

EAST AFRICA
AND GREAT BRITAIN

1875-1890

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CHARLES SHELTON NICKENS. EAST AFRICA AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1875-1890.
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THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY IS TO DEMONSTRATE THE MANNER IN WHICH EAST AFRICA WAS OPENED TO CIVILIZATION AND COMMERCE BY PRIVATE INITIATIVE AND LATER BY SANCTION OF THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE. THE INVOLVEMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE EAST COAST OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT CAME NOT AS A RESULT OF ANY PREARRANGED IMPERIALISTIC DESIRE TO COLONIZE THE AREA BUT RATHER AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ANTI-SLAVE ACTIVITY IN ENGLAND AND THE DESIRE OF LONDON TO RETAIN ITS AUTHORITY IN EGYPT.

AFTER SEVERAL ANTI-SLAVE TRADE TREATIES AND AN ABORTATIVE ATTEMPT BY THE KHEDEVE OF EGYPT TO ANNEX THE AREA OF EAST AFRICA, SIR WILLIAM MACKINNON ATTEMPTED TO GAIN A CONCESSION FROM THE SULTAN OF ZANZIBAR IN ORDER TO OPEN THE COAST. THIS PLAN FAILED DUE TO THE ADVERSE ACTION TAKEN BY LORD SALISBURY, THEN BRITISH PRIME MINISTER. A PERIOD OF BRITISH INACTIVITY FOLLOWED. SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES DID PRESENT THEMSELVES DURING THIS TIME, BUT GREAT BRITAIN DECLINED TO ACCEPT THEM.

AS A RESULT OF INCREASED EUROPEAN, AND ESPECIALLY GERMAN, INTEREST IN THE EAST COAST, THE AREA WAS PARTITIONED BETWEEN GERMANY AND GREAT BRITAIN. AT THIS SAME TIME, MACKINNON AGAIN BECAME INTERESTED IN THE AREA AND IN THE POSSIBILITY OF FORMING A COMPANY TO OPEN UP THE INTERIOR OF THE DARK CONTINENT. THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD WHICH MADE POSSIBLE THE EMIN PASHA RELIEF EXPEDITION THEN FORMED THE IMPERIAL BRITISH EAST AFRICA COMPANY IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT MACKINNON'S DESIGNS. THE COMPANY RECEIVED A CONCESSION FROM THE SULTAN OF ZANZIBAR AND WAS OFFICIALLY CHARTERED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

THE FIRST YEAR OF THE COMPANY WAS ONE IN WHICH IT COMPLETELY IMPOVERISHED ITSELF BY ATTEMPTING TO EXTEND ITS INFLUENCE TO THE REGION OF THE GREAT LAKES IN EAST-CENTRAL AFRICA. BECAUSE THE COMPANY WAS UNDERCAPITALIZED, BECAUSE LORD SALISBURY BECAME DISGRUNTLED WITH MACKINNON'S LEADERSHIP, AND BECAUSE BISMARCK DECLARED THAT EAST AFRICA WAS NOT, AFTER ALL, A VALUABLE AREA FOR GERMAN INTERESTS, THE ANGLO-GERMAN AGREEMENT OF 1890 WAS SETTLED. THIS AGREEMENT ALLOWED GREAT BRITAIN TO ASSUME A PROTECTORATE OVER THE ISLAND OF ZANZIBAR AND TO DECLARE DIRECT GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL OVER THE COAST OF EAST AFRICA.

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
PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the manner in which East Africa was opened to civilization and commerce by private initiative and later by sanction of the British Foreign Office. British involvement in the affairs of the east coast of Africa came not as a result of any imperialistic motive but rather as a result of British efforts to suppress the slave trade and the desire to maintain the authority of London in Egypt. After an attempt by Egypt to invade the east coast of Africa, Sir William MacKinnon obtained a promise of a concession from the Sultan of Zanzibar in order that the former might establish a company to develop the area. The concession failed, and the British Foreign Office refused to take any sort of action until the Germans began to show interest in the east coast of the dark continent. Britain and Germany then divided the area into two spheres of influence, and MacKinnon was given permission to establish his company, the Imperial British East Africa Company, to control the British sphere.

The research and writing of this thesis came about as a result of efforts to discover if British interference in the affairs of East Africa was prompted by imperialistic motives. At the outset it was discovered that the British government was in no way disposed to assume any responsibility for the opening up and development of East Africa. After extensive research the conclusion was reached that Great Britain's assumption of a protectorate in East Africa came about due to a chain of events which were in no way planned or controlled by the British government. This thesis is an attempt to demonstrate these events and to shake somewhat the

ground on which the theory of the "new imperialism" rests.

I wish to acknowledge my debt of gratitude to the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, for providing me with microfilm reproductions of several of the letters of Sir William MacKinnon; to Mr. A. R. Robinson of the Commonwealth Office Library, London, for arranging to have the papers of the Imperial British East Africa Company microfilmed for me; to Messers. L. Obear and Clarence Witt of the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C., for assisting me in locating the appropriate volumes of British public papers and many autobiographies and for allowing me the opportunity of checking several of these out of the Library; to Mr. M. Stroud of the Duke University Library, Durham, North Carolina, for his assistance in the location of several volumes; to Mrs. de Kiewiet-Hemphill of Memphis, Tennessee, for granting me permission to have her dissertation microfilmed; and to Dr. Kathleen E. Dunlop of East Carolina University, whose guidance was indispensable. I must also thank my wife, Susan, for her forbearance in the face of my impatience and for her willingness to assist me in any manner possible.



THE EAST AFRICAN COAST

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

East Africa first became known to Great Britain by way of the slave trade. This trade had been carried on since the tenth century when the Arabs settled the East African coast for that specific purpose. From the time of the Crusades the people of England and France had been trading with the Arabs. The French government legalized the slave trade, but the English government attempted to arrest the trade because of adverse English public opinion.¹ This dissent arose because East African slaves were being shipped by the Arabs into British India. The control of the slave trade became the object of British policy in East Africa during the first three quarters of the nineteenth century.

In 1799 the men of the British navy defeated the last of the pro-French slavers, Tippu Sahib, and established British control over the sea routes between Oman and India.² The Moresby Treaty was negotiated with Seyyid Said (1804-1856) in September of 1822 to prevent the further importation of slaves into Africa. Said was the Omani ruler who previously made the island of Zanzibar the pivotal point of Arab control of East Africa and the market place for the ever growing slave trade. This

¹
G. M. Trevelyan, History of England, Vol. III (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1953), p. 129.

²
Donald L. Wiedner, A History of Africa South of the Sahara (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 110. (Hereinafter referred to as Wiedner, Africa South).

consequently limited the trade to the western part of the Indian Ocean.³

The British recognized at an early date that Zanzibar's position as the geographical, political, and commercial center of the east coast of Africa would make it necessary for them to establish diplomatic relations with Said's island if their fight against the slave trade was to be successful.⁴ After the Moresby Treaty⁵ further treaties were therefore negotiated with Said. In 1839 Captain Moresby signed another treaty with Said which stipulated that British warships had the right of search and seizure in Said's territorial waters.⁶ Although these treaties arrested the importation of slaves into British India, they by no means stopped the trade itself. Captain Robert Cogan of the Bombay government wrote in 1838 that the abolition of slavery was a question repugnant to the interests and feelings of the Sultan's subjects.⁷

For a time it appeared that England was going to take Said's African dominions, but the British made no attempt to annex any of his

³
Roland Oliver and J.D. Fage, A Short History of Africa (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1962), p. 175. (Hereinafter referred to as Oliver and Fage, Short History).

⁴
Halford Lancaster Hoskins, European Imperialism in Africa (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1930), pp. 63-64. (Hereinafter referred to as Hoskins, European Imperialism).

⁵
Great Britain, British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. XI, pp. 630-638. (Hereinafter referred to as B.F.S.P.).

⁶
Oliver and Fage, Short History, p. 175.

⁷
B.F.S.P., Vol. XXVII, pp. 885-886.

territory.⁸ Said continued to consolidate his power on the coast, and in 1840 he moved his entire court to the island of Zanzibar.⁹ Soon after his permanent move there he established forty-five plantations for the purpose of growing cloves--a new crop to the island.¹⁰ By adopting laws requiring the planting of cloves and by carefully cultivating the island's plantations Said made it possible for Zanzibar to monopolize the world's supply of this crop.¹¹

Said also dispatched expeditions into the interior of East Africa to deal with the Swahili¹² people of the coast in order to procure slaves from the deeper interior. By the year 1844 Seyyid Said's traders had reached at least as far as Lake Tanganyika.¹³ For the most part the Arabs simply armed the chiefs of certain tribes, and these chiefs effected the procurement of slaves.¹⁴ Towns were established in the

8

There was one incident involving the coastal town of Mombasa in 1824, when Captain Robert W. Owen proclaimed a British protectorate over the port. For the full details see, Harry Hamilton Johnson, A History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913), pp. 27-33.

9

John Milner Gray, History of Zanzibar (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 1. (Hereinafter referred to as Gray, Zanzibar).

10

Wiedner, Africa South, p. 109.

11

Gray, Zanzibar, p. 112.

12

Richard Reusch, History of East Africa (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1961), Chp. VI. (Hereinafter referred to as Reusch, East Africa).

13

B.F.S.P., Vol. XXI, p. 343.

14

Oliver and Fage, Short History, p. 174.

interior in order to provide a center for the above exchanges between the Arabs and the native chiefs.¹⁵

Since British policy in this area was directed towards eradicating this trade in slaves, the price which Said had to pay for diplomatic relations with London was his agreement to restrict the trade.¹⁶ In May of 1841 Captain Atkins Hamerton came to Zanzibar from Bombay to serve as British consul. Four years later he secured Seyyid Said's signature to another treaty which prohibited the exportation of slaves from his African dominions, outlawed the importation of slaves into his Asian possessions, and allowed Britain to confiscate his subjects' ships if their cargo were slaves.¹⁷

In light of Cogan's statement regarding the feelings of Said's subjects¹⁸ it is not surprising that there was open rebellion when this new attack on the slave trade was announced. This attack fell upon the Americans rather than the English. In March of 1861 Commander Oldfield of the American consulate in Zanzibar witnessed his country's consulate being attacked and blockaded for one entire day by Arabs from Said's northern territories. It was only when the consul paid them off with five hundred dollars that they withdrew.¹⁹

¹⁵

It has been estimated that between 1807 and 1895, approximately fifty million persons either lost their lives or were removed from the African continent as a result of the slave trade. Basil Davidson, Black Mother (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1961), p. 102.

