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OPERATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
IN THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION: 1899-1902

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of History
East Carolina University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in History

by
Robert L. Capeci
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Robert L. Capeci. OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS IN THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION: 1899-1902. (Under the direction of William N. Still, Jr.) Department of History, East Carolina University, May 1975.

The purpose of this study is to examine the role performed by American marine units during the Philippine Insurrection; to analyze the problems they encountered in conventional military combat tactics, counter-guerrilla operations, and civilian pacification tasks; and to evaluate their achievements.

A close examination of American military history will clearly indicate that this nation's involvement in small, limited, guerrilla wars is not a recent phenomenon. On the contrary, the armed forces of the United States have a wealth of such experiences which bear a striking resemblance to many political-military clashes of the post-World War Two era. Consider such past conflicts as the wars with the Barbary pirates, the wars against the American Plains Indian, the Boxer Rebellion, and the Mexican and Caribbean interventions in the first three decades of this century. Each was small in expenditure of national and economic resources, each was limited in political objectives in that the total destruction of the adversary was not a prerequisite for victory, and each required combat operations against irregular or partisan land and/or naval forces, i.e., a guerrilla war.

The Philippine Insurrection was such a conflict, and further, its nature was that of a war of national liberation directed by Asians against a Western power, and carried out in a jungle terrain. It is for these reasons that this particular conflict has been chosen.

Although the American army and navy had actively engaged in hostilities against the Filipino insurgent, the focus of this paper is on the combat operations of the United States Marine Corps because of their widely varied experiences. Their mission involved them in land actions which included conventional military battles, anti-guerrilla campaigns, and civilian pacification activities. Moreover, the diverse nature of these seaborne soldiers also suited them for naval, amphibious, and riverine operations.

The writer believes that the military and political lessons learned firsthand by these American regulars are highly relevant and deserve examination in our contemporary world.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	GEOPOLITICAL BACKGROUND.	1
II.	MILITARY BACKGROUND.	50
III.	"TRADITIONAL READINESS".	83
IV.	"AVENGE OUR LATE COMRADES"	113
V.	"STAND GENTLEMEN -- HE SERVED ON SAMAR". . . .	160
VI.	"CHARGE: MURDER"	197
VII.	"PUNISH TREACHERY WITH DEATH".	231
VIII.	"I AM NOT A MURDERER".	262
IX.	CONCLUSIONS.	297
	APPENDIX "A"	332
	APPENDIX "B"	342
	APPENDIX "C"	343
	APPENDIX "D"	344
	APPENDIX "E"	345
	APPENDIX "F"	348
	APPENDIX "G"	351
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	352

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
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APPROXIMATE SCALE OF MILES
PACIFIC OCEAN
SULU SEA
VISAYAN SEA
CELEBES SEA
Mindoro Strait
Hinatuan Channel
Surigao Strait
Surigao Sea
Mindanao Sea
Illana Bay
Davao Gulf
Sarangani Channel
Basilan Strait
Balabac Strait
Lagonoy Gulf
Lamon Bay
Ragay Gulf
Gingoog Bay
Iligan Bay
Gulf of Davao
LUZON
MINDORO
PALAWAN
MINDANAO
NEGROS
CEBU
BOHOL
PANAY
MASBATE
ILOILO
CAPIZ
CATANDUANES
CAMARINES
ALBAY
SORSOGON
ROMBLON
CUYO IS.
CALAMIANES ISLANDS
CAGAYAN
PUERTO PRINCESA
SULU ARCHIPELAGO
TAWI TAWI
SANGAMANO
BASILAN
SARANGANI Is.
C San Agustin
DINAGAT
SURIGAO
BORNEO
BRITISH NORTH BORNEO
MOROTAI

CHAPTER I

GEOPOLITICAL BACKGROUND

"Take up the White Man's burden --
And reap his old reward:
The blame of those ye better,
The hate of those ye guard . . . ."

-- From "The White Man's Burden" by Rudyard Kipling.

"There was nothing left for us to do,
but to take them all, and to educate
the Filipinos, and to uplift and
civilize and Christianize them . . . ."

-- President William McKinley, 1898.

At the height of the western colonialist era American soldiers sailed to a distant archipelago to impose the Stars and Stripes over a brownskinned population. Instead of the fond welcome that was expected, the doughboys were soon faced with a full fledged rebellion. To those familiar with the history of the Philippines, the Insurrection came as no surprise. The Islands were uniquely positioned at the approach to the Orient, and its people had been influenced not only by its intimate contact with Asia, but by more than three centuries of European domination. This chapter will present a concise review of the geographical, political, and historical factors that brought Americans and Filipinos muzzle to muzzle.

The Philippine Land

Perhaps the major reason for international interest in the Philippine Islands is its uniquely sensitive geographical

position, lying slightly above the equator off the southeastern coast of the Asian mainland.

The archipelago consists of 7,083 islands and islets which stretch for nearly a thousand miles north to south. The islands are divided into three geographic areas: Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao and Sulu which have a land area totaling more than 114,000 square miles.[1]

The Islands' long irregular coastline -- twice as long as that of the continental United States -- gives to the Philippines the advantage of natural harbors capable of handling large ships, and Manila Bay is rated as one of the finest natural harbors in the world.[2]

The lush valleys and fertile plains explain the richness that is characteristic of the archipelago's agricultural resources. The large domestic demand for rice can be met without relying on imports,[3] and the forests covering the islands produce first-rate lumber for local and export use. In the 1890's exports included copra, abaca, gums, resins,

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1 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, A Short History of the Philippines (1969), p. 7, hereinafter cited as Agoncillo, Short History; W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands (1928), I, 4, hereinafter cited as Forbes, Philippine Islands; David Bernstein, The Philippine Story (1947), p. 3, hereinafter cited as Bernstein, Philippine Story; The Philippines (1945), p. 1, hereinafter cited as The Philippines.

2 Agoncillo, Short History, pp. 7-8.

3 Ibid.

sugar, lumber, copper, gold, iron, zinc, chromium, manganese, and nonmetalic minerals: salt, clay, asbestos, sulfur, gypsum, etc.[4]

The climate caused considerable discomfort to the American army, however, who found that except for some mountainous areas, the temperature never fell below eighty degrees Farenheit. Generally there were three seasons: the "cool" season from October to March; the torrid hot and dry season from March to June that features an intense tropical sun; and from June to October the rainy season descends with a continual downpour that floods rivers and streams, rots uniforms and equipment, and turns roads into muddy slush.[5]

The Philippine People

The near four hundred years of Spanish domination have given the Filipino an outward appearance of Western culture.

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[4] Senate committee report of November 30, 1898, Report on Financial and Industrial Conditions in the Philippine Islands, United States Senate document number 169, of the 3rd session of the 55th Congress, XI, 18-26, hereinafter all Senate documents will be cited as SD followed by document number, Congressional number, session, binding volume, part (if applicable), and page. For more information on the Island's natural resources see Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, 12-14; Bernstein, Philippine Story, pp. 7-10; Agoncillo, Short History, p. 8; The Philippines, pp. 5-10.

[5] R. Ernest Dupuy and William H. Bauner, The Little Wars of the United States (1968), p. 71, hereinafter cited as Dupuy, Little Wars. See also Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, 5; Bernstein, Philippine Story, pp. 10-11; Agoncillo, Short History, p. 8; The Philippines, p. 1.

This often leads to a serious misunderstanding of the Filipino. The original occupants of the Philippine archipelago migrated from Malaya, and the Asian countries have had intimate contact with the Islands for countless centuries. The outward garb of the Filipino may be Western but inwardly he is still Asian.[6] The Americans at the beginning of this century failed to grasp that the Spanish occupation did not erase the basically Malayan culture, nor the eighty-seven distinct Malayo-Polynesian languages.[7]

The Filipino is guided in his daily actions by a basic fatalistic philosophy. Through it he can face disaster and tragedy with almost indifferent resignation. Personal misfortune, political graft and corruption, or national crisis stir little more than impassiveness. It is precisely this attitude, however, that keeps him sane.[8]

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[6] Agoncillo, Short History, p. 8.

[7] House committee report of March 20, 1921, Report of the Special Mission on Investigation to the Philippine Islands, 1921, United States House document number 325 of the 2nd session of the 67th Congress, CXVII, 6, hereinafter all House documents will be cited HD followed by document number, Congressional number, session, binding volume, part (if applicable), and page; Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, 14-16; Bernstein, Philippine Story, pp. 10-11; Agoncillo, Short History, p. 8; The Philippines, pp. 1-2.

[8] Agoncillo, Short History, p. 9.

Observers quickly note the Filipino's strong sense of loyalty towards family and friends, an overwhelming hospitality toward strangers, and a strict code of honor. He has also been known to possess an oversensitivity to criticism, no matter how valid, an indolence that goes beyond a reaction to tropical conditions, and a notorious tendency toward violence. The latter often leads to intra-community vendettas and has contributed to the intense regionalism throughout Philippine history.[9]

Early Philippine History

The record of man on the Philippine archipelago extends to at least some 22,000 years ago when primitive Asians traveled on land bridges -- formed, theorize the geologists, as a result of low sea level during the ice age -- and settled in the island chain.[10] The post-ice age melting submerged the land bridges some 7,000 years ago, but sea-going adventurers from Southeast Asia soon commenced to populate the islands.[11] Succeeding waves of non-European travelers continued to settle the islands up to the fifteenth century. Foremost among these settlers were the Chinese and the Malays. The influence of the former, named

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[9] Ibid., pp. 9, 11-13.

[10] Ibid., pp. 16-17.

[11] Ibid., p. 17; The Philippines, pp. 11-12.

"Sangleys" by the Spanish,[12] was chiefly economic for most of the Chinese who migrated to the Philippines were economic men whose principle motive lay not in colonization, but in profits.[13] The Malays, themselves Islamized by Arab traders, brought a Muslim culture to parts of the Islands; their descendants in the Philippines were later derogatorily referred to as "Moros" by the Spanish.[14]

The Philippine's Contact With the West

Spain's involvement with the Philippine archipelago began when Magellan's fleet stopped at Samar in 1521.[15] Shortly thereafter the name "Felipinas" was given to the island chain,[16] and by the end of the sixteenth century

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12 Agoncillo, Short History, p. 47.

13 Ibid., p. 20; Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, 30-31, 41.

14 Bernstein, Philippine Story, p. 13; Agoncillo, Short History, pp. 19-20, 46.

15 Bernstein, Philippine Story, pp. 32-34; Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, 32-33. Agoncillo, Short History, p. 31, notes that Magellan and many of his crew were massacred by Filipinos who became disenchanted with the actions of the Spaniards.

16 It is noted by Agoncillo, Short History, p. 32, that originally the name "Felipinas" pertained only to the islands of Samar and Leyete. See also Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, xiii.

Spanish control extended throughout most of the archipelago.[17] This control soon came to be centered in the person of the local Spanish friar, and the separation of Church and State never developed.[18]

Although the natives were Christianized by Spain, this did little to reverse the traditional lack of a strong Philippine national unity or political structure.[19] On the contrary, Spanish rule allowed the Filipino to exist through more than two centuries of political stagnation and political corruption.[20]

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17 Paul H. Clyde, The Far East; A History of the Impact of the West on Eastern Asia (1952), p. 280; hereinafter cited as Clyde, Far East. It is noted in Agoncillo, Short History, p. 37, that many Filipinos were never effectively controlled by the Spaniards, such as the inhabitants in Luzon's Mountain Province, Mindanao, Sulu, the interior of all the large islands, and almost all of the Muslims.

18 John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags (1973), p. 8, hereinafter cited as Gates, Schoolbooks; John Clifford, History of the Pioneer Battalion at Guam, L.I., 1899 and the Campaign in Samar, P.I., 1901 (1914), pp. 57-58, hereinafter cited as Clifford, Pioneer Battalion; Bernstein, Philippine Story, pp. 20, 39-43; Clyde, Far East, p. 280; Agoncillo, Short History, pp. 50-56, 59-60.

19 Clyde, Far East, p. 280. Agoncillo, Short History, p. 45, notes that the Spanish used the tactic of "divide and rule" to control the Filipinos by emphasizing tribal and sectional rivalries.

20 Clyde, Far East, p. 280; Bernstein, Philippine Story, pp. 36-37. Agoncillo, Short History, p. 60, cites foreign traveler's accounts which describe the Spanish colonial government in the Philippines as generally inefficient, dishonest, and ignorant.

In the field of education, the Spanish printed numerous works, generally church-orientated, and the friars were responsible for teaching the Filipino the art of engraving and printing. In addition, the Spaniards must be credited for preparing and publishing the lexicographies of the Philippine languages.[21] On the other hand, they must be held accountable for their failure to teach the Spanish language, and for the hard fact that less than five percent of the Filipinos were taught to read or write in any language.[22] A "heritage of ignorance" is the way one scholar describes the contribution of Spanish learning.[23]

Economic progress under the Spaniards was painfully slow for agricultural methods remained primitive until well into the nineteenth century. In addition, the commercial potential of the Philippines was curtailed because of excessive Spanish restrictions on trade.[24]

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21 Agoncillo, Short History, p. 54.

22 Bernstein, Philippine Story, p. 37; Agoncillo, Short History, p. 59.

23 Agoncillo, Short History, p. 55, quoting Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera. Agoncillo maintains that the Spaniards feared an educated Filipino populace and that liberal and rebellious were considered synonymous terms (p. 58).

24 Clyde, Far East, p. 280. Edgar Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850-1898 (1965), p. 134,

A Time of Reform

In light of nineteenth century political awakening within Spain, and the liberal movement for democracy throughout Europe, it is not surprising that the brew of revolution was also fermenting in the Philippine Islands.[25]

Moreover the Suez Canal opened in 1869 thereby shortening considerably the distance from Spain to the Philippines, with the result that many liberal-minded Spaniards migrated to the islands. Thus at a time when more natives were in college, they were exposed to new ideas and reading material from Europe. At the same time even the most elite Filipino was chaffing at the Spanish assumption of superiority as well as the religious intolerance, cruelty, and corruption.[26]

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makes the claim that the gulf between the lower and upper class Filipino was intensified because of the Hispanization of the islands. For a favorable view of Spain's colonial influences, see Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, 47-49.

25 Agoncillo, Short History, p. 68. The Philippine uprisings against Spain and later America, says John T Farrell, "An Abandoned Approach to Philippine History: John Taylor and the Philippine Insurrection Records," The Catholic Review, XXXIX (January, 1954), 386-88, were not European type of wars of independence, but rather a twentieth century phenomenon that was taking place throughout Asia, i.e., a struggle against western control.

26 Agoncillo, Short History, pp. 45, 47. This author further explains that Philippine resistance to Spanish rule did not originate in the 19th century, and he cites conflicts as early as 1574 (pp. 44-45). Revolts of varying intensities are noted in years 1807, 1811, 1814, 1820, 1828,

The dissenters of the 1870-80's were not revolutionaries but conservative reformers; they insisted not upon independence, but that the Philippines be accepted as a province of Spain with the accompanying Spanish citizenship. Not the least of their demands was for the end of the despised friar domination of Philippine political and economic life.[27]

When workers revolted at Cavite in 1872 over the imposition of tribute upon the Filipinos, the Spanish colonial rulers chose to view the confrontation as a rebellion aimed at overthrowing the government. They overresponded with a swift crackdown on the freedoms of press and thought. Many native priests, writers, lawyers, and prominent citizens who were known to be connected with the secularization movement were quickly rounded up and handed death sentences, imprisonment or exile.[28] These actions proved efficient, but the long result was to produce a discontented, angry

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1837, 1844, 1854, 1863, 1869, and 1872, according to Austin Craig and Conrado Benitiz, Philippine Progress Prior to 1898 (1916), pp. 128-29.

27 "Testimony Taken by the Philippine Commission Relating to Religious Orders," July 31 to August 4, 1900, SD 190, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 47-91; Agoncillo, Short History, pp. 72, 76, 80.

28 Agoncillo, Short History, pp. 68-69, states that well known leaders were publically put to death by means of the garrot.

generation of Filipinos now even more dedicated to reform. Eventually Spain's refusal to acknowledge (except in censorship) the voices of native reformists led many Filipinos to view favorably armed revolution as a solution. "Insurrection," wrote one noted Filipino author of the period, "is the last remedy, especially when the people have acquired the belief that peaceful means to secure the remedies for evil proved futile."[29]

A Time of Revolution

By the early 1890's the Filipino leadership was gradually shifting from those conservative reformers, the educated native, to the radical revolutionaries who were plebeian and espoused independence by violent means.[30] An example of the latter group was a new secret society named the Katipunan. Its full name was the Kataastaasang Katipunan nang manga An ak nany Bayan which translates as the Highest and Most Respectable Society of the Sons of

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29 Ibid., p. 73, quoting Marcelo H. del Pilar. See also Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, 51-60; Bernstein, Philippine Story, ch. iv.

30 Maximo M. Kalaw, The Development of Philippine Politics, 1872-1920 (1927), chs. iii-v, hereinafter cited as Kalaw, Philippine Politics; George A. Malcom, The Government of the Philippine Islands (1916), chs. iii-v, hereinafter cited as Malcom, The Government of the Philippine Islands; James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines (1914), I, 42-147; Agoncillo, Short History, pp. 79-81.

the People.[31] None of the members were wealthy or belonged to the intelligentsia, and at best were small merchants and clerks with little in common with the middle class. An early member of this organization was Emilio Aguinaldo, and he assisted the society's efforts at preparing for revolution. Because of the secrecy of Katipunan, its membership did not exceed three hundred by December, 1895, but by the time of the revolution in August, 1896, the number had climbed to ten thousand eager members. The reformers, however, disowned the actions and statements of these radicals and continued to maintain that freedom was possible through nonviolent means.[32] The people, however, put their support by the thousands behind the revolutionaries; the Katipunan was succeeding where the reformist societies had failed.[33]

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31 "The Philippine Insurrection, 1896-1898," from Spanish publications compiled by Major John S. Mallory, U.S.A., HD 2, 58th Cong., 2nd sess., IV, Appenidx VIII, 399, hereinafter cited as "Philippine Insurrection, 1896-1898;" Dupuy, Little Wars, p. 83; Agoncillo, Short History, pp. 71-81; Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, 54-55, Bernstein, Philippine Story, p. 60.

32 Bernstein, Philippine Story, pp. 53-59; Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, 52-55. Agoncillo, Short History, pp. 80-81, quotes Jose Rizal, a leading Filipino reformer, that armed revolution was "in the highest degree absurd and, what is worse, disastrous for us (p. 85)."

33 Agoncillo, Short History, p. 80.

The Philippine revolt of 1896 was a premature effort which occurred in August only because of the Spaniards' discovery of revolutionary preparations. The Katipunan triggered the rebellion in hopes of preventing the total destruction of their movement by the Spanish police.[34] The rebel activities were most intense among the Tagalog-speaking inhabitants of central Luzon with its center in Cavite Province about twenty miles southwest of Manila. After a brief taste of success, the rebels were thrown back by a Spanish offensive. The Filipinos then changed their methods from open conventional warfare to guerrilla tactics, avoiding large clashes in favor of harassing small Spanish forces.

A year after the revolt began rivalries fractured the rebel leadership, and the Spanish army had surrounded a large contingent of rebels in the mountains of central Luzon. Although the revolutionaries appeared to be at the end of their rope, the Spaniards were still faced with rugged, unfamiliar terrain, and a fiercely determined, if badly armed, enemy hiding in the brush. Negotiation was suggested by neutral Filipinos, and by December of 1897

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[34] Clyde, Far East, p. 281. This author points out that ironically, the reformer but anti-revolutionary Jose Rizal was unjustly executed for inspiring the uprisings, thereby becoming a Filipino martyr and national hero. Full details of the 1896 revolt are in "Philippine Insurrection, 1896-1898," pp. 399-425.

both parties had signed a three-document peace agreement.[35]

Aguinaldo, whose military successes had elevated him to leadership in the revolutionary movement,[36] agreed to the Spanish demand that he and twenty-seven of his associates go into exile in Hong Kong in return for four hundred thousand pesos paid immediately, and another payment of two hundred thousand pesos later. In addition the Spaniards agreed to issue a general amnesty for rebel Filipinos and to use a sum of nine hundred thousand pesos as indemnity for natives who "suffered the evils of war." Aguinaldo's major demand was the inactment of major reforms, although such reforms were never part of a written agreement.[37]

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[35] "Philippine Insurrection, 1896-1898," p. 428; "Treaty of Peace," SD 62, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., VIII, pt. 2, 421; Agoncillo, Short History, pp. 87-102; Clyde, Far East, p. 281; Bernstein, Philippine Story, pp. 61-63; Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, 58-59.

[36] Agoncillo, Short History, p. 92. This author quoted de Tavera, who knew Aguinaldo, and described General Aguinaldo as an excellent soldier, but possessing much less ability as a diplomat -- "when he was spoken to about foreign policy or political affairs he seemed to be entirely at a loss." For more on Aguinaldo, see Bernstein, Philippine Story, pp. 60-62.

[37] "Philippine Insurrection, 1896-1898," p. 428; Emilio Aguinaldo, "True Review of the Philippine Revolution," Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 1902, XXXV, pt. 8, Appendix, 440-46; Malcom, The Government of the Philippine Islands, chs. iii-iv; Kalaw, Philippine Politics,

The truce was short lived as both sides showed bad faith,[38] and by February of 1898 the situation had deteriorated enough to cause the American counsul to cable Washington that "war exists." He added that "battles are of almost daily occurrence. Prisoners are brought here and shot without a trial, and Manila is under martial law . . . ."[39]

Moreover, this latest revolutionary response differed with preceeding Philippine revolts in that the uprisings were now spreading from Luzon to the other islands, and many of the previously uncommitted educated Filipinos were now espousing the cause of independence.[40] The rebels were further encouraged by the possibility of war between Spain

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chs. iii-iv; Agoncillo, Short History, p. 103. Whether such verbal agreements about reforms were ever given to Aguinaldo has never been fully resolved and cannot be substantiated by revolutionary sources. For more on the Filipino version of the agreements, see Leandro H. Fernandez, A Brief History of the Philippines (1919), p. 251; Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, 59.

38 "Philippine Insurrection, 1896-1898," pp. 423-24; Agoncillo, Short History, p. 103. The revolutionaries failed to turn in all of their arms, and the Spaniards conducted mass arrests of suspected revolutionaries.

39 U.S. Consul Oscar F. Williams to Mr. Cridler, February 22, 1898, SD 62, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., VIII, pt. 2, 319-20. See also Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, 55-59, II, 354.

40 Leandro H. Fernandez, The Philippine Republic (1926), pp. 48-50.

and the United States. "The most important problem with which this government is now called upon to deal pertaining to its foreign relations," stated President McKinley to Congress in December, 1897, "concerns its duty toward Spain and the Cuban insurrection."[41]

In exile Emilio Aguinaldo was observing the situation taking place in his homeland and spent the money given to him by the Spaniards, not for personal luxuries, but to finance purchases of arms and ammunition for future revolutionary activities. He perceived that the salvation for the Philippines lay in hostilities between the United States and Spain; the latter already nearly paralyzed with two bloody colonial revolutions.[42]

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[41] Quoted from President McKinley's annual message, Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., 1897, XXXI, p. 1, 3.

[42] Major General F.V. Greene, "Memoranda . . .," September 30, 1898, SD 62, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., VIII, pt. 2, 421; Bernstein, Philippine Story, p. 65; Forbes, Philippine Islands, I, 60. Agoncillo, Short History, p. 107, notes that the reason Aguinaldo left Hong Kong for Singapore in April, 1898, was to avoid a court hearing brought against him by a fellow exile who desired that 400,000 pesos paid by Spain be divided and shared by each exile. For a generally uncomplimentary view of the characters and motivations of the Philippine revolutionary leaders, see John R.M. Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States -- A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introduction (1906), I, ch. i, hereinafter cited as Taylor, Philippine Insurrection; John Foreman, The Philippine Islands, 2nd ed., (1899), pp. 550-57.

The Spanish-American War and the Philippines

To the American public a war with Spain seemed inevitable because of her long record of corruption, oppression and brutality in the colonial rule of Cuba. When on February 15, 1898, the USS Maine was destroyed in Havana harbor, the public outcry could no longer be avoided, and on April 20, 1898, Congress passed a joint resolution which precipitated the war with Spain. To make it plain that America had no colonialistic motivations, the Teller Amendment -- which stated that the United States had no designs on Cuba and would withdraw upon freeing Cuba from Spain -- was passed without Congressional opposition.[43]

Shortly after war began, the American fleet struck, not off Cuba, but in Manila Bay on the opposite side of the globe. It was no accident that a United States naval squadron was in ideal strategic position, nor that it was commanded by Commodore George Dewey. In October, 1897, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, selected Commodore Dewey to command the Asiatic squadron because Dewey shared Roosevelt's thinking on the expansion of the navy and on war with Spain. It was also Roosevelt

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[43] John A. Garraty, The American Nation, 2nd ed., (1971), p. 723, hereinafter cited as Garraty, The American Nation. Of the 266 crew members who went down with the USS Maine, Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea (1962), p. 11, hereinafter cited as Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, states that twenty-eight of the victims were marines.

who ordered Dewey in February, 1898, to move the fleet from Japan to Hong Kong in order to be able to take prompt offensive action against the Spanish naval forces that were based in Manila Bay in the event of war with Spain.[44]

Meanwhile, the Filipinos watched the turn of events with mixed emotions. Some clung to a loyalty toward Spain while others saw the occasion as an opportunity for independence. The exiled revolutionary leaders in Singapore[45] were naturally in the latter group -- Aguinaldo was later to receive and turn down a tempting offer from the Spanish for his allegiance[46] -- but they had some misgivings about the intentions of the Americans in the Philippines.

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[44] Agoncillo, Short History, p. 105; Annual report of the Secretary of the Navy to the President, November 15, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI, 6, hereinafter cited as Sec. Nav. Report, followed by the appropriate Congressional document and page number. For information concerning the choice of Dewey for the assignment in the Pacific, see George Dewey, Autobiography of George Dewey (1916), pp. 167-70. For a concise discussion of the controversy as to whether Dewey's order to attack the Spanish fleet in Manila was a premeditated plot with colonial designs, see Armin Rappaport (ed.), "Taking the Philippines: Design or Drift," Issues in American Diplomacy (1965), II, pp. 67-90, hereinafter cited as Rappaport, "Design or Drift."

[45] Agoncillo, Short History, p. 107, points out that the exiles left Hong Kong on April 23, 1898.

[46] William Thaddeus Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism (1939), p. 29, hereinafter cited as Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun.

To assure Aguinaldo that he need not be suspicious of the United States, the American consul-general in Singapore, E. Spencer Pratt, pointed to the Platt Amendment, and apparently gave pledges promising Filipino independence. The rebel leader then agreed to return to the Philippines for the purpose of leading his people against the Spaniards. Following the meeting Pratt telegraphed Dewey: "Aguinaldo insurgent leader, here. Will come Hong Kong arrange with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired." Dewey, apparently aware of Aguinaldo's prestige with the insurgents quickly replied to Pratt, "Tell Aguinaldo to come as soon as possible."[47]

Dewey was forced to sail before Aguinaldo's arrival in Hong Kong, but he sent the gunboat McCullock to pick up the rebel leader and bring him to Manila. Prior to leaving, Aguinaldo placed orders for rifles and ammunition with Rounseville Wildman, the American consul-general at Hong Kong.[48]

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47 Pratt to Dewey, April 24, 1898, Dewey to Pratt, April 24, 1898, SD 62 , 55th Cong., 3rd sess., VIII, 341-42. See also official communications in ibid., pp. 333-34, 340, 345, 352. Consul-general Pratt was later reprimanded by the U.S. State Department for encouraging a "Cuba Libre" type policy for the Philippines, William R. Day to Pratt, July 20, 1898, ibid., pp. 356-57.

48 Dewey to Sec. Nav., May 20, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, Appendix, 100; Dewey to Senate committee, June 26, 1902, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 3, XXV,

With four cruisers and two gunboats, Dewey steamed his now well-drilled force across the South China Sea, and at daybreak of May 1, 1898, he opened fire on the Spanish fleet anchored in Manila Bay. In a swift, one-sided battle all ten of the Spanish warships lay destroyed with Dewey's force virtually untouched.[49]

Although Dewey did send his marines ashore to secure the Spanish naval base at Cavite, he had no suitable land force to pursue the Spanish Army or occupy the islands. Dewey, who had in mind "simply taking possession of the city" recommended to Washington "a well-equipped force of 5,000 men."[50]

Meanwhile, Aguinaldo had arrived and quickly set up a revolutionary government which named him as president, adopted a constitution, and proclaimed in effect a declaration of independence from Spain. The Filipinos were

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2927. Agoncillo, Short History, p. 108, refers to the arms shipments and notes that the first shipment was carried out, but that a second, without either explanation or reimbursement, was not.

49 Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI, 6; Dewey to Sec. Nav., May 4, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, Appendix, 70; Garraty, The American Nation, p. 723. For the Spanish view of the naval battle see Dion Williams, "The Battle for Manila Bay," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LIV (May, 1928), pp. 343-359.

50 Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 112; Dewey to Senate committee, June 26, 1902, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXV, pt. 3, 2938; Dewey to Sec. Nav., May 15, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, Appendix, 98.

rallied against the Spanish and with the United States. "There where you see the American flag flying," announced Aguinaldo, "they are our redeemers!"[51]

The rebels organized themselves into an army and had no problem in obtaining volunteers. "They could have had any number of men," said Dewey, "it was just a question of arming them."[52] Simultaneous attacks on the Spanish garrisons were so sweeping that the whole of Luzon -- minus the city of Manila held by the Spanish army, and the Cavite naval base guarded by United States Marines -- were in Aguinaldo's hands by June, 1898. "He whipped the Spaniards battle after battle," explained Dewey.[53]

Commodore Dewey, who was forced to wait three and one half months for sufficient American army forces to arrive, realized the value of the Filipino army. Dewey later testified:

> . . . I thought that the closer they invested the city [Manila] the easier

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[51] Dewey to Senate committee, June 26, 1902, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXV, pt. 3, pp. 2949-50; "Philippine Insurrection, 1896-1898," pp. 399-433; "The Manifesto of the Filipinos," undated, SD 62, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., VIII, pt. 2, 346.

[52] Dewey to Senate committee, June 26, 1902, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXV, pt. 3, 2940.

[53] Ibid., p. 2928; "Philippine Insurrection, 1896-1898," pp. 399-433.

> it would be when our troops arrived to march in. The Filipinos were our friends, assisting us; they were doing our work.[54]

On July 25, 1898, General Wesley Merritt arrived with the main force of the United States Army,[55] and the Americans, now over ten thousand strong, prepared themselves for a combined naval and land attack upon the thirteen thousand besieged Spanish troops inside the Walled City of Manila.[56] The American assault commenced at approximately 9:30 A.M. on August 13, 1898, and by early afternoon the stars and stripes flew over the flagstaff in the main square. The battle casualties of the United States were extremely light for two reasons. First, for three and one half months Admiral Dewey's squadron and the insurgents on

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54 Dewey to Senate committee, June 26, 1902, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXV, pt. 3, 2936.

55 Major General Francis V. Greene, U.S.A., to Senate committee, October 7, 1898, SD 221, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XIX, 98. Prior to General Merritt's debarkation, General Thomas Anderson arrived with some 2,500 American troops on June 30, 1898, and two weeks later General Greene arrived with 3,586. More troops came later with General MacArthur on August 4, which at that time brought the strength of the U.S. Army on Luzon to 10,907, according to Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, pp. 30-37.

56 Many of America's military thought the city of Manila to be impregnable because of its impressive fortifications designed to ward off attacks from land or sea. In reality, however, the Spanish weapons -- notably the artillery -- were hopelessly obsolete, according to Agoncillo, Short History, p. 126.

land had kept Manila tightly bottled. Second, the Spanish Governor-General had realized the hopelessness of defending the city but in order to save Spanish honor, he entered into a secret agreement with Dewey and Merritt to surrender the city on condition that there would be a mock battle. The Olympia was to raise the international code signal for "surrender," and the Spanish would then raise the white flag.[57]

The Spanish had also insisted that the Americans prevent the Filipino troops from entering the city, apparently fearing vengence. Dewey and Merritt accepted the terms, in effect favoring the enemy and turning their backs to their allies.[58]

In any event, Manila fell to American arms when, at almost the same hour, a protocol of peace had been signed in Washington by the United States and Spain. Thus the Spanish-American War came to a close; a conflict in which

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[57] Annual Report of the Major General-Commanding the Army to the Secretary of War, November 29, 1898, HD 2, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., III, 46-48, 58, hereinafter cited as C.G. Army Report, followed by the appropriate Congressional document and page number; Dewey to Sec. Nav., August 13, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, 119; Dewey to Senate committee, June 27, 1902, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXV, pt. 3, 2943; Agoncillo, Short History, p. 124, 127.

[58] Agoncillo, Short History, p. 127. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 38, is more complimentary of the American motives.

not an American defeat was suffered nor a color or gun captured. However, it was these same unforeseen military victories that created a national intoxication and which clouded the once limited American objectives of the war.[59]

Philippine Independence Rebuffed

Although American foreign diplomats and military commanders were initially friendly toward their Filipino allies -- a common expression was, "we intend to whip the Spaniards and set you free"[60] -- imperialistic designs on the Philippines were being urged by some politicians in Washington.[61]

Many administration officials were mindful of the fact that the territory of California had yielded an additional bonus in the form of gold after it became the property of the United States. No sooner had the smoke from Dewey's guns disappeared when a special commissioner of the State Department, who had been on board, began an intensive investigation for the purpose of obtaining information on

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59 Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 45; L.J. Hale, Dream and Reality (1959), pp. 176-88.

60 General Thomas Anderson was quoted by the Chicago Record (February 24, 1900), and repeated by James H. Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines; 1898-1912 (1913), p. 19, hereinafter cited as Blount, American Occupation.

61 Rappaport, "Design or Drift," p. 69; R.A. Alger, The Spanish American War (1901), p. 326.

mineral resources, and Dewey received a message in August from the President's office requesting information on mineral deposits, harbors, and other possibilities that might be "most advantageous."[62]

In addition, dreams of Oriental trade stirred the cockles of imperialistic hearts. "We make no hypocritical pretence of being interested in the Philippines solely on the account of others," Senator Henry Cabot Lodge candidly stated, "we believe in Trade Expansion . . . ." Lodge pointed out that "the Phillippines [sic] mean a vast future trade and wealth and power . . . ."[63]

Colonial interests appear to have gained at least the attention of President McKinley, for he answered Dewey's request for five thousand occupation troops with a total force of more than twelve thousand. The decision to send

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62 Financial report on the Philippines, 1898, SD 169, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI; Acting Sec. Nav. Allen to Dewey, August 13, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, Appendix, 122-23. By 1900, the harbor of Manila had been so improved by the Americans that it could handle the largest ships then afloat, according to Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 23. See also Ganel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the United States (1951), p. 27, hereinafter cited as Grunder, Philippines.

63 Senator Lodge quoted by Blount, American Occupation, p. 179, and Garraty, The American Nation, p. 726. President McKinley in a dispatch to the American delegation in the peace conference, September 16, 1898, stated that his political leadership could not ignore the Philippines' "commercial opportunity," quoted by John H. Latane, The American Nation; A History, ed. Albert B. Hart (1907), XXV, 70.

this force was planned within days of the Manila Bay victory and apparently received even more consideration than the coming military offensive in Cuba.[64]

The President, who initially did not support the voluntary annexation of Hawaii and cited any forcible annexation as "criminal aggression,"[65] expressed only a lukewarm desire for a naval base on Luzon after Dewey's Manila victory.[66] However, by October McKinley instructed the American delegates to the peace conference to demand the whole archipelago from Spain.[67] Scholars have speculated about the cause for this change of heart, but most seem to agree, that in the President's mind at least, there was no acceptable choice

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64 Boston Evening Transcript, May 13, 1898, cited by Daniel B. Schirmer, Republic or Empire; American Resistance to the Philippine War (1972), p. 71, hereinafter cited as Schirmer, Republic or Empire; Blount, American Occupation, p. 47.

65 President's annual message, April 11, 1898, Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., 1898, XXXI, pt. 3, 3699.

66 Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy (1961), pp. 243-259, hereinafter cited as May, Imperial Democracy; Wayne H. Morgan, William McKinley and His America (1963), pp. 387-88. It is apparent that in Washington's military circles, talk of a base in the Philippines was more than lukewarm. In a report submitted by the Quartermaster, U.S.M.C., to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, September 28, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI, 878, a new base soon to be constructed in the Philippines is mentioned.

67 State Department communique, Mr. Hay to Mr. Day, October 26, 1898, SD 148, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XI, 35.

to annexation.[68]

In the minds of the Filipino revolutionaries and their followers, however, there was but one acceptable course: full independence for the Philippines. And they had little reason to doubt that the Filipinos would be set free. Aguinaldo had been actively sought out by American diplomatic officials, taken to the Islands and given arms by Commodore Dewey, and reassured by the American army commander.[69] Whether the high placed Americans "did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized," said a high placed military observer in the Islands, because of the American's actions "the

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68 May, Imperial Democracy, pp. 243-259. Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 24, states that the alternatives that were considered by President McKinley were (1) returning the islands to Spain, (2) turn over the administration of the islands to a European power, (3) self-rule by the Filipinos. Gates mentions that newspaper editors increased their demand for annexation and that, for political reasons, McKinely gave in. See also Grunder, Philippines, p. 28.

69 See State Department correspondence, 1898, SD 62, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., VIII, pt. 2, 333-34, 340-45; Dewey to Sec. Nav., May 20, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, Appendix, 100; Agoncillo, Short History, pp. 107-08; Dewey to Sec. Nav., June 27, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, Appendix, 103; Thomas M. Anderson, "Our Rule in the Philippines," North American Review, CLXX (February, 1900), 275, hereinafter cited as Anderson, "Our Rule." Thomas M. Anderson was an army brigadier general in 1898 and the early American commander of land forces in the Philippines. See also "Act of the Filipino Committee in Hong Kong," May 5, 1898, SD 208, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XII, pt. 2, 7-8.

Filipinos certainly thought so . . . ."[70]

The Filipino Revolutionary Committee stated that, after a close reading of the American Constitution, "it was probable then that independence will be granted." Indeed Commodore Dewey had advised Washington in June, 1898, of the Filipinos' full capacity for self-government and scoffed at the thought of an American colonial War. Aguinaldo's statements to his followers indicate that he may well have been aware of Dewey's opinion.[71]

Prelude to New Conflict

The Filipinos' hope that independence would be granted them was squashed when news of the Treaty of Paris reached

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70 Anderson, "Our Rule," p. 272.

71 Upon hearing that American newspapers were speculating upon the annexation of the Philippines, Dewey cabled Washington that in his opinion the Filipinos "are superior in intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races," Dewey to Sec. Nav., June 27, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, Appendix, 103; E. Spencer Pratt to Consulate General of the U.S., May 20, June 2, and June 8, 1898, SD 62, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., VIII, pt. 2, 345-46, 431. Reverend Clay Macauly's letter to the Boston Transcript maintained that he conversed with Dewey during a trip there in 1898, and the Commodore stated: "Rather than make a war of conquest upon the Filipino people, I would up anchor and sail out of the harbor," quoted by Blount, American Occupation, p. 24. See also L.H. Healey and L. Kutner, The Admiral (1944), p. 224; J. Barrett, Admiral George Dewey (1899), p. 35; Reports of Rear-Admiral George Dewey on the Battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898, and on the Investment and Fall of Manila, May 1, to August 13, 1898 (1900), p. 43.

the Islands. The peace agreement specifically provided for the annexation of the entire Philippine archipelago by the United States. Emotions ran strong against the Americans; in towns throughout the island the people passed resolutions which expressed their loyalty to the Filipino government and denounced the Treaty of Paris.[72]

The situation was made worse by the conduct of the American soldiers. General Thomas Anderson wrote that Americans often engaged in obtaining "trophies" from the Filipino civilians, who not unreasonably considered such action as looting. Furthermore, the soldiers treated the Filipino with condescension, refused to pay debts to local merchants, and did not hesitate in pushing their weight around (quite literally, as most Filipinos are physically smaller). "Drunkenness with its consequent evils is rife all over the city among the new white population," wrote a Filipino scholar of the day; "the orgies of the newcomers, the incessant street brawls, the insults offered with impunity to natives of both sexes . . . were hardly calculated to arouse in the natives admiration for their new masters."[73]

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72 Agoncillo, Short History, pp. 132, 138. This author notes that much of the intelligentsia and wealthy who before gave their loyalty to Spain or at least against revolution, had accepted the rule by the United States. For details of the treaty of peace with Spain, see SD 62, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., VIII.

73 John Foreman quoted by Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun,

Aguinaldo claimed that the illegal entry into private homes by American soldiers differed little from the practice carried on during the Spanish rule. He also stated clearly his peoples' resentment toward the individual actions of soldiers and the collective action of what he termed the "violent and agressive seizure" of Philippine territory "by a nation which arrogated to itself the title champion of oppressed nations."[74]

In addition to the growing dissatisfaction by the Filipino population, the Americans became the heirs to a racial hatred formerly reserved for the Spaniards. The

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p. 81. See also Anderson, "Our Rule," p. 282; "Memorandum in Regards to Trial by Court-Martial," SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 3, XXV, 2073-96; Samuel Eliot Morison, et al., Dissent in Three American Wars (1970), pp. 88-89, hereinafter cited as Morison, Dissent; Moorefield Storey and Marcial P. Lichauco, The Conquest of the Philippines (1926), hereinafter cited as Storey, The Conquest of the Philippines. The problem of abuses committed by American soldiers on private citizens in a foreign country was not a new phenomenon for the U.S. Army. Alfred H. Bill, Rehearsal for Conflict; The War With Mexico, 1846-1848 (1947), pp. 122, 263, 309, maintains that some troops under General Zachary Taylor exhibited such a lack of discipline that it was estimated that seven of every ten volunteers (as opposed to regulars) committed crimes against Mexican civilians. However, to underscore the importance that command leadership plays in maintaining discipline, Bill describes the forces under General Winfield Scott during the conquest of Mexico City. The conduct of these was so correct that influential Mexicans offered Scott the dictatorship of all Mexico.

[74] Aguinaldo quoted by Agoncillo, Short History, p. 134. In E. Aguinaldo, "Manifesto," January 5, 1899, Philippine Insurgent Records, 1896-1901, With Associated Records of the United States War Department, 1900-1906, Microcopy 254, folder 171-4, microfilm roll 15, hereinafter cited as PIR,

bitter quarrel between the Spanish rulers and the dissenters was seen by the Philippine population as not only a ruler versus native contest, but as a white against brown conflict as well. This racist sentiment was easily transferred to the new white rulers.[75]

Racism, however, was not confined to the Filipinos. The turn of the century witnessed a theme of Anglo-Saxon supremacy in the United States that resulted in a political disenfranchise of American Negroes, a nationwide desire for racial segregation, and a wave of mob violence.

The white primary election came into vogue in 1896, and by 1900 all of the former Confederates states, excepting Georgia, had in effect stopped Negroes from voting. It was 1896 that the Supreme Court ushered in the "separate but equal" policy, and Jim Crow laws openly enforced white supremacy throughout the South.[76]

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followed by folder number, or volume and page number, or book number (whichever applicable), and microfilm roll number, Aguinaldo attacks the mistreatment of Filipino citizens which is allowed by American commanders and adds; "Upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed." Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 82, also quotes Aguinaldo on the subject. Reports of American misconduct contained in military correspondence, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIV, pt. 2, 984-992.

75 Agoncillo, Short History, p. 68.

76 Bryan Fulks, Black Struggle: A History of the Negro in America (1969), p. 195, hereinafter cited as Fulks, Black Struggle; Garraty, The American Nation, pp. 562-63.

But racism was not confined only to the former slave states. A large volume of anti-Negro legislation was frequently introduced, although seldom passed, by a wide variety of the members of Congress. Mob violence against Blacks in the North, while not previously unknown, greatly increased in tempo and viciousness. Author Wilber Cash maintained that between 1890 and 1900 a total of 1,111 Negroes were lynched throughout the United States.[77]

It would be quite unrealistic to suppose that the bigotry evident in American society was not also present in its military. The United States Army itself was segregated; black soldiers served in all-Negro regiments which were commanded by white officers. Although there was an open door policy for enlistments in the Navy, Negroes invariably served only in menial positions. The Marine Corps had no blacks whatsoever and had never accepted them.[78]

This American disdain for persons of color was transported to the Philippines by the soldiers. Among officers

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77 Wilber F. Cash, The Mind of the South (1941), pp. 299, 135.

78 R. Ernest Dupuy, The Compact History of the United States Army (1961), p. 145, hereinafter cited as Dupuy, The Compact History of the United States Army; Fulks, Black Struggle, pp. 214, 247-48. Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 388, notes that Negroes were not accepted into the Marine Corps until 1943. Gates, Schoolbooks, pp. 66-67, however, maintains that the treatment toward the Negro by the U.S. Army is reputed to be fair, efficient, and humane.

and enlisted alike the Filipino was commonly referred to as "nigger;" a term that the Filipino understood from its tone and context to be one of disrespect.[79] This superior attitude is evident in the boast of American Brigadier General Fredrick Funston (famous for his spectacular capture of Aguinaldo): he would "rawhide these bullet-headed Asians until they yell for mercy," and in no case, he added would they "get in the way of the bandwagon of Anglo-Saxon progress and decency."[80]

The military authorities on the islands were well aware of the racism and growing hatred brewing in the ranks, and eventually issued a General Order prohibiting soldiers from addressing the Filipinos as "niggers." No evidence

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79 Major Cornelius Gardner, U.S.A., to Civil Governor of the Philippine Islands, December 16, 1901, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIV, 884; Soldiers' Letters (1899), pp. 3, 5, 8, 13, 19, hereinafter cited as Soldiers' Letters. The term "nigger" was not used only by soldiers from the South. This slur appears very frequently in the personal letters of one Minnesota volunteer lieutenant (later general) when referring to Filipinos, see Alexander Bacon Coxe, Sr., to Kid (no further identification available but most likely his wife), January 6, 1900, Alexander Bacon Coxe, Sr., Papers, Manuscript Department, East Carolina University, hereinafter cited as Coxe Papers. See also Bradley A. Fiske, War Time in Manila (1913), pp. 89, 105; Albert G. Robinson, The Philippines: the War and the People, a Record of Personal Observations and Experiences (1901), p. 58; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 82; Moorefield Storey, Marked Severities in the Philippines: Secretary Root's Record (1902), pp. 15, 99, hereinafter cited as Storey, Marked Severities.

80 Funston quoted by Samuel E. Morison and Henry Commager, The Growth of the American Republic (1969), II,

exists, however, that this order was rigorously enforced, or even enforced at all.[81]

The racial attitudes of the American people were well known by the insurgent leadership. In a message General Apolinario Mabini stated to the Filipino people:

> Annexation in whatever form it may be adopted will unite us forever with a nation whose manners and customs are different from our own, a nation which hates the colored race with a moral hatred, and from which we could never separate ourselves except by war.[82]

The seeds of an American-Filipino conflict were sown with the passing of two events. After the Filipinos had effectively besieged the Spanish army, the Americans accepted the surrender of Manila to the exclusion of Filipino troops.[83] If that move caused a wound to be inflicted in

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259. See also Herbert Welsh, The Other Man's Country (1900), p. 126; Soldiers' Letters, p. 10.

81 See Anderson, "Our Rule," p. 282; Blount, American Occupation, p. 101; "Exhibit F," SD 205, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XV, pt. 1, 42.

82 Philippine Information Society, "The Outbreak of Hostilities," Facts About the Filipinos (1901), I, 50, hereinafter cited as "Outbreak of Hostilities." Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 31, states that the treatment of the Negro in America was often cited by the Spaniards for wartime propaganda which aimed at, and succeeded, in generating fear of the Americans by Filipinos. It is not surprising that insurgent propaganda often took on similar aspects, see T. Sandico, "To the Country," May 16, 1898, HD 2, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., V, pt. 2, 361-65.

83 Agoncillo, Short History, p. 129.

local pride, the American army commander, Major General Ewell S. Otis, commenced to rub salt into it. He demanded that the Filipino army -- in a tone more appropriate of an enemy than ally -- withdraw even further beyond the city limits and suburbs of Manila.[84]

Unfortunately when the tense situation called for cool heads, they proved to be in short supply on both sides. The Filipino soldiers openly displayed contempt and hostility toward the Americans. They seemed to take delight in casting insults -- sarcastically they would proclaim the doughboys as connoisseurs, but only at draining whiskey bottles -- and their attempts at provocation were obvious.[85] The Americans on the other hand, assumed an air of high-handedness and arrogance. General Fredrick Funston, for example, admitted considering the Filipino army as the enemy

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84 Otis to Aguinaldo, September 8, 1898, HD 2, 56th Cong., 1st sess., V, pt. 2, 6-9. President McKinley in a message to the Secretary of War, hereinafter cited as Sec. War, December 21, 1898, SD 208, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XII, pt. 1, 82-83, had instructed that neither recognition of the Filipino government nor joint occupation of Manila be granted. See also Acting Secretary of Navy to Dewey, August 17, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, Appendix, 124.

85 Otis to Adjutant General, U.S. Army, August 31, 1899, HD 2, 56th Cong., 1st sess., V, pt. 2, 90-91. For more on incidents allegedly provoked by Filipino troops, see Dewey to Secretary of Navy, July 16, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, 118; Adjutant General's Office, Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, April 15, 1898-July 30, 1902 (1902), II, 867-68, 872, hereinafter cited as Correspondence; Agoncillo, Short History, p. 131.

even before the first shots were exchanged.[86] Charges were officially made from both sides citing incidents of trespassing and deliberate provocations.[87]

Each army saw that they were being drawn to an armed conflict, and they entrenched their lines and positioned artillery pieces. The Filipinos hurriedly manufactured long native knives called bolos and distributed them to the population, while naval vessels were carefully placed to deliver supporting fire to American units.[88] An attempt at compromise was tried, but the Filipino offer when forwarded to Washington received no reply.[89] Senator Augustus O. Bacon correctly envisioned the tense situation when he warned his colleagues: "It will take but a spark to ignite the magazines which are about to explode."[90]

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86 Fredrick Funston, Memories of Two Wars: Cuban and Philippine Experiences (1914), pp. 176-77, hereinafter cited as Funston, Memories; Agoncillo, Short History, p. 131; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 46.

87 Agoncillo, Short History, p. 136.

88 Ibid., p. 132; Gates, Schoolbooks, pp. 40-41; Report of Major General E.S. Otis (1899), pp. 38, 94; Major J.F. Bell to Major General Merritt, August 29, 1898, SD 62, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., VIII, pt. 2, 380.

89 "Minutes of the Commission Meetings," SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXV, pt. 3, 2709-2751.

90 Senate speech by Senator Bacon, January 18, 1899, Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., 1899, XXXII, pt. 1, 734.

Conventional Warfare

The spark occurred on the night of February 4, 1899. At eight-thirty P.M. a three-man patrol of Company "D", 1st Nebraska Volunteer Infantry, was probing an area near their regimental sector,[91] when they came upon a group of Filipino soldiers. Private Willie Grayson later described the incident:

> I yelled, "Halt!" The man moved. I challenged him again with another "Halt!" Then he immediately shouted, "Halto" to me. Well, I thought the best thing to do was to shoot him. He dropped. Then two Filipinos sprang out of a gateway about fifteen feet from us. I called "Halt" and Miller fired and dropped one. I saw that another was left. Well, I think I got my second Filipino that time. We retreated to where our six other fellows were and I said, "Line up, fellows, the niggers are in here all through these yards" . . . it was some minutes after our second shots before the Filipinos began firing.[92]

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91 Agoncillo, Short History, p. 136, claims that the Filipino soldiers were within their jurisdiction, and that it was the American patrol that overstepped their limits. However, the opposing view is taken in correspondence from American military commanders, HD 2, 56th Cong., 1st sess., V, pt. 2, 423-24.

92 Storey, The Conquest of the Philippines, p. 92, quotes Private Grayson. Dupuy, Little Wars, p. 66, accused this soldier of exhibiting an itchy trigger finger, but according to "The Outbreak of Hostilities," pp. 6-36, he was following the orders of General Arthur MacArthur to fire in the event that an arrest could not be made.

