, the recusancy fines were back in force and were being vigorously enforced. An aide to the Jesuit Robert Parsons recorded that, "the hopes of poor Catholics be all dashed, and they expect now a worse world than in the Queen's time."¹⁹ With the prospect of enduring yet another reign filled with persecution and hatred more and more likely, a limit was reached within a small portion of the recusant community. Encouraged by Jesuits and English Catholics abroad, a more militant solution to their dilemma appeared, which eventually led to the failed Guy Fawkes/Gunpowder conspiracy, which attempted to blow up both James and Parliament at the opening of Parliament 5 November 1605.

The plot was exposed at the last minute by Sir Robert Cecil and the plotters were swiftly rounded up. In the wake of the attempt, anti-Catholic hysteria ran rampant throughout England, and Parliament passed several new fines and measures that compelled attendance at Anglican Communion, as well as barring recusants from appearing at Court or within ten miles of London. Beyond the additional acts banning recusants from the practises of law or medicine, there was the Oath of Allegiance, which demanded that all non-noble recusants renounce the pope's power to depose kings and release subjects from their royal allegiances. Recusants who refused the oath were liable for *praemunire* - the loss of goods and imprisonment at the king's pleasure.²⁰ Fortunately for the recusants, most of these new levies were only rarely enforced.

How the recusants caused damage to the king's relationship with Parliament was that while Bancroft was avidly suppressing the Puritans, James was intermittently relaxing the new fines and obligations brought on the Catholics following the

Gunpowder Plot. This was partly a result of James' own beliefs in toleration, and partly as a product of lobbying by the French and Spanish crowns to alleviate the burden placed upon English Catholics by Parliament's active persecution for recusancy. While some accommodation made sense diplomatically, it caused a great alienation between the king and his Protestant subjects - even into the higher ranks of the Church of England, as illustrated by a letter from Matthew Hutton, Archbishop of York, to Robert Cecil:

I have received Letters from your Lordship and others of his Majesty's most honorable Privy Councill,... That the Puritans be proceeded against according to the Law, except they conform themselves....I wish with all my Heart that the like order were taken and given, not only to all Bishops, but to all majestates and Justices &c. to proceed against Papists and Recusants; who of late, partly by this round Dealing against Puritans, and partly by reason of some extraordinary Favour, have grown mightily in Number, Courage, and Influence.

The Puritans, whose fantastick Zeal I dislike, though they differ in Ceremony and Accidents, yet they agree with us in Substance of Religion;...But The Papists are opposite and contrary in very substantiall Points of Religion,...'tis high time to look unto them.²¹

James' push against the Puritans backfired. What was intended by James to be a drive towards uniformity and stability within the Church of England only hardened the existing division, driving many moderates, both within the English Church and Parliament, to sympathize with the Puritans. To counter James' arguments against their fellow Protestants, many in Parliament were quick to point out that it was the Catholics that had made an attempt upon king and Parliament, not the Puritans, so why should one be treated like the other.

The influence of the Catholics upon James was immense. The simple fact that his queen, Anne of Denmark, had privately converted to Catholicism only intensified the situation. In theological terms, the king was torn between his conciliatory stance with Rome, which followed from his goal of a renewed universal church (which would, of course, be in the image of the Church of England), and fear of assassination by Jesuits and other Catholic extremists (as in the Gunpowder Plot). Ironically, even after the Gunpowder conspiracy, James pleaded with both the Privy Council and Parliament that the plot was the result of Jesuit-inspired radicals, and that the bulk of English Catholics (who took the Oath of Allegiance) remained loyal.²² All of these actions forced James to actively defend the correctness of the English Church in regards to both Protestant and Catholic (as in the model of the "Early" Church) faiths. As a result the king was assailed both domestically and abroad, and his policies regarding English Catholics were subject to great criticism within England. James countered these attacks (mostly by Puritan divines) by:

... relenting nothing, but insisted more eagerlie, both by penne and by tongue, saying, The Papists were seeking his life indeid, but the [prebyterian] ministers were seeking his crowne, dearer to him than his life.²³

This shows that James treated the two factions opposing the *via media* similarly. He repressed the more virulent Puritans as best as he could, but tolerated those who remained within the flock of the Church of England, which was the policy as well for the recusants. As Maurice Lee points out, James made a distinction between the "'doctrinal' variety and the politically minded," as the king remarked to Parliament in 1604 that, "There is no man half so dangerous as he that repugns order. Yet some which make scruple I would use with clemency: but let them meet me with

obedience."²⁴ For the king, a good subject was an acquiescent one, be they Protestant or Catholic.

One area that did concern James was the influence of Continental theologians upon England. He rationalized that if he could put a stop to their heretical writings, much of the clamor at home might settle down. So James ordered his diplomats abroad to secure various copies of religious manuscripts. It was of continual annoyance to Cecil, while he lived, that James would often spend more time reading and responding to tracts upon theology and kingship than he would on the governance of England, "I would wish my Master read fewer [books] than he doth."²⁵

All of this did work to the advantage of members of James' diplomatic corps (if it could be called one), for the king's preoccupation allowed ambassadors to shine if they discovered a desired text, and to receive even greater patronage if they were able to suppress a title James found to disliking. While not quite the expected role of one representing the sovereign king of England, Scotland and Ireland, it caused no surprise to those familiar with the manner that James carried out his day-to-day business abroad.

ii. Mechanics and Strategy of Jacobean Foreign Policy

From 1603-1612, the method through which James conducted his foreign policy remained fairly constant.²⁶ The cornerstone of its administration was Cecil. As Principal Secretary, it was part of his portfolio to oversee the gathering and dispensing of information within the government. As the posts would arrive, the dispatches would be forwarded to Cecil, who would evaluate the worth of the data received. If he deemed it important, Cecil would refer the matter to the Privy Council, where suggestions on possible courses of action were taken and then forwarded to James, wherever he might be.

When the material reached James, he would study it and return a decision to Cecil on how to act, or if to act at all. Cecil would then return to the Privy Council with the king's orders, where the monarch's wishes would be executed. It was a cumbersome and time consuming operation that depended on the location of both the Council members and the king. Yet, this was only true for information generated abroad.

In general, James preferred to conduct business in England, expecting the requests of foreign governments to be made through their resident ambassadors to his Court.²⁷ Any type of follow-up questions were frequently handled by James writing directly to the prince or government involved. It was a personal preference, but one that fit James' style of rule (Whereas the Spanish, on the other hand, preferred to send out experienced diplomats who undertook most of the business of state in foreign capitals, and the French combined a mixture of each).

In 1612, with Cecil's death, the manner in which information travelled to James changed, as he refused to name a new Secretary, choosing instead to act as his own. Thus all communication was technically supposed to go directly through the king, but as the time needed to sort through the various dispatches rose, James commissioned the work out to various members of the Privy Council. So the system would remain until 1614, when James was forced to name a Secretary to manage Parliament. His choice was Sir Ralph Winwood, but since Winwood was the candidate of the anti-Spanish faction, James divided the responsibility, giving half to Sir Anthony Lake, who was supported by the Howards. When Winwood died in 1617, he was replaced by Sir Robert Naunton, who owed his loyalty to Buckingham. Then, in 1618, Lake was dismissed (a result of action by Buckingham) and replaced by Sir George Calvert.

What is critical to note is that after Cecil, there is no one person handling all the correspondence of government, nor anyone holding office for an extended period of time. The importance of this is debatable. James was still conducting the majority of his diplomacy himself, in England, so that the *absolute* need for an efficient and continuous diplomatic corps is arguable. Obviously it would benefit the king to have a competent foreign service, but considering his other problems, particularly the pecuniary ones, there were no resources to spare, nor the need dire enough. Yet there can be no doubt that poor administration would cost James the initiative, and go far in explaining why the king seemed to be continuously a step behind, a step slow in reacting to developments abroad.

The last part of the personnel matrix surrounding the king was the Spanish ambassador, Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuna, the count of Gondomar. By all accounts an important player in James' formulation of foreign policy, how did the Spaniard gain such an effect over the king, and just how much power did he actually wield?

Of all that has been written in English about James' relations with Gondomar, only two works treat the matter with any sort of objectivity, Garret Mattingly's *Renaissance Diplomacy* (1955), and Charles Carter's *The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598-1625* (1962). What they have determined was that an affinity arose between king and ambassador. Gondomar's secret was that he did not underestimate James. Instead, he treated the king with poise and candor, holding firm to his views even in the face of royal opposition. As an expert huntsman, a polished courtier, and a solid scholar, Gondomar was the perfect companion for the king, as their shared interests allowed the ambassador to spend a great deal of time with James outside of official business. It was in the course of these more casual conversations that

Gondomar was able to discover James' feelings and intentions, while simultaneously justifying the policies of his own king.

When he arrived in England in 1613, Sarmiento's mission was duofold. First, he was to try and prevent the marriage of Prince Charles to a French princess, which would have had the effect of nullifying the recently negotiated Franco-Spanish double wedding. His second goal was to try to preclude any English involvement in possible hostilities on the Continent. To accomplish both of these he proposed to James a possible Spanish match.

The idea was attractive to the English king for a number of reasons. For his personal needs, Spain would be able to afford a greater dowry (or so James thought). In regards to foreign affairs, James believed that an alliance with Philip would provide the framework for peace in Germany, since Philip should be able to put pressure on the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria, while James could use his own ties to the Union. All of this was a long shot, but Gondomar accurately read that James was interested. It would be a proposition that would reappear every time James drifted too close to the Dutch or the French.

While Gondomar did an amazing job in the day-to-day activities, such as forcing James to execute Sir Walter Raleigh for an attack on the Spanish colony at San Thome, Charles Carter points out that, "when it came to gaining concrete secret information, Gondomar had little success."²⁸ This leads one to believe that while James may have occasionally said too much to Gondomar, more often than not he was intentionally revealing information. Whether it was to maintain peaceful ties with Spain (as was probably the case with Raleigh), or to simply bounce ideas off the ambassador to measure their net worth, cannot be determined, but the point forces a reevaluation of how much influence Gondomar actually had over the king.

Undoubtedly, Sarmiento had as much sway over the formulation of James' foreign policy as anyone in England, but that is not saying much. Of all the areas of government, James was most protective of the prerogative concerning his complete independence in international affairs. It was the main reason why James carried out most of his diplomacy in England - he was not about to relinquish any power to his diplomats abroad, much less allow them to take part in the creation of policy. Instead they were his eyes and ears, he was the brain. This also permitted James to set the tempo of negotiations, since, as a monarch, he was attended by ambassadors at his convenience. This allowed James to move as quickly, or as slowly, as he deemed proper.

While this may have appeased James' ego, it was poor diplomacy. Since James did all real business in England, James' embassies abroad became mere messengers and reporters of news and gossip. As a result, James had great difficulty maintaining quality people (that and his tendency to not reimburse the ambassadors' *per diem*). One of his best envoys, Sir Thomas Roe, drifted in and out of royal service, frustrated with his king's failure to reward properly.²⁹ This, in turn, created a dependence upon the gentry to fill the necessary posts abroad, men who lacked the rank to command respect and the courtly polish to be believably disingenuous when the need arose.

In comparison, Spain developed a top notch diplomatic service, filled with intelligent, talented members of the high aristocracy. Their ambassadors had the prestige and the skill to maintain the facade of Spanish hegemony long into Spain's decline. France tended, once again, to situate between the extremes of England and Spain. While France produced relatively few ambassadors of note in the period (with the main exception being Jeannin), they were usually more than competent and were members of the lower nobility. It was also worth noting that both France and Spain

had organized channels of communication, where intelligence and dispatches could be processed for analysis. Henri IV even had an autonomous department within his cabinet which had the sole duty of handling foreign affairs. All of this goes to show that there was greater professionalism, and therefore greater efficiency, on the part of the Continental powers when it came to dealing with international relations.

The consequence of these policies would hurt James in the long run. For the king already suffered from an overly inflated sense of self-importance, and when he would try to mediate between the combatants in 1619, there would be no feedback mechanism in place to give the king an accurate picture of what was actually occurring. For there is truth in the old expression that, "knowledge is power." So while James' intentions were sincere, his understanding was weak, which made him look foolish to those involved. The king was not a fool, but out of touch. The sad fact was that James' message, even if it had the benefit of decent intelligence behind it, was out of place in the early seventeenth century. James feared war and the havoc that it could bring, but his peers seem to have forgotten that, and the world would be turned upside down.

In the Fall of 1603, with James adapting himself to his new throne, Sir Robert Cecil sent a dispatch to Sir Ralph Winwood to advise him of the new king's agenda abroad. Cecil wrote:

...that neither the condition of his Estate, nor the Inclination of his Mind did permit him, that for the Friendship of one, he would enter into a War with another; but that he was resolved always to carry an even hand betwixt them both.³⁰

In a sentence, Cecil was able to summarize the ambition and scope of Jacobean foreign policy. James was opposed to war. Most likely a carry over from his turbulent youth, the king, for all the success or failure it might bring, became a devoted believer in the ability and effectiveness of impartial, royal mediation (particularly his own). And as he went out of his way to avoid war, he was more than willing to intercede as an intermediary to bring peace. It was a position that James would firmly maintain throughout his reign, gaining only mixed results.

James' actions as king of England were based largely on the policies he formulated as king of Scotland. This largely amounted to trying to remain friendly with as many nations as possible, something James had been forced to do to insure his accession to the English throne. Once in England, James continued to follow this path of friendship, creating a very passive foreign policy - initiative that was bound to anger someone, somewhere. As a result, it became James' practice to wait upon events. Then, if trouble happened, James could deny responsibility and react freely in order to remain at peace and garner good will from his fellow princes.³¹

While England was not a first-rate power in the early seventeenth century, she was one of many who played or could have played a central role. Through geographic location, England sat at a strategic crossroads for maritime Europe, and her navy could effectively hinder trade from the Iberian peninsula to the Baltic Sea. Additionally, England's moderate Protestantism made it an acceptable ally for either of the Catholic powers, which offered the opportunity for the Stuarts to play upon the European balance-of-power.

A more successful contemporary, seventeenth-century example would be the Venetian Republic. At the time, Venice was accorded much greater respect and influence than it actually deserved, but the Venetians were active diplomatically and

were alertly watching what the more powerful nations were doing, ready to find a situation that they could utilize for their own benefit.³² Meanwhile, the "wait and see" strategy favored by James impaired any influence that England might wield, while "reducing her to a cipher in international affairs except under very special circumstances."³³ The only way for James' course to have worked would be if England could have played freely between two evenly matched forces, so that any English support for one party or the other would be the decisive factor. In such a world, England could play an important function with little effort or expense.

This is reflected by James' apparent success in foreign affairs during the first decade of his reign in England. In the period of 1603-1610, Henri IV ruled France, and under Henri, France began to press Spain. As both Catholic nations were recovering from a generation of constant warfare, England assumed a decisive role in European relations. That, of course, also depended upon France and Spain remaining hostile to one another; if Europe's two Catholic powers ever cooperated, all of Protestant Europe would be imperiled, including England. Hence James walked a narrow line, and was able, for a while, to generate positive results. But James' influence dwindled after Henri's death for a variety of reasons.

iii. Early Foreign Policy 1603-09

Inheriting a war as well as a nation, one of James' first actions as king of England was to begin negotiations for an end to all hostilities with Spain. As a sign of his good intentions, James rescinded all of Elizabeth's letters of marque, effectively ending England's sole weapon against Spanish shipping ("legal" privateering).³⁴ Despite this action, and James' obvious desire for peace, the negotiations between the two parties were surprisingly complex. Domestically, the more radical Protestants

wanted to continue the war, which they saw as a crusade against the Antichrist in Rome, and his black knight, Spain. Internationally, both the French and the Dutch were opposed to England concluding a peace with Spain.

The Dutch feared that if James bowed out, then Spain might be able to concentrate its forces in the Netherlands. That factor, combined with the possible deprivation of English resources, might spell defeat for the Provinces. In return, James showed no love for the "Hollanders," because in his eyes, they were rebels against a rightful monarch, something James abhorred. Yet James did recognize that the Dutch were Protestant, and that it was important to defend his co-religionists from the Spanish and their Inquisition. As for France, Henri was concerned that if England was able to negotiate a peace with Spain, so would the Dutch. Henri believed that France's safety lay in a beleaguered and battle-weary Spain. If the Spanish were able to gain the peace they so dearly wanted, they would be able to rearm and once again threaten France, both internally and externally. To provoke James, Henri hinted that an English peace would drive the Dutch into the French hemisphere, which would economically hurt England, while warning James that the Spanish were not to be trusted.

Despite the distractions, the negotiations went on, but with James and his ministers being mindful of Continental concerns. James expressed his terms for peace to include clauses, such as one that permitted the recruiting of troops by both parties (Holland and Flanders) in England, which would more likely aid the United Provinces (how many Englishmen would volunteer to serve with Spain?). James was also able to skirt the issue of English colonies in the Americas, as well as English trade in both the East and West Indies, which Elizabeth's former councilors had convinced the king not to abandon. Overall the process came off smoothly, showing James as a strong and

able leader, as well as a canny negotiator. The process was completed with the signing of the Treaty of London (August, 1604).