¹⁶

Reginald Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890 (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1939), p. 10. (Hereinafter referred to as Coupland, Exploitation).

¹⁷

B.F.S.P., Vol. XXV, pp. 628-632.

¹⁸

B.F.S.P., Vol. XXVII, pp. 885-886.

¹⁹

B.F.S.P., Vol. LIII, pp. 1219-1220.

After the death of Seyyid Said in 1856 his sons quarreled over control of his dominions. One of these sons, Barghash, attempted to seize Zanzibar but was unsuccessful. Another son maintained that Zanzibar should be a part of his dominions, and in order to enforce his contention he put a fleet to sea. The fleet was turned back by the British during February 1859. Lord Canning, the British Governor-General of India, was called upon to arbitrate the dispute among the sons in order to prevent further disorder. The Asian and the East African dominions of Said were divided into two political states with the African area falling to Barghash.²⁰ The next year Britain, anxious to insure the independence of both sultans, negotiated an agreement with France providing reciprocal respect on the part of both powers for the dominion of Zanzibar.²¹ Great Britain, thus, in effect, created the independent state of Zanzibar on the east coast of the continent and made certain that the state would follow the orders of the British Foreign Office. In this manner the inconveniences of direct rule of annexation were avoided.²²

In 1872 Britain was still unsatisfied with the progress of the program against slavery, and so it was arranged for Sir Bartle Frere to go to Zanzibar. He arrived on January 12, 1873 and immediately secured Barghash's signature

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For the text see, B.F.S.P., Vol. LVI, pp. 1396 ff.

21

B.F.S.P., Vol. LVII, p. 785.

22

Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, and Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1965), p. 42. (Hereinafter referred to as Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, Victorians).

to a new anti-slavery treaty. By the terms of this treaty Barghash agreed to halt the export of all slaves from the continent whether they were bound for other parts of his dominions or not. He further agreed to close all slave markets within his possessions and to protect the liberated slaves in his dominions.²³ In 1875 Barghash visited London and signed a supplementary treaty which provided that Arab ships carrying slaves other than those in attendance on their masters or employed in navigation should be deemed as being engaged in the slave trade.²⁴ In April of the next year Barghash issued two proclamations that forbade any conveyance of slaves by land under any conditions.²⁵

Although the east African slave trade was outlawed on paper, the British actually turned the Sultan's subjects against him. British authority became even greater in 1866 with the arrival of Dr. John Kirk the new British consul to Zanzibar.²⁶ Under Kirk's considerable influence Barghash became the means by which the British hoped to control the commerce in slaves.²⁷ After the proclamations of 1876 the town of Kilwa on the mainland rebelled against the authority of Barghash. Only the timely arrival of a British man-of-war forestalled a bloody rebellion.²⁸

²³

B.F.S.P., Vol. LXI, pp. 173-174.

²⁴

B.F.S.P., Vol. LXVI, p. 89.

²⁵

B.F.S.P., Vol. LXVII, pp. 455-456.

²⁶

Dr. John Kirk, later Sir John Kirk, the son of a Scottish minister, was born in 1832. He obtained his M.D. at Edinburgh in 1854, and served in the Crimea and on Livingstone's Zambesi expedition in 1858-1863.

²⁷

Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, Victorians, p. 47.

²⁸

Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 227-228.

At about the same time the town of Mombasa was the center of a riot directed at the Church Missionary Station there. The disturbance was staged by discontented lower class Swahili peoples who felt that the work of the Church Missionary Society threatened their position as slave traders.²⁹ In 1872 the British established a regular system of mail steamer service connecting Zanzibar with the ports of Europe and British India.³⁰ Three years later a step towards organized trading was taken when a branch of the company of MacKinnon, MacKenzie, and Company was established on the island.³¹

Wishing to strengthen his armed forces in order to comply with the terms of the treaties he had signed with the British Barghash in 1874 arranged for Lieutenant William Lloyd Mathews of H.M.S. London to serve him and supervise the organization of a small army on the

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After Livingston's last journey and his subsequent attacks on the slave trade, an aroused England flooded Africa with missionaries. In the 1860's and 1870's there were intense efforts by these missionaries to reach the great lakes region of east central Africa. See Roland Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1952), pp. 9-15. (Hereinafter referred to as R. Oliver, Missionary Factor). E. A. Benians, James Butler, and C. E. Carrington (eds.), The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. III (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1959), pp. 88-92. (Hereinafter referred to as Benians, Butler, and Carrington, Cambridge History of the British Empire). Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 355-356.

30

P. L. McDermott, British East Africa (London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1893), p. 3. (Hereinafter referred to as McDermott, British East Africa).

31

Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge, Imperial British East Africa Company (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1960), p. 4. (Hereinafter referred to as Vere-Hodge, East Africa Company).

European model. Mathews arrived in Zanzibar in November of that same year, and in 1877 he drilled his first men in the service of the Sultan.³²

32

Robert Nunez Lyne, An Apostle of Empire (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1936), p. 35, pp. 40-48. (Hereinafter referred to as Lyne, Apostle).

CHAPTER II

THE EGYPTIAN INVASION

During the latter 1850's English explorers entered the lakes region and made glowing reports as to the potential of the area.¹ Richard Burton and John Hanning Speke reached Lake Tanganyika in 1858. In the same year Speke joined forces with James Augustus Grant, and together they saw Lake Victoria. By 1862 Speke and Grant had verified the fact that Lake Victoria was the source of the White Nile.² In that same year Samuel White Baker and his wife left Khartoum to explore the upper Nile tributaries. Along with Speke and Grant they discovered Lake Albert on March 14, 1863.³

No European power, however, reacted to all this exploration and discovery. The only country to react in a positive manner was Egypt under the Khedive Ismail.⁴ Because of British pressure to

1
For a convenient collection of the writings of these explorers, see: Charles Richards and James Place, (eds.), East African Explorers (London: Oxford University Press, 1960). (Hereinafter referred to as Richards and Place (eds.), Explorers).

2
Richards and Place, (eds.), Explorers, pp. 129-150 for extracts of Speke's journal.

3
Extracts from White's journal are to be found in Richards and Place (eds.), Explorers, pp. 151-178.

4
Ismail had descended from the line of the Albanian Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman general who created a modern independent state out of Egypt.

eradicate the slave trade in his provinces,⁵ Ismail appointed in 1869 Samuel White Baker to lead Egyptian forces into the area.⁶ Baker's term of office was to run for four years, and the appointment invested the new governor with absolute and final powers in the region under his command. Baker left Khartoum in February of 1870 with his forces to go south and was promptly bogged down in the Sudd⁷ where he spent the next year. By March of 1872, however, Baker reached the Victoria Nile with his command. In that same month he proclaimed the kingdom of Bunyoro a possession of the Khedive of Egypt.⁸ There erupted three months later the first trouble between Baker's men and the natives, and this led to his withdrawal during that same summer. Baker eschewed any attempts to punish the kingdom as he had decided to wait for reinforcements. As it turned out, he waited too long for in April of 1873 his term of office expired, and

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About 1860, some three or four thousand slaves per year were being brought down the Nile to Cairo from central Africa (i.e., the lakes region). B.F.S.P., Vol. LI, pp. 1069-1078. For the pressure put on Egypt by Great Britain to eradicate the slave trade in the Sudan and Cairo, see: B.F.S.P., Vol. XXVI, pp. 632-636, pp. 717-725; Vol. XXXI, pp. 594-597; Vol. XXXIII, pp. 609-613; Vol. XXXVII, p. 431-434; Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 476-477. Also see The New York Times, August 26 and December 24, 1877, page 3 in each.

6

Coupland, Exploitation, p. 273.

7

The Sudd is a marsh-land area barring the way to the south.

8

A. R. Dunbar, A History of Bunyoro-Kitara (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 59. (Hereinafter referred to as Dunbar, Bunyoro-Kitara).

his appointment was not renewed by Ismail.⁹

Ismail was disgruntled with Baker's failures, and he therefore contracted another governor for his Equatorial province through his chief adviser Nubar Pasha. In the autumn of 1873 Nubar Pasha secured the services of another Englishman, Colonel Charles George Gordon, the famous "Chinese Gordon," for the Khedive.¹⁰ Ismail's instructions to Gordon were to establish a separate government in the province of Equatoria because communications were unsure due to the incipient rebellion in the Sudan.¹¹

At approximately the same time that Gordon was attempting to carry out the Khedive's orders, the American who gained fame by finding Dr. Henry Livingstone, Henry Morton Stanley, was also in the general area of the great lakes. In early 1875 the latter was the guest of Kabaka Mutesa I of the kingdom of Buganda, who was then the dominate power in the region. In his writings Stanley described Mutesa's punitive expedition against the natives of the island of Buvuma¹² who had refused to pay tribute to the Bugandan king. The ensuing battle was a huge one by any standards since over three hundred, twenty-five

9

Dunbar, Bunyoro-Kitara, p. 61; Kenneth Ingham, A History of East Africa (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 118. (Hereinafter referred to as Ingham, East Africa).

10

Coupland, Exploitation, p. 273.

11

Dunbar, Bunyoro-Kitara, p. 62. The rebellion was later to turn into full-scale revolt culminating in the fiasco at Khartoum in January of 1885.

12

Buvuma Island is situated directly opposite the point where the Nile flows out of Lake Victoria.

canoes were involved in the several days' fight.¹³ Stanley's own exploits were not less bloody since in the latter part of 1875 he murdered several of the people of Bumbire island.¹⁴

Stanley secured the friendship of Mutesa which was something that Gordon's lieutenant, Charles Chaille-Long,¹⁵ was quite unable to do. Chaille-Long had convinced himself upon his return to Gordon's headquarters at Gondokoro that he had achieved some measure of understanding with Mutesa. When Gordon, however, sent a second lieutenant, Linant de Bellefonds, to persuade the native chief to give up his slave trading, de Bellefonds found that Mutesa did not have the same opinion.¹⁶ While de Bellefonds and Mutesa were negotiating, Stanley arrived. Stanley willingly agreed to accompany Mutesa on his expedition against the Buvuma islanders.¹⁷ This convinced the chief that he had better chances of enlisting European aid through Stanley than enlisting the assistance of the Egyptians through Gordon.¹⁸

13

Henry Morton Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, Vol. I, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1878), p. 246 and pp. 256-261. (Herein-after referred to as Stanley, Through the Dark Continent).