The return fire of the Filipino soldiers activated what General Arthur MacArthur later identified as an American contingency plan. He explained that all units were connected by telephone wire, and that moments after Private Grayson's first shots MacArthur received the following message from his regimental commander: "The pipe line outpost has been fired on; I am moving out with my entire regiment." After receiving this report General MacArthur stated that he "simply wired all commanders to carry out prearranged plans, and the whole division was placed on the firing line."[93]

Aguinaldo did not desire, nor could he afford, armed hostilities with Americans at this time. He had hoped that the efforts of the anti-imperialists in the United States might yet be successful in leading the American people to demand independence for the Philippines.[94] Moreover,

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93 Testimony of General MacArthur before a Senate committee, April 8, 1902, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIV, pt. 2, 900.

94 Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 70. Dissenters over the issues of annexation and conquest of the Philippines were organized into the Anti-Imperialist League, generally centered in New England, according to Schirmer, Republic or Empire, pp. 93-104; Garraty, The American Nation, p. 726. It would be an error to assume that the anti-imperialists were earlier replicas of the "doves" of recent Vietnam War vintage. There are major differences in idealogy and motivation between the dissention movements, according to Robert L. Beisher, "1898 & 1968: the Anti-Imperialists and the Doves," Political Science Quarterly, LXXXV (1970), 187-216.

Aguinaldo did not wish to attract adverse publicity while the United States Senate was debating the ratification of the peace treaty.[95] Militarily time was needed to train the undisciplined Filipino soldiers, and to obtain foreign equipment and arms and possibly foreign military assistance.[96]

In an attempt to stop the hostilities, Aguinaldo sent a member of his staff under a flag of truce to confer with the American commander, General Otis. His message stated

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95 Storey, The Conquest of the Philippines, p. 96. The treaty was ratified by the Senate on February 6, 1899, two days after the outbreak of the Insurrection. Aguinaldo's reluctance for hostilities was apparently not shared by all his subordinates. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 76, notes that insurgent records mention General Cailles defiantly telling an American interpreter in January, 1899: "War, War, is what we want."

96 The necessity of diplomatic contact between the Filipino government and European powers is discussed in T. Sandico to E. Aguinaldo, August 9, 1898, PIR, roll 3. Aguinaldo was also hopeful of obtaining assistance from China and Japan in the form of weapons and/or troops. One shipload of Mauser rifles and ammunition did arrive from the Chinese island of Amoy, according to Dewey to Sec. Nav., May 27, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, Appendix, 101. Furthermore, an unsigned insurgent letter addressed to G. Apacible, April 11, 1899, PIR, book 36, roll 89, mentions a Japanese national who was returning to his country to obtain promised arms. Manuel Luis Quezon, The Good Fight (1946), p. 55, states that some Japanese officers did reach the Philippines to act as advisors. Large scale support, however, never materialized from either the Japanese or Chinese governments. For the position of the Japanese government toward the Philippine Insurrection, see James K. Eyre, Jr., "Japan and the American Annexation of the Philippines," Pacific Historical Review, XI (1942), 55-71.

that the firing on his side the night before had been against his orders. Otis dryly replied: "Fighting having begun must go on to the grim end," and he ordered a general attack against the entrenched Filipino soldiers.[97] Thus the Philippine Insurrection had begun; a war declared not by America's Congress, but decreed by a general.

The ensuing days saw the American army units around Manila, with the supporting fire of naval gunboats and warships, striking swiftly. Although the U.S. Army force was primarily composed of inexperienced volunteers, they were clearly superior in arms, military science, and tactics to the larger, but untrained and poorly equipped, Filipino army.[98]

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97 Statement made by General Rives, U.S.A., in February 5, 1899 when his unit was defending Manila, quoted in Senate speech on January 11, 1900, Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 1900, XXXIII, pt. 1, 770. General Otis later wrote that he knew that the fighting of February 4, 1898 was not intentionally started by the Filipinos. See Correspondence, II, 894; Otis to Adjutant General, U.S. Army, April 6, 1899, HD 2, 56th Cong., 1st sess., V, pt. 2, 370.

98 It is claimed in Otis to Adjutant General U.S. Army, August 31, 1899, HD 2, 56th Cong., 1st sess., V, pt. 2, 3-7, that during the early months of the Insurrection the American force consisted of some five thousand regular and fifteen thousand volunteer troops. However, of this number only a total of 3,500 men were not due for discharge under wartime legislation. According to Dupuy, Little Wars, p. 69 those men with expiring terms -- regulars and volunteers, officers and enlisted -- willingly agreed to stay in the Islands until their replacements could be sent. See also Senate bill number 657, Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXXV, pt. 1, 130. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun,

General Otis, who was fearful of overextending his limited force, concentrated on improving his defensive position around Manila while awaiting reinforcements. Yet, by the end of February, 1899 the American army had pushed the insurgents into the Luzon countryside, quelled an uprising in Manila, and a naval force was sent to occupy the islands of Cebu and Panay.[99]

After the arrival of additional troops in late February and March, Otis signaled an offensive that resulted in crushing defeats for Filipino forces, pushing Aguinaldo and his headquarters further north on Luzon. However, Otis surprisingly ordered the retirement of his forces to Manila, allowing the rebels to re-occupy much of their recently lost territory.[100]

By the autumn months of 1899 the badly needed reinforcements arrived from the United States which consisted

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p. 86, places the Filipino force around Manila about thirty thousand troops, but only about one half of this number were armed.

99 Albert P. Niblack, "Operations of the Navy and Marine Corps in the Philippine Archipelago, 1898-1902," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, XXX (1904), 746, hereinafter cited as Niblack, "Operations of the Navy and the Marine Corps."

100 Dupuy, Little Wars, p. 74; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 121. Sexton contends that General Otis was extremely over-cautious, and that the Insurrection could have been settled in that spring of 1899.

of regular army units, and new volunteer regiments raised because of the Insurrection. Otis felt sufficiently strong to issue orders for a new offensive against the Filipino army.[101]

Aguinaldo had now realized that in the art of conventional warfare, the Americans were clearly superior. Success could not be achieved for the Filipino army by fighting a war of battalions and regiments on the open battlefied. He therefore instructed his forces to become more elusive, a strategy that gradually evolved into guerrilla warfare.[102]

Guerrilla Warfare

Eleven months after Private Grayson "dropped" the Filipino in his rifle sights, the insurgent army was dispersed and its leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, had been chased to Luzon's northern Benquet Mountains. Letters from Americans in the field told joyously that the war was over, and all

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101 Dupuy, Little Wars, p. 83. Twenty-five regiments of volunteers were raised to specifically serve in the Philippine Insurrection, and by 1900 two-thirds of all American forces were stationed in the Philippine Islands. See Funston, Memories, p. 313; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 238.

102 Funston, Memories, p. 313; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 12; Dupuy, Little Wars, p. 77. Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 40, contends that Aguinaldo had always preferred guerrilla to conventional warfare against the Americans, but that he relented to subordinates' pressure for a conventional army that might gain coveted foreign respect and recognition.







Personal photographs taken by a lieutenant of the Minnesota Volunteers while the regiment was stationed south of Manila from 1899 to 1901, Coxe Papers. On the reverse side of the photo of the burning house is written: "The Major amuses himself."







From the Coxe Papers

were looking forward to going home.[103] Indeed, a magazine article written by General Otis and printed in June, 1900 stated that "the Insurrection ended some months ago." The general predicted "no more fighting of any moment . . . [just] little skirmishes which amount to nothing."[104] The general's optimism was soon to fade, and it took another two and a half years to pacify the Philippines.

The Americans failed to realize that the absence of conventional resistance meant a change, not an end, to the Insurrection. The "little skirmishes which amounted to nothing" were actually doubling the American casualties in the early months of 1900.[105]

Aguinaldo began relinquishing control of the towns and key cities to the Americans while at the same time completely dominating the population: taxes and supplies were collected, and an intelligence network was established, all under the noses of the complacent Yankees.

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103 Coxe to Aunt Hallie (further identification unavailable), March 1, April 18, July 7, 1900, Coxe Papers.

104 General Otis, in Leslie's Weekly (June 16, 1900), and quoted by Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 237. Agoncillo, Short History, p. 143, states that General Otis routinely forwarded highly optimistic reports to Washington and predicted an American victory by mid 1900.

105 Dupuy, Little Wars, p. 84, 77, observed that American casualties during 1899 exceeded those sustained during the entire Spanish-American War.

An instructional pamphlet published by an insurgent revolutionary Junta proposed some methods to be employed:

> The guerrillas shall make up for their small numbers by their ceaseless activity and their daring. They shall hide in the woods and in distant barrios and when least expected shall fall upon the enemy . . . .
>
> We repeat that we must not give or accept combats with such a powerful foe if we have not the greatest chance of success . . . .[106]

Thus the Filipino insurgent was conducting a mode of warfare thirty-seven years before Mao Tse-Tung wrote:

> In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws.[107]

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106 Isobelo De Los Reyes, "Guerrilla Tactics," from a pamphlet published by the Filipino Revolutionary Committee, July 15, 1900, HD 2, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., VI, pt. 3, 72. Further descriptions of Filipino guerrilla tactics in Major General John C. Bates to Adjutant General, Division of the Philippines, HD 2, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., VI, pt. 3, 227.

107 Samuel B. Griffith (ed.), Mao Tse-Tung On Guerrilla Warfare (1961), p. 46, hereinafter cited as Griffith (ed.), Mao On Guerrilla Warfare. For more on contemporary guerrilla doctrines see also Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-Tung (1967), pp. 48-53; Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (1961); Li Tso-Peng, Strategy: One Against Ten. Tactics: Ten Against One (1966).

The success of the guerrilla depended not only upon the support of the masses in furnishing supplies, but also upon their complete loyalty. The Filipino insurrecto was successful on both counts.[108]

Savage attacks employed by the insurgents caused the United States Army to increase its forces in the Philippines from the fifteen thousand soldiers in February, 1899 to 69,420 officers and men at the height of guerrilla activities in December of 1900.[109] For the American soldier, the fighting had grown more dangerous and more frustrating. "If they would only come out and fight . . .," complained one officer.[110] "There is no fight in it," explained another, "they either catch you off your guard and murder you

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108 According to Aguinaldo's proclamation to the Filipinos, January 15, 1899, HD 2, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., VI, pt. 3, 60, and the proclamation of an unnamed important insurgent leader, February 15, 1899, HD 2, 56th Cong., 1st sess., V, pt. 2, 362, Aguinaldo maintained popular support in part by ordering his commanders to refrain from abusing the population. This is not to say that harsh methods were not resorted to. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 240, states that insurgents often carried out cruel retribution on those Filipinos who betrayed the revolutionary cause. This fact caused many to fear for the safety of those Filipinos that did cooperate with the Americans if independence was granted to the insurgents, see Coxe to Aunt Hallie, August 23, 1900, Coxe Papers.

109 C.G. Army Report, HD 2, 57th Cong., 1st sess., IV, pt. 1, 74.

110 Coxe to Aunt Hallie, September 7, 1900, Coxe Papers.

or else turn tail at the first volley."[111]

These Americans were not fighting a uniformed army, and there was none of the adventure that soldiers expected in war: tactics, pitched battles, gallant charges, victories, glories. They were faced with a dedicated force who tilled the land by day, and dug up their weapons at night to fight whenever the chance presented itself. "A single battalion can today march from one end of this Department to the other without encountering enough resistance from the enemy to seriously impede its progress," reported an American general, "but small parties of troops cannot leave the garrisoned posts without incurring the danger of attack . . . ."[112]

When General Otis was relieved as Military Governor in May, 1900, the insurgents were enjoying eminent success with guerrilla warfare. However Otis' replacement, Gen. Arthur MacArthur, gradually turned the tide by chipping away at the popular support received by Aguinaldo's forces. A proclamation of amnesty was issued which allowed all insurrectos

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111 New York Times (June 18, 1900), p. 6, col. 5.

112 Major General John C. Bates to Adjutant General, Division of the Philippines, August 15, 1900, HD 2, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., VI, pt. 3, 227; Coxe to Aunt Hallie, July 26, 1900, Coxe Papers.

to surrender without facing punishment, except for the crime of murder, and MacArthur authorized the payment of a thirty peso bounty to Filipinos who surrendered rifles.[113]

In addition, General MacArthur adopted rigid measures to control the insurrectos. A proclamation placing the Philippine Islands under martial law was announced in December, 1900, directing that insurgents captured in civilian dress would be subject to indictment for murder. It also required overt acts of loyalty to American authority by all Filipinos to avoid being labeled as unfriendly; neutrality was deemed as unfriendly.[114]

Perhaps the most dramatic event to effect the outcome of the Insurrection was the capture of its leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, in March, 1901. The credit for this feat must be given to Brigadier General Fredrick Funston and a group of Macabebes[115] who skillfully used deception to get into

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113 Major General Arthur MacArthur, "Notice of Amnesty," June 21, 1900, HD 2, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., VI, pt. 3, 65.

114 Proclamation of Major General Arthur MacArthur, December 20, 1900, HD 2, 57th Cong., 1st sess., V, pt. 2, 91.

115 Macabebes are descendants of American Indians brought to the Philippines from Mexico by the Spaniards. Hundreds of years of close association produced a fierce hatred of the Filipino by the Macabebe, and their loyalty went naturally to the Spanish and later to the Americans. During the Insurrection the U.S. Army formed them into a military unit known as the Macabebe Scouts. After the Insurrection the unit accepted Filipinos and the name was

Aguinaldo's camp, make the capture, and safely return through the jungle to American lines.[116]

As a result of General MacArthur's considerate treatment of the insurgent leader, and because Aguinaldo sensed the futility of further sacrifice of his people -- "Enough of blood; enough of tears and desolation" -- he took an oath of allegiance to the United States and urged his followers to do likewise. The effect was immediate, and within a short period almost every insurgent of importance had surrendered.[117]

However, the fighting did not immediately cease. Other insurgents and their followers fought on, utilizing the tactics of the guerrilla and operating from rugged, nearly inaccessable terrain. The fighting ground down to

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changed to the Philippine Scouts, and this unit fought bravely against the Japanese in World War Two, see Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, pp. 163-64.

116 Funston, Memories, pp. 384-426.

117 Major General Arthur MacArthur to Adjutant General of the Army, July 4, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 1st sess.,V, pt. 2, 100-01; Dupuy, Little Wars, p. 87; Agoncillo, Short History, p. 144. This latter author maintains (p. 142) that the capture of Aguinaldo had less effect upon the Insurrection's outcome than (1) the desertion of the cause by the Filipino intelligentsia and upper class, (2) the deep division and rivalries among insurgent leadership, and (3) the superior arms and training of the Americans; all three had extracted their toll before Aguinaldo' capture.

a dirty struggle that often pitched poorly armed guerrillas against outnumbered American outposts. The United States volunteer regiments were shipped home, and the solution of this bitter guerrilla struggle was in the hands of army and marine regulars with a small naval force off shore. "We ain't heroes," these leathery warriors were won't to say, "we're regulars."[118]

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118 Quote recorded by a newspaperman and mentioned in Blount, American Occupation, p. 194. The wind-down of the Insurrection is discussed in the New York Times (January 8, 1901), p. 5, col. 5; Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 256; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 283.

CHAPTER II

MILITARY BACKGROUND

> We have fought in every clime and place
> Where we could take a gun . . . .
>
> -- From "The Marines' Hymn"
>
> 'E isn't one o' the reg'lar Line, nor 'e
> isn't one of the crew.
> 'E's a kind of a giddy harumfrodite --
> soldier an' sailor too!
>
> -- From "Soldier an' Sailor Too" by Rudyard Kipling.

The Philippine Insurrection made adversaries of two very dissimilar military forces. On the one hand were the Filipino insurgents: rebels born in the industrial age but scarcely touched by it. At a time when technology was speedily changing the tactics of the world's armies, few citizens of the Philippines knew how to shoot, much less load, a firearm. But the martial spirit had become imbedded in Filipino hearts. They had fought to throw out the Spanish colonizers and stood ready to resist the salesmen of American Manifest Destiny. Revolution had forged these brown warriors into a common steel bond.

At the other side stood the cocky army from the United States that had handily crushed the colonial army of Spain, albeit an already crumbling one. Among these Americans were members of the United States Marine Corps; a small, elite band of professional soldiers that had sailed into combat the world over on the vessels of America's growing fleet.

They were accustomed to manning the ship's batteries, but their speciality was as an amphibious landing force. This capability provided the U.S. Navy with a tough, light, infantry force that could show the flag from Tripoli to Japan. Although perfectly at home with the pitch and roll of the sea, marines had often traded it for the mud of land campaigns alongside the army. Their arms were befitting to a modern fighting force, and through the years had earned the reputation as deadly sharpshooters.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the composition, training, weapons, and capabilities of both these forces.

Dewey's Marines

The marines were involved in the Philippines from that very first American shell fired at the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. As Commodore Dewey slipped his fleet into the harbor, the sailors and marines stood ready at their battle stations. The starboard gun on the USS Baltimore was manned by marines from the ship's marine detachment, and they exhibited a combination of exhilaration and fear concerning the oncoming confrontation with the Spanish. The words of the ship's captain were still ringing in their ears: "Well men we must fight on empty stomachs, but we have full hearts. Let us see what we can do under the old flag just once

more."[1]

The Spanish fleet was then sighted, and the American warships moved into battle positions. The Baltimore swung hard to starboard which provided its starboard gun crew with an excellent opportunity to sight in on the enemy. They awaited only the word. The bridge signaled "commence firing." Then with a deafening roar the first shot of the battle of Manila Bay was fired by the marine gunners almost simultaneously with the first shot of the USS Olympia.[2]

The marines from the Baltimore were soon to make another first in historical records. One effect of Dewey's crushing victory was to demoralize the Spanish troops on

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1 John Ellicott, "Marines at Manila Bay," Marine Corps Gazette, XXXVII (May, 1953), 55, hereinafter cited as Ellicott, "Marines at Manila Bay." The captain referred to "empty stomachs" because the crew had been at battle stations from about eleven o'clock in the evening of April 31st until the naval battle commenced at 5:15 A.M., May 1st, according to Dewey to Sec. Nav., May 4, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, Appendix, 70. Dion Williams, "Thirty Years Ago," Marine Corps Gazette, XIII (March, 1928), 12, states that marine detachments were permanent contingents aboard the following vessels in Dewey's fleet: Olympia (Dewey's flagship), Baltimore, Raleigh, Boston, Concord, and Petrel, comprising a total of some two hundred leathernecks. Author Dion Williams was a first lieutenant in the Baltimore marine detachment at the battle of Manila and a general officer at the writing of this article.

2 Ellicott, "Marines at Manila Bay," p. 55. These shots were indeed the first fired against the Spanish fleet, however, the Boston and the McCullock had returned fire on Spanish harbor defenses the previous evening, according to Dewey to Sec. Nav., May 4, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, Appendix, 70.

Luzon. American shelling had caused many casualties, and Aguinaldo's army took the opportunity to attack the outlying Spanish positions. Shortly thereafter, Dewey received reports of looting and disorder at the Spanish naval arsenal at Cavite, and he ordered the Baltimore to land her marines.[3] Forty-eight hours after the defeat of the Spanish fleet, First Lieutenant Dion Williams disembarked with a contingent of marines and proceeded with his mission to organize a marine guard at the Spanish barracks. "As soon as order was restored in the Arsenal and town," remembers Williams, "the Stars and Stripes were hoisted on the flag staff at the Arsenal while the Marine Guard presented arms, and the bugler sounded 'To the Colors.'" This was the first American flag to fly over enemy soil in the war, hoisted by the first American troops on Spanish territory.[4]

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[3] Williams, "Thirty Years Ago," p. 14. The Spanish naval base at Cavite was about ten miles south of, and across the bay from, the city of Manila, according to Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 23. Historian Edwin H. Simmons, "The United States Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, LVIII (April, 1974), 35, states that the Spanish had suffered 381 men killed by Dewey's guns but inflicted only slight wounds to two American officers and six enlisted men.

[4] Ellicott, "Marines at Manila Bay," p. 55; Williams, "Thirty Years Ago," p. 14, who also notes (p. 16) that the marines from the Baltimore rotated the guard duties with others from the Olympia, Raleigh, and Boston, and subsequently they were commanded by marine Captain William P. Biddle.

The marines placed the navy yard under firm control and commenced to provide for the Spanish prisoners. Some of these had been critically wounded and were left behind by the retreating Spanish army. Others had held a bitter hatred toward the Filipino -- often the case among Spanish officers -- and surrendered to the marines to avoid capture by Filipino soldiers. Lieutenant Williams did note, however, that in his observation the Filipinos appeared to treat their Spanish prisoners quite humanely.[5]

The marines confiscated a large quantity of Spanish rifles and ammunition at the arsenal. Under directions from Dewey, the arms were issued to the representatives of the Filipino army.[6]

Dewey's fleet stood as the lone American force for some nine weeks before the army could send sufficient occupation troops. During that period Dewey effectively blockaded and

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[5] Dewey to Sec. Nav., May 4, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, Appendix, 68, reported the occupation of the Cavite arsenal and further details are given by Williams, "Thirty Years Ago," pp. 15-20, 95. Dewey also notes in the former document that there were some two hundred and fifty Spanish P.O.W.'s held by the marines at Cavite (p. 68), and that the Filipino had 1,800 (pp. 103, 106, 125) which were treated "most humanely."

[6] Dewey to Sec. Nav., June 27, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, Appendix, 103; Williams, "Thirty Years Ago," p. 18. For additional information on the marines in the battle of Manila Bay and the subsequent occupation of the Cavite naval base see Walter Mills, The Martial Spirit (1931), p. 197.

bottled up the Spanish forces, but he lacked the capability to occupy strategic points ashore. Dewey later lamented:

> If there had been five thousand marines under my command at Manila Bay, the city would have surrendered to me on May 1, 1898, and could have been properly garrisoned. The Filipinos would have received us with open arms, and there would have been no Insurrection.[7]

The Old Corps

Although the admiral's statement was complimentary to the marines, he was speaking figuratively. It was not possible for Dewey to land five thousand marines in 1898, because the entire Corps of 1898 only numbered some three thousand.[8] The United States Marine Corps of that era was a tough but small military organization. Prior to the war with Spain the leathernecks carried out routine peacetime duties with naval units ashore and afloat in much the same manner as they had done since their beginning in 1775. It

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7 Dewey to Sec. Nav., January 14, 1909, House Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings on the Status of the Marine Corps (1909), p. 350. See also Dewey to Sec. Nav., May 13, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, Appendix, 98-99; Dion Williams, "Coordination of Army and Navy Training," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, XLVIII (April, 1922), 597. Edwin H. Simmons, "The United States Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, LVIII (April, 1974), 35, writes that there were about thirteen thousand Spanish troops facing Dewey.

8 Annual report of the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy, October 9, 1896, HD 3, 54th Cong., 2nd sess., X, 59, hereinafter cited as CMC Report, followed by the appropriate Congressional document and page number; Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII, 57.

was in that year that the Continental Congress authorized "two Battalions of Marines be raised . . . that particular care be taken that no person be appointed to office or enlisted into said Battalions, but such are good seamen . . . ."[9] These men were trained to be soldiers but bred to the sea and placed under the command of the United States Navy, a pattern similar to the British model which had utilized marines since 1664.[10]

These Continental Marines, although few in number (the two battalions authorized were never raised)[11] did distinguish themselves in the American Revolution. Their

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9 William Bell Clark (ed.), Naval Documents of the Continental Congress (1966), II, 972. It should not be inferred that there exists unbroken service from 1775; the marines were disbanded after the Revolution in 1784 and not reinstated until 1798. For further information refer to Philip N. Pierce and Frank O. Hough, The Compact History of the United States Marine Corps (1960), pp. 33, 36, hereinafter cited as Pierce, Compact History. For additional details concerning the Continental Marines see Edwin H. Simmons, "The United States Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, LVII (November, 1973), 23-28.

10 Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 3. American marines have traditionally been under the command of naval authority but can, and have been, placed under command of the United States Army. Marines served under General Washington in the Revolution, General Jackson at New Orleans, General Pershing in France, and General MacArthur in Korea. This practice was put into law with the National Security Act of 1947, Pierce, Compact History, p. 280. See also House Miscellaneous Report, No. 666, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., III.

11 Pierce, Compact History, p. 18.

duties were widely varied -- from the sea battles with John Paul Jones to service with Washington's army -- and set the pattern for future campaigns.[12]

The Marine Corps, as it exists today, was formed by an act of Congress in 1798, in time to participate in the undeclared naval war with France.[13] Thereafter the leathernecks found themselves in the thick of foreign and domestic emergencies, conflicts, and full-fledged shooting wars. Because of the notable conduct of these troops under fire, the term "marine" soon came to signify all that is highest in soldierly virtues. American schoolboys for seventy-five years learned a lesson in heroic conduct from a true tale about marines first printed in the 1824 McGuffrey Eclectic Reader.[14]

The years between the Civil War and the war with Spain saw the United States Navy in a slow, often reluctant, period

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12 Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, pp. 4-9. For an interesting account of the marines with John Paul Jones see S.E. Morison, John Paul Jones: A Sailor's Biography (1959), p. 146.

13 E.N. McClellen, "From 1783 to 1798," Marine Corps Gazette, VII (September, 1922), 273-280.

14 Richard S. Collum, The History of the United States Marine Corps (1890), p. 64; Pierce, Compact History, pp. 63-64; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 37. The tale concerned the Massachusetts state prison riot of 1824 when a thirty man marine detachment backed down nearly three hundred armed inmates.

of change -- wooden sailing vessels were giving way to steam and iron -- and the traditional role of seagoing marines seemed questionable on the new iron ships. By the 1880's the "new" navy had evolved, and it was guided in its new role by the writings of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and his stress on a powerful navy with overseas bases.[15]

It was obvious that this "new" navy would require far-flung supply bases, obtained in one way or another. Navy planners envisioned a naval amphibious force that could seize and defend advanced bases. Yet there had been few historical parallels for such a military maneuver.[16] One school of thought pressed for the abolishment of the Marine Corps, and an enlarged navy with amphibious capabilities.[17] The other side argued that the amphibious role should be undertaken by an expanded Corps, which was already an organized force with considerable experience in fighting land campaigns.[18]

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[15] Garraty, The American Nation, pp. 716-17.

[16] Pierce, Compact History, p. 134.

[17] Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, pp. 86-87, 101-06; Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 24; Pierce, Compact History, pp. 133-34.

[18] Pierce, Compact History, p. 134.

The debate was still raging in 1898 when the issue was drawn by an immediate need for such a force -- and the Marine Corps had it.

The week before Spain declared war on the United States, the Marine Corps was ordered to ready a battalion for service in Cuba, and the day after war was declared, as the navy band played "The Girl I Left Behind Me," a combat ready battalion embarked aboard ships. These marines waded ashore at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to seize a site for an advanced naval base, thus becoming the first American troops to land on Cuban soil.[19]

A New Corps in the Old Tradition

Prior to the war with Spain, the United States Marine

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19 Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI, 18; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, pp. 113-17; Pierce, Compact History, pp. 137-40. The landing on Cuba showed the amphibious capability of the Marine Corps, but in addition, the naval battles of the Spanish-American War saved for the marines a traditional role of detachments on board ships. Prior to the war numerous voices were heard objecting to marines serving as warship gun crews. The Marine Corps argued that marines were well adapted for this work as they were thoroughly trained as sharpshooters. "It has been demonstrated," said the marines' Commandant, "that a good marksman with the rifle is a good gunner . . . ." Somewhat reluctantly the Navy Department allowed the marines a trial on the guns. After the war the Commandant could state that judged by the naval battle reports, "I feel safe in asserting that the Department did not make a mistake." See Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 54th Cong., 1st sess., XII, xxxvii-xxxviii; CMC Report, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI, 80. Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 24, points out that the Corps' swiftness at organizing and striking against Cuba caused a needed uplift of morale among the marines who had felt that they were on the verge of disbandment.

Corps consisted of about seventy-six officers commanding less than three thousand men. These troops were widely distributed on thirty-five regular ships of the navy, five additional receiving vessels, and fifteen different shore installations on both coasts of the United States.[20] Although the Corps was operating at its authorized strength, the Commandant reported that the demands of the "new" navy were causing a manpower shortage for the marines, and that duty on the men was very severe because of that shortage.[21]

The demands of war stretched still further the capabilities of the Corps. The Commandant was ordered in 1898 to organize a battalion for combat in Cuba, and between 1899 and 1900, seven battalions were required to be raised for duty in the Philippines, Guam, and China. The navy assisted by authorizing the recruitment of an additional forty-three officers and 1,640 men (for service in the Spanish-American War only), and in 1899 the Naval Personnel Act increased the Corps' strength to 211 officers and six thousand enlisted marines.[22] It was still necessary,

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20 CMC Report, HD 3, 54th Cong., 2nd sess., I, 591; Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XII; Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps (1939), pp. 253-54, hereinafter cited as Metcalf, A History of U.S.M.C.; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 610.

21 CMC Report, HD 3, 54th Cong., 1st sess., XII, 520.

22 Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV,

however, to resort to the traditional marine formula, i.e. skeletonizing stateside posts and stations, in order to fulfill an overseas commitment. For example, after the marine battalion shipped out for Cuba amongst much fanfare, there remained but seventy-one marines for duty on the entire east coast.[23]

The men who bore arms for "Corps and Country" were typical of American soldiers of the period: farm boys looking for travel and adventure, immigrant youths, older drifters, and tough non-commissioned officers with an Irish

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32; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 610. According to CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 914-15, 927-28, by October of 1899 almost all of those enlisted men who signed up for Spanish-American War service had been discharged; however, thirty of the officers were granted regular commissions. In Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI, 19, the Secretary noted that he requested an increase in the authorized strength of the Marine Corps because of the excellent service performed by the First Marine Battalion on Cuba during the war with Spain.

23 CMC Report, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI, 827. A later CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 915, describes the skeletonization method used to form combat battalions that were ordered to the Far East in 1899. This was far from being a new method for the Corps. Pierce, Compact History, pp. 68, 291, notes that when Colonel Archibald Henderson was Commandant in 1836 he raised a regiment of marines to march against the Seminole and Creeks -- "Have gone to Florida to fight Indians. Will be back when the war is over," reportedly read a note tacked to his locked door in Washington -- by drastically reducing shore installations. Nor was this method forgotten in modern conflicts. Much the same method, notes Pierce, was utilized to fulfill General Douglas MacArthur's request in 1950 for a marine division to be used for combat service in Korea.

brogue in their booming voices. One apparent common characteristic was the popularity of the handlebar moustache.

The marine recruit had to be between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, although a fourteen year old could enlist as a musician. The Corps further required the applicant to be able to read and write, be unmarried, and mentally and physically sound. The enlistment was for a five year period, as opposed to three years required by the army and four years by the navy.[24]

Once in, the recruit was trained to perform in a variety of roles. A marine of the period explained his duties:

> A marine is infantry on land, artillery aboard ship, and is called a sea-soldier, but is used for everything, such as infantry, cavalry, artillery, signal and engineer corps . . . .[25]

Promotion was slow, especially for the officers. The prewar advancement picture was commented on by the marine

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[24] Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 54th Cong., 1st sess., XII, xxxviii; CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1135, and Sec. Nav. Report, p. 27, in the same Congressional document; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 108. According to CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 928, the marines in 1899 managed to attract one hundred and fifty former army veterans who chose to enlist in the Corps.

[25] Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 48. Pierce, Compact History, p. 178, explains that prior to 1915 the now famous marine "boot camp" did not exist. Recruits were assigned directly to a marine unit, and there they received their basic training in small doses from a wide variety of instructors.

Commandant when he pinpointed one officer and and explained to the Secretary of the Navy:

> Captain Williams has no hope for promotion to Major for four years . . . when he will be fifty-eight years old, and after a service of thirty-eight years, twenty-four of which in his present grade.[26]

However, the Spanish-American War and the subsequent Insurrection opened up promotions, and further increases in officer billets were authorized in 1899.[27] At this time qualified non-commissioned officers became eligible for advancement to commissioned rank and many took advantage of that opportunity. Routinely, officers came from the Naval Academy, from civilian life, and sometimes officers in the navy transferred to the Corps.[28]

The non-commissioned officers, traditionally known as the "backbone of the Corps," were required to demonstrate their proficiency in military skills in order to advance in rank. A thorough knowledge of drill regulations with the ability to drill troop formations from the squad to company level was one rigid prerequisite. A thorough familiarity with the small arms and machine guns used in the naval

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[26] CMC Report, HD 3, 54th Cong., 2nd sess., X, 591.

[27] Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 32.

[28] CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 927-29.

service, and the ability to command and instruct naval personnel in these weapons was also required. Quite often many small marine detachments had no officer attached, and it was often necessary for the non-commissioned officer to handle administrative duties.[29]

Marine Field Uniform and Equipment

The final decade of the nineteenth century was the last hurrah for the blue uniforms of America's soldiers. With the development of machine guns and accurate repeater rifles, the soldier was losing his traditional preference for those uniforms that drew attention on the battlefield. Rather, the reverse was true, and the early years of the twentieth century saw the military reluctantly turn to uniforms that allowed the soldier to blend with the terrain. A soldier that was hard to see made a poor target. The tan colored or khaki uniform had made its appearance with the British army as early as 1868 during the Abyssinian campaign and at the turn of the century a similar one would be adopted for the American soldier and marine in the field.[30]

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[29] Ibid., p. 915.

[30] Frederick Wilkinson, Militaria (1969), p. 65. According to Fred G. Blakeslee, Uniforms of the World (1929), p. 90, hereinafter cited as Blakeslee, Uniforms of the World, the U.S. Marine Corps kept their traditional and colorful dress blue for ceremonial use in the temperate zones and utilized a dress white uniform for wear in tropical climates.

From The American Navy (1898), p. 30



RETURNING TO THE MAINE AFTER A SHAM BATTLE ASHORE.

THE summons to go ashore is always welcomed by the marines as a pleasant variation of their duties on shipboard, and especially gratifying to them is the news that there is to be a sham battle in which the men from other ships will take part. Opportunity is given of seeing old friends and renewing acquaintances, and as the men embark for the ship after a day's arduous drill, their recollection of the interspersed pleasures make them forget their fatigue. The officers of the "Maine" had brought their men to a state of high efficiency and their discipline was never more conspicuous than in that awful catastrophe in Havana harbor.

Defense Department photo (Marine Corps) 521309, from
Historical and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps



From John Crane, The United States Marines (1952), p. 17.



OFFICERS OF THE 1ST BATTALION at Portsmouth, N. H., on their return in 1898 from Cuba. (Sitting) 1st Lt. James E. Mahoney; 1st Lt. Lewis C. Lucas; 1st Lt. Herbert L. Draper; Colonel Robert W. Huntington; Captain Charles L. McCawley, A.Q.M.; Captain Francis H. Harrington; Captain William B. Spicer; 1st Lt. Wendell C. Neville. (Standing) 2nd Lt. George C. Reid; 1st Lt. Charles G. Long; 2nd Lt. Edwin A. Jonas; Lt. John M. Edgar (M.C.) U. S. Navy; 2nd Lt. Newt H. Hall; 1st Lt. Clarence L. A. Ingate; 1st Lt. William N. McKelvy; Captain George F. Elliott; 2nd Lt. Smedley D. Butler; 2nd Lt. Philip N. Bannon; 2nd Lt. Melville J. Shaw.



PORTSMOUTH, NEW HAMPSHIRE—Marines immediately after the Spanish-American War (1898-1899). Many Marines died when the U.S.S. MAINE exploded and sank in Havana Harbor, February 15, 1898.

MARINES AT Guantanamo, Cuba, 1898. The first Battalion of Marines, supported by a squadron under Commander McCalla, seized and held Guantanamo Bay, giving the Atlantic Fleet a base of operations from which to trap Cervera at Santiago.

In 1898, however, marines still clung to a blue campaign suit which was basically the same as that worn by the U.S. Army. It consisted basically of rough textured blue-gray trousers, folded at the knee over dust colored canvas leggings that were laced on each outboard side. The blue flannel shirt was collarless, with long sleeves and large white buttons.[31]

Both the army and marines had authorized a cork tropical helmet, but these were not popular. The troops charged that the helmets were too easily knocked from the head in bush country, and the marines' white helmet made an inviting target for enemy marksmen.[32]

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31 Regulations for the Uniform and Dress, Equipment, etc., of the United States Marine Corps, July 14, 1892 (1892), pp. 12, 21, hereinafter cited as Marine Uniform Regulations of 1892; Joel D. Thacker, "Marine Uniforms: 1775-1950," Marine Corps Gazette, XXIV (November, 1950), 51, hereinafter cited as Thacker, "Marine Uniforms;" "Marines on the South Line," Manila Times (August 9, 1899), in Records of the United States Marine Corps, National Archives Inventory, Record Group 127, entry 26, Reports Relating to Engagements of the Marine Corps Personnel in the Philippines and China, 1899-1905, hereinafter cited as RG 127, followed by the appropriate entry number; John Crane, U.S. Marines (1952), pp. 17-20; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 107; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, pp. 83-84. The Marine Corps authorized a blue unlined flannel jacket, known as a skeleton, but because of the tropical heat it was seldom worn in the Philippines, see Quartermaster to CMC, September 19, 1898, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 961. According to Edwin H. Simmons, "The United States Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, LVII (February, 1974), 46, the canvas leggings remained as an article of field equipment until they were replaced by combat boots in the middle of the Korean War.

32 Marine Uniform Regulations of 1892, p. 23; CMC

Instead the troops preferred the brown felt, wide brimmed headgear known as a campaign hat, adopted from the cowboy in the west.[33] "I know of no better hat for all round field service," reported one marine officer, and he recommended it "in rain and sunshine and to wear while sleeping on the ground . . . ."[34] The marines wore their campaign hats proudly, creased fore and aft, with a large marine emblem on the left side, later moved to the front in 1901.[35]

Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 918, 960; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, pp. 83-84; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, photo, pp. 142-43.

33 Thacker, "Marine Uniforms," p. 51; Dupuy, The Compact History of the United States Army, p. 153; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, pp. 83-84.

34 Assistant Quartermaster, First Marine Battalion to Quartermaster, U.S. Marine Corps, September 27, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI, 887.

35 Regulations Governing the Uniform and Equipment of Officers and Enlisted Men of the United States Marine Corps (1900), p. 20, hereinafter cited as Marine Uniform Regulations of 1900; Thacker, "Marine Uniforms," p. 51. In 1912, the marines changed the design of the campaign hat from one with a fore and after crease to a four point crease similar to the style of the Montana cowboy and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, see Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 188, and photographs pp. 142-43, 174-75, 206-07. Although the campaign uniforms of American soldiers and marines were similar during the Insurrection, a major distinction was the manner of wearing chevrons or "stripes" on the coat sleeve to denote rank. According to War Department, Regulations and Decisions Pertaining to the Uniforms of the Army of the United States (1897), p. 25, the army required that the chevrons be worn point down, in a manner similar to the British army, while the marines, according to Thacker,

Commencing in 1900, marines sent to the Philippines were outfitted in a new campaign suit consisting of a cotton khaki shirt and trousers. This replaced the coarse blue field uniform that had been worn in battle by the marines in Cuba.[36] The blue field suit proved to be unstable in color and of insufficient weight to stand wear. However, the marines continued to favor the blue flannel shirt as late as 1902 because of its ability to soak up perspiration in the daytime and afford protection from the evening chill.[37]

When marching into battle, the typical marine carried: his rifle, double canvas cartridge belts holding a total of

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"Marine Uniforms," p. 51, wore theirs point up and they always had since chevrons were first authorized in 1833. See also Blakeslee, Uniforms of the World, p. 90; photographs in Edwin H. Simmons, "The United States Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, LVIII (April, 1974), 37; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, pp. 62-63, 110-11.

36 Quartermaster to CMC, September 29, 1900, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1186; CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XX, 1253; Thacker, "Marine Uniforms," p. 51. The marine quartermaster department attempted to produce a khaki campaign hat to match the new campaign suit, but problems with colors remaining fast caused the project to be abandoned. The brown felt campaign hat was re-adopted and remains in use, see previously mentioned Quartermaster report, p. 1190; Marine Uniform Regulations of 1900, pp. 12, 19.

37 Adjutant and Inspector's Office to CMC, September 20, 1899, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 949. A Marine Corps entry of six different enlisted uniforms at the Paris Exposition of 1900 received praise in European military circles, see CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1190; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 188.

one hundred rounds, a poncho draped over the belt, bayonet, haversack, mess kit, and a canteen filled with water or coffee. Inside the haversack would be one day's field ration consisting mainly of canned meat, hardtack, canned beans, and possibly dehydrated fruits. For expected lengthy engagements, two day's additional field rations, two hundred additional rounds of ammunition, one blanket for each two men and necessary cooking utensils, tools, etc., would be transported in wagon or pack trains.[38]

Marine Weapons

The marines that splashed ashore at Cuba, and those that Dewey put ashore at Cavite in 1898 were armed with a rifle that was considered a radical innovation.[39] Prior

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38 Marine Uniform Regulations of 1892, pp. 23-24; Marine Uniform Regulations of 1900, pp. 23-24; Headquarters Second Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Corps, General Orders number thirteen, HD 2, 56th Cong., 1st sess., VI, 459; R.B. Asprey, "Waller of Samar," Marine Corps Gazette, XLV (May, 1961), 40; "Marines on the South Line," Manila Times (author, date, and page number unknown), clipping contained in RG 127, entry 26; Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 42; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 85. The latter author states that although rice was plentiful in the Philippines, it was seldom utilized by the Americans because they disliked it. Sexton also notes (p. 85) that mules were imported by the Americans for transportation purposes. Filipinos used water buffalos to pull carts, but the Americans considered them too slow as well as impractical since they required a daily supply of water to wallow in.

39 Melvin M. Johnson, "Marine Weapons: From Musket to M1," Marine Corps Gazette, XXIV (November, 1950), 118, hereinafter cited as Johnson, "Marine Weapons;" Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 108.

to this time, rifles had used black powder to fire a large caliber bullet. This larger projectile was limited in range but was used in order to obtain effective shock upon impact; a shock that could not then be obtained by small caliber bullets. A major technical breakthrough came with the development of smokeless powder, which was important "not only on account of the absence of smoke," said the Secretary of Navy, "but because of greater velocities obtained by its use . . . ."[40] Thus, smokeless powder greatly increased the velocity of a bullet, giving to the smaller caliber bullets the necessary hitting power.

In 1895 the Corps accepted the first American military weapon to utilize smokeless powder and the small caliber round. This piece was the United States Naval Rifle, 6 millimeter (.236 caliber), more commonly referred to as the Lee, or Navy, or straight-pull rifle, or any combination thereof. The rifle was considered radical because it used a five round clip with only a rapid-fire capability with no way to utilize the weapon as a single loader. Previously,

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[40] Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI, 32, which also cited the value of smokeless powder with rapid-fire weapons because of the greatly reduced powder residue. Aradi Gluckman, United States Muskets, Rifles, and Carbines (1948), p. 330, hereinafter cited as Gluckman, U.S. Rifles, records that smokeless powder was invented in 1844 by Paul Marie Eugene Vielle, a French chemist, but the French government managed to keep the secret closed until the early 1890's.

rifles were loaded by inserting one round in the chamber, closing the bolt, and after firing the process was repeated. Although rapid-firing or repeater rifles were common in civilian firearms, the prevalent military theory was that the action was too rapid, invaribly tempting the shooter to waste ammunition. The Lee Naval rifle was loaded by pulling straight back on the bolt which cocked the trigger, extracted a spent round from the chamber and ejected it from the weapon. A forward push on the bolt slid a new cartridge off the five round clip and loaded it into the chamber and the rifle was ready to fire. The bolt action took only a fraction of a second to complete and the trained shooter could accomplish it without taking his sights off the target. After the fifth round was fired a new five round clip was then quickly inserted. The simple and swift reloading capability of the Lee Naval rifle allowed the average shooter to fire forty well aimed shots per minute, giving the marine a superiority in fire power over more traditionally armed counterparts.[41]

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[41] Gluckman, U.S. Rifles, pp. 321, 330-33; Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 54th Cong., 1st sess., XII, xiv; CMC Report, HD 3, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., X, 558-59; CMC Report, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI, 831. The Lee Navy rifle replaced the caliber forty-five Springield which was essentially a modified Civil War model which had been used by the Marine Corps since 1884. The Springfield was a single shot, breech-loader characterized by its short range and large, but powerful slow moving projectile. This rifle was used in the Philippines by U.S. volunteer units until late 1899 when it was replaced by the Krag, Funston, Memories, p. 176;

The leathernecks quickly took to their new weapon which was lighter and had much greater range and accuracy over its predecessor; it was soon discovered that the Lee was deadly at ranges varying from six to even eleven hundred yards. In light of the increased performance of their new rifle the Corps found it necessary to revise its small arms firing regulations. They established higher standards for marksmanship rating and provided for shooting at ranges in excess of six hundred yards.[42]

One side benefit of the new rifle was the absence of the tremendous kick that was so common in the black powder, large bore predecessors. It was this kick that adversely affected marksmanship, because the shooter's anticipation of the jolt would cause him to involuntarily flench just prior to pulling the trigger, thus causing the muzzle to move off target.[43]

Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 84; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 108.

[42] Assistant Quartermaster, First Marine Battalion to CMC, September 27, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI, 888; CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 925-26. The Adjutant and Inspector to CMC, September 20, 1899, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 948, reports that the new Lee Navy rifle's "increased range over the Springfield [was] causing it to be unsafe to the public when used on most of the ordinary ranges."

[43] Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 84. The Lee Navy rifle was not without defects. The Adjutant and Inspector to CMC, September 14, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI, 848, reports that the weapon's "exterior springs have

While the marines carried their new rifle into battle against the Spanish in Cuba in 1898, and again against the Filipino insurrecto in 1899, the United States Army had also replaced their caliber .45 Springfield rifle with a smaller caliber utilizing smokeless powder. They chose the bolt action, thirty caliber Danish-made Krag-Jorgensen rifle. This rifle was loaded by placing five loose rounds into a box-type magazine on the right hand side of the receiver. Thus the Krag also could fire rapidly by working the bolt. But unlike the Lee, it was designed to be used as a single shot weapon with the full magazine held in reserve for use only in emergencies.[44]

The use of two different rifles by troops in the Philippines caused the U.S. Navy's Bureau of Ordnance to recommend the convening of a joint board of army, navy, and marine officers to consider the adoption of a uniform caliber for small arms and rapid-fire guns for use by all the uniformed services. Such a board was convened in December,

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frequently broken; the follower and triggers sometimes broken," and later in the same report (p. 887) the rifle is criticized because of its "delicate parts." However, most of these defects were corrected by 1899, according to Adjutant and Inspector to CMC, September 20, 1899, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 948.

[44] CMC Report, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI, 831; CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XII, 918; Dupuy, Compact History of the United States Army, p. 168; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 84; Gluckman, U.S. Rifles, pp. 330-33.

1899 and it reported as follows:

> The board is of the opinion that there are no conditions in the nature of the service peculiar to the Army, Navy and Marine Corps which require a different caliber for their small arms and machine guns.
>
> . . . the board is of the opinion that the same caliber should be adopted for these services . . . .
>
> . . . as great numbers of satisfactory caliber .30 rifles are now in service in the Army and are being manufactured at a considerable daily rate, after large preliminary expenditures for plant and as, under the prospective enlarged sphere of the Army's action and possible increase in numbers, it will require an immediate additional supply of such arms, the board is further of the opinion that the retention of the caliber now in use is at present imperative for the Army, and therefore, under their previous conclusions, it should also be adopted for the Navy and Marine Corps.[45]

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[45] Bureau of Ordnance Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 485. The board did not undertake long and tedious competitive testing of various rifles, but they did recommend that future weapons selection utilizing such testing by a joint services board. During the Insurrection the U.S. Army replaced the new thirty-eight caliber revolver with the older Colt forty-five caliber, but not for reasons of uniformity. According to Dupuy, Little Wars, p. 94, the newer weapon had proved ineffective in stopping charging bolomen, so the older, greater impact weapon was reissued. The problem was even greater in the campaigns against the rebellious and fanatic Muslims on Mindanao after 1902 which led to the development of the Colt, automatic, forty-five caliber pistol which is still widely known for its powerful stopping power, and it was adopted in 1911. The marines had not replaced their Navy Colt forty-five caliber revolver since its adoption in the 1850's until its replacement by the Colt automatic pistol in 1911, see Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 189; R.L. Capeci, "The Military Handgun," Complex News, III (July 17, 1969), 2 (a Marine Corps organization news bulletin).

Thus, without attempting any discussion of the respective merits of each services' weapons, the board recommended the use of an uniform caliber and standard cartridge for all the military, and economic considerations pointed to the general use of the .30 caliber Krag rifle. The Marine Corps immediately adopted the new weapon and soon were receiving large shipments. One thousand of the weapons were quickly shipped to Cavite, and by the end of 1900, "practically all the posts of the Marine Corps were supplied with the new rifle."[46]

If the marines were disgruntled about turning in their Lee Navy rifles for newer but unknown weapons, it was short-lived. The Krag rifle was at least the equal to its predecessor in range and accuracy, and as the Commandant was to report in late 1900, "there seems every reason to believe that the new rifles are far superior to the Lee 6 mm. rifles as a military arm."[47]

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46 CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1096-97. The regular U.S. Army units had been armed with the Krag throughout the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection, according to Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 84; Dupuy, Compact History of the United States Army, p. 168.

47 CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1096. Johnson, "Marine Weapons," p. 118, describes the Krag as "a more powerful, longer-ranged weapon" than the Lee.

Naval and marine forces also changed their rapid-fire infantry weapons from 6 millimeter to .30 caliber in order to utilize a uniform cartridge. For the marines this meant that their high-wheeled Colt-Browning machine gun, nicknamed the "potato digger," and the Gatling gun could now handle the same ammunition as their Krags. In addition to these weapons the marines employed the Hotchkiss, a forerunner of the modern aircraft .37 millimeter cannon.[48]

When artillery fire was needed the marines often relied upon supporting naval warships, but the Marine Corps did equip its battalions in the Philippines with a three-inch field gun that was a breech-loading, rifled weapon. Normally it was horse drawn, but more than once it had to be pulled by hand over rice dikes.[49]

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[48] Bureau of Ordnance Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 485; CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 918; Edwin Simmons, "History of the United States Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, LVII (April, 1974), 36; Metcalf, History of U.S.M.C., p. 251; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 84. The slang term "gat" had its beginnings from soldiers' references to the Gatling gun, according to Johnson, "Marine Weapons," p. 117. Both the Gatling and the Hotchkiss rapid-fire guns were wheeled weapons and a photograph of both these is available in Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, pp. 110-11. See also Arthur Kingston, "Machine Guns and Automatic Rifles," Marine Corps Gazette, I (June, 1916), 133-146.

[49] CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 918; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 84.

The rapid-fire and artillery weapons were often extremely effective against the insurrectos since they had no defense against them. Their use often resulted in demoralization among the insurgents.[50]

Superior weapons, however, lose their battlefield importance if the soldiers who use them lack adequate training. There is ample evidence that the Corps insisted upon a proficiency in all infantry weapons, and they gave special emphasis to marksmanship training. Even prior to the outbreak of hostilities with the Spanish, the Corps reported that "during the year great attention has been paid to target practice." The Commandant had ordered that rifle marksmanship training be conducted on every post and station of the Corps, and "that known distance and record target practice with the smaller caliber rapid-fire guns shall be a feature of the instruction of the enlisted men of the Marine Corps . . . ."[51]

Marines fired regularly at rifle ranges and were required to be accurate at ranges from two to six hundred yards. Moreover, the adoption of the Lee and Krag rifles allowed for excellent shooters to regularly hit targets in

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[50] Dupuy, Little Wars, p. 72; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 84.

[51] CMC Report, HD 3, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., X, Appendix, 558; CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 948.

excess of one thousand yards.[52]

When combat battalions were requested for duty in the Philippines, the Corps could report that the marines "were all well instructed in the use of the rifle" and that "they had constant practice."[53]

The Insurrecto and His Weapons

The Americans in the Philippines found themselves facing a foe who was superior in number and strong in his determination to escape foreign domination. A critical weakness of the insurgents, however, was their shortage of weapons and a pitiful lack of military training.