Ironically, after the peace with Spain, many in Parliament and on the Privy Council chided the terms of the agreement, complaining that James could have pushed for a "better" peace. Henry Howard, earl of Northampton, passed this information on to Sir Charles Cornwallis, the English ambassador in Madrid, writing:

...though it be true, that by warre we are as poore as they, that the realm would give no more, the revenue could afford no more, and that the Queen sold her land by lumps, yet all are now persuaded, that without a peace the King of Spaine would have resigned up into the King's hands his whole dominions.³⁵

Many of the complaints arose from the delays in the resumption of trade with Spain. These delays were caused intentionally by the Spanish in hope that the English might take it upon themselves to break the blockade of Antwerp. The port city had been the center of Flemish trade, but had been closed off by the Dutch early in the war.³⁶ It was a difficult situation for James. By taking any path, he would alienate one party or the other, and yet the status quo was disrupting English trade and creating animosity in the merchant community - a critical source for royal borrowing. In the end, the decision was made for James, when Archduke Albert and the United Provinces surprised Europe with the announcement of a cease-fire (December, 1606).

The reasons behind the sudden decision by the Dutch to negotiate an end to the war lay with the actions of England and France. Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, the Advocate of the States of Holland, thought that England would not come to the aid of the Dutch because of James' pacifism, his financial difficulties, his inability to take the initiative, and English fears of commercial and maritime rivalries with the Provinces.³⁷

Oldenbarnevelt also believed that Henri IV was using the Dutch to bleed the Spanish dry, so that a rested and restored France, which had profited from neutrality, might then be able to attack Habsburg forces in Flanders, Franche-Comte, Italy and Navarre.³⁸ He was correct on both accounts.

Cecil defended English inactivity by claiming that Henri only wanted to use England to put additional pressure on Spain, while pointing out that the duke de Sully had initiated massive naval preparations, which was seen as an ominous sign in the Hague and in London.³⁹ A maritime France would have to compete with both England and the Provinces for limited resources, which could only lead to conflict and possible war among the anti-Habsburg allies. The entire process was also clouded by the animosity between the monarchs of France and England. Henri felt that James was so preoccupied with the hunt, and being inoffensive, that he would not act as a true king would. In return, James believed he could trust no man who apostatized himself in order to gain a throne. The shared ill-will was well known to both the Dutch and Spanish, and was extensively reported upon by the Venetian embassies in both nations.⁴⁰

While the cease-fire went into effect in early 1607, it would take two long years of diplomatic wrangling between Spain, the United Provinces, England and France for the terms of a settlement to be worked out. It was a long and exhaustive process that involved England and France as much as it did the combatants. First, not all of the Dutch leadership was in favor of peace. The ultra-Protestants, led by Prince Maurice of Orange, opposed the process, partially out of religious fervor, and partially due to fears that some of the Provinces might try go their own way without the fear of war and invasion to restrain them. Oldenbarnevelt and the commercial sector were able to coerce the Dutch "hardliners" to the table because of valid fears about the loyalty of

their allies and due to the severe economic considerations facing the Provinces - but it added to divisions already present within the Estates-General.

A second factor upon which peace hinged was the agreement of England and France to "treaties of guarantee." These were agreements whereby both crowns would pledge to actively defend the Netherlands if Spain should violate any of the provisions of a yet to be agreed peace settlement. Here the obstacle was England, since Henri refused to bear the burden of defending the Dutch alone. But James feared an entangling alliance which might bring England once again into open war with Spain. There was also the issue of the debt, owed to England, by both France and the Provinces. Cecil, feeling the pinch of financial distress, desperately needed funds for the royal coffers. The estimated £1,400,000 owed by Henri, for support during the War of the Three Henries, along with the £819,000 owed by the Dutch, would temporarily alleviate the budget crunch.

The final and most crucial component for a settlement between the Dutch and Spain was Philip III's acknowledgment of Dutch independence and sovereignty. This would be the most difficult item to obtain, since it would mean Spain's admission of defeat. All parties realized that Philip would demand a number of concessions from the Dutch and their allies if the peace was ever to be finalized. It would then be up to the ambassadors from France (Pierre Jeannin) and England (Sir Ralph Winwood and Sir Richard Spencer) to convince the Dutch to accept or to devise alternatives acceptable to both warring parties and the guarantors.

To add melodrama to the negotiations, both France and England were opposed to a peace between the Provinces and Spain. Both France and England had justifiable concerns over the abilities of the participants if not engaged in war with each other - the maritime capability of the Dutch and the military might of the Spanish. It was in

the best interest of the governments in Paris and London to maintain the conflict. Yet each furthered the peace process out of a fear that the other was secretly doing the same. James was alarmed that the French would gain sole influence over the Dutch, and he believed that peace must be the "right" thing to pursue. Henri was concerned that James might usurp Henri's own leadership of anti-Habsburg Europe. Out of the paranoia of each side, both furthered a peace that was detrimental to their own well-being.

This dissension between the Provinces' allies was well known to the Spanish. They were quite content to play one party against the other, in the hope that amid the strife, better terms might be arranged. One ploy that Madrid repeatedly offered to both Henri and James was a marriage contract between one of the crown princes, the *Dauphin* or the Prince of Wales, and an *Infanta*, with the Low Countries as the dowry. To the English, a Franco-Spanish alliance would be a disaster. For France, an Anglo-Spanish pact would result in a strategic nightmare. While neither of the nations took the bait (which was obviously too good to be true) the presence of the offers did increase the discord and prevented any cooperation between the supposed allies. The Spanish were also happy to inform Henri (and through him, the Dutch) the extent to which members of James' Privy Council and Court, including Cecil, were receiving subsidies from Madrid. This caused the French and Dutch to seriously doubt the sincerity of any action originating from London.⁴¹

The situation only got worse for James. Henri, a master at dissembling, was quick to point out to Maurice and Oldenbarnevelt that England's hesitation and stalling could only be taken as an attempt to prolong the war to English benefit. At the same time he passed on to the Spanish the idea that French support for the Dutch was actually being paid for by the English. This additionally damaged English credibility in

the Hague and in Madrid.⁴² To further fulfil James' fears, Henri then went on to privately negotiate a new defensive alliance with the Dutch, which would also act as a guarantee of any future peace between the Provinces and Spain (January, 1608). The French king had caught England unaware, and was able to advance his own personal status at James' expense. James was forced to respond half-heartedly to French initiatives.

As a result of Henri's actions, James reluctantly agreed to a new defensive alliance with the Netherlands, much along the lines of Henri's own, in June, 1608.⁴³ With the two treaties of guarantee in hand, the negotiations for a peace treaty between the Provinces and Spain could proceed. The two principal intermediaries, Jeannin and Winwood, recognized that even beyond the principle of Dutch independence, there were three major issues that needed to be worked out. These issues were: the Spanish demand that Catholicism be tolerated in the Provinces, the Dutch call for the removal of the Spanish army from Flanders, and the Dutch bid for unlimited participation in the East Indian trade. Of these the mediators realized that the first was the most dangerous, because of the probability of dividing what little French and English cooperation remained - Henri would be obliged to assist the Spanish defense of the Catholic faith and James would be forced to side with the Calvinist Provinces. Otherwise, the guarantors and their ambassadors both hoped that the Dutch would gain the second point and lose the third.⁴⁴

A crisis quickly developed in the summer of 1608. Philip III decided that as long as the Dutch continued to refuse toleration and insist on access to the Indies, then a treaty was beyond reach. However, Philip did leave open the possibility of a long-term truce, out of fear that a continuation of the war would lead to the incorporation of the Low Countries into France or England. Jeannin and Winwood urged the Dutch to

accept the idea of a truce, provided that it was for at least twelve years, as a way to get around the difficulties surrounding religion and trade. Spain was more likely to accept ambivalent wording (as in open to interpretation by either side) which benefitted the Dutch in a limited-term agreement.⁴⁵ By pressing the Dutch to agree, the ambassadors created more tension within the Estates-General. One faction, led by Prince Maurice vowed to never give in, while Oldenbarnevelt and the merchants pushed for an immediate settlement. Both sides blamed France and England for creating dissension and for siding with the Spanish.⁴⁶

Despite all the rancor and infighting, a truce was finally hammered out. It did not address religion or the presence of General Ambrogio Spinola's army in Flanders, and remained ambivalent to Dutch trade in the Indies. On the question of sovereignty, Spain acquiesced, granting independence, but inserted loopholes that could be exploited at a later time.⁴⁷ The resulting Truce of Antwerp was signed 29 March 1609, allowing for a momentary sigh of relief among the major powers as the next crisis hurtled at them. The duke of Kleves-Julich had died only four days earlier.

iv. Kleves-Julich

As the conflict over the succession of the Kleves-Julich duchies began to gather momentum, James and Cecil chose that ill-opportune moment to announce that after 1 August 1609 (O.S.) every alien vessel that wished to fish English waters had to obtain a royal license.⁴⁸ While this was simply another attempt by Cecil to bring money into the treasury, the timing of the proclamation, which was aimed primarily at the Dutch, coincided with the events occurring on the Continent. It caused additional confusion and friction between nations that needed to cooperate to solve this new dilemma. Yet it should be also understood that James thought the matter of Kleves-Julich had been

settled with the Treaty of Dortmund (May, 1609), which provided for the joint administration of the duchies by the duke of Neuberg's son (Count Wolfgang Wilhelm) and the brother of the elector of Brandenburg (where the duke's son and the elector were the main claimants), pending a final decision by an unnamed source.⁴⁹

To reinforce this peaceful settlement, which was so in line with James' nature, the king issued a manifesto guaranteeing the agreement. Winwood was granted power to resolve any disputes, and vigorous retaliation threatened against any party that might attempt to overthrow the accord by use of arms.⁵⁰ Unfortunately for James, as he was declaring his unconditional support for the treaty, the emperor, Rudolph, sent his cousin, the Archduke Leopold, bishop of Passau and Strassburg, to be commissioner and to adjudicate the dispute. Leopold promptly took control of the city of Juliers and began to fortify its defenses, expecting some resistance from Brandenburg or Neuberg. What surprised all observers, Henri IV in particular, was that the claimants did nothing.

In order to force the issue, Henri warned Leopold that he was duty-bound to use force to evict the Archduke, unless he withdrew from Juliers forthwith.⁵¹ Yet Leopold and the rest of Europe were fairly certain that Henri was bluffing, since the French king could do little until the petitioners for the duchies and their German allies acted first. Finally, in December, 1609, the Protestant Union declared for the princes of Brandenburg and Neuberg, citing a number of reasons, including the need to save face with Henri IV, as well as to force England and the Provinces to commit to their cause. Henri immediately responded by volunteering to match whatever resources the Union put in the field, in the neighborhood of 8000 foot and 2000 horse. While the maritime nations had tried to avoid entanglement in the Imperial conflict, it was expected that both would act: the Dutch to prevent the duchies from falling into Spanish hands, and

James because of his earlier commitment (the Manifesto) and his personal jealousy of Henri's leadership in Protestant Germany.⁵²

By January, 1610, James made the reluctant decision to follow Henri, assigning 4000 foot, which were stationed in the Netherlands as the English garrisons of the "cautionary" towns. James still hoped that Leopold would depart peacefully, but consigned himself to a war that was for "true and pure Honour" and a just cause.⁵³ Yet in April, James began having second doubts, as rumors from the Hague reported that Henri was massing a force of 30,000 men, and had issued an ultimatum to Archduke Albert of Flanders demanding passage through Luxembourg. Even the pro-action Winwood had become unsettled, writing Cecil:

What his Design is in an Enterprise of so great Charge Trouble and Danger, and for ought yet is seen to so small a purpose, our wisest Men in these Parts do loose themselves in the Discourse. For *Quorsum ista perditio* [what reason this recklessness] to bring an Army of 30000 Men ...before a poor misserable Place such as Juliers is?⁵⁴

Henri's actions caught James by surprise and without any diplomatic escape. For better or worse, his troops were committed into what appeared to be a French led crusade against Habsburg Europe. In London, there was great concern that Henri was rashly trying to start an apocalyptic war amid all Christianity, a war that boded ill for unprepared England.⁵⁵ Fortunately for James (and the rest of Europe), the situation was defused with the assassination of Henri on 14 May 1610. Henri's death ended any plan for an anti-Habsburg offensive, and elevated the relieved James to titular leader of the quest to remove Archduke Leopold from Juliers.

The summer of 1610 did witness the siege of Juliers by English, French, Dutch and Union forces, and the town capitulated in September. However, tension remained high between the allied armies. Turmoil arose in the joint command structure over precedence, and each nation's forces claimed credit for the victory. Despite those complications, the operation was rather cut and dry since no Habsburg forces responded to Leopold's pleas for assistance. The Spanish commander in Flanders, Ambrogio Spinola, had urged Archduke Albert and Philip III to not intervene, claiming that while the duchies would be easy to take, they would be difficult to hold, especially in the face of a large international force.⁵⁶ Additionally, Philip realized that his uncles, Rudolph and Matthias, were battling each other over control of the Emperorship, and would be of little assistance if war broke out in the Rhineland. For the risks involved, Philip believed that intervening in the duchies was not worth renewing wars with France, England, and the Provinces, especially considering the dramatic shift in political leadership caused by Henri's demise.

In the mix of international relations, France was removed as an agitator. Louis XIII's regent and mother, Marie de Medici, was content to follow a policy of restraint in an attempt to reduce any internal divisions which might challenge her regency or prevent her son from attaining the throne. As a result, James went from being the balance between two major powers, a position that both he and England were capable of fulfilling, to being elevated into the role of uncontested leader of Protestant Europe, something that neither king nor country were prepared for. Further complications in Kleves-Julich only served to emphasize this.

When, in the Fall, 1610, the duke of Saxony decided to press his claim to the duchies (weak as it might be), James, Marie de Medici and the Dutch Estates agreed that all of the claimants should meet and settle the succession once and for all. The

conference produced the Treaty of Jüterbog (31 March 1611), which granted Saxony a share of the duchies, to be held jointly with Brandenburg and Neuberg. Wolfgang Wilhem of Neuberg, disgruntled with the outcome, was forced to accept the proceedings because of pressure from the Union and the Dutch. He then turned to Archduke Albert and Maximilian of Bavaria for support. The elector of Brandenburg, also displeased with the Saxon gains, renounced the treaty in December, and chaos once again descended on the duchies. At this juncture, England, France and the Provinces were all tired of dealing with claimants, and jointly decided to let Germany resolve a German problem.

Despite the major nations' intentions to ignore the continually festering succession, the events had a way of forcing attention back to the region. Some were by-products of the actions taken by the powers, such as the double marriage between the crowned heads of Spain and France in 1613. In what was supposed to be a diplomatic coup for Marie de Medici, Louis XIII of France and the future Philip IV married each others' sister. On the bigger scale, the marriage was not as important as it could have been, as Louis, even at the age of twelve, was already showing a very anti-Spanish disposition towards "papa's enemies," and the French nobility began to get restless anytime Marie spoke of closer ties to Spain.⁵⁷ But the marriage did impact France's allies, such as the Duke of Savoy, who was forced to retreat from Milan, and the Grisons, who were left to the mercy of Spain. Marie also squandered the trust and friendship of Henri's former Protestant allies: the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the princes of Germany. This would force a realignment within the Protestant community as new ties were sought.

One such movement was seen in Brandenburg, where on Christmas Day, 1613, Elector Johann Sigismund of Brandenburg received communion in the Reformed style,

signifying his conversion from Lutheranism to Calvinism.⁵⁸ It was a calculated decision supported by James and Prince Maurice, as well as the Elector Palatine, and acknowledged by the presence of Stephen Lesieur, James' ambassador to the Empire.⁵⁹ The act alone caused a major shift in Imperial politics, as there were now two Calvinist electors (Brandenburg and the Palatinate), as well as two powerful Calvinist duchies (Hessen-Kassel and Nassau). The more moderate Lutherans (especially Saxony) were finding themselves in an increasingly tenuous position as they attempted to balance themselves between the growing aggressiveness of the Catholic and Calvinist states of the Empire. The conversion also expanded support for the Brandenburg claim (now represented by the elector's son, Georg Wilhelm) from the Dutch and the Palatinate, on the grounds of a shared faith.. To counter Brandenburg, and to possibly fulfil a natural inclination, Wolfgang Wilhem of Neuberg married the sister of Maximillian of Bavaria, and secretly converted to Catholicism.⁶⁰ Very quickly, through religion, the possessionary princes had elevated the conflict over the duchies from one of legal inheritance into a battleground between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation.

Now that Brandenburg felt confident of Dutch backing, and Neuberg believed that Bavaria and Archduke Albert would come to his aid, neither felt responsible for working with or cooperating with the other, drawing the territories into increasing chaos. The situation was such, that in March, 1614, the Privy Council of Kleves appealed to Archduke Albert and the United Provinces to intervene and end the quarreling and scheming by both sides. The succession of Kleves-Julich was once again spilling over into international politics. In response, the Dutch moved to take Julich in May, 1614, securing it for Brandenburg. This was followed by Neuberg seizing Dusseldorf five days later (with Spinola's assistance). To maintain succor from Archduke Albert and Spain, Neuberg announced his conversion, which, though

suspected, created a stir throughout Germany. It also caused the mobilization of the main Spanish army by Spinola as a demonstration of Habsburg support.