14

Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, Vol. I, pp. 270-296. Stanley states that these people had attacked him.

15

Chaille-Long was an American soldier-of-fortune who had served in the Federal army during the Civil War.

16

Dunbar, Bunyoro-Kitara, pp. 63-64; Oliver and Fage, Short History, pp. 176-177; Ingham, East Africa, pp. 119-120.

17

Frederick J.D. Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire, Vol. II (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1893), p. 610. (Herein-after referred to as Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire.)

18

Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, Vol. I, chs. IX-XVI.

With Gordon in the employ of the ruler of Egypt, Great Britain might well be able to see slavery eradicated in the area of the Upper Nile. Since the opening of the de Lesseps-built Suez Canal in 1869, Egypt was a vital link between the British Isles and her possessions in India and the east. In spite of the Canal's great importance Great Britain did not establish any sort of political or military control over Egypt. The British, however, acquired financial interests in the canal.

In 1875 the Earl of Beaconsfield was able to buy forty-four per cent of the shares in the canal from Ismail who was in financial troubles.¹⁹ In November of 1876 during Lord Salisbury's visit to Berlin, Bismarck suggested that England should occupy Egypt.²⁰ The next year Queen Victoria's daughter, the Empress Frederick, wrote to her mother suggesting that England establish herself in Egypt.²¹ The British ministry, however, saw no need at that time to control the political affairs of Egypt.²²

19

William Flavelle Monypenny and George Earle Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, Vol. II (rev. ed.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929) pp. 783-788. (Hereinafter referred to as Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli); Robert Blake, Disraeli (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 582-584. (Hereinafter referred to as Blake, Disraeli).

20

Frederick E. Ponsonby, (ed.), Letters of the Empress Frederick (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1929), p. 151. (Hereinafter referred to as Ponsonby, (ed.), Empress Frederick).

21

George Earl Buckle, (ed.), The Letters of Queen Victoria, Second series, Vol. II (New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1928), p. 546. (Hereinafter referred to as Buckle, (ed.), The Letters of Queen Victoria).

22

Monypenny and Buckle, Disraeli, Vol. II, p. 975.

With Gordon's help the Khedive hoped to secure the Upper Nile and deal a death blow to the slave trade both in the great lakes area and on the Nile. It was Gordon's idea to secure a port of entry in the area of Formosa Bay to central east Africa on the Indian Coast.²³ In December of 1875 he wrote to C. M. Watson of his staff that the chief problem was

...how to remedy the delay in communicating with the civilized world in a quicker way than at present.... I want to pierce Formosa Bay, distant from Mutesa about 400 miles. A series of small powerful military posts along a constructed road would do the job and free us from Khartoum and these steamers.²⁴

Gordon suggested this idea of providing easier access to Lake Victoria²⁵ to Ismail early in 1875. The Khedive accepted the idea²⁶ and dispatched a fleet under the command of H. F. McKillop to occupy the port.²⁷ In command of the land forces was Charles Chaille-Long. Chaille-Long sailed from Suez on September 17, 1875 and linked up with McKillop at

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Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire, Vol. II, p. 610.

²⁴

S. Lane-Poole, Watson Pasha, p. 61, cited in Coupland, Exploitation, p. 274.

²⁵

William F. Butler, Charles George Gordon (London: Macmillan and Company, Ltd., 1899), p. 106. (Hereinafter referred to as Butler, Gordon); A. Egmont Hake, The Story of Chinese Gordon (New York: R. Worthington, 1884), p. 195. (Hereinafter referred to as Hake, Chinese Gordon).

²⁶

Oliver and Fage, Short History, p. 175; Benians, Butler, and Carrington, Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. III, p. 81.

²⁷

Charles Chaille-Long, My Life on Four Continents, Vol. I (London: Hutchinson and Company, 1912), p. 181. (Hereinafter referred to as Chaille-Long, My Life).

Berbera on September 25. Chaille-Long brought the two steamers, Tantah and Dessouk, from Suez, and McKillop commanded the other two steamers, the Latif and the Mohammed Ali.²⁸ Chaille-Long had under him thirteen hundred men including cavalry, infantry, and artillery.²⁹ According to the Khedive's orders³⁰ the expedition was originally to disembark at the mouth of the Juba River³¹ and establish a base there.³² Orders were soon forthcoming from the Khedive to occupy Formosa Bay which was farther to the south.³³

The Egyptian expedition accordingly moved south and occupied the town of Brava. Some indication of the authority of Sultan Barghash there was noted by Chaille-Long, who protested to McKillop that

...our interference...might stir up a question of a violation of neutrality, but McKillop being the commander of the naval forces and the coast, I could not insist.³⁴

It was more than a violation; it was rather a clash of interests between the Khedive and the Sultan.³⁵ The situation also presented an interesting problem to London. Who was to be the officially sanctioned

28

Chaille-Long, My Life, p. 175.

29

Chaille-Long, My Life, p. 182.

30

Chaille-Long, My Life, p. 175.

31

The Juba River is in the present Somali Republic.

32

Coupland, Exploitation, p. 278; Chaille-Long, My Life, p. 173.

33

Coupland, Exploitation, p. 279.

34

Chaille-Long, My Life, p. 177.

35

Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, Victorians, p. 48.

power on the east coast of Africa--the Khedive or the Sultan?

While the diplomats puzzled, McKillop and Chaille-Long moved even further south and occupied Kismayu after a brief skirmish. McKillop seemed to have enjoyed himself at the ceremonies of surrender, and to make himself presentable he borrowed Chaille-Long's full-dress uniform for the occasion.³⁶ While waiting for further orders at Kismayu, McKillop had the audacity to send the steamer Tantah to Zanzibar to procure a supply of coal. Barghash sent the coal and a letter to McKillop as well informing him to use the coal to leave the Formosa Bay area. Barghash's letter was as follows:

To the Commander of the Egyptians at Kismayu.

My Brother,

I send you the coal you desire, also fruit. The latter may serve to keep you in good health, the former to take you away from my country. Go, and peace be with you.³⁷

But McKillop did not leave Kismayu, and in December Kirk went north along the coast to determine the extent of the Egyptian invasion. At the town of Kismayu Kirk was rather badly treated by one of McKillop's subordinates and returned to Zanzibar in a great state of agitation. Dr. Kirk had already lodged a protest against the presence of the Egyptian troops in the Sultan's territory with London.³⁸ McKillop did not want a fight with the Sultan's troops

³⁶
Chaille-Long, My Life, pp. 180-181.

³⁷
Chaille-Long, My Life, p. 183.

³⁸
Coupland, Exploitation, p. 285.

and most certainly not with British troops.³⁹ All the while Kirk was pressing the claims of Barghash in London. He had the backing of the missionary, philanthropic, and humanitarian interests in Britain since these groups were convinced that the doctrine of legitimate trade should be upheld in central Africa by those who were prepared to risk men and capital in its interest.⁴⁰ Two men in particular placed great pressure on the British government to keep Gordon and his Egyptian troops out of the lakes region. These men were Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton and Sir William MacKinnon.⁴¹

In the meantime Gordon was in peril of annihilation after an abortive attack on Mutesa's Buganda. Gordon had sent his lieutenant, Nuehr Aga, to Mutesa in order to secure permission to establish garrisons in his kingdom. Mutesa thought he saw the beginning of a full-scale invasion, and instead of Gordon annexing Buganda, Mutesa took Gordon's garrison force.⁴² Thus at the beginning of 1876 Gordon found it expedient to retreat from the lakes area. He reached Khartoum in early November of 1876.⁴³

With pressure on him from two sides, Gordon's defeat and British government pressure on Cairo, the Khedive had no recourse but to recall his invasion force. On December 25, 1875 the steamer Tantah, which

³⁹ Chaille-Long, My Life, p. 191; Coupland, Exploitation, p. 285.

⁴⁰ R. Oliver, Missionary Factor, pp. 87-89.

⁴¹ R. Oliver, Missionary Factor, p. 89.

⁴² Dunbar, Bunyoro-Kitara, p. 63.

⁴³ Ingham, East Africa, p. 121; Hake, Chinese Gordon, Chapter XI.

had returned to Suez after its Zanzibar coal mission, returned to the McKillop-Chaille-Long force with a laconic letter from the Khedive ordering them to return to Egypt at once.⁴⁴ McKillop wrote to Gordon from the mouth of the Juba River on December 26, 1875 that he had received orders directing him to return to Suez.⁴⁵ He also stated in the same letter that all his attempts to venture inland in order to link up with Gordon had come to naught.

The paramount consideration of the whole of the Khedive's experiment was, in British eyes, the suppression of the slave trade in East and east-central Africa. The real struggle was between Kirk and Gordon, each trying to secure for his sovereign the blessing of Great Britain. As it turned out Dr. John Kirk was right in asserting that on the east coast of Africa Barghash was a much more efficient instrument of British policy than was Ismail.⁴⁶ By this time it was becoming clear that East Africa was the back door to the Upper Nile and thus to the whole of Egypt, and as such it was a sore spot for Great Britain.⁴⁷ The Khedive's abortive invasion had shown this and in another light had been a challenge to the influence of London in Zanzibar.⁴⁸ British interests had even another reason for desiring

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Chaille-Long, My Life, p. 192.

⁴⁵

Coupland, Exploitation, p. 286, cites the letter.

⁴⁶

Coupland, Exploitation, p. 292.

⁴⁷

A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 301. (Hereinafter referred to as A.J.P. Taylor, Struggle for Mastery in Europe).