The insurrectos managed to import some Remington and Winchester rifles, but their main arm was the Mauser, an excellent bolt action rifle that utilized smokeless gun powder.[54] Aguinaldo purchased some Mausers; others the

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52 Assistant Quartermaster, First Marine Battalion to CMC, September 27, 1898, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI, 888; CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 953.

53 CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 922; Assistant Quartermaster, First Marine Battalion, HD 3, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., XI, 887.

54 Chief Ordnance Officer, Headquarters, Department of Pacific and Eighth Corps to Adjutant General, First Division of Eighth Corps, March 1, 1899, HD 2, 56th Cong., 1st sess., V, pt. 2, 420-21; Funston, Memories, pp. 195, 329, 342; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 144. The Mauser was an excellent rifle and the forerunner of the famous "Springfield, '03" rifle that was used by Americans in World Wars One and early Two, according to Johnson, "Marine Weapons," p. 118.

insurgents captured from the Spanish, but they never acquired enough. As American military intelligence reports point out, there were always fewer weapons than insurrectos.[55] Rare was the rebel unit that had firearms for more than half of its troops, and generally the unarmed Filipinos moved into battle behind their armed companions, ready to pick up the weapons of their fallen comrades.[56]

Ammunition for the assortment of small arms was also a problem for the Filipino army. Each soldier was required to save the spent cartridge cases, but the reloading process was technically poor with the result being predictably deplorable. Often the reloaded cartridges would carry the projectile only a few feet beyond the muzzle of the gun.[57]

Occasionally Filipino units possessed Maxim machine guns, as well as Hotchkiss and Gatling rapid-fire guns. However, these weapons were in such short supply that they were frequently taken out of a battle at a most critical time to prevent their capture.[58] Some insurgent forces

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55 Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 86, who also mentions one unit of insurrectos armed only with bows and arrows, and of a "battle" that saw Filipino children throwing stones at the advancing line of American infantrymen.

56 Dupuy, Little Wars, p. 70.

57 Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 87.

58 Coxe to Kid, January 6, 1900, Coxe Papers; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, pp. 87, 144. The Maxim machine guns

managed to acquire artillery pieces, and American field reports mention 3.2-inch breech-loading cannons, Krupp field pieces, three pounder rapid fire guns and three-inch naval pieces. More often, however, the Filipinos improvised artillery weapons by hollowing out sturdy bamboo logs which were strengthened with a wire binding. These bamboo guns, as the Americans called them, would be filled with scrap iron, nuts and bolts, broken glass, rocks or whatever scrap material was immediately available. A small black powder charge with a fuse acted as the propellant. When detonated, the bamboo cannons expelled a shower of jagged missiles in a manner similar to grapeshot.[59]

The bolo was the one weapon that was both plentiful and feared by American soldiers. This heavy-bladed jungle knife, about twenty inches long and kept razor sharp, was a tool common to the Filipino peasants and used for every cutting task from felling timber to decapitating an enemy.[60]

The shortage of arms was not the only handicap for Aguinaldo's army. Most of the insurgent generals were

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were reported to have been captured from Spanish troops on the Islands, according to Funston, Memories, p. 285.

[59] Coxe to Kid, January 6, 1900, and attached clipping from the Manila Morning Orient (author, date, and page number unknown), Coxe Papers; Dupuy, Little Wars, p. 70.

[60] Dupuy, Little Wars, pp. 70-71.

acquainted with military science only through a few hastily read books on the subject, if at all. The Filipino army was in the process of organizing and training when hostilities broke out. Military experience among the soldiers was nearly nonexistent, with the possible exception of those Filipinos who had served with the Spanish militia on the Islands.

The insurgent force that met the American army on the conventional battlefield during those first few months of the Insurrection were raw, pathetically lacking in discipline, and almost totally ignorant of modern military weaponry.[61]

The Filipino's poor marksmanship illustrates the inadequacy of his military training. The severe shortage of ammunition no doubt prevented actual shooting practice, but more significant, however, was the inability to properly aim a rifle. The insurrecto routinely sighted his weapon by looking through only the front sight and completely ignoring the rear sight -- often even removing it -- a practice that invariably resulted in the bullet going over the target. Moreover, the knack of trigger squeeze, acknowledged as an important elementary marksmanship skill,

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[61] Unsigned insurgent message to G. Apacible, April 11, 1899, PIR, book 36, roll 89; Funston, Memories, pp. 226, 352.

was virtually unknown.[62]

The effect of the imbalance of military instruction between the two armies was often dramatically displayed on the battlefield. Assaulting American infantry would receive fire from an insurgent unit behind defensive positions. However, the Filipino fire was too inaccurate and lacking in volume, allowing the Americans quickly to gain fire superiority with their heavy and deadly return fire. Overwhelmed, the insurrectos could do little more than huddle in their trenches, listening and clutching their bolos. When the American attackers came near enough, the insurrectos would leap from their positions to fight it out in hand to hand

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62 Statement of General Arthur MacArthur before a Senate committee, April 8, 1902, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIV, pt. 2, 894; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, pp. 87-88; Blount, American Occupation, pp. 596-97. The lack of marksmanship was unfortunate since an insurgent unit that has been trained as sharpshooters is described as a "no more terrifying object" by William Elsey Connelly, Quantrell and the Border Wars (1910), p. 318, and in his work he relates the fear instilled by such partisans -- in this case the Quantrell Raiders -- on their adversaries because of their constant marksmanship practice. Dupuy, Little Wars, p. 70, points out that the Filipino insurgents were poor shots as a direct result of poor training, since in later years the Philippine Scouts of the United States Army became crack marksmen and nearly always attained one hundred percent qualification of units in annual marksmanship firing. General MacArthur told a Senate committee on April 6, 1902, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIV, 895, that if the insurgents had been adequately trained with their weapons, "the losses to the American army would have terrified the nation."

combat. Under the circumstances, the assault of the Americans was rarely turned back.[63]

Even so, some Filipino victories were recorded. If arms, equipment, and military training were inadequate within the ranks of the Filipino army, there was, however, no lack of courage. Veteran American soldiers respected the toughness of the Filipino, and most agreed with army General Henry W. Lawton who described the insurrectos as "the bravest men I have ever seen."[64]

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63 General MacArthur to CG, Army, undated, HD 2, 56th Cong., 1st sess., V, pt. 2, 425; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, pp. 87-88, points out that American fire was often so accurate that the insurrectos could rise in their trench position to fire their weapons only at the cost of losing the top of their heads. This resulted in an insurgent practice of "sticking the rifle over the top and pulling the trigger, without taking aim or even seeing at what they were shooting."

64 Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 88; Funston, Memories, p. 432.



Maslud
Manburao
Caratungan
Estrella
San Jose
Mag-Asawang-Tubig
Pinagsabangan
Bahi
Gasan
Ouou
Moncada
Nampicuan
Mayamot
Sto Tomas
San Antonio
Munoz
Rizal
Dibucao
Bater
Comento
S Luis
Dibut Bay
CAMILING
PANIQUI
Maasin
Sta Ignacia
Guimba
Baloc
Calipahan
Bongabon
Mayantoc
Calibungan
S Ricardo
Laur
VICTORIA
Licab
Pinagpanaan
Lorenzo
Aliaga
TARLAC
SANGITAN
CABANATUAN
Sula
Moriones
Zaragoza
La Paz
Balogblog
San Miguel
Rajal
Alinea
Salmag
O'Donnell
Capas
Concepcion
Jaen
Papaya
Alacaac
Mabancal
San Antonio
GAPAN
Paniqui
Dingalan Bay
Tiaong
BAMBAN
Santa Cruz
Biangue
Poonbato
San Cabiao
Umiray
Magalang
Vicente
Bulualto
Pinotpandian
Villar
Cabangan
SAPANGBATO
Dau
Arayat
San Jose
Sibul Springs
Moraza
Leyley
Angeles
Maloma
Caraguay
Sta Ana
Candaba
Biac-Na-Bato
San Felipe
Mexico
San Ildefonso
Porac
San Fernando
Akle
Sta Fe
Ibad
Bacolor
San Matias
Diliman
Kinasakitan
Marcelino
Aglao
San Jose
Guagua
San Simon
Nagbayto
San Rafael
SAN ANTONIO
Gutad
Lubao
Calumpit
Norzagaray
Subic
Dinalupihan
Santa Cruz
Masantol
Plaridel
Pulong
Pandi
Buhangin
Tamala
POLILLO
Agusuhin
Culo
Panginay
Pastol
Caydan
OLONGAPO
ORAN
S Nicolas
Bocaue
Hacienda Remedios
Loobac
Pinaglapatan
Batangan
Infanta
Sampaloc Pt
Subic Bay
Mabayo
Pinuunan
ABUCAY
Meycauayan
Wawa
Obando
Novaliches
Montalban
Dinahican
Moron
S Mateo
Pilar
MANILA
CALOOCAN
QUEZON CITY
Puerto Real
Port Lampon
STRAIT
ORION
San Roque
Sandalan
Bagac Bay
Bagac
MANILA
S JUAN DEL MONTE
Antipolo
Kapalong
BAY
Limay
PASAY
TAYTAY
Sampalok
Paysawan
MAKATI
PARAÑAQUE
Cardona
TANAY
Bagongbayan
Agloloma
S ROQUE
Cavite
Santa Maria
Labayat
Cabcaben
CARIDAD
Bagumbayan
Pilapila
Mariveles
Bacoor
Alabang
Quisao
Fam
La Monja I
Corregidori I
Caballo I
Laguna de Bay
Pangil
LAMON B
General Trias
Lambac
Jalajala
Matiquio
Papatahan
Naic
Buenavista
Biñan
Bimitagan
San Juan
Carmona
Sta Rosa
Punta
Santa Cruz
Lupas
Calamias
Ternate
Quintana
Sampaloc
Pagsanjan
Caghanapol
Lomingoy
Tabora
Silang
Nanhaya
Pila
Cavinti
Camp Mayapis
Patungan
Bailen
CANLUBANG
Linga
Malalos
Luisiana
Mauban
Looc
Punta
Magdalena
Urdaneta
Amadeo
Calauan
Majayjay
Sampaloc
Alfonso
Talisay
Sta Tomas
LUCBAN
Bayu
NASUGBU
Tagaytay
Tanauan
Sto Angel
Fortune I
Bilaran
Bayuyungan
SAN PABLO
Valencia
Lian
Tuy
Bañaga
Volcano I
Alaminos
Dolores
Mamala
TAYABAS
Rizal
Baleteli
Binubusan
Subic
Lake Taal
LIPA
Sariaya
Pagbilao
Adya
Tiaong
Candelaria
Cabra I
Dacanlao
LUCENA
Lubang
Lucsuhin
Baja
BALAYAN
LEMERY
Bul
Castañas
Maliig
(Bana)
San Pedriño Point
Rosario
Bignay
Tilik
Ambil
Calatagan
Balayan Bay
Ibaan
San Juan
Ambil I
Sipating
Bauan
Baybayin
Bationan
Looc
Lubang Bay
Anilao
Bañaba
Pinagbayanan
Looc Bay
Columpan Peninsula
Talaga
BATANGAS
TAYABAS
Lubang Islands
Batangas Bay
Pinamucan
Bataan
Bantigui Point
Bulacan
Tingluy
Laiya
Golo I
Tonlingonan
Ilijan
Lobo
Moricaban I
Papaya
Malabrigo
Verde Island Passage
Malabrigo Point
San Augustin
Verdi I
San Agapito
Mananao
Camorong
Sabang
Balanacan
Baco I
Cape Calavite
Maduron
Wawa
San Teodoro
Mogpog
Boac
Lumangbayan
Baco
Salong
Ignonoc
Calapan
Silonay
Santa Rosa
Baluguhan
Estrella
Bahi

MANILA BAY
SORSOGON BAY
LUZON
MANILA BAY
LAGUNA DE BAY
SAPANGBATO
ABUCAY
ORION
CARIDAD
PARANAQUE
PASAY
MAKATI
MANILA
QUEZON CITY
TAYTAY
CANLUBANG
SAN PABLO
LUCBAN
LIPA
LEMERY
BATANGAS
NASUGBU
Magalang
San Vicente
Bulualto
Tartaro
Sibul Springs
Candaling
Angeles
Manibaug
Mexico
Ildefonso
Diliman
Floridablanca
Lubao
Macabebe
Masantol
Calumpit
Pulilan
Baliuag
Bustos
Niugan
Plaridel
Pandi
Norzagaray
Buhangin
Santa Cruz
Montalban
Meycauayan
Novaliches
S Mateo
Obando
Malabon (Tanong)
Navotas
Cainta
Antipolo
Teresa
Baras
Tanay
Pililla
Binangonan
Cardona
Pilapila
Darangan
Alabang
Muntinlupa
S Pedro
Biñas
Sta Rosa
Cabuyao
Marinig
Carmona
Sampaloc
Munting Ilog
Silung
Indang
Tagaytay
Talisay Aya
Alfonso
Mendez (Nuñez)
Malabag
Urdaneta
Castaños
Looc
Wawa
Bilaran
Lian
Tuy
Tabora
Bailen
Magallanes
Maragondon
Naic
Ternate
Patungan
Quinluan
Buenavista
Dasmarinas
Amaya
Calibuyo
Rosario
Cabcaben
Pilar
Limay
Kitang
Lamao
Mabatang
Samal
Pampanga Bay
Puerta Rivers
(Puerto Rivas)
Pagbilao
Lucban
Sariaya
Candelaria
Tiaong
Dolores
Lucena
Mayorbon
Los Baños
Calauan
Majayjay
Pila
Liliw
Nagcarlan
Rizal
Sto Angel
Sto Tomas
Tanauan
Talisay
Balete
Alaminos
S Francisco
S Cristobal
Dapdap
Marulao
Bulihan
Bukal
Concepcion
Montero
Lucban
Tayabang
Castañas
Bignay
Santa Catalina
Lucutan
Gabay
Lagnas
Palahanan
Alupay
Baybayin
Putingcahoy
Nayom
Bolbog
Mayuro
Bucal
Ranchayaan
Pinagbayanan
Kalubcub Primero)
Cabubcub
(Kalubcub Segundo)
Sta Rita
Sta Clara
Norte
Tolo
Talaga
Tagatan
Mainaga
Mabin
Arilao
Boboy
Bayan
Ibaan
Mabayas
Tayano
Sto Tomas
Taal
Lake Taal
Subic
Pamiga
San Nicolas
Dita
Adya
Cuenca
Alitagtag
Bauan
San Jose
Rosario
Mojon
Balibago
San Luis
Balayong
Sto Niño
Dominio
Guagua
Sexmoan
Palit
Pulong Sampalok
Susung Dalaga
Ipo
Osboy
Kay Banban
Hacienda Remedios
Loobac
Wawa
Bosoboso
Pinugay
Angono
Taytay
Teresa
Baras
San Juan
Pateros
Pasig
Taguig
Las Piñas
Bacoor
Kawit
Zapote
Imus
Noveleta
Tanza
Sukat
Pilapila
Binangonan
Darangan
Cardona
Bunot Quisao I
Nagsulo
Diablo Pass
Gamutan
Kinagatan
Jalakala
Lambao
Bayugo
Janosa
Balibago
Binitagan
Bolbo I
Malohi
Jalajala Pt
Punta
Nanhaya
Bay Is
Calamba I
Real
Pansol
Calamba
Los Baños
Majayjay

CHAPTER III

"TRADITIONAL READINESS"

They buried him with honor, and news to the
home will come,
How he did in protecting his country and
brave deeds he done.
This is the life of a sentry or a soldier
that walks his post;
To honor and shield the old flag and at last
give up the ghost.

-- From "Cavite, P.I., August 14, 1900,"
by G. Brindley.

In the closing months of the nineteenth century, the United States Marine Corps once again answered the drums of war. But unlike past conflicts, this challenge required nothing less than a complete transformation from an elite, quaint and tiny soldierly unit into an elite, modern and efficient military organization.

The Corps succeeded in meeting these demands, and in doing so not only saved itself from extinction but gave the marines their role for the twentieth century. For the real function of the Marine Corps is not specifically as naval infantry, or landing parties, or to provide an amphibious forced entry capability. The true mission of the Marine Corps is combat readiness: to instantly respond and adapt to any given military emergency -- from island hopping to trench warfare, foreign guerrilla to domestic urban confrontations.

To meet the challenges of the Insurrection the Corps set an example in combat readiness. This chapter will examine that response, specifically the organizational capability to rapidly expand without advance notification, and the tactical capability to meet the adversary on his own terrain and terms.

Marines Get the Call

The first contingent of the American occupation army reached the Philippines on June 30, 1898, when General Thomas Anderson disembarked at Manila with twenty-five hundred men. The next day one of the infantry units was dispatched to the Cavite naval station to relieve the marine guard that Commodore Dewey had dispatched some eight weeks before. After briefing their army replacements the leathernecks boarded small boats and returned to duties with the fleet.[1]

Conditions were developing, however, that would bring to Cavite the largest number of marines heretofore assembled. The first and obvious reason was the presence of numerous insurgent forces on the peninsula of Cavite. After the outbreak of hostilities these Filipino units were seen

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[1] Williams, "Thirty Years Ago," p. 100. The marines from the fleet returned to share security duties in the naval station with the army, and remained there until the arrival of the marine battalion, see Colonel P.C. Pope to CMC, May 27, 1899, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 930.

as a threat to the security of the naval station.[2]

The second and more speculative reason was the desire of the U.S. Navy to completely control the former Spanish naval installations, and even the entire Cavite peninsula itself.[3] Aside from a natural disinclination towards a dependence upon the army for security, the Navy Department may well have seen an opportunity to change its role in the Insurrection. Ever since Dewey's victory the navy had played a passive role in the Islands. Explicitly, the navy's principle duties had been "to cooperate with the Army and to maintain a blockade of such extent as has been determined by the general policy of campaign laid down by the War Department."[4] A large marine force operating on the Cavite peninsula would change the navy's course to a more active participation.

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[2] Dewey to Sec. Nav., March 9, 1899, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 33; Pierce, Compact History, p. 142.

[3] The desirability was clearly stated by Rear Admiral George C. Remey to Sec. Nav., June 14, 1900, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1113.

[4] Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 3. To further add to the speculation that the navy sought a more active role it can be pointed out that Admiral Dewey initially saw a need for only one marine battalion, Dewey to Sec. Nav., March 9, 1899, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 33, but within eighteen months over two thousand marines had arrived forming two full regiments, according to CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XX, 1228.

In any event, on the ninth of March, 1899, Dewey formally requested a battalion of marines to garrison and provide adequate security for the Cavite naval station.[5]

The battalion, designated as the First Battalion and consisting of fifteen officers and two hundred and sixty men, was formed at the Brooklyn Navy Yard and placed under the command of Colonel P.C. Pope. After an initial difficulty in obtaining adequate shipping, the battalion sailed and off-loaded at Manila Bay on May 23rd. Upon arrival at the Cavite naval station a formal guard ceremony took place, and once again the marines unfurled their colors on a foreign shore.[6]

The men of the First Battalion soon settled down to the age old routine of guard duty, drills, parades, and maintenance repair work. Not forgotten, however, was ombat training. Colonel Pope reported that his men were being "thoroughly drilled with the 3-inch field pieces and the Colt's automatic guns," in spite of the heavy tropical

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[5] Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 3, 33; CMC Report, ibid., p. 917.

[6] Colonel P.C. Pope to CMC, May 27, 1899, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 930. Colonel Pope had neither a full first or middle name, according to Edward W. Callahan (ed.), List of Officers of the Navy of the United States and of the Marine Corps from 1775-1900 (1969), p. 695, hereinafter cited as Callahan, List.

rains and initial climatic fevers within the ranks.[7]

In a report to the Commandant, Colonel Pope suggested that the strength of his battalion was "not sufficient to be prepared for every call that might be made upon it."[8] Apparently Rear Admiral J.C. Watson, Dewey's replacement, agreed and in a cablegram sent in July he requested a second battalion.[9]

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7 Colonel Pope to CMC, June 18, 1899, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 920. A detailed account of the marine garrison's typical daily routine is contained in Manila Times, August 8, 1899, included in a folder marked "Philippines, 1898-1899," held at the Reference Section, Historical and Museums Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., hereinafter such material is cited by its folder title, Hdqs. U.S.M.C.

8 Colonel Pope to CMC, May 27, 1899, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 931.

9 Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 33, which also notes that in April a marine battalion was sent to Guam for occupation duties, and although it was called the Pioneer Battalion, no reason can be found for that particular title, see also Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 3. George Dewey was promoted to the newly created rank of Admiral of the Navy in 1899 and returned to the United States in May of that year. The following month Rear Admiral J. Crittenden Watson replaced navy Captain Albert S. Barker who had temporarily succeeded Dewey as Commander, Naval Force on Asiatic Station, Sec. Nav. Report already cited, pp. 3, 33. Watson in turn was relieved by Rear Admiral George C. Remey in April, 1900, and when Remey stationed himself in the waters off China in July of that year, he assigned the second in command, titled the Senior Squadron Commander, to thereafter command the naval forces in the Philippines. The latter position was filled by Rear Admiral Louis Kempff from April 19 to May 20, 1900, and at that time he was relieved by Rear Admiral Fredrick Rodgers. See Rear Admiral George C. Remey to Sec. Nav., August 28, 1900, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 544; Rear Admiral

The Second Battalion was quickly formed for service at Cavite. Sixteen officers and 362 enlisted men were placed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel George F. Elliott, and on September 21st they relieved an army volunteer unit at Cavite. The marines now held full responsibility for the security of the naval station and much of its surroundings. Apparently the leathernecks' performance of duty was to the liking of Admiral Watson; he noted that it was "being another instance redounding to the credit of the marines . . . ."[10]

Land the Landing Force

Meanwhile, the sea-going marines serving with the fleet off the Philippines were far from inactive, and one particular action brought praise to a machine gun crew.

On Februsry 17, 1899, a naval officer from the USS Helena volunteered for duty with the army, and he was assigned a gun crew of three marines to man a Colt automatic gun. The crew was commended by the army for their heavy, well-directed fire in spite of numerous obstacles, not the least being intense enemy fire. The army division's chief

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George C. Remey to Sec. Nav., August 13, 1901, HD 3, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XIX, 608.

10 Endorsement of Admiral Watson of Colonel Pope to CMC, September 28, 1899, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1104; CMC Report, ibid., pp. 920-22.

of artillery stated that the crews' accurate and devastating fire assisted materially in preventing heavier American casualties and in bringing about the surrender of numerous insurgents.[11]

The marine crew from the Helena was not an isolated incident, however. The Asiatic squadron kept its sea-going marines busy with numerous landing parties.[12] One such action involved marines from the Baltimore, Concord and Charleston. A landing force of sixty marines was organized and assigned the mission of destroying a large rifled gun (flat trajectory cannon) which the insurgents emplaced at the mouth of a river at Olongapo, near Subic Bay. On September 23, 1899, the marines landed and despite heavy gunfire from the entrenched insurgents the gun was captured and destroyed in a short time.[13]

A landing force struck again on November 26, 1899, with an amphibious raid of the town of Vigan, on the northwest end

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11 Major Richard W. Young, Utah Artillery to Second Division Hdqs., April 8, 1899, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 942-43. See also other correspondence from army and navy commanders involved, April, 1899, ibid., pp. 943-46. Funston, Memories, p. 237, witnessed and lauded the actions of this gun crew.

12 Niblack, "Operations of the Navy and Marine Corps," pp. 746-753.

13 CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1114.

of Luzon. Spearheading the landing were forty-nine marines from the Oregon, joined by a company under Captain Dion Williams from the Cavite garrison. As the landing force approached the coast in small boats, overhead naval gunfire drove the insurgents from their beach entrenchments. Once ashore the column easily captured the town and rescued three hundred and fifty Spanish prisoners.[14]

That scene was virtually re-enacted two months later when twenty marines from the USS Brooklyn led a landing party which resulted in the rescue of ten Americans, four hundred and sixty Spanish soldiers, and a number of clergymen and pro-American Filipinos -- a total of 522 prisoners held by the insurgents. The conduct of the marines was singled out and commended by the naval officer in charge of the operation, by Admiral Watson, and by the Secretary of the Navy.[15]

Thus the marines on board the ships of the fleet continued to serve in the tradition of the old Corps while perfecting amphibious techniques that were to become a

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[14] Ibid.; Lieutenant Commander Alex McCrackin to Commanding Officer, USS Oregon, November 29, 1899, RG 127, entry 26; Niblack, "Operations of the Navy and Marine Corps," pp. 747-48.

[15] CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1115-16; Niblack, "Operations of the Navy and Marine Corps," p. 749.

trademark some forty years later. In addition to landing party raids, the sea-going leathernecks took part in the sea patrol and blockade of the Philippine coast, naval bombardment of insurgent fortified positions, seizure of small islands, convoying of army expeditions, delivering supplies, and supplemented the marine infantry battalions in combat operations.[16]

The navy-marine combination provided a striking power that was distinct from any army capability. It enjoyed a combination of mobility and strength because of the characteristics of warships, and the nature of the marine detachment on board. The leathernecks were not merely passengers to be carted about for limited periods, but permanent multi-skilled members of the crew, an infantry unit instantly available to the naval commander. The Filipino army found that their flanks were constantly exposed to coastal raids and interior strongholds became vunerable to river-borne assaults. Having neither the means nor the adequate manpower to counter this amphibious threat, the insurgents were forced to seek refuge in isolated mountainous positions.

Early Operations of the Marine Brigade

The main striking force of the Corps in 1899 was the

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16 See Niblack, "Operations of the Navy and Marine Corps," p. 748.

First and Second Marine Battalions which formed the Marine Brigade. Initially these units concentrated on settling in, and their main duties consisted of rebuilding and guarding their new station.[17] But by the autumn months the marines were ready for combat.

In October they planned expeditions into insurgent territory, and one company augmented with a Colt rapid-fire gun joined forces with twenty marines and twenty-four bluejackets from the USS Baltimore.[18] Their mission was to cooperate with U.S. Army units operating at Bacoor, south of Cavite, in a sweep against known insurgent positions. This operation was later called the Imus expedition.

The army commander, Brigadier General Fred Grant, attached the marines to army assault units and ordered his force to commence the approach march to the mouth of the Imus River. The troops plowed through rough and broken terrain covered with rice paddies, bamboo hedges, and small streams. The marine commanding officer, Captain Henry C. Haines, noted that his men spent the greater part of their time up to their knees in the mud or water.[19]

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17 Metcalf, History of U.S.M.C., p. 266, states, however, that the marines raided Olongapo on September, 23, 1899.

18 During this period a typical marine or army infantry company contained about seventy-five men, and a machine gun crew consisted of five men.

19 Captain Henry C. Haines to Colonel Elliott, October 4, 1899, RG 127, entry 26.

Their advance was met by insurgent fire from behind clumps of bamboo, and the American bugler sounded the attack. The insurgents quickly fled before the advancing infantrymen and further resistance collapsed.

Haines was pleased with the fire discipline of his inexperienced men, and the army commanders also expressed their admiration at the marines' behavior.[20] Although Filipino resistance was slight the operation was useful in gaining experience with the terrain and insurgent tactics. However, it was primarily a warm-up to the more seriously contested operations that lay ahead.

Army headquarters planned another assault into the area south of Cavite, and the marines were again invited by General Otis to participate. This time, however, the commander of the army forces, Brigadier General Theodore Schwan, agreed to allow a marine battalion to operate independently in a coordinated two-pronged attack.

The target for the combined forces assault was the town

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20 Haines to Colonel Elliott, October 4, 1899, RG 127, entry 26. See also the report of a marine officer who commanded the fleet's landing party, Captain John T. Myers to Commanding Officer, USS Baltimore, October 4, 1899, ibid.; CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1104-05. Although Captain Haines complimented his men, he was unhappy about the haphazard way that they were selected for this mission. In his report already cited Haines complained that the marines from the brigade at Cavite had "no regular squad organization, the men having been taken from three companies at random." Other reports indicate that this poor practice was often utilized.

of Novaleta, located southwest of Cavite. This area was a hotbed of insurrecto activity, and it previously had been a thorn in the side of the Spanish army. The Spaniards found Novaleta to be heavily entrenched with a network of fortified bunkers and trench lines, further protected by a virtually impassable swamp. After losing an entire regiment at Novaleta, they considered the insurgent stronghold as impregnable and avoided campaigning there.

To assault Novaleta, the army units were to leave Bacoor in a column and approach Novaleta from the east while the marine battalion would assault the city's northern outskirts. Hopefully, the marine drive would push the rebels along the most likely route to retreat, into the path of waiting army guns. To complete the inter-service plan, the six-inch guns of the gunboat Petrel would provide supporting fire.[21]

A force of 356 marines were readied by their commander, Lieutenant Colonel George F. Elliott.[22] He organized his

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21 For information concerning the Novaleta battle see in RG 127, entry 26, the following: Admiral Watson to Sec. Nav., October 10, 13, 1899; Colonel Elliott to Admiral Watson, October 9, 12, 13, 1899; Captain Henry C. Haines to Colonel Elliott, October 11, 1899; Captain B.H. Fuller to Colonel Elliott, October 9, 1899; "Marines on the South Line," Manila Times (August 9, 1899). See also CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1105-09; Colonel Elliott to Admiral Watson, October 10, 1899, ibid., p. 1143.

22 Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 27, describes Colonel Elliott as "one of those rough and ready field officers . . .; his men were always ready to go with him wherever he went."

battalion into three assault columns preceeded by a special scout unit which included a former Spanish cavalryman who was familiar with the countryside.

The marines marched from the naval station with the morning sun on October 8th along a sandy and muddy road, the men perspiring freely under their combat equipment. By mid morning the leathernecks had entered the insurgent territory and paused to await a prearranged signal from a navy cutter which would indicate that the army forces were in position.

Colonel Elliott received the signal and he in turn signaled "commence fire" to the Petrel.

The gunboat shelled to the front of the marine battalion as they moved out in assault formation: the advance guard four hundred yards to the rear of the scout unit, followed by the three assault units in a column spaced two hundred yards apart.

The scouts moved cautiously down a single narrow road, the only route through an impenetrable thicket of thorn bushes. After advancing about a mile the scouts were suddenly pinned down by heavy gunfire from hidden insurgent infantrymen. Colonel Elliott deployed one assault column forward while maneuvering the others to the right and left. The marines received the order to move out, and they began the arduous task of navigating the mud flats while avoiding Filipino bullets.

The gunboat Petrel turned her guns upon the insurgent positions, filling the air with shrieking shells that "would hiss until bursting into trees, swamps and insurgent trenches," wrote an American newspaper correspondent, "enough to dishearten the bravest of the foe."

The marines quickly laid down a heavy base of fire, gaining the necessary fire superiority to support an assault. As the leathernecks closed in they received a hail of bullets from the left flank from insurgents barracaded in a building. This threat was soon silenced and the building set afire.

The first trench lines were breached, and the insurgents fell back and prepared secondary stone breastworks along the bank of a small river. A second charge was sounded, but this time the men were slow to respond, most of them near exhaustion. The officers, however, succeeded with threats, urgings and example to push their men forward -- a Lieutenant Gilson was seen standing on a breastworks waving his hat and shouting, "Come on boys."

The main force launched its charge, and the insurgents broke contact again. The marine scouts reconnoitered the area and found that the insurgents had fled toward the army forces then closing in. By noon of that day this major insurrecto stronghold in south Luzon had fallen.

After regrouping the marines attended to the casualties. Two officers and nine enlisted men were wounded, one

mortally, and fifty others were treated for heat exhaustion. When the advance guard of the army's forces linked up with the marines, Colonel Elliott ordered an attack by part of his command on a nearby fort; the remainder were put to destroying bunkers, blockhouses and living quarters in the area. About two P.M. the command fell into marching order and started back for Cavite.

In his after action reports Colonel Elliott praised his men for their conduct under fire, but it was obvious that these marines required more seasoning. Although junior officers reported no signs of cowardice, there were reports of shaky fire discipline, and the officers experienced difficulty getting the men to cease firing. However, one junior officer complained bitterly that the problem was due to the command's practice of grouping the men into hastily formed units. "Confusion occured," reported Captain Ben H. Fuller, because of "no previous acquaintance" of the officers and their men. "I would respectfully suggest," he wrote, "that companies when going into battle should have their own officers and not strangers."[23]

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23 Captain Fuller to Colonel Elliott, October 9, 1899, RG 127, entry 26. Colonel Elliott's concern appears to have been centered not on cowardice, but just the opposite. He requested that three of his young officers be admonished for their "bravado" because they brashly risked unnecessary danger during a firefight, see Colonel Elliott to Admiral Watson, October 10, 1899, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1143.

Soon after the guns fell silent on the battlefield, there was an outbreak of hostilities of a different sort. The jubilation of the naval authorities over the participation of Elliott's marines and the Petrel in an active role against the insurgents turned sour when they read the official report of the battle from General Otis to the War Department. Except for a terse comment concerning naval "demonstrations," there was no mention of the sea services at Novaleta. The army field commander, Brigadier General Theodore Schwan, had sent his personal compliments and expression of appreciation to Colonel Elliott shortly after the gunfire ceased,[24] but the army had failed to yield the ultimate bureaucratic prize -- official recognition.[25]

The situation was partly rectified when General Schwan put his gratitude in writing for the "very timely and most effective aid rendered" by the naval services.[26] For a time the inter-service harmony was slightly out of tune, but the war continued on.

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[24] "Marines on the South Line," Manila Times (October 9, 1899), RG 127, entry 26.

[25] The account of the army-navy bickering is reported in Manila Times (October 10, 1899), folder "Philippines, general," Hdqs. U.S.M.C., and illustrates a fear by some navy-marine personnel that the army was stealing the show during the Insurrection.

[26] General Schwan to Commanding General, Department of the Pacific and Eighth Army Corps, October 23, 1899, RG 127, entry 26.

From John Crane, The United States Marines (1952), p. 19.



Marines in the Philippine Islands, 1899-1904.

MARINE CORPS BUGLERS and Drummer in the Philippines, 1900.

MARINE OUTPOST on the sand hills outside of Vera Cruz, Mexico, 1914.



The Battle for the Hearts and Minds

After the battle of Novaleta, the marines concentrated their efforts on clearing and pacifying the countryside surrounding the naval stations. Their attention was then shifted to the town of Olongapo on Subic Bay, a troublesome haven for insurrectos.[27]

To clear the area, plans were drawn for another joint military operation: the navy would provide three vessels to land two companies of marines on the beach while units from the Third Infantry would move in overland.

After last minute preparations the anxious marines boarded ship on December 9, 1899. At six-thirty the following morning the vessels appeared on the horizon, and the leathernecks scrambled into small landing boats. There was no opposition on the beaches and the two companies pushed inland toward Olongapo.

Instead of hostile insurgents, however, the marines were greeted by grinning doughboys of the Third Infantry. The soldiers had arrived before sunset the previous day and by five P.M. controlled the town. It is not clear why they did not wait for the ships to arrive, but it is not unlikely that the army found one-upmanship irresistable.[28]

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27 Rear Admiral George C. Remey to Sec. Nav., August 13, 1901, HD 3, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XIX, 614.

28 Brigadier General F.D. Grant to General MacArthur,

Nevertheless, the soldiers departed, and the marines moved in to stay. Captain Herbert L. Draper took command of the occupying force and quickly acted to pacify the area.[29]

During this period the Filipino resistance was foregoing conventional battlefield tactics and resuming the struggle through guerrilla warfare. Thus a vital objective for both sides was the support and loyalty of the Filipino people. The insurrecto leaders were well aware of this fact and so directed their efforts.[30] For young Captain Draper the task required nothing less than a complete campaign of

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December 10, 1899, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., VIII, pt. 5, 106; Brigadier General F.D. Grant to Adjutant General, Department of Northern Luzon, April 15, 1900, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., VIII, pt. 5, 72.

29 Captain J.T. Myers was orginally the officer in charge of the two companies at Olongapo, but he was replaced by Captain Draper on December 25, 1899, see ibid; Case File Number 0703, John T. Myers, Officer Case File Unit, Files Section, Records Branch, Personnel Department, Hdqs. U.S.M.C.; History of U.S. Marine Corps Activities at Subic Bay, P.I., 1899-1955, p. 6, folder "Philippines, general," Hdqs. U.S.M.C., hereinafter cited as Subic Bay. In error is CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1114, which states that Captain Draper led the occupying companies into Olongapo.

30 See the following PIR: Mabini to Province Chief of Pangasinan, April 5, 1899, book B-3, roll 88; Unsigned message to G. Apacible, April 11, 1899, book B-36, roll 89; Mabini to Aradio Maxilion, April 11, 1899, folder 1079-1, roll 65; Leandro Fullon to Martin Delgado, April 13, 1899, folder 117-2, roll 12; "Plan of Combat," undated but estimated by interpreters as January, 1900, folder 1267-1, roll 77.

counter-guerrilla warfare -- political, economical, and social measures as well as military -- at a time when virtually no precedent existed for American military officers.

His first effort was directed against insurgent infiltration into the town thereby breaking their link with the local population. This was accomplished with round the clock patrolling of the entire area. When concentrations of insurgents were discovered they were attacked in force and driven from the area. Soon the marines' effort was made vastly easier when local inhabitants, seeing that the Americans would protect them, volunteered information on insurgent activities.

Within two months Captain Draper could report of "peace and tranquility" in the town. Robberies and taxation of the civilian population by bandits and/or insurgents came to an end, and the town began to thrive under the cloak of American security.[31]

Once the immediate guerrilla threat against Olongapo passed, Captain Draper had the good sense to turn his efforts towards political and economic measures. The first priority was directed towards developing a system of self-government. The marine officer felt that with self-rule, the town would return to the normal peacetime routine.

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[31] Captain Draper to Commanding Officer, First Marines, February 10, 1900, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1143-44.

After consulting with local officials and town elders an election for municipal officers was conducted on January 28, 1900. Under the protection of the marines, local political aspirants campaigned for office and the populace peacefully voted via a secret ballot. After the official count the victors were installed in their offices with appropriate ceremonies.[32]

With a new government Olongapo began to operate as a municipality. Town officials started a tax collection system which paid for street cleaning and other sanitation measures. Soon a school was opened and a marine lieutenant filled in as the English teacher. On the recommendation from the new municipal officials Draper trained and organized a local police force, and distinguished them with old marine full dress helmets.

Local ordinances were again enforced and the security of the town attracted new citizens who moved in from the countryside thereby increasing the population and fostering a new prosperity.

The physical needs of the civilians were also attended to. When it appeared that some families were close to starvation, military rations were issued until civilian food production could take over. Moreover, Draper brought in

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[32] Ibid.

medical teams to administer care and distribute medicines whenever needed.

To every peaceful Filipino Draper guaranteed in the name of the United States:

> . . . the fruit of his own toil, the rights of life and liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and the right to worship God as he saw fit, and demanded in return obedience to the laws.[33]

To those who would challenge the laws, swift military reprisals awaited. In February, 1900, two marines were killed in an ambush outside of town, and Draper marched with over a hundred men to a suspected insurgent village. The marines moved quickly to attain surprise, but the insurrecto band had slipped away. However, a large cache of ammunition was captured.

On the following day Draper ordered all the inhabitants of two nearby localities to move into the town of Olongapo within three days or be declared outlaws. The order was complied with. The first abandoned town was then entirely destroyed, and the whole region -- mountains, valleys and swamps -- was the object of a thorough but futile search mission.

The second abandoned town was subjected to a coordinated attack by marine and army units, with fire support from the USS Nashville. Some arms and ammunition were

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[33] Ibid.

found, but again the insurgents had evaded capture.

A third attack was directed on a town close to a U.S. Army detachment at Subic. After clearing his intentions with the army commander, the town was raided. Several bolos and many tons of rice intended to supply the insurgents were captured, and this time a number of prisoners were taken, including insurrectos, supporters, and spies. The information pinpointing the insurgent locations was volunteered by Filipinos in Olongapo; Draper's concern for popular support paid off militarily.[34]

The marine commander's multiple approach effectively crushed the strength and influence of the insurrecto by capturing his supplies, invading his base operations and by severing his support from the local population. In a matter of months the region was pacified, and the following year the main insurgent force -- tired and demoralized from marine operations -- surrendered to the marines.[35]

Captain Draper's foresight in seeing the advantages in marshalling popular support in a revolutionary insurrection was admirable, especially during a period when the prevailing

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[34] Captain Draper to Commanding Officer, First Marines, February 23, 1900, RG 127, entry 26; Captain Draper to Commanding Officer, First Marines, March 14, and April 9, 1900, folder "Philippines, 1898-1899," Hdqs. U.S.M.C.

[35] Rear Admiral George C. Remey to Sec. Nav., August 13, 1901, HD 3, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XIX, 614; CMC Report, ibid., p. 1227.

military attitude favored rule by the bayonet.[36] However, other marine commanders were equally prudent. For example, the small island of Isabela of Basilan was occupied by a marine garrison commanded by Captain Thomas S. Borden. After instituting a rule similar to Captain Draper's, Borden was notified of his transfer to other duties. The civilian inhabitants wrote a letter to the American authorities requesting that the marine captain be allowed to stay:

> . . . having observed that during his command in this locality the preservation of peace and tranquility affecting happily the prosperity of the country, he inspected with scrupulous care the hygienic means for the care of the health of the public . . . for which reason Mr. Borden is loved and respected and at the same time esteemed by the people in general.[37]

Many decades later the bloody American experience in Vietnam would prompt military writers to extol the importance of gaining the hearts and minds of a country torn by guerrilla war, but in 1900 that lesson was already being learned and applied.

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36 Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 283; St. Louis Dispatch (April 10, 1902), p. 4, col. 3; New York Times (June 18, 1900), p. 6, col. 5; William J. Pomeroy, Guerrilla and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare (1964), p. 28, hereinafter cited as Pomeroy, Guerrilla Warfare; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 252; Agoncillo, Short History, p. 134; Grunder, Philippines, p. 65.

37 Residents of Isabela of Basilan to Admiral Watson, September 27, 1900, folder "Philippines, 1900-1901," Hdqs. U.S.M.C.

More Marines For More Crises

The Second Battalion of marines had barely laid down their seabags at Cavite when in late September Admiral Watson cabled for yet another battalion; a request he justified by pointing to the arduous duty faced by the marines in the Philippines.[38]

Upon receipt of orders from the Secretary of the Navy the Third Battalion was immediately created from various east coast shore installations. Two companies of eighty men each were formed at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, while two similar companies were organized at Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C. Like the two battalions before it, the fifteen officers and 325 enlisted men of the Third Battalion traveled cross country by train and sailed from the west coast. They docked at the Philippines on 15 December, 1899.[39] Their commanding officer was a renowned Corps character with the

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38 Admiral Watson to Sec. Nav., October 21, 1899, referred to in CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1109.

39 CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1109-10. According to Subic Bay, p. 7, after the Third Battalion arrived in Cavite it was disbanded and its personnel were distributed to the First and Second Battalions and the former title of Marine Brigade was changed to First Regiment of Marines on December 18, 1900. The regiment was commonly referred to as the First Marines. Such military designations as Ninth Infantry, Seventh Cavalry, and First Marines refer to regiments and not divisions as sometimes believed. Note the regiments' titles in Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, pp. 133-34, 193, 677-78.

lengthy and redundant name of Major Littleton Waller Trazewell Waller. "A most excellent officer," one of Waller's lieutenants later explained, "the only small man I ever knew who talked a lot about himself but who could always deliver the goods."[40]

The marines were stepping up their operations against the Filipino insurrectos when new troubles erupted with the Boxers in China. By mid 1900 it became obvious that troops would be required to protect the lives and property of the Americans there, and the military authorities ordered the transfer of marines and later army regulars from the Philippines to face the Boxers.

On June 14, 1900, Major Waller sailed from Cavite with a force of one hundred and forty marines to join an international army consisting of British, Austrian, German, French, Italian, Japanese, and Russian troops. By July the entire First Marines were in China, and the conflict climaxed with the famous seige of Peking in late August. "Official and unofficial reports and particularly the dispatches of our minister," stated the Secretary of the Navy, "show that the American Marines bore their full share of the burdens of this memorable seige."[41]

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[40] F.M. Wise, A Marine Tells It To You (1929), p. 7.

[41] Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 3-4, which also notes that the first American troops to land

In order to replace the marines sent to China, naval authorities requested an additional battalion for service at Cavite. Thus the Fourth Battalion was formed and outfitted, but it was diverted from its original destination. Because of the gravity of the situation it was sent to China to take part in active operations.[42]

On July 10, 1900, Marine Corps Headquarters was directed by the Navy Department to organize still another battalion for service in China, and on July 28th, the Fifth Battalion sailed for the Orient and joined the First Marines in China.[43]

In late summer the first U.S. Army reinforcements arrived in China from the Philippines. Together the First Marines and these regulars, the crack Ninth Infantry, formed the United States Brigade at Tientsin, commanded by the senior marine officer, Colonel Robert L. Meade.[44]

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in China to meet the Boxers were sea-going marines from the USS Newark and Oregon; CMC Report, ibid., pp. 116-1132.

42 CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1110, which also notes that this was the first battalion of marines to be armed with Krag rifles.

43 Ibid., pp. 1111, 1116, 1121, 1138. This document notes (p. 1132) that a total of 1,200 marines served in the Boxer Rebellion.

44 Ibid., p. 1121. Colonel Meade was later the Commander of U.S. Forces in China and army Major General Adna Chaffee assumed command in July 30, 1900, Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 143.

Meanwhile, on Luzon the few remaining marines -- one company at Olongapo and a small garrison at the Cavite naval station -- were forced to consolidate their forces, and the military control of Cavite peninsula was returned to the U.S. Army.[45]

In September a request from naval authorities in the Philippines prompted the Secretary of the Navy to order the Corps to organize and equip the Sixth Battalion for service in the Philippines. The battalion sailed from the west coast by early October which coincided with the cessation of hositlities in China. The manpower shortage at Cavite came to an abrupt halt with the arrival of the Sixth Battalion from the States, the First Marines from China, and another battalion of marines transferred from occupation duty on Guam.[46]

With the influx of marines pouring into Cavite the peninsula was returned to permanent naval control. By 1901,

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45 Subic Bay, p. 10; Rear Admiral George C. Remey to Sec. Nav., August 13, 1901, HD 3, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XIX, 614. According to Commander, Naval Force on Asiatic Station to Sec. Nav., June 14, 1900, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1113, the military governor had agreed to give official control of the Cavite peninsula to the navy in the summer of 1900, just prior to the Boxer crisis.

46 Rear Admiral George C. Remey to Sec. Nav., August 13, 1901, HD 3, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XIX, 609; CMC Report, ibid., p. 1234; Rear Admiral Louis Kempff to Sec. Nav., HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1111; CMC Report, ibid., pp. 1111-12; CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XX, 1234.

the marine force in the Philippines numbered more than two thousand troops organized into the First and Second Regiments. Together they formed the First Marine Brigade -- the ancestor of many brigades that would bear that number.[47] The headquarters of the brigade and one regiment were stationed at Cavite, and the other regiment occupied Olongapo. In addition, about one hundred marines were stationed at Port Isabela, fifty more at Pollok, Mindanao, and squad-sized units guarded several lighthouses throughout the archipelago.[48]

Throughout 1901 the marines continued to render valuable active service and cleared their assigned areas of insurgent guerrillas. The number of armed Filipinos being captured greatly increased in the province of Cavite, and one of the more troublesome guerrilla leaders, Colonel Alba, surrendered his entire force along with weapons and ammunition to the marines.[49]

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47 Subic Bay, pp. 11-12; CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XX, 1228; Rear Admiral George C. Remey to Sec. Nav., August 13, 1901, HD 3, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XIX, 614.

48 Commander, Naval Forces on Asiatic Station to Sec. Nav., February 28, 1902, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XVI, 442; Rear Admiral George C. Remey to Sec. Nav., August 13, 1901, HD 3, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XIX, 614.

49 Commander, Naval Forces on Asiatic Station to Sec. Nav., April 8, 1901, HD 3, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XX, 1227.

In addition to the unceasing chasing of insurgents, marines were also required to perform such important non-combat duties as port captains, district commanders, custom inspectors, provost judges, internal revenue collectors and military governors.[50]

In the relatively short period from March, 1899, to October, 1900, the Corps had executed a rapid and orderly expansion which provided combat troops for the Philippine Insurrection and the Boxer Rebellion, and occupation forces for Guam and Puerto Rico. These units were efficiently supplied and transported across the American continent and ocean waterways, demonstrating the Corps' organizational ability for logistics planning and coordination. More important, the troops arrived well trained, highly motivated and effectively led.[51]

In the Philippines, the marines exhibited an operational flexibility which allowed them to meet the conventional Filipino army in land warfare, to outlast a guerrilla force in its own territory, and to continue to serve the fleet.

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[50] Rear Admiral George C. Remey to Sec. Nav., HD 3, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XIX, 614.

[51] It is notable that the Corps carried on its rapid expansion effort with "no relaxation in the standard of men required for enlistment in the Marine Corps . . .," according to CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1134.

The amphibious capability of the marines gave them a mobility that was not inherent in other forces. Because of it they had the capacity to "take and hold, any city on the coast," explained Colonel Elliott, "being able to move quickly and without publishing the point of the attack to the natives, as it is always done in army movement."[52]

The responsiveness of the marines in the Philippines prompted the Secretary of the Navy to explain to the President: "This is in keeping with the traditional readiness of the organization to answer at the shortest notice calls made upon it for active duty."[53]

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[52] Unaddressed letter from Colonel Elliott, written probably in October, 1899, RG 127, entry 26. The army experienced much difficulty in obtaining the element of surprise. First Lieutenant Campbell King, U.S.A., to Adjutant, Guinan, Samar, P.I., September 12, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 623, reported that insurgent positions "cannot be reached . . . in such a manner as to take them by surprise."

[53] Sec. Nav. Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XVI, 37.

PHILIPPINE S
SAMAR
LEYTE
SEA
CARIGARA BAY
LEYTE GULF
Cross-Island March
Cahayagan I
Batag I
Laoang I
Laoang
Bacon I
Palapag
Pambuhan
Bugko
Cervantes
Catubig
Gamay
Sila Point
Gamay Bay
Barabod Point
Nabugtusan I
Binarayan I
Lapinin
Lo-oc
Tula
Lope de Vega
Tacabucan
Magubay
Trinidad
Calbayog
Bondo
Gandara
Pagsanghan
San Jorge
Hinica-an
Calape
Janipen
Tarangnan
Hernandez
Sierra
Silanga
San Fernando
Bagacay
Tula
Taft
Sulat
Nena
San Julian
Sta Fe
Canahavan Islands
CATBALOGAN
Jiabong
WRIGHT
Himabangan
San Jose
Maqueda
Bohol
Zumarraga
Calbiga
Jubasan
Quintarcan
Tinog
Villareal
San Fernando
Lale
Borongan
San Jose
Caibiran
Talalora
Plaridel
Tagacay
Pawikan
(Pawican)
Balaqui
(Balaquid)
Sta Rita
Tanandog
San Eduardo
Linalan
San Buenaventura
Llorente
Babatngon
Bagalibas
Sohoton
Leyte
Belen
Impo
Calingcaguing
Barugo
Basey
Magallanes
Hernani
Lukay
San Antonio
TACLOBAN
Pambuhan Sur
Pambujam Harbor
Alangalang
Santa Fe
San Jose
PALO
San Pedro
Naga
Malbog
Sta Margarita
Salcedo
Agay-Ayan
Valencia
Dagami
Bolongtd
TANAUAN
Sto Niño
Laua-an
Gimorlos
Balangiga
Mercedes
Guiuan
Barbo
Salug
Dolores
Kiling
Tolosa
Dagami
ORMOC
Ipil
BURAUEN
Julita
San Roque
Manicani I
Calicoan I
Suluan
Leleboon I
Sungi-Point
Candolu I
Puerto Bello
Benulho
Dulag
Merida
La Paz
Mayorgac
Damulaan
(Damula-an)
Talisayan
Tarragona
Pilar
San Augustin
Monserrat
(Montserrat)
Abuyog
Villa Hermosa
BAYBAY
Taytay Point
Osmeña
Calarman Point
Humirog
Kikilo
Hubas
Plaridel
Hibagwan
Hingatungan Point
Silago
Homonhon Island
Homonhon
ORAS
Apitan I
Oras Bay
Tubabao I
Luctoban I
Kaybani I
Hilaban I
Sibay I
Fulin I
Dolores
Jinolaso
Linao I
Cansangaya
Catarman
Cabaun I
Palijon I
Hiraposan I
Oot Point
Lope de Vega
Pambuhan
Catubig
Oras
Dolores
Pambuhan
Catarman

CHAPTER IV

"AVENGE OUR LATE COMRADES"

> The month of October, in the year of 1901
> Eventful in its history for the bloodshed
> it had run;
> Soldiers and marines received orders to
> proceed without delay,
> And avenge a nation's honor in the blood
> that passed away.
>
> -- From "Soldiers and Marines on Famous Hikes"
> by Patrick Cathsem, Former Private, U.S.M.C.,
> 1902.