At this point, with the Netherlands and Spain prepared to dissolve the Twelve-Year Truce, Archduke Albert and the Elector of Cologne urgently solicited the assistance of England and France to mediate and prevent the outbreak of open hostilities. While the king and queen-regent both desired a peaceful outcome, their individual abilities to resolve the dispute had diminished since 1610. Marie de Medici was facing a rebellion, as the nobility, led by the prince de Conde and the duke de Bouillon (the leader of the Huguenot community), were demanding a greater voice in the regency government. To maintain any semblance of order within France, Marie eventually yielded to the nobles' demands. As a result of this internal turmoil, France was completely removed as a factor in Imperial politics. We find that James was politically bound as well.

Since Cecil's death in 1612, James had floundered. With the demise of Cecil's "Great Contract" for revenue reform in 1610, and with the position of Lord Treasurer being filled by the opportunistic and incompetent earl of Suffolk, James teetered on the brink of insolvency. By the end of 1614, James' credit had descended to the point where Suffolk was forced to scrounge for money in order to get food delivered to the king's residence at Hampton Court. This collapse of the king's finances was echoed by the confusion generated diplomatically, since James had assumed Cecil's role as Secretary of State for himself. Thus, while the king was off in the country hunting, there was no one trying to create a cogent foreign policy, and James had been caught unaware by the rapid developments in Germany. The king did attempt to rectify this by making Sir Ralph Winwood Secretary in late March, 1614, but this was too little, too late.

James' impotence was evident in the summer of 1614, when his suggestion that a neutral prince (the Catholic Prince William of Orange, Maurice's brother) take peaceful possession of the duchies until a settlement could be arranged was met with Maurice reinforcing Julich. Instead of being able to moderate a peace, James was simply ignored. The plight of ineffectiveness was sped along by James' proroguing of Parliament in 1614.⁶¹ While James had been able to gain a small gift of money (the Benevolence), it was not enough for him to take any action to support or guarantee the ongoing negotiations in Germany. As James helplessly watched, Spinola marched on the duchies, seizing a swath of territory along the Rhine, and forcing the capitulation of the city of Wesel. The Dutch, who had been willing to parley, were forced to mobilize their army and follow Spinola into the Rhineland.

By fall, the Spanish Army of Flanders and the Dutch army were engaged in a shadow dance, as each was under orders to not break the Truce unless the other did first. Neither Maurice nor Spinola wanted the responsibility for renewing the war, so their armies ranged across the duchies in a war of maneuver. As the cost of the bloodless campaign mounted, the influence of negotiators, such as Sir Henry Wotton, rose, and eventually a truce was signed that finalized a settlement.

The Treaty of Xanten (November, 1614) divided the Kleves-Julich patrimony between the two original pretenders, allowing Brandenburg the duchy of Kleves, as well as the territories of Mark and Ravensburg. The Neuberg claim was rewarded with Julich and Berg. Yet even this did not end the dispute, as the terms of the treaty provided for the withdrawal of forces from the Rhineland region, but never specified which army was to move first. Since Maurice refused to leave Julich until Spinola abandoned Wesel, and Spinola would not abandon Wesel without a sign of good faith

from the Dutch, the opposing belligerents dug in, where they would remain until the hostilities over the Bohemian succession broke out in 1619.⁶²

While the battle over the Kleves-Julich duchies appeared over, in some measure, by their occupation by Catholic and Calvinist forces, the fallout from the discord set the stage for what was to follow. In England, James credited himself for diffusing yet another situation that was about to escape from others. But it became very apparent abroad, with the Spanish and the Dutch in particular, that James was all talk, since he obviously lacked the funds and domestic support for any type of foreign commitment. Even the conclusion of the succession was called into question, as Frederick V of the Palatinate curtly reminded James that Spinola remained between the Provinces and the Protestant Union, cutting each off from the support of the other.⁶³ The Union itself was on the verge of self-destruction, as its member city-states found themselves unwilling to pay the tab for princely self-aggrandizement (as with Brandenburg's campaign for the duchies), claiming that the Union was for the defense of the members' hereditary territory, not expansionist claims.⁶⁴ This contention within Protestant ranks would cause the Union to move too slowly when forces were needed to prevent Maximilian of Bavaria and Spinola from seizing the Palatinate in 1620, defeating the entire purpose of the Union in the first place.

v. *The Intermezzo*

The strife over the duchies did not absorb all James' attention, as he also found plenty of distractions elsewhere. He was instrumental in mediating a peace between the Swedes and the Danes (the Treaty of Knared, January, 1613), which he was quick to point out to all who would listen. Another of his actions was the marriage of his daughter, the Princess Elizabeth. Potential suitors for the young princess included the

future duke of Savoy, the king of Sweden, and the Elector Palatine. Only Palatine was a serious match, since Gustavus Adolphus II of Sweden was the traditional enemy of James' brother-in-law, the king of Denmark, and the Prince of Piedmont was a Catholic and would require Elizabeth to convert. It was ironic, in regards to the Savoyard match, that Cecil quoted James as saying he "would not abandon her to make her Queen of the world."⁶⁵

While James chose Frederick V of Palatine (they were married in 1613), Savoy remained an ally, as James supported Charles Emmanuel's attempt to wrest Montferrat away from Habsburg control (the wars of Mantuan succession, 1613-15 and 1616-17). Yet here again, James' financial limitations came into play, when, in 1616-17, the duke implored England to fulfil its part of a defensive league between the two, only to have the English king turn away the Savoyard ambassador on the grounds of royal poverty.⁶⁶ While Charles Emmanuel was able to negotiate a peace with Spain, James had lost a great deal of good faith with the Italian princes and city-states. He would find little succor there when attempting to negotiate a peaceful solution to the Bohemian War.⁶⁷

With the betrothal of the Princess Elizabeth to the Elector Palatine, James also forged ties with the Protestant Union. He signed a six-year defensive pact in Wesel (April 1612) and encouraged the Dutch to ally themselves as well, which resulted in the Netherlands-Union Treaty of the Hague (May, 1613). For the Protestant Union and the Puritans alike, the marriage of Elizabeth Stuart and the Elector Palatine seemed to cement the alliance between the Union and England. It was a spiritual lift for the German Protestant cause in a land that was under siege by an early modern "Cold War."

Despite the ties between England, the Union and the Netherlands, it was apparent that the Kleves-Julich succession was far from settled. Both Catholic and Protestant princes were actively building their supplies of materiel and troops. The extent of this rearmament shocked the English poet and pamphleteer, John Taylor, on his travels through Europe. He remarked on this seventeenth century arms race that, "When I perceived these fortifications I was amazed, for it is almost incredible for the number of men and horses that are daily set on work about [the walls]." ⁶⁸ Another English traveller in Europe, Thomas Coryat, commented on an armory he had seen where, " The store being so great, that it is thought it can well arme ten thousand men, and ... so incomparable that no armoury of Christendome doth match it." ⁶⁹

All of this was of great concern to England, which was now linked to the Evangelical states of the Empire, because it might force James and Parliament to fulfil the promises of money and trained fighting men. Both items were in scarce supply on the island nation. Additionally, the affairs of the Palatinate achieved cause for royal and dynastic interest in England with the birth of a male child, Frederick James, to Frederick and Elizabeth. The death of Elizabeth's elder brother, Henry, prince of Wales, in 1612, combined with the fact that the young Charles, prince of York (who had been born in 1600), was a sickly child, and might not outlive his father, made Frederick James a potential heir to the Stuart throne. With the birth of two more sons, Frederick and Elizabeth insured that there would be a male of Stuart blood for the throne if needed. It must also be remembered that Charles did not marry until 1625, and that he did not produce an heir until 1630. Thus during the first phase of the Thirty Years' War (1618-1630), the Protestant armies were also fighting for the birth-right of Charles' heir to the English crown.

Yet the Palatinate was not the only area of concern to the English Crown and Parliament - English relations with the Netherlands had deteriorated since the completion of the Truce of Antwerp. The heightened tensions between the former allies was a boon for Spain and the Archdukes, and opened the possibility of general discord between the protectors of Protestant Germany.

Relieved of the burden of having to fight a war of attrition with Spain, the Dutch rapidly emerged as the dominant maritime and commercial power in Europe. While much of the gain had come at the expense of the Spanish and Portuguese, the English found that they too were being supplanted by Dutch hegemony. Of particular annoyance to James and the Privy Council was the exportation of plain, undyed, English woolens to the Netherlands, where they were dyed and finished, and then sold back to the English with a high mark-up.

It had been one of James' pet projects to have all the woollen production done by Englishmen, as something beneficial to both England's economy and the royal treasury. When alderman Sir William Cockayne proposed to the Privy Council a plan to have no cloth leave England unfinished, which would provide new employment in a rather sluggish economy, James approved it. The king immediately revoked the monopoly of the Merchant Adventurers, who had heretofore provided for the exportation of English woolens, and awarded a new monopoly to Cockayne. The plan met with swift and fierce resistance from Noel Caron, the Dutch ambassador, and the Estates-General, who promised a boycott of English cloth if the king did not relent. James was unswayed, being still angry over the state of Anglo-Dutch relations in the East Indies, where Dutch merchantmen had begun assaulting their English counter parts in their drive to secure a monopoly on the spice trade.

While Cockayne's scheme had its merits theoretically, it was a disaster in execution. Cockayne's company was unable to meet expectations in production and quality, and was forced to ask permission to export a quantity of unfinished woolen goods. The effectiveness of Dutch competition and the inefficiency of native industry was soon felt in the distress of the clothing districts. With a multitude of petitions of grievances arriving from the manufacturing shires, it became apparent that Cockayne had set unrealistic goals in his enthusiasm and desire to sway the king. Less than two years after the granting of the monopoly, the Council revoked it, restoring the privilege upon the Merchant Adventurers.⁷⁰ While James did not give up on the goal of an entirely domestic clothing industry, he was willing to reconsider the timing and allow for a more gradual approach. Yet the damage had been done abroad, and even after James retreated, the Dutch were unwilling to resume buying English cloth, claiming it was of inferior quality. To make amends with the Provinces, James was forced to make a settlement with regards to the cautionary towns.

Originally designed as a way for England to insure it would be repaid for its support of the Dutch Rebellion, the cities had become an area of conflict between the two nations. The Netherlands wanted the restoration of the towns, while James refused to agree to their release until England had been fully compensated. One of the reasons for Dutch anxiety was the fear that Philip would make a grand enough offer of plate to tempt the financially strapped James. After the Cockayne project, the Dutch proposed to reopen their markets to English trade goods only if James would concede the towns for a lesser amount. With the reluctant concurrence of his Council, James sold Flushing, Brill and Rammekens to the Provinces for £215,000 in April, 1616.⁷¹ The source of the English dilemma over possession of a few, minor Dutch cities revolved around the issue of face. The towns represented England's only possessions on the

Continent - the last physical ties to bind the island nation to the mainland. Without these many on the Council feared that England might not remain relevant to Continental affairs, since she no longer had anything at stake.

Despite the many qualms over the wisdom of such an action, James had little alternative. But to replace the lost bonds, it was necessary to forge new ones. This partially explains the quest-like nature that surrounds James' pursuit of a bride for Prince Charles, who had become the royal heir upon the death of Prince Henry in November, 1612. In undertaking the search, James had several qualifications that any candidate must first meet, the most important being family wealth. Any future queen of England would have to bring with her a dowry large enough to reduce a sizeable portion of her father-in-law's debt. The two most obvious choices were the same ones that had been considered for Prince Henry: France and Spain. Beyond the wealth and prestige such a match would bring, James visualized an avenue to create a new system of alliances which could forestall future wars and restore peace to Christianity.

Yet James could still see the reality of the situation. While the crowns of Spain and France had often inter-married over the years, the two nations still viewed each other as foes. A marriage was no guarantee of peace, but it still had the potential to open doors that at the time were closed. Charles would have to marry, and his options were limited. Indeed, the choice had already been made, when in May, 1615, Marie de Medici's reply to an inquiry into the availability of one of Louis XIII's sisters was a most definite no. While the politics behind the decision could change, and Louis' assumption of personal rule would open new possibilities, for the time being James' search was confined to Spain. James was forced into a series of endless negotiations with Gondomar over a Spanish match, which held little popular support in Parliament or the nation at-large.

The match did hold some benefits. If James and Philip could come to an agreement over the marriage of their children, they might be able to work together to solve some of the problems facing Europe in general, or so James thought. But overall, there were far too many obstacles to overcome for a near-term solution to be had, the largest among them being religion. Questions were raised about the freedom of the *Infanta* to worship freely, including the presence of priests in her personal household. But the truly crucial question was in what faith would any children be raised, and by whom. Each of these were debated back and forth, while a growing suspicion arose in England doubting the sincerity of the Spanish offer to begin with, while others began claiming the entire process was only designed to further the rift between England and the Netherlands. There was increasing evidence to buttress this supposition, as each time James conceded on a point, the Spanish would ask for yet another allowance, each more inflammatory than the last.⁷²

While James has been roundly criticized for continuing with this increasingly less viable charade, it must be asked what option did he have? If James broke off the negotiations, relations with Spain would have worsened, and Charles would still not have a suitable bride. The entire Spanish match drama can be seen as symbolic for all of James' foreign policies: he was damned if he did, and damned if he didn't.

An understanding of the dilemma over the marriage for Charles is critical, because it was also a major factor in the greatest foreign crisis of James' reign, the Bohemian succession. It was with Bohemia, and the proposed election of James' son-in-law, Frederick, as its king, that James found himself caught between his hoped for alliance with Spain and his duty as leader of Protestant Europe.

vii. The Bohemian Crisis

The start of the Thirty Years' War revolved around the process by which Archduke Ferdinand of Styria became elected Emperor Ferdinand II of Austria.⁷³ It may be recalled that for a Holy Roman Emperor to be chosen, he had to gain the support of the majority of the seven electors (from the Palatinate, Saxony, Brandenburg, Bohemia, Mainz, Cologne, and Trier). By 1617, the favorite to succeed Matthias was Ferdinand, who had already gained the support of Spain (and its influence over the three ecclesiastical electors) and John George of Saxony. The next step for Ferdinand was to be accepted as king by both Hungary and Bohemia, with Bohemia being the key, since it possessed an electoral vote.

Everything proceeded as planned, and Ferdinand was elected king-designate by the estates of both Habsburg territories. Then, in early 1618, Ferdinand, who was an ardent Catholic, ordered for his Bohemian regents to press hard upon his Protestant subjects, including: the censorship of the press, a ban on Protestant office holders, and the termination of Protestant worship in two towns. There was an immediate outbreak of protest, led by the lesser nobility and gentry, who called upon the Defensors (who were supposed to protect that religious status quo in Bohemia) to call a meeting of the Estates, which they did. Convening in March, the Estates promptly requested for Ferdinand to re-examine his policies, who instead ordered them to disperse. Not to be frightened, the Estates reconvened in May, 1618.

As soon as they met, they were again ordered to disband. While this last order may have been Ferdinand's wish, it was issued by the council of regents. In anger, the delegates stormed the council chamber and tossed two of the Catholic regents and a secretary out the window, the "defenestration of Prague." This shocked the rest of Europe, Ferdinand in particular.

Gathering momentum during the summer of 1618, the Bohemians were joined by Lusatia, Silesia, and Upper Austria. They turned to the Protestant Union for support, offering the kingship for aid. In September, 1618, a Savoyard regiment under Ernest, count of Mansfeld, seized the city of Pilsen for the rebels. By the Spring, 1619, Heinrich Matthias, Count Thurn, a leader of the defenestration, was leading an army to besiege Vienna, causing Moravia and Lower Austria to join the rebellion. Yet this early success only solidified Catholic unity.

Spain responded in the fall of 1618 with several grants of coin worth 700,000 thalers, and began dispatching troops to come to the aid of Ferdinand. The Catholic League, which had expired when its treaty had run out the year before, was reformed under Maximillian of Bavaria, who began to gather his levies. By June, 1619, Ferdinand was ready to march with 30,000 men, and he quickly relieved Vienna, mauling Mansfeld's regiment in the process. Yet the Bohemians continued on, officially deposing Ferdinand on 22 August 1619, and then offering the crown to Frederick of the Palatinate on 26 August. The attention of Europe was now focused on James' son-in-law and the question of would he accept or decline.

For James there was no question of what Frederick should do, but whether he was stupid enough to do what he should not - accept the throne. As soon as the crisis had broken out, James had word sent to Spain that he would volunteer to mediate the dispute, and he urged Frederick to not take an active role in the hostilities.⁷⁴ The Spanish council, already committed to assisting Ferdinand, ordered Gondomar to accept James' attempt to find a peaceful solution as a way of preventing England from joining the hostilities.⁷⁵ So Gondomar re-proposed a Spanish match for Prince Charles.