⁴⁸

Coupland, Exploitation, p. 301.

closer ties with Barghash. Barghash, under threat of rebellion in his dominions, had in 1874 asked Bismarck for German protection from British attacks on the lucrative slave trade. The request had been refused by Germany at that time, but Britain could not be sure that it would be refused again.⁴⁹

Ismail's attempt to annex the east African coast had opened Barghash's eyes to his true position. With the withdrawal of the Khedive's forces he declared that he indeed "...had never before understood the force of the disinterested friendship of Her Majesty's Government for his country..."⁵⁰ and that he was pleased to have Britain for a friend. In the following two years Barghash visited London, signed further anti-slave trade treaties, and established a European-style army under the generalship of William Lloyd Mathews.⁵¹ It was evident that an alternate method of opening up East Africa would have to be found now that Ismail's attempt had not succeeded. The method to be used was provided from Europe this time.

⁴⁹

M. J. de Kiewiet-Hemphill, "History of the Imperial British East Africa Company, 1876-1895." (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1955), p. 10. (Hereinafter referred to as Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.").

⁵⁰

Kirk's description of what the Sultan stated, quoted in Coupland, Exploitation, p. 293.

⁵¹

Lyne, Apostle, pp. 40-48.

CHAPTER III

THE MACKINNON CONCESSION

In May and June of 1876 Leopold II of Belgium visited England because he had become interested in the commercial and political possibilities of Africa.¹ Leopold's plan, as it developed, was to instigate the first period of European enterprise in equatorial Africa.² Leopold was sagacious enough to realize that his project might have to be carried out under international auspices for

...a project advanced in too exclusively Belgian a light would rouse almost certain resistance, whereas it would have a much better chance of being well received by public opinion if it presented itself under an international flag.³

By the eleventh of June he was back in Brussels arranging for an international conference to be held in September in order that the geographers, travellers, explorers, and other persons interested in the opening of Africa might meet and discuss the means for obtaining that end.⁴ Leopold invited English participation, but he had already

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Neal Ascherson, The King Incorporated (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1964), p. 11. (Hereinafter referred to as Ascherson, The King Incorporated). Roger Anstey, Britain and the Congo in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 57. (Hereinafter referred to as Anstey, Britain and the Congo).

2

A. J. P. Taylor, Struggle for Mastery in Europe, p. 294.

3

Albert Maurice, (ed.), Unpublished Letters of Henry Morton Stanley (New York: Philosophical Library Inc., 1957), p. 8. (Hereinafter cited as Maurice, Unpublished Letters).

4

William L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1931), pp. 290-291. (Hereinafter referred to as Langer, European Alliances).

determined that the headquarters of this undertaking would be situated on Belgian soil.⁵ Just before the conference met, Leopold wrote that he insisted

...on the completely charitable, completely scientific and philanthropic nature of the aim to be achieved. It is not a question of a business proposition, it is a matter of a completely spontaneous collaboration between all those who wish to engage in introducing civilization to Africa.⁶

When the conference itself opened in Brussels on September 12, 1876, Leopold gave the opening address. In it he stressed the civilizing and humanitarian aspects of the undertaking and noted that bases would be needed on both sides of Africa -- at the mouth of the Congo and on the island of Zanzibar.⁷ After the first meeting the conference broke up into smaller group discussions culminating in the establishment of an International Committee to oversee the work of the various national committees that were set up. The International Committee met once more, in 1877, and then never met again.

The British committee's formation was entrusted to the Royal Geographical Society, and this body in turn appointed its own committee to study the problem. The report of that committee assured that Britain, as a national entity, would not participate in Leopold's undertaking since it expressed the opinion that the British themselves could better carry out

⁵ Maurice, Unpublished Letters, p. 3.

⁶ A. Roeykens, Leopold II et la Conférence Géographique de Bruxelles, 1876, pp. 28-29, quoted in Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 59.

⁷ Ascherson, The King Incorporated, p. 94.

the exploration and opening up of Africa.⁸ The fate of the various other national committees approximated that of Britain's.⁹

Two individual Britons did participate. They were Sir William MacKinnon and Sir James Hutton. Along with these men the Belgian banker, Leon Lambert, and a newly formed organization called Afrikaansche Handelsvereeniging, raised 742,500 francs of the total of 1,000,000 francs Leopold had called for as the initial cost of the project.¹⁰

One other person was also interested in the project. On December 13, 1878 Sultan Barghash wrote to the British Foreign Office telling them that he had heard of the Brussels' meeting and that he wanted the participants to know that he would assist them in every possible manner.

Leopold placed the famous explorer Henry Morton Stanley in charge of opening up the Congo. Stanley did all the basic ground work in setting up the Congo state,¹² and then Leopold attempted to secure General Charles Gordon for the post of governor of the Congo. Leopold was able

⁸
Royal Geographical Society Proceedings, 1876-1877, pp. 16-20, cited in Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 61.

⁹
See Ascherson, The King Incorporated, p. 97 for the fate of the other committees.

¹⁰
Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 79; Ascherson, The King Incorporated, p. 110.

¹¹
Foreign Office Records, 84/1454 cited in Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 63.

¹²
Maurice, Unpublished Letters, p. 24; Anstey, Britain and the Congo, pp. 82-83.

to induce Sir William MacKinnon to speak with Gordon about the position, and in February of 1880 the latter went to Brussels to talk with the King. The talks came to nothing, however, because Gordon wanted the Congo to have the status of a free state and be so recognized by other governments.¹³ Leopold, however, had a different idea as to the Congo's political status.

Without Stanley's knowledge in November 1879 Leopold dropped even the pretense of committees and refunded foreign investors' money to them.¹⁴ By that time he believed that the Congo was financially strong enough to stand alone and, in any event, he was ready to assume the personal kingship of the area. It is generally agreed that the whole project as originally planned was merely a front for Leopold's own personal schemes.¹⁵ The King was interested only in Belgian annexation and in Belgian exploitation. The fact remains that the whole timing of the penetration of Africa was determined by the Congo hope of Leopold II.

Sir William MacKinnon had been interested in the opening of Africa even before his association with Leopold, but he put his own plans aside in order to more effectively work within the Belgian King's association. MacKinnon's motivation for taking part in the exploration and development of the continent of Africa was both commercial and religious.¹⁶ He was

¹³

Ascherson, The King Incorporated, p. 123. Leopold did achieve this remarkable feat at the Berlin West Africa Conference in 1885.

¹⁴

Sybil Eyre Crowe, The Berlin West Africa Conference, 1884-1885 (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1942), p. 15. (Hereinafter referred to as S. E. Crowe, West Africa).

¹⁵

Langer, European Alliances, p. 291.

¹⁶

Harry Hamilton Johnson, The Story of My Life (New York: Garden City Publishing Company, 1923), pp. 137-138 describes MacKinnon's austere religious life. (Hereinafter referred to as H. H. Johnson, Story).

born at Campbeltown in Argyleshire, Scotland on March 31, 1823, the son of poor parents. Early in his life he went to Glasgow, worked in a silk warehouse for a time, and then became employed in the office of a merchant engaged in the growing trade with the Far East and India. In 1847 he went to India to join his old friend Robert MacKenzie who had a small trading concern dealing with coastal Indian ports. Together they formed the company of MacKinnon, MacKenzie and Company, which later became the Calcutta and Burmah Steam Navigation Company and was finally renamed the British India Steam Navigation Company in 1862. During this time the trading service was extended to touch the east coast of Africa, the Dutch East Indies, and Australia. MacKinnon combined a sense of piety with his commercial interests. In one famine year he discovered that several of his agents had made a deal to convey rice at exorbitant prices. Upon learning this, MacKinnon arranged for the rice to be transported at below cost. In 1873 he established a mail service between Aden and Zanzibar and through this arrangement had gained the friendship and confidence of Sultan Barghash.¹⁷

In November after he returned from Brussels, MacKinnon was instrumental in calling a meeting of commercial and philanthropist interests in Glasgow to discuss various ways of gaining access into the interior of Africa. At this meeting the decision was made to construct a road from the harbor city of Dar-es-Salaam to Lake Nyasa.¹⁸ Of course

¹⁷

The above account of William MacKinnon's life is from: Vere-Hodge, East Africa Company; Edward Irving Carlyle, "Sir William MacKinnon," The Dictionary of National Biography, Vol. XXII, supplement (London: Oxford University Press, 1922), pp. 999ff. (Hereinafter referred to as Dictionary of National Biography).

¹⁸

R. Oliver, Missionary Factor, p. 89.

before undertaking this operation, the permission of Sultan Barghash would be needed. This MacKinnon proceeded to secure by means of having Dr. John Kirk approach the Sultan. Kirk was willing to do this since he was at this time fearful of a re-enactment of the Egyptian invasion, perhaps by another country, of the Sultan's dominions.¹⁹ Barghash accepted Kirk's advice, and in December of 1876 he wrote to Lord Derby, then British Foreign Secretary, telling him that he

...was pleased much when told by the honoured Dr. Kirk of the intention to open roads to Lake Nyasa and the sea of Ujiji and the Ukerewe of Uganda, and I should wish these my friends to know by Your Lordship that it is my desire to render every assistance to them throughout my dominions.²⁰

Because of the attitude adopted by Barghash MacKinnon proposed in January of 1877 to go beyond the original plan calling for mere road building and to form a company which would take over the administration and the opening up of the east coast of the African continent. One of MacKinnon's partners in this proposed venture was the Reverend Horace Waller.²¹ In a letter to MacKinnon he likened the company to the East India Company of old with wide powers covering all aspects of economic and political operations. The proposed company would have the power to appoint commissioners, to pass laws, to maintain an army, to make treaties with the natives, to take all unoccupied land and

19

Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 70.

20

F. O. 84/1454, December 13, 1876, quoted in Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.," p. 37.

21

The Reverend Horace Waller had long been associated with African concerns. He had worked with Livingstone and had also been associated with the missions established by the Universities Mission to Central Africa.

dispose of it as was seen fit, and to collect taxes. It was also to have exclusive rights over all mining and forestry activities in the area. Customs would be collected by the company at the ports along the coast. In fact the company would have been a colonial power in every sense.²² Because of MacKinnon's Indian interests it is understandable he would seize upon this chance to duplicate the feats of the trading companies of old. But once again the Sultan's approval was needed as a concession would be necessary before Barghash turned over to the company all his power on the mainland of the African continent. Barghash would share in the profits of the company by means of an annual rental fee to be paid to him by the company as well as a percentage of the total profits.²³ Kirk consulted the Sultan on the matter and wrote to MacKinnon in April of 1877 telling him that Barghash was favorably inclined towards granting the proposed company the needed concession.²⁴

MacKinnon wanted to secure the approval of his government before embarking on the undertaking, however, and so asked the Foreign Office for support in this venture. MacKinnon received an informal affirmative.