When the Filipino insurgents adopted guerrilla warfare, the marines on Luzon proved themselves able to conform to the new situation. As described in the previous chapter the leathernecks' conventional military skills were scrutinized and reshaped for the new challenge. Moreover, their leaders utilized the tactic of the guerrillas themselves: constant harassment, constant attack. The marines illustrated that well-trained and equipped soldiers could effectively counter revolutionary irregulars.

They can, that is, if measures beyond purely military ones can be envisioned. If one applies Mao Tse-Tung's formula -- the guerrillas are the fish that swim in the sea of people -- then it follows that the political temperature must be favorable for the fish to thrive. The marines' pacification and self-government policies on Luzon changed the temperature of the water and the fish died.

This chapter will demonstrate, however, that the leathernecks did not transfer the lessons of Olongapo when they were ordered to Samar. They, along with the army command, permitted a desire for revenge to alienate the native population, which in turn strengthened Filipino loyalty to the insurrecto.

The Insurrection Appears Over

The American authorities by late 1901 were expressing their pleasure over the progress that was being made toward the pacification of the archipelago. The initial successes that had been scored by the guerrillas during the previous year were on the wane. With the capture of Emilio Aguinaldo the spirit of the insurrectos was sapped, and thousands of them surrendered under the offer of amnesty by General Arthur MacArthur. American field commanders reported the pacification of all but a handful of the Luzon provinces, and most were operating under the control of civilian authorities. The other islands were quiet, and even those considered as yet unpacified -- Cebu, Bohol, Samar, and Mindanao -- were tightly blockaded and their ports closed.[1]

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[1] Major General Adna Chaffee to Adjutant General of the Army, September 30, 1902, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 186-88; CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 965. According to Rear Admiral George C. Remey to Sec. Nav., August 13, 1901, HD 3, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XIX, 607, the navy saw the situation as a "radical decline of the Insurrection," and reduced the size of its fleet off the Philippines. The civilian authorities referred to were the commission composed of American civilian officials sent

Numerous Filipino political leaders were calling for a halt to hostilities and proclaimed that the revolution was "morally and materially dead."[2] Guerrilla leaders complained of apathy and war weariness throughout the population; furthermore, there were indications of active cooperation of many Filipinos -- including former insurgents -- with American units. Recruits no longer flocked to insurrecto units and more frequently had to be impressed by force. All available evidence indicated that "the general condition of the islands as regards pacification has never been so favorable as now."[3] But in the last days of September, 1901, an incident took place on Samar that rocked the entire military establishment.

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by President McKinley in June of 1900, and the Civil Governor first appointed by the President on July 4, 1901. As soon as a province was pacified the control would pass from the military to civil officials, see Blount, American Occupation, chs., xiv-xv. General Otis was relieved by General MacArthur as Commanding General of the Division of the Philippines and as Military Governor of the Islands on May 5, 1900, see General MacArthur to Adjutant General of the Army, October 1, 1900, HD 2, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., VI, 72. General MacArthur was relieved by Major General Adna Chaffee in July, 1901, Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 267.

2 Words of Felipe Buencamino speaking for the Federal Party, quoted in SD 259, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XVII, 24.

3 Captain Allen, U.S.A., (first name unavailable) Chief of Constabulary, in SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIII, pt. 1, 216.

Insurrection of Samar

The island of Samar, part of the Visayan group, lies southwest of Luzon. It is some 5,276 square miles in size with a population at the turn of the century estimated at 266,237. Geographically Samar was ideally suited for protracted guerrilla warfare; the wild, dense jungle and mountainous interior provided a base of operations which was penetrated by few rivers and no roads. Most of the population was widely dispersed in the numerous coastal towns and villages and only six percent of the population normally resided in the interior.[4]

During the Spanish colonial era, Samar had been occupied only to the extent that a few small garrisons commanded by non-commissioned officers were scattered among the scanty coastal barrios (villages). The heartland of the island was left to aboriginal negritos who had roamed undisturbed for

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[4] See statement of Captain Ayer, a member of General Smith's staff, SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 7; population census figures of 1903 in Blount, American Occupation, pp. 372-73; General Robert P. Hughes to Adjutant General, Division of the Philippines, November 30, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 593-95; Gates, Schoolbooks, pp. 252-53. The men of Samar were described as "the strongest and biggest natives I have seen in the islands" by marine Major L.W.T. Waller, see Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy), National Archives Inventory, Record Group 125, General Court-Martial Case, Number 10195, Major Littleton W.T. Waller, U.S.M.C., March, 1902, p. 261, hereinafter cited as Court-Martial of Major Waller. The unit classification, Division of the Philippines, was the headquarters for all U.S. Army forces on the Islands, and was stationed in Manila.

centuries.[5]

Until the withdrawal of the Spaniards from the Philippines, Samar had not been touched with rebellion. Just before the arrival of American occupation troops on the island, however, a short, heavily built man with a thick black mustache appeared at Catbalogan, the capital of Samar. He was Vincente Lucban, an educated man in his late fifties who could read and write both English and Spanish. His parents were Filipino-Chinese who resided in southern Luzon and had managed to acquire a moderate amount of wealth. He and most of his family had been active in revolutionary activities for years.[6]

Arriving on Samar with one hundred riflemen of the Filipino army, Lucban announced that he bore a commission as a brigadier general from Aguinaldo and proclaimed himself governor of the island as well as military commander.

He quickly commenced to regiment the entire population. The men were organized into a military force; the women were assigned to make rifle cartridges; arsenals and strongholds were constructed in the interior; and each household was required to display a flag of the Philippine Republic.

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[5] Testimony of General Robert P. Hughes before the Senate, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIII, pt. 1, 551-54.

[6] Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, pp. 30-32.

Afterwards, he destroyed the power of the Church by replacing the clergy with native priests of his own choosing. Lucban's success at propanganda, and his skill at rousing the patriotism of the people made him a popular leader almost overnight.[7]

"General" Lucban had been firmly entrenched on Samar for more than a year when the first American troops arrived in 1900. He relinquished the coastal towns to the Americans but rallied his forces into the interior, determined to resist the invaders. The coastal population was heavily infiltrated with insurgent spies, and any native suspected of cooperating with the Americans was harshly dealt with. The foreign occupation of Samar did little to weaken the power of Lucban, and indeed his following increased.[8]

A vigorous campaign to crush the guerrilla force on Samar was launched by American army units in August, 1901,

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7 Ibid., pp. 31-32. The arsenals of the insurgents were primitive affairs where make-shift weapons were constructed. That Lucban emerged an excellent guerrilla in spite of a lack of military training is in keeping with the nature of this type of warfare: "Guerrilla hostilities are the university of war," wrote Mao, "after you fought several times valiantly and aggressively, you may become a leader of troops," Griffith (ed.), Mao on Guerrilla Warfare, p. 73.

8 Senate testimony of General Hughes, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIII, pt. 1, 551-55; Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 32. Lucban is described as an "incorrigible last-ditch fighter" in Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (1961), p. 354.

but Lucban successfully withstood this assault. Inside the guerrilla headquarters plans were formulated for surprise attacks against isolated American detachments.[9]

The Massacre at Balangiga

One of these remote garrisons was manned by Company "C" of the Ninth United States Infantry, a regiment of regulars. Its members had seen combat in Cuba, northern Luzon, and had only recently returned to the Philippines after their bout with the fierce Boxers in China. The companies of the regiment were scattered throughout the islands, and Company "C" drew the assignment of occupying the village town of Balangiga on the southwest coast of Samar. The company, commanded by Captain Thomas W. Connell, consisted of two infantry officers, a surgeon, and seventy-one enlisted men. They arrived on August 11, 1901, and garrisoned themselves comfortably in the native buildings around the town plaza.[10]

Throughout the remainder of August and well into September there was little or no opposition to the American

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9 Report of General Hughes to Adjutant General, Division of the Philippines, August 20, 1901, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIV, pt. 2, 1586-87.

10 General Hughes to General Chaffee, June 17, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 1st sess., VII, pt. 4, 6; General Chaffee to Adjutant General of the Army, October 1, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 1st sess., VII, pt. 5, 9; Captain Edwin V. Bookmiller to Department of Visayas, October 1, 1901, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIV, pt. 2, 1594.

soldiers. The native officials of Balangiga had assured them of their friendship.[11]

At daybreak on September 28th, the routine began no different from countless other Sunday mornings. The men of Company "C" lined up in morning chow formation at the field kitchen, some reading the mail which had recently arrived from home. The soldiers did not carry their weapons to chow in accordance with instructions from their company commander -- a gesture to show the trust of the Americans towards the local natives.[12]

Near the field kitchen some eighty workmen, who had been brought in from the countryside by the village presidente (mayor), were diligently engrossed in clean-up chores under the eyes of the three American sentries -- the only armed men in the compound. Chatting with one of these sentries was the village police chief. Without warning, the police chief swiftly grabbed the startled soldier's Krag and smartly smashed the butt into the American's head. The "workmen" -- actually Lucban's insurgents armed with bolos -- instantly killed the other two sentries, chopping them

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11 P. Abayon, Presidente of Balangiga, to General Lucban, May 30, 1901, PIR, folder 820-2, roll 46.

12 Captain Bookmiller to Department of Visayas, October 1, 1901, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIV, pt. 2, 1594-95; Elihu Root to the President, July 12, 1902, SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 4.

with bolos, picks, and shovels.[13]

Within seconds the church bell began to clang continuously signaling an attack by the entire male populace of Balangiga. Most of the enlisted men were butchered at the mess tables, chopped and dismembered in grisly fashion. The officers suffered a similar fate when bolomen suddenly burst into their quarters.

A scant handfull of soldiers, most of them bleeding severely from slash wounds, defended themselves with shovels, baseball bats, and rocks. The company cook escaped death by hurling canned goods at his attackers -- he was the pitcher on the company baseball team -- and managed to join the survivors. The small group of soldiers grappled with their assailants and they successfully fought their way to the rifles stacked in one of the barracks. Soon the sharp crack of the Krags echoed through the compound; not a few

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[13] Details of the massacre of Company "C" at Balangiga are contained in reports of various army officials who investigated the incident, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIV, pt. 2, 1594-1603; HD 2, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XII, 148, 188, 606-09, 625-34. See also the following accounts in the New York Times: (September 30, 1901), p. 1, col 7: (October 1, 1901), p. 3, col. 1; (October 3, 1901), p. 1, col. 6; (October 7, 1901), p. 6, col. 5; (October 23, 1901), p. 8, col. 2. The leader of the Balangiga assault claims that over seven hundred Filipinos took part in the attack, Eugenio Daza to Senior Colonel, 2nd chief of an unnamed province, October 6, 1901, PIR, folder 820-5, roll 46. The U.S. Army estimate puts the number of attackers at about four hundred, see "Principal Events in the Philippine Islands, July 1, 1901 to June 30, 1902," HD 2 , 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 148.

of the natives felt the deadly sting of the American's rapid and accurate fire.

The soldiers fought their way to the beach and set out in native outrigger canoes. Although more casualties were suffered to the treacherous water and natives along the shore, the neighboring American garrison at Basey was reached the following morning. Of the seventy-four officers and men of Company "C", Ninth Infantry, only twenty-six survived, and twenty-two of these were wounded. The Americans had not sold their lives cheaply, however, for in the town of Balangiga lay one hundred and fifty dead Filipinos.

At Basey, a detachment from Company "G", Ninth Infantry was rushed to Balangiga on the steamer Pittsburg. After coming ashore they drove off the remaining insurgents and entered the garrison. The scene that greeted these seasoned infantrymen sickened them. Brains and entrails of dead Americans strewed the plaza and barracks. Some of the bodies of the Americans were burning and none had escaped mutilation. The company commander's head had been severed and smoldered in a fire. Not even the company dog had escaped the terror, its eyes gouged out and replaced by stones in the sockets.[14]

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[14] The company commander of Company "G", Ninth Infantry, Captain Edwin V. Bookmiller, relates the details of the expedition to Balangiga in reports contained in SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIV, pt. 2, 1596 and HD 2, 57th Cong.,

Also dotting the street were the dead Filipino attackers, some only boys in their early teens. Among these bodies was the town presidente; it was he who had planned the attack while feigning friendship for the Americans.[15]

The men of Company "G" buried the bodies and collected the strewn personal articles of the dead soldiers. They searched for government equipment and noted with dread that approximately fifty-seven rifles and 25,000 rounds of ammunition were missing. These in the hands of Lucban's rebels presented a real threat to all Americans on the island.[16]

The Impact of Balangiga

The grim tale of the massacre of Company "C" passed quickly to every American outpost and garrison on the

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2nd sess., XII, 627. See also Brigadier General George B. Davis to Sec. War, June 19, 1902, SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 9.

15 P. Abayon, Presidente of Balangiga to General Lucban, May 30, 1901, PIR, folder 820-2, roll 46, and folder 502-6, roll 31, and folder 1074-4, roll 65. "We have agreed to have a fictitious policy with them," wrote the presidente, "doing whatever they may like, and when the occasion comes the people will quickly rise up against them."

16 The number of rifles captured varies from fifty-seven to one hundred, depending upon the source cited, see reports of various military commanders, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 188, 607, 609. In the message C. Guevaro to local chiefs, February 8, 1902, PIR, folder 1074-5, roll 65, quotes the leader of the Balangiga attack, Eugenio Daza, as capturing seventy-five rifles, however, another insurgent source, Bernandino to Colonel Narciso Abuque, October 24, 1901, PIR, folder 1074-3, roll 65, writes that sixty rifles were taken.

Islands. Most soldiers spoke of little else but revenge. As they viewed the incident, an American unit was brutally hacked to pieces by a howling mob of savages, none uniformed or under military discipline. The action was considered even more despicable because of the deception used by natives in Balangiga; "one of the most cowardly acts," wrote one marine.[17] The New York Times reported on the:

> . . . intense feelings throughout the Army because of the massacre which would not be the case to any extent had it been the work of ordinary insurgents . . . the authors of the massacre were pacificos, most of whom had taken the oath of allegiance . . . .[18]

The insurgents, understandably, perceived the Balangiga incident differently than their American counterparts. When informed by General Lucban that a modern, experienced, and

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17 Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 24. "Remember Balangiga" became a common battle cry among American soldiers, claims Blount, American Occupation, p. 392. The Secretary of War, Elihu Root, also accuses the Balangiga natives of treachery in SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 4. In a personal letter of General Chaffee to General Hughes, September 30, 1901 in SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XIV, pt. 2, 1591, the lack of proper security by the Americans at Balangiga is pointed to as the main cause of the insurgent attack, rather than treachery by the natives.

18 New York Times (October 7, 1901), p. 6, col. 5. It is ironic that American soldiers would condemn guerrilla tactics when Francis Marion, the "Swamp Fox" in the American Revolution, was probably one of the most accomplished guerrilla leaders of all. When they could not catch him, the British branded Marion a criminal and bitterly complained that he did not fight "like a gentleman," nor "a Christian," see Pomeroy, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 20; Griffith (ed.), Mao on Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 9-10.

fully armed unit of the United States Army had been attacked by their commrades "without other arms than bolos," they stood in awe of the courage displayed. The successful attack was seen as -- in their general's words -- "a glorious achievement."[19]

Although it would be more than three decades before Mao Tse-Tung produced the first systematic study of guerrilla warfare, the Samar insurgent leadership revealed by their actions that they already had grasped many of the vital principles. Lucban's planning for the Balangiga attack followed Mao's later blueprint: to fight only when the chance of victory is weighted heavily in favor of the guerrillas, and then to utilize sudden, sharp, vicious attacks of short duration. "The enemy must be taken unaware," wrote Mao; "Attack in violent and deceptive form." The first law of the guerrilla must be to preserve himself.[20]

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19 General Lucban to local chiefs, October 6, 1901, PIR, folder 1074-4, roll 65. Blount, American Occupation, p. 27, insists that mutilation of bodies and other savage acts committed by the Filipinos at Balangiga were not typical, and such acts were rarely used against the Americans. The Balangiga attack is justified in Storey, Marked Severities, p. 31.

20 Griffith (ed.), Mao on Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 20, 23, 97. There is no evidence to suggest that Filipino insurgents were influenced by communist doctrines, only that the guerrilla strategy that evolved out of necessity was in keeping with later published military doctrines. An unsigned insurgent draft, believed to be written about January, 1900, titled "Plans of Combat," PIR, folder 1267-1, roll 77, gives instructions on the conduct of guerrilla warfare.

Standing on a Volcano

Within weeks of the Balangiga incident a rash of insurrecto disturbances took place on Samar which further increased the impact of the massacre. These activities were climaxed by a major attack on Company "E", Ninth Infantry, when forty-six men of this unit were attacked by a reported four hundred bolomen. Fortunately Company "E" was more alert than their commrades at Balangiga, and they beat off the insurgents, killing eighty-one at the cost of ten Americans killed and six wounded.[21]

The military high command reacted to the Balangiga disaster and subsequent insurgent attacks with anger and near panic. The convinced themselves -- based on a mixture of hearsay and rumor -- that they were "standing on a volcano," and that a new insurrection was on the verge of erupting.[22] Army patrols began to enter areas previously pacified -- even in Manila -- and soon the shooting of peaceful civilians occurred.[23]

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21 General Chaffee to Adjutant General of the Army, September 30, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 189; General Hughes to Adjutant General, Division of the Philippines, October 17, 1901, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIV, pt. 2, 1580-81; New York Times (October 8, 1901), p. 8, col. 7.

22 Blount, American Occupation, pp. 61, 377-78; Gates Schoolbooks, pp. 250-51.

23 Gates, Schoolbooks, pp. 250-51.

The commander of the Division of the Philippines, Major General Adna Romanza Chaffee, mirrored the attitude of many of the soldiers in that he believed that the Filipino could not be trusted. He ordered suspicion to be the duty of each American soldier, and for the army to put a "wholesome fear" into the heart of every Filipino.[24] Reinforcements consisting of two army battalions were quickly dispatched by Chaffee to Samar with instructions to deal severely with resistance; privately the general stated a preference for ". . . a few cemeteries for hombres in Southern Samar."[25]

General Chaffee was alarmed over reports from Samar that insurgents had been observed with rifles, and he reacted swiftly in order to quell Lucban's operations once and for all. The island had recently been placed under the control of a new command, the Sixth Separate Brigade, commanded by the veteran soldier, Brigadier General Jacob ("Hell Roaring Jake") Smith. Chaffee conferred with General Smith personally and reminded him of the captured rifles and ammunition. "You must get them back," ordered Chaffee, and then added, "Capture the arms if you can, buy them if you must

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[24] General Chaffee to General Hughes, September 30, 1901, quoted by Storey, Marked Severities, p. 28.

[25] Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 250, quoting from Chaffee's personal papers.

but . . . get them back."[26]

The new commander was impressed with the urgency and no nonsense attitude expressed by General Chaffee. The station commanders were ordered by Smith to:

> . . . adopt a policy that will create in the minds of all the people a burning desire for the War to cease; a desire or longing so intense, so personal . . . and so real that it will impel them to devote themselves in earnest to bring about a state of real peace . . . .
>
> The policy to be pursued in this brigade will be to wage war in the sharpest and most decisive manner possible.
>
> . . . no civilized war, however civilized, can be carried on a humanitarian basis . . . .
>
> Every native, whether in arms or living in the pueblos or barrios will be regarded and treated as an enemy until he has conclusively shown that he is a friend . . . .
>
> Neutrality must not be tolerated on the part of any native . . . . In short, if not an active friend he is an open enemy . . . .[27]

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26 General Chaffee to Adjutant General of the Army, September 30, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 188. General Chaffee explains the policy of separate brigades in a personal letter to General Hughes, September 30, 1901, SD 331, 57th Cong., XXIV, p. 2, 1591. General Smith was a former enlisted man and a veteran of the Civil War, Indian Wars, and the Spanish-American War. He had exhibited high courage and good conduct in battles, receiving serious wounds in both the Civil and Spanish-American Wars, according to Elihu Root to President Roosevelt, July 12, 1902, SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 5. Most of the high command of the United States Army in the Philippines, including Generals Chaffee and Smith, were "old Indian fighters," and Pomeroy, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 28, suggests that they were influenced by the conflicts with the Indians where brutal extermination was more often the accepted solution. For General Smith's background see New York Times (April 14, 1902), p. 1, col. 5.

27 The quotation from a proclamation labeled circular #6 contained in HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 208;

In essence Smith scrapped the "Benevolent Assimilation" policy of President McKinley, whereby the United States expressed an empathy for the political, economic, social, and psychological needs of the Filipino people. It had provided for civilian self-government wherever possible, and proclaimed overriding trust in the population.[28] District commanders governing in the spirit of that policy found an effective tool for counter-guerrilla warfare; guerrillas seldom flourish where popular grievences are acted upon.[29]

However, Smith's new policy was one of vengence and destruction.[30] This policy played into the hands of Lucban who had already convinced the people that the Americans would treat them with extreme brutality. Thus the guerrilla's task of keeping the support of the masses while denying it to the Americans was made significantly easier. The Filipinos of Samar saw little choice but to continue their

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Appendix "A" of this paper.

28 For details of the policy of "Benevolent Assimilation," first articulated by President McKinley and later acted on by Civil Governor Taft, see Adjutant General's Office, Correspondence Relating to the War in Spain, April 15, 1898-July 30, 1902 (1902), II, 858-59; Gates, Schoolbooks, pp. 33-40. For a critical examination of the policy see Blount, American Occupation, ch. ii.

29 Griffith (ed.), Mao on Guerrilla Warfare, p. 44.

30 For a typical report of destructiveness see the Report of Major Waller to General Smith, November 12, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 441; see also testimony in SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 6-17.

resistance to what appeared to be an American policy of blood and iron.[31]

Smith's basic tactic was to bring the war home to the individual Filipino -- to make Samar "a howling wilderness" -- by widespread distruction. In order to starve out the guerrillas, all trade, especially foodstuffs, was prohibited, and American search missions destroyed barrios, crops, and draft animals. The inhabitants were to be driven to the Americans in order to escape destruction and starvation.[32]

The Marines Ordered to Samar

As Smith sought to attain more troops for his campaign on Samar, he was pleasantly surprised to learn that Rear Admiral Frederick Rodgers, commander of naval forces in the Islands, had volunteered a battalion of marines. The admiral's offer was genially accepted, and it was agreed that the marine battalion would operate under Smith's control.[33]

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31 See the comments of Captain Ayer, a member of General Smith's staff, in SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 7.

32 Destructive measures upon native dwellings, crops, and livestock are detailed in combat reports of army, navy, and marine commanders to General Smith in HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 432-73. Enforcement of the trade and food blockade of Samar is included in a report of army Sergeant J. O'Keefe to Sixth Separate Brigade, November 16, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 431-32. For reference to "howling wilderness" see Adjutant General's Office, General Orders No. 80, July 16, 1902, SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 2-3.

33 Brigadier General James F. Wade, U.S.A., to Adjutant

On October 20, 1901, the First Marine Brigade stirred with activity as three companies from the First Marines and one from the Second Marines, totaling some three hundred marines, were selected to form the Samar battalion. Most of these marines had seen combat against the Spanish in Cuba, the insurrectos on Cavite peninsula, and the Boxers in China.[34]

Major L.W.T. Waller was selected to command this battalion. A flamboyant and aggressive officer, Waller at age forty-five was a veteran of twenty-five years of service. He has been described as a short man with a large mustache and even larger ego. A fellow officer wrote of Waller; "He was the only officer I've known who was really as good as he said he was."[35]

General, August 8, 1902, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 204; CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 965-66; New York Times (October 23, 1901), p. 6, col. 6, and p. 8, col. 2. See Appendixes "B" through "D" of this paper.

34 Subic Bay, p. 22; CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 965; Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, pp. 25-27. Companies "C", "D", and "H" were drawn from the First Regiment, and the Second Regiment supplied Company "F", however, the companies were kept intact and the marines remained under their own officers.

35 Pierce, Compact History, p. 146, quoting an unnamed contemporary of Waller's. The official record of Waller is contained in RG 127, entry 67. This same record indicates that Major Waller was selected as the commander of the Samar battalion in spite of a recent disciplinary measure taken against him. "Under suspension for 10 days, under the influence of liquor -- September 18-28, 1901." Although generally in excellent health, Waller was deaf, see Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 308.

Waller saw his first combat action in 1882 when his ship's marine detachment landed at Alexandria, Egypt, to protect American property during anti-foreign rebellion headed by Arabi Pasha. There he observed the cruelty of the Arab cavalry to British troops and the equally cruel reprisals. He later served in Spanish-American campaigns, the early fighting on Cavite peninsula, and commanded the marine battalion against the Boxers of China.[36]

During his service Waller was often cited for bravery and meritorious conduct, but duty in China brought him considerable praise: "Major Waller has shown untiring zeal . . . [and] conduct that of a fine soldier . . . high praise everywhere [has been] bestowed upon him by our people and the British forces, by whom . . . he is held in high esteem," wrote the Commander of the U.S. For es, and the senior squadron commander in China waters added "[concerning] our Marines under Major Waller . . . foreign officers have only the highest praise for their fighting

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36 New York Times (April 12, 1902), p. 1, col. 6; "Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation," October 1, 1900, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 449. Waller served on the USS Indiana and participated in a naval battle with the Spanish fleet in 1898. The ship's commanding officer included in Waller's fitness report the following: "Possesses exceptional qualities . . . . Has every professional qualification and appears to have in addition the natural ability for high command . . . showed coolness and bravery in all actions," folder "Philippines, Samar," Hdqs. U.S.M.C.

qualities."[37] Because of his outstanding service, Waller had been promoted to the rank of major in 1899, and in 1900 he was brevetted a lieutenant colonel for conspicuous conduct in China.[38]

Waller insured that his battalion was properly equipped for its assigned mission, and on October 22, 1901, he led his marines aboard Admiral Rodger's flagship, the USS New York. Two days later after an uneventful trip the ship dropped anchor off Catbalogan on the western coast of Samar. There the battalion and its stores were transferred to the USS Zafiro, where General Smith with his aides were piped

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37 Quoted from marine Colonel Robert L. Meade, Commander of U.S. Forces in China, to CMC, July 18, 1900, and Rear Admiral Louis Kempff, the senior squadron commander in the China waters, both contained in RG 127, entry 26. The same box of records contains praise from General Chaffee, Commander of U.S. Forces in China, September 1, 1900. In addition to citing the First Regiment of Marines, Chaffee adds, "particularly do I desire to invite attention to Major L.W.T. Waller . . . whose energy, good judgement, and capacity to command their battalion in battle I noted with pleasure."

38 Callahan, List, p. 700; Colonel Ruid, "Awards For Services in China," RG 127, entry 26; CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 916; Colonel Meade to CMC, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1127. A brevet is a promotion presented for meritorious service, an honorary rank without pay, see Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 40. Waller was referred to as "Colonel" by his subordinates because of his brevet rank, but his official rank was major and official documents refer to the official rank; this paper shall do likewise.

aboard to greet the marines.[39]

Waller and his officers were briefed by the general concerning future operations as the Zafiro and other support vessels steamed forty miles south along the western coast. When they arrived at the town of Basey, Waller had his staff disembark and set up battalion headquarters. Companies "C" and "D" also off-loaded with their equipment, which included one three-inch artillery piece and a Colt rapid-fire gun.[40]

After supervising the relief of Ninth Infantry soldiers by his marines, Major Waller returned to the Zafiro, which then ventured further south to Balangiga. There the remaining two companies, "F" and "H", relieved soldiers of the Nineteenth Infantry, and Captain David D. Porter, designated as the garrison commander, was instructed to begin combat patroling as soon as possible. Major Waller reembarked aboard the ship which returned him to his headquarters

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39 Waller to General Smith, October 27, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 438; Appendix "F" of this paper; CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 965-66. Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 25, states that the transfer off the New York and to the Zafiro was made because the former could not proceed through the shallow water off Balangiga.

40 Waller to General Smith, October 27, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 438; CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 966; Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 25; report of Admiral Rodgers, October 29, 1901, folder "Philippines, Samar," Hdqs. U.S.M.C.

at Basey.[41]

Once settled in his new headquarters, the marine commander studied the area assigned to his battalion, later described by Smith as the "hardest problem in the whole command."[42] Included was almost the entire southern tip of Samar; Waller's authority extended over all American forces from Basey on the southwest, to Balangiga at the south, to Hermani on the southeast.[43]

The major dictated written orders for the battalion's operational responsibility with special emphasis placed upon the prevention of rice and other goods from getting into the interior. The last paragraph, however, demonstrated the combined effect of General Smith's briefing, the Balangiga massacre, and Waller's attitude towards his assigned mission: "We have also to avenge our late comrades in North China, the murdered men of the Ninth U.S. Infantry."[44]

Search and Destroy Missions

The marines, like the soldiers sent to Samar, were

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[41] Ibid.

[42] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 367.

[43] Ibid., pp. 71-72, 178.

[44] Ibid., pp. 73-75; see also Appendix "E" of this paper.

already seething with hatred for the Balangiga attackers and needed no encouragement to seek revenge. This became obvious once the marines began their combat patrols. One former marine later remembered: "Our orders were plain. We were to shoot on sight anyone over 12 years old, armed or not, to burn everything and make the island of Samar a howling wilderness."[45] Another marine veteran wrote that in his opinion the intention of General Smith "was to get at the thieves and murderers of the American soldiers. So we went hiking through the island, killing the savages and destroying their homes." He remembered coming upon a small hut with a crippled old man and his young daughter. In the hut the marines found personal effects that had obviously belonged to the ill-fated American soldiers at Balangiga. The marines became enraged and "put the people to death and destroyed their place."[46]

It was not uncommon for the night air to be shattered by a marine's cry of "Help! Murder!" At once all would bolt awake; "We all thought the Filipinos had got into the

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45 The Modesto Bee (May 31, 1965), p. 1, col. 2, published an interview with former marine Corporal Charles N. Barekman from Modesto, California.

46 Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 27. See also army Sergeant J. O'Keefe to Sixth Separate Brigade, November 16, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 432. The Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army later stated that such "revengeful feelings" were incited by inflamatory remarks by the leaders, SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 16.

quarters and were going to massacre us." But an investigation would turn up only a marine having a nightmare. Indeed, the marines lived under the shadow of Balangiga.[47]

The first combat operations by the marines were deep patrols sent out daily to sweep their zone of responsibility. The marines were seeking the main insurgent force, but usually encountered only small roving bands, sometimes lying in an ambush, but more often sniping from a distance. Numerous suspected insurrectos were killed or captured, and a large number of plantations and villages were put to the torch along with rice, pigs, hens, cattle and other provisions.[48]

These continuous patrols not only disrupted insurrecto activities, but taught the marines invaluable practical lessons about the guerrilla and his environment. Although the leathernecks were veterans of guerrilla operations on Luzon,[49] the mountainous and jungle terrain on Samar made

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[47] Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 35.

[48] Waller to General Smith, October 27, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 438; Appendix "F" of this paper; CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 966; Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, pp. 27, 29. This scorched earth policy was often referred to as "search and devastate," according to Blount, American Occupation, p. 392.

[49] The difficulty of pursuing guerrillas on Luzon is reported in General MacArthur to Adjutant General of the Army, October 1, 1901, HD 2, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., VI, 59-72.

operations more difficult.

The marines soon learned of the rugged conditions on this island. Long marches took them uphill, downhill, across swollen streams and rivers, and into mud and rice paddies. They blistered under a tropical sun, but a drenching rain could leave them chilled and shivering. The dampness and volcanic rock tore apart their shoes, and vines made shreds of their uniforms. Besides the insurrectos, other enemies attacked the marines: lizards, ants, centipedes, snakes, spiders, tarantulas, rats, huge mosquitoes, and the most troublesome, slimy leeches. The latter would attach themselves to the human body, raising large stinging welts, and clothing could not keep them out.[50]

The combination of fever, chills, bruises, cuts, sore eyes, and swollen feet would often exhaust healthy troops in less than two days on the march. One experienced observer testified:

> At times the country was so rough and difficult that I remember one afternoon where we marched over three hours and did not make over a mile and a half; the men were exhausted, and it was necessary for each man in the column at times to help the man behind him.[51]

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[50] The difficulty of operating in the interior of Samar is described by experienced veterans in SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 7-8; Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, pp. 28-29.

[51] The statement of an unnamed witness in SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 7.

The slippery guerrilla and his tactic of retreating whenever he was met with strength caused increasing frustration within the marine ranks. Units would fall upon a known insurgent base only to find it empty, but not before receiving wounds from carefully hidden traps. Some of these traps were large concealed holes four feet deep and two feet wide. Set in the bottom of the holes were upright poisoned spurs ready to impale an unaware victim. Similar traps could be found in a variety of trenches and pits and were placed wherever the marines would venture.[52]

By the end of October the marine combat expeditions became bolder, and on the 28th of that month Captain Porter embarked on the USS Vicksburg with seventy-five marines from the base at Balangiga. They sailed around the southern part of Samar and landed near a town called Guinan on a peninsula that trailed off the southeastern end of the island. Captain Porter's marines, plus twelve from the Vicksburg's marine detachment, landed and destroyed numerous buildings and a supply of hemp. They were ready for battle but aside from a few shots, the enemy would not stand. The marines sailed back to Balangiga leaving a column of black smoke on the

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[52] See order of Lucban to unnamed local presidente, May 29, 1900, PIR, XV, 2510, roll 640; CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 966; Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 28; Waller to Headquarters Sixth Separate Brigade, November 17, 1901, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIV, pt. 2, 1581.

horizon from the burning town.[53]

Militarily, the marines were acting on the correct formula for effective counter-insurgency;[54] operating from inaccessible bases, they struck swiftly with rapid blows, disrupting supplies and making former guerrilla areas unsafe for the insurgents. On land, the marine garrisons became centers whereby continuous patroling and pressure neutralized guerrilla military activities in an ever increasing radius.[55] By sea, via naval vessels, their mobility was extended to the entire coastline where no guerrilla unit could feel safe from attack.[56] However, the guerrilla's power lay deeper than military positions on a map. His strength lies concealed within his weakness. It is a weakness of guerrillas that they operate in small groups and therefore are vunerable to destruction; likewise, their strength is the ability of small groups to move rapidly and secretly making detection difficult. Guerrillas protect no territory.

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53 Edward B. Barry, Commander of Vicksburg, to Admiral Rodgers, October 29, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 432; Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 28.

54 For effective counter-insurgency techniques see Griffith (ed.), Mao on Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 10, 32-33.

55 Waller to General Smith, October 27 and 31, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 439-40.

56 See reports of Vicksburg commander E.B. Barry to

An effective counter-insurgent unit must be able to locate, isolate, and eradicate its guerrilla enemy. To accomplish this requires timely and accurate information which can only be obtained from the people. "It is only undisciplined troops who make people their enemies and who, like fish out of its native element, cannot live."[57]

Mao put this theory into print, but the Filipino insurgents had already sensed its wisdom and prohibited mistreatment of the people and actively sought popular support.[58] Because of the effectiveness of guerrilla propaganda and callous destruction by the Americans, the people of Samar were solidly in support of the Insurrection. In most cases this support was active: women and children as well as the men were armed and prepared to engage the Americans;

Admiral Rodgers, October 29, and November 7 and 8, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 432-33.

[57] Griffith (ed.), Mao on Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 92-93.

[58] In Apolinario Mabini to Arcadio Maxilion, April 11, 1899, PIR, folder 1079-1, roll 65, points out "orders from Aguinaldo to repress abuses of his soldiers lest the pueblos should get tired and accept American autonomy;" likewise Apolinario Mabini to Provincial Chief of Pangasinan, April 5, 1899, PIR, book B-3, roll 88, orders "military chiefs to take precautions that abuses are not committed by troops . . . where families are gathered . . .;" Leandro Fullon to Martin Delgado, April 13, 1899, PIR, folder 117-2, roll 2, instructs that abuses to the population are to be avoided "first by the use of persuasion and then by shooting." See other insurgent records in HD 2, 56th Cong., 1st sess., V, pt. 2, 362.

town officials reported American activities to the guerrillas; coast watchers warned of American ship movements. The little information that was given to the Americans was extracted by force. But if the marines were hampered by a lack of military intelligence, the blinders were applied by their own hands.[59]

The Search for the Stronghold

Although marine forces were penetrating the coastal regions at will, Major Waller realized that the insurgent's main stronghold had not been encountered. Indications pointed to such a bastion in the interior, and Waller was determined to seek out and destroy it.

Rigid interrogation of suspected guerrillas had turned up vague references to an interior stronghold, but none could -- or would -- give an exact location. It was estimated that a force possibly as large as seven hundred had gathered there. The marine commander, however, obtained

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59 "We had great difficulty in getting satisfactory intelligence," said the commander of the naval patrol on Samar, navy Commander William Swift, Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 155. The character of the natives of Samar is described by American officials in SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 3-14. Presidente of Basey to Lucban, June 24, 1901, PIR, XXI, 3497, roll 641, stated that although he was holding office under the Americans, he assured Lucban of his loyalty to the insurgent cause. Cooperation between the town and village officials with insurgents is reported by army Sergeant J. O'Keefe to Sixth Separate Brigade Headquarters, November 16, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., 432. Native coast watchers are mentioned in Waller to Sixth Separate Brigade, October 31, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 439.

the needed intelligence when Francis Laguilla, a recently escaped guerrilla prisoner, walked into a marine garrison. He explained that he had been forced to work at the interior fortification. Apparently not an ardent supporter of insurgent causes, he eagerly agreed to describe its location to the American officers.[60]

Waller received the new information enthusiastically, but Laguilla's description was less than detailed. A close examination of the maps indicated that the objective lay perhaps fifteen miles up the Cadacan River.[61] Two alternatives faced Waller: one, an overland trek through the uncharted jungle and mountainous terrain, or two, a voyage by assault boats blindly up the river until guerrilla resistance was encountered. Because of the difficult terrain the former plan was eliminated, and preparations were made for the latter.

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60 Waller to General Smith, October 27 and 28, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 438-40. Ironically, although Waller expressed frustration over the difficulty of obtaining information from the natives, he authorized (p. 438) the burning of a village for giving information to the insurgents, apparently on the belief that fear would bring willing cooperation from the natives.

61 The Cadacan River (sometimes spelled "Cabacan" by Waller) orginates in the mountain region north of Basey; it flows eastward for some five miles then turns due south for about twenty miles before empyting into the Leyte Gulf just east of Basey. Some military reports in 1901 referred to this river as the Sohoton River, but other reports indicate that the Sohoton River flows from a point deep in the interior westward, and empties into the Cadacan River. On

Major Waller ordered the construction of a bamboo raft to be used as a floating gun platform to carry a three-inch field piece. The platform was to be towed by the boats, and would be available to provide supporting artillery fire for the assaulting troops.[62]

The construction of the bamboo gun platform was completed on November 5th, and Waller decided to launch the expedition the following day. From the Vicksburg he obtained three small vessels: a steam launch which mounted a one-pound cannon in the bow, a small cutter armed with a Colt rapid-fire gun, and a whaleboat. As these arrangements were being carried out, Waller sent a small scouting party up the Cadacan River. The patrol ventured some seven miles when the marines came under rifle and bamboo cannon fire from waiting guerrillas. The ambushers were quickly driven off with a volley of well-aimed shots by the alert marines. Six insurgents were found dead at their positions along with a bamboo cannon. All the marines returned unscathed.[63]

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current army maps, what Waller knew as the Cadacan River is now labeled the Basey River.

62 Waller to General Smith, October 27 and 31, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 439-40.

63 Waller to General Smith, November 5, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 441.

The following morning (November 6th) the launch and two other boats filled with armed marines headed for the mouth of the Cadacan River.[64] There they were joined by another cutter towing the bamboo gun platform and Waller with his main force riding in native boats. Only the launch was power operated, but its occupants had to be transferred to a cutter because it could not pass over the sandbar. The expedition, strung out in a long line, paddled up-river. Because of the dense undergrowth, no patrols provided flank security on the banks. Clearly Major Waller was gambling that his vunerable expedition would draw out the guerrillas, and that in an open fight the technical and professional auperiority of the marines would carry the day.

About three miles inland, the marines were fired upon by insurrectos concealed along the banks. The first scattered rifle shots were followed by bamboo cannon and heavier rifle fire, mortally wounding two marines. The boats maneuvered towards the riverbank and received another volley of guerrilla fire. The marines made it to shore but the ambushers had fled. The bodies of the two dead marines were placed on the gun platform, and Waller ordered the unit back into their boats.

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64 For details concerning actions on the Cadacan River on 6 November, see Waller to General Smith, November 12, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 440; Executive Office, Vicksburg, Lieutenant Commander James H. Glennon to Admiral Rodgers, November 7, 1901, ibid., pp. 436-38. See also CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 966-67;

The column proceeded a short distance up-river and was again halted by heavy insurgent fire. The marines scrambled ashore, the Colt cutting the jungle brush with its covering fire, but once more the guerrillas had disappeared, leaving only some empty Krag cartridges.

The day was getting late and rather than be caught bobbing on a river deep in insurgent country when night fell, Waller ordered the water-borne column to return down-river. Except for an occasional sniper round, the column made it safely to the river mouth only to be given a jab by nature. Rough water capsized the bamboo gun platform causing minor damage to the cannon and threw the bodies of the two dead marines and fifteen extra rifles into the river. Only one body was retrieved, but fortunately the deep river made it unlikely that the insurgents could recover the weapons. The marines returned to camp, knowing the guerrillas had again eluded them. Waller immediatley began working on a second expedition.

The Battle for Sohoton Cliffs

A second major effort on the Cadacan River was planned for mid November, but meanwhile Waller kept up the pressure on the insurgents, never allowing them to regroup. Combat expeditions engaged the insurgents on each day from the 7th to the 10th of November. Major Waller reported the combat actions of these four days resulted in:

Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 33.

> Two hundred and fifty-five houses burned, thirty-nine men killed, eighteen men captured, seventeen bolos captured, one ton hemp and one-half ton rice destroyed, thirteen carabaos killed, fifty bancas [native boats] destroyed (approximately).[65]

On the 13th and 14th of November, the marines were back hiking along the Cadacan River, and a small patrol killed twelve insurgents after several skirmishes.[66]

The apparent ability of the numerous marine patrols to travel through the difficult interior terrain, convinced Waller that the next major assault up the Cadacan need not be river-bound. This time his strategy called for an approach to the Sohoton Cliffs region by three columns, two by overland routes and the third by way of the river. The three columns were to converge at the insurgent stronghold and make a combined assault. The three-inch gun was once again readied on its bamboo platform and would be available to "dislodge them with shrapnel." The effective execution of this strategy, however, hinged on the ability of the overland columns to penetrate the jungle successfully.[67]

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65 Waller to General Smith, November 12, 1902, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 438-39.

66 CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 967.

67 Details of the November 15-19 assault on Sohoton Cliffs are in Waller to Adjutant General, Sixth Separate Brigade, November 23, 1901, RG 127, entry 10; CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 967-68; Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, pp. 33-34; "Principal Events in the

The first column consisted of fifty marines under the command of Captain Hiram I. Bearss. They embarked in boats on November 15th for the first leg of their trip and journeyed up-river as far as the barrio of Odoc. There they disembarked and marched through the jungle to Liruan, the point of rendezvous with the second column. Captain David Porter was in command of the second column of about fifty men which marched overland to the link-up point at Liruan. There Porter assumed over-all command of the combined columns, and the force hacked its way through the jungle arriving at the region of the suspected stronghold on the next day.

The third column of some one hundred men was under Waller's direct command. This was the boat force, and it began its movement up-river on the morning of November 16th. The trip was made easier by the use of a steam launch which towed the other boats. Waller's force received light hostile fire after traveling only a few miles up-river, and he ordered the Colt rapid-fire gun and his riflemen to sustain a heavy protective fire into the brush along both banks. This fire was continued for the remainder of their journey.

Waller's force arrived in the area of the guerrilla stronghold before dark. Porter's detachment had already

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Philippine Islands, July 1, 1901 to June 30, 1902," HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 153.

arrived and had made a careful observation of the insurgent stronghold. Porter discovered with his field glasses that the stronghold consisted of a series of overhanging cliffs, well over two hundred feet high. The cliff's surface was composed of a soft volcanic stone which facilitated the honey-combing of caves and gun positions. Ropes dangled down from the cliffs supporting huge bamboo cages which held tons of rocks, ready to be cut loose and tumble down upon unsuspecting attackers from the river.

Porter's position on the high river bank made it impractical for him to confer with his commander on the river below. However, Waller was made aware that danger existed with a brief semaphore signal. Although puzzled, the river force then returned a short distance down-river and set up camp for the night.

Waller's original assault plan had called for a combined attack on the stronghold. The unit under Porter's command was to cross the river at a concealed point and attack the cliffs, from a flank if possible, while simultaneously the river force would beach their boats and launch a frontal charge on the guerrilla position. However, by morning Porter decided to deviate from the original plan. In his estimation the suspended rocks would prove disastrous to the men in the boats. Because he was unable to consult with Waller, Porter gave the order on his own initiation for his column to attack alone.

One of the marine scouts discovered a trail cut through the undergrowth and from the number of poisoned spear pit traps and other unmanned defenses, it was estimated that the trail led to a main insurgent position. Under Porter's direction, the marines hurried single file down the trail. Suddenly they came upon a number of bamboo guns, and in one the fuse was burning. Within seconds a shower of scrap iron, broken glass and rocks would tear flesh and bones. But without hesitation, Acting Corporal Harry Glenn charged the gun, and at the last moment yanked out the fuse.

Pushing on, Porter's men rushed a guerrilla outpost but found it recently evacuated; food still cooking over the fires. From this position the marines could see the main insurgent stronghold on the opposite side of the river approximately one hundred and fifty yards away. Porter selected a high point nearby to position a Colt rapid-fire gun. In the ten minutes it took to assemble the Colt gun, the troops positioned themselves and waited for the signal to move out. On cue the Colt began chattering, raking the unsuspecting insurgents on the cliffs in a hail of bullets as Porter and Bearss led their troops down the steep river bank. The river was too deep to ford so the troops were hastily ordered to search for boats. Time was critical; although the Colt could keep the guerrillas scrambling for the present, they would soon man their defensive positions.

Corporal Robert LaKaye spotted native bancas across the river some fifty yards, and dove into the water. He was spotted by a few guerrillas whose rifle fire quickly peppered the water around him, but LaKaye got to the boats and brought them back.

The Colt's fire was shifted to those insurgents in front of the assaulting party, while the marines swarmed into the boats. They made it across the river but faced the difficult task of scaling the cliffs. Luckily in their confusion the insurgents had left their bamboo ladders dangling in place. Quickly Porter and Bearss led their marines up the ladders.

During the next hour, fighting was as fierce as the marines were to experience in the Insurrection. It was later learned that the position had been prepared by three years work. "No white troops have ever penetrated these positions," said Waller in his reports, adding that "they were held as a final rallying point." The marines encountered guerrillas in caves and fortified pits armed with Krags, bamboo guns and the razor-sharp bolos. For the unwary Americans, numerous emplaced spears and pit traps awaited. The marines charged every position encountered, some cutting the air with a shrill "rebel yell." Resistance was fierce as the insurgents fought hand to hand with the Americans, but bolos were no match for thirty caliber bullets. Soon the insurgent defense faltered, then collapsed.

As the Filipinos scrambled down the cliffs and into the jungle, Porter held his marines from pursuing them. Rations were short, and the tropical heat and long marches had weakened his men, many of whom were blistered and barefooted.

When the first shots had been fired, Waller and his detachment were then some ten minutes down-river. Unaware of what Porter was up to, the feisty major was no doubt upset that his orders were departed from. He angrily ordered the boats forward, but they did not arrive in time for the main assault.

Waller did not reprimand Porter, however, Later in his report of the operation Waller not only justified Porter's actions -- "Instant destruction would have been the fate of the boats had they attempted the passage of the river, until after the cliffs had been taken" -- but recommended him, along with Captain Bearss, for "either a medal of honor or brevet."[68]

The marines systematically destroyed the insurgent

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68 Waller to Adjutant General, Sixth Separate Brigade, November 23, 1901, RG 127, entry 10. It cannot be explained why Waller would recommend a medal of honor for Porter and Bearss because navy and marine officers at that time were not eligible to receive the award, Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 132. Also recommended for citations were Corporals Harry Glenn and Robert L. LaKaye who received Special Letters of Commendation. Recommended but not cited were Gunnery Sergeant J.M. Quick (already holding a Medal of Honor from the fighting in Cuba), and Private Cambell (gunner for the Colt rapid-fire gun).

stronghold along with large powder magazines and food supplies. Years of insurgent labor were wiped out in one day, along with forty bamboo guns captured and thirty defenders killed, without a casualty to the marines. "We have proved to them," wrote Waller, "that their impregnable places may be taken."

The Autopsy of a Battle

Major Waller's victory at Sohoton was in a large measure a result of the guerrillas temporarily abandoning guerrilla warfare. They attempted to defend territory against the invading marines, which was -- as the results indicated -- a foolhardy tactic for ill-armed guerrillas. The insurgents of Samar had ignored a lesson that their comrades on Luzon had already learned:

> Indeed, it is now the important maxim of Filipino tactics to disband when closely pressed and seek safety in the nearest barrio, a movement quickly accomplished by means of the assistance of the people and the ease of which the Filipino soldier is transformed into the appearance of a peaceful native.[69]

Furthermore, the Samar insurgents violated the decentralization principle for supply bases that had already worked well for them in other areas. Guerrilla supply areas should have been scattered and even these should not have been depended upon too much: "The enemy," insists Mao,

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69 General Arthur MacArthur, 1900, quoted by Pomeroy, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 31.

"is the principal source of their supply."[70]

Waller scored a victory not only in spite of tactical mistakes, but perhaps, because of them. As an attacking force confronting a well fortified position, the marines would have been expected to employ the element of surprise. The official reports are vague as to the reasoning behind the tactics used, but note that large columns of troops converged on the vicinity of the insurgent stronghold in daylight hours, rather than under the cover of darkness. And once in position before sundown, Waller exposed his men to discovery and ambush by camping overnight.

Certainly surprise could not have been his objective as he ordered his boat detachment to blast its way with gunfire into guerrilla territory. Furthermore, as Captain Bearss' colomn marched overland from Basey to the rendezvous point at Liruan, they destroyed all villages and houses in their path, "in accordance with my orders," stated Major Waller.

The marines' greatest allies in the Sohoton Cliffs campaign were, first, the complete lack of an effective early warning system by the insurgents. The second was the unconcealed and conspicuous river group which distracted the attention of the guerrillas, and -- as Major Waller admits, but obviously did not plan -- "made it possible for the

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70 Griffith (ed.), Mao on Guerrilla Warfare, p. 83.

flanking column to reach the camp and surprise the enemy."

A serious question arises as to why no planned reconnaissance was taken of the insurgents' position prior to the assault. Waller sent his main force blindly to the Sohoton mountains, apparently on the belief that his force was strong enough to handle any confrontation, obviously inviting a challenge. Had it not been for Porter's actions, "instant destruction" may have indeed been the fate of the boats.