Among the English people, the possibility of their Princess Elizabeth becoming a queen, maybe even an empress, all in the cause of Protestantism was too good to believe. England was being swept up in militant Protestantism, where Frederick and Elizabeth became:

Debora and Barak now alreadie on the march... And shall we suffer our sweete Princess, our royall infanta, the only daughter of our soveraigne lord and king, to goe before us into the field and not follow after her?⁷⁶

Emotions ran so high that even government officials were caught up in the tidings. James' resident ambassador in Paris, Sir Edward Herbert, wrote home in favor of Frederick taking the crown saying that:

...God forbid he should refuse yt, being the apparent way His providence hath opened to the to the ruine of the Papacie. I hope therfore his [Majesty] will assist in this great work, having, by the means of winter approaching, time enough to resolve, and prepare by treaties and other ways against the next summer.⁷⁷

When James was slow to act publicly on Frederick's assumption of royalty, the more radical Puritans began to question James loyalty to the Protestant cause. They began to use the "voices" of the dead, in an attempt to goad their king into action, such as Thomas Scott's polemic that portrays the late Prince Henry pleading, "Yea, what would not England doe for my dear and Royall Sister of Bohemia, if the King my Father would but give it the word of command?"⁷⁸ While this would obviously do little to affect the king's policies, the ceaseless rhetoric and propaganda in the pulpit

and on the street corner caused a great deal of murmuring and discontent to be directed primarily at the king and his favorite, Buckingham.⁷⁹

Despite domestic support, James desired only to be a mutually accepted mediator. He was not going to support Frederick's quest for Bohemia. The only backing which James might provide was for the protection of Frederick's rights in the Palatinate, which had more to do with the king's concern over the inheritance of his grandchildren than Frederick himself. Even then, James was determined to use diplomacy, not force of arms.

While James stalled for time, the war went on. The Imperial electors tried to quell the spread of revolt by naming Ferdinand emperor on 28 August 1619 (Matthias had died in March). It was hoped that with Ferdinand declared emperor the foreign allies of the rebel states would concede that this was an internal Imperial affair. Yet this was brushed aside as Bethlen Gabor, the Turkish supported prince of Transylvania who was allied with the rebels, conquered eastern Hungary. This led Frederick, on 28 September 1619, to accept the crown of Bohemia. By November, Protestant forces were again laying siege to Vienna, and in December, an anti-Habsburg alliance was formed between the Turks, the Dutch, and the Venetians. What started out as an appeal for religious freedom became a major international war.

This was not lost to all in England. Those who were old enough to remember the height of England's war with Spain were troubled by what had come to pass. Commentator John Chamberlain wrote Dudley Carleton that:

We heare the Palsgrave is crowned king of Behemia, so that there is now no place left for deliberation, nor for mediation of peace till one side be utterly ruined. God send him goode successe, but surely yt was a venterous part and like to set all Christendome by the eares.⁸⁰

Unfortunately for all of Europe, Chamberlain was right.

To regain the initiative, in December, 1619, the Spanish council approved a plan that would have Spinola's army invade the Lower Palatinate, and then transfer the electorate to Maximillian of Bavaria. At this point, in late 1619-early 1620, James could have made a difference. Historian Garret Mattingly points out that Gondomar's mission at the time was to keep James out of the conflict, which he did by tantalizing James with the offers of marriage and mediation. But Mattingly also points out that, "the mere threat of English intervention might have kept Spinola out of the Palatinate and gone far to restore the pre-war balance in Germany."⁸¹ It did not happen, and in the spring of 1620, Spinola's forces rolled into the Rhineland, forcing the Protestants to scramble. On 8 November 1620, Prague fell, after the Catholic rout of Frederick's forces at White Mountain. The Bohemian revolt was over.

Frederick still refused to listen to the advice of his royal father-in-law, and witnessed the desertion of his allies one-by-one as they each made separate peace with the emperor. By 13 July 1622, Frederick was beaten. He released his generals and retired to await the outcome of James' mediation. It was too late, the triumphant forces of the emperor no longer needed James' intervention, and they took the remainder of the Palatinate. The war was not over, far from it, but the stage at which James could have altered the outcome was.

The theory, as outlined by Mattingly and Maurice Lee, was that Spain would not have authorized the invasion of the Palatinate if James had made a legitimate move to defend it, because the Spanish feared the rebirth of the coalition of the 1580's-1590's of France, England, and the Netherlands.⁸² With the fall of Frederick's birthright, and the reassignment of the electoral status, there could be no middle ground from

which to negotiate. One of the reasons that the war dragged on for so long was that the diplomats were unable to discover any compromise that would be acceptable to both the Catholic and Protestant sides. Therefore, if James had protected the Palatinate, then it **might** have been possible that a diplomatic solution could have been arranged.

The emphasis above is on *if* and *might* because they sum up James' foreign policy. Throughout James' reign, England had the potential, and sometimes the ability, to be a major factor in the outcome of the various European power struggles. The term that best describes it was "wild card." Yet that would only be true from an outside view - of a Continental historian exploring the maybes and might have beens. On the inside, James was as steady as a rock, and Gondomar knew this. King James I of England was a pacifist. He despised war and its implements of destruction. His only use for the military arts was to provide deterrence, to keep the wolves at bay.

Just by looking at what James tried to do makes this all very obvious. He inherits a nation at war with Spain and makes peace. He then tries to get Spain and the Netherlands to agree to an end of hostilities, even if it was against England's economic interest, because the king feared that the Dutch and French would find a way to drag him back into the fray with Spain. He was willing to help forge a peace at his own loss!

In his next involvement abroad, James was faced with the Kleves-Julich succession crisis. There mediation was made much more difficult by the intransigence of the parties involved, which caused James to agree with Henri's proposal to use a limited amount of force to separate the claimants until a peaceful solution could be worked out. This was James' closest brush with war, and that occurred only because James fell into Henri's trap. When the duchies flared up again, James was able, with

Marie de Medici, to get the Treaty of Xanten signed, which temporarily capped hostilities.

James made peace between the Swedes and Danes, and increased his prestige within Protestant Germany by marrying his daughter to the Elector Palatine. He prevented a religious civil war in the Netherlands by presiding over the Synod of Dort, and sought closer ties to Catholic Spain under the assumption that if they (England and Spain) worked in concert, they would be able to maintain peace between Protestants and Catholics.

It was a noble dream, and if Frederick had not accepted the Bohemian crown, James would very likely have been remembered in a much more positive light. This is not to claim that he was a good king, or an effective head-of-state, but a recognition that despite his domestic policies, if the Thirty Years' War had been averted, then there would have been much less anti-Stuart sentiment in the 1620's, and probably no embarrassing war with Spain. Unfortunately, maybes and ifs are only hypothetical.

Yet James did try to stay on the path of peace, which, as mentioned above, puts a new light onto James' relationship with Gondomar. James knew that Gondomar desired peace with England as much as the king did with Spain, although for different reasons (which James knew and would only expect). So it was very easy for the king to give Gondomar as much information as the situation suited, especially when the king was concerned that actions by his more head strong vassals might endanger his peaceful association with Spain. This was one of the points that Charles Carter emphasized.

So it all comes down to 1618-1619, with the defenestration and Frederick's usurpation of Ferdinand's title. There was no choice for James to make. He opposed the succession, and even if he had not, he did not have the resources to act. Popular sentiment and fiery pamphlets do not generate revenue during one of the harshest years

economically in English history. Even if James had committed himself to defend the Palatinate, would Gondomar have believed that James would actually risk war with Spain? James loved his daughter, but would he risk his kingdom for her? It simply does not fit the pattern that James demonstrated over and over again.

One must also not forget that James thought himself to be a great negotiator, so he certainly would have assumed that he could remedy any ills after the fighting ceased, but it never did, did it? His continued efforts to find a peaceful solution after the fall of the Palatinate are almost embarrassing to read about. One can hear the snickers from the French and Spanish diplomats, "Oh, here comes yet another envoy from James!" It was sad in its futility, because James had nothing to bargain with, nor any way of enforcing his terms, he was simply a "has been" waiting for the end that never came.

IV. Conclusion

When the Thirty Years' War ended with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, how many people looked back over the course of the years to wonder how such a tragedy could occur, and could anyone have stopped it?

The only answer to the first part is to say that men often see better into the past than into the future. None of the key participants in 1618-19 knew that what they initiated over the Bohemian crown would rip Europe apart in a cataclysm of death and destruction. As for the second part of the question, there were many who could have done something to stop the bloodshed, if they had known where it would lead. But of all the parties involved, only one was dedicated to peace, which taken to its extreme also meant that that party unwittingly played a role in starting the fighting that it was trying to prevent.

When James I came to the throne of England, the stage was already set for the war that was to come. Germany was divided theologically and secularly, and was ready to explode at the slightest touch, as first Donauworth and then Kleves-Julich illustrated. Spain was locked into a desperate struggle with the Dutch Republic, while still nominally engaged with England. France alone was at peace, but was still rebuilding after a generation of civil war.

Even in the nation that James entered there simmered old disputes over religion and politics, as Calvinists, Lutherans, and Catholics all struggled to coexist with each other, while all complained of the burden of supporting over fifteen years of war. Yet none of that should have bothered their Scottish king, who had endured his own private hell in his native land. James was a veteran of civil strife, surviving six coups and untold disparagement at the hands of the Scottish clergy. Those that he had loved had

been taken from him, he had been imprisoned, and his mother had been executed when he was a young lad of twenty-one.

Crowned as a toddler, James came to believe in an absolute monarchy, and brooked no infringement of the rights and powers granted directly to him by God. He saw parliaments as representatives of the will of the people, whose job it was to inform the king of his people's wants and concerns, as well as to handle any responsibilities designated upon them by the Crown. At no time did James ever accept the validity of a people choosing their king. Kings were the anointed of God. Even so, as a child James found himself controlled by whatever faction was in physical possession of their king, and so he grew to long for the day when he would be independent of the tasks assigned to him, to enjoy what it was to be king. All of this went into the makeup of James I.

These experiences would also affect James' formulation of foreign policy. As king, it was part of his jealously guarded prerogative to handle international affairs. When it came to making this policy, James was guided by four principles: religion, expense, dynastic concerns, and peace. Each, at times, was more important than the others, which caused as much confusion to the king as it did to the people watching him. On occasions when these principles conflicted with each other, the king would be at a loss on how to act, until he could figure out some way to make them coexist.

In the realm of religion, James always remained a stern Calvinist. He was a declared opponent of the pope, but he was willing to tolerate Catholicism provided that Catholics were loyal to him first, their nation second, and their religion third. It was a reality of the early seventeenth century that the two most powerful nations in Europe were both Catholic. Toleration was a necessity for peace. This was not to say that James accepted the status quo, or the tension that existed between the branches of

Christianity. Mixed with James' defense of the Protestant fundamentals of the Church of England was his constant hope of a reconciliation within Christianity.

It was these irenical beliefs which were the foundation of James diplomacy with Spain, the Vatican, and (partially) with France. He saw himself as embodying the rational and sensible middle, versus the extremism of the Jesuits and the ultra-Calvinists, his goal being to encourage those opposing forces to meet in the center, where he would rejoice at offering his services to mediate their differences. It was a grand and naive strategy - one that rested upon the assumption that the other princes of Europe could be persuaded by peaceful debate to forsake their own faiths for James'.

So when it came time to respond to Frederick's pleas for assistance, James had to admit that Frederick was fighting for the Protestant cause, but was it the right Protestant cause? Frederick was under the sway of the ultra-Calvinists - the equivalents of Puritans in England, and Presbyterians in Scotland - for whom James had as much antipathy as for Jesuits. It was the followers of Knox and Melville who tried to deny James' power and authority in Scotland, and though he was finally able to break their strength, he feared them in their radicalism. It was in response to the persecution of the Puritan clergy in England that the Great Contract was defeated in 1610, and the Parliament of 1614 dismissed.

Even though he feared assassination by Catholic extremists, and deplored the Inquisition of Catholic Spain, the abuses of the papacy, and the perversion of the Christian faith by Catholic dogma, James would not relent to Protestant extremism anymore than he would kneel to the pope. Thus Frederick was playing with fire that James did not want to touch. The elector was challenging the tenuous compromise that held Germany together, risking the destruction of what his father and grandfather had fought to preserve. For that, James was to defend him?

The next factor that influenced James' foreign policy was money. After all that he had experienced in Scotland, James was overjoyed to be entering into his wealthy new kingdom. He was king of England, Scotland, Wales, and Ireland; he was the Defender of the Faith, and the leader of Protestant Europe; he was one of the most important men in the world; who was to tell him that he could not enjoy himself? Yet James did overdo it, spending funds he did not have, anticipating that his Lord Treasurers would find ways to support his needs and desires. This was a shock to the rather sober country gentry that had begun to serve in Parliament under Elizabeth.

Their expectations were in conflict with the king's. They wanted their new monarch to embrace the fiscal conservatism of his predecessor, not to lavish gifts of gold and titles on every two-bit Scotsman that wandered south looking to make his fortune. They expected a stern Calvinist theologian, who would take the fight to the Anti-Christ in Rome and his minions in Madrid, while defending (as cheaply as possible) European Protestantism from the Counter Reformation. Instead they got a man fond of cursing and drinking, who ogled at pretty young men, and who treated the Spaniards with as much respect and friendship as he did the Dutch.

Even so, a working relationship was possible, as long as James was willing to forsake the Union between England and Scotland, and relinquish all practices of quasi-legal revenue such as purveyance, wardships, and impositions. For granting all of that, James would gain the friendship of the House of Commons, provided, of course, that he also permit Parliament to assert control over Church affairs as well. After all of that would the legislature ever turn back? Would they even have given James the funds that he needed?

During 1619-1620, England found itself mired in a terrible depression. There was unemployment in the woolens industry, and the past two harvests were poor.

Given that, if James had raised an army and navy to go to war, how long would they have fought without pay or supplies? The Army of Flanders mutinied no less than forty-six times between 1572 and 1607. France, Sweden, even Cromwell's New Model Army faced similar revolts over food and back-pay, leading Cardinal Richelieu to write:

History knows many more armies ruined by want and disorder than by the efforts of their enemies; and I have witnessed how all the enterprises which were embarked on in my day were lacking for that reason alone.¹

How would James, who at times had trouble feeding his household, be able to support a campaigning army? It was easy for the pundits to point to the popular support for the Palatine cause, but does that mean that the poor and the downtrodden, or even the wealthy and powerful, who may root for their princess and her husband, and hope that it might bring an end to the Catholic threat, would be willing and able to finance an expedition to Bohemia or the Palatinate. It cost Spain 3.4 million thalers (which was approximately £708,000) to help keep Ferdinand's relatively small army in the field for **one** season.²

What would it have cost James to outfit an army from scratch, ship it to the Rhineland, and provide for pay, food, and equipment for an indefinite time period? Parliament was still sitting members of the Lower House who had refused Elizabeth a large enough subsidy to pay for the preservation of England in 1588, when an invading army was on its way! In this light, how would James ever get the appropriations for an expedition in Germany? The English volunteers that did serve in Frederick's and Elizabeth's defense relied upon monies generated by the City of London and voluntary

contributions, not Parliament. England's mobilization to protect Frederick was never a feasible option.

Based on the first two notions affecting James' policy, religion and finance, English action was not even a possibility. So why was it an issue? That answer lies within the third factor, dynastic considerations. The first goal of any monarch is to ensure that the line is carried on. It was how England became Protestant in the first place. For James, there was more than simply providing a male heir.

Throughout his reign in Scotland, James aspired for one thing, the throne of England. Every foreign policy decision he made was geared toward furthering that goal. He sent unofficial envoys to Spain and to Rome, hinting at the possibility of conversion, which although there was never any likelihood of that occurring, it was enough to prevent the Catholic powers from ever generating a legitimate alternative to James for the English crown. To prevent Elizabeth from impinging upon his chances, James let his mother face the headsman's axe, and tolerated Gloriana's complicity in many of the coups that marked his youth. After enduring it all, he was triumphant. So his next concern was to ensure that the Stuarts remained the crowned heads of England and Scotland.

To accomplish this James needed for two things to happen: the approval of the Union between Scotland and England, and male grandchildren. The first was the most important item which he proposed at his first Parliament. The Union was a way for James to insure that his heir would be seen as a Briton, not as a Scot. It would solidly reinforce that England and Scotland were one nation, with one sovereign, who was master of both. Thus, it was the act that was to unify the nations under James that divided the paths of king and Parliament. James was bitter at its defeat, and lost

confidence in the ability of the legislature to work cooperatively with their king, which would only be reinforced by the events of 1610 and 1614.

As a result of James' anger over the failure of the Union, he refused to concede to Parliament in 1610, which caused the House of Commons to become indignant with the king's truculence, which only raised James' ire over the arrogance with which his subjects treated their monarch. It was a downward spiral that continued to get worse, with the 1614 session of Parliament starting at the same point where it had left off in 1611. The outcome is well known. There was a rift created between king and assembly, leaving James bereft of any additional income, and creating the formation of factions between the country supporters of Parliament and the members of James' court.

The second stage of James' dynastic strategy was to be accomplished through the marriages of his three children, Henry, Elizabeth, and Charles. With Henry's death in 1612, the pressure for James to quickly find matches for his remaining children increased. The decision to marry Elizabeth to Frederick V would come back to haunt James, but at the time there were not a great many options. Louis XIII and the future Philip IV were betrothed to each others' sister. The choices left open to James were Savoy, the Palatinate, and Sweden. Of the three, the Palatinate appeared to offer the best combination of compatible religion and political prestige (who had ever heard of Gustavus Adolphus?).

Even more difficult was finding a bride for Charles, since his wife would become Queen of England, and (hopefully) mother to the heirs to the throne. Once again James found himself limited in options. A match with France or Spain would provide (again hopefully) closer ties between that nation and England. Since the bride would become queen, there would also be an appropriate dowry, which was important

to the cash-starved king of England. The problem was religion. Neither Marie de Medici, nor Philip III were excited about sending one of their daughters to England, which was reputed to be a living hell for Catholics. As negotiations started and stalled with both nations, James became increasingly anxious, the need for a grandchild growing.