Sir Julian Pauncefote, then the legal under-secretary at the Foreign Office, wrote to MacKinnon in December of 1877 telling him that he was

22

The MacKinnon Papers, located in the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Horace Waller to MacKinnon, January 12, 1877. (Hereinafter referred to as MacKinnon Papers).

23

Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 306-308, citing the text of the proposed concession from the Kirk Papers.

24

MacKinnon Papers, Kirk to MacKinnon, April 19, 1877.

...directed by the Earl of Derby to acknowledge the receipt of your letter....I am to state to you in reply that this scheme is one which it is competent to you and to the parties associated with you to carry into effect without the sanction of Her Majesty's Government, but that as it seems calculated to render considerable aid in the suppression of the slave trade and to develop the resources of that part of Africa which is to be the scene of your contemplated operations, it commends itself to such support as Her Majesty's Government can properly afford to such an undertaking. I am to add, however, that they would not feel justified in giving to it a formal sanction, and they must reserve to themselves the right of free action in the event of complications arising which might imperil the good relations of this country with Foreign Powers.²⁵

MacKinnon seemed to have been satisfied with this reply, and therefore in March of 1878 he sent his negotiators to Zanzibar to conclude the concession with Barghash.²⁶

The two negotiators, Gerald Waller, the brother of Horace, and George Percy Badger, an Arabic scholar of note as well as a personal friend of Barghash, arrived in Zanzibar on April 4, 1878 with the terms of the concession.

General Waller had specific instructions from MacKinnon:

A leading object of the association represented by us would be to occupy the territory between the coast and Lake Victoria in His Highness' name, so as to prevent the Egyptian Government, which would neither respect His Highness' sovereignty nor the liberties of the native populations, from extending its baneful influence in that direction. His Highness not having the means of occupying and developing his continental possessions now lying waste and unprotected and offering to the Egyptians who are rapidly extending southwards a strong temptation to come and occupy them, the proposal you have to submit will present to His Highness an opportunity of vigorously accomplishing this without any cost to his government:

²⁵

Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.," p. 37; Coupland, Exploitation, p. 312.

²⁶

Coupland, Exploitation, p. 306.

and should His Highness think fit to grant the concessions, the recognition of His Highness's territorial rights and an approval of the steps they intend to take, both of which they have good reasons for believing will be cordially granted. On your arrival at Zanzibar you will please to put yourself in confidential communication with Dr. Kirk and be guided by him as to the mode you should adopt in approaching His Highness on the subject of these concessions and in all other matters relating to this important proposal.²⁷

The talk with Barghash ensued at once and lasted through the rest of April and into May. In May Kirk wrote to MacKinnon telling him that the Zanzibarie Arabs were voicing strong objections to Barghash's signing the concession because of their fear of any sort of European intervention in East Africa and the possibility that they would lose their vested interests on the mainland.²⁸ There was also another concern. On the part of Dr. Kirk this was the fear that Badger would spoil the chances for Barghash's approval because of his ill-tempered personality and his tactics of trying to bully the Sultan into accepting the concession.²⁹

Kirk's apprehensions proved to be well grounded, and within a very short time the negotiations were broken off and Waller and Badger sailed for England. Barghash wrote to MacKinnon telling him that he could not afford to lose the friendship of a certain Indian merchant, one Tharia Topan, which he most certainly would do as Topan had threatened to dissolve all partnerships if Barghash signed the concession.³⁰

²⁷

Coupland, Exploitation, p. 306, quoting MacKinnon's instructions to Waller found in the Kirk Papers.

²⁸

MacKinnon Papers, Kirk to MacKinnon, May 31, 1878.

²⁹

MacKinnon Papers, Kirk to MacKinnon, May 4, 1878.

³⁰

MacKinnon Papers, Barghash to MacKinnon, May 22, 1878.

Barghash, however, sent a revised concession for MacKinnon's consideration. Kirk stated that the revised concession was merely a put off.³¹

All chances for the concession were at an end, but there was more to it than that. It was asserted soon after the failure of the negotiations that MacKinnon simply did not receive enough encouragement from the Foreign Office to induce him to continue his attempts to gain a concession from the Sultan.³² In 1877 a questioner in the House of Commons asked for Government assistance in paying for the road that MacKinnon had begun at Dar-es-Salaam and received a negative answer to his query.³³ Compounding these two setbacks, MacKinnon was at the time involved in litigation because of a suit brought against him by the liquidators of the Glasgow Bank, of which he had formerly been a director.³⁴ He was finally exonerated, but it is certain that he gave this matter his full attention at the time thereby temporarily postponing his plans for East Africa. But the death blow had been dealt to MacKinnon's dreams by the Foreign Office and more particularly by Lord Salisbury, the new Foreign Secretary.³⁵

In the 1880's when the question of the concession again was raised at the Foreign Office, Villiers Lister, then the assistant under-secretary,

³¹

MacKinnon Papers, Kirk to MacKinnon, June 28, 1878.

³²

Francis de Winton, "England and Germany in East Africa," The Nineteenth Century, Vol. XXVII (January-June, 1890), p. 722.

³³

Great Britain, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CCXXXII, p. 391. (Hereinafter referred to as Hansard's Parliamentary Debates).

³⁴

Dictionary of National Biography, p. 999.

³⁵

Blake, Disraeli, pp. 598-645.

wrote: "There is a secret history of the failure of the former MacKinnon scheme which I will not commit to paper."³⁶ It has been discovered that Lord Salisbury, fearing British involvement in East Africa, contacted Badger before he left for Zanzibar in March and directed him to ruin the concession before it was signed. After Badger had seen to this, he wrote to Salisbury:

The Sultan was most grateful for the hints which your Lordship conveyed to him through me, and it is not impossible that they co-operated to induce him to use greater caution in the matter of the proposed concession.³⁷

But all the fault may not rest on Salisbury's shoulders for Kirk had written to Horace Waller that he was

...glad you agree with me that schemes for the good of Africa must be financially successful to the promoters. I am sick and tired of the cant everyone tells me of MacKinnon's disinterestedness. Bosh!³⁸

MacKinnon's only connection with Africa in the next few years was through Leopold's Congo schemes. He attempted to secure Gordon's services for Leopold but to no avail.³⁹ As late as 1886 Kirk could

³⁶

Foreign Office 84/1737, Lister memorandum, 1885, quoted in Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.," p. 41.

³⁷

Foreign Office 84/1528, Badger to Salisbury, July 3, 1878, quoted in Roland Oliver, Sir Harry Johnson and the Scramble for Africa (London: Chatte and Windus, 1957), p. 84, (Hereinafter referred to as R. Oliver, Sir Harry Johnson).

³⁸

Kirk to Horace Waller, October 17, 1878, quoted in Coupland, Exploitation, p. 317, from the Kirk Papers.

³⁹

Vere-Hodge, East Africa Company, Dictionary of National Biography, pp. 999 ff.

write to MacKinnon telling him that he could understand the latter's unwillingness to embark on an East African business venture since there was very little to encourage him.⁴⁰

CHAPTER IV

BRITISH OPPORTUNITIES

In the early years of the 1800's MacKinnon turned to Leopold and the Congo venture, and Great Britain became embroiled in affairs in Egypt and the Sudan thereby temporarily forestalling British Foreign Office interest in East Africa. In Egypt the attempts of the Khedives to create a modern state through the use of European methods had all come to nothing. By the middle of the 1870's the country was financially bankrupted, and Bismarck was urging Disraeli to take control of Egypt.¹ In April of 1879, because of his growing incompetency, the British and French effected the overthrow of Khedive Ismail and placed his son, Tewfik, in his place. Unrest grew in the country because of a nascent nationalism. In January of 1881 Egyptian army officers under the leadership of Colonel Ahmed Arabi Bey forced the Minister of War to relinquish his post. By September of the same year they, joined by the rising tide of nationalist forces, were able to effect the dissolution of the entire ministry. In December a new parliament was formed which demanded more rights for Egyptians. The reply of Britain and France was the Gambetta Note issued to the nationalist forces in January of 1882. The note was a rejection of the nationalists' demands for the complete control of their government. In July 1882 British warships demolished the breastworks which had been erected by the men of Arabi Bey at Alexandria and then landed troops who were

¹

See Page 12 of this thesis.

able to eradicate all opposition within six weeks' time.² Though Gladstone assured the world that Britain had no intentions of remaining in Egypt permanently, Lord Salisbury warned at the time that there was only one real power in Egypt and that power was Great Britain.³ As it developed Salisbury was right, and all British attention was focused on Egypt.

In the meantime, the Sultan of Zanzibar was determined to preserve the territorial integrity of his empire. As a result of the abortive Egyptian invasion of East Africa Barghash had seen that the British were the ones to help him in this. He decided to secure her protection by drawing up an act of succession which the British would concur in, honor, and protect. The text of that act of succession follows:

This is my will regarding the succession to the Government of Zanzibar and its dependencies. In the name of God.

From Barghash-bin-Sultan, be it known to those who may see this that, finding it for the public good to make an arrangement for the government of Zanzibar after my death and to remove any doubt and dispute, my wish and intention is that the British Government shall promise the throne of Zanzibar and its dependencies to the eldest of my sons and after him to his son, should he have one, and so on until they come of age. And regarding the man we may name as Regent during the minority of our son, our wish is that in the event of his doing anything to the injury of the Kingdom or to the disadvantage of our son it shall be for the Great Government to remove him at their discretion and to place in his stead one of their choice,

2

Langer, European Alliances, pp. 260-261.

3

Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1921-1932), Vol. III, pp. 94-95. (Hereinafter referred to as Cecil, Life of Salisbury)

and so to do until the coming to the years of wisdom of our son, which when he shall reach the government be delivered to him. The full meaning of this is that the Great Government shall act for us in everything, should God cause anything to come upon us before our sons are of age. And in this we invoke the help of God. And Salaam.