If the guerrillas erred in choosing to defend territory against a formidable opponent, Waller was equally mistaken in assuming that the capture of territory was a crippling blow to the guerrilla insurgents. While it is not impossible to put down a popular uprising with brute force alone,[71] it certainly is expensive in manpower as well as dollars. Considering a later plan to build a line of outposts across southern Samar, Waller qualified it by stating, "I should require more men, however, to garrison these points and move about at the same time."[72] Even the success of such a plan would merely push the guerrillas into another battalion's district. How many men would it require to garrison the entire island . . . the entire

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71 One of few such examples in modern history is the occupation of Greece by Germany during World War Two.

72 Waller to General Smith, October 21, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 440.

archipelago? Surely, to paraphrase Mao, it is easier to dry up the pond than to stomp on each fish that swims in it.

Cheers for the Victors

But few in the Manila or Washington headquarters gave great attention to such questions. The pressure from political circles for a quick victory was a chief concern for ranking officers. Moreover, the military charged that it was these same politicians that hamstrung their efforts by coddling the Filipinos.[73]

The origins of this political pressure began with the anti-imperialist movement, which at the turn of the century was active in the United States.[74] Motivations of morality became intertwined with that of politics, and many Democratic newspapers championed the causes of the anti-imperialists, which helped strengthen the movement. Their weight was soon felt by the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations, and the military high command came "under a pressure, for political reasons, to finish the war."[75]

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73 Much of the military, including Generals Chaffee and Smith, objected to the policy of "Benevolent Assimilation" and civilian control, see Blount, American Occupation, p. 383, ch. ii; Gates, Schoolbooks, pp. 282-83; Grunder, Philippines, p. 65.

74 For information on the anti-imperialist movement, see Garraty, The American Nation, p. 726; Morison, Dissent, pp. 78-79; Schirmer, Republic or Empire, ch. xvi.

75 Speech by Herbert Welsh, "Mass Meetings of Protest,"

The tension was further heightened by two events in 1901 that drew new levels of public criticism. First, in July the position of military commander in the Philippines passed from General MacArthur to General Chaffee. However, Chaffee, who commanded U.S. forces in China the previous year, had been assailed for authorizing alleged brutal measures against the Boxers. Hence, the anti-imperialists strongly denounced the administration's appointment. Secondly, the front page horror stories generated by the Balangiga massacre in September dampened public support for the existing military policies.[76]

Political expediency demanded that the surge of rebel activity be reversed, and because of the humiliating and frightening defeat at Balangiga, military morale was sagging. A dramatic victory was urgently needed.

A telegram from Major Waller provided that boost and brightened the atmosphere in the officers' club; the marines had scored an unquestioned triumph on Samar.[77] Suddenly

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quoted by Schirmer, Republic or Empire, p. 240. See also Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 256; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 267; Blount, American Occupation, pp. 61, 376-77.

[76] Schirmer, Republic or Empire, pp. 231-32; Blount, American Occupation, pp. 61, 376-77, 393-95; Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 256.

[77] Waller to General Smith, November 19, 1901, folder "Philippines, 1898-1899," Hdqs. U.S.M.C. This telegram was followed by the more detailed report, Major Waller to Adjutant General, Sixth Separate Brigade, November 23, 1901, RG 127, entry 10.

official communications became pregnant with praise for the leathernecks.

Admiral Rodgers -- his initiative to volunteer the battalion vindicated -- sent a hearty "well done, marines." His colleagues in Washington were ecstatic over the campaign that the Secretary of the Navy described as "excellent work." Indeed, Waller had given the Navy Department its first headlines since Dewey's victory.

Even the army momentarily forgot interservice rivalry and expressed official gratitude. General Chaffee praised the "manly heart and soldierly spirit" of the marines, "which make light of obstacles," while General Smith pointed to the leathernecks' achievement as proof that "there is nothing impossible for the American fighting man."[78]

Waller had won more than a military battle. The tone of many editorials changed, political demands for the moment were appeased, and vengence for Balangiga was at least partially attained. As a result Waller was cloaked in newly found recognition and appreciation from his superiors. The War Department recommended a second brevet promotion, and his name was seriously mentioned as the future Commandant of the Marine Corps.[79]

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78 For congratulatory messages, see CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 968-69; SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXV, pt. 2, 1582.

79 See endorsement of General Chaffee and Smith, report

When General Smith discussed the forthcoming operations with Waller, the omnipotent scent of anticipated glories pierced the heavy tropical air.

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of Waller to Sixth Separate Brigade, November 23, 1901, RG 127, entry 10; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 165; New York Times (April 14, 1902), p. 1, col. 5.

CHAPTER V

"STAND, GENTLEMEN -- HE SERVED ON SAMAR"

> The summons for marines' service was accepted
> with some joy,
> For we meant to annihilate, to conquer, or
> to die;
> So we proceeded on our journey, which seemed
> to us quite far,
> To make a like-long name as heroes of Samar
>
> -- From "Soldiers and Marines on Famous Hikes,"
> by Patrick Cathsem, Former Private, U.S.M.C.,
> 1902.

After the Sohoton Cliffs battle and the praise that followed, the marines awaited the opportunity to administer the final blow to the insurgents on southern Samar. However, the flush of victory blinded those in authority to the obvious signs that Lucban's army was far from prostrate. The guerrilla army remained intact, many living in villages occupied by the marines and soldiers. They worked at civilian pursuits with weapons concealed nearby, prepared to surface on a guerrilla mission when ordered to do so.

The victory over the insurgent stronghold gave the marines a temporary psychological advantage, but much was left to be done.

If the tactics of the Olongapo pacification program were followed, the next step called for small detachments to branch out from the Basey and Balangiga garrisons to occupy and pacify the nearby towns and villages. If the natives could be protected from the guerrillas, the bond between them would break; in guerrilla war this is a real victory.

This chapter will show that the desire for a quick military victory caused the battalion to overextend itself on destructive missions far from Basey, while the security in that region deteriorated. Moreover, a tragic defeat was snatched from the jaws of victory because an ambitious leader overlooked the importance of terrain and weather. These geographic obstacles are potential weapons for the guerrilla willing to utilize them against his pursuers.

The General's Plan

A close examination of Major Waller's reports to General Smith indicate that the destruction of the Sohoton stronghold was part of a larger plan for ending the insurgent menace in southern Samar. This plan, often alluded to but never spelled out in official communiques, was apparently given orally to Waller by the general in the initial briefing on the Zafiro.[1]

The overall objective of the marines was to destroy the insurgent's presence in southern Samar. Thereafter peace would be maintained by constructing a chain of posts along a line "entirely across the island between Basey and Lanang" in order to "cut off the southern end of the island entirely," Furthermore, a telephone cable to provide

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[1] Waller refers to "the plan" and "to instructions already given by the general," see Waller to General Smith, November 5, December 1, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 441, 445; Waller to Sixth Separate Brigade, November 23, 1901, RG 127, entry 10.

communications between the southwest and southeast coasts was to be laid.[2]

Immediately upon their arrival on Samar, the marines struck all suspected insurrecto havens, and then they were ready to proceed with the preliminary efforts for the chain of outposts. To accomplish this "the Cabacan [sic] River freed from the enemy, would make an excellent water by which to move troops."[3] Thus the assault on Sohoton Cliffs was important not only in destroying a stronghold, but in gaining access to the Cadacan River as a waterway into the interior. Waller intended to "work up both sides of the river, striking a trail that I know to exist and which will lead us to the East coast, near Hernani." "This plan," adds Waller, "has been explained to the General, meeting with his approval."[4]

By the beginning of December, 1901, -- with many insurgent villages in ruins, the population dispursed, and Sohoton overrun -- Major Waller was ready to implement General Smith's plan. Upon its completion they would push north for new campaigns on Samar.

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[2] Waller to General Smith, October 31, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 440.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Waller to General Smith, November 23, 1901, RG 127, entry 10.

But first there were a few tidying-up operations. Waller allowed his men a few days rest after the November 15th through 17th operation before sending them out again. A platoon-sized expedition dispersed guerrilla forces at Eba on November 23rd, and two days later Waller himself led some two hundred men up the Cadacan River. Once again a detachment went by boat while two other columns pushed overland. Ill-luck, however, plagued this operation from the beginning. The launch Florida was supposed to accompany the boat group, but it could not cross the sandbars at the mouth of the river. Hence the marines had to paddle their way in small boats, three of which swamped. One of the overland columns led by Captain Porter failed to arrive at the rendezvous on schedule having lost its way in the jungle trails. With the remaining column, Waller worked both banks of the river destroying numerous guerrilla encampments as well as a primitive arms factory, but he failed to encounter any insurrectos. Porter's missing column was soon found and gave Waller information on the many interior trails. This information led the major to believe that one trail "reached eastwardly until it strikes the Suribao or the Lanang rivers, emptying on the east coast."[5]

Having cleared the Cadacan River and discovered a

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[5] Waller to General Smith, December 1, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 444.

possible east-west trail, Waller was ready to make the march across the island that the General desired.[6] It was believed that a large part of the insurgent force that had been scattered by the Sohoton Cliffs engagement was encamped between Basey and Balangiga. For that reason Waller planned his next operation to push southeast along the coast from Basey to Balangiga, and after sending out search missions continuing around the southern tip of the island to Lanang. There a detachment would march westward across the interior via a trail that was believed to lead to the Sohoton Cliffs.[7]

On to Lanang

Waller was ready to proceed with his next expedition in force on December 8th. On that date he began the twenty-five mile trip from Basey to Balangiga with two columns of about seventy-five men each. One column directly under his own command moved along the shoreline, while the other under Captain Bearss marched parallel in the same direction but two miles inland. Off shore a navy cutter containing

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6 Waller refers to General Smith's desire that the marines make the march in Waller's communication to General Smith, December 5, 1901, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 969.

7 Waller describes his basic plan to General Smith in Waller's report of December 1, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 445. The entire expedition is referred to as the "long march" while the one through the interior is called the "cross-island march."

the marines' supplies kept abreast of the beach column. Also on board from the staff of General Smith was army Second Lieutenant DeWitt C. Lyles, Twelfth United States Infantry, to act as the general's representative and laison officer between the marines and the army garrisons on the east coast.[8]

For five days the two columns of marines hiked through the coastal barrios, occasionally engaging guerrillas and burning their houses and supplies. On the 12th of December, the tired troops marched into the Balangiga garrison, renamed Camp Connell.[9]

Waller's expedition, reinforced by the garrison at Camp Connell, harassed the insurgents around Balangiga. Combat patrols killed a large number of bolomen and put to the torch several villages including the coastal town of Quinapundan. "The country has been well worked," remarked Waller.[10]

On Christmas day Waller declared a day of rest for the first time in weeks. The force was camped at the coastal

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8 Waller to Admiral Rodgers, December 15, 1901, folder "Philippines, Samar," Hdqs. U.S.M.C.

9 Ibid. The camp at Balangiga was renamed in honor of the slain company commander of Company "C", Ninth Infantry, Captain Thomas W. Connell.

10 Waller to Admiral Rodgers, December 13, 15, and 18, 1901, folder "Philippines, Samar," Hdqs. U.S.M.C.

town of Pambuhan and in place of hikes and fire fights, the marines amused themselves with games and potato races. The height of the day was dinner. Compared to bland combat rations -- hardtack, canned meat and beans -- the freshly killed deer that the major ordered to be roasted was a feast indeed. The unit cook added potatoes, onions and biscuits, making it quite a banquet not only for the marines but for sixteen Filipino prisoners as well. The day ended with singing, dancing, smoking, card playing, and the retelling of old stories about adventure, romance and home -- knowing full well that daybreak would require them to return to the jungle.[11]

The day before Christmas the major had left Pambuhan on the gunboat Arayat and sailed to Lanang to confer with army officials. The cross-island march was to start from Lanang, and Waller hoped to obtain information abour guerrilla movements, interior terrain, trails, etc.[12]

At Lanang Waller was introduced to the garrison commander, Captain Pickering, First Infantry, and Waller told him of the mission to march directly across the island. Captain Pickering seemed alarmed by Waller's intentions. He

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[11] Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, pp. 28-29, 42.

[12] Waller to Admiral Rodgers, January 25, 1902, folder "Philippines, Samar," Hdqs. U.S.M.C., hereinafter cited as, Report of Waller, January 25, 1902.

introduced Waller to Second Lieutenant Kenneth P. Williams, First Infantry, who had only recently returned from a twelve-day march into the interior searching for a trail from the east coast to the Sohoton Mountains which, according to old and unreliable Spanish maps, was supposed to exist. Williams not only failed to find the Sohoton trail, the same trail Waller intended to use, but he believed that no such trail existed. What concerned Williams even more was that the terrain was extremely broken, cut by rivers capable of instant flooding, and covered with a forest even more dense than in other parts of Samar. Although the distance was only some thirty-five miles across the island at that point, no American troops had successfully made the trip, and indications were that the Spanish had also avoided that section. The two junior officers diplomatically presented arguments against the march. However, they were ignored. Waller had more than once tackled difficult tasks, and he equated aggressiveness with military professionalism. As Waller later reported, the challenge was accepted:

> Remembering the general's several talks on the subject and his evident desire to know the terrain and run wires across, coupled with my own desire for some further knowledge of the people and the nature of this heretofore impenetrable country, I decided to make the trial with 50 men and the necessary carriers.[13]

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[13] Ibid. The closing paragraph in this report indicates

Waller turned his attention to logistical problems. He had planned to draw the necessary rations from the army company at Lanang, but that garrison was short and did not expect to be resupplied until early January. However, the garrison commander did agree to stretch his own stores to give the marines a four-day supply of hard bread, bacon and coffee -- a meager diet for men faced with a long march over extremely rugged country. With that matter decided, Waller boarded the Arayat to spend Christmas with his troops.

Waller had left Basey with a force of two companies, but for the cross-island march he required only fifty men.[14] All of his officers volunteered, but Waller chose two of his most reliable officers, Captains Porter and Bearss, plus First Lieutenant Alexander S. Williams and army Second Lieutenant DeWitt C. Lyles. Second Lieutenant Frank Halford was so disappointed at not being selected for the expedition that the major relented and allowed him to go also.

The fifty enlisted marines were carefully screened,

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that General Smith's plan called for a route of march from Hernani on the east; the choice of Lanang was that of Waller's.

[14] Ibid. Captain Porter ensured that Gunnery Sergeant John H. Quick was selected to go. Quick already held the Medal of Honor for gallantry in Cuba and later was presented the army's Distinguished Service Cross for heroism in World War One, Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, pp. 116, 201. In his reports Waller mentions only fifty enlisted marines on the cross-island march but other reports indicate there may have been fifty-two.

and to assist the marines, thirty-three native cargadores (carriers) and two armed native scouts were also chosen. The remainder of the men were placed under the command of Captain A.J. Matthews who would lead them back to Balangiga over land via Omagongong, Quinapundan, and the southern coastline. The groups departed Pambuhan and started for their separate destinations on December 26, 1901.[15]

The Cross-Island March Begins

Major Waller marched at the head of his column across the coastal beaches washed by the Philippine Sea. By the afternoon of the 27th he was on the outskirts of Lanang. Supplies were gathered while the marines exchanged war stories with the First Infantry troops. Because rations were in short supply, Waller sent word to his headquarters at Basey, by way of the Arayat, to establish a supply dump at the Sohoton Cliffs. He estimated that this would bring his expedition a day or so closer to food supplies.

The weather had been poor, but on the morning of December 28th, the clouds had parted and the marines enjoyed

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15 The main document concerning the cross-island march across Samar is the Report of Waller, January 25, 1902. See also the CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XIV, 970-74; Cable of General Chaffee to Adjutant General, Washington, D.C., January 28, 1902, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXV, pt. 2, 1583; a cable of Admiral Rodgers to Secretary of the Navy, January 11, 1902, folder "Philippines, Samar," Hdqs. U.S.M.C.; New York Times (January 11, 1902), p. 6, col. 6; Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, pp. 36-39 (Clifford, as a marine private, was a member of the expedition).

good weather for their send-off. The expedition boarded small boats to carry them inland on the Lanang River, and assisted by the ideal weather and river currents the boats made seventeen miles the first day.

All seemed well as the expedition continued on the next morning, but earlier rainstorms in the mountains caused the river to swell. After only eight miles Waller decided to give up the river transportation because of the rapids. Abandoning the boats they hiked westward, up steep mountain ridges, across streams, and through the thick vegetation.[16]

After a short period of hiking Waller noticed that the climate and terrain were beginning to take their toll. Clothing stayed wet because of the necessity to cross and recross swollen rivers. This in turn caused red chafe marks where cartridge belts and pack straps rubbed. Progress was slow and Waller estimated that for every four or five miles gained they had to march twelve. Of the unknown, uninhabited, and trackless region Waller recorded:

> We had no signs of human beings except once in a while a lonely temporary fishing shack. The banks of the river were high and mountainous, covered with massive timbers and a network of vines and undergrowth. There were not even birds to break the monotony.

By the 30th of December it became obvious that due to the slow progress, the food supplies would have to be used

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16 Report of Major Waller, January 25, 1902.

sparingly, and Waller put the men on short rations. The bread was gone, much of the remainder was damaged, and Waller allotted two pieces of bacon plus coffee per man, twice a day.

By New Year's Day Waller had expected to find signs of the Sohoton River but found nothing. They had been traveling by compass in a west-southwest direction, but a search for trails proved futile. "All of the elements seemed against us," remarked Waller, and he noted that many of the men had sore feet, raw chafing sores, and painful and swollen welts from leeches and thorns.

The march was continued through January 2nd by following a large stream that flowed in a westerly direction. Perhaps, they felt, it would empty into the Sohoton River, and all they had to do was to follow it. But by late afternoon, the stream took a sharp bend and emptied into a still larger body of water, which unfortunately flowed strongly in an easterly direction.

Waller's Expedition Divided

Waller was forced to admit that he was lost, and many of his men were in too poor a physical condition to keep up. The rations were still further cut to one piece of raw bacon for each man, twice a day. If the expedition did not make it to civilization soon, starvation would become a serious possibility.

Waller later reported that he was all in favor of pushing on westward. However he also felt sure that the river flowing east was the Suribao, which empties into the Philippine Sea at Borongan, north of Lanang. Waller recognized that some of his officers might favor going back. In what must have been one of his rare exercises in democratic procedures, Waller announced that he would "be governed by the majority after each officer had expressed his views."[17]

As a result of the conference it was decided to turn back, to build rafts from available timbers and float east via the Suribao River. The next morning, January 3rd, the men turned to in cutting timbers and soon the first raft was built. To determine the safe capacity of the raft it was pulled into the water; "it sank with one man on it." All the timbers that they could find were either too green or waterlogged to float. Waller maintained an outward calm in front of his men and gave the order for them to pick up their gear and commence to march eastward along the Suribao. The column moved on but after a short distance Waller was notified that many of the men could not keep the pace; yet a slower pace risked starvation. Waller held another

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17 Ibid. Waller did not include enlisted men for obvious military reasons, and also because he felt that officers should maintain high morale among the men even if it meant hiding the full nature of the problems from them: "It was my expressed desire that nothing but cheerful, cheering sentiments should be made to or in the presence of the men."

conference and announced a second change in direction. He would take Lieutenants Halford and Lyles, thirteen of the men that he considered to be in the best condition, and ten native carriers. He planned to push on as fast as possible in the original direction, west to the Sohoton Mountains. His party would clearly mark a trail, and Captain Porter would lead the remainder of the expedition at a pace the weaker men could maintain. Once Waller arrived at an American garrison a relief party would be sent to meet Porter's group.

Waller's advance group cut its way into the jungle but still failed to make adequate progress. The skies blackened and rain fell continually, drenching the marines and making it impossible to light fires for heating coffee or fighting the wet chills. Waller's maps had been destroyed, and rations were still further reduced to one third, i.e., one strip of raw bacon per day. Waller decided to change the direction of the march for the third time and return to Lanang. Porter was instructed via a native messenger to return to the Suribao River and again construct rafts. Porter tried but again had no success. He could do little else but wait for the arrival of Waller's party.[18]

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18 The account of the group under Captain Porter is detailed in his report to Waller, February 8, 1902, folder "Philippines, Samar," Hdqs. U.S.M.C., hereinafter cited as Report of Captain Porter, February 8, 1902. There is a discrepency between the Report of Major Waller, January 25, 1902, and this report of Porter's concerning the date that

While Porter waited he listened to various recommendations by Captain Bearss and Lieutenant Williams. Finally he granted permission for Bearss and one corporal to push on to Waller's group to find out what the major's latest plans were. Porter became anxious, however, when neither Waller nor Bearss returned. He inventoried his rations, a few cans of bacon and one ration of coffee, and sent a native carrier with a note to Waller. Porter became even more perplexed when the native returned claiming he could not find the advanced group nor Captain Bearss.

Unknown to Porter, Major Waller's group had stumbled upon a clearing bearing bananas, cocoanuts, palms and sweet potatoes, enough food to fight off starvation for the entire party. The marines and native bearers were ordered to gather all the food they could carry, and while at their tasks Bearss and the corporal came upon them. Waller, hearing of Porter's failure to construct rafts, sent a note by native carrier with instructions to the group for yet another, the fourth, change in direction. Waller would allow his group to eat and rest for about an hour, and then they would push on westward towards Basey. The message to

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Waller's group left to push ahead. Waller states the date as January 3rd while Porter maintains that it was January 1st. First Lieutenant A.S. Williams to Waller, Feburary 16, 1902, Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 110, seems to support Porter's version.

Porter instructed him to bring his troops to the clearing, feed and rest them, then follow along the trail to Basey marked by Waller's group.

Waller was more optimistic about his mission with the easing of the food situation. He waited for Porter's arrival for nearly an hour to no avail then pushed on. Shortly afterward, the native who had been dispatched with the instructions to Porter returned to Waller's group, the note undelivered. The native pleaded that he was afraid and could not get through to Porter because "insurrectos were so numerous." Waller eyed the native suspiciously; no insurrectos had been encountered nor had there been signs of their presence. Waller was put in a predicament: should he search for Porter or push on to Basey? He decided on the latter course, based on assurances by Bearss that "Captain Porter would follow as he was considering it when he left."

Porter, however, was completely confused about his loss of contact with Waller, and he came to the conclusion that "there was but one thing to do and that was to return to Lanang."[19]

Waller Pushes On

On January 4th, Waller was leading his party through a jungle trail when they came upon a shack in a clearing. The major deployed his men and rushed the shack, capturing five

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19 Report of Captain Porter, February 8, 1902.

natives. Upon questioning, one man and a young boy stated that they knew the way to Basey. The other natives were released and these two were placed under guard to act as guides.

The ragged group of marines were led to and across the Sohoton River and eventually to the long sought after Spanish trail. The trail indeed existed, if neglected and overgrown, and led to the Sohoton caves in the west.

The men, most without shoes, continued to cut their way through the spiny underbrush and on the morning of January 6th, they reached the Cadacan River. They proceeded to the supply base that Waller had earlier instructed to be set up on the river near Banglay. The base was located and its commander, marine Captain Robert H. Dunlap, directed the tattered band towards a navy cutter standing by. By evening Waller's group was securely in the confines of Basey.

"The cook never worked so hard in his life as he did when those poor hungry men came in and sat themselves down at the tables," wrote one member of Waller's group. He praised the cook for "waiting on them and doing all he could to make them comfortable."[20] Of his party Waller commented:

> The men, realizing that all was over and that they were safe and once more near home, gave up. Some quietly wept; others laughed hysterically . . . . Most of them had no shoes. Cut, torn, bruised and delapidated, they had marched without murmur

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20 Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 38.

> for twenty-nine days . . . . My shirt was in rags, my hat was a hat only by courtesy. Torn as we were, with eyes suffused with blood from leech bites, I felt that appearances made no difference, we had come through.[21]

But Waller had brought back only a token of his main column; still in the jungle was Captain Porter with one officer, thirty-seven enlisted men and most of the native carriers. One hour after Waller's arrival in Basey, a relief party, consisting of nine marines, one doctor, eleven native carriers, and led by First Lieutenant John H.A. Day, was organized and sent to the Sohoton Cliffs area to set up camp and wait.[22] It was assumed that Porter would be following the same trail as that taken by the advance group. Waller planned to meet the relief party the following day to lead the search if Porter failed to appear.

Meanwhile, Major Waller, feverish and physically weak from his ordeal, changed into a clean uniform and reported to General Smith at Tacloban, Leyte, across the narrow Strait of San Juanico from Basey. On the following day, he went to the Sohoton Cliffs to lead the relief party.

They frantically searched the area for Porter's group

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21 Report of Major Waller, January 25, 1902.

22 See Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy), National Archives Inventory, Record Group 125, General Court-Martial Case, Number 10196, First Lieutenant John Horace Arthur Day, U.S.M.C., April, 1902, pp. 50-51, hereinafter cited as Court-Martial of Lieutenant Day.

but met with no success. Not a trace of them was evident, not even in those places where they were last seen. To make matters worse the rains and resulting flooding had entirely obliterated the traces of all camp sites and trails, many of which were completely underwater.

Soon the relief party itself began to succumb to the hardships of terrain and climate; the tropical fevers and leech bites began to break down the physical endurance of the relief party, and on the eighth day the food ran out. After searching for one more day, Waller was forced to give the order to return to Basey.

The relief party returned to the garrison on the 15th of January and Major Waller collapsed. He was admitted to the dispensary with a fever of one hundred and five degrees; leech bites covered his body and his eyes were almost swollen shut from a weeping eczema.[23] The pugnacious major had walked the approximate one hundred and ninety mile route with the original column that left Basey in December plus some sixty more miles with the relief party; he was at that time forty-five years old.[24]

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[23] See the report of General Chaffee, "Summary of Principal Events, etc.," HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 161-62. Admiral Rodgers' report of January 28, 1902, folder "Philippines, Samar," Hdqs. U.S.M.C., notes that the navy was disturbed about the health of Waller. Detailed report of Waller's physical condition in Court-Martial of Lieutenant Day, p. 43.

[24] Report of Major Waller, January 25, 1902.

Retracing Past Steps

While the search party fruitlessly canvased the jungle, Porter had already decided to lead his men in the opposite direction. He had been left without definite instructions from Major Waller and was baffled by the failure of Captain Bearss to return. He was faced, moreover, with the rapidly deteriorating physical condition of his men. As he later reported:

> My men with a very few exceptions were in too bad a condition to deal with anything but facts and the only thing we were positive of was that we could get to Lanang by our old trail . . . .[25]

After a discussion with Lieutenant Williams, it was decided that a few of the strongest men should push ahead and request a relief party from the army garrison. "I considered myself stronger and in better physical condition than Lt. Williams," reported Porter, "therefore with Sergeant Quick, six men and six natives I started for Lanang at 8:30 a.m. January 3, 1902." Lieutenant Williams was ordered to wait a reasonable time for Major Waller (Porter's last note from the major said that Waller's party was returning to join the main group), and then to proceed with

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[25] Report of Captain Porter, February 8, 1902. See also the report of Lieutenant W.R. Shoemaker, U.S.N., Commanding Officer of USS Yorktown, to Commander of the Southern Squadron, January 20, 1902, folder "Philippines, Samar," Hdqs. U.S.M.C., hereinafter cited as Report of Lieutenant Shoemaker, January 20, 1902.

the remainder of the group to Lanang, following Porter's trail.[26]

Porter's small party moved rapidly but at the cost of some of the men's stamina. Upon reaching the point where a week before the original expedition had disembarked from the small boats, Porter was forced to leave four of his seven enlisted men behind because of their condition. Fortunately, a small potato patch was found, and the four were left there, hopefully able to subsist until a relief party arrived.

Porter, Sergeant Quick and the two other enlisted men realized that time was essential to their comrades left behind; Porter had estimated that they could reach Lanang in four days, but because of swollen waterways, lack of food, and sore feet -- "like pieces of raw beef" -- it was not until the evening of January 11th, that the village was reached.

A relief party from Company "K", First Infantry, was immediately organized with Second Lieutenant Kenneth P. Williams, the army officer most experienced with the interior, designated as the officer in charge.[27]

Time Running Out

Meanwhile, marine Lieutenant A.S. Williams prodded his

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26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

stumbling group eastward along the banks of the Suribao River, the heavy rains slowing their progress. The river and streams rose to unbelievable heights making it difficult to travel along their banks and nearly impossible to cross them as was so often necessary.

"The marines were a wreck," wrote survivor Private John Clifford. They were nearly starved, "without shoes, shirt or trousers enough to cover their bodies." Many were delirious with fever and most suffered from raw and bleeding feet. They could no longer function as a military unit since "their rifles were covered with rust and dirt, and the men were too weak to fire them, even if they should meet the enemy."[28]

Within a few days, marines started dropping off along the trail, too weak to go on. At first it was noticed that two were missing, but no one knew just when or where they dropped out. Williams sent Sergeant Eugene Dooley to search for the two, Privates Morgan Bassett and Lockette A. Bailey, but he had no success. Later the sergeant was again ordered to search for two more missing men, Privates Patrick J. Connell and Francis E. Brown, but they too had disappeared. In the meantime Private James Woods fell out and was found

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28 Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, pp. 36-37; Report of Lieutenant Shoemaker, January 20, 1902.

by the sergeant bleeding from cuts and leech bites over his body and nearly blind from weeping eczema. He was so weak from lack of food and exhausting conditions that he could not walk, nor even lift his head from the ground. He begged the sergeant to just leave him be.

Sergeant Dooley continued the search and found more of his comrades. Private Joseph Baroni was in a similar condition, unable to walk and resigned to death. Private Timothy Murray was lying near an old tree trunk, and when Dooley approached Murray began barking like a dog. Although the private was able to walk he refused to move, driven completely insane by his experiences.

Lying in a group further along the trail were Privates Thomas Brett, George N. Foster and Eugene Sanjule. They had long been buddies together in Company "F" and had chosen to die together; Dooley could do nothing to help them. The sergeant reported back to Lieutenant Willaims and told of the ten lost men; five were physically spent, four had disappeared, and another was driven to lunacy.

The lieutenant was faced with the choice of continuing the search and carrying out the fallen men, or pushing on in hopes of meeting the rescue party that Porter surely would have sent. Lieutenant Williams rejected the first alternative; his men were incapable of carrying anyone, many were not even able to carry their own weapons and equipment. Furthermore, if help did not arrive very soon, many

more of his group would not survive. Williams gave Sergeant Dooley nine men in the strongest condition, and ordered him to rush ahead and make contact with the rescue party that would be searching for them.[29]

The Rescue Party

Second Lieutenant Kenneth P. Williams, First Infantry, organized the rescue party on January 11th, the same day that Porter had hobbled into Lanang from the jungle. He equipped ten infantrymen, one medic, and thirty native carriers and prepared to leave the following morning in seven small native boats, "the best that could be procured at this station," apologized Williams.[30]

Every effort was made to start out on the morning of January 12th, but because of heavy rainfall -- "the seven days' previous downpour" -- the Lanang River was swollen, and the rapid current immediately washed the boats out to sea. The relief expedition was forced to wait until the

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29 Report of First Lieutenant A.S. Williams, February 16, 1902, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 972-73, and also available in Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 110-14, hereinafter cited as the Report of Lieutenant A.S. Williams, U.S.M.C.; Report of Lieutenant Shoemaker, January 20, 1902.

30 Details of the army rescue mission from Lanang are contained in the report of Second Lieutenant Kenneth P. Williams to Captain Pickering, January 19, 1902, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 446, hereinafter cited as the Report of Lieutenant Kenneth P. Williams, January 19, 1902. See also the Report of Lieutenant Shoemaker, U.S.N., January 20, 1902.

morning of the 14th.[31]

Once on the river the rescue party encountered numerous difficulties. The strong current delayed their progress, and often they had to haul the boats by hand. Over forty hours were also lost due to swift and unexpected rises of the river on the evenings of the 14th and 17th -- the river would rise as much as fifteen feet in a few short hours -- and the soldiers spent many hours just preventing the boats from breaking loose.

On the 18th of January the rescue party faced a double danger, the first from the river and the second from guerrillas. The current was still exceedingly rapid, and the boats with their contents were frequently overturned and washed down-river for distances of two or three hundred yards. At 9:30 in the morning, while battling the river and climate, the infantrymen were fired upon by insurgents positioned on a mountainside. The shots were ineffective and the soldiers pushed on.

The first marines were found on January 16th in a clearing close to the river, very weak but alive. These were the four left by Captain Porter. The army lieutenant sent the thankful four down-river in one of the boats with

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31 Report of Lieutenant Kenneth P. Williams, January 19, 1902. In his report Lieutenant Shoemaker maintains that "it rained speadily for 18 days" prior to the rescue attempt.



MARINE DETACHMENT at the home of the U. S. Consul, Matautu Point, Apia, Upolu, April, 1899. Consul, Mr. Osborne, and his son are on the steps.

MARINE DETACHMENT aboard a man-o-war in Asiatic waters, 1899.



GROUP of Pioneer Marine Battalion on Guam, August, 1899, to November, 1900. Also part of Lost Marine Battalion in Samar, Philippines, October, 1901, to March, 1902. Those in parenthesis are two of the ten men lost in the mountains of Samar. (Standing, L. to R.) Simon H. Grishar; Corporal Abdill; Oliver J. Gatlly; (Joseph T. Barlow); Walter Patterson; James Farrel; Thomas B. Whalen; Robert Conally. (Seated, L. to R.) (Joseph Baroni); Frank W. Ganan; Frank A. Allen; George W. Sutton; "Drummer"; Walter Gutkly; mascot from Guam. Picture taken at Cavite Navy Yard, December, 1900.

LT. DION WILLIAMS and his detachment of Marines saluting Admiral Dewey upon his first visit to the Navy Yard, Cavite, P.I., on June 13, 1898.



From John Crane, The United States Marines (1952), p. 18.

a native boatman and continued the search for the main column.

On a mountainside two days later, the soldiers found ten more marines lying on the ground in the heavy rain; they were too sick and too weak to even realize that they had been rescued. They were Sergeant Dooley's group who had been sent ahead my marine Lieutenant Williams.

A medic and two soldiers were left with the ten survivors and the search for the main marine column continued. Later that same day (January 18th) that rescue was accomplished. Lieutenant Williams, United States Army, extended a hand of assistance to Lieutenant Williams, United States Marine Corps, who could stand only with the assistance of an improvised crutch. The soldiers stood agast at the condition of their countrymen strung out along a trail -- crawling or lying -- for about a mile and a quarter. They were reduced to the verge of death, for all purposes naked, most delirious with fever and suffering from severe depression. The only survivors that could walk unassisted were the native carriers.

To get the weakened marines down the mountain to the boats, the soldiers had to work in shifts, carrying the survivors on their backs. Later that afternoon, Lieutenant Williams' party arrived in Lanang, and when they realized that they were safe, the marines "broke down completely

upon their arrival."[32]

The Results of the March

The tragic ordeal of the long march was over, leaving the interior of southern Samar unconquered. The ten marines that Lieutenant A.S. Williams was forced to leave behind were never found.[33] All of the survivors were hospitalized, and one died there. The thirty-five mile march across the island lasted twenty-two days and had cost eleven American lives.

Major Waller studied the results of his march and reported his findings. One, no substantial body of insurgents were in that vicinity of Samar; "They cannot subsist any force there." Two, the old Spanish trail indeed existed, but it was in fact two trails, neither of which were where the army thought the long searched for trail was. Three, the idea of laying telephone wire across the island was possible but a "hazard" (quite an understatement), and falling trees would constantly disrupt it.[34]

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32 Report of Captain Porter, February 8, 1902; Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, pp. 39-40.

33 Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 35, states that a search party consisting of a detachment of sailors came across bleached human bones, possibly those of the ten lost marines, some six months after Waller's march.

34 Report of Major Waller, January 25, 1902.

One cannot avoid the feeling that the future installation of telephone wire was not Waller's prime motivation for leading the cross-island march. He obviously did not expect to encounter a large insurgent force, thus he limited the expedition to fifty men. Why then did a man holding the rank of major (the normal rank for battalion commander) and breveted a lieutenant colonel (a rank commensurate with a regimental commander) choose to accompany what officially was no more than a map and survey detail of less than company size? One is forced to suspect that ambition foreshadowed military necessity. The feisty marine had served nearly three decades of painfully slow advancement. Generals Chaffee and Smith had proved appreciative of past accomplishments of the marine battalion and another headline victory might be the vehicle to ride Waller into the Commandant's house.

The junior officers also realized that the march was not a simple telephone wire route, and that is why they volunteered to go, and why General Smith's aide, Lieutenant DeWitt C. Lyles, U.S.A., also requested to accompany the expedition. Six officers led a fifty man detail that would have normally required one lieutenant.

If the main objective had been to reconnoiter the interior of southern Samar it would appear prudent to start in an area that was familiar, namely to probe from a west to east direction. Weeks of hikes, patrols, expeditions,

scouting missions, and the Sohoton Cliffs operations had given the marines a thorough knowledge of southwest Samar. The Sohoton Cliffs area could have been converted into an advance base from which operations could be launched. Fresh expeditions could have pushed eastward, a new outpost set up from which other expeditions could be launched, and the process repeated.[35]

Waller's actions appeared to be that of a commander who was pressed for time. He commenced the cross-island march from an unfamiliar area, with troops that had already been fatigued by twenty days of campaigning, and a ration supply stretched to the breaking point. If time was of importance it was only to save reputations. General Smith had planned to pacify Samar by the end of December and he was running behind schedule.[36] Waller refused to heed the advice of experienced army officers at Lanang. It was in his view the voice of caution at a time when General Smith desired

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35 Compare Waller's planning for the long march with previous rationale from a report of Waller to General Smith, October 31, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 440; "The general desires me to work toward and connect with the garrison at Pambujan [on southwest coast]. I feel that to move quickly and attack with fresh men from the Vicksburg would be better than attacking with tired troops, impeded by rations . . . ." The same report mentions the feasibility of utilizing the Sohoton Cliffs area as an advance base for a move across the island: "I believe it will then be possible to move entirely across the island between Basey and Lanang . . . . The Cabacan River, freed from the enemy, would make an excellent waterway by which to move troops."

36 Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 374.

aggressiveness.

One on the cross-island march Major Waller found himself in a desperate situation, made the correct decision, and then he erred in carrying the decision out. A commander's job is to command, and he must place himself in the best position to command. The advance group is not the ideal position to make decisions for the main body. A commander's job is to delegate authority but never responsibility; Captain Porter should have been delegated as the officer in charge of the advance group instead of being delegated the responsibility of the main body. Even if Waller's actions succeeded in saving all of the men, it would have been an unnecessary deviation from his job as a commander. It was vital that the advance group be sent; it was foolish that Waller went with it.[37]

Major Waller, perhaps fired by ambition, erred in leading his men into an unknown region. He erred by leaving them there, no doubt because of impatience. On January 20th he compounded his errors by selecting scapegoats for his past mistakes -- out of pure vengence.

The Uppity Native Carriers

It will be remembered that on December 28, 1901, Major

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37 The decision to push on the way to Basey was a wise one because there was no food encountered on the way out from Lanang, while the strong possibility existed that there was some ahead. Moreover, the expedition's position was much closer to Sohoton than it was to Lanang.

Waller began his long march with five junior officers, fifty enlisted men, two armed native scouts and thirty-three native carriers. When Waller decided to push ahead with the advance group he took ten native carriers along with him. Later when Porter left the main column to get assistance from Lanang, he took with him six native carriers. Marine Lieutenant A.S. Williams was left with the native scouts, nicknamed Slim and Smoke, and seventeen native carriers. When the marine survivors arrived in Lanang on January 18th, the scouts and fourteen native carriers accompanied them; three native carriers were not immediately accounted for.[38]

After the army relief party brought marine Lieutenant Williams to the safety of Lanang, he talked at length to Captain Porter about his experiences in the jungle. Part of this conversation concerned the alleged treachery of some natives. Porter in his report stated:

> Lt. Williams, U.S.M.C. reported to me that he had been attacked by three of the native packers and that one of them had succeeded in stabbing him several times with a bolo. Fortunately the wounds were slight.
>
> He said that several of the other packers and the native scout known as "Slim" had looked on during the encounter without going to his assistance. From my conversation with Lt. Williams, U.S.M.C. and most of the men I found that the natives had been most

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38 The distribution of the natives on the cross-island march is contained in Headquarters, Division of the Philippines, General Orders Number Ninety-three, May 7, 1902, SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 44-45.

> surly refusing to obey orders when called upon and going out of calling distance as soon as they went into camp. It is my opinion that had there been one or two more days they would certainly have been attacked by the native packers, being unable to offer little resistance in their weakened condition.[39]

The three natives that Williams said attacked him had deserted immediately after the incident occurred.

On the 20th of January, Captain Porter embarked with all of the marine survivors on board the Arayat for transportation to the army hospital at Tacloban, Leyte. The native scouts and carriers were all clamped in irons below decks and that afternoon delivered to Basey. Rumors quickly spread among the marine garrison that the natives had attacked Williams' group, killing ten with the others dying in the hospital.[40]

Although Major Waller had been in telephonic communication with General Smith, the general's first official knowledge of native treachery came in a telegram on January 22, 1902:

> It became necessary to expend eleven prisoners. Ten who were implemented in the attack on Lt. Williams and one who plotted against me.
>
> Waller, Major[41]

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[39] Report of Captain Porter, February 8, 1902.

[40] Court-Martial of Lieutenant Day, pp. 60-61.

[41] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 70.

Heretofore, official correspondence revealed no mention of any native who "plotted" against the major. Nor did the major explain why he executed ten natives for the overt acts of three -- three who had escaped execution by deserting.

The Marines Leave Samar

Tragic as the cross-island march was, it did not stop the war. The months of January and February were filled with routine patrols, expeditions, and engagements with the guerrillas. Another marine garrison was also established at Quinapundan when Captain Bearss arrived there on January 19th with an undersized company.[42]

However, in late January, 1901, the garrison at Basey numbered less than fifty marines, and many of these were on the sick list. While the marine battalion had exhausted itself with expeditions throughout southern Samar, the natives in the Basey area were becoming increasingly hostile, and the authorities suspected that an attack would soon take place. The marines had undertaken a fierce campaign to avenge the Americans killed at Balangiga, but now they faced a similar threat themselves.[43]

But service on Samar was drawing to a close for the

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[42] CMC Report, HD 3, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 973-74.

[43] Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 233-34.

marines. By February, 1902, the Sixth Separate Brigade decided to relieve the battered marine battalion. Waller was instructed that upon the arrival of the transport USS Lawton, his marines would return to duties at Cavite. On March 1st, the battalion was fully embarked, and the island of Samar slowly faded on the horizon.[44]

As the Lawton pulled out of the port she passed the cruiser USS New York. The entire crew of the war vessel were assembled, and the officers were amassed at attention as the ship bearing the Samar battalion passed by. The colors were dipped in salute, and the navy band played the death march in memory of the marines who stayed behind on Samar. The marines were hailed as heroes.

Upon their arrival in Cavite they were greeted by another band as the crowd on the dock gave them a cheering welcome. Colonel James Forney, commanding the First Marine Brigade, ordered that the men be allotted the best quarters in town, and each immediately be given a month's pay and five day's leave.[45]

In the ensuing years, these veterans found that a tradition of glory had grown around their sufferings and

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[44] Headquarters Sixth Separate Brigade, Special Orders Number Thirty-seven, February 19, 1902; Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 7.

[45] CMC Report, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 974; Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 44; Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 440.

achievements while under Major Waller. Thereafter, officers and men of the United States Marine Corps paid a traditional tribute to the indomitable courage of these marines by rising in their presence with the following words of homage: "Stand, gentlemen. He served on Samar!"[46]

The Welcome for Major Waller

Major Waller stepped off the Lawton as a hero. The exploits of the Samar battalion had been headlined in the major newspapers and had captured the imagination of the public as a welcome victory after the horror of the massacre at Balangiga.

But if Waller was pleased by the cheers, he was also due for a shocking surprise. In the major's own words:

> Leaving Samar without the faintest suspicion of anything wrong, we reached Cavite. We looked forward to the meeting of our old friends -- we expected a warm welcome home . . . cheer after cheer went up for us . . . . I went to my Commander-in-Chief [Major General Chaffee] and was met with the charge of murder.[47]

Murder of whom? The general explained that the United States Army would court-martial the marine officer for the execution of the natives that Waller reported as "expended" in his message of January 22nd. What the general did not

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46 Joel D. Thacker, Stand, Gentlemen, He Served On Samar (1945), a brief pamphlet prepared by Colonel Thacker when he was historian for the Marine Corps, folder "Philippines, Samar," Hdqs. U.S.M.C.; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 126.

47 Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 440.

explain was the background that led to this decision.

The Roosevelt administration's problems with press criticisms had been only temporarily reversed by Waller's victory at Sohoton Cliffs. Hearings by a Senate committee had uncovered evidence of atrocities committed by American troops in the Philippines. These charges -- many brought by veterans of the Insurrection -- were headlined by anti-imperialist newspapers which insisted that the incidents were not isolated. Brutality, they charged, was administration policy.[48]

The Secretary of War, Elihu Root, responded to the charges by conducting his own investigation. His findings indicated that although numerous army officers and enlisted men had been court-martialed for looting, torture, and murder, unusually light sentences seemed to be the rule. Many newspapers seized upon this disclosure as further proof of the administration's cruel military policies.[49]

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[48] See correspondence of President Roosevelt, Elihu Root, and Adjutant General of the Army, SD 213, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 1-6; Senate hearings in SD 205, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XV, 2 pt.; SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIII-XXV, pt. 1-3. See also Blount, American Occupation, pp. 393-95; Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 256; Schirmer, Republic or Empire, ch. xvi; Storey, Marked Severities, pp. 10-25.

[49] Exhibit "F", "Memorandum showing trials of officers and enlisted men . . .," SD 215, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XV, pt. 1, 42-44; "Memorandum in Regards to Trial by Court-Martial," SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 3, XXV, 2073-96. See also Storey, The Conquest of the Philippines, pp. 136-37; Morison, Dissent, p. 192.

At the height of this media criticism, the Department of War received via military channels a routine communique from Samar stating that eleven Filipinos had been executed. Because of Waller's status as a battalion commander, the possibility existed that critics would interpret his act as further evidence of the government's inhumane policy. This was too much for Washington. General Chaffee was cabled promptly, and Waller was ordered to answer to a charge of murder.[50]

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[50] See messages from the War Department to General Chaffee, SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIV, pt. 2, 1547-52.

CHAPTER VI

"CHARGE: MURDER"

He's "only a soldier for Uncle Sam" tis true,
But say, when it comes to fight,
His country's honor is in good hands,
For they're death dealing machines to a man.

-- From "A Just Cause," by Amos Engham, former Corporal, U.S.M.C., 1899.

"War," as one military leader declared, and countless others have proved, "is hell." Nevertheless, nations that count themselves among the civilized countries of the world have customarily set a limit to the nature and extent of savagery they will allow their soldiers to perpetrate.

As shown in the previous chapters, the Philippine Insurrection degenerated into a particularly harsh conflict with barbarities committed by both sides. On Samar a massacre of American troops was promptly followed by a vigorous and brutal offensive by the marine battalion. Countless villages were burned; wholesale destruction of indigenous property was routinely undertaken; and unarmed Filipinos were frequently killed, without, apparently, the slightest hint of official displeasure. Yet a simple message concerning a matter that evidently Major Waller and his marines considered to be routine -- the execution of unfriendly natives for treachery -- set off a burst of righteous indignation on the part of the United States Army authorities and resulted in the court-martial of Major Waller. The

object of this chapter is to examine the charges against the marine commander and to determine just how the American military differentuated between hellish warfare and criminal behavior.

Major Waller was court-martialed specifically because of the execution of eleven Filipinos, but the Insurrection was not without precedent for such executions. In 1900 General Arthur MacArthur ordered the hanging of some seventy-nine Filipino guerrillas,[1] and General Fredrick Funston authorized the hanging of two insurgents who were caught out of uniform in the act of wounding two tied and bound Macabebe scouts.[2] Both actions were upheld as legal. In the former incident the executions followed formal investigations and trials for murder. In the latter no type of investigation or trial was conducted, but the executions took place immediately after the accused were caught in the commission of a crime in a battlefield situation.

Briefly, General Orders Number One Hundred of 1863[3]

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[1] Dupuy, Little Wars, p. 85.

[2] Funston, Memories, pp. 332-35.

[3] "Instructions for the Government of the United States in the Field," General Orders Number One Hundred of 1863, regulated the conduct of American soldiers during time of war; they were embodied by President Lincoln and were considered a milestone in the effort for a more humane conduct of warfare. General Orders Number One Hundred of 1863 are published in their entirety in SD 347, 57th Cong., 1st

stated that indigenous personnel caught in the actual commission of a brutal crime, as in the Funston incident, could be administered the death penalty immediately if deemed appropriate and necessary by the senior American officer who was present. If, however, any delay in administering the punishment should occur, the accused must be turned over to the appropriate authority to await trial by a military commission.

Nevertheless, Waller, although not inexperienced with military law, walked into the courtroom totally convinced of the righteousness of his action. The reasons for this confidence were revealed in the court testimony which shocked the American public and focused public attention on the military policies of the United States forces in the Philippine Islands.

Undertaking a Legal Defensive

When notified of the pending legal action against him, Major Waller was relieved of military duties and confined to the naval station at Cavite where he directed his energies toward a plan of legal defense.

Waller was charged with the violation of the Articles of War of the United States Army, specifically article Fifty-eight which read:

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sess., XXVI, 10-22. See also Brigadier General James F. Bell to Station Commanders of Batangas, Luzon, December 13, 1901, Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 1902, XXXV, pt. 5, 51110-11.

> In time of war, insurrection, or rebellion, larceny, robbery, burglary, arson, mayhem, manslaughter, murder, assault and battery with intent to kill, wounding by shooting or stabbing, with an attempt to commit murder, rape, or an assault and battery with intent to commit rape, shall be punishable by the sentence of a general court-martial, when committed by persons in the military service of the United States, and the punishment in any case shall not be less than the punishment provided, for the like offense, by the laws of the State, Territory or District in which such offense may have been committed.[4]

Three counselors were retained by Waller to represent his defense. The principal attorney was army Major Edwin F. Glenn. He had served as the former Judge Advocate of the Visayas and was personally familiar with conditions and the population on Samar. Major Glenn was no doubt also sympathetic toward Waller's legal troubles since Glenn himself was awaiting a general court-martial for torturing the town presidente of Ibarras, Panay.[5]

Navy Commander Adolf Marix and an American civilian

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[4] Adjutant General of the Army, A Manual for Courts-Martial (1901), Article Fifty-eight. The Articles of War, relevant to 1902, can be found in Section 1342 of the Revised Statutes (1874), and the Articles for the Government of the Navy are in Section 1624 of the same document. The maximum sentence for the crime of murder committed by U.S. personnel during the Insurrection was death.

[5] See Adjutant General of the Army, General Orders Number Eighty-seven, July 26, 1902, SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 17.

attorney, Oscar Sutro, were the other two counselors.[6] The three attorneys and Major Waller spent the first three weeks of March pouring over official records and reports and the pertinent law books on capital offenses.

According to the 1901 edition of the Manual for Courts-Martial, a general court-martial was to be composed of at least five but no more than thirteen commissioned officers. The duties as president of the court were automatically assumed by the highest ranking member of the court. In addition to his general duties as a court member, the president was charged with maintaining order and acting as the spokesman for the court; his signature was required to authenticate all acts, orders, and proceedings of the court.

The Manual for Courts-Martial required that the court members be seated according to rank, and they were charged with duties as both judge and jury; a majority opinion was necessary to determine a guilty finding, and the sentence

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6 Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 4. The transcript of Waller's general court-martial is also available in the Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), National Archives Inventory, Record Group 153, General Court-Martial Case No. 30313, Major Littleton W.T. Waller, U.S.M.C. Waller's court-martial is also covered in Headquarters, Division of the Philippines, General Orders Number Ninety-three, May 7, 1902, SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 43-48; the New York Times (April 1, 1902), p. 3, col. 2; (April 3, 1902), p. 3, col. 3; (April 8, 1902), p. 3, col. 2; (April 9, 1902), p. 3, col. 3; (April 11, 1902), p. 3, col. 3; (April 12, 1902), p. 1, col. 6; (April 14, 1902), p. 1, col. 5; (April 15, 1902), p. 3, col. 3; (April 16, 1902), p. 1, col. 5; (April 17, 1902), p. 8, col. 2.

must have been decided and apporved by a two-thirds majority. All members of the court were sworn to secrecy relating to the deliberations of the court in closed session, and how a member voted was not information to be divulged.