Ironically, it would be the weighing of these needs that would paralyze James in 1618-19. Would he bite on Gondomar's offer of a Spanish match, or come to the assistance of his son-in-law? James did express a definite concern over the safety and status of the Palatinate, as much as he disapproved of Frederick's actions. Elizabeth was the mother of his grandchildren, the potential heirs if anything should happen to Charles (as Elizabeth's daughter's line would produce the Hanoverian that succeeded the last Stuart, Anne, in 1714). There was a definite exigency to provide for the protection of Frederick's family and his birthright. It would not do for heirs to the English throne to be destitute of titles, land, and monies. It was for that reason, and that reason only, that James even considered coming to his daughter's aid.

As important as that was, it was not enough. In staying out, and trying to mediate, James was confident of his ability to negotiate a settlement that would provide for the safety (and then later, the restoration) of Frederick's titles and territories. This made James even more desirous of a Spanish marriage for Charles, since the English king could then get the Spanish king to put pressure upon the emperor, which would insure a positive outcome to any peace conference. James honestly believed that if he and Philip stood hand-in-hand and demanded satisfaction, that all of Europe would fall orderly into place.

There is one other aspect to James' dynastic considerations that came into play in 1618, which sealed James' against any defense of Bohemia (versus the Palatinate).

This had to do with the nature of the Bohemian monarchy. The Bohemian Estates, in 1617, accepted Ferdinand as their king. He held the most legitimate claim, as the Habsburg heir. In James' mind, Ferdinand was the king of Bohemia, and the Estates could in no way, shape, or form alter that. James believed in absolute monarchy, and was fundamentally opposed to the concept of a contractual kingship. This transcended political theory - if the Bohemian Estates could legally depose their monarch, why could not the English or Scottish Parliaments? James was diligent in suppressing the expression of the concept in England, and would never support a prince who tried to seize a throne through its use.

The final area under study was James' inclination towards peace. A review of James' actions shows that whenever possible, the king favored a peaceful settlement. Yet his propensity to seek out a non-violent solution allowed the king to be manipulated by foreign potentates, such as Henri IV, and their ambassadors, such as Gondomar. When Gondomar recommended to the Spanish council that James could be neutralized by an offer of marriage, it only demonstrated that James had gone too far.³ The English king had become predictable, devolving into a "velvet glove." The statesmen of *Realpolitik* in Paris and Madrid understood that the soft touch only worked with threat of the iron fist.

By placing so much value on compromise and negotiation, James also became contradictory and indecisive. When Parliament wanted to address the practice of impositions, James was originally opposed, because it involved royal prerogative, which the king protected for dynastic reasons. Yet James did relent, and permitted the House of Commons to condemn the practice. Then James was forced to compromise to gain the subsidies and supplies he so desperately needed. The Commons then raised another area of prerogative they wanted examine, and James became incensed and

prorogued the session. Of all the king's weaknesses by far his greatest, beyond extravagance or vanity, was his tendency to vacillate.

James faced the same problem with his strategies abroad. One of the strongest influences left from the Elizabethan period was that the Netherlands had to be protected. The English people saw the Dutch as the "besieged fortress" who were fighting the Spaniard at the gate, protecting the Evangelical faith from the "spawn of the Antichrist."⁴ Yet a strong Netherlands was bound to run into conflicts with England, as the Amboyna massacre (1623) and the string of Anglo-Dutch wars at the end of the century proves. On top of popular sentiment, James did not have any type of conceptualized plan for how to treat the United Provinces.

He knew that he needed them militarily. Maurice and his army were the bulwark against Spanish aggression in Western Europe, especially after Henri's assassination. Yet James also realized that the Netherlands were England's enemy economically, and that England could not reach her potential without Dutch resistance. Conflicts over fisheries, woolens, the East Indies, and America were only likely to intensify. In spite of these contradictions, James believed it was his role to play internal arbitrator for the division within the Dutch church. But that should not be surprising, because James placed religion as an equal to statecraft.

England was changing, as was the organization of the economy. The time was rapidly approaching when it would be acknowledged that the king could no longer be forced to try and live within his means. The costs associated with governing had risen beyond that level. Unfortunately for James (and Charles I) that time had yet to pass in England (and would not until the Restoration of Charles II in 1660). This put James into a predicament - costs were rising and his revenue was stagnant. How was the king to finance any foreign policy at all?

Everything revolved around money. To maintain the peace James needed to be able to threaten war, which required an army and navy he did not possess. To negotiate peace, England needed other nations to believe that the English crown would honor its obligations, which hinged upon military ability. In addition, diplomacy required money of its own to support the statesmen and ambassadors abroad, to obtain information, and to open closed doors. These were all unmet needs. Without frequent and dependable sources of financial support, James could not maintain a far-reaching foreign policy.

The times had changed, but James tried to use the same, old methods (which were of questionable merit the first time around). All told, though, what else could he have done? Would England have tolerated the extensive commitment of English men and resources for such a cause, considering that England itself was in no danger, and Frederick was technically the usurper? That is assuming, of course, that England would have the resources to commit, considering that the fairly capable 31 ship Royal Navy bequeathed by Elizabeth to James was no longer even sea-worthy.⁵ Even then, when James finally proposed aiding his daughter and son-in law in 1621, the Commons quickly degenerated towards suspicion of the king's motives and accusations against the Crown's fiduciary practices.⁶ England was not prepared to enter into a European land war in the 1620's. The only military-type actions that Parliament debated in 1621, and later, in 1624, were the re-issuance of letters of marque, and possible naval raids "beyond the line," where the cost and actual threat to English shores could remain minimal, and profits possible. Even if James had wanted a more aggressive foreign policy, it would never have happened, because of domestic restraints.

Hence we can see that by late 1618 James' decision was a forgone conclusion. James did not have the finances, the will, or the ability to intervene in the Bohemian

crisis. All the speculation at the time about whether England would intervene was just that, speculation. Yet there were those on the continent who held out hope that the king of England would arise from his lethargy and seize the opportunity that was handed him. He did not. Even his son, Charles, would remain out of the fray in Germany (while foolishly waging war on both France and Spain). So by 1618, the fate of Europe was sealed, the best hope for peace looked away, unwittingly aiding the darkness that would sweep the slate clean.

V. ENDNOTES

Introduction

¹ S.R.Gardiner, *History of England from the accession of James I to outbreak of the Civil War, 1603-1642*, 10 vols, (New York: AMS Press, 1965). G.R. Elton, *England, 1200-1640* (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1969). Christopher Hill, *Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).

² See Conrad Russell, *The Crisis of Parliaments, English History 1509-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 256-326.

³ Theodore K. Raab, *The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1975), 88-9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 91.

Chapter II. The Domestic Policy of James I

¹ See especially, Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years' War* (London: Routledge, 1984) 1-46. Also see R.J.W. Evans, *Rudolph II and his World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) and J.W. Zophy, *The Holy Roman Empire. A Dictionary Handbook* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1980).

² Maurice of Hesse-Kassel to Louis XIII, 23 March 1615, quoted by Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years War* (London: Routledge, 1984), 12.

³ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁴ Zorzi Giustinian to the Venetian Doge and Senate, 4 January 1608 (O.S.). *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs. Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice* (hereafter, *C.S.P. Venice*), 1609-1611, p.211.

⁵ See Geoffrey Parker, *Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). For Philip II between 1580-1590 see Garrett Mattingly, *Armada* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1959). On Philip III see Patrick William, "Philip III and the Restoration of Spanish Government, 1598-1603" in *English Historical Review*. vol. 88.(1973) pp.751-69. For Spain in the Thirty Years' War, see J.H. Elliot, "Spain and the war," in Geoffrey Parker's *The Thirty Years' War*, 103-9. On the Duke of Lerma and Baltasar de Zuniga, and Spanish policy and diplomacy under Philip III, see Charles H. Carter, *The Secret Diplomacy of the Hapsburgs, 1598-1625* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964). For Philip IV, see R.A. Stradling, *Phillip IV and the Government of Spain 1621-1665* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) For the Count-Duke of Olivares, there is J.H. Elliot, *The Count-Duke of Olivares: the Statesman in the Age of Decline* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).

⁶ Carter, *Secret Diplomacy*, 30.

⁷ A fictional speech by the Count Gondomar to the Spanish Council of State (Consejo Estado) and Ferdinand of Styria (the future Emperor Ferdinand II) quoted in a pamphlet by Thomas Scott to oppose the proposed Spanish match for Prince Charles. Thomas Scott, *Vox Populi, or Newes from Spayne* (1620) Reel 1362, (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microforms, 1958), 4.

⁸ See Dr. William Cobb of East Carolina University, for his discourse on "Henri IV and the First Regency, 1589-1617," and "Louis XIII, Richelieu, and the Second Regency," in his, *French Diplomatic Relations with Spain: 1632-1635* (Tulane University, 1970). See also, Richard Bonney, *The King's Debts, Finance and Politics in France, 1589-1661* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). For Henri IV, see David Buisseret, *Henri IV* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1984). For more on Richelieu and Louis XIII, there is J.H. Elliot, *Richelieu and Olivares* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) and C.V. Wedgwood, *Richelieu and the French Monarchy* (London: English University Press, 1949).

⁹ This is most aptly demonstrated in a letter Henri wrote to Landgrave Moritz of Hessen-Kassel from Paris in 1604:

I have already written to you that I would be pleased to favor and assist the three princes [Brandenburg, Neuberg, and Zweibrucken], our good cousins and friends, who aspire to the succession of Kleve and its dependent lands when the occasion presents itself. But, in order to make [my assistance] more beneficial for them and their friends, it would be necessary for the three princes to be well united and agreed about their pretensions, before the succession arises, so that they can bring all their means together to harvest it without division or debate. For, in this fashion, they will be better and more willingly assisted by their friends which will make their party stronger.

Henri IV to Landgrave Moritz of Hessen-Kassel, 27 December 1604, in Christoph von Rommel, *Correspondance in edite de Henri IV, Roi de France et de Navarre, avec Maurice-le-Savant, Landgrave de Hesse* (Paris: Jules Renauard, 1840) pp. 209-215, as quoted in Alison D. Anderson, *The Julich-Kleve Succession Crises (1609-1620): A Study in International Relations*. (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1992), 26.

¹⁰ For conspiracies against Henri IV, see Bonney, *King's Debts*, 66-69. On Henri's possible reasons for intervening in Kleves-Julich, see Bonney, *King's Debts*, 68-72, and Simon Adams, "The Union, the League and the politics of Europe," in Parker, *Thirty Years' War*, 30.

¹¹ For the character of Marie de Medici, see Bonney, *King's Debts*, p.73-4. For troop figures, see *Ibid.*, 69.

¹² Russell, *Crisis of Parliaments*, 133.

¹³ Charles and Katherine George, *The Protestant Mind of the English Reformation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 12.

¹⁴ For more on the attempts by the recusants to overthrow the Elizabethian compromise, see Michael Carrafiello, "English Catholicism and the Jesuit Mission of 1580-1581," *The Historical Journal*, 37, No.4, 1994: 761-774.

¹⁵ Sir John Neale, *Queen Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments*, 2 vols (London, 1953-7), 79, as quoted in , Russell, *Crisis of Parliaments*, 154.

¹⁶ This brief summary of the Elizabethan *via media* and the resultant Puritan movement was culled from several sources, including: Christopher Hill, *The Century of Revolution, 1603-1714* , pp. 63-85; Conrad Russell, *Crisis of Parliaments*, pp.144-183; and Samuel R. Gardiner, *History of England, from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War, 1603-1642*, vol. I, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1905), pp.6-84. I am also indebted here, particularly to Dr. Michael Carrafiello, as well as to Dr. Bodo Nischan and Dr. William Cobb, all of East Carolina University, for their valuable input that helped me piece this together. For the Puritan movement see Patrick Collinson, *The Elizabethan Puritan Movement* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1967), and Charles H. George and Katherine George, *The Protestant Mind of the English Reformation, 1570-1640* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

¹⁷ An example of the rhetoric between the conservatives and Puritan/Presbyterians is shown through conservative John Whitgift, and Thomas Cartwright, a former Marian exile that taught theology in Geneva and a disciple of Jean Calvin., with Whitgift decrying that:

The name Puritan is very aptly given to these men; not because they be pure, more than were the heretics called Cathari; but because they think themselves to be *mundiores ceteris*, 'more pure than others,' as Cathari did, and separte themselves from all other churches and congregations, as spotted and defiled: because they suppose the church which they have devised to be without all impurity.

And with Cartwright replying that:

Albeit we hold divers points more purely then they do which impugn them, yet I know none that by comparison hath either said or written that all those that think as we do in those points are more holy and more unblameable in life than any of those that think otherwise. If we say that in those points which we hold from them that we think soundlier than they do, we are ready to

prove it; ... And therefore, as the name was first by papists maliciously invented, so it is by you very unbrotherly confirmed.

John Ayre, ed. *The Works of John Whitgift*, 3 vols. (Cambridge: The Parker Society, 1851), Vol. I, 171-172.

Whitgift's offensive against the Puritans was echoed by Richard Bancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury (1604-1610), who published an attack upon the Puritans with his *Dangerous positions and proceedings*:

This ... reforming consort with their followers [the presbyterian disturbers of the English Church's peace], have divided themselves from all the rest of the ministerie, and Christians in England: and linked themselves into a newe brotherhood, with this lincke, viz.... the desire of the pure Discipline.

Richard Bancroft, *Dangerous positions and proceedings, published and practised within this iland of Brytaine* (1593) English Books, 1475-1640, Reel 375 (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microforms, 1958), 121.

18 John Donne's "Sermon XXXIV, on Whitsunday,"

But then, of those who doe professe Christ Jesus, some grovell still in the superstitions they were fallen into, and some are raised, by Gods good grace, out of them, and I am one of those, God hath afforded me my station, in that Church, which is departed from Babylon.... But I am at home, when I consider Bulls of excommunications, and solicitations of Rebellions, and pistols, and poysons, and the discoveries of those; There is our *Nos*, We, testimonies that we are in the favour, and care of God; We, our Nation, we, our Church; There I am at home;... Is not S. Pauls *Sumus*, and S. Iohns *Scimus*, as good a ground for our faith, as the servile and mercenary voices of a herd of new pensionary Bishops, shovelled together at Trent for that prupose, are for the contrary?... Then when it conduced to their advantage in arguement, or to their profit in purse, such and such things fell from them, and now that opposition is made against such sayings of theirs, their profit lies at stake, and their reputation too, to make good, and to maintain that which they have once, how undiscreetly soever, said.

John Donne, "Sermon XXXIV." *LXXX Sermons* (1640), 338-339.

19 Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976), 25.

20 Jill Raitt, "Elizabeth of England, John Casimir, and the Protestant League," *Controversy and Conciliation: the Reformation in the Palatinate, 1559-1583*. Derk Visser, ed. (Allison Park, PA: Pickway Publications, 1986), 117.

²¹ Sir Francis Walsingham, Elizabeth's Secretary, wrote a memorandum to Elizabeth's Privy Council that:

Whether Holland and Zealand, the Prince of Orange being now taken away, can with any possibility hold out unless they be protected by some potent prince.

Whether it be likely that the King of Spain, being possessed of these countries, will attempt somewhat against her Majesty.

Whether he shall not be provoked thereunto by Scotland and the ill-affected in this realm.

in Maurice Lee, *Great Britain's Solomon: James VI and I in his Three Kingdoms*. (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 95.

²² Lord Burghley to Queen Elizabeth in 1584:

Although her majesty should thereby enter into a war presently, yet were she better able to do it now, while she may make the same out of her realm, having the help of the people of Holland and before the King of Spain should have consumed his conquests in these countries... and shall be so strong by sea and so free from all other actions and quarrels.. as that her majesty shall no wise be able with her own power, nor with the aid of any other, neither by sea nor land, to withstand his attempts, but shall be forced to give place to his insatiable malice.

Lord Burghley to Queen Elizabeth in A.L. Rowse, *The Expansion of Elizabethan England* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955), 241-2.

²³ H.W. Richmond, *Statesmen and Sea Power* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 17-8.

²⁵ Philip II told his council in 1587 that:

Seeing how the English are taking over Holland and Zealand, and how they infest the Indies and the High Seas, it is clear that defensive measures no longer suffice to secure everything. Instead we need to put their own house to the torch, and in such a way that they will have to deal with it and abandon everything else.

Don Juan de Idiaquez to the duke of Medina Sidonia, 28 February 1587, in Geoffrey Parker, *After Columbus: Spain's Struggle for Atlantic Hegemony*. The Lawrence F. Brewster Lecture in History, XI. (Greenville, NC: East Carolina University, 1992), 19.

²⁶ J.H. Rose, A.P. Newton, & E.A. Benians, eds. *The Cambridge History of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929), 111.