Written by my hand,⁴
August 26, 1881

The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, in a letter to Barghash thanked the Sultan for his confidence in the British empire but declined to accept any further commitments on behalf of the Queen for the present.⁵ Two years later, in December of 1884, Barghash tried once more to get British protection. This time he drew up a deed committing himself and his successors to always seek the advice of Great Britain and never to allow his nation to become a protectorate of any other nation. He wrote:

I, Barghash-bin-Said, Sultan of Zanzibar and of the interior of Africa, will not accept the protectorate of any nation whatever nor cede my sovereign rights or any part of my dominions which are in the islands or on the mainland of Africa from Tungi in the south to Warsheikh in the north to any Power or Association without consulting the English, and this I do for myself and my successors.

Written by my hand,
Barghash-bin-Said⁶
December 6, 1884

This time the Foreign Office did not reply.

⁴
Copy of the act of succession drawn by Barghash, found in the Kirk Papers, quoted by Coupland, Exploitation, p. 377.

⁵
Granville to Barghash, June 19, 1882, the Kirk Papers, quoted by Coupland, Exploitation, p. 381.

⁶
Memorandum by Barghash found in the Kirk Papers and quoted by Coupland, Exploitation, p. 388.

The British did, however, sign a commercial treaty with Barghash on April 30, 1886.⁷ At the time, however, Barghash was signing commercial treaties with all the interested powers so Great Britain was not displaying any distinguishable interest.

An opportunity for British interests in East Africa during this period was made by Harry Hamilton Johnson, a botanist and more importantly an adventurer given over to the cause of empire. Johnson had been in Tunis during the French occupation and through conversations with their officials had learned to view the Mediterranean and the Egyptian episode as a prelude to the sudden takeover of the whole continent. He said that the western powers of the continent of Europe seemed to be readying themselves for an attack on Africa.⁸ In April of 1880 the ministry of Lord Beaconsfield was replaced by that of Gladstone and the Liberal Party which supposedly was anti-imperialistic. Johnson's reaction was as follows:

I was in Tunis at the time, and in my twenty-first year. For some time I had taken an increasing interest in foreign politics, and the idea of Gladstone's advent to power, pledged by his speeches to withdraw from Candahar and to give up Cyprus, filled me with such dismay and regret that I said to myself, 'Why, if you take such an intense interest in the Empire, not become yourself an active agent for its extension?'

I resolved that I would, and the whole tenor of my life has been changed by the resolution taken that morning under the Moorish arcades of my dirty but picturesque abode in

7

B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVII, p. 54.

8

H. H. Johnson, Story, p. 77

Tunis.⁹

Late in 1883 Harry Johnson was provided with funds in order that he might undertake a combined natural history and botanical expedition to Mt. Kilimanjaro. The money was supplied by the Royal Society, the British Association, and was supplemented by the Royal Geographical Society.¹⁰ Johnson himself states that his purpose in going to Tanganyika was merely to collect flora and fauna. He admits, however, that when he stopped at Zanzibar Dr. John Kirk provided him with a form treaty which when signed by the proper native chiefs, and if the Sultan of Zanzibar was agreeable to relinquishing his suzerainty over the Kilimanjaro region, would make them subjects of the Queen of England.¹¹ Johnson later remarked that he was gratefully surprised that the Gladstone Government gave him this chance to further the cause of empire.¹²

Johnson was only twenty-five years of age in March of 1884 when he sailed from England for East Africa by way of Egypt and Aden. In Zanzibar Johnson spent several weeks conversing with Dr. John Kirk, and then in mid-May he quit the island for the mainland port of Mombasa. He struck inland at once and within three weeks reached

9

Alex Johnson, The Life and Letters of Sir Harry Johnson (New York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1929), p. 30. (Hereinafter referred to as A. Johnson, Letters of Harry Johnson.)

10

A. Johnson, Letters of Harry Johnson, p. 65.

11

H. H. Johnson, Story, pp. 130-138 and p. 145.

12

A. Johnson, Letters of Harry Johnson, p. 66.

Kilimanjaro, the territory of the Chagga, where he made contact with the chief of the Moshi,¹³ one Mandara. Mandara granted Johnson permission to build a base of operations on the side of Kilimanjaro which afforded him a grand view of the surrounding country.¹⁴ In late June Johnson assisted Mandara in a one-day war against the Kibosho tribe thereby furthering the already good relationship between the two men.¹⁵ Relations were very good as a matter of fact, and on July 10, 1884 Johnson wrote to Edmond Fitzmaurice, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, that

here is a country as large as Switzerland, enjoying a singularly fertile soil and healthy climate, capable of producing every vegetable production of the tropical and temperate zones, ...here is a land eminently suited for European colonization, situated near midway between the Equatorial Lakes and the Coast. Within a few years it must be either English, French or German. The German traveller, Dr. Fischer and the French explorer M. Revoil have both directed the attention of their respective governments to the project of colonizing Kilimanjaro, while that idea is not even beyond the scope of action of the International African Association. However all these are still hesitating, while I am on the spot, the first in the field, and should be able to make Kilimanjaro as completely English as Ceylon, should I receive the necessary authorization. Moreover this might be done without exciting any notice or involving any responsibility for a cost not exceeding £5,000. I have only to invite a certain number of chosen colonists...to come and occupy the beautiful sites which will be given them gratis, and there to cultivate the vine, the coffee plant, the sugar-cane, rice, wheat, oranges and limes- and the

¹³

Moshi was a state within the larger Chagga tribe.

¹⁴

A. Johnson, Letters of Harry Johnson, pp. 77-78.

¹⁵

R. Oliver, Sir Harry Johnson, p. 66; A. Johnson, Letters of Harry Johnson, pp. 81-83.

principal points of this healthy district will soon be made, 170 or 180 miles distant; trade will flow entirely into English hands; the ivory, wax, iron, hides of the interior will come to our markets. And this without any overt act beyond the making of an agreement with Mandara and permitting him to fly the English flag. He desires all sorts of European things-forges, sewing-machines, guns, ammunition, tables, pictures, etcetera. In return he will trade in the fine ivory, wax and gums of his country. Think of the cultivation of quinine in a region singularly adapted for its favourable growth. Think even of the preserves of African elephants which might be formed in the forests of this mountain. Think what a commanding position this hilly district, with its European climate, occupies in Eastern Equatorial Africa. All the trade from the Coast, with an intervening district offering no difficulties whatever in the construction of roads and railways, Kilimanjaro offers an admirable center for that occupation and colonization of Eastern Africa that must inevitably come from one of the European powers.... What is wanted is \$5,000 only with which to engage a hundred workmen to make a good road to the Coast, clear the forests here and build timber houses. Then, in a year's time, when all is ready, missionaries and colonists might be invited to take up their abodes on Mandara's territory. A careful selection should be made, so that no debauchees, or drunkards, or fanatics should disturb the peace of the rising colony, nor break the pleasant intercourse which at present exists between the natives and the little known white man. Nor should Kilimanjaro be made the subject of speculative companies - it is for this reason that I address myself privately to you before proclaiming to the world at large the advantages of this region. What should first be done is to introduce European cattle, livestock, vegetables, etcetera, build houses and then invite the colonists and let every man henceforth cultivate and trade on his own account. Here amid my natural history and anthropological studies I shall wait inactive until I receive the reply with which I hope you will favour me, and any suggestion you may make, whether it be in accordance with my own wishes or not, I shall strictly carry out.¹⁶

In the summer of that year, Johnson was able to secure Mandara's

16

H. H. Johnson to Edmond Fitzmaurice from Chagga, October 7, 1884, Foreign Office 84/1687, quoted in R. Oliver, Sir Harry Johnson, pp. 66-68.

mark on the form which Kirk had given him in Zanzibar.¹⁷ Then in September Johnson concluded a treaty with all the chiefs of the Taveita tribe, the terms of which gave Johnson full and absolute rights over a three by two mile area of land near Kilimanjaro. The treaty made it clear that Johnson planned to bring European settlers to the area to found a town and that the treaty itself was not only given to him but to whomever he designated as his representative.¹⁸

During the latter months of 1884, while Johnson was still in Africa, his letter to Fitzmaurice was causing comment in England. The letter had arrived at the same time that Germany had made her sudden appearance on the colonial scene and at the time when Anglo-Portuguese relations on the west coast of Africa had been brought to a head.¹⁹ For these reasons Fitzmaurice, Sir T. Villiers Lister, who was a Foreign Office Under-Secretary whom Johnson knew, and Lord Granville himself, favored British acceptance of Johnson's plans.

Fitzmaurice wrote to Granville:

The proposal, as I understand it, is that he or Sir John Kirk or somebody should be allowed to hoist the British flag and forestall...the Germans and the International Association. Could we not send out Sir John Kirk empowering him to communicate with Johnson at once and have the British flag hoisted...? I would like to pay off the Germans for the Cameroons.²⁰

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H. H. Johnson, Story, p. 136.

18

The text of this treaty was enclosed in Foreign Office 84/1746 and is quoted by R. Oliver, Sir Harry Johnson, p. 74.

19

See CHAPTER V.

20

Fitzmaurice to Granville, Foreign Office 84/1687, quoted by R. Oliver, Sir Harry Johnson, p. 72.

On October 10 Granville sent a telegram to Kirk asking him for his opinion on the matter. Kirk's reply was that the Foreign Office should wait until Johnson returned to Zanzibar before any action was taken. Granville again sent a telegraph to Kirk and correctly noted that if Kirk's advice was followed it was likely that the Germans would beat the British to the area. In any event, Johnson was waiting for his answer now. Kirk procrastinated further. He wrote to Granville stating that he saw no danger of German annexation at all.²¹ The next month Kirk wrote to Granville again telling him that the British should be careful not to ruin their good relations with Barghash by annexing any territory in East Africa. If Britain did so, Kirk went on, there would soon be little left of the Sultan's possessions.²²

Meanwhile, several officials, including Clement Hill at the Foreign Office, Lord Kimberley who was the Secretary of the India Office, as well as Lords Derby and Granville, devised a scheme by which Barghash was to send Mathews into the Kilimanjaro region to negotiate treaties with the natives on behalf of the Sultan.²³ Granville immediately sent Kirk a note telling him to set the plan in motion. The officials, however, had acted without the consent

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How very wrong Kirk was! Even before he wrote this note Carl Peters had arrived in East Africa and was negotiating treaties with native chiefs. See: CHAPTER V, pp. 49-50.