The defense team closely examined the official list of the members of the court when it was published.[7] In addition to officers of the United States Army, names of marine officers also appeared as members of the court, as authorized by article Seventy-eight of the Articles of War. Thirteen members comprised the general court; seven were army officers, including the president of the court Brigadier General William H. Bisbee, and six were marines. The assigned prosecutor, or judge advocate, was Major Henry P. Kingsbury, Third Cavalry.

Waller must have viewed the list of court members with some satisfaction since most were line officers, and the president, General Bisbee, was an old warrior with considerable experience with savagery during the Indian Wars. Army Major Robertson was a member of the Ninth Infantry Regiment, a former acquaintance of Captain Connell, and probably not overly sentimental about the treatment of the Samar natives.

Of the marine officers, Colonel James Forney and Lieutenant Colonel Mancil C. Goodrell were, respectively,

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[7] See Headquarters, Division of the Philippines, Special Orders Number Fifty-four, March 5, 1902, amended on March 10, 12, and 17, 1902, Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 1-4.

Waller's brigade and regimental commanders and well acquainted with the efficiency and professionalism of the flamboyant major. The other marine officers were Waller's contemporaries.[8]

The Court-Martial Convenes

At ten o'clock in the morning of March 17, 1902, the court members, judge advocate, defense team, defendant, and court reporter assembled in a barracks room of an army post in Manila. After swearing in the various officials, the judge advocate read aloud the following charge and specification:

> Charge: Murder, in violation of the Fifty-eighth Article of War.
>
> Specification: In that Major Littleton W.T. Waller, United States Marine Corps, being then and there detached for service with the United States Army, by authority of the President of the United States, did, in time of war, wilfully and feloniously and with malice aforethought, murder and kill eleven men, names unknown, natives of the Philippine Islands, by ordering and causing his subordinate officer under his command John Horace Arthur Day, First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps, and a firing detail of enlisted men under his said command, to take out said eleven man and shoot them to death, which said order was then and there carried into execution and said eleven natives, and each of them, were shot with rifles, from the effects of which they then and there died.
>
> This at Basey, Island of Samar, Philippine Islands, on or about the 20th day of January, 1902.[9]

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[8] Ibid. None of the marine court members had served in Samar.

[9] Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 3-5.

When Major Kingsbury completed the reading, Major Waller entered the following plea: "The accused enters a plea in bar to the jurisdiction of the court." More than a few eyebrows of the court members rose in disbelief. Waller was telling the court that it had no jurisdiction to try him of the alleged crime.

"The charge," continued Waller, "is based on Section 1821 of the Revised Statutes [federal statutes revised in 1874], that 'Marines detached for service with the army are subject to the rules and Articles of War prescribed for the Army.'"

Waller maintained that the specification, "does not allege that Major Waller is <u>now</u> detached for service with the United States Army, nor does it allege that due process against him for the offense was instituted <u>before</u> he was detached from the Army." Waller was arguing that he was on that day of his trial not under army command, and further, he had learned of the legal action against him after the army forces released him. "The charge does not, therefore," uttered the accused, "present a case within the jurisdiction of the Army court-martial."[10]

Waller then introduced into evidence three letters which

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[10] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 5.

he maintained proved his point.[11]

The first two letters were orders from Rear Admiral Rodgers to Major Waller ordering him to Samar with a battalion of marines. The first, dated October 21, 1901, informed Waller that he was to be "hereby detached from duty with the First Brigade, U.S. Marine, Cavite . . . ." The second, dated a day after the first, modifies the original order in so far that Waller is instructed; "you will not regard yourself detached from the First Brigade, Marines."[12] That last statement could have implied that by being "not . . . detached from the First Brigade Marines," Waller was also not detached from naval control thus never officially under army command and control. However, Waller was not disputing the legitimacy of army control over his former battalion, only that the army had later given up its jurisdiction.

The third letter from General Smith's headquarters to Waller dated February 19, 1902, informed Waller that he and his battalion "will stand relieved from duty in the Sixth

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[11] Ibid., pp. 5-6. See Appendixes "B", "C", and "D" of this paper.

[12] Ibid., p. 6. There appears to be a typographical error on line two of the second letter dated 22nd October, 1901, which reads: ". . . and directing you to report to the Commanding Officer of the Marine Battalion . . . ." Since Waller was the Commanding Officer, the letter should have directed Waller as the Commanding Officer, as was done in the first letter.

Separate Brigade" upon the arrival of the transport Lawton. Waller argued that, by General Smith's order, his battalion was returned to naval control prior to formal charges being placed against him on March 4, 1902.

Waller quoted army Colonel Winthrop, former Judge Advocate General of the Army and a recognized authority on military law:

> Officers of the Marine Corps will be amenable to trial by Army courts-martial while detached for service; that this jurisdiction is readily and properly exercised while they are serving with the Army; that it may legally be exercised within a reasonable period after the service is terminated, provided it be regularly attached by due commencement of proceedings before its termination. [emphasis mine] .13

Attention was drawn to the court by Waller that in General Smith's order of February 19th he stated that the marines were "relieved from duty in the Sixth Separate Brigade," and army jurisdiction was then voluntarily surrendered. "No process of any kind," stated Waller, speaking in the third person, "had been issued against Major Waller on February 19, 1902. Ordering an officer to separate from service without such is a formal waiver and an abandonment of jurisdiction."

Major Waller acknowledged that General Chaffee had sent an Inspector of the Army to investigate the execution

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13 Ibid., p. 8.

incident on Samar prior to the sailing of the marines, but the Inspector was without judicial power: "He did not summon anyone before him. He did not have Major Waller before him. No one was sworn; no one was notified. It was no process of law in any shape or form."

The Inspector was assigned to obtain information for the general, but Waller insisted that "the law demands that there shall be a due course of law, not an inspection by an inspector without any power whatever."

Waller's main argument hinged on the premise that he was not afforded due process of law. Legal authorities and precedent cases were quoted to define due process and to show that every requirement was absent in his case, specifically; a complainant, a defendant, and a judge. "'Due process of law,'" quoted Waller, "'implies the right of the person to be present before the tribunal which is asked to pronounce judgement against him, to be heard by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right of controverting every material fact which bears on the question of right in the matter involved. If any question of fact or liability be conclusively presumed against this,'" emphasized Waller, "'it denies to him due process of law.'"

Prior to ending his plea he ensured the individuals of the court that his arguments were legal in nature and not a

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[14] Ibid., p. 10.

sentiment of personal bias. "The plea is not against the members of the court," said Waller, "but against the jurisdiction of the court -- that it is no court." The accused sat down.

The judge advocate rose to answer the defendant's plea, apparently as much of a surprise to him as to the court. Major Kingsbury pronounced that Major General Chaffee, who was the representative of the President of the United States, ordered the court-martial and by implication, that made the proceedings legal. On the same track, Kingsbury introduced as evidence two messages from naval authorities which ordered marine officers to report to General Chaffee, either as court members or witnesses for Waller's trial. This action implied that the navy recognized the jurisdiction by the army in the matter.

Apparently short of legal ammunition, the judge advocate then summed up the army's position to the accused's plea in bar of jurisdiction:

> This matter was reported officially . . . to Major General Chaffee. In the execution of his office, he directed that investigation be made by Major Smith, Inspector of the Department of the South Philippines. This investigation was made. After this investigation was received, General Chaffee -- still in the execution of his office -- had charges preferred against Major Waller, and this court was ordered.[15]

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[15] Ibid., p. 12.

Major Kingsbury needed only to add, "and that is that" to suggest that to be ordered to stand trial should be jurisdiction enough in any man's army.

Major Glenn, the key defense counselor, rose to rebut the judge advocate's argument. "The fact that Major General Chaffee ordered the court does not decide the question," he noted, and with a hint of sarcasm added, "if that could be, there would be no such thing as a plea in bar of jurisdiction. The President of the United States cannot decide it. No one can decide it but this court . . . ."

The defense counselor closed his rebuttal by emphasizing again the defendant's main argument: ". . . the Army waives the right to try this officer when he has been detached from service with the Army without due process of law."[16]

The judge advocate relinquished an opportunity for his rebuttal, and it remained for the court to resolve the issue. General Bisbee ordered the courtroom closed for deliberation, instructing the accused, the defense attorneys, and the judge advocate to withdraw.

Only a few minutes had passed, however, when the court was reopened by the president. General Bisbee obviously felt that the defense plea was too lightly argued by the judge advocate; to decide this case on a legal technicality

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16 Ibid., p. 13.

would certainly cause a stir in public opinion, to say nothing of General Chaffee's reaction. Bisbee asked Kingsbury as to whether he had "any further knowledge or information," or could secure more. Kingsbury was confused; the defense's plea caught him off guard. "I do not quite understand what the court wishes," he stated. To which the president patiently reminded the judge advocate that the plea of the defense "is that the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of this court for certain reasons." Then Bisbee spelled out what was snagging the court: "We want to know whether there is any possible written or other evidence from the President of the United States placing him on detached duty with the Army, and thereby placing him within the province of this court." General Bisbee then repeated his initial request for additional information from the judge advocate. Major Kingsbury tried to go on the offense. "These people," he stated, indicating the defendant and his battalion, "were ordered to report to Major General Chaffee, or to the Commanding General of the Division of the Philippines, as a battalion of Marines." Kingsbury knew that much was common knowledge and proved nothing. He meekly added; "Those orders must have come from the President of the United States." Upon drawing a promise from the judge advocate to research the relevant official documents, the president adjourned the day's session.

Apparently at the hub of the court's problem was the wording of the federal Revised Statutes. Section 1621 of the Revised Statutes stated:

> The Marine Corps shall, at all times, be subject to the laws and regulations established for the government of the Navy, except when detached for service with the Army by order of the President; and when so detached they shall be subject to the rules and articles of war prescribed for the government of the Army.[17]

Waller did not deny that he had operated under the control and command of the Sixth Separate Brigade; when Admiral Rodgers volunteered a marine battalion for service on Samar it was reported that army and naval leaders agreed that "the marine battalion should be under the general command of Brigadier General Smith."[18] However, it was not uncommon for marines to cooperate with army units in land battles, such as the battle of Novaleta,[19] without the marines coming under the jurisdiction of army discipline. Clearly, the marine battalion could only have been detached for service under army jurisdiction "by order of the

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17 See letter of Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War, June 27, 1902, p. 37, contained with the transcript of Court-Martial of Major Waller.

18 Brigadier General James F. Wade, U.S.A., to Adjutant General of the Army, August 8, 1902, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 204.

19 See Chapter III of this paper concerning the joint army-marine effort in the battle of Novaleta, Luzon in 1899.

President."

On the following day, March 18th, the court reconvened to consider further evidence from the judge advocate. Major Kingsbury had brought with him the correspondence that had passed between army and naval headquarters and which resulted in the marine battalion being shipped to Samar.[20]

He maintained that navy and army headquarters in the Philippines, as well as the Secretaries of War and the Navy, were aware of, and approved, the marine battalion's transfer to Samar; this movement was ordered by the "acts of these officers [which] were the acts of the President." The judge advocate then quoted numerous court decisions to indicate that a military government of the United States was one that was "exercised by the military commanders, under the direction of the President . . . but, as he cannot administer all of the details, he delegates, expressly or impliedly, to the commanders of armies under him . . . [whom] may legally do whatever the President might himself do if personally present, and in their proceedings and orders are presumed to act by the President's direction or sanction."[21]

The judge advocate had presented astute arguments that

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20 Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 15-17.

21 Ibid., pp. 18-19.

units of the Marine Corps need not be detached personally by the President -- such authority could conceivably have been delegated to General Chaffee -- but Kingsbury then moved on to a confusing legal contention. The possibility that the defendant might have been relieved from army control prior to formal charges was admitted by the judge advocate but quickly dismissed as wholly irrevelant; "the court had jurisdiction of him now because he is in its custody . . . jurisdiction of this case commenced when the act [of which the defendant was charged] was committed."[22] Simply stated, Waller was under army control when the alleged crime took place, and he was then under its control before the court, ergo the court had full jurisdiction -- the lack of due process apparently notwithstanding.

"I don't know what to do with that statement, at all," stated Major Glenn to the court, indicating his bewilderment over the judge advocate's jurisdiction theory. The defense counselor conceded to Kingsbury's reasoning that the marine battalion served under the army by presidential authority, but he stuck to the defense's main argument that the army had released Waller prior to the commencement of legal proceedings. Glenn scoffed at the contention that because Waller was before the court, jurisdiction therefore was a

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22 Ibid., p. 19.

fact: "a man can never make a plea in bar of jurisdiction if the mere fact of being in the power of the court puts him under its jurisdiction." The navy had indeed ordered Waller to report before the court, but that alone, stressed Glenn, does not give the army "back the jurisdiction which it forfeited by law."[23]

Both sides declined further argument and the president closed the court for further deliberations.

When the court was reopened its president tersely announced:

> The decision of the court is that the court is without jurisdiction in this case. The objection of the accused is sustained.
> The judge advocate will immediately inform the convening authority, so that it may take what action it sees fit in the matter.[24]

The convening authority was General Chaffee, and although he was powerless to change a verdict concerning the guilt or innocence of a defendant, a plea such as in bar of jurisdiction could be overruled. The president of the court ordered the court to report each morning to await instructions from General Chaffee concerning the court's decision. No instructions were forthcoming on the mornings of the 19th or 20th of March.

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[23] Ibid., p. 20.

[24] Ibid., pp. 20-21.

When the court reopened at ten-fifteen, A.M. on March 21st, General Disbee ordered the judge advocate to read a letter which the court president had received from Captain W.P. Hall, Chaffee's Assistant Adjutant General. "The convening authority directs me to reply as follows," wrote Captain Hall, "it is not, nor can it be contended that the Court has not due and lawful jurisdiction over the offense."[25] That one sentence recocheted amidst the defense team and shattered their legal loophole; Chaffee was overruling the court's decision to sustain Waller's plea in bar of jurisdiction.

The general based his decision on several factors, but mainly that the investigation conducted by the Inspector on General Smith's request was for the purpose of this trial a formal inquiry -- "being formal in that it was duly ordered by competent authority." Chaffee claimed that the inquiry had in itself "sufficient regularity to show that proceedings had regularly attached prior to the accused being relieved from duty with the Army . . . ."

Whether the Inspector's inquiry was due process or not was not an essential argument for jurisdiction, wrote Captain Hall, because -- as the judge advocate argued -- Waller had been "returned to the jurisdiction of the Army by lawful and legal superior authority [Captain Hall's emphasis]."

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[25] Ibid., pp. 23-24.

This last contention seemed to say that a jailer had automatic jurisdiction over the jailee because the latter was in jail. Hall, however, compared Waller's situation to that of an army deserter who escapes beyond American jurisdiction "but upon his return to such jurisdiction, and his capture, the whole case revives against him."

Clearly the crux of the problem from Chaffee's point of view was that of discipline; a crime had been committed and it must prosecuted, in spite of legal niceties. "For it follows," wrote Hall, "that if the Army has no jurisdiction of this case, the Naval authorities are surely powerless," and hence Waller would not answer for his deed.

The letter ended with instructions to the court that it indeed "had due and lawful jurisdiction of the person in this case . . . . It will proceed with the trial of the case upon its merits."[26]

The court was closed briefly and when it reopened it announced, not surprisingly, that considering the views of the convening authority the court had decided that proper jurisdiction existed and directed the case to proceed.

The charges were again read by the judge advocate and Major Waller made his new plea: "To the specification, guilty, except to the words 'wilfully and feloniously and with malice of aforethought, murder . . .' and to those

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26 Ibid., p. 26.

words, not guilty." Waller was admitting that he had ordered the natives' execution, but that this act was a justified one and not murder under the law.

The legal proceedings then shifted to the conventional as the prosecution brought the first of its witnesses to testify.

The Case Against Major Waller

Captain Robert H. Dunlap, U.S.M.C., was duly sworn in and took his seat on the witness stand. Under direct examination Dunlap responded to the judge advocate's questions and repeated a telephone conversation that he had with marine Second Lieutenant J.P.V. Gridley on January 20th of that year. Gridley had been at the Sixth Separate Brigade headquarters at Tacloban acting as the marine battalion adjutant on that date, and he had observed the Arayat when it arrived with the marine survivors and native prisoners from Lanang. Gridley later talked with the marines at the hospital and afterwards telephoned Captain Dunlap at Basey in order to relay to Major Waller the information that he had collected. Dunlap testified that Gridley described the survivors as "in horrible shape, some of them he thought dying -- would not live -- and that they had evidently suffered a great deal."[27] Dunlap further stated that Gridley told of conversations with Captain Porter, marine Lieutenant

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[27] Ibid., p. 31.

Williams, and Gunnery Sergeant Quick concerning the treachery of the native carriers on the march. Specifically, Gridley said that the natives had been accused of attaining food for themselves and not sharing it with the starving marines. Some of the natives had also physically assaulted Lieutenant Williams, inflicting several bolo wounds. Dunlap was told that the treacherous natives would be sent to Basey under guard later that day, and that they would arrive between two and two-thirty P.M.

Captain Dunlap also testified that Sergeant Quick had arrived that morning from Tacloban and conversed with Dunlap and then Major Waller. Quick repeated the story, basically the same as heard from Lieutenant Gridley, about the suffering of the marines and the treachery of the native carriers.

Dunlap's testimony established that Major Waller had learned of the alleged treachery of the native carriers through hearsay that was three times removed, i.e., Lieutenant Williams told Lieutenant Gridley, who told Captain Dunlap, who passed it on to Waller. The major did hear a report in person from Gunnery Sergeant Quick, but it too was not an eyewitness account; Quick had left with Captain Porter on January 3rd and had not been with Lieutenant Williams' group after that date.

Major Kingsbury moved to gain crutial evidence from Captain Dunlap. "Did you hear Major Waller give the order

to kill these people?" To which the answer was, "I did." "I heard Major Waller give the order to Mr. Day to take these prisoners who had been sent back under guard to be shot."[28] "When Major Waller gave this command was it a deliberate command?" "It was," answered Dunlap.

Another concern of the prosecution was probed, that of the physical condition of Major Waller on January 20th, five days after he returned from the jungle with the futile search mission. "Was Major Waller sick at this time?" "He was." Dunlap then added that Waller was lying on his bunk. The judge advocate asked, "Do you think Major Waller was in his right senses . . .?" Major Waller objected to this question and it was withdrawn by the judge advocate. After getting Dunlap to testify that Sergeant Quick had not been put under oath prior to speaking to Major Waller, the judge advocate turned the witness over for cross-examination by Waller himself.

Under Waller's questioning Dunlap repeated the time sequence concerning the significant events that occurred on January 10th: the phone conversation with Lieutenant Gridley, ten, A.M.; Sergeant Quick's arrival at Basey, eleven-thirty,

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[28] Ibid., p. 34. The "Mr. Day" referred to by Captain Dunlap was marine First Lieutenant John H.A. Day, who was in command of the firing squads that executed the natives. It was, and is, common to address navy and marine junior officers as "Mister" in lieu of "Ensign", or "Lieutenant".

A.M.; the arrival of the launch with the native prisoners at Basey, between two and two-thirty, P.M. It was further related that although other people were walking past the vicinity of Major Waller's room, the order given to Lieutenant Day to carry out the execution was probably overheard only by Dunlap.

To end his cross-examination, Waller extracted Dunlap's view of the affair: "Did you express any opinion . . . in regard to what should be done with these men?" "I did," answered Dunlap, "I said they should be shot."[29]

The redirect and recross-examination established the fact that the native scout Slim was purposely picked out of the group of prisoners and not shot with the others. Lieutenant Day regarded Slim highly, as they had dealings together prior to the long march. However, Major Waller "gave the order that he should be shot just the same as the others . . . ." The main group of natives were shot about two hours after their arrival at Basey, about four, P.M., and Slim similarly executed about a half hour later.

Clearly not satisfied with the questioning, General Bisbee quizzed the witness further. Dunlap related that other than possible questioning conducted by Lieutenant Day, no investigation was held to determine the nature of the natives' treachery. No officer present protested the

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29 Ibid., p. 37.

execution before or after, save Day's attempt to exempt Slim from the firing squad.

The court focused on a key point that neither side had dealt with, the status of the executed natives. The general asked, "were they prisoners of war . . .?" Dunlap seemed perplexed; "I do not know about that, sir . . . ." Dunlap stated that some of the native carriers may have been suspected insurgents that were captured on earlier expeditions and forced to work for the marines, not an unusual practice. Most were simply paid cargedores (carriers) hired by the marine garrison. However, ". . . one was a native policeman," stated Dunlap, obviously referring to Slim, "[he] carried a rifle, and knew how to use it."[30]

The court, however, failed to press Dunlap on the status of the prisoners at the time that they were executed. Were they considered insurgent spies, or agents? Once placed under guard, were they prisoners of war? Could they have been classed as employees of the United States government? These vital questions were not asked.

The next witness was called by the judge advocate to determine Waller's physical and mental competence at the time that the executions were ordered. It was well known that the marine commander had experienced severe physical punishment in the jungle, and that fever and exhaustion had

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30 Ibid., p. 40.

caused him to be placed under a physician's care. Doctor G.A. Lung, the senior naval medical officer at Basey in January, 1902, took the stand.

After establishing his medical position at Basey on January 20th, Doctor Lung was asked if Major Waller had been sick. "Yes, sir," he replied, but the defense counselor was quickly on his feet, objecting to any comment on the physical condition of the accused. "I cannot understand what you want," Glenn said to the judge advocate and then faced the court; "If he is trying to excuse Major Waller on the ground of his condition, we don't want that." To which Major Kingsbury retorted, "I want to prove that this order was given in his right senses. If they admit that, I quit. If you admit that the order was deliberately given, and in his right senses." The eyes of the court turned to the defense counsel. "Yes," said Glenn, "the mere fact of his plea to the fact that he gave the order in itself carries with -- until it is raised by the defense itself -- the fact that the man was sane."[31] The defense further reiterated that the execution did take place, but that it was ordered for rational reasons and carried out in the authorized manner. The judge advocate was satisfied and declined to probe the issue further. The witness was excused and the president then adjourned the court.

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[31] Ibid., p. 43.

Enter Confusion

March 22nd was a Saturday and the second day of testimony since the plea in bar of jurisdiction was overruled. Promptly at ten-fifteen, A.M. the court was opened and the prosecution called its next witness, marine First Lieutenant John Horace Arthur Day. After establishing that Day had been stationed at Basey and knew the accused, he was asked about receiving orders in regard to an execution of natives on January 19th. Day started to acknowledge that he had received such an order, but the line of questioning was objected to by Waller on the grounds that the specification stated that the alleged offense occurred on the twentieth of January: "The judge advocate can't go back two, three or four days. We are prepared to try this case on the specification." Waller again acknowledged that he issued the order for the execution as mentioned in the specification, but he refused to admit to other orders for other executions.

The judge advocate was flustered; he reminded the accused that "the specification reads: 'on or about the 20th day of January.'" Major Glenn reiterated the defense position that indeed an order for execution had been given, and the judge advocate had fixed the date as January 20th. Major Kingsbury patiently explained that the government's specification refers to "the execution or killing of eleven prisoners. Now, there was one prisoner killed on the 19th,

and there were ten killed on the 20th."[32]

This was the first allusion to executions carried out on more than one day. Captain Dunlap testified that a group of natives were shot about four, P.M. and Slim was executed about one half hour later. The telegram of January 22nd from Waller to the Sixth Separate Brigade acknowledged that eleven natives were expended: "Ten who were implemented in the attack on Lt. Williams and one who plotted against me," but no specific date for the executions was mentioned.[33]

The judge advocate insisted that Dunlap testified that nine natives were executed; "Those were the men that came on the boat that day," explained Kingsbury, "eight men first, and one afterwards. No witness has stated that they were killed on one day."[34]

Major Glenn responded sarcastically: "We will admit any day, but cannot admit that it was done on two days . . . ."

General Bisbee closed the court for deliberation on the defense objection. The judge advocate had established the

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32 Ibid., p. 46.

33 See Waller to Sixth Separate Brigade Headquarters, January 22, 1902, Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 70.

34 Major Kingsbury was alluding to testimony that his witness did not give. Captain Dunlap stated that he thought ten native prisoners were taken from the boat and subsequently shot, Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 38.

killing of ten natives but since the specification mentions eleven natives executed "on or about the 20th day of January, 1902," it was reasonable that an execution could have taken place on another day. The defense objection was overruled.

The court ordered the judge advocate to repeat his question to Lieutenant Day: "Did you receive an order on the 19th, the day before the vessel arrived with the native prisoners and the sick?" The witness hesitated then announced: "I should like to state that charges of murder have been preferred against me, and I am to be tried. Some of the questions asked here might tend to incriminate me." Day requested that his civilian lawyer be allowed in the court while he was on the witness stand. No objections were raised.[35]

The questioning was resumed, and Day acknowledged that he was ordered to shoot native prisoners but was not certain of the date. Day testified that he commanded a firing squad that executed one native prior to the arrival of the boat with the native prisoners from Tacloban, and that later he met that boat and took eleven natives to the guardhouse.

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[35] Lieutenant Day subsequently faced a general court-martial for the charge of unlawfully executing eleven natives on or about the 19th and 20th of January, Headquarters, Division of the Philippines, General Orders Number Ninety-three, SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 46-48.

Of these eleven, two natives were picked out as "good men" and not charged with treachery.

The judge advocate wanted to know why Lieutenant Day failed to execute the native Slim with the others. Day explained: "He had been the first sergeant of the Filipino scouts under my command; I was fond of the man; he had proved faithful on a previous occasion . . . ." He requested Major Waller to delay until the next day the execution of Slim but was refused.

The judge advocate proceeded to the question of how it was determined that an execution was in order. "Were any of these eleven men interrogated by any person whilst they were on the post at Basey?" To which Day answered: "They were not, to my knowledge." Kingsbury asked; "Do you know whether these natives that you had charge of that day had any trial?" "I do not know of any trial that they had," was the reply.[36] The judge advocate then surprisingly relinquished further questioning of Day, although he had elicited no information about a possible execution on January 19th.

Under cross-examination Day explained that although he had pleaded for Slim's life, he later apologized to Major Waller for having made the request; "I told him," said Day, "that I had interviewed Sergeant Quick, of the Marines, and

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[36] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 51.

another native scout named Smoke, and that their testimony had convinced me that the man named Slim was the leader in the plot to massacre Colonel Waller and his party, and Captain Porter and his party."[37]

General Bisbee was undoubtedly unsatisfied with Day's testimony. There had been reference to an execution on two different days and the total number of those executed was still in doubt. He asked Day: "How many men were killed, to your knowledge, executed?" "Eleven, sir," answered Day, "ten on one day, and one on the previous day. I cannot recall the exact dates."[38]

The next witness was Sergeant Henry Slater, a marine enlisted man who was part of the firing squad that shot the native prisoners on the afternoon of January 20th. He could have cleared up some of the confusion about how many natives were actually shot, but the sergeant was not asked the pertinent questions. His testimony established that he was on the firing squads in question, and that no one to his knowledge talked with the prisoners.

The testimony of the next two witnesses resulted in further confusion concerning who was killed and when. Privates Omer J. Kresge and James McGee each testified that they were assigned to three firing squads, but their poor

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37 Ibid., p. 53.

38 Ibid.

memories and the less than skillful questioning by the judge advocate left the dates and the number of executed natives still in doubt. The latter witness did verify, however, that not all of the natives brought by boat to Basey were executed; marine Private George Davis had been detailed to pick out two natives whom he knew were not treacherous on the recent march.

After an agreement to question Gunnery Sergeant Quick at a later time -- he was on the sick list -- the judge advocate submitted as evidence the telegram of January 22, 1902, in which Waller notified General Smith of the necessity "to expend 11 prisoners,"[39] and announced that the prosecution had rested its case.

The Case Against Waller

Major Kingsbury can be credited with establishing that the native prisoners from Lanang received neither a trial nor investigation, and that Waller based a charge of treachery upon rumors and hearsay evidence. The order for the execution was deliberate, and, as contended by the defense, issued by the accused while in a sane state of mind, unaffected by illness or other physical discomforts.

However, the government's case against Major Waller seemed far from conclusive. The prosecution's information

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[39] Waller to Sixth Separate Brigade Headquarters, January 22, 1902, Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 70.

clearly indicated that eleven natives were executed on two different dates, January 19th and 20th. But Major Waller, who readily admitted the responsibility for the executions, insisted that they all occurred on the same day. The court could not have helped speculating whether Lieutenant Day -- who admitted executing a native on the nineteenth -- was not trying to save himself from prosecution by passing the responsibility on to Major Waller.

Major Kingsbury had extracted from Captain Dunlap only that ten natives were killed on January 20th; no questions were asked concerning the preceeding day. Neither did the judge advocate make best use of the enlisted eyewitnesses, whose testimony raised more questions than it solved. At the conclusion of the government's case, the court could not be sure of the number of persons put to death, nor when the executions occurred.

It appeared obvious from the defendant's plea that the defense would claim legitimacy for Waller's actions. A normal assumption could have been made by the government that the defense would claim a special status of either the defendant, or the victims, or both. Major Kingsbury did not address himself to either the status of the executed natives -- even after the court raised the issue -- nor the authority that Major Waller's military position allotted. The judge advocate appeared to rest his case on the assumption

that the illegality of Waller's actions were self-evident because the government disapproved of them.

CHAPTER VII

"PUNISH TREACHERY WITH DEATH"

Damn, damn, damn the Filipino
Pock-marked Khakic ladrone;
Underneath the starry flag
Civilize him with a Krag
And return us to our beloved home!

-- Refrain from a popular song by
American troops during the Insurrection.

The harsh actions of the marines on Samar were all undertaken without, apparently, the dissent of even one battalion member. In fact, quite the opposite was true; testimony by, and interviews of, several Samar battalion members indicate that all felt justified in making Samar a "howling wilderness."

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the marines' rationalization in believing that their campaign was just. Where did Waller get the notion that his occupation force could wage a scorched earth policy against the inhabitants? Why did marine patrols shoot such people as "a crippled old man and a young girl"[1] without fear of official retribution? Waller, with more than twenty years of service in

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[1] The words of eyewitness Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 26. The Manila Times (March 15, 1902), quoted by Storey, Marked Severities, pp. 33-34, claims that Waller personally had captured natives "tied to trees and submitted to a series of slow tortures that finally resulted in death, in some instances the victims living for three or four days." However, no proof was forwarded to substantiate the story.

numerous conflicts around the globe, had never previously executed anyone; what led him to believe that he literally held the power of life and death over the inhabitants of Samar? The court-martial of Major Waller provided answers to such questions.

The Case for the Defense

At a nod from the court president, Major Glenn rose to commence the arguments for the defense. His preliminary statement outlined the contention of the defendant: because of the nature of Major Waller's position in Samar, the treachery of the executed natives, and the explosive state of affairs around Basey that January, the order for the executions was "necessary, justifiable and lawful."[2]

Waller then called his first witness to the stand, Captain David D. Porter and immediately developed a key point. Porter was asked about Major Waller's position and authority on Samar. "He was District Commander," was the answer, "he had absolute authority in that district." Porter then indicated the limits of Waller's district on a map; "From Basey Northeast to Hernani, and everything south and east of these two places."

The subject of the questioning then shifted to the instructions received by Major Waller from General Smith upon the arrival of the marine battalion at Samar, which

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2 Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 70.

Porter said he had witnessed. The captain was shown Waller's order of October 23, 1901, and then it was read aloud. The order was written by Waller on the USS New York shortly after the briefing of the marine commander by General Smith. It instructed the company commanders on their specific responsibilities on Samar and emphasized general precautions about the natives. However, halfway through the order the major instructed: "Place no confidence in the natives, and punish treachery immediately with death." The message ended with the instruction:

> WE MUST DO OUR PART OF THE WORK, AND WITH THE SURE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE ARE NOT TO EXPECT QUARTER.
>
> The latter fact will be told to the men after they are landed.
>
> We must also avenge our late comrades in North China, the murdered men of the Ninth U.S. Infantry.[3]

The defendant of course knew of the inflammatory nature of his order and with this in mind asked Captain Porter: ". . . did these orders assume anything or go beyond any instructions that were given by General Smith to Major Waller in that conversation in your hearing?" Porter paused and answered: "They do not go as far." Porter surely implied that General Smith had issued rather harsh instructions, but Waller did not pursue the point.

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[3] Ibid., pp. 73-75. See also Appendix "E" of this paper.

Instead, the questioning shifted to the expedition across the southern interior of Samar. Waller got Porter to testify that he was witness to a subsequent conversation at the Sixth Separate Brigade headquarters when General Smith directed Waller to "open up that country across from Hernani to Sojoton [sic]."

Upon the defense's direction, Porter described the long march that took Waller's force from Basey to Lanang, passing through Balangiga, Quinapundan, Omagongon, Pamboan and Hernani. He told of the cross-island march from Lanang including the desperate condition of the marines which required Waller and later Porter to separate from the main group. Waller then offered into evidence the report of Captain Porter to Major Waller of February 8, 1902, in which Porter described his experiences on the march.[4]

Porter was asked during Waller's direct examination to describe the conduct of the native carriers under his command. He testified that after Major Waller left the main group the natives appeared surly and seemed to group together more. They refused to cut wood, and even Slim and Smoke, the two native scouts, failed to come when they were sent for. Porter also mentioned the failure of a native to

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[4] Porter to Waller, February 8, 1902, Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 79-84.

deliver a message to Waller. The native claimed that he could not find the major; yet Porter knew the path to be clearly blazed.

Captain Porter repeated what marine Lieutenant Williams had told him concerning the attack by the three carriers. Since Porter in his report of February 8, 1902, specifically accused Slim of not coming to the aid of Lieutenant Williams, Waller asked about Slim's whereabouts during the assault. Porter claimed that Slim was on the opposite side of the Lanang River to the position of the attack, but that the river was only about twenty-five yards wide.

Upon further testimony it was established that the native cargedores and scouts "got their share of rations right along." Porter was not asked whether the native ration was equal to that of the marines'.

Porter described Waller as a commander whose treatment of his men was "thoughtful and considerate," not an officer that would risk his men to any dangers that he himself would not incur. The junior officers held a feeling of "great respect and admiration," said Porter, who added that "they certainly had every confidence in him."

The captain's day of questioning drew to a close with his description of his and marine Lieutenant Williams' discussion with Lieutenant Gridley at Tacloban, and the instructions that Porter gave to Sergeant Quick to pass on to Waller. Porter was asked his opinion concerning the

native prisoners, and he replied that it was the same as that expressed by Lieutenant Williams: "they should be shot."[5]

The court met again on Sunday morning March 24, 1902, at ten-fifteen. Lieutenant Day was in court and requested that his earlier testimony for the prosecution be changed. On the subject of whether the native prisoners had a trial on January 20th, Day had previously answered in the negative, but now wished to change his answer. "I did not exactly understand that question. There was an investigation; I was a party to that investigation." There was no further elaboration by Day as to the extent of this investigation, which apparently was still far short of a trial or hearing.

When Captain Porter returned to continue his testimony under direct examination, Waller's questions probed the reason as to why it was Sergeant Quick who had reported to Major Waller on January rather than one of the officers. Porter stated that both he and Lieutenant Williams were too ill to make the trip to Basey, and Quick was selected because of the sergeant's intelligence and capability.

General Smith's Involvement Attacked

Under cross-examination Kingsbury questioned Porter about the numerous details concerning the cross-island

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[5] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 88.

march, mainly the distance covered each day and the difficulty of the terrain, little of which seemed relevant to the trial. After a question concerning the amount of food rations, Kingsbury suddenly asked: "Did General Smith indicate to Major Waller in that conversation [on board the USS New York in October, 1901] that, as district commander, he had the power of life and death over unarmed and defenseless prisoners that at any time might be turned over to him by his subordinate officers?" Porter evidently saw that this was a key question; he asked the judge advocate to repeat it and then answered: "It was the impression that he gave me, decidedly."[6]

The army prosecutor's patience was being taxed by these marines; first they claimed immunity to army discipline, and now they dared to imply that an army general offered them carte blanche authority to execute anyone in their path. He decided to cut into the heart of Porter's testimony: "In this conversation did General Smith indicate to Major Waller that, as district commander, he had the power of life and death over unarmed and defenseless prisoners that at anytime might be turned over to him by his subordinates?" Porter repeated his previous statement: "It was the impression that he gave me, decidedly." Was Porter hedging? Kingsbury probed again: "Did General Smith

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6 Ibid., p. 93.

inform Major Waller that it would not be necessary to try according to law prisoners who had charges of treachery against them, and who had not been put to death at the time of the commission of the alleged treachery by the immediate commanding officer present at that time and aware of the crime?" Kingsbury and the court awaited the answer; would this marine captain have the gall to implicate General Smith? Porter seemed slightly confused: "Not to my knowledge," he stated, but then asked that the question be repeated. "I would like to amend my answer, and say, not in those words. He did not use those words." A highly unsatisfactory answer; he was still implying a delegation of improper authority by the general.

The judge advocate then attempted to show that Porter had no direct knowledge of treachery and had filled the courtroom with biased information concerning the executed natives. "Whilst you were in command of this expedition did you see any act committed by any natives that you thought punishable by being killed summarily?" Porter could only answer: "No."

Kingsbury continued to press the issue. He extracted an admission from Porter that the native carriers under his direct command did not desert the ailing marines, but in fact, they aided the Americans.[7] Moreover, Porter admitted

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[7] Ibid., p. 95. Porter's native carriers were not

that Sergeant Quick was with him and could not have known of any treachery of the natives with Williams' group.

The judge advocate inquired: "Do you know officially what became of the three native men who had a fight with Lieutenant Williams?" "I know," stated Captain Porter, "that they escaped." Kingsbury quickly followed up: "With the exception of that fight, do you know officially of any acts of violence committed by the natives against any of the officers or men on that expedition?" "Not actual violence," Porter admitted without further elaboration.

Porter was asked if at the time that he had separated from Williams' group "did you or did you not believe that Lieutenant Williams and his marines were in any physical danger from these native carriers?" There was but one answer; no able commander would leave his subordinates in obvious danger. "I did not," was the terse answer. The judge advocate sat down.

General Bisbee turned to Captain Porter for further questioning. He was evidently disturbed about the implication of General Smith, and he wanted specifics. Under questioning Porter explained why he assumed that Waller had absolute control over his assigned district. The president wanted the particulars: "Did General Smith, in words, tell

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allowed to carry the marines' rifles and ammunition, but in the main column under Lieutenant Williams, the natives were so required.

him that he did have such control over that district?" Porter answered: "He told him that he would be absolutely in command over that district." The answer was still nebulous; the general added another question: "Did General Smith, in words, or by inference, give to this district commander the power of life and death over natives?" "By inference," was the answer. "What was the inference," pressed the general; the reputation of a fellow general officer was being bandied about. Captain Porter, obviously pained, answered: "He told him that 'we want no prisoners.'"[8]

The answer was unbelievable; either this young marine captain was perjuring himself to save his commander, or the court had unearthed a new and more explosive revelation. "Was he [Waller] warned or given directions what action he should take in case he should meet with treachery?" "To punish it with death," replied Porter, and he repeated his answer in the same terminology used in Major Waller's order of October 23, 1901: "To punish treachery with death."[9] After explaining that no natives in his group were executed, Porter was excused.

Testimony of Lieutenant Alexander S. Williams

Waller called to the stand the one individual that, besides the defendant, had been most involved in the entire

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8 Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 101.

9 Ibid., pp. 102-03.

episode of native treachery. First Lieutenant A.S. Williams had, after the departure of first Waller and later Porter, been placed in command of the main column on the ill-fated march. These men were the weakest, and could travel only at an extremely slow pace which increased the possibility of starvation. He also had control over the largest group of natives.

At the time of Waller's trial, Williams was a patient in the naval hospital and still showed the effects of his ordeal. His answers to the preliminary questions seemed extremely confused; he could not remember either the month the battalion arrived at Samar, nor when it departed.

Under direct examination by Waller he told of the expedition around the southern tip from Basey to Lanang and the cross-island march. The report by Lieutenant Williams concerning his experiences on the long march was then offered into evidence.[10]

The report told of the difficult terrain as well as Williams' confrontation with three natives. The party was without rations for fifteen days, save what few sweet potatoes and breadfruit they had found. Furthermore their boots had fallen apart: "The entire sole . . . separating from the uppers, exposing the men's feet to the rocks and thorns and

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[10] A.S. Williams to Waller, February 16, 1902, Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 110-14.

causing untold misery." By day they slowly and painfully stumbled onward, but at night they lay "in a semi-stupor."

The report stated that until about January 7th the behavior of the native carriers, "while not helpful, was not unfriendly," but after that time "they became steadily worse and toward the last, when the men could not carry their own rifles, the mutinous demeanor of the natives caused me daily to fear a massacre."

Yet, although fearing a massacre, Williams felt safe enough to allow the men's rifles and ammunition belts to be "carried by the natives."

The attack on Williams occurred one day before his group was rescued. According to his report the lieutenant went looking for the natives during a stop at a clearing and found that all but three natives had crossed the river and camped by themselves. Williams approached the three and ordered them to search for firewood. No further details are given in the report other than: "They attacked me with a bolo, inflicting several small wounds, but ran off when I shouted for help."

Under direct examination Williams stated that the river at the site of the assault upon him was about two hundred feet wide, and the remainder of the natives were in hearing distance -- but not in sight -- of the assault.

Why, asked Waller, did not Lieutenant Williams, who had expressed to Lieutenant Gridley the opinion that the

native prisoners should be shot, execute them during the march? It was explained that although he had twice planned to do just that, he did not carry the plan through for fear that some of his men, due to weakness, "might slip up in carrying it out, and the natives might kill us."[11]

Kingsbury got Williams to admit that the attack on him was the only incident of violence by the natives, and it was emphasized that the natives carried the marines' rifles. To which Waller in redirect examination made it known that only the scouts knew how to load and fire a rifle.

Under examination by General Bisbee, Williams stated that on January 18th, when the survivors of his party were

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11 Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 118. The number of marines and natives with Williams at any given time is sketchy in the reports. Waller stated in his report of January 25, 1902, that the cross-island march started with fifty enlisted marines, five officers other than himself, thirty-three native carriers, and two native scouts. Waller reported taking thirteen enlisted marines, two officers other than himself, plus Captain Bearss who joined him later, and ten native carriers for the advance group to Soboton. In his report of February 8, 1902, Captain Porter reported taking seven enlisted marines and six native carriers to push on ahead to Lanang. Lieutenant Williams in his report of February 16, 1902, reported that he sent Sergeant Dooley ahead with eight other marines to find the search party, and that ten marines fell out and had to be left behind. He also said that three natives deserted. This would leave Lieutenant Williams with eleven enlisted marines, and fourteen native carriers and two armed scouts. But Williams' testimony states that thirteen enlisted marines were with him at the end of the march, and Sergeant Dooley had nine more (p. 127). There are other disagreements on numbers. Captain Porter testified that fifty-two enlisted marines started the march (p. 77), and that Waller selected fifteen enlisted marines for the advance group (p. 76).

put into small boats by the rescue party, about ten natives were left behind unguarded because of a lack of room in the boats. They arrived later at Lanang, and they all were placed under guard on the Arayat. Williams explained the lack of concern for the native carriers at the time because "our own conditions was so extreme that the natives were neglected."

Bisbee also asked ". . . suppose they had desired to murder all that party, up to the time that relief came; would it have been possible for them to have done it?" "I believe it would, sir," conceded Williams.

The court must have wondered why treacherous natives who could have murdered the Americans, did not do so, and further, why such natives would voluntarily return to American control at Lanang.

Bisbee concluded by asking if the natives' "mutinous conduct consisted almost wholly in not obeying orders, and not securing food for your command?" Williams agreed that it did.[12]

The fourth day of testimony was Tuesday, March 25th, and it began with the return of Lieutenant A.S. Williams to the stand. Under redirect examination by Major Waller, Williams stated that the natives had gathered more food than they themselves needed and did not offer to share it with

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12 Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 125.

the marines until the rescue party appeared, when at that time the natives became very amicable.

Major Kingsbury asked Williams to relate the full circumstances of the attack upon him by the three natives. The lieutenant told that in searching for natives to gather some firewood, he came upon their rough shack, made by placing banana leaves against a tree. Williams stated that he:

> pulled some of the leaves apart and shouted to the natives to come out. One of them did . . . . I ordered them to search for firewood . . . . The second man to come out had a bolo, and he looked pretty savage, and I pulled my revolver, not with the idea of shooting him, but more to intimidate him, and as soon as I did this he grabbed the pistol with his right hand on the barrel, and my right in his teeth, and the third man to come out pushed my legs from under me, and I fell down with my head lower than my feet. The second one to come out had dropped his bolo when he took hold of my revolver, and told the third man to take the bolo, which he did and knelt down by my left side and commenced stabbing me. I thought every stab was going through me, and I let go of the revolver and seized the bolo, and finally wrenched it away from him, and prevented him from stabbing me through. There was a brief instant I stopped him, and the other man was monkeying with the revolver, and the third man got some heavy twine that he had around the pack, and then I started to yell for help, and in a minute or so the men came crawling up, the first one too weak to work the bolt of his rifle, and the natives ran away just an instant before the men arrived.[13]

The judge advocate asked if it were possible that the natives were acting in self-defense. Williams thought not,

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[13] Ibid., p. 135.

but Kingsbury did not press further in that vein. He could have pointed to the twine that the third man was readying which might have indicated that the natives thought that Williams had gone beserk and were attempting to subdue him. That same reasoning might also explain why the native toting the bolo dropped it and chose instead to bite Williams' gun hand.

But Kingsbury took a different track in his questioning, emphasizing the differences in cultural values and habits. He asked Williams if the fact that the natives found sufficient food to exist on and did not give any to the Americans was sufficient to indict them for treachery. Williams emphasized that it did, wherein the judge advocate stressed his point in the form of a question: "Then you think that these natives ought to be actuated by the same motives as Americans?" Williams was confused by the question, and Kingsbury continued:

> I mean by that the nature of the natives, that they ought to have the same nature as Americans, according to your idea? An American under these conditions would have divided his food. Do you think that the natives ought, from what you know of them to have the same nature -- that any native in these islands would have the same nature?

Williams did not see the trap that Kingsbury had laid for him and he answered by insisting: "I think that they ought

to, but I know now that they have not."[14]

The defendant quizzed the witness about the strategic situation that had occurred around Basey while Waller's expedition was underway. Williams remembered that a few days after the expedition began, Waller had found insurgent documents that suggested that Basey might soon come under an attack similar to the Balangiga incident. Williams told the court that Waller had sent instructions to Captain Dunlap at Basey to be on the alert.

Questioning by the court president revealed the nature of the wounds that Williams received from the native attack as slight but numerous, eleven counting the bite marks on his hand.

Waller's Witnesses Tell His Story

As Williams stepped from the stand, the defense called its next witness, Captain Hiram I. Bearss. Waller's questioning directed Bearss to a subject that was mentioned in Waller's message of January 22nd to General Smith: the native "who plotted against me."[15] "After you joined Major Waller," asked the accused, referring to Bearss leaving the main column on the cross-island march and overtaking the advance group, "do you know of any attempt that was made

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[14] Ibid., p. 138.

[15] Ibid., p. 70.

upon Major Waller's life by a native?" Bearss said that on the evening of January 5th, the night before they met Captain Dunlap in Sohoton, he had shared a blanket with Waller. The major woke him during the night and claimed that someone had taken his bolo. "I immediately got up, and in looking around found a native, one Captain Victor, just behind the tree. This man was some distance from where he should have been. The bolo was found on the ground close to where this native had dropped it."[16] Bearss explained that the major's habit was to always keep the bolo with him when he sat or laid down.

"You spoke of 'Captain Victor'," said Waller, "why did you give him the title 'Captain'?" Bearss explained, "he was known among the natives as a captain, and had been a captain of insurrectos, so I was told."

Before finishing with his witness Waller had Bearss testify that the natives around Basey were generally considered by army and marine officers alike to be treacherous.

Under cross-examination Bearss admitted that while a marine guard had been posted over two natives previously found in a shack -- these two were guiding Waller's party to Sohoton -- Victor had not been so guarded after the bolo

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16 Ibid., p. 145. Previous testimony had established that the natives were given bolos and bayonets during the day to use as tools, but that these were collected before nightfall.

incident, and Waller had made no mention of future arrest. However, as soon as the party reached Basey, Victor was placed in the guardhouse.

The next witness, Commander William Swift, commanding officer of the USS Yorktown and senior naval officer in the Samar area, testified that his assignment placed him in frequent consultation with numerous army and marine commanders. In his opinion the natives of Basey were supplying the insurrectos of that area, and that this activity increased while Waller was engaged in his long march.

The next three witnesses were Privates William J. McCandless, Omer J. Kresge, and Charles R. Morgan. The first two testified that after the long march but before the executions, they had conversations with natives who spoke of overhearing Victor on the march plotting to kill Waller's entire group. Under cross-examination McCandless admitted that he communicated to the natives only "partly in Spanish and partly in English," and Kresge revealed that he never told Waller about Victor's plot.

Private Morgan was on the cross-island march with Waller's group and testified that Victor was the ringleader of the natives; "He was always spokesman for the crowd, and everything, was always kicking. You'd tell him to do anything, he'd turn it over to somebody else, and of course had to force them to do it."

Waller questioned Private Morgan concerning the whereabouts of the father and son who were captured on the long march by Waller's group, and who then guided the Americans to Sohoton. Morgan stated that the father wished to return to his home in the interior and Waller allowed him to do so. "The son is in Cavite," said the private and added: "At present he is living at ease, sir, at leisure." "Who is taking care of him?" The answer, Waller knew, would establish that he did not hold all Filipinos in contempt: "Colonel Waller, sir."[17]

The following day, March 26th, the defense called army Second Lieutenant DeWitt C. Lyles as its next witness. It was established that he was an aide to General Smith. Lyles was ordered by Smith to report to the marine battalion as the general's representative and as an aide to Major Waller. The lieutenant affirmed that army officers at Lanang advised against the cross-island march, but that Waller had insisted that "he was acting under orders . . . ." A report of Lieutenant Lyles to Major Waller of January 7, 1902, was admitted into evidence, but it contained no startling evidence.[18] Under cross-examination he stated that the

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[17] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 167.

[18] Lieutenant Lyles to Waller, January 7, 1902, Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 171. Lieutenant Lyles, in his report, stated that he observed "many acts of quiet heroism and fortitude on the part of the entire command . . . ."

native carriers with Waller's group acted much like "any other natives, presumably not more or less treacherous, but who seemed to be "nervous" about the possibility of starvation.

Replying to questions from Bisbee, Lyles stated that it was his understanding that Major Waller had complete control over his assigned district.

After Lyles, the defense produced a string of additional witnesses. Gunnery Sergeant Quick repeated to the court his instructions from Captain Porter at Tacloban, that he report to Major Waller and disclose the treachery of certain native cargadores and the scout Slim. Private Harold Kinman testified that he was with Lieutenant A.S. Williams on the cross-island march, and that the native carriers appeared to increase their sullenness as the marines became weaker. Under cross-examination by the judge advocate, Kinman advanced the opinion that the natives knew where food was to be found, but that there was not enough of this food, mainly camotes (sweet potatoes), to adequately feed the entire force. The natives, he said, seemed to have remained relatively friendly until the rations gave out, and even then the natives under Williams were not always guarded at night.

Corporal William Slattery told of the natives hiding camotes in their clothing and shoving potatoes into the ground rather than digging them up for the marines. In

response to Bisbee's questions, the corporal acknowledged that it was possible for the native carriers to have left at any time.

Private Albert N. Neville repeated the accusation of treachery against the native carriers. He was in charge of rations and testified that Waller insisted that the natives be properly fed. Bisbee suspected that a shadow of the Ninth Infantry massacre hung over Samar, and he confirmed his suspicions when he asked Neville if there was a feeling of unrest among the marines on Samar "occasioned by this attack at Balangiga." The private answered in the affirmative.