- ²⁷ J.A. Williamson, *Sir John Hawkins, the Time and the Man* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927), 451. See also above, # 26, for Lord Burghley's view in a letter to the Queen.
- ²⁸ R.B. Wernham, *Before the Armada: The Emergence of the English Nation, 1485-1588* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), 408.
- ²⁹ John Vicars, *Englands Hallelu-jah; or, Great Britaines retribution* (London, 1631) as quoted in Marvin Breslow, *A Mirror for England, English Puritan Views of Foreign Nations, 1618-1640* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 46.
- ³⁰ Kennedy, *Rise and Fall*, 34.
- ³¹ See Michael J. Brown, *Itinerant Ambassador: The Life of Sir Thomas Roe* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970)
- ³² Sir Thomas Palmer to Henry, Prince of Wales, "Essay on ... our Travailes into forraine Countries," as quoted in John W. Stoye, *English Travellers Abroad, 1604-1667* (New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1968), 21.

Chapter II. The Domestic Policy of James I

¹ Lee, *Great Britain's Solomon*, 35.

² James VI, "The Trew Law of Free Monarchies: or The Reciproock and mutuall duetie betwixt a free King and his naturall Subjects," (1598):

...out of the lawe of God, the duetie, and alleageance of the people to their lawfull king, their obedience, I say, ought to be to him, as to God's Lieutenant in earth, obeying his commands in all things, except directly against God... following and obeying his lawfull commands, eschewing and flying his fury in his vnlawfull, without resistance, but by sobbes and teares to God, according to that sentence vsed in the primitue Church in the time of the persection.

Johann P. Sommerville, ed. *Political Writings / King James VI and I*. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 72.

³ For more on how the Tudors, Henry VII in particular, broke the independence of the aristocracy, see Lacy Baldwin Smith, *The Elizabethan World*. The American Heritage Library (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991), 41-2.

⁴ Lee, *Great Britain's Solomon*, 79.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 69-70.

⁷ Lee's proposal make great sense and fits with what intelligence Cecil would have gathered about the king's work habits - Cecil knew that James liked to delegate, and therefore Cecil insured that if the king was going to leave the running of the country to someone else, it might as well as be him. For more on this see, Lee, *Great Britain's Solomon*, 102-3.

⁸ D.H. Willson, *James VI and I* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1956), 163.

⁹ Gardiner, *History of England*, vol I, 92.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 90.

¹¹ Willson, *James VI and I*, 178.

¹² *Ibid.*, 186.

¹³ Financial data for James is compiled in the appendix of this document entitled, "Table of Jacobean Royal Finance, 1603-1621."

- 14 Robert Ashton, *The Crown and the Money Market, 1603-1640* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), 79-112.
- 15 Willson, *James VI and I*, 262.
- 16 Russell, *Crisis of Parliaments*, 275.
- 17 Gardiner, *History of England*, Vol. 1, 294.
- 18 Russel, *Crisis of Parliaments*, 277.
- 19 *Ibid.*, 281.
- 20 Robert Ashton, "Deficit Finance in the Reign of James I," *Economic History Review*. 2nd series, Vol X (1957), 23.
- 21 *Ibid.*
- 22 Russell, *Crisis of Parliaments*, 286.
- 23 S.R. Gardiner, ed. *Parliamentary Debates in 1610, edited from the notes of a Member of the House of Commons*. Camden Society: Series I, No. 81, reprint (1862 edition) (New York: AMS Press, 1968), 7.
- 24 Privy Council letter, Harleian MS. 444, fols. 48-52, as quoted by Ashton, "Deficit Finance in the Reign of James I." *EconHR*, 16.
- 25 R.C. Munden, "King, Commons, and Reform," 56-7, as well as Kevin Sharpe's article, "Introduction: Parliamentary History 1603-1629: In or out of Perspective?" in *Faction and Parliament; Essays on Early Stuart History*. Kevin Sharpe, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 1-42.
- 26 Sir Thomas Wentworth to the House of Commons, quoted in J.P. Kenyon, *The Stuart Constitution, 1603-1688*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 18.
- 27 See G.L. Harriss, "Medieval Doctrines in the Debates on Supply, 1610-1629," in *Faction and Parliament*, 73-103.
- 28 In an unfinished manuscript entitled, "A True Presentation of Forepast Parliaments to the viewe of present tymes and Posteritie," a member of the Parliament of 1628 declares that the House of Commons would be foolish if they were to base their power on the king's poverty, for then, "as the Kinge grows rich their power grows the poorer." from the Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS. Ashmole 1149, fol. 199. as quoted by Kevin Sharpe, "Parliamentary History," *Faction and Parliament*, 20.
- 29 *Ibid.*, 21.

³⁰ See Pauline Croft, ed., "A Collection of Several Speeches and Treatises of the Late Lord Treasurer Cecil and of Several Observations of the Lords of the Council given to King James concerning his Estate and Revenue in the Years 1608, 1609, and 1610." in *Camden Miscellany*, Vol. XXIX. Camden Fourth Series, Vol. 34 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1987), 245-317.

³¹ Based upon the calculations of S.R. Gardiner in the Introduction to *Parliamentary Debates in 1610*, x-xi. Gardiner emphasized that with even the strictest economy, James' expenses would have amounted to £290,700, while ordinary revenue averaged £247,000, leaving a deficit of £26,700. For a breakdown of the available financial data for James reign, see Appendix A.

³² For more on short term deficit finance, and the economic implications for the Stuarts, see Ashton, "Deficit Finance in the Reign of James I," *EconHR*, 15-29.

³³ Sir Edward Coke to the Commons, S.R. Gardiner, ed., *Debates in the House of commons in 1625*. Ed., from a M.s. in the library of Sir Rainald Kightly, bart.. (1873 edition) no.6 (London: Camden Society (Great Britain), 1965), 32.

³⁴ For more on the Parliament of 1604, and James' rapport with it, including the issue of the Union, see R.C. Munden, "James I and 'the growth of mutual distrust' : King, Commons, and Reform, 1603-4." in *Faction and Parliament*, 43-72.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 67-8.

³⁶ Gardiner, *History of England*, Vol. 1, 286.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 330.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 357.

³⁹ R.C. Munden, "James I and 'the growth of mutual distrust,'" *Faction and Parliament*, 43-72.

⁴⁰ Gardiner, *History of England*, Vol. 2, 85-6.

⁴¹ Russell, *Crisis of Parliaments*, 278.

⁴² Lee, *Great Britain's Solomon*, 245.

⁴³ I am basing much of this section on Maurice Lee's *Great Britain's Solomon*. It is the best and most recent appraisal of the interrelation between James and his favorites, and is based upon a solid historical basis, without the pruriency of earlier accounts.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 233-257.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 252.

Chapter III. Jacobean Foreign Policy

¹ Christopher Hill, *The Century of Revolution, 1603-1714* (London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961), 6.

² For the disputation, David Willson, *King James VI and I* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1956) p. 82. For his defense of Protestantism, see Willson as well as S.R. Gardiner in Vol. I of *History of England*, various places.

³ Mr. Bowes to Sir Robert Cecill, 17 December 1596 (O.S.). *C.S.P. Scottish*, 1589-1603, p.727.

⁴ Willson, *James VI and I*, 38. Knox justified his deposing of Mary, Queen of Scots, with the following passage from Calvin's *Institutes* (IV,xx,31):

Through the correcting of unbridled government be the revengement of the Lord, let us not by and by think that it is committed to us, to whome there is given no other commaundment but to obey and suffer. I speake alway of private men. For if there be at this time any magistrates for the behalf of the people, (such as in olde time were the Ephori, that were set against the Kinges of Lacedemonia, or the Tribunes of the people, against the Romane Consuls: or the Demarchy, against the Senate of Athenes: and the same power also which peradventure as things are nowe the three estates have in everie realme when they hold their principall assemblies) I doe so not forbid them according to their office to withstande the outraging licentiousness of kinges: that I affirme that if they winke at kinges wilfully raging over and treading downe the poor communitie, their dissembling is not without wicked breace of faith, because they deceitfully betray the libertie of the people, wherof they know themselves to bee appointed protectors by the ordinance of God.

Which he expressed to Elizabeth, also passing on Calvin and Melanchthon's approval, in an attempt, which was successful, to keep the English from restoring Mary. For more on this, see Martin Breslow, ed. *The Political Writings of John Knox*. (Washington: The Folger Shakespeare Library, 1985). For the ramifications of Knox, see H.D. Foster, "The Political Theories of Calvinists before the Puritan Exodus to America." *American Historical Review*, XXI, No.3, 1916: 481-503.

⁵ This particular letter was only available in extract form, but the text says: Queen Elizabeth to the King of Scotland, 6 July 1590 (O.S.),

Warns him against a sect newly arisen in both their realms, such as would have no Kings, but a Presbytery. Advises him to stop the mouths or

make shorter the tongues of those who make orations for the persecuted in England for the Gospel; and hopes that, howsoever he be pleased to bear with their audacity towards himself, he will not suffer her to receive such indignity at the hands of such caterpillars.

C.S.P. Scottish, 1589-1603, P.579.

⁶ James attacked the Puritans/more radical Presbyterians primarily through attempted suppression on the pulpit, by making certain topics "off-limit," and by expressing his disapproval of their "brand" of theology, an example is this passage from James' *Basilikon Doron* (1599), where James publicly warns his young son, Prince Henry, about the Puritans; while concurrently laying the ground work for his famous admonishment to the clerics at the Hampton Court Conference (1604), "No bishop, no King!":

Take heede therfore (my Sonne) to these Puritanes, verie pestes in the Church and common-weill of Scotland; whom (by long experience) I have found, no desertes can [oblige], oathes nor promises binde, breathing nothing but sedition and calumnies, aspiring without measure, rayling without reason, and making their own imaginations (without any warrant of the Worde) the square of their Conscience. I protest before the great God (and sen I am here upon my Testament, it is no place for me to lye in) that I never founde with anie Hie-land or Bordour thieves so greate ingratitude, and so many lyes & vile perjuries, as I have found with some of them: and suffer not the principalles of them to brooke your lande if ye like to sit at rest: except yee would keepe them for trying your patience, as Socrates did an evill wife: And for preservative against their poyson, interteine and advance the godlie, learned, and modest men of the ministerie, whom of (God be prayesd) there lacketh not a reasonable number: And by their perferment to Bishopprickes and Benefices (annuling that vile Acte of Annexation if yee finde it not done to your hande) yee shall not onelie bannish their Partie (which can not agree with a Monarchie) but yee shall also reestablishe the olde institution of three Estates in Parliament, which can no otherwaie bee done:

James I. *Basilikon Doron* (1599) English Books, 1475-1640, Reel 963 (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microforms, 1958), 47-9.

⁷ G.H.M. Posthumus Meyjes, "Jean Hotman's *Syllabus* of Eirenical Literature," J.C. Grayson, trans. in *Reform and Reformation: England and the Continent, c1500-c1750*, Derek Baker, ed., 175-194, Studies in Church History, Subsidia 2. The Ecclesiastical

History Society. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), 179. For James' desire for a restored (and reformed) Catholic Church, the best evidence is from a discussion between Edward Bruce, Lord Kinloss and the Venetian Ambassador, Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, which took place during James' procession from Scotland to be crowned king of England. In the conversation, Kinloss describes James' ambition to call an ecumenical council which would resolve the differences in the Christian Church. Giovanni Scaramelli to the Venetian Doge and Senate, 8 May 1603 (O.S.). *C.S.P. Venice*, 1603-7, p. 22.

⁸ F.J. Shriver, "Orthodoxy and diplomacy: James I and the Vorstius affair." *English Historical Review*, LXXXV, no.336, 1970: 455.

⁹ Christopher Grayson, "James I and the Religious Crisis in the United Provinces, 1613-19," *Reform and Reformation: England and the Continent c1500-c1750*, Derek Baker, ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), 195-220, and John Platt, "Eirenic Anglicans at the Synod of Dort," in Baker, *Reform and Reformation*, 221-244.

¹⁰ For more on the Vorstius Affair and its effects upon both Dutch and English politics, see F.J Shriver, "Orthodoxy and diplomacy: James I and the Vorstius affair." *EHR*: 459-74. and Christopher Grayson, "James I and the Religious Crisis in the United Provinces, 1613-19." in Baker, *Reform and Reformation*, 195-219. The Synod of Dort and how the controversy between the Remonstrants and Anti-Remonstrants effected the Church of England is best discussed in three articles in Margo Todd, ed. *Reformation to Revolution; Politics and Religion in Early Modern England* (London: Routledge, 1995), in the aforementioned articles: Nicholas Tyacke's "Puritanism, Arminianism and the Counter-Revolution," Peter White's "The Via Media in the Early Stuart Church," and Peter Lake's "Calvinism and the English Church 1570-1635."

¹¹ Thomas Gataker, "A Sparke Toward the Kindling of Sorrow for Sion," p.32-3, as quoted in Marvin Breslow, *A Mirror for England*, 15.

¹² From the publisher's note to Thomas Coryat, *Coryat's Crudities*, Vol. I (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1905), xii.

¹³ One of the arch-Plotters was Thomas Percy, who was the earl of Northumberland's steward, and who had dined with him just days before the discovery of the plot. see Jenny Wormald, "Gunpowder, Treason and Scots," *Journal of British Studies*. Vol.24, No. 2 (1985): 141-168.

¹⁴ Carter, *Secret Diplomacy*, 123.

- 15 See Carrafiello, "English Catholicism," *Historical Journal*, 761-774.
- 16 Carter, *Secret Diplomacy*, 128.
- 17 Gardiner, *History of England*, vol I, 96.
- 18 *Ibid*, 97.
- 19 Richard Blount to Robert Parsons, 31 July 1603, in Michael Carrafiello, "Robert Parsons' Climate of Resistance and the Gunpowder Plot," *The Seventeenth Century*. Vol. III, No. 2 (1988): 126.
- 20 Sommerville, *Political Writings*, xx.
- 21 Archbishop of York to the Lord Cranborne, 18 December 1604 (O.S.) in Edward Sawyer, ed., *Memorials of Affairs of State in the Reigns of Queen Elizabeth and King James I. Collected (chiefly) from the original papers of the right Honorable Sir Ralph Winwood, Kt. Sometime one of the Principal Secretaries of State*, 1725 edition, Vol II (New York: AMS Press, 1972), 40.
- 22 James I, "A Speach in the Parliament Hovse, as Neere the Very Words as Could be Gathered at the instant" 9 November 1605 (O.S.):

As it may very well be possible that the zeale of your hearts shall make some of you in your speeches rashly to blame such as may be innocent of this attempt; But vpon the other part I wish you to consider, That I would be sorie that any being innocent of this practise, either domesticall of forraine, should receiue blame or harme for the same.... That vpon the one part many honest men, seduced with some errors of Popery, may yet remaine good and faithfull Subiects.
- Sommerville, *Political Writings*, 152. See also, Wormald, "Gunpowder," *JBS*, 148.
- 23 Puritan divine and recorder David Calderwood, *The True History of the Church of Scotland* (1608 ?). Wodrow Society (Edinburgh, 1842-49), 6: 367, as quoted by Wormald, previous citation.
- 24 King James to Parliament, July 1604, as quoted by Lee, *Great Britain's Solomon*, 113.
- 25 Sir Robert Cecil to Sir Thomas Edmondes, 20 Sept 1611 (O.S.), Public Record Office, London, State Papers 78/58, ff. 175-6, as cited in Maurice Lee, *James I and Henri IV; An Essay in English Foreign Policy, 1603-1610* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), 13.

- ²⁶ The bulk of this section was gleaned from Garret Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955) and Charles Carter, *Secret Diplomacy*.
- ²⁷ See Charles Carter, "The Ambassadors of Early Modern Europe: Patterns of Diplomatic Representation in the Early Seventeenth Century," in *From the Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation, Essays in Honor of Garrett Mattingly*, Charles H. Carter, ed. (New York: Random House, 1965), 269-295.
- ²⁸ Carter, *Secret Diplomacy*, 133.
- ²⁹ Brown, *Itinerant Ambassador*, 188.
- ³⁰ The Lord Cecyll to Mr. Winwood, 3 Oct 1603 (O.S.). Sawyer, *Memorials of the Affairs of State*. Vol II, 6.
- ³¹ See the first chapter of Maurice Lee's, *James I and Henri IV*, particularly, pp., 11-16.
- ³² See Carter, "The Ambassadors of Early Modern Europe." *Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation*, 269-295, and see Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 198-210 and 233-239.
- ³³ Lee, *James I and Henri IV*, 13. Lee uses M. Petitot, ed., *Negociations du President Jeannin*, in *Collection des Memoires relatifs a l'histoire de France*, 2nd series, Vols XI-XV (Paris, 1821-2) which I was unable to get. Jeannin's memoirs are the best source of information on the period 1603-1614, and even Edward Sawyer, in *Memorials of the Affairs of State*, leaves out certain documents, saying that they have already been printed in *Jeannin*.
- ³⁴ 23 June 1603 (O.S.)- By the King. [Begins] Although we have made it known by publike Edict, that at our entrance into these... Robert Steele, ed. *A Bibliography of Royal Proclamations of the Tudor and Stuart Sovereigns and of Others Published under Authority 1485-1714*. Vol. I (New York: Burt Franklin, 1967), 109.
- ³⁵ Henry, Earl of Northampton to Sir Charles Cornwallis, 12 June 1605 (O.S.), Sawyer, *Memorials of the Affairs of State*. Vol. II, 91-95.
- ³⁶ See Lee, *James I and Henri IV*, 41-70. Also, The Earle of Salisbury to Mr. Winwood, 23 Oct, 1604 (O.S.), where Cecil discusses the Council's suspicion that the seizing of English shipping off Flanders, which was disrupting Anglo-Dutch relations, was "the mischief the Spaniard aims at."