²²

H. H. Johnson, Story, pp. 130-138; A. Johnson, Letters of Harry Johnson, pp. 94-95; R. Oliver, Sir Harry Johnson, pp. 70-77.

²³

Coupland, Exploitation, p. 394; Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.," p. 59, H. H. Johnson, Story, p. 134.

of the Prime Minister, who was against British expansion in East Africa. Gladstone when he learned of the plan wrote:

Terribly have I been puzzled and perplexed on finding a group of the soberest men among us to have concocted a scheme such as that touching the mountain country behind Zanzibar with an unrememberable name. There must somewhere or other be reasons for it which have not come before me. I have asked Granville whether it may not stand over for a while.²⁴

Granville accordingly wrote to Kirk instructing him to disregard his first directive and not to plan any action without the support of the British Government. No action was taken by the Sultan.

At this juncture James F. Hutton of Manchester wrote to Percy Anderson of the African section of the Foreign Office asking official support for a scheme put forth by the Vice-Consul at Zanzibar, Fredrick Holmwood. Holmwood's scheme entailed the creation of a new British Company which would obtain concessions from the Sultan and construct a railway from the coast at the town of Tanga to Mount Kilimanjaro.²⁵ The Foreign Office considered the matter, but when it was discovered that Hutton and his supporters wanted their scheme to be given the full support of the British government no further action was taken.²⁶ It is not surprising, however, that official approval was not given since the Prime Minister was opposed to any expansion in East Africa. Furthermore, the Foreign Office was unwilling to antagonize Bismarck.

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S. Gwynn and G. M. Tuckwell, Life of Sir Charles Dilke, Vol. I, pp. 83-84, quoted in R. Oliver, Sir Harry Johnson, p. 77.

²⁵

Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 424-427, Kiewiet-Hamphill, "I.B.E.A.," pp. 66-68.

²⁶

Quoted by Coupland, Exploitation, p. 428.

The Germans had interests in East Africa, and German support for Britain's Egyptian policy was needed.²⁷ According to Johnson's account of the matter²⁸ MacKinnon was approached by Hutton and the Baroness Burdett-Coutts and urged to accept Johnson's treaties, send men out to East Africa, and convert the Kilimanjaro area into British East Africa. MacKinnon declined the offer. He refused to have any faith whatsoever in the east coast of the dark continent.²⁹

Johnson's concessions and his plans had thus come to naught, and a brilliant opportunity for Britain had been missed. Kirk later wrote to Johnson lamenting that the two of them working together might have been able to secure British interests.³⁰

²⁷

Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, Victorians, pp. 192-194; Coupland, Exploitation, p. 428, Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.," p. 68.

²⁸

Johnson had returned to London in late December of 1884.

²⁹

H. H. Johnson, Story, p. 139; A. Johnson, Letters of Harry Johnson, p. 93.

³⁰

Kirk to Johnson, 1887, in A. Johnson, Letters of Harry Johnson, p. 69.

CHAPTER V
DELIMITATION AND PARTITION

From 1881 through 1884 Great Britain was engaged in negotiations with Portugal concerning Portuguese claims in West Africa. Britain had co-operated with Portugal in efforts to suppress the slave trade in that area as early as 1877.¹ In 1881 the French had begun to move into the region of the Congo River, and London was fearful that their doing so constituted a threat to British trade.² Britain was thus willing to recognize Portuguese claims of control over both banks of the Congo River mouth. If this were done Portugal could act on behalf of free trade, and Britain would not find it necessary to involve herself in the area at all. It would, in other words, cost Britain nothing, and therefore the Gladstone Government was entirely willing to accept Portuguese claims.³ A draft treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Portugal in April of 1883.⁴ There was an immediate protest by Prince Bismarck who must have felt somewhat left out of things.⁵ With several concessions made by Portugal, the final form of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty was signed in Lisbon

¹

Anstey, Britain and the Congo, pp. 84-88.

²

Anstey, Britain and the Congo, p. 101.

³

Benians, Butler and Carrington, Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. III, p. 128.

⁴

The New York Times, January 7, 1883, p. 1.

⁵

The New York Times, May 16, 1883, p. 16.

on February 26, 1884.⁶ By term of Article III reciprocity of trade was guaranteed to both nations in their respective African territories.

Article III stated:

The subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall in the African colonies of the other enjoy the privileges of the most favoured nation in all matters relating to navigation and commerce and to customs dues.

Britain and Portugal therefore had a working agreement concerning Africa. The treaty was, however, never ratified by the British. The reasons for this were several. First, there was strong, organized opposition to the treaty in England. This opposition was led by those Englishmen who were associated with Leopold's Congo schemes, and they wished to see British acceptance of a free Congo state under the direction of the Belgian King. Hutton wrote to his cohort MacKinnon in the summer of 1884 that their objectives in the Congo would be laid to waste if the Portuguese claims were recognized by Britain.⁷

The House of Commons had already begun to debate the treaty in the early months of 1883. The debate was led by Jacob Bright, M.P., a friend of Hutton and MacKinnon. The upshot of the debate was that in April of 1883 Gladstone was forced to agree to submit the whole of the treaty to Parliament before the government could ratify it.⁸

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B.S.F.P., Vol. LXXV, pp. 476-482. For the correspondence between Britain and Portugal concerning this treaty, consisting of 26 letters, see B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXV, pp. 1272-1334.

7

MacKinnon Papers, Hutton to MacKinnon, July 4, 1884.

8

For the debate in the House of Commons on the proposed Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, see Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CCLXXVI, pp. 830, 1429, 1724, 1725, 1889; Vol. CCLXXVII, pp. 813-814, 1284-1296, 1298-1300, 1321-1327.

The result of the debate and the pressure of Hutton and MacKinnon on behalf of Leopold was a stiffening of terms by Britain. However, even with all the changes made the Portuguese still signed the treaty on February 26. Hutton wrote to MacKinnon that the course of action now to be taken was simply to get rid of the treaty.⁹ There was a rapid escalation of lobbying in opposition to the treaty,¹⁰ and Hutton enlisted the aid of all English Chambers of Commerce by means of a circular letter.¹¹ Perhaps the domestic opposition could have been placated, but now there was opposition from abroad.

In March France had sent a note protesting the treaty¹² which was not unwavering in its demands.¹³ On June 7 a note received from the German minister in London made it clear that Prince Bismarck would not accept the treaty in any form whatsoever.¹⁴ With alacrity Granville, the British Foreign secretary, abnegated the treaty and the Portuguese minister agreed with him.¹⁵ Germany and Great Britain had had a working arrangement whereby there existed mutual support for each other in international affairs.¹⁶ Bismarck, however, did

⁹ MacKinnon Papers, Hutton to MacKinnon, March 18, 1884.

¹⁰ The Times (London), April 30, 1884, p. 4.

¹¹ The Times (London), March 11, 1884, p. 4.

¹² S. E. Crowe, West Africa, p. 24.

¹³ S. E. Crowe, West Africa, pp. 23-28.

¹⁴ S. E. Crowe, West Africa, p. 32.

¹⁵ S. E. Crowe, West Africa, p. 32.

¹⁶ Langer, European Alliances, p. 283.

not seem to have any sort of agreement in mind when he approached France with the idea for an international conference.¹⁷ Perhaps Bismarck was disturbed by British vacillation over the matter of agreement concerning the German settlement at Angra Pequena Bay in Southwest Africa.¹⁸ There were perhaps other reasons as well. The English historian A.J.P. Taylor asserts that Bismarck picked a quarrel with Great Britain at that time because he wished to prove to France that his approach to her was not merely a sham.¹⁹ There were also domestic reasons why he should quarrel with London in 1884: he wished to involve Germany in a colonial conflict with England so that he might point out that the Reich was in danger and thus encourage nationalism; he needed fuel with which to feed the coming Reichstag elections; and, finally, he wanted to strangle the Anglophil sentiments of the Crown Prince who was to soon succeed to power.²⁰

Meanwhile in England H. M. Stanley was making a speaking tour in order to promote the cause of Leopold's Association. He spoke in London on September 18, in Manchester on October 21, and in both cities received wholehearted support.²¹ The Foreign Office, however, distrusted Leopold's whole scheme because of his clandestine maneuvers

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S. E. Crowe, West Africa, p. 21.

18

S. E. Crowe, West Africa, pp. 39-41.

19

A. J. P. Taylor, Struggle for Mastery in Europe, p. 294.

20

A. J. P. Taylor, Struggle for Mastery in Europe, pp. 292-293.

21

The Times (London), September 19, 1884, p. 6, October 22, 1884, p. 10.

in England.²² However, by the latter months of 1884, due to further pressure from Bismarck, the Foreign Office first sympathized with Leopold's Association and finally, by treaty, recognized its flag as the flag of an independent and friendly nation.²³

Britain, therefore, voluntarily scrapped the Anglo-Portuguese convention²⁴ and began correspondence with Germany concerning the meeting of a conference at Berlin that would settle the West African question.²⁵ The conference began in November and continued through the winter, finally being concluded in February of 1885.²⁶ Besides recognizing Leopold's Association,²⁷ the conference stipulated that if a European country wanted to annex African territory, she must issue a proclamation to that effect.²⁸

22

S. E. Crowe, West Africa, pp. 86-87.

23

S. E. Crowe, West Africa, p. 90, pp. 146-147.

24

Hoskins, European Imperialism, p. 41.

25

B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXV, pp. 1013-1036.

26

The New York Times, November, 1884 through February 1885, is an accessible account of the progress of the Congress.

27

B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVI, pp. 6-20.

28

Article thirty-four stated: La Puissance qui dorenavant prendra possession d'un territoire sur les côtes du continent Africain situé en dehors de ses possessions actuelles, ou qui, n'en ayant pas en jusque-là, viendrait à en acquérir, et de même la Puissance qui y assumera un Protectorat, accompagnera l'acte respectif d'une Notification adressée aux autres Puissances Signataires du présent Acte, afin de les mettre à même de faire valoir, s'il y a lieu, leurs réclamations. B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVI, p. 19.