On the following day, Thursday, March 27th, the defense began the day's proceedings by calling as a witness the native scout Smoke, of whom all the marines spoke well. He identified himself by his real name of Leonardo Cabubuy. Through an official interpreter Smoke told of a conversation that he had with a native carrier named Juan aboard the Arayat: "Juan told me on board the gunboat that he heard from Victor that Victor himself had intention to kill the Colonel, and I reported the matter to the Colonel when I got back to Basey." Furthermore, Victor had told Juan that "some of the natives of the party had the intention to kill Lieutenant Williams himself and his party, because they

don't want to give them food."[19] Smoke claimed that according to Juan, Victor was the leader of the treacherous natives and Slim was the second in command. Juan, however, could not confirm this testimony because he had been executed at Basey; there were no witnesses to the conversation, and no other native had ever mentioned such a plot. Nevertheless, the judge advocate did not object to the third person hearsay. It was the questioning from General Bisbee that extracted from Smoke a declaration that he had not heard the natives complain about the Americans or speak about them in an unfriendly manner.

Lieutenant J.P.V. Gridley replaced Smoke on the witness stand and stated categorically that Major Waller gave no orders to execute anyone prior to January 20th. Gridley was sure of that since he had been the battalion adjutant and would have known had such an order been given.

Concerning the situation at Basey, Gridley stated that in mid January there were nearly ninety native prisoners in the guardhouse, and that the surrounding population was hostile. Moreover, there were less than fifty marines available for duty.[20]

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19 Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 217, 220.

20 Ibid., pp. 233-34. The number of available marines for duty was small because of the large sick list and the company-sized expedition that Captain Bearss had taken out on January 17th.

On the following day Lieutenant Gridley continued his testimony; he flatly asserted that eleven natives were executed on January 20th. Waller was originally charged with killing eleven natives, but the judge advocate claimed -- and Lieutenant Day so testified -- that one native was executed on the previous day, a total of twelve.

When Captain Dunlap was recalled he maintained that when he testified that ten natives were executed on January 20th, he was referring to those taken off the Arayat. He said that Victor was also shot earlier that same day, agreeing that a total of eleven natives were executed by Waller's order on the 20th of January.

The next witness called by Waller was Major Robert N. Getty, an army provost judge of Samar. He testified that as the marine battalion readied to board the Lawton in February for transfer to Cavite, they were visited by General Smith. Smith told Waller and his assembled men that he had "never served with Marines before . . . but from his observation, he considered them as premier soldiers . . . [and] was very complimentary to Major Waller."[21] Since this complimentary address occurred after the execution of the natives was known, it could be implied that the general was, at least, not upset by it.

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21 Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 257-58.

After two army lieutenants testified as to the sullen nature of the natives around Basey, Waller called marine Private George Davis, the man who picked the "good" natives from the group of "treacherous" natives. He testified that eleven natives were lined up in the guardhouse, and that he was sent by Lieutenant Day to pick out two, leaving nine. However, neither Slim nor Victor were among the eleven.

Davis also declared that he overheard the natives with Williams' group -- "as far as I could understand the Visayan language" -- conspire to take the marines' guns and run off. Under cross-examination Davis said he did not tell Lieutenant Williams of the plot because he did not think he would be believed. When pressed, Davis said that the party was in such poor physical condition that whenever he spoke to another marine, he would just "ask you for something to eat."[22]

Private Daniel J. Mahoney helped clarify the confusion about when, where, and how many natives were executed. He was on the firing party that disposed of nine natives on the afternoon of the 20th; neither Victor nor Slim were among them. Of the nine prisoners, eight were shot by volleys from the firing squad and one was shot while trying to escape. This testimony was backed by Private A. Lomas, also a member of the firing party that had executed the

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22 Ibid., p. 274.

nine prisoners. He testified that Slim and Victor were not part of the nine he executed, but that he had seen their bodies.

Waller's First Testimony

The court reopened on Monday, March 31st at 10:15 A.M., and the accused had himself sworn in as a witness. To questioning by defense counselor Major Glenn, the defendant stated that he issued his "avenge" order of October 23, 1901[23] -- in which he instructed "punish treachery immediately with death" -- as a result of, and inspired by a conference with General Smith on board the USS New York earlier that same day.

Glenn then questioned the defendant about the events of January 20th. Waller described himself on that day as being confined to his bed: "bandaged from the soles of my feet to my waist, and from my hands to my shoulders; I also had bandages around my waist."[24] He heard about the survivors from Lanang and of the treachery of some native carriers from Captain Dunlap and Sergeant Quick, both of whom expressed and agreed with the opinions of Captain Porter and Lieutenant Williams, that the natives should be shot.

Waller expressed no regrets about his decision. Glenn

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[23] Ibid., p. 73; Appendix "E" of this paper.

[24] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 295.

asked: "Did you honestly believe that these men deserved death?" Waller glanced at the court and curtly answered: "Undoubtedly. And they were the only men I ever had shot." Waller added that the military situation at Basey -- the guardhouse full of native prisoners, a hostile surrounding population, and a severe shortage of men fit for duty -- added to his decision. He had felt it unwise to add to the population of the overcrowded guardhouse with treacherous natives who might possibly stir up the others.

Concerning the execution on January 19th, Waller absolutely denied having authorized or even to have known about such an event.

The judge advocate wanted to know about the decision to execute Victor. Waller explained that Victor's attempt to steal the bolo was not regarded as serious -- "I did not regard that as anything but a personal matter at the time" -- but the major heard reports that Victor had been "detailed to assassinate" Waller and the other officers with his group on the cross-island march. The first such report was from Private McCandless on January 6th, but Waller was busy readying the relief party in order to return to the interior. A Corporal Carroll gave the major a similar report on January 20th, after Captain Dunlap repeated Lieutenant Gridley's phone message concerning the treachery of

the natives.[25] Victor was then ordered to be shot prior to the arrival of the native prisoners from Tacloban.

Waller mentioned an investigation that he had ordered Captain Dunlap and Lieutenant Day to conduct prior to the execution of Slim and the other nine natives, but he advanced no information on what actually had been done. Victor, however, was investigated by Waller personally. General Bisbee asked if Victor denied his guilt. "He would not answer at all," said Waller, "he simply sat there and trembled . . . simply trembled." The execution of Victor took place twenty minutes after his "investigation."[26]

The Defense Rests

When Waller was finished with his testimony the court adjourned and reopened the following morning, April 1st. Major Waller stood and announced that the defense had rested its case.

Waller's defense was based, as Glenn had outlined earlier, upon one, Major Waller's position as district commander; two, the treachery of the natives; and three, the tense tactical situation at Basey. At the completion of the testimony of its witnesses, the defense had shown that

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25 Ibid., pp. 300-02. Neither Corporal Carroll nor Private McCandless made the cross-island march; the plot they reported was allegedly told by other natives.

26 Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 308-09.

indeed Waller had thought himself district commander, but he presented no documentary evidence to support any such contention. Moreover, no attempt was made by the defense to show that as district commander he was even authorized under General Orders Number One Hundred of 1863 to order executions. In this vein, the best defense for Waller came from Captain Porter's answers to General Bisbee's probing, i.e., General Smith had told Waller that "we want no prisoners," a certain inference to kill suspects rather than imprison them.

The effort to prove the natives guilty of treachery seemed strained; non-cooperation and disobedience are not necessarily tantamount to mutiny. A case could have been made against the three natives that scuffled with Lieutenant Williams, but alas, they had fled thereby thwarting "justice" at Basey. And unless assault and battery is catching it is difficult to understand why it was believed that the other natives were infected by it.

The whole treachery issue was mute in any event. Waller needed proper authority to execute anyone, even a proven treacherous murderer.

Also weak was the third line of defense: that the nature of the Basey population, the shortage of military personnel and the overcrowding of the guardhouse made the execution necessary. Under the American system of law, capital punishment is not considered an instrument for

alleviating overcrowded prison facilities. Waller had the option of sending the prisoners over the six mile distance to Tacloban, or at least to utilize the telephonic communication and request assistance and advice from his superior headquarters.

The main success for the defense was in the manner in which it discredited the prosecution's theory of the time and the number of natives that were actually shot, thus adequately indicating that the judge advocate was less than thorough in investigating all the facts in the case.

The biggest question mark at this point in the trial was General Smith's exact role in this affair. Obviously, testimony by General Smith could have quickly settled the issue, but that seemed unlikely. However, when Kingsbury examined army Major Getty on March 28th, the following exchange occurred after a defense objection. "We object to what the witness believes General Smith would have done under certain circumstances," said Major Waller, "you can call General Smith, if you please: he can tell you better what he would have done." The judge advocate looked at the president and responded with: "Well, I think they are right. I am going to call General Smith."[27]

Doubtlessly few in the courtroom took Kingsbury

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27 Ibid., p. 259.

seriously, considering it a bluff to put the cocky defendant in his place; to subpeona a general would indeed be rather unusual. However, this was becoming a highly unusual trial.

CHAPTER VIII

"I AM NOT A MURDERER"

Ah! no, don't cheer him now,
The time has long since past;
He only asks for "more nights in"
As a reward for duty past.

-- From "A Just Cause," by Amos Engham,
former Corporal, U.S.M.C., 1899.

As this trial progressed the prosecution found that its duty was not to pinpoint who ordered the executions but why. The defendant had placed the responsibility squarely on his own shoulders, but yet the influence of his superiors in the matter was unclear. If Waller's actions were based solely on his own judgement, the incident could thus be categorized as the act of a misguided commander. However, if the accused was merely following orders from higher authorities, the entire military establishment could appear to be officially sanctioning atrocities. And if this were true, the trial was no more than a cowardly attempt by the army to cover up its own involvement by using Major Waller as a scapegoat.

In his testimony Waller appeared reluctant to state specifically that he had received carte blanche approval from General Smith for the executions -- Waller steadfastly insisted that his own military position enjoyed the necessary authority -- yet testimony had been given which hinted that the general's instructions concerning the treatment of

natives was less than benevolent.

In order to deal with the guilt or innocence of the defendant, the exact influence of his superior would have to be explored.

Confusion Clears

The judge advocate began his rebuttal with army Second Lieutenant Kenneth Williams who headed the rescue mission from Lanang. He described the condition of marine Lieutenant Williams and his group when they were finally found; physically they were "in comparison to the natives . . . very bad." The marines were all lying on the ground and strung along the trail for "about a mile and a quarter."[1]

Kenneth Williams told of leaving most of the native carriers behind with one small boat, leaving them to their own resourses to get to Lanang on their own, which they did. Waller in his cross-examination got Williams to agree that the flow of the Lanang River was toward the Lanang army garrison, implying that the natives were powerless to go anywhere else.

After excusing Williams, Kingsbury attacked the confusion that surrounded the executions by recalling Private McGee. He previously testified that he had been a member of three different firing squads that killed eleven of the

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[1] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 316.

prisoners on January 20th.[2] The private now acknowledged that he had participated in another execution on January 19th.

The court president had McGee review the exact number of victims. The first execution occurred on the morning of January 19th when one unidentified native from the Basey jail was shot. The remainder were eliminated on January 20th as follows: Victor in the morning, nine natives from the Arayat, including the attempted escapee, at two-thirty, P.M., and Slim about one-half hour later. General Bisbee eyed the young marine and demanded: "That would make twelve natives executed, so far as your knowledge goes?" McGee was certain this time and answered: "Yes, sir."[3]

The judge advocate announced that he intended to put Lieutenant Day on the stand the following morning to testify that the order to execute the native on January 19th came directly from Major Waller. Major Glenn was quickly to his feet and conceded that one native may well have been executed prior to January 20th but ". . . we will not concede that Major Waller gave the order . . . ." He was allowing the twelfth victim to fall squarely into Lieutenant Day's lap.

The next day, the tenth of trial testimony, Lieutenant

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[2] Ibid., pp. 64-65.

[3] Ibid., p. 328.

Day arrived with his civilian counsel, and upon the first question Day evoked the fifth amendment. Kingsbury argued angrily but without results. After a short deliberation the court upheld Day's position, and since the judge advocate had no other witnesses present he moved to adjourn. However, Major Glenn wanted clarification of something Kingsbury had mentioned before Day took the stand, a reference to General Smith. The judge advocate was deliberately evasive: "I don't know. I simply decline to answer . . . ."

At this point a member of the court insisted that testimony by General Smith would not be pertinent enough to cause a delay: "General Smith's assumption of authority to order doesn't alter the case one little bit . . . ." The court member was assuming that the general would take full responsibility for the executions and apparently was trying to avoid that. Waller was either guilty or not, he said, and "in either case his [General Smith's] testimony would be perfectly irrelevant. I move that we do not wait for General Smith."[4]

But in fact, the judge advocate had already submitted a request to General Chaffee for General Smith's presence at Waller's trial. Chaffee responded by ordering the old warrior to testify.

The court reopened on April 5th, and the judge advocate

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[4] Ibid., p. 336.

again called Lieutenant Day as a witness. Immediately R.C. Harrison, Day's civilian lawyer, and Kingsbury became engulfed in a lengthy and angry argument because Day again evoked the fifth amendment when asked about the execution on January 19th. In the midst of the argument Major Glenn stepped in to ensure that the court did infor that Lieutenant Day was attempting to protect Waller by not testifying. "I wish to say to the court that the counsel for the defense has refused on every occasion to talk to Mr. Day or to his counsel on the subject. We have given them no advice."[5]

In the end the court supported Day and ruled that he did not have to answer the judge advocate's question. Disgusted, Kingsbury excused his reluctant witness.

The General Testifies

The next witness for the prosecution identified himself as Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith, commanding the Sixth Separate Brigade.

The judge advocate's first questions concerned the "avenge" order written by Waller.[6] Waller had testified that he instructed his officers to "punish treachery immediately with death," because he was influenced by the briefing conducted by General Smith earlier that day.

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[5] Ibid., p. 354.

[6] Ibid., p. 355. For Waller's order of October 23, 1902, see Appendix "E" of this paper.

Moreover, Captain Porter had added that Waller's order did not go as far as the general's instructions.

But the general told a different story. "Did you," asked the judge advocate, "in that conversation, or in any other conversations, with Major Waller, give him, or anyone else, the impression that the instructions in this order of Major Waller were not severe enough in the conduct of affairs in Samar?" Major Kingsbury's question was a direct attack on defense testimony, and the general's answer boomed across the courtroom: "No, sir." The general added that he never saw Waller's order.[7]

What had transpired at the initial briefing on the USS New York between himself and Major Waller (he did "not remember of Captain Porter being present") was, said Smith, that the officers were cautioned to "guard against treachery," and that certain precautions must be taken.

> I gave instructions that treachery must be looked out for, that people in the towns must be watched, the soldiers must carry their guns to their meals, and that we must have no more Balangiga affairs; but that treachery, under all circumstances, was governed and controlled by General Orders Number One Hundred of 1863.

General Smith took a breath and then emphasized, "Those were by instructions for the prosecution of the war."[8]

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[7] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 355.

[8] Ibid., p. 356. General Chaffee had himself ordered

"Did you ever," the general was asked, "in a conversation with Major Waller, designate any particular act as treachery under General Orders Number One Hundred?" The general answered that he specifically mentioned the case of "guides . . . discovered to be leading [U.S. troops] into an ambush, and were playing treacherous, that they would summarily punish them, under General Orders Number One Hundred of 1863."

The judge advocate allowed the general's answer to settle and then asked what was perhaps the key question in this trial: "Did you, in any conversation that you had with Major Waller, inform him or intimate to him that, as district commander, he had the power of life and death?"

Before the general could answer, Major Waller was on his feet. "Mister President, I object to the question." He explained; "To allow this witness to answer this question would be framing our defense for us." It was apparent that Waller was expecting the general to answer in the affirmative.

Waller continued; "At an earlier stage of the case the judge advocate was kind enough to try to frame our defense for us: we stopped him" -- a reference to the testimony by the naval surgeon which, if given, might have implied that Waller was sick and not responsible for his actions on

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that all hostile acts on the part of the natives be punished "quickly and severely," Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 250.

January 20th -- "now he comes and tries to make it appear that we claim that this was done by General Smith's order."

Waller, still objecting, recited again his main defense against the allegations against him:

> There is not one word in the record to indicate that we ever intended to show that the killing of the eleven natives was by General Smith's order. It was by Major Waller's order, and no order of General Smith, either special or by general order. It was done by Major Waller, and he stands responsible for it . . . .
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> Not a word was brought out to show that that was done on anything except the order by Major Waller. The only thing is when he said "punish treachery with death," and General Smith has already said that he did instruct his commanders to punish treachery by death.[9]

After some argument the court overruled Waller's objection and the general was directed to answer the question: did Smith give Waller the power of life and death? "No, sir. I had no such authority myself, and could not delegate any authority I did not have."

Smith further professed that he did not tell Waller that trials of treacherous prisoners could be waived. "If charges of treachery against prisoners had been forwarded to you," Kingsbury asked Smith, "would you have ordered a court to try them?" The general explained that he would "have ordered a military commission, and have them tried."

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[9] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 357.

Smith said two such commissions had already existed within his command.

When asked about Waller's telegram of January 22, 1902, which reported the executions, Smith claimed that although it was received by his headquarters on that date, he had not seen it until just a few days prior to his testimony. The Adjutant General, Captain Waldo E. Ayer, had admitted to General Smith that he had received the message, but that "he did not understand it, as it stated that he [Waller] had 'expended' the prisoners." Smith insisted with a straight face, "I never received one reporting the killing of any prisoners." It was General Chaffee who had pointed out the executions on Samar, after which Smith maintained, he "had the matter looked into."

As to the cross-island march, Smith explained that Waller -- who "had been doing some extraordinarily fine work with his marines, had prosecuted the war with vigor, as I wanted done [emphasis mine], and proved to me to be a very fine commanding officer" -- suggested the march. "I approved his plan and . . . I left it to his descretion from which point [Basey or Lanang] he would start." The general ended his direct examination by stating that he always favored subordinates treating prisoners in accordance to the rules of war.

As Major Waller approached the witness stand he pondered the questions he would ask Smith. The defense had

already insisted that it would not pass the responsibility on to higher headquarters, but apparently the mild words of General Smith in the courtroom bore little similarity to the caustic instructions of "Hell Roaring Jake" in the field. Waller came directly to the point; referring to the initial briefing on the New York he asked: "Did you order treachery to be punished summarily by death?" Smith answered, "I said 'punish summarily,' not by death, 'according to General Orders Number One Hundred of 1863.'"[10] Waller snapped back: "Did you mention General Orders Number One Hundred?" The question implied that legalities were not the typical topic of Smith's conversations after Balangiga, and Smith's answer was evasive: "I think I did, in my testimony."

Waller shifted his questions to the subject of his own authority on Samar. Smith admitted that Waller could exercise his discretion in executing military law to its fullest extent, but he quibbled about Waller's title as sub-district commander, preferring to name the area a "territorial district over a certain district."

Waller then sharpened his questions and their very nature implicated the general. Smith was asked if he ever "ordered that people that cut out telegraph wires or cut down telegraph poles should be killed?" "No," he answered,

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10 Ibid., p. 363. The general's answer is bewildering; General Orders Number One Hundred of 1863 permits treachery to be punished summarily by death during battlefield conditions.

but allowed that he "may have told officers that if they caught natives or anyone interfering with the telegraph lines that they would be treated as hostile." Waller persisted: "Did you mean hung, or did you say hung?" The reply was negative.

Smith hoped to butter Waller up and stated that the marines were "magnificent . . . they were equal to the best soldiers that ever fought an enemy." But Waller was not impressed and placed a key question for the general's interpretation: "In having eleven men executed at Basey on the 20th of January did Major Waller, in the manner that they were executed -- no military commission; I won't say how much of an investigation -- did Major Waller disobey any specific orders or instructions from you, or did he merely interpret martial and military law and General Orders Number One Hundred in a different way." General Smith hemmed and hawed and avoided a direct answer; he claimed that he really did not know what Waller did.

Under redirect examination by Kingsbury the general acknowledged that since all army facilities were overcrowded with native prisoners, he did instruct, "we don't want to be burdened with prisoners," but that he was referring to the practice of taking non-hostile suspects that were often found in insurgent territory.

Under questioning from Bisbee, Smith said that if he had seen Waller's order of October 23rd he would have

changed that portion referring to "punish treachery immediately with death" to read "punish treachery as prescribed by the laws of war summarily," and he would have eliminated altogether the reference to "avenge our late comrades." The general justified the later elimination because he believed it was uncalled for: "I investigated and was satisfied, very soon after I arrived there, that the Balangiga affair came under the laws of war . . . [except] mutilating the killed. Revenge was not what we were down there for . . . ."[11]

Waller was obviously upset that the general was justifying the Balangiga massacre, and during his recross-examination it was the only subject Waller asked about. However, he could not get Smith to change his testimony.

As General Smith was excused Major Waller must have judged that his former superior had thrown him to the wolves. The general had spoken to the court in tones of toleration and concern for legal procedure, not with the fury -- as Captain Porter testified -- when he demanded that "treachery be punished with death" and that he would tolerate "no prisoners." Waller's actions in Samar had been made to appear as excessively severe and cruel, not because of General Smith's instructions but in spite of them. Waller had hoped to keep the general out of his defense, but now he had no choice but to discredit Smith's testimony.

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11 Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 370-71.

Waller Returns to the Stand

When the court met on April 8th, the judge advocate announced that he had no further testimony to offer. Major Glenn then stated that he intended to present four witnesses in sur-rebuttal, the first being the defendant.[12]

In response to the defense counselor's questioning, Waller denied that the subject of trials or military commissions for natives ever came up during conversations with General Smith. In fact Waller stated that despite his requests to the general, he could not get a trial for a native accused of murder; after being confined for eight months without a trial Waller finally released him.

"During those conversations was General Orders Number One Hundred ever mentioned in any shape or form?" Waller answered that it was referred to in the general's Circular Number Six, but otherwise "it was never mentioned."[13]

Glenn asked about the origins of the phrase "punish treachery immediately with death" that was used in Waller's order. Waller answered that it had been inspired by his conversation with Smith; "I did not misunderstand," the

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12 Ibid., p. 373. For additional information on Waller's second testimony, see also New York Times editions (April 15, 1902), p. 3, col. 3, and (April 16, 1902), p. 1, col. 5; Springfield Daily Republican (April 9, 1902), and Springfield Sunday Republican (April 13, 1902), both quoted in Schirmer, Republic or Empire, p. 237.

13 Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 374.

defendant emphasized, "I could not misunderstand, the language of his order." Waller was told by Smith of the pressure he was under to quickly pacify south Samar, in turn Waller was instructed to do everything in his power toward that end.

The defense counsel asked for General Smith's exact words. "His actual language was: 'I want no prisoners,'" said Waller, and then he further explained that the general was not referring to prisoners already taken "because this conversation took place at Balangiga, and there were no prisoners there."

The defense counsel's questions moved to the area of campaign policy: "State all that Smith said," he directed. Waller repeated the general's order: "'I wish you to kill and burn. The more you kill and the more you burn, the better you will please me.' Not once only, but several times. I think every officer there had the same order."

"Did you ever ask General Smith whom he wished you to kill?"

"Yes, he said he wanted all persons killed who were capable of bearing arms, and I asked if he would define the age limit -- meaning whether there would be children or old men . . . . 'I would like to know the limit of age;" and then years was given."

"What did General Smith say?"

"'Ten years.' The order was repeated by me to Captain Porter and the officers at Balangiga, and I informed them of the fact that we did not make war that way."

"Can you remember what you said to Captain Porter on that subject?"

"I do not remember the exact words. It was, in effect, that we were not sent there to make war on women and children and old men."

Under defense questioning Waller also revealed a note that Lieutenant Day had brought to Basey from General Smith which read: "The interior of Samar must be made a howling wilderness." Waller had read the note to Captains Bearss and Dunlap.[14]

The subject shifted to the military title that Waller held while on Samar. He understood it to be "Commander of the Sub-District of South Samar" and produced a copy of an official letter from Major Waller to General Smith, October 27, 1901,[15] in which he states: "In obedience to your verbal instructions, I have the honor to report that on the 25th instant I took command of the Sub-District of South

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[14] Ibid., p. 376. There was no mention of a date that the note was delivered.

[15] Waller to General Smith, October 27, 1901, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 438-39, also found in Appendix "F" of this paper. All of the correspondence from Major Waller to General Smith is headed "Headquarters Subdistrict of South Samar," see ibid., pp. 438-45.

Samar . . . ."

Under cross-examination by the judge advocate, Waller admitted that he did take prisoners in spite of Smith's instructions that he wanted none; "I have been twenty-three years in the service," he explained, "I have served with almost every army in the world, and I know the laws of war, sir." When pressed, Waller would not state that he was less severe than Smith had advocated, but the court could "interpret my language that way if you choose," he said.[16]

Hoping to trip up Waller on the prisoner question Kingsbury asked: "Did General Smith say anything to you about the disposition of prisoners that you would take, or had in charge?" Waller answered caustically: "Having said that he did not want prisoners, how could he make any disposition of them afterwards?"

When Major Waller returned to his seat at the defense table he undoubtedly realized that his testimony had caused a stir in the courtroom. But he could not foresee the

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16 According to a news story by Stephen Bonsal of the Boston Transcript, quoted by Storey, Marked Severities, p. 38, Waller may have been less severe than most of the army commanders on the island: "During my stay in Samar the only prisoners that were made, so far as I know, were taken by Waller's command . . . ." Bonsal added that he overheard Waller's practice "criticized by the highest officers as a mistake . . . ." The reporter concluded that any executions ordered by Waller "would be fully covered by the general orders of General Smith. The truth is [that] the struggle in Samar is one of extermination."

stories that soon would be splashed across American newspapers; the phrases "kill and burn," "I want no prisoners," and "howling wilderness" were exploited for their shock value.[17] The testimony added fuel to the controversy already raging in the United States in which the anti-imperialists were accusing the Republican administration and the War Department of knowingly condoning savage methods of warfare, including scorched earth tactics, torture of prisoners, and murder of non-combatants. Because of his high military position, General Smith's alleged instructions gave credibility to the anti-imperialist charges.[18]

Waller called his remaining witnesses: Captain Porter, Second Lieutenant F. Halford and Captain Bearss. Porter

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17 See New York Times (April 9, 1902), p. 3, col. 3; (April 11, 1902), p. 3, col. 3; (April 12, 1902), p. 1, col. 6; (April 14, 1902), p. 1, col. 5; (April 15, 1902), p. 3, col. 3; (April 16, 1902), p. 1, col. 5; (April 17, 1902), p. 8, col. 2. See the following editions of the Atlanta Constitution: (April 8, 1902), p. 3, col. 1; (April 9, 1902), p. 3, col. 1; (April 11, 1902), p. 2, col. 2; (April 12, 1902), p. 3, col. 1; (April 13, 1902), p. 2, col. 6; (April 14, 1902), p. 1, col. 2. See the St. Louis Dispatch (April 6, 1902), p. 7, col. 3; the Boston Herald (August 25, 1902), and Boston Transcript (no date given), quoted by Storey, Marked Severities, pp. 38, 73; the Springfield Daily Republican (April 9, 1902), and the Springfield Sunday Republican (April 13, 1902), quoted by Schirmer, Republic or Empire, p. 237. See also General Chaffee to Adjutant General of the Army, May 5, 1902, Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 1902, XXXIV, pt. 5, 5111.

18 See Schirmer, Republic or Empire, ch. iii; Morison, Dissent, pp. 78-79; Storey, Marked Severities, pp. 27-28.

said that he was a witness to General Smith's conversation at Balangiga when he instructed "Kill and burn, kill and burn. The more you kill and the more you burn, the better you will please me." Porter stated again the the general definitely said he wanted no prisoners. Moreover, he testified that Major Waller did instruct him to disregard Smith's orders to kill everyone over ten years old. Waller told him to make war only "against men capable of bearing arms." Porter did not remember General Orders Number One Hundred being mentioned by the general.[19]

Lieutenant Halford also testified about instructions from Smith to kill all natives over age ten, and Waller's orders countermanding the general.

Captain Bearss acknowledged that Waller read instructions from Smith calling for a "howling wilderness" in Samar.

On April 9th the defense called Captain A.R.H. Van Deman, Twenty-First Infantry, in charge of the Division of Military Information, Adjutant General's Office, Division of the Philippines, and the custodian of captured insurgent records. He brought a number of such records at the request of Waller who was apparently incensed that General Smith had justified the Balangiga massacre. Introduced into evidence were six captured insurgent records which described the

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19 Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 381-84.

attack and indicated that even the insurrecto leaders believed it to be contrary to orthodox rules of war.[20] No objection came from the judge advocate who might have been expected to question the relevancy of the documents toward Waller's defense.

Waller's Statement in Defense

April 11, 1902, was a Friday and the seventeenth day of testimony in the trial. Shortly after the court opened Waller took the stand and read from a written statement. Waller attempted to explain to the court why anyone of them -- given the circumstances at Basey and the precedents that he had observed -- would have similarly ordered the executions. Waller was clearly not asking for leniency: "I was either right or wrong. If I was wrong give me the whole, full, complete sentence required by the law [death]. If I was right then I am entitled to most honorable acquittal."[21]

Waller cited his experiences in previous conflicts in various parts of the globe and the standards of the rules of war as they had been set by custom and tradition. During the naval battle off Santiago, Cuba, when the Spanish naval

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20 Ibid., pp. 415-435.

21 Ibid., pp. 436-40. A summary of Waller's statement was carried in New York Times (April 12, 1902), p. 1, col. 6.

force was destroyed, Waller observed compassion on the part of the American victors because "the necessities of war there did not require any but mercy." He explained his assignment:

> I was sent to pick up the wounded and bring off prisoners from the beaches where they huddled and in constant danger from the exploding magazines . . . . After working for hours with the wounded we took the prisoners on board ship; there were on board my ship two-hundred and forty-three in all. We issued clothes to the naked men and the officers gave up their clothes and bed to the Spanish officers . . . . I have received many tokens and letters . . . in grateful acknowledgement of the mercy shown.

On the other hand Waller's experiences taught him that, when conditions necessitated, ferocity also had its place in war:

> In 1882 I was with the British forces in the Egyptian campaign . . . . The Arabs captured some pickets [sentinels] of the Bengal Cavalry, decapitated them, sticking their heads on lances and poles, planting the poles in the sand. The Arab cavalry was never spared after that. If prisoners were captured, even foot troops, and it was found out after capture that they were or had been cavalry, they were executed without referring the matter to the commanding general before execution; yet these acts were approved by him afterwards. The topography and geography of the country made it possible for the commanding general to be communicated with prior to the execution of the prisoners and they were actual prisoners of war.[22]

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[22] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 437; New York Times

To emphasize the point that repressive tactics were not the exclusive practice of foreign armies fighting ancient battles, Waller referred to more contemporary events:

> In the campaign in Northern China in 1900 the Chinese mutilated our dead and such few prisoners as they captured they tortured to death.
>
> The fanatics would rise from the ground from behind grave mounds and other obstacles and even while the line was advancing in triumphant charge, kill and mutilate the wounded and mutilate the dead. This was seldom done by regular troops -- whenever a "Boxer" or fanatic was captured either in the European concessions or outside he was brought in and executed without referring the matter to the Commander-in-Chief. This was true with every nation represented in the Allied Forces. It is quite true that for some time, three weeks, I was the Commander-in-Chief of the United States forces in China, but the same acts occurred later when I was not, and, as no protest was made I have every right to believe that they were approved as far as our forces were concerned, and I know that they were approved by the other nations.[23]

Upon his arrival in Samar, Waller found little differences between the treacherous conduct of the Arab cavalry or Chinese Boxers and the Samar insurrectos: "I found the

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(April 12, 1902), p. 1, col. 6. The last sentence was apparently added because of the similarity between that cited by Waller and his own easy access to General Smith in Tacloban on January 20th.

[23] Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 437-38. Waller's reference to "the same acts occurred later" not only implicated General Chaffee, the later Commander-in-Chief but also one court member, Major William P. Biddle, U.S.M.C., who had relieved Major Waller as the commanding officer of marine forces in China, Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, pp. 143-44.

natives even worse than [Smith] had pictured them . . . they did everything that savage treacherous minds could conceive."

The major went on to explain the inflammatory effect of the massacre of the Ninth Infantry:

> . . . the massacre of Balangiga . . . is fresh in the minds of all but more so to us who served with them in China. Picture to yourselves, if you please, the butchered men, picture to yourselves the bodies of the officers where in one case in pure revelry of blood appetite in wanton sacrilege of the human body -- they cut open and poured in jam and jelly.[24] For weeks as we drove these devils from point to point we picked up little tokens of the Ninth Infantry -- photographs, cards, everything that a soldier cares for.
>
> They the fiends, stole the class ring from poor Connell's hand. These are the same people who attempted to murder my officers and men. I shot them [Waller's emphasis].

To emphasize a parallel between the misery of the fallen men of the Ninth Infantry and his marines on the cross-island march, Waller dwelt on the pitiful condition of his men in the Tacloban hospital; "a scene . . . that shall remain in my mind and heart forever."[25] He explained

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[24] The description is correct, but Waller did not personally observe the scene. However, the atrocities were common knowledge, if exaggerated, among the soldiers at Basey when Waller arrived.

[25] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 439. Although Waller did not see his men until after the natives were executed, he did receive information on their condition via Lieutenant Gridley and Sergeant Quick.

that all who had observed these survivors, "the poor suffering men, lying there, too weak to feel emotion of any kind," were moved to intense feelings of pity. "To these officers, the men were strangers and yet the effect on them was such as to bring tears. What do you suppose were my feelings toward men who had followed me unmurmuringly through two hard campaigns? Men who gave up their lives without murmur or complaint . . . ?"

If upon learning of the details of the massacre at Balangiga, Waller was so moved by the treachery of the Samar inhabitants that he called for vengence by his subordinates, what, indeed, were his feelings when he learned of the horrors subjected upon his own men? The natives delivered to his doorstep were not viewed by Waller as distinct individuals but as members of an evil conspiracy. In Waller's mind the prisoners became blurred with the Arab cavalrymen, the Boxers, and the murderers of Balangiga; they became as one, a barbarous enemy that civilized men were dutybound to eliminate.

As pointed out in a recent work, man "reacts to a life-threatening attack with one of two patterns of behavior: either with flight, or with aggression and violence -- that is, fight."[26] When faced with the supposed treachery on

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26 Erich Fromm, "Man Would As Soon Flee as Fight," Psychology Today, VII (August, 1973), 35, quoting psychologists V.H. Mark and F.R. Ervin, hereinafter cited as Fromm, "Man Would As Soon Flee as Fight."

Samar, the marines exhibited a fear of massacre and an aggressive attitude towards the supposed cause of that fear, the treacherous natives.

Although man has inhabitions against killing other human beings, history has shown that the death of an enemy is made easier if he "is often not felt as another human being, as a fellow man, but as 'something' with which one does not identify."[27] Once the enemy is viewed as subhuman, the process of psychic numbing allows a soldier to kill without conscience. The language is also modified to justify such action (the political enemies doomed to death by Hitler were not surprisingly called "Untermenschen" or subhumans).[28]

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27 Ibid., p. 39.

28 James S. Gordon, "The Death Immersion," New Republic, CLXIX (July 28 and August 4, 1973), 30; Fromm, "Man Would As Soon Flee as Fight," p. 39. Fromm points to the recent My Lai incident in Vietnam and notes that American soldiers referred to the killing of Vietnamese as the "wasting" of "gooks." William Greider, "'Mere Gook Rule' Haunts Calley Trial," Washington Post (March 14, 1971), p. A1, col. 3, claims that Americans appear to have believed in the theory that "life is less valuable to an oriental." Vietnam veteran Philip Scribner Balboni, "What Every Vietnam Veteran Knows," New Republic, CLXII (December 19, 1970), 13-15, says that most of the American soldiers saw the Vietnamese people as the real "enemy," because they were "gooks" and "animals," and U.S. troops felt justified in cutting off and collecting Vietnamese ears. This paper has already referred to the practice by American soldiers of calling Filipinos "niggers," and Morison, Dissent, pp. 77-78, noted that at the turn of the century, Americans generally regarded all brown-skinned people as inferiors.

Likewise, Waller viewed the Samar inhabitants as "fiends" and "devils" who were guilty of "everything that savage treacherous minds could conceive." It was "they" who massacred Americans and "these are the same people" who starved and plotted against his men. Human beings are killed; Waller "expended" the natives.

To Waller his actions were very reasonable:

> As the representative officer responsible for the safety and welfare of my men, after investigation and from the information I had, considering the situation from all points, I ordered the eleven men shot. I honestly thought I was right then, I believe now that I was right.

Waller paused for emphasis and added: "Whatever may happen to me I have sure knowledge that my people know, and I believe the world knows, that I am not a murderer."[29]

Major Glenn followed the defendant's statement with a statement of his own pointing to what he considered the legal weaknesses of the prosecution's arguments. Malice on the part of the accused by speech or some act, he pointed out, must be shown by the government in order to prove a charge of murder. But he charged that the prosecution had not done this. Nor could the lesser charge of manslaughter be considered, because Waller was acting within his authority as a district commander. A past legal decision asserted that such a public official "invested with certain

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29 Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 440.

discretionary powers, never has been and never should be made answerable for any injury, when acting with the scope of his authority, and not influenced by malice, corruption or cruelty."[30]

Glenn attacked the judge advocate's attempt to disprove the accusation of treacherous conduct on the part of the natives. Waller, argued Glenn, "honestly and without reservation believed that the natives were guilty of treachery, and deserved to be punished by death." Whether the treachery was later shown to be a fact or not was thought by Glenn to be irrevelant.

Another major legal factor addressed to by the defense counsel was the status of the eleven natives at the time of their arrest. Glenn maintained that they were not prisoners of war, but that their actions on the march placed them in the same category as highway robbers and pirates which are not entitled to privileges as prisoners of war.

The defense counsel closed by attempting to show that martial law prevailed in South Samar, and a previous case cited ruled that under such law a commander was "the legislator, judge, and executioner . . . [and that] the more formal board of a military commission . . . may be dispensed with . . . ."[31]

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[30] Ibid., pp. 444-46.

[31] Ibid., p. 459.

Prosecution's Closing Argument

Major Kingsbury arrived in court on April 12th with his prepared statements, written to refute the closing arguments of the defense. He opened with a legal attack against Glenn's contention concerning malice and its requirement to prove the crime of murder. The judge advocate quoted a legal authority who maintained that "the law presumes malice from the act of killing," thereby relieving the prosecution from having to show malice.[32]

Kingsbury then recalled the major events of the cross-island march when "a brave and gallant column of marines" set out to conquer the interior of Samar only to be destroyed because of "a mismanagement as terrible in results as it was foolhardy in its conduct."[33] He maintained that if the march had succeeded it would be "most reasonable to infer that those natives would still be breathing . . . ."

Even if the conduct of the natives was as treacherous as the defense wanted all to believe, Waller, according to the judge advocate, had grossly exceeded his authority by ordering their execution. "They were not his prisoners," he argued, "they were prisoners of the United States of

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[32] Ibid., p. 462.

[33] Ibid., p. 464. As might be expected the defense took offense over this statement concerning the leadership abilities of Waller and so informed the court (pp. 394-95).

America, who alone could deal with them . . . ." Waller's only duty was "to guard these prisoners and send Lieutenant Williams' report and accusations to higher and proper authority for adjudication."[34]

The judge advocate conceded that General Orders Number One Hundred could be interpreted to justify "that war rebels, war traitors, spies and treacherous persons, when caught in the act, could be summarily punished . . . ." However, this could not apply to Waller's case since "the moment that the offense is condoned by delay, be it forced or natural delay, the provisions of General Orders Number One Hundred cease to apply . . . ."[35] The natives could have only been executed for treachery on the march by Captain Porter or Lieutenant Williams. But Kingsbury pointed out that the former observed no treachery prior to leaving Williams -- indeed Porter testified that he would not have deserted his fellow marines if he had -- and the latter feared that an execution could not have been accomplished because of the feeble condition of his men. The judge advocate maintained that the rules of war "did not permit the commanding officer to kill [a] prisoner at any time he might suddenly make up his mind to do so."

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[34] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 464.

[35] Ibid., p. 465.

The judge advocate then shifted his offense toward a different target, those scholarly law quotations by the defense counsel explaining the powers to be exercised under martial law. These arguments could not be successfully disputed, Kingsbury admitted, but sarcastically added that they "of course, had nothing whatsoever to do with this issue." The defendant could not proclaim martial law and neither the Congress nor the President of the United States had done so. Thus, Kingsbury emphasized, there was no martial law in Samar, but instead a military government. This was headed by a commander of the army who had a right of sovereignty from the President. However, according to a previous decision, "an inferior officer cannot, in general, be authorized to exercise such right of sovereignty."[36]

The judge advocate returned to the subject of the natives and assaulted the defense's accusation of treachery. It was pointed out that Williams' men, scattered out over a trail one and a quarter miles long, were completely helpless. If treachery was indeed their goal, the natives had

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[36] Ibid., p. 471. The qualification "in general" presumes a possible condition in which an inferior officer may exercise such sovereignty. An inferior officer isolated and completely cut off from communication with his superior would be considered as an independent commander, but that even he could only exercise this sovereignty in relation to that specific emergency. Kingsbury pointed out that a mere six miles separated Waller from General Smith, and, in addition, easy access via the telephone existed.

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every opportunity to destroy the entire column or at least to desert with the arms and ammunition. But they remained, Kingsbury reminded the court, and they carried weapons and other gear for the Americans. Their reward was to be shot dead "to appease the angry gods, who had brought upon the marines great suffering and untold disaster."

With thinly disguised sarcasm Kingsbury drew attention to Waller's inference that the Basey jail was a seething hotbed of revolution. It was pointed out that not one incident of trouble at the jail was noted prior to January 20th, even though "Captain" Victor was confined there on January 6th and had time to arouse the prisoners.

According to the judge advocate the executions were ordered by Waller on the basis of "hearsay testimony that had trickled through the minds that could not have helped being prejudiced" by their acquaintance "with death in all its horrors and ghastly details."[37]

The Findings

On April 12, 1902, the arguments were concluded, and all testimony now stood as a matter of record; there

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[37] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 489. The physical and mental condition of the survivors is noted in "Summary of the Principal Events Connected with Military Operations in the Philippine Islands, July 1, 1901 to June 30, 1902," HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 162, and states: "Captain Porter, Lieutenant Williams, and eighteen men in hospital, not very clear in mind regarding much of the time covered by period of suffering."

remained only for the court to reach a verdict. After a brief adjournment to cast their vote, the court announced their findings:

> Of the specification -- Guilty, except of the words "Wilfully and feloniously and with malice aforethought murder" and of those words, Not Guilty. Of the charge -- Not Guilty.[38]

The verdict indicated that the court agreed with the defense, i.e., although the natives had been executed, murder had not been committed.

General Chaffee was not only displeased at the verdict itself, but at the vagueness of the findings. He had his Adjutant General's Office reconvene the court to pronounce either a clear acquittal or -- and this possibility was given a heavy emphasis -- a lesser charge of manslaughter.[39]

The court met again on April 24th, and after due deliberation it revoked its former findings and announced that it "does therefore acquit him, the said Major Littleton W.T. Waller, U.S. Marine Corps."[40]

Waller walked from the courtroom a free man, his honor

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[38] Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 397-98.

[39] J.F. Kerr, Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters, Division of the Philippines, to Brigadier General William H. Bisbee, April 22, 1902, copy of this letter in Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 399-400.

[40] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 400.

and professional reputation intact. However, the anti-imperialist newspapers charged the Roosevelt administration with talking loudly but carrying a small stick to tap the wrists of those guilty of "atrocities."[41]

General Chaffee showed his displeasure by attaching to his review of the case a dire warning to his officers. He stated that Waller's actions, "which partook more of unlawful retaliation than a justifiable act of war," would not act as an approved precedent. Chaffee acknowledged that the law, in specific cases, did sanction executions but that:

> in this instance, there was no overwhelming necessity, no impending danger, no imperative interest and, on the part of the executed natives, no overt acts to justify the summary course pursued.[42]

The general made it plain that Waller incorrectly took upon himself a power that legally can be conferred "only upon a commanding general, in time of war, and on the field of military operations." He found himself "at a loss to understand why the court did not find a minor included offense [manslaughter]."

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[41] Schirmer, Republic or Empire, pp. 238-40. The anti-imperialists failed to note that the President, Secretary of War, and General Chaffee were as powerless to override the decision of a court-martial board as would be an American mayor attempting to reverse the verdict of a jury in his city.

[42] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 404.

The final legal action of the Waller court-martial was its review by the Office of the Judge Advocate General in Washington, D.C.[43] It was this high army office that ironically gave the feisty marine major the last laugh. The trial that caused the American public to become alarmed and criticism to be heaped upon the Roosevelt administration and the army high command, need never have been conducted.

The review casually noted:

> It would appear, that the order for the transfer of any portion of the Marine Corps from duty with the Navy to shore duty should come from the President . . . the service of [Waller's] command, between October 21, 1901, and February 10, 1902, was in fact, cooperative, and was not such as to bring the marine detachment within the operation of the Articles of War . . . the court-martial acted without jurisdiction and that its proceedings are, for that reason null and void . . . .[44]

The Judge Advocate General agreed with the initial findings of Waller's court on jurisdiction, and if General Chaffee had not interfered the "kill and burn" testimony would never have been given.

Nevertheless, testimony had been given, and the Judge Advocate General ruled on the controversial legal aspects of the case. Summary execution was authorized in certain

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[43] Judge Advocate General to Secretary of War, June 27, 1902, copy attached to Court-Martial of Major Waller.

[44] Ibid., pp. 41-44.

circumstances, but it "must be justified by military necessity . . . [which] must be instant and overwhelming, not warranting delay, and the facts justifying a resort to the death penalty must be so clearly established as to preclude the necessity for inquiry . . . . The contention made in Major Waller's behalf, that he had the right to order the summary execution of the native prisoners cannot be entertained for a moment."[45]

The status of the native carriers had been neither that of bandits nor spies, but as "civil employees of the United States and, as such, . . . were subject to trial by general court-martial for any offense committed by them during the period of their employment."[46] In any event, the review stressed the point that the executed natives were never prisoners of war.

So while the Judge Advocate General upheld Waller's contention that the army lacked proper jurisdiction, he certainly did not agree that the executions were legal. Major Waller's "duty and responsibility would have ended with the preparation and submission of charges."[47]

If the army's court-martial had held the proper

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[45] Ibid., p. 34.

[46] Ibid., pp. 30, 36.

[47] Ibid., p. 34.

jurisdiction over Weller, and if it had found the major guilty of murder, there appears little doubt that the verdict would have been upheld by the highest military review authorities.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

> By gaining the people, the kingdom is gained;
> by losing the people, the kingdom is lost.
>
> -- From Confucius.

The court-martial of Major Waller highlighted the division of opinion among American civilian and military officials concerning the conduct of military operations in the Islands. However, even before the trial took place the advocates of bayonet rule were being overruled, and the Roosevelt administration ordered heavier emphasis on civil government.

This chapter will outline the concluding legal and military battles during the Insurrection and comment on the lessons learned in combating insurgent revolutionaries.

Legal Whirlpool

General Bisbee's court-martial board did not disband after Waller's trial, as it had yet additional legal duties to perform. On April 16, 1902, the board convened to commence the general court-martial of Lieutenant John H.A. Day, U.S.M.C., charged with the murder of natives executed on January 19 and 20, 1902.[1]

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[1] Court-Martial of Lieutenant Day, p. 5. Some of the confusion concerning the execution of a native on January 19th, was apparently cleared up by Day who testified that the victim was a confessed insurgent spy, and when the evidence was presented to Waller on January 19th, the native was ordered shot (p. 57). Waller in his testimony as a

The court testimony clarified the physical and mental condition of Major Waller at the time of these executions. The naval surgeon, Doctor George A. Lung, who was not allowed to testify in Waller's court, maintained that Major Waller was on the sick list from January 16th to the 24th. During that period Waller's temperature on January 19th ranged from 103.2 degreed in the morning to 105 degrees in the evening; on January 20th the temperatures recorded were 102.2 and 103.2 respectively.[2] This fever would have certainly affected a patient mentally, stated the doctor, and it was highly unlikely that the events of January 19th would be remembered by Waller.

The illness rendered Waller unfit to command, and Lung had told the major this fact. Typically stubborn, however, Waller resisted the doctor's suggestion that he relinquish his command. Under examination by the judge advocate and the court, the doctor insisted that Waller's mental and physical disabilities were easily apparent to a layman, and that any junior officer receiving an order from him "involving life and death, or the expenditure of property . . .

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witness, however, denied knowing anything about an execution before January 20th (p. 14). Day's court-martial transcript is also available in the Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate (Army), National Archives Inventory, Record Group 153, General Court-Martial Case Number 30314, First Lieutenant John Horace Arthur Day, U.S.M.C.

[2] Ibid., p. 43. See also a copy of Waller's official medical chart in Appendix "G" of this paper.

certainly would be justifiable in disobeying the order."[3] Nevertheless, the court acquitted Day of all charges.

General Smith was less fortunate. As a result of the furor over the "kill and burn" testimony during Waller's trial, he was relieved of his command and on April 24, 1902, was brought before a general court-martial to face a charge of "conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline."[4] The general was found guilty of the charge and "admonished." The Secretary of War attempted to minimize the impact of the bad publicity by explaining to the President that because of "the good sense and self-restraint of General Smith's subordinates . . . his intemperate and unjustifiable verbal instructions were not followed . . . ."[5] But in approving the sentence President Roosevelt noted

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3 Waller's illness was still serious enough on January 27, 1902, that the commander of the Vicksburg mentioned his concern to his superiors, Admiral Rodgers to Sec. Nav., January 28, 1902, folder "Philippines, Samar." It was also noted in "Summary of the Principal Events Connected with Military Operations in the Philippine Islands, July 1, 1901, to June 30, 1902," HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 162, that Waller was "disordered in his recollections." Furthermore, the St. Louis Dispatch (April 6, 1902), p. 7, col. 3, reported that "for days after his arrival at Basey [Waller] was unable to give a clear account of what happened to him in the interior . . . ."

4 Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, General Orders Number Eighty, July 16, 1902, SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 2-3, ibid., pp. 6-17.

5 Elihu Root to President Roosevelt, July 12, 1902, SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 3-5.

that:

> the very fact of warfare is of such character as to afford infinite provocation for the commission of acts of cruelty by junior officers and the enlisted men, must make the officers in high and responsibly position peculiarly careful in their bearing and conduct so as to keep a moral check over any acts of improper character by their subordinates . . . . Loose and violent talk by an officer of high rank is always likely to excite to wrong doing those among his subordinates whose wills are weak or whose passions are strong.[6]

The President ordered General Smith to be involuntarily placed on the retired list.

Samar's legal aftermath drew to a close when the officer who ably acted as Waller's defense counsel, Major Edwin F. Glenn, U.S.A., was court-martialed on April 30, 1902, for torturing a Filipino town presidente. He was found guilty, fined fifty dollars and suspended from command for

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[6] White House Order, July 14, 1902, SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 5-6. Although the President classified General Smith's instructions as "loose talk," it is apparent from court testimony that the oral commands were expected to be carried out. Writing on similar circumstances, a Soviet author explained how Russian prisoners were tortured in the 1930's and 40's without written orders. "As always," he stated, "Stalin did not pronounce that final word, and his subordinates had to guess what he wanted. Thus, like a jackal, he left himself an escape hole . . . ." The desired results were accomplished because "it was simply stated, orally but often, that any measures or means employed were good . . . . If some sort of mess developed [a high official] could show Stalin his hands were clean: he had issued no direct instructions to use torture! But at the same time he had ensured that torture would be used," Alexander Solzhenitsyn, "The Gulag Archipelago," Harper's, CCXLIX (July, 1974), 41.

a one month period.[7]

Epilogue

The survivors of the Samar campaign continued to serve at the Cavite naval base until May, 1902, when orders were received from Headquarters, Marine Corps ordering all veterans with three or more years overseas service back to the United States. The trip home was not without incident; the transport Warren with its cargo of three hundred marines, under Waller's command, and six hundred soldiers was forced to delay its voyage due to an outbreak of cholera. The entire contingent was quarantined for some fifteen days in an internment camp behind high fences. However, the ship eventually sailed, and when in late June it passed under the Golden Gate Bridge, the veterans unleashed an ear-splitting cheer.