37 Zorzi Giustinian to the Venetian Doge and Senate, 20 Nov 1606 (O.S.), *C.S.P. Venice*, 1603-7, 437.

38 *Ibid.*

39 Lee, *James I and Henri IV*, 69-70.

40 Piero Priuli (Venetian ambassador in Paris) to the Doge and Senate, 20 Sept 1606 (O.S.), *C.S.P. Venice*, 1603-1607, 405.

41 For a discussion on the extent of Spanish subsidies to various parties in England, and the effectiveness, see C. H. Carter, *Secret Diplomacy*, especially pp.123-130.

About Cecil's being on Spain's payroll, Carter remarks that:

Salisbury's pension in fact came to be treated as a normal perquisite of the position of chief minister. It did not but friendship: a point had simply been reached where refusal to grant it would create more than normal hostility. Spain, far from being in control of its hireling, was rather in the position of a hapless diner who must "bribe" a surly waiter with tips to avoid getting soup spilled on him.

Ibid., 126-7. The reaction by the Dutch was rather ironic, since the Dutch were also guilty of attempting to open doors with "gifts":

From the beginning, they sowed gold about them with a prodigality that ended by scandalizing the city and the Court... They spent more than 300 crowns per day, which the people found monstrous and the king found ridiculous on the part of men who complained of their miserable state.

Ibid., 125-6, where Carter quotes Joseph Cuvelier, "Les preliminaires du traite de Londres (29 aout 1604)," *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* (Brussels), II (1923): 248, who cites *C.S.P. Venice*, 1603-7, xiv.

42 In a manner of speaking, Henri was correct with regards to the English subsidizing the French support of the Provinces, under a reciprocal defensive agreement worked out in 1603 by Cecil and the duke de Sully, the terms of which were to remain secret, included a clause where the troops for the Dutch resistance were to be raised in England, and paid for by France. Of the cost to France, one-third could be deducted off the total owed by France to England. Lee, *James I and Henri IV*, 26-7, who cites J. Dumont, *Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens* (Amsterdam, 1728) V, pt. ii, 30-1, where the agreement is dated July 20/30, 1603.

- 43 Principall Heads of the League to be concluded betwixt his Majesty and the States, sent enclosed in my Lord Salisbury's Letter, 4 June 1608 (O.S.), Sawyer, *Memorials of the Affairs of State*, Vol II, 409.
- 44 Giustinian to the Doge and Senate, 18 Nov 1607, *C.S.P. Venice*, 1607-1610, 65-6.
- 45 Sir Ralph Winwood to Sir Thomas Edmonds, 27 Aug 1608, Sawyer, *Memorials of Affairs of State*, Vol. II, 435.
- 46 John Chamberlain to Dudley Carleton, 8 Nov 1608 (O.S.), McClure, *The Letters of John Chamberlain*, Vol. I, 269.
- 47 Spain and the Archduke declared their willingness to treat the Provinces, "in the capacity of, and as taking them for free lands, provinces, and estates, over which they claim nothing." *Jeannin*, XV, 305-310, as cited by Lee, *James I and Henri IV*, 131. The catch is in the use of "as."
- 48 The royal proclamation enacting the restrictions dated 6 May 1609 (O.S.):
 6 May 1609, By the King. *A Proclamation touching Fishing*. The King while aware 'how farre the absoluteness of soueraign power extendeth it selfe' desires to give Satisfaction to other Princes. He has hithero allowed Allies to fish in his Streams and on his Coasts to the ultimate hurt of his own subjects. He must now reconsider the matter. From August 1st every alien must obtain a yearly licence at London for England and Ireland, at Edinburg for Scotland, before fishing, stating the number of vessels and ships and the tonnage employed.
 Steele, *Tudor and Stuart Sovereigns*, Vol. I, 127.
- 49 The Treaty of Dortmund, 31 May 1609. Sawyer, *Memorials of the Affairs of State*, Vol. III, 43-4.
- 50 King James's Manifesto for settling the Affairs of Cleves and Juliers, 16 June 1609 (O.S.), *Ibid.*, 53-4.
- 51 Henri to Leopold, 15 Aug 1609, "It is honorable for me to assist [my allies] with my council, my authority and my means, if they have need of them, and it would be disgraceful for me to abandon them." in M. Berger de Xivrey and J. Gaudet, eds., *Recueil des Lettres Missives de Henri IV*. Collection de Documents inedits sur l'histoire de France. Premiere Serie: Histoire Politique, Vol. 9 (Paris: Imprimerie Imperiale, 1876), 664. as cited by Anderson, *Julich-Kleve Succession Crises*, 47.

52 Marc' Antonio Correr (Venetian Ambassador to England) and Francesco Contarini (Special Ambassador to England) to the Venetian Doge and Senate, 4 Feb 1610, *C.S.P. Venice, 1607-1610*, 416-7.

53 Sir Ralph Winwood to the Earl of Salisbury, 20 Feb 1609/10 (O.S.)

I thinke a little Rhetorick will serve to make the princes and the Allies understand the Greatness and worth of his M[ajesty]'s succors. For all circumstances duely considered, that his M[ajesty] doth enjoy a perfect peace at home, and doth not enforce a warr abroad; that no particular or private reason of State doth advise him to embrace this Cause, but onlt true and pure Honour without Vanity or Ambition, and that the Charge he doth undergo is undertaken solely and simply for this cause; they cannot but acknowledge the succors to be great, and equipment to the greatest which they shall receive.

Public Record Office, London, State Papers 84/67 ff. 42-45, as cited by Anderson, *Julich-Kleve Succession Crises*, 87.

54 Sir Ralph Winwood to the Earl of Salisbury, 3 May 1610 (O.S.), Sawyer, *Memorials of the Affairs of State*, Vol. III, 155-6.

55 John Chamberlain to Sir Ralph Winwood, 2 May 1610 (O.S.),

I received yours of the 21st of Aprill, and find thereby great liklyhood of new Troubles in those Parts; which if they go forward, I fear will draw all Christendom into the Quarrell: Wherein we for our Parts, are fitter to skirmish with the Pen then with the Sword, and readyer to uphold our side with Words and Wishes, then with Arms or other real Assistance.

McClure, *The Letters of John Chamberlain*, Vol. I, 297.

56 Anderson, *Julich-Kleve Succession*, 119.

57 A. Lloyd Moote, *Louis XIII, the Just* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 48-9.

58 For more on Johann Sigismund's conversion, and what it meant, both in Brandenburg and in the Empire, see Bodo Nischan, *Prince, People, and Confession: The Second Reformation in Brandenburg* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).

59 Nischan, *Second Reformation*, 91-102.

60 It had been suspected by the Dutch that Wolfgang Wilhelm, duke of Neuberg, was inclined to the Catholic faith, or at least opposed to Calvinism, and was seen as loyal to the Hapsburg family; which is why the Provinces continually supported the

Brandenburg claim over Neuberg's. see Sir Richard Spencer and Sir Ralph Winwood to the Earl of Salisbury, 20 May 1609 (O.S.), Sawyer, *Memorials of the Affairs of State*, Vol. III, 41-42.

⁶¹ For more on the 'Addled Parliament,' see Gardiner, *History*, Vol. II, 227-251.

⁶² Sir Henry Wotton to the Marquis Spinola, 17/27 November 1614, and Sir Henry Wotton to Sir Ralph Winwood, 21 Nov 1614 (O.S.), Logan P. Smith, *The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton*, Vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907), 61-2.

⁶³ Frederick to Sir Ralph Winwood, 19 Jan 1615, Bayerisches Geheims Staatsarchiv, Munich, Kasten Schwarz 16734, f. 141, as cited by Simon Adams, "The Union, the League and the politics of Europe," in Parker, *The Thirty Years War*, 36.

⁶⁴ J. Muller, "Reichsstädtische Politik in den letzten Zeiten der Union," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Oesterreichischen Geschichtsforschung*, XXXIII (1912), 484-5, as cited in *Ibid.*, 37.

⁶⁵ The Earl of Salisbury to Sir Ralph Winwood, 3 April 1611 (O.S.), Sawyer, *Memorials of the Affairs of State*, Vol. III, 271.

⁶⁶ Sir Henry Wotton to Sir Ralph Winwood, 16/26 Jan 1617, Smith, *Wotton*, Vol. II, 109-110.

⁶⁷ The peace that Savoy was able to arrange was due to James - the convergence of Sir Walter Raleigh's last voyage, English men-of-war being chartered to the Venetians, and James' discussions of a war against the Barbary pirates led Philip III and the duke of Lerma to believe that James was planning to move against Spain in the Mediterranean. To forestall the possibility, the Spanish settled with Savoy, having already won Montferrat on the battlefield. see Willson, *James VI & I*, 361-3. While James lost face with many of the Italian states, Savoy did stand behind the Palatinate, and was among the first to aid his ascension to the Bohemian crown. see Parker, *Thirty Years' War*, 51-2.

⁶⁸ John Taylor, *Three Weeks, three daies and three houres observations and travel from London to Hamburgh* (1617) English Books, 1475-1640, Reel 977 (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1958), 6.

⁶⁹ Coryat, *Coryat's Crudities*, Vol. I, 345.

⁷⁰ Gardiner, *History*, Vol. II, 385-90.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 382-385.

72 *Ibid.*, Vol. III, 37-8, 58-62, 377.

73 I have relied a great deal upon Parker, *Thirty Years' War*, 38-61, in this section, as it is the most current source available.

74 The Marquis of Buckingham to the Count of Gondomar, 30 September 1618 (O.S.), S.R. Gardiner, *Letters and Other Documents Illustrating the Relations Between England and Germany at the Commencement of the Thirty Years' War*. Vol. 1 (London: Camden Society, 1865), 13. James I to Frederick V, Elector Palatine, 4 July 1619 (O.S.), *Ibid.*, Vol. 2, 152-3.

75 Consulta by the Count of Gondomar upon the Letter of the Marquis of Buckingham to Francis Cottington, 4/14 January 1619, *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, 27-31.

76 John Harrison, "A Short Relation of the departure of the high and mightie Prince Frederick King Elect of Bohemia; with his royall & vertous Ladie Elizabeth: And the thyrse hopefull young Prince Henrie, from Heydelberg towards Prague, to receiuse the Crown of that Kingdome (1619)", as quoted by Breslow, *Mirror of England*, 11.

77 Sir Edward Herbert to Sir Robert Naunton, 9/19 Sept 1619, Gardiner, *Letters and Other Documents*, Vol. 2, 12-3.

78 Thomas Scott, "Vox Coeli, or Newes from Heaven (1624)", as quoted by Breslow, *Mirror of England*, 18.

79 Lee, *Great Britain's Solomon*, 253-4.

80 John Chamberlain to Sir Dudley Carleton, 11 Sept 1619 (O.S.), McClure, *Letters of John Chamberlain*, Vol. II, 263-4.

81 Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 266.

82 Lee, *Great Britain's Solomon*, 270-281; and Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, 265-268.

Chapter IV. Conclusion

¹ L.Andre, ed., *Le Testament Politique du Cardinal de Richelieu*, (Paris, 1947), 480. as cited by Martin van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 17. Van Creveld does an excellent job explaining the inter-relationship between armies, strategy, and the need to forage for food and supplies.

² Parker, *Thirty Years' War*, 50.

³ Consulta by the Count of Gondomar upon the Letter of the Marquis of Buckingham to Francis Cottington, 4/14 January 1619, Gardiner, *Letters Illustrating*, Vol. 1, 27-31.

⁴ Breslow, *Mirror for England*, 74.

⁵ For more on the state of the Royal Navy under James, see Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*, 38.

⁶ A Proclamation declaring His Maiestes pleasure concerning the dissoluing of the present convention of Parliament, 6 Jan 1621/22 (O.S.), Steele, *Royal Proclamations*, Vol.I, 156.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Books

Akrigg, G.P.V., ed. Letters of King James VI & I. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

Ayre, John, ed. The Works of John Whitgift, D.D.. 3 vols. The Parker Society. Cambridge: University Press, 1851-3.

Benecke, Gerhard. Germany in the Thirty Years' War. Documents of Modern History. London: Edward Arnold, 1978.

Bodin, Jean. The Six Books of a commonweale (Six Livres de la Republique); A facsimile reprint of the English translation of 1606, corrected and supplemented in the light of a new comparison with the French and Latin texts. Richard Knolles, trans. (1606 edition), K.D. McCrae, ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962.

Breslow, Marvin A. The Political Writings of John Knox, The First Blast of the Trumpet against the Monstrous Regiment of Women and Other Selected Works. Folger Books. Washington: The Folger Shakespeare Library, 1985.

Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs. Existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice. Vols. VI-XVIII (1603-1625). Horatio Brown and Allen Hinds, eds. London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1904-1914.

Calendar of State Papers, Relating to Scotland. Preserved in the State Paper Department of Her Majesty's Public Record Office. Vol. II (1589-1603). Markham John Thorpe, ed. London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans, & Roberts, 1858.

Calvin, John. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Henry Beveridge, trans. 2 Vols. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans's Publishing Company, 1970.

Camden Miscellany, Vol. XXIX. Camden Fourth Series, Vol. 34. London: Royal Historical Society, 1987.

- Cooper, J.P., ed. Wentworth Papers, 1597-1628. Camden Fourth Series, Vol. 12. London: Royal Historical Society, 1973.
- Coryat, Thomas. Coryat's Crudities: Hastily gobbled up in five Moneths travells in France, Savoy, Italy, Rhetia commonly called the Grisons country, Helvetia alias Switzerland, some parts of high Germany and the Netherlands; Newly digested in the hungry aire of Oldcombe in the County of Somerset, and now dispersed to the nourishment of the travelling Members of this Kingdome. 2 vols. Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1905.
- Davis, James C., ed. Pursuit of Power: Venetian Ambassadors' Reports on Spain, Turkey, and France in the Age of Philip II, 1560-1600. Harper Torchbooks. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970.
- Firth, C.H., ed. Stuart Tracts, 1603-1693. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, Inc, 1964.
- Fuller, Thomas. The Church History of Britain. J.S. Brewer, ed. (1845 ed.) 6 vols. (Reprint) Westmead, England: Gregg International Publishers, 1970.
- Gardiner, Samuel Rawson. Debates in the House of commons in 1625. Ed., from a M.s. in the library of Sir Rainald Kightly, bart.. no.6. London: Camden Society (Great Britain), 1965.
- _____, ed. Letters and Other Documents Illustrating the Relations Between England and Germany at the Commencement of the Thirty Years War. 3 vols. London: Camden Society (Great Britain), 1865.
- _____. Parliamentary Debates in 1610. Edited, from the Notes of a Member of the House of Commons. Camden Society: Series I, No. 81, reprint (1862 ed.) New York: AMS Press, 1968.
- Hakluyt, Richard. Voyages. reprint (1907 ed.) 8 vols. Everyman's Library. London: J.M. Dent & Sons, LTD., 1932.
- Hervey, Mary F. S. The Life, Correspondence, & Collections of Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921.

Holt, Guy, ed. Certain Letters of James Howell. New York: William Edward Rudge, 1928.

Howell, James. Epistolae Ho-Eliaanae or Familiar Letters. 3 vols. London: J.M. Dent and Co., 1903.

Kenyon, J.P., ed. The Stuart Constitution, 1603-1688; Documents and commentary. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966.

Lee, Sidney L., ed. The Autobiography of Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury. New York: Scribner & Welford, 1886.

Memoirs of the Embassy of the Marshal De Bassompierre to the Court of England in 1626. J.W. Croker, trans. notes by Sir Harry Nicholas. London: John Murray, 1819.

McClure, Norman Egbert, ed. The Letters of John Chamberlain. 2 vols. Memoirs XII, Parts I and II. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1939.

Moryson, Fynes. An Itinerary; Containing His Ten Yeeres Travell through the Twelve Dominions of Germany, Bohmerland, Sweitzerland, Netherland, Denmarke, Poland, Italy, Turkey, France, England, Scotland & Ireland. 4 vols. Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1907.

Petrie, Sir Charles, ed. The Letters, Speeches, and Proclamations of King Charles I. London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1935.

Powell, William S. John Pory / 1572-1636, The Life and Letters of a Man of Many Parts. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977.

Reynolds, S.H., ed. The Table Talk of John Selden. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1892.

Sawyer, Edward. Memorials of Affairs of State in the Reigns of Queen Elizabeth and King James I. Collected (chiefly) from the original papers of the right Honorable Sir Ralph Winwood, Kt. Sometime one of the Principal Secretaries of State. 3 vols. 1725 edition. New York: AMS Press, 1972.

Smith, Logan Pearsall. The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907.

Sommerville, Johann P., ed. Political Writings / King James VI and I. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Steele, Robert, ed. A Bibliography of Royal Proclamations of the Tudor and Stuart Sovereigns and of Others Published under Authority 1485-1714, with an Historical Essay on their Origin and Use. 3 vols. Burt Franklin: Bibliography and Reference Series # 128. New York: Burt Franklin, 1967.

Thomson, Elizabeth McClure, ed. The Chamberlain Letters, A Selection of the Letters of John Chamberlain Concerning Life in England from 1597 to 1626. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965.

Microforms

A Most true relation of the late proceedings in Bohemia, Germany, and Hungaria, dated the first, the tenth and the thirteenth of July this present year 1620. English Books, 1475-1640. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microforms, 1958. Reel 875.

Bancroft, Richard. Daungerous positions and proceedings, published and practised within this iland of Brytaine (1593). English Books, 1475-1640. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microforms, 1958. Reel 375.

Barlow, William. The summe and substance of the conference, which, it pleased his Majestie to have with the lords, bishops, and other clergie, at Hampton Court (1604). English Books, 1475-1640. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microforms, 1958. Reel 777.

Donne, John. LXXX sermons; preached by that learned and reverend divine, Iohn Donne (1640). Library Resources Inc., 1970. Ultrafiche. LEL 10626.

James I. Basilikon Doron. Devided into three books (1599 edition). English Books, 1475-1640. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microforms, 1958. Reel 963.

- _____. The fathers blessing: or a second councill to his sonne. Appropriated to the generall, from that perticular example his majestie composed for the prince his son (1616). English Books, 1475-1640. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microforms, 1958. Reel 994.
- Jewel, John. An apologie, or aunswer in defence of the Church of England (1562). English Books, 1475-1640. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microforms, 1958. Reel 420.
- The Peace-maker: or, Great Brittaines blessing (1618). English Books, 1475-1640. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1958. Reel 739.
- Scott, Thomas. Robert earle of Essex his ghost, sent from Elizian. to the nobility, gentry, and commonalitie of England. (1624) English Books, 1475-1640. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microforms, 1958. Reel 977.
- _____. Certaine reasons and arguements of policie, why the king of England should enter into warre with the Spaniard (1624). English Books, 1475-1640. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microforms, 1958. Reel 1291.
- _____. Vox Populi or Newes from Spayne, translated according to Spanish coppie. Which may serve to forwarn both England and the United Provinces how farre to trust to Spanish pretences. (1620) English Books, 1475-1640. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microforms, 1958. Reel 1362.
- Taylor, John. Three Weeks, three daies and three houres observations and travel from London to Hamburg (1617) English Books, 1475-1640. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microforms, 1958. Reel 977.
- _____. An Englishman's Love to Bohemia (1620). English Books, 1475-1640. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microforms, 1958. Reel 1222.
- Troubles in Bohemia, and diverse other Kingdomes, procured by the Divellish practices of State-medling Jesuites. (1619) English Books, 1475-1640. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microforms, 1958. Reel 875.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books

Aston, Trevor, ed. Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1965.

Ashton, Robert. The Crown and the Money Market 1603-1640. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960.

Beller, Elmer Adolph. Propaganda in Germany during the Thirty Years' War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940.

Bireley, Robert, S.J. Religion and Politics in the Age of the Counter-Reformation, Emperor Ferdinand II, William Lamormaini, S.J., and the Formulation of Imperial Policy. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981.

Bloch, Marc. Land and Work in Mediaeval Europe. J.E. Anderson, trans. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

Bonney, Richard. The European Dynastic States, 1494-1660. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.

_____. The King's Debts: Fiance and Politics in France 1589-1661. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.

Breslow, Marvin Arthur. A Mirror for England, English Puritan Views of Foreign Nations, 1618-1640. Harvard Historical Studies, LXXXIV. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.

Buisseret, David. Henry IV. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984.

Carter, Charles Howard, ed. From the Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation - Essays in Honor of Garrett Mattingly. New York: Random House, 1965.

_____. The Secret Diplomacy of the Hapsburgs, 1598-1625. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964.

- Collins, Stephen L. Fron Divine Cosmos to Sovereign State, An Intellectual History of Consciousness and the Idea of Order in Renaissance England. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Collison, Patrick. The Elizabethan Puritan Movement. Berkely: The University of California Press, 1967.
- Cust, Richard and Ann Hughes, eds. Conflict in Early Stuart England, Studies in Religion and Politics 1603-1642. London: Longman, 1989.
- Elliot, J.H. The Count-Duke of Olivares: the Statesman in the Age of Decline. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.
- _____. Richelieu and Olivares. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- Evans, R.J.W. Rudolph II and his World: a Study in Intellectual History 1576-1612. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973.
- Fichtner, Paula Sutter. Protestantism and Primogeniture in Early Modern Germany. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.
- Figgis, John Neville. The Divine Right of Kings. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1970.
- Gardiner, Samuel R. History of England from the Accession of James I to the Civil War, 1603-1642. 10 vols. New Impression (Reprint). London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1905.
- _____. The Thirty Years War, 1618-1646. Reprint (1874 ed.). 10 vols. New York: Haskell House, 1964.
- George, Charles H. and Katherine George. The Protestant Mind of the English Reformation, 1570-1640. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- Guy, John. Tudor England. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Hamerow, Theodore S. Reflections on History and Historians. Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987.

Hill, Christopher. The Century of Revolution: 1603-1714. 2nd ed. The Norton Library History of England Series. London: W.W. Norton & Co, 1980.

———. Change and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century England. Rev. Ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.

———. The Intellectual Orgins of the English Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Hirst, Derik. Authority and Conflict: England, 1603-1658. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986.

Howard, Michael. The British Way in Warfare, A Reappraisal. The Neale Lecture in English History. London: Jonathan Cape, 1975.

Israel, J. The Dutch Republic and the Spanish World, 1606-61. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976.

———. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers; Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000. New York: Vintage Books, 1987.

Kingdon, Robert M. Myths about the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacres, 1572-1576. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.

Lee, Maurice. Great Britain's Solomon: James VI and I in his Three Kingdoms. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990.

———. James I and Henri IV; An Essay in English Foreign Policy 1603-1610. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970.

Lewalski, Barbara Kiefer. Writing Women in Jacobean England. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.

Lockyer, Roger. Buckingham, the Life and Political Career of George Villiers, First Duke of Buckingham, 1592-1628. London: Longman, 1981.

- Martin, Colin and Geoffrey Parker. The Spanish Armada. London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1988.
- Mattingly, Garrett. The Armada. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959.
- . Renaissance Diplomacy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955.
- Nef, John V. Industry and Government in France and England, 1540-1640. Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 15. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1940.
- Nischan, Bodo. Prince, People, and Confession: The Second Reformation in Brandenburg. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994.
- Notestein, Wallace. Four Worthies: John Chamberlain, Anne Clifford, John Taylor, Oliver Heywood. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957.
- Parker, Geoffrey. After Columbus: Spain's Struggle for Atlantic Hegemony. The Lawrence Brewster Lecture in History, XI. Greenville, NC: East Carolina University, 1992.
- . The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
- . The Dutch Revolt. Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1977.
- . ed. Spain and the Netherlands, 1559-1659; Ten Studies. London: Collins, 1979.
- . ed. The Thirty Years' War. London: Routledge, 1984.
- Polisensky, J.V. The Thirty Years War. Robert Evans, trans. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.
- and Frederick Snider. War and Society in Europe, 1618-1648. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

- Pollard, A.W. and G.R. Redgrave, compilers. A Short-Title Catalogue of Books Printed in England, Scotland, and Ireland and of English Books Printed Abroad 1475-1640. 3 vols. London: The Bibliographic Society, 1926, 1950, 1991.
- Preston, Richard A. and Sydney F. Wise. Men in Arms; A History of Warfare and Its Inter relationships with Western Society. 4th ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1979.
- Rabb, Theodore K. The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Ranke, Leopold von. The History of the Popes. E. Foster, trans. 3 vols. Bohn's Standard Library. London: Bell & Daldy, 1873.
- Reay, Barry, ed. Popular Culture in Seventeenth-Century England. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.
- Reeve, L.J. Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Richmond, H.W. Statesmen and Seapower. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946.
- Roberts, Michael. The Swedish Imperial Experience 1560-1718. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- Rose, J.H., A.P. Newton, & E.A. Benians, eds. Cambridge History of the British Empire. Vol I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929.
- Ross, Josephine. The Winter Queen: The Story of Elizabeth Stuart. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989.
- Rowse, A.L. The Expansion of Elizabethan England. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955.
- Russell, Conrad. The Crisis of Parliaments, English History 1509-1660. The Short Oxford History of the Modern World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- Seaton, M.E. Literary Relations of England and Scandanavia in the Seventeenth-Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935.

- Sharpe, Kevin, ed. Faction and Parliament: Essays on Early Stuart History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Sommerville, Johann P. Politics and Ideology in England, 1603-1640. London: Longman, 1986.
- Stoye, John Walter. English Travellers Abroad, 1604-1667, Their Influence in English Society and Politics. New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1968.
- Stone, Lawrence. The Crisis of the Aristocracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Stradling, R.A. Philip IV and the Government of Spain 1621-1665. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Tawney, R.H. Business and Politics under James I; Lionel Cranfield as Merchant and Minister. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958.
- _____. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1926.
- Thorpe, Malcolm R. and Arthur J. Slavin, eds. Politics, Religion & Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe- Essays in Honor of De Lamar Jensen. Vol. XXVII, Sixteenth Century Essays & Studies. Kirksville, MO: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, Inc., 1994.
- Todd, Margo, ed. Reformation to Revolution; Politics and Religion in Early Modern England. Rewriting Histories Series. London: Routledge, 1995.
- Tomlinson, Howard, ed. Before the English Civil War; Essays on Early Stuart Politics and Government. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.
- Trevor-Roper, H.R., ed. Catholics, Anglicans and Puritans: Seventeenth Century Essays. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987.
- _____. The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century, Religion, the Reformation and Social Change. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1956.

van Creveld, Martin L. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Scribner's, 1930.

Wedgewood, C.V. Richelieu and the French Monarchy. London: English University Press Ltd., 1949.

_____. The Thirty Years' War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939.

Wernham, R.B. After the Armada : Elizabethian England and the Struggle for Western Europe, 1588-1595. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

_____. Before the Armada: The Emergence of the English Nation, 1485-1588. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966.

Willson, David Harris. James VI and I. London: Jonathan Cape, 1956.

Zophy, Jon W., ed. The Holy Roman Empire; A Dictionary Handbook. New York: Greenwood Press, 1980.

Dissertations & Articles in Books

Anderson, Alison D. The Julich-Kleve Succession Crisis (1609-1620): A Study in International Relations. PhD dissertation. University of Illinois-Urbana, 1992.

Barrett, Barney. Hoc est corpus meum : a Theological Controversey and a Synthesis of Ideas in England. MA Thesis. East Carolina University, 1994.

Cobb, William H. French Diplomatic Relations with Spain: 1632-1635. PhD dissertation. Tulane University, 1970.

Grayson, Christopher. " James I and the Religious Crisis in the United Provinces 1613-19." In Reform and Reformation: England and the Continent c1500-c1750, ed. Derek Baker, 195-220. Studies in Church History, Subsidia 2. The Ecclesiastical History Society. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979.

Platt, John. "Eirenical Anglicans at the Synod of Dort." In Reform and Reformation: England and the Continent c1500-c1750, ed. Derek Baker, 221-244. Studies in Church History, Subsidia 2. The Ecclesiastical History Society. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979.

Raitt, Jill. "Elizabeth of England, John Casimir, and the Protestant League." In Controversy and Conciliation: The Reformation and the Palatinate, 1559-1583, ed. Derek Visser, 117-145. Allison Park, PA: Pickwick Publications, 1986.

Periodicals

Ashton, Robert. "Deficit Finance in the Reign of James I." Economic History Review. 2nd series, Vol X (1957): 15-29.

Beller, E.A. "The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference of Hamburg, 1638-40." English Historical Review. XLI (1926): 61-77.

Brauer, Jerald C. "Reflections on the Nature of English Puritanism." Church History. XXIII, No. 2 (1954): 99-108.

Brightwell, P. "Spain and Bohemia, the Decision to Intervene, 1619." European Studies Review. 12 (1982): 117-41.

———. "Spain, Bohemia, and Europe, 1619-21." European Studies Review. 12 (1982): 371-97.

Carrafiello, Michael L. "English Catholicism and the Jesuit Mission of 1580-1581." The Historical Journal. 37, No. 4 (1994): 761-774.

———. "Robert Parsons' Climate of Resistance and the Gunpowder Plot." The Seventeenth Century. III, No. 2 (1988): 115-134.

Elliot, J.H. "A Question of Reputation ? Spanish Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth Century." Journal of Modern History. 55 (1983): 475-83.

Fincham, Kenneth and Peter Lake. "The Ecclesiastical Policy of King James I." Journal of British Studies. Vol. 24, No.2 (1985): 169-207.

- Foster, Herbert D. "The Political Theories of Calvinists Before the Puritan Exodus to America." American Historical Review. XXI, No. 3 (1916): 481-503.
- Macalpine, Ida and Richard Hunter. "Porphyria and King George III." Scientific American. CCXXI, No. 1 (1969): 38-46.
- Mosse, George L. "Puritan Political Thought and the 'Cases of Conscience'." Church History. XXIII, No.2 (1954): 109-118.
- Palmer, William. "Ireland and English Foreign Policy in the 1570s." The Historian. Vol. 58, No. 1 (1995): 87-100.
- Shriver, Frederick. "Hampton Court Re-visited: James I and the Puritans." Journal of Ecclesiastical History. Vol. 33, No. 1 (1982): 48-71.
- _____. "Orthodoxy and diplomacy: James I and the Vorstius affair." English Historical Review. LXXXV (1970): 459-474.
- Simpson, Alan. "Saints in Arms : English Puritanism as Political Utopianism." Church History. XXIII, No. 2 (1954): 119-125.
- William, Patrick. " Phillip III and the Restoration of Spanish Government, 1593-1603." English Historical Review. 88 (1973): 751-69.
- Wormald, Jenny. " Gunpowder, Treason, and Scots." Journal of British Studies. Vol. 24, No. 2 (1985): 141-168.
- Zaller, R. "Interest of State, James I and the Palatinate." Albion. VI (1974): 144-75.

APPENDIX: Table of Jacobean Royal Finance, 1603-1621

	Income	Expenses		Deficit	Debt	Notes
		Ordinary	Extraordinary			
1606	£ 314,959	£ 366,790	£ 100,000	£ 81,831	£ 735,000	#’s 1-6
1608	£ 366,000	£ 475,000	£ 198,000	£ 178,000	£ 597,337	#’s 7-9
1610	£ 460,000	£ 517,000		£ 130,000	£ 280,000	#’s 10-14
1613			£ 176,000	£ 160,000	£ 500,000	#’s 15-17
1614		£ 522,940			£ 680,000	#’s 18-19
1615					£ 700,000	
1617				£ 30,000-ordinary only		# 20
1618					£ 900,000+	
1621				£ -45,000	£ 829,000	# 21

Notes

- 1) In 1603, income from Crown lands was at a high of £ 88,000, would reach an all time low in 1628 of £ 10,000. Also, Elizabeth had sold off £ 372,000 worth of Crown lands between 1598-1603.
- 2) From 1606-1611, £ 120,000 of Income was from the Great Farm of Customs.
- 3) Of the £ 366,790 in expenses in 1606, £ 40,000 was in presents and annuities.
- 4) The £ 100,000 for extraordinary expenses in 1606 was a normal average.
- 5) Included in the £ 735,000 debit in 1606 was £ 400,000 inherited from Elizabeth, as well as £ 104,000 of debt from 1603-5, and £ 231,280 in new debt from 1606.
- 6) Parliament voted James 3 subsidies and 6 fifteenths and tenths in 1606 amounting to £ 453,000 over four years, for a total of £ 1,105,419 by 1610.
- 7) 1608 includes £ 98,000 of extraordinary expenses for Ulster (other years ?).

- 8) James sold £ 426,151 worth of Crown lands in 1608.
- 9) Cecil began to assess Impositions after 1608
- 10) Income in 1610 was represented as £ 163,000 from lands and miscellaneous, £ 177,000 from old customs and impositions, and £ 70,000 in new impositions.
- 11) Of the £ 517,000 in expenses in 1610, £ 50,000+ was in presents and annuities.
- 12) In 1610, the four year cumulative deficit was £ 334,332.
- 13) The £ 280,000 debt in 1610 was what remained after the relief granted in 1606, and included a £120,000 Elizabethan forced loan that had just come due.
- 14) James sold an additional £ 445,000 worth of Crown lands between 1609-10.
- 15) From 1611-1613 the Great Farm of Customs brought in £ 136,000 annually.
- 16) Extraordinary expenses in 1613 included £ 16,000 for Prince Henry's funeral, as well as £ 60,000 for Princess Elizabeth's wedding to Frederick of the Palatinate.
- 17) There was a partial redemption of Henri of Navarre's (Henri IV's) debt in 1613.
- 18) From 1614-1621 the Great Farm of Customs brought in £ 140,000 annually.
- 19) The £ 522,940 in ordinary expenses in 1614 were the highest of James' reign.
- 20) James was paid £ 215,000 in 1616 for the return of the Dutch cautionary towns.
- 21) There was an ordinary surplus of £ 45,000 in 1621.

Table compiled from: Robert Ashton, *The Crown and the Money Market* (1960), Ashton, "Deficit Finance in the Reign of James I" *EHR* (1957), S.R. Gardiner, *History of England 1603-1642* (1905), and D.H. Willson, *King James VI and I* (1956).