These marines made a cross-country trip by train and were hosted to a hero's welcome in New York City. The crowd displayed flags and shouted cheers to "Waller's brave marines."[8]

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7 Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, July 26, 1902, SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 17. The seemingly light sentences for General Smith and Major Glenn, added to the acquitals of Major Waller and Lieutenant Day, drew charges of "whitewash" from anti-imperialists, Schirmer, Republic or Empire, pp. 238-40.

8 Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, pp. 44-46.

Meanwhile the bitter Insurrection ground on. The last two important insurgent generals, Lucban on Samar and Miguel Malvar in southern Luzon, still commanded large and loyal forces and were prepared to continue the struggle.

After three months of terror tactics under General Smith's leadership, little of value had been accomplished on Samar. The military's meddling in civil affairs had disrupted trade and commerce and so aroused the population that the acting governor of the Philippines, Luke E. Wright, was forced to intervene. Although Wright was a former military man, he was forced to admit that Smith probably caused more problems than he solved. Eventually, even General Chaffee realized that Smith's campaign had little success.[9]

Thus, about the time that Major Waller had emerged from the jungle after his long march, Chaffee had already forced modifications to Smith's pacification approach. The changes included a more favorable treatment of those Filipinos taking no active or voluntary part in the revolt, the relaxing of restrictions on trade and fishing, and greater emphasis on providing civilians with food and other necessities; in short, there was a return to the policy of benevolence.[10]

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9 See various field orders and military messages, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 206-08, 216-23; SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXV, pt. 3, 2163-69.

10 See various military correspondence, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 212-13; SD 331, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXIV, pt. 2, 1579, 1607-10.

Soon afterward, Lucban was captured by army forces on February 27, 1902, but his successor, Guevorra, vowed to carry on the fight. But change was occurring. As a direct result of the relaxed American policy, the new guerrilla leader was forced to surrender a month later with sixty-five officers, 737 troops and 225 assorted rifles. The "howling wilderness" of Samar returned to a more tranquil period.[11]

There seems little doubt that had the Sixth Separate Brigade embarked earlier on a less ruthless campaign, the pacification of Samar could have been completed months before. Two years earlier General MacArthur had warned his commanders that intimidation of the natives was a certain deterrent toward pacification.[12]

But Smith was from the old school of Indian fighters who pacified "savages" by killing them. The lesson that he supplied is little different than that learned by the British army in her American colonies: revolutionary war is never confined within the bounds of military action; hence,

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11 General Chaffee to Adjutant General of the Army, May 3, 1902, SD 347, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XXVI, 7; General Chaffee to Adjutant General of the Army, May 3, 1902, Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 1902, XXXIV, pt. 5, 51111-12; General Chaffee to Adjutant General of the Army, September 30, 1902, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 189.

12 Major General Arthur MacArthur to Brigadier General F.D. Grant, December 1, 1899, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., VIII, pt. 5, 97.

military measures a[illegible] will not suffice.[13]

The army was more pragmatic in Luzon's Batangas province, and the energetic campaign launched by Brigadier General James F. Bell succeeded in capturing Malvar by mid April, thereby crushing the last major resistance in the Insurrection.[14]

In the spring of 1902 the first free elections of provincial governors were held, and by late June the archipelago was sufficiently pacified to permit civil government to function in all except the Moro provinces. The United States was, therefore, able to reduce its forces from the maximum of seventy thousand to about fifteen thousand by the following year.

President Theodore Roosevelt issued on the 4th of July, 1902, a proclamation that announced the end of the conflict. It granted amnesty to all who would take the oath of

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[13] Pomeroy, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 50; Griffith (ed.), Mao on Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 6-7, 34. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (1962), pp. 307-08, states that Zachary Taylor set the precedent for the use of harsh methods against "savages" during the Seminole War in the 1830's.

[14] General Chaffee to Adjutant General, September 30, 1902, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 190-92; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 283. General Bell's campaign on Luzon occurred about the same time as General Smith's on Samar, and both were criticized by anti-imperialists for the vigorous policies utilized. However, General Bell's tactics have fared better under historians' scrutiny. For a comparison between the two campaigns, see Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 256.

allegiance to the United States and the established authority of the civil government throughout most of the islands.[15]

The violence did not completely cease, however, especially with the Mohammedan Moro tribes on the island of Mindanao. The United States Army was involved in fierce fighting there during 1903, and it did not completely subside until 1916.[16] On the other islands guerrilla attacks upon isolated outposts continued until 1906. However, neither the Moro activities nor the other sporadic attacks, more banditry than revolution, were considered as part of the struggle for Philippine independence.[17]

America's first involvement with an Asian war for national liberation carried a high price. In dollars the figure, which does not include the twenty million dollars paid to Spain nor the cost for naval operations, comes to $284,364,155. America sent 126,468 troops who fought in 2,811 separate engagements which resulted in 4,243 of them

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15 Dupuy, Little Wars, p. 92; Report of the Philippine Commission, 1902, p. 3; General Chaffee to Adjutant General of the Army, September 30, 1902, HD 2, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XII, 186-95; Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 270.

16 Blount, American Occupation, p. 523. Agoncillo, Short History, p. 155, notes that the Moros were never effectively controlled during the long Spanish occupation.

17 Blount, American Occupation, p. 408; Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 264.

killed and 2,818 others wounded in action. It is approximated that sixteen thousand Filipinos lost their lives in combat while possibly as many as two hundred and fifty thousand civilians died of famine, pestilence and other ills consequent of the war.[18] Heavy bears the white man's burden.

Most of the survivors of the long march soon returned to civilian life after their enlistment expired, but they kept in touch with each other through the "Guam and Samar Campaign Association of Marines."[19] Some of the veterans reenlisted to see further service in Cuba, the "banana wars" of the Caribbean, and to fight the "Huns" in France. One such marine, John H. Quick -- already a winner of the Medal of Honor for heroism on Cuba in 1898 -- later won the nations' second highest award. The Distinguished Service Cross was awarded to Quick by the United States Army in

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18 Henry F. Graff (ed.), American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection (1969), ch. ii, hereinafter cited as Graff (ed.), American Imperialism; Blount, American Occupation, p. 170; Dupuy, Little wars, pp. 92-93; Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun, p. 83. The latter author (p. 14) notes a positive side of the Insurrection by listing valuable military experience that was attained: almost all of the high command of the U.S. Army in World War One learned about combat as junior officers on the Philippines (John Pershing was a captain on Mindanao in 1903). Moreover, the relatively efficient American occupation of the Rhineland was no doubt due to the lessons learned by the officers while serving in civil administration positions throughout the islands.

19 Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 47.

recognition for his heroism while serving with the marine brigade in France. Quick retired at the end of the war with the highest enlisted rank of Sergeant Major.[20]

Nearly all of the marine officers continued on with a military career; most retired as colonels with a few attaining general's stars. The commander at the battle of Novaleta, George F. Elliott, was appointed in 1903 as the Commandant of the Marine Corps. A generation later the same position was gained by his former company commander at Novaleta, who frequently criticized headquarter's procedures, when Ben H. Fuller was appointed as the Commandant in 1930.[21] Further, President Franklin D. Roosevelt belatedly presented the Medals of Honor in 1934 to Brigadier General David D. Porter and Colonel Hiram I. Bearss for their heroic leadership at the Sohoton Cliffs battle.[22]

In 1906 Colonel "Tough Tony" Waller, as he came to be called, was dispatched to Cuba to head the marine brigade which quickly put down native unrest there. When General Elliott stepped down as Commandant, it was widely expected

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20 Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, p. 201.

21 Ibid., p. 147. Elliott made a remarkable rise from the rank of captain to Lieutenant General Commandant in just five years. However, Elliott was far from an inexperienced youngster, as he wore lieutenant bars for twenty-two years.

22 See folder "Philippines, general," Hdqs. U.S.M.C. By 1934 the federal law prohibiting officers of the naval services from being awarded the Medal of Honor was repealed.

that the successor would be Waller, and President Roosevelt had so hinted. But in 1910 Taft was President. While he was Governor in Manila, Taft developed a dislike for Waller because of his court-martial; so he gave the appointment to Colonel William P. Biddle, a court member in Waller's trial. Waller never really got over this disappointment, especially when he was again passed over for the top post in 1914.

The fiery campaigner continued to serve his Corps, however, and in 1915 he commanded the marine forces which restored order to the island of Haiti. Brigadier General Waller tried to get assigned to France when the United States entered World War One in 1917, but he was considered too old for combat duties. Instead, headquarters ordered him to command the formerly mismanaged Advanced Base Force in the Caribbean, and to no one's surprise, he revitalized it in short order. After the battlefields fell silent and the military embarked upon a new era, the old warrior hung up his sword. Waller retired in 1920 with the rank of Major General. He died in July, 1926.[23]

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[23] Waller's later career contained in Dupuy, Little Wars, pp. 147-48; Heinl, Soldiers of the Sea, pp. 152, 156, 164-65, 173, 222. The press had continued to hound Waller for the rest of his life because of the harsh brand of warfare he conducted on Samar. One newspaper particularly hostile to Waller -- "Butcher Waller" it tagged him -- did allow rebuttal space. See "Major Waller Tells His Story of the Philippines," Philadelphia North American (April 30, 1903), copy in folder "Philippines, Samar," Hdqs. U.S.M.C.

The ten marines who perished in Samar's interior jungles were remembered by their comrades-in-arms with a tablet that was unveiled at Marine Barracks, Boston Navy Yard, Massachusetts, on September 5, 1910.[24] On that occasion a marine sergeant -- formerly a private with Captain Porter's Company "F" on Samar -- read his poem that ended with these words:

> No cannon's roar their sleep disturbs,
> Nor martial tumult's clang;
> The jungle hides the silent forms
> that rest by the Lanang,
> And we who with them fought and bled
> This poor tribute provide,
> To teach a cold forgetting world
> How Samar's Heroes died.[25]

Whether they deserved the title as "Heroes" or, as the anti-imperialists maintained, "Butchers," is a controversy that has outlived them.

Old Lessons For New Conflicts

A more important factor that has survived the marines of Samar is the continued use of guerrilla warfare to achieve political goals. One of the unsettling conditions of the Cold War era is the existence of revolutionary movements, especially in the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Many of these Third World countries show a striking parallel to the situation that existed in the

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[24] Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, p. 54.

[25] Thomas F. Carney, "The Heroes of Samar," reprinted in Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, pp. 53-54.

Philippines during the time of Aguinaldo. Geographical position and often tropical climatic conditions have produced a rugged terrain that, together with the absence of wealth and modern technology, have resulted in primitive road networks and communication systems.

The society is rural with little or no industry, depending mainly upon agriculture. The peasants form in the vast majority and live in squalid poverty while serving a tiny wealthy ruling class. Moreover, the population has had unfavorable experiences with western colonialism and/or exploitation.

A prime requirement for any insurgency is the existence of a popular and revolutionary cause. In contemporary troublespots the cause varies little from that espoused by the Filipino insurrecto: the independence from western domination. The fierce nationalism that was common in the Philippines is now present in the developing world, and it is routinely seized upon by the communists to gain popular support in these areas. By this influence they have often guided insurgents into guerrilla revolutions termed "wars of national liberation."[26]

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26 There are, of course, real differences between the world situation in the post-Spanish-American War and the post-World War Two eras. The Philippine Insurrection was an isolated phenomenon that occurred in an age of rising colonialism and was without outside aid or even moral support. In addition, the Philippines were physically isolated from possible external assistance. On the other hand,

Thus it behooves the West to closely examine the experiences of those marines who grappled with the Filipino guerrillas. They saw at firsthand a modern insurgency long before it became commonplace. Their successful techniques can be reapplied, and their failures must be avoided.

These leathernecks tackled their tasks through a trial and error approach because they lacked exact guidelines. But their pragmatism of yesterday can be today's precedent for counter-insurgency.

The Varied Marine Approach

The Insurrection campaigns revealed that too many American officers mistakenly believed that the "lesson" of the American Civil War was that war was always hell. This misreading of history held that conflicts of a short duration, even if severe, were always more humane than long ones no matter how benevolently conducted. As a result, the initial American object of "Benevolent Assimilation" often faltered.[27] In Circular Number Six General Smith advocated "short, severe wars," and the papers of General Chaffee indicated that he also was little committed to benevolence and

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modern insurgents usually enjoy vast encouragement and material support from communist and/or Third World governments, and they frequently share a common border with countries friendly to their cause.

[27] Gates, Schoolbooks, p. 283.

civil government.[28] Such attitudes were distinctly counter-productive when fighting a guerrilla war where military success alone was insufficient. Indeed the greatest lesson of this conflict was that the Americans had to "conquer the support of the country itself" before they could beat the guerrilla.[29]

If the name of the game in guerrilla warfare for both the guerrilla and counter-guerrilla fighters is to gain and hold the support of the people,[30] then the pacification efforts of the marines in the towns on Luzon indicated that they learned this fact. However, on Samar Waller's battalion made perhaps the two biggest mistakes in dealing with guerrillas: oversimplification and impatience. In return for a short-termed military triumph over Lucban's insurrecto

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28 Ibid., p. 282; St. Louis Dispatch (April 10, 1902), p. 4, col. 3. See Circular Number Six in Appendix "A" of this paper.

29 The words and opinion of Taylor, Philippine Insurrection, p. 33FZ, an army captain who compiled and commented on five volumes of captured insurgent records. A view similar to Taylor's on colonial policies was expressed by a lieutenant colonel in the French army. He wrote that the best means for pacifying a new colony was the combined use of force and politics, the latter being more important than the former, with the utilization of destruction only as a last resort, Louis Lyautey, "Du Role Colonial De l'Armée," Revue des Deux Mondes, CLVII (February, 1900), 308-28.

30 This is also the view of Roger Hilsman, "Internal War; The New Communist Tactic," in The Guerrilla -- And How To Fight Him, ed. Thomas N. Greene (1962), pp. 29-30. This work was based on his experiences in Burma with the OSS in World War Two.

bands, they paid the price of an antagonistic population.

Although they had decimated the insurgent stronghold at Sohoton and scattered the guerrillas in battle after battle, witnesses testified at Waller's court-martial that by January, 1902, the marines felt threatened in their base at Basey, even fearing another massacre.[31] The marines had handily defeated the guerrillas in the field, yet could not break the bond that the insurgents had with the population. From the people the insurrectos received vital assistance in the form of supplies, intelligence and recruits.

The military on Samar often complained of the inhabitants' unusually strong loyalty to the insurgents,[32] but the actions of the marine battalion gave the people few alternatives. All the natives were treated as hostile, villages were constantly attacked and burned, and the marines rarely afforded the villagers protection from the guerrillas.

Compare this situation with the marine occupation of Olongapo on Luzon in 1900. There the townspeople found that their occupiers provided physical security against the demands of the guerrillas. Self-government with free elections

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31 Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 139. See also Court-Martial of Lieutenant Day, pp. 55-56.

32 Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 260-62, 264-65; Circular Number Six, Appendix "F" of this paper.

was not only permitted but encouraged by the Americans. Although the marine commander dealt forcefully with insurgent forces, courtesy was always shown to the civilians. In addition, schools were opened, food and medical assistance were provided, and the population increased and thrived under American rule.

This policy resulted in the prompt pacification of the area, and the guerrillas, their access to the population effectively cut off, were forced to surrender. This success was directly linked to the image that these Americans created to the population, i.e., as a force that was both firm and efficient, just and generous.[33]

Basic Principles

From the pragmatic approach that the marines undertook to suppress the guerrilla, a number of lessons have surfaced which can serve as useful guidelines to countering insurgency anywhere.

If the insurgent gains popular support by insisting

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33 The marine commander at Olongapo attributed pacification success to the fact that "perfect security and justice reign / ed / in the town," Captain Draper to Commanding Officer, First Marines, March 14, 1900, folder "Philippines, 1898-1899," Hdqs. U.S.M.C. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, however, saw an additional ingredient for the progress: the commander did "everything in his power to promote a feeling of friendship toward the American government, as well as to keep . . . his district free from insurgents," CMC Report, HD 3, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., XXIV, 1115. See the pacification of Olongapo in ch. III of this paper.

that his goal is the improvement of the country for the benefit of its people, can the counter-insurgent do less? As a first principle, the counter-insurgent must have and stick to a clear political aim; the establishment and maintenance of an autonomic, united and stable government that is committed to freedom for its population.

Top priority must be given to the establishment of self-government. Without a reasonably efficient and popular administration to direct programs, any success over the insurgency on the battlefield will produce few lasting results in the villages because of a lack of the necessary civic follow-up action.

To ensure that long-termed political aims are not sacrificed for short-termed military ones, principle number two requires counter-insurgents to have, and to utilize, a comprehensive plan. Such a plan should include not only vital military and security measures, but also all political, economic, social, and other measures that have a bearing on the insurgency. A properly established plan will have the roles and responsibilities of the many agencies clearly defined to avoid gaps or duplication. It will also provide for the proper coordination between military and civilian agencies.[34] While Major Waller showed that military success

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[34] General Smith authored just the type of plan that must be avoided, a schedule of towns to be destroyed and ground to be covered. See Court-Martial of Major Waller, pp. 374-76.

alone was insufficient to beat the insurgent, it is also true that the civic actions at Olongapo would have been useless without the military operations that provided the necessary security.

An overall plan is also valuable for setting priorities for the areas to be pacified. If the insurgency is nationwide as it was in the Philippines, it will be impossible to attack it in every area at once. It should be understood that conditions will require energetic efforts in some areas while maintaining holding actions in others.

The plan must be strong enough to require the insurgents to lose the initiative; yet it must be flexible in order to take advantage of success. Once a plan has been adopted it must be followed consistently or the counter-insurgents may soon find themselves merely reacting to insurgent actions.

The third principle requires a policy aimed at defeating the insurgency, not merely the insurgents. This is based on the premise that if the guerrilla is kept apart from the population then he will perish. At Olongapo, the "fish" died easily when the "sea" dried up, but on Samar much effort went to stomp each "fish" while ignoring the "sea" that continually produced more "fish."

An insurgency consists of more than clench-fisted guerrillas roaming a jungle; it is a political subversion

that operates through a clandestined and highly motivated infrastructure that has infiltrated the towns and villages. Through it supplies, intelligence, and recruits are obtained which are absolutely vital to the success of the insurgents. Without the assistance of the town officials of Balangiga, for example, the victory over Company "C" would have had little chance for success.

Military and civic measures then must be designed to cut the contact between the guerrilla military units and the subversive political organization. If this can be accomplished, the guerrilla will be forced to surface and oppose the counter-guerrillas' military in the open, a situation that favors the latter.

In order to eliminate the infrastructure, a main effort must be directed toward identifying and eliminating its members. However, counter-insurgent actions must be guided by the fourth principle: to always function in strict accordance with moral and established law.

As Waller's trial so clearly indicated, the Samar battalion grossly violated this principle. The indiscriminate destruction of indigenous life and property created more problems for the marines than it solved. Major Waller presided over a military government that refused to abide by the law and thereby forfeited its right to command the respect and obedience of its subjects. The marines' actions evoked feelings of fear, mistrust and hatred among the

natives, providing more anti-American propagenda than Lucban could ever have dreamed possible.

This is not to say that tough laws are not to be enacted. Curfews, detention, long imprisonment, and even capital punishment may be required to suppress terrorism and other guerrilla activities. However, harsh measures must be legally formulated, effective, and seen by the population as applied equally to all.

Waller had suggested that the natives he executed had been given an investigation, but even if true, it was far from sufficient. It should always be the policy that accused persons be brought before a public trial. Not only will justice be satisfied, but the violent crimes that are often committed by insurgents on non-combatants will be emphasized and highlighted before public opinion. A policy of public trials on Samar could have placed the Americans not only in the position of acting in accordance with the law but also as the protector of the innocent, thereby placing insurgents in the position of criminals.

One side effect of a policy of abiding by the law is that it makes counter-insurgent officials, civilian and military, responsible for cruel and illegal reprisals against captured guerrillas. This will greatly enhance abiding by the final basic principle: avoid hate and terror campaigns.

Such tactics lead directly to illegal violence by frustrated soldiers and eventually to widespread mistreatment of civilians. Hate and terror are clearly unproductive and, according to "Che" Guevara, will destroy all efforts at maintaining public support.[35]

General Smith and Major Waller urged the Samar battalion to "avenge" dead comrades and in so doing, according to President Theodore Roosevelt, "prepare [ed] the minds of those under him for the commission of the deeds which we regret. Loose and violent talk by an officer of high rank is always likely to excite wrongdoing . . . ."[36] Smith and Waller can thus be termed accessories to the murder of the non-combatants killed by vengence-seeking marine patrols,[37] but even more important, the hate and terror campaigns had long-term drawbacks. Fearing abuse from the occupation forces, the guerrillas selected not to surrender voluntarily to the marines and showed a willingness to fight to the

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35 Ernesto Guevara's policy is explained by Peter Paret and John W. Shy, "Guerrilla Warfare and U.S. Military Policy: A Study," The Guerrilla -- And How To Fight Him, ed. Thomas N. Greene (1962), p. 43. The authors also cite police brutality in South Korea and the Philippines (1950's) as assisting the communist insurgents, pp. 50-51.

36 President Theodore Roosevelt to Adjutant General of the Army, July 14, 1902, SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV, 5.

37 See Clifford, Pioneer Battalion, pp. 27-28.

death to avoid capture. This in turn cost American lives and vital military information. Moreover, the guerrillas would retaliate against real or rumored mistreatment of Filipinos by abusing captured American troops.

The after effects of hate and terror would have long outlasted General Smith's military campaigns, leaving civil officials with a hostile population of not only the insurrectos themselves but also their relatives and fellow villagers in the insurgent dominated areas. It is highly unlikely that these people would have returned past hatred with loyalty and obedience to the government. Unless truly totalitarian techniques are used, control over a hostile occupied population cannot long be maintained.

The Military Response

Aside from the political and civic side of counter-insurgency, the marines' experience in the Insurrection has suggested certain methods for dealing with the guerrilla's military threat.

Upon the landing of the Samar battalion, Major Waller proceeded to embark on a campaign designed to drive all the guerrillas from his area and to destroy their strongholds. Since guerrillas must attack at a time and target of their own choosing, the marine tactic of constant probing -- utilizing naval vessels for increased mobility -- compelled the guerrilla forces to go on the defensive. The defeat of the insurgents at the Sohoton Cliffs stronghold was a stinging

setback for Lucban's forces. Had Major Waller concentrated his forces around Basey rather than attempting the cross-island expedition and had he taken action against the insurgent infrastructure in the area, perhaps real pacification would have occurred. As it happened, however, less than two months after the rout of the insurrectos at Sohoton Cliffs, Basey was thought to be in danger of attack.[38]

In effect, Waller and Smith were not practicing proper economy of forces. Instead of spreading the marine strength over the entire southern tip of Samar, it should have been concentrated. Operations could have struck into selected areas at the marine commander's time and choosing. While concentrating his main forces within the chosen area, Waller needed only to deploy sufficient forces to other areas to prevent guerrilla bases from being established. Upon the success in one area, operations could commence in another, admittedly a long process and apparently contrary to General Smith's desire for quick victory.[39]

The expeditions launched by the marines on Samar resemble the "search and destroy" missions of American forces in their more recent Southeast Asian venture. In both discords

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[38] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 139; Court-Martial of Lieutenant Day, pp. 55-56.

[39] Court-Martial of Major Waller, p. 374.

reliance upon that tactic was inappropriate.[40] While such missions do keep the insurgents stirred up and off balance, they fail to affect the all-important insurgent infrastructure. The expeditions of Waller's battalion did kill some insurrectos, but the numbers were very limited and depended more upon chance than planning. As a result the infrastructure was left intact and free to replace casualties with new recruits.

Preferable to "search and destroy" missions are what may be termed "seek and keep" operations. Utilizing such tactics the Samar battalion could have sought out the centers of insurgent activities with reconaissance patrols and followed up with combat operations to clear the guerrillas out. Once they controlled the area the marines could remain until the insurgent infrastructure was destroyed and proper authority was restored, thus releasing the military for operations in another area.

"Search and destroy" operations are primarily a conventional military response to unconventional warfare and therein lies its weakness. The tactics of Roger's Rangers of Revolutionary War fame must be dusted off and studied

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[40] For a criticism of search and destroy missions in Vietnam from a military author, see William R. Corson, The Betrayal (1968), ch. vii, hereinafter cited as Corson, The Betrayal.

again with the view of counter-guerrilla forces operating in the same environment and conditions as the guerrilla forces. The tactics of the guerrilla must be used against the guerrillas themselves: constant harassment, constant attack.

To implement these tactics the counter-guerrilla must abandon the policy of short, swift raids into disputed areas in favor of long-range and deep penetration operations. The possibility of running into deadly counter-guerrilla forces will in itself begin to restrict the freedom of movement of the guerrilla bands, affecting their supply and communication systems. For just as government forces are vunerable to the ambush, so too are the guerrillas. The countryside is normally bustling with constant guerrilla movement of units, supplies, and messengers.

To carry out this policy highly disciplined and aggressive soldiers must be lightly armed and organized into small, mobile units. The marine battalion on Samar was idealy suited for such operations. Instead of large expeditions that always telegraphed their approach, Waller could have utilized marine squad and platoon-sized, long-range patrols that could move and fight like guerrillas. Naval vessels were readilly available to inject and retract small units along coastal beaches and interior riverbanks. After penetrating deep into insurgent territory, they would have then been able to select guerrilla routes

of communications, and using the tactic of ambush could have disrupted the insurrectos' freedom of movement. The small units armed with rapid-firing Kregs could have safely taken on large guerrilla units and, if necessary, melted into the jungle.

Also important is the type of soldier selected for counter-guerrilla warfare. As noted, the American marines and soldiers that occupied the Philippines had little empathy with the Filipino for numerous reasons, racial bigotry being just one. Popular support will always elude foreign soldiers who habitually look down their noses at the local residents and refer to them with slurs. Such a counter-insurgent force will fail, claim the Chinese guerrilla experts, because they become "an anti-popular force."[41]

The key, however, is the individual soldier. The troops that make up the counter-guerrilla force must be volunteers who stepped forward because of a desire to help the people. A mere hatred of the guerrilla or his politics is not enough.

Although the counter-guerrilla force must be able to be unconventional, this requirement does not rule out the regular soldier. Quite the contrary; well disciplined and physically fit troops from elite units can become the

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41 Li Tso-Peng, Strategy: One Against Ten. Tactics: Ten Against One (1966), pp. 36-37; Griffith (ed.), Mao on Guerrilla Warfare, p. 33.

nucleus of an excellent pacification force. However, stern measures must be taken to weed out the callous and the xenophobic. Those selected must be psychologically conditioned not only to fight but to maintain order and become involved in civic projects.

Another major factor in the success of counter-insurgency is the quality of leadership provided, especially at the junior officer level. The nature of a guerrilla war requires that many small detachments will control areas widely separated from each other, commanded often by lieutenants and captains. This was true in the Insurrection and although benevolence was the official policy at the division headquarters in Manila, there was little that generals could do to ensure that the policy was being observed, or even prevent crimes against the civilian population.[42]

One army officer in the Islands noted in 1901 that precisely because the individual junior officer is so important to a pacification effort, they should be selected for their "character, learning, experience, and integrity" and possess a sense of "justice and patience."[43] However,

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42 Atrocities were committed by U.S. troops on a scale to warrant a Senate investigation. See SD 205, 57th Cong., 1st sess., XV, pts. 1 and 2; SD 213, 57th Cong., 2nd sess., XV.

43 E.J. McClernand, "Our Philippine Problem," Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, XXIX (1901), 328-29.

this did not go far enough. Major Waller and most of his officers had these characteristics, but their previous training was inappropriate for counter-insurgent duties. They had been exposed only to the orthodox military training which taught soldiers to kill; the mission of the conventional army is to destroy the enemy. However, such a simplistic approach to guerrilla wars is seldom adequate, and the marine battalion's ability for destruction and killing was nearly disastrous for the pacification effort on Samar.

A further handicap to Waller and his subordinates was the traditional avoidance of the professional officer of politics. But in counter-insurgency many of the tasks necessarily take military leaders into the political field.

Clearly, the soldiers and officers who are expected to participate in pacification programs must by carefully selected and trained to kill and to be courteous -- and conditioned to know when each is called for.

In the final analysis, even if Waller and his command had been ideally suited and perfectly trained for counter-insurgency, success on Samar could not have been guaranteed. They were foreigners and outsiders rarely win guerrilla wars. It is an intimate affair and the outcome is decided not by weapons alone, but also by cultural values, political beliefs, and age-old customs -- a delicate situation

for foreign troops.[44]

Although the role of foreign troops in a guerrilla war is a difficult one at best, many situations can be concluded successfully. The Philippine Insurrection ended in such a victory in no small part due to the effort of those officers who continued to pursue the policy of benevolence. Their patience and dedication wore down the majority of the population who eventually saw their insurrectos disintegrate to little more then banditos. The independence movement failed at gaining moral or material support abroad, and their leadership splintered into squabbling cliques. The Filipinos came to realize that their lives and property would be safer in the hands of their conquerors than their own leaders.[45]

A more recent example of a foreign army triumphing over indegenous insurgents was in Malaya, where a small but effective British army persevered through the years 1948 to 1960 and eventually checked a communist led guerrilla movement.[46]

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[44] This is a lesson learned by the European colonial powers after World War Two. In 1957 Great Britain acknowledged that in Africa "the winds of change" were too strong and the cost of a counter-insurgent effort would require too great a cost, Pomeroy, Guerrilla Warfare, pp. 117-18.

[45] Agoncillo, Short History, pp. 142-44.

[46] See E. O'Ballance, The Communist Insurgent War,

Geographic factors played a large part in the victory, however. Malaya, like the Philippines, was completely isolated from outside support, without friendly borders to obliging neighbors, and had a coastline that was easily blockaded by naval vessels. Few potential troublespots can promise such advantages.

For the future, the lessons learned by the United States Marines in their struggle against the Filipino insurrecto offer innumerable insights for the developing governments that are faced with armed revolutionary movements within their borders, and for the large foreign powers who wish to directly assist them.

Overall the marines' accomplishments in the Philippine Insurrection were noteworthy. When combat battalions were requested, the Corps showed their ability to expand their organization swiftly, orderly, and without lowering their professional standards. The main missions of protecting the naval installations and pacifying surrounding villages were efficiently accomplished.

Versatility was the trademark of these leathernecks who seemed equally at home whether walking a guardpost, manning a ship's gun battery, patroling through an insurgent

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1948-1960 (1966); R.L. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War (1966). The British effort in Malaya was relatively a shoestring operation; their troop strength rarely exceeded twenty thousand and their financial investment was marginal.

sector, splashing ashore with a landing force, or assaulting a hostile position as part of an army attack force. Their professionalism made them tough adversaries on the conventional battlefield, and their good sense gained them popular support against the guerrilla. The nature of the marines as seaborne soldiers gave them an amphibious mobility that was ideally suited for insurgencies, and one that could not be equalled by army units.

As a result of the presence of the marine brigade in the Philippines, the Corps had its role expanded to include the defense of overseas naval stations while providing a mobile striking force in the event of war. Thereafter, to increase its capability the navy routinely embarked marine expeditionary forces with the fleet. These developments were the beginning steps to the amphibious landing techniques that were completed in time for World War Two.[47]

There was no shortage of opportunities to utilize the knowledge gained by the marines concerning counter-insurgency and jungle tactics during the Insurrection: against insurgents in limited and primitive guerrilla "banana wars" during the Caribbean intervention years, against the Japanese jungle fighters in the South Pacific during World War Two, and against the Viet Cong during the American phase of

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[47] Conclusion drawn by unnamed commentator in folder, Philippines, 1900-1901," Hdqs. U.S.M.C. See also Dion Williams, "The Defense of Our New Naval Bases," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, XXVIII (June, 1902), pp. 181-94.

the Vietnam War. In the latter conflict the Corps seemed to have learned much from their experiences, and they placed a high priority on pacification programs aimed at gaining and protecting popular support. Special units were organized and trained for such purposes.[48]

The post-Vietnam War evaluation and debate is still being carried on, and many critics have suggested that the United States' effort was seriously bungled. Military force and firepower, some insist, were overemphasized at the cost of alienating the support of the people, and the leadership allowed American soldiers to ride roughshod over the people, which too often resulted in needless atrocities.[49]

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48 These units were under CAP, the Combined Action Program, which placed a squad of specially trained marines in key villages to live among the people and share their bazards. Their mission was to gain the confidence of the people by providing security from the Viet Cong, training a local defense force, and assisting in civil projects. The squad consisted of idealistic, low ranking enlisted men which was small enough not to disrupt the existing social order of the village, yet, with the assistance of the native defense platoon, was strong enough to provide twenty four hours of security. This security denied the Viet Cong their usual access to the population. See Don Moser, "To Keep a Village Free," Life, LXIII (August 25, 1967), 24-28, 58-62; Corson, The Betrayal, pp. 174-98.

49 See Philip Scribner Balboni, "What Every Vietnam Veteran Knows," The New Republic, CLXIII (December 19, 1970), 13-15. Corson, The Betrayal, pp. 175-78, maintains that the American army's high command in Saigon actively harassed and attempted to eliminate numerous marine pacification and other civic action programs. The opposition, says Corson, transcended petty inter-service rivalry. The use of military force, via search and destroy missions and body counts, was dogma to army policy; they entertained no

Even if the criticism is only partially true, it graphically points to the fact that the attitudes of General "Hell Roaring Jake" Smith still exist, and his prototypes have failed to learn from past campaigns. The errors of Samar were allowed to reoccur in Vietnam and may again in a future confrontation. Plutarch once observed that wise men profited more from fools than the other way around, because "wise men avoided the faults of fools, but fools would not imitate the good examples of wise men." American military history embraces the activities of both fools and wise men; the present generation will be judged by whom it imitates.

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official call to win the hearts and minds of the people. As a personal observation, the author of this paper while a marine platoon commander in Vietnam (1967-68) continuously heard from U.S. Army counterparts -- apparently parroting the feelings of their superiors -- the slogan: "grab the Vietnamese by the short hairs, and the hearts and minds will follow," a crude reference to a belief in military force over pacification efforts. It should also be noted that not all marines, civilian leaders, or the American people, were immune to this attitude.

APPENDIXES

"A" HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE

Tacloban, Leyte, P.I., December 24th, 1901.

Circular,

#6.

TO ALL STATION COMMANDERS

The Brigade Commander has become thoroughly convinced from the great mass of evidence at hand that the insurrection for some time past and still in force in the island of Samar has been supported solely by the people who live in the pueblos ostensibly pursuing their peaceful pursuits and enjoying American protection, and that this is especially true in regard to the "pudientes" or wealthy class.

He is and for some time past has been satisfied that the people themselves, and especially this wealthy and influential class, can stop this insurrection at any time they make up their minds to do so; that up to the present time they do not want peace; that they are working in every way and to the utmost of their ability to prevent peace. He is satisfied that this class, while openly talking peace, is doing so simply to gain the confidence of our officers and soldiers, only to betray them to the insurrectos, or, in short, that while ostensibly aiding the Americans they are in reality secretly doing everything in their power to support and maintain this insurrection.

Under such conditions there can be but one course to pursue, which is, to adopt a policy that will create in the minds of all the people a burning desire for the War to cease; a desire or longing so intense, so personal, especially to every individual of the class mentioned, and so real that it will impel them to devote themselves in earnest to bringing about a state of real peace, -- that will impel them to join hands with the Americans in the accomplishment of this end.

The policy to be pursued in this Brigade, from this time on, will be to wage War in the sharpest and most decisive manner possible. This policy will apply to the island of Samar and to such other portions of the Brigade to which it may become necessary to apply it, even though such territory is supposedly peaceful or is under Civil Government.

In waging this Warfare, officers of this Brigade are directed and expected to cooperate to their utmost, so as to terminate this war as soon as practicable, since short, severe wars are the most humane in the end. No civilized war, however civilized, can be carried on a humanitarian basis. In waging this war officers will be guided by the provisions of General Order No. 100, A.G.O. 1863, which order promulgates the instructions, for the government of the armies of the United States in the field. (Copies of this order will be furnished to the troops of this Brigade

as soon as practicable. In the meantime commanding officers will personally see to it that the younger and less experienced officers of this command are instructed in the provisions of this order, wherever it is possible to do so.) Commanding Officers are earnestly requested and expected to exercise, without reference to these Headquarters, their own discretion in their adoption of any and all measures of warfare coming within the provisions of this General Order which will tend to accomplish the desired results in the most direct way or in the shortest possible space of time. They will also encourage the younger officers of their commands to constantly look for, engage, harass and annoy the enemy in the field, and to this end Commanding Officers will repose a large amount of confidence in these subordinate officers, and will permit them a large latitude of action and a discretion similar to that herein conferred upon the Commanding Officers of stations by these Headquarters.

Without warranting in any way carelessness of action or recklessness in the slightest degree, or the relaxation of that constant vigilance which the officer should at all times exercise in the enemy country, and especially in these islands, officers should be encouraged to bear in mind always that we have the decided morale over the natives of the island and that they must not hesitate to attack them boldly on all occasions and to drive home such attacks with vigor: they should bear in mind that mere numbers of

insurgents should not warrant any other course, unless and until his command is so outnumbered as to render the loss of a major portion thereof a certainty, which contingency is not likely to arise within this Brigade.

In dealing with the natives of all classes, officers will be guided by the following principles:

1st: -- Every native, whether in arms or living in the pueblos or barrios will be regarded and treated as an enemy until he has conclusively shown that he is a friend. This he cannot be by mere words or promises, nor by imparting information which, while true, is old or stale and of no value; nor can it be done by aiding us in ways that do no material harm to the insurgents. In short, the only manner in which the native may demonstrate his loyalty is by some positive act or acts that actually positively commit him to us, thereby severing his relations with the insurgents and producing or tending to produce distinctly unfriendly relations with the insurgents.

Not only the ordinary natives but especially those of influence or position in the pueblos who manifestly and openly cultivate friendly relations with the Americans will be regarded with particular suspicion, since by the announced policy of the insurgent government their ablest and most staunch friends or those who are capable of most skillfully practicing duplicity are selected and directed to cultivate the friendship of American officers, so as to obtain their

confidence and secretly communicate to the insurgents everything the Americans do or contemplate doing, particularly with regard to the movements of troops. In a word, friendship for the American on the part of any native will be measured directly and solely by his acts, and neither sentiment nor social reason of any kind will be permitted to enter into the determination of such friendship.

2nd: -- It will be regarded as a certainty that all officials of the pueblos and barrios are likewise officials of Lukban and his officers, or at least they are in actual touch and sympathy with the insurgent leaders and are in secret aiding these leaders with information, supplies, etc., wherever possible. Officers will not be misled by the fact that officials of the pueblos pass ordinances inimicable to those in the insurrection, or by any action taken by them either collectively or individually. The public acts of pueblo councils that are so favorable to the Americans are usually negatived by secret communications on the part of the parties enacting them to those in insurrection, therefore, such acts cannot be taken as a guide in determining the friendship, or lack of it, of these officials for the American government.

3rd: -- The taking of the oath of allegiance by officials, presidentes, vice-presidentes, consejeros, principales, tenientes of barrios, or people of influence, does not indicate that they or any of them have espoused the American

cause, since it is a well established fact that these people frequently take the oath of allegiance with direct object and intent of enabling them to be of greater service to their real friends in the field. In short, the loyalty of these people is to be determined only by acts which, when combined with usual course of conduct, irrevocably binds them to the American cause.

Neutrality must not be tolerated on the part of any native. The time has now arrived when all the natives in this Brigade who are not openly for us must be regarded as against us. In short, if not an active friend he is an open enemy.

4th: -- The most dangerous class with whom we have to deal is the wealthy sympathizer and contributor. This class comprises not only all those officiales and principales above mentioned but all those of importance who live in the pueblos with their families. By far the most important, as well as the most dangerous member of this class, is the native priest. He is the most dangerous and successful because he is usually the best informed besides wielding an immense influence with the people by virtue of his position. He has much to lose, in his opinion, but little to gain through American supremacy in these islands.

It is expected that officers will exercise their best endeavours to suppress and prevent aid being given by people of this class, especially by the native priest. Whenever

there is evidence that this assistance or where there is a strong suspicion that they are secretly aiding the enemies of our government, they will be confined and held. The profession of the priest will not prevent his arrest or proceedings against him. If the evidence is sufficient they will be tried by the proper court. If there is no sufficient evidence to convict, they will be arrested and confined as a military necessity and held as prisoners of war until released by orders from these Headquarters.

It will be borne in mind in these islands as a rule it is next to impossible to secure evidence against men of influence, and especially against native priests, so long as they are at large. On the other hand, after they are arrested and confined it is usually quite easy to secure abundant evidence against them. Officers in command of stations will not hesitate, therefore, to arrest and detain individuals who they have good reasons to believe are aiding the insurrection, even when positive evidence is lacking.

5th: -- Presidente and officials of the pueblos, generally including the police, will be especially watched by the troops, and where sufficient evidence can be found to warrant their convictions before the proper court of the violations of their oaths of office, by reasons of their acting as agents of the insurrectos, or aiding or assisting or protecting these insurgents in any way, they should be arrested and tried by military commission or provost court.

In all cases where will be warranted conviction, charges will be preferred and duly forwarded for action by these Headquarters.

6th: -- In the treatment of natives the officers of this Brigade will bear in mind that the ordinary "tavo" is regarded by the native of influence and standing as but little more than a piece of machinery to be manipulated as may suit his fancy. He is the ignorant tool who follows too blindly the lead of the man of influence. But little attention should be paid therefore to the ordinary offenses against the laws of war that may be committed by this class. Their minor offenses can and will be safely and properly be disregarded. Their services may be utilized wherever practicable or desirable in operations against their leaders.

In the selection of guides, however, officers will bear in mind that the more intelligent the native selected the greater the chance of success in the particular undertaking. Guides from the "pudientes" or influential class, should be impressed freely and in numbers sufficient to accomplish the object in view. They should be informed of their duties and responsibilities as such and be held to a strict compliance therewith. This class can at all times communicate with the insurgents when they wish to do so, and this desire can and should be cultivated in them. Even though they may not know any given trail their facilities for acquiring knowledge thereof are unlimited. Besides, it is quite well

established that this class are good barometers and as such will add ample protection against the bamboo trap and similar pitfalls placed in the trails, if they occupy their proper positions with the command.

7th: -- Special efforts will be made to prevent contributions of all kinds to the enemy. Natives living in the pueblos will be informed that they can secure protection from forced contributions whenever they desire such protection. To secure it, however, reports of attempted collections must be promptly made to the nearest American official, and in time to be of value. Presidents of the pueblos can at all times prevent the collection of contributions within their pueblos if they really wish to do so. Any failure to do this on the part of any official when known, should be carefully investigated, and unless it is clearly established that he is not at fault, he should be promptly confined and punished.

It is quite usual for natives of all classes to claim that they are afraid of the insurgents; that if they assist the Americans or give any information to them that they will be killed. There may be some isolated case in which such claims have a foundation but they are very rare indeed and it is quite certain that in all cases this fear may be promptly removed by an honest effort on the part of the party possessing it. This myth of so-called fear will disappear with the first honest effort of the possessor to

suppress the insurrection. Officers will furnish protection against all real dangers directed against those natives who seek such protection within their commands, provided they are friends of the established government, and to no one else. All collectors of these contributions will be promptly arrested and proceeded against.

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL SMITH.

(signed)

W.E. AYER
CAPTAIN, 12th INFANTRY,
ADJUTANT GENERAL

"B"

UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP NEW YORK,

Cavite, P.I.,

October 21, 1901

Sir:

You are hereby detached from duty with the First Brigade, U.S. Marines, Cavite, and from such other duty as may have been assigned you, and you will report immediately to the Senior Squadron Commander, Commanding Southern Squadron, for duty as Commanding Officer of the Marine Battalion destined for service in the Island of Samar, P.I.

Respectively,

FRED RODGERS,

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,

Senior Squadron Commander,

Commanding Southern Squadron.

Major Littleton W.T. Waller, U.S.M.C.

First Brigade, U.S. Marines,

Cavite, P.I.

"C"

U.S. Flagship NEW YORK

Cavite, P.I.

22nd October, 1901

Sir:

Your orders of October 21st, detaching you from duty with the First Brigade, Marine, and directing you to report to the Commanding Officer of the Marine Battalion destined for service in Samar, are so far modified that you will not regard yourself detached from the First Brigade, Marine.

Very Respectfully,

FRED RODGERS,

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,

Senior Squadron Commander,

Commanding Southern Squadron

Major Littleton W.T. Waller, U.S.M.C.

First Brigade, U.S. Marines,

Cavite, P.I.

"D" HEADQUARTERS SIXTH SEPARATE BRIGADE

Tacloban, Leyte, February 19th, 1903

Special Order,

No. 37.

Par. 3. Upon arrival of transport Lawton and the embarkation thereon of the Battalion of the U.S. Marines under command of Major L.W.T. Waller, U.S. Marine Corps, this battalion will stand relieved from duty in the Sixth Separate Brigade.

On their separation from the brigade the thanks of the Brigade Commander are due and gratefully acknowledged for the uniform ability and cheerfulness with which his orders have been carried out by Major Waller, his officers and men.

By Command of Brigadier General Smith:

W.E. AYER,

Captain 19th Infantry,

Adjutant General.

"E" HEADQUARTERS MARINE BATTALION -- SAMAR,

U.S. Flagship NEW YORK

Catbalogan, Samar,

23. October, 1901.

Captain Porter with Companies "F" and "H" will garrison Balangiga. One 3-inch gun with six boxes of ammunition. The duty will be to scout the surrounding country to the Eastward, connecting with the Army at Quinapundan, Salcedo, and clearing out that part of the country; scouting again to the Northward and Eastward towards Panbuhan on the East coast; to the Westward & Northward, and Westward to about half way between Balangiga and Basey. The whole country between the points named must be cleared of the treacherous enemy, and the expeditions, in a way, are to be punitive.

All rice and hemp are to be seized, and if practicable, brought in, if not, it must be destroyed. Bancas and boats of all kinds not painted red and registered, showing proper papers must be seized, and, if not practicable to utilize them, they must be destroyed.

Rice must not be allowed to get into the interior. If registered bancas carry contraband they must be seized. Families may be allowed enough rice per diem to subsist upon.

Impress native labor for all manual labor as far as possible. Clear back the brush keeping it down as far as possible.

Place no confidence in the natives, and punish treachery immediately with death.

All parties of any strength must be accompanied by a surgeon, natives will be utilized to carry provisions, and a few with long poles will precede the column to look out for pits and traps.

Men must be cautioned about these means of death.

Allow no man to go to meals, the sinks, or anywhere without his arms and ammunition. The same instructions apply to officers.

All males who have not come in and presented themselves by October 25th will be regarded and treated as enemies. It must be impressed on the men that the natives are treacherous, brave and savage. No trust, no confidence can be placed in them.

The Headquarters will be at Basey. Wire connections will soon be had between Balangiga and Basey, a company will be stationed at a point either between Basey and Balangiga or Basey and Santa Rita. Notice will be given of its locality when decided upon.

The utmost energy and activity will be observed in the suppression of the insurrection and the pacifying of all positions of the inlands, in order that we may soon proceed to the Northern part of the island.

The men must be informed of the courage, skill, size and strength of the enemy. WE MUST DO OUR PART OF THE WORK,

AND WITH THE SURE KNOWLEDGE THAT WE ARE NOT TO EXPECT QUARTER.

The latter fact will be told to the men after they are landed.

We have also to avenge our late comrades in North China, the murdered men of the Ninth U.S. Infantry.

(signed) Littleton W.T. Waller,

Major & Brevet Lieut-Colonel, U.S. Marines,

Commanding

"P" HEADQUARTERS SUBDISTRICT OF SOUTH SAMAR

First District of the Visayas,

Basey, Samar, P.I., October 27, 1901

Sir: 1. In obedience to your verbal instructions, I have to report that on the 28th instant I took command of the substation of South Samar, first district of the Visayas, beginning with Basey and running east and south, including Balangiga, relieving Captains Bookmiller and Blatchford at the above mentioned points in the order named. My headquarters were established, at your suggestion, at Basey.

2. This post I occupied with 158 men, one 3-inch rifle, and a Colt 6-millimeter automatic gun. Balangiga was occupied the same day by Capt. D.D. Porter, U.S. Marine Corps, with 159 men. The shelling of the insurgent trenches by the Frolic and Vicksburg was witnessed by the brigadier-general commanding the first district, Department of the Visayas. Returning from Balangiga, I sent an expedition to San Antonio, south of Basey, acting upon the information given me by Captain Bookmiller. Some bolomen fled at the approach of the party. Only two were captured. There were about 20 in all. The barrio was destroyed because of the smuggling of rice to the insurgents. Oath was administered to 48 men.

3. Francisco Laguilla presented himself, stating that he had been captured two months ago and made to work for the insurgents; that he had escaped from them in the Sojoton Mountains, about 15 miles up the Cabacan or Sojoton River.

He reported this force to be 200 strong and having 2 rifles and many bamboo cannon. This statement was to some extent corroborated by a man from San Antonio, although he gave a different name to the locality, and placing the position of the enemy at the overhanging rocks about 13 miles up the same river -- Cabacan. I also received information that a large force of bolomen had approached this town last night, but hearing of the strength of the force and the presence of 2 guns, they fell back to the River Cabacan.

4. An expedition was sent out this morning from Balangiga to Quinapundan, the result of which I have not yet heard. On the night of the 26th the telephone wire was cut at a point between Basey and San Antonio, about 2½ miles from this point. A quarter of a mile of wire was taken away and the insulators broken. This damage was repaired to-day.

5. This morning a small expedition went to Gibasey and destroyed that village. These people have been giving information to the insurgents. The presidente of the barrio, Serrafio Eleano, already under suspicion by Captain Bookmiller, was in and out of Basey twice yesterday without reporting or getting permission to go or come. He again arrived in town this morning, was unsatisfactory in his answers, and denied knowledge of the presence of the insurgents in his barrio or neighborhood. I have positive knowledge that they were present there on the 25th instant, but went back to the Sojoton Mountains, where they are in force about,

estimated, 400, with 2 rifles and many bamboo cannon.

6. It was my intention to go toward Nip-nipa, searching for a supposed powder supply, to-day, but a gunboat appears to be working in that direction now. I shall push in toward the Sojoton Mountains and attempt to dislodge the enemy from the overhanging rocks and drive him from his stronghold.

7. The position is reported as practically impregnable. I believe I can dislodge them with shrapnel. Shall therefore try a gun platform of bamboo and boards which, I believe, can be made sufficiently stable, of very little draft, and easily managed. A steam launch would be most useful on this expedition.

Very respectfully,

Littleton W.T. Waller,

Major, U.S. Marine Corps, Commanding

The Brigadier-General Commanding First District,

Department of the Visayas,

Tacloban, Leyte, P.I.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF M. AND S.

FORM Q.

CLINICAL CHART.

Name, Waller, Race, Col, Age, ..., Color, ...

Nativity, ..., Disease, ...

DAY OF MONTH	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31							
DAY OF DISEASE	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16							
	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME	ME

TEMPERATURE.

C.	F.
41.6°	107°
41.1°	106°
40.5°	105°
40.0°	104°
39.4°	103°
38.9°	102°
38.3°	101°
37.7°	100°
37.2°	99°
36.6°	98°
36.1°	97°
35.5°	96°

RESPIRATION. PULSE.

60	95°
55	150
45	140
40	130
35	120
30	110
25	100
20	90
15	80
10	70

URINALYSIS.

- Quantity,
- Sp. Gravity,
- Reaction,
- Color,
- Albumen,
- Urea,
- Sugar,
- Microscopic Examination.

STOOLS.

- Number,
- Character,

REMARKS.

4—585

Respiration curve in red ink; pulse curve in black ink.

Jan 17th P.M. quinine & 2 Co. aloes pill, stool during night
18th quinine & antepyrine a.m. & P.M.
19th " " " faindeb white on stool vomited 3 times

20th Looking well, says feels better Stools 1 during night
1 10:30 am watery

	17th	18th	19th
		am	am
20 m	-6 pm	pm	
101.8	103	101.6	103 4

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