The Congress of Berlin of 1884-1885 then recognized the right of the powers of Europe to annex African territories not held by other peoples. In effect it gave official sanction to the new imperialism.²⁹ By it Britain to all intents and purposes conceded West Africa to Germany and turned her attention to the east coast.

Official German action had been taken in East Africa in October of 1884 with the appointment of Gerhard Rohlfs, an intrepid German adventurer who had traversed the Sahara Desert, to the post of Consul-General to the court of the Sultan of Zanzibar. The fact that he was an ardent advocate of German expansion was known in London.³¹ The next month the German press carried stories that Germany was in fact about to annex the island and declare it a German protectorate.³² The real work of German expansion in East Africa, however, was already in progress, albeit unauthorized, under the direction of Carl Peters.

An organization designed to promote the expansion of Germany overseas had been formed in the year 1882; the Kolonialverein. This society was in every aspect a respectable organization composed of sober men whose aim was to identify the demand for colonies with German nationalism.³³ Peters was an extremist within this group,

29

Hoskins, European Imperialism, p. 41.

30

Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, Victorians, p. 191.

31

Coupland, Exploitation, p. 398.

32

Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.," p. 62.

33

Mary Evelyn Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire, 1884-1918 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930), pp. 81-82. (Hereinafter referred to as Townsend, Germany's Colonial Empire.)

and finally in March of 1884 he had broken with it and had founded the Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation.³⁴ This society was supported in its founding by thirty other Germans who felt that the whole process of overseas expansion was progressing entirely too slowly. Its avowed purpose was the founding of a colony. Its manifesto emphasized the need to establish a German colony in Africa before the whole continent was annexed by other European powers.³⁵ Peters discovered to his dismay that the German Foreign Office wanted nothing to do with him or with his organization.³⁶ Therefore he decided to embark on a colonizing expedition without the knowledge of the Foreign Office. Accordingly in September of 1884 he and three of his cohorts, Count Joachim Pfeil, Dr. Carl Juhlke, and August Otto, left Trieste bound for Aden. They were disguised as mechanics and were traveling under aliases in order to avoid detection.³⁷ On November 4, 1884 they reached Zanzibar where they remained until the 10th. On that date Peters and his party crossed the twenty-mile stretch of water to the mainland port of Saadani. From there they progressed inland due west to the hitherland area of Usagara.³⁸ Peters returned to Zanzibar on December 17, 1884 having concluded

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Lyne, Apostle, p. 67; Townsend, Germany's Colonial Empire, p. 83.

³⁵

Townsend, Germany's Colonial Empire, pp. 83-85; Lyne, Apostle, p. 67.

³⁶

Carl Peters, New Light on Dark Africa (London: Ward Lock, and Company, 1891), p. 63. (Hereinafter referred to as Peters, New Light).

³⁷

Townsend, Germany's Colonial Empire, pp. 132-133.

³⁸

For the detail of the journey see, Peters, New Light.

twelve treaties with native chiefs. He was alone since Otto had died and Pfeil and Juhlke remained in the interior in order to negotiate further treaties.³⁹ The authenticity of these treaties was not beyond question to say the least. In a letter from Archdeacon Farler, of the Universities Mission of Central Africa, to Lord Kitchener it was stated that the Germans who concluded the treaties did not speak one single word of Swahili and that the natives did not speak any German at all.⁴⁰ In another letter to Kitchener Farler said that in one town in the interior the German party led by Peters made no mention whatsoever of their desire to negotiate a treaty yet later at Zanzibar claimed to have done so.⁴¹ Even Kitchener himself, in a letter to the Foreign Office dated June 30, 1886, revealed that Juhlke had in one case manufactured a Sultan so that he might sign away his rights.⁴²

Twelve treaties were, however, in Peters' possession when he returned to Berlin in February, 1885. Over a week before the final meeting of the Berlin West African Conference Carl Peters and his associates were granted a charter by the Kaiser giving official sanction to the Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation.

39

B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVII, pp. 11-22 contains all the treaties concluded by Peters and his group from November 25, 1884 to July 3, 1885.

40

Quoted in Lyne, Apostle, pp. 71-72.

41

Quoted in Lyne, Apostle, p. 77.

42

Quoted in Lyne, Apostle, p. 78.

The charter was as follows:⁴³

We, William, by the grace of God, German Emperor,
King of Prussia, make known and ordain as follows:--

The present Presidents of the Society for German Colonization, Dr. Karl Peters and our Chamberlain Felix, Count behr-Bandelin, having sought our protection for the territorial acquisitions of the Society in East Africa, west of the Empire of the Sultan of Zanzibar, and outside of the suzerainty ("oberhoheit") of other Powers, and the Treaties lately concluded by the said Dr. Peters with the Rulers of Usagara, Nguru, Useguha, and Ukami in November and December last, by which these territories have been ceded to him for the German Colonial Society with sovereign rights ("Landeshoheit") over the same, having been laid before us, with the Petition to place these territories under our suzerainty, we hereby declare that we have accepted the suzerainty, and have placed under our Imperial protection the territories in question, reserving to ourselves a right of deciding hereafter respecting any further acquisitions in the same district which may be proved to have been obtained by legal contract by the Society, or by their legitimate successors.

We grant unto the said Society, on the condition that it remains German, and that the members of the Board of Directors or other persons intrusted with its management are subjects of the German Empire, as well as to the legitimate successors of this Society under the same conditions, the authority to exercise all rights arising from the Treaties submitted to us, including that of jurisdiction over both the natives and the subjects of Germany and of other nations established in those territories, or sojourning there for commercial or other purposes, under the superintendence of our Government, subject to further regulations to be issued by us, and supplementary additions to this, our Charter of Protection.

In witness thereof we have with our Royal hand executed this Charter of Protection, and have caused it to be sealed with our Imperial seal.

Given at Berlin, February 17, 1885.

/Signed/
V. Bismarck

/Signed/
William

A historian of Germany's colonial venture, Mary Evelyn Townsend, maintains that Peters forced Bismarck to grant him this charter (Schutzbrief) by threatening to sell all his treaties to Leopold if Germany did not want them.⁴⁴

London's reaction was quick. On March 12 Gladstone stated in the House of Commons that if Germany wished to become a colonizing power he was highly in favor of it and that he hoped God would favor her in her efforts.⁴⁵

Understandably the Sultan of Zanzibar was distressed and angry about this German attack on his dominions. As soon as he learned of the protection afforded Peters' company by the Kaiser he telegraphed to Berlin protesting the so-called treaties made by Peters and protesting German encroachment on his territory on the mainland of the African continent.⁴⁶ At the same time he wrote to London explaining that his territory was being annexed by the German government's decree and that he needed British assistance in order to forestall this action.⁴⁷ British help was not forthcoming.

A reply, however, was received from Berlin. In June, presumably after the proper amount of time for consideration, Barghash received a succinct note from the German Government telling him that all the

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Townsend, Germany's Colonial Empire, p. 133.

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Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CCXCV, p. 979.

⁴⁶

McDermott, British East Africa, p. 4; B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVII, p. 1110.

⁴⁷

B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVII, pp. 1110-1111.

Peters' treaties had been made with independent princes or sultans of the interior of Africa who owed no allegiance to Zanzibar whatsoever, and thus the Sultan of that island had entirely no ground for protest.⁴⁸ If Barghash did have any ground on which to stand it was lost to him on the seventh of August, 1885 when a German naval squadron sailed into the harbor of Zanzibar and dropped anchor. Under threat of annihilation the Sultan acknowledged all the German demands made on him. The formal acknowledgement came on August 11 when Barghash recognized a German protectorate over Usagara, Ngura, Useguha, Ukami, and Witu, to the north.⁴⁹

Salisbury, who had assumed the post of prime minister in June, was of the opinion that the coast absolutely was of no use to the Germans or to any other European power for that matter.⁵⁰ On August 24, he wrote to a member of the Foreign Office staff that he had been

...using the credit I have got with Bismarck in the Caroline Islands and Zanzibar to get help in Russia and Turkey and Egypt. He is rather a Jew, but on the whole I have as yet got my money's worth.⁵¹

The fact was that Britain rather sorely needed the support afforded by Germany in the perplexing problem of the Egyptian financial situation. The preceeding January Bismarck had loudly proclaimed that any German support received depended entirely upon London's position

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B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVII, pp. 1113-1114.

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B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVII, p. 1122.

⁵⁰

Cecil, Life of Salisbury, Vol. III, pp. 229-230.

⁵¹

Cecil, Life of Salisbury, Vol. III, p. 230.

in regard to German claims in East Africa.⁵² In the latter half of 1885 Salisbury was caught in the middle. The only way out of this delicate situation without offending the Germans was to rely on private initiative in East Africa in order to save at least a part of the former British quasi-protectorate.

Hutton and MacKinnon at this time were engaged in talks with Vice-Consul Holmwood concerning his proposed formation of a British company which would re-apply for the concession which MacKinnon had attempted to obtain in 1877.⁵³ Although this scheme was never realized, the British Government did consent to at least inform Bismarck that several British citizens were interested in East Africa to the extent of forming a company in order to establish a settlement there for trading purposes. It was pointed out that there was an uneasiness in Britain because of fear that German intentions in East Africa would disturb British Indian interests.⁵⁴ In order that the British claim on East African territories might be stronger, Salisbury in October convinced Harry Johnson to hand over his Kilimanjaro treaties to William MacKinnon.⁵⁵ Johnson's Treaties were thus to form the first recognized British authority to intervene in the interior of the mainland of East Africa.⁵⁶

⁵²

Robinson, Gallagher, and Denny, Victorians, p. 192.

⁵³

For the fate of this particular scheme see CHAPTER III, pp. 25-31.

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McDermott, British East Africa, p. 4.

⁵⁵

Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.," pp. 69-70.

⁵⁶

H. H. Johnson, Story, p. 136.

The next year an expedition sanctioned by the Foreign Office penetrated to Kilimanjaro in order to confirm these treaties. This was accomplished by September of 1886.⁵⁷

By October of 1885 it was therefore evident that there existed a case for arbitration in East Africa. It was necessary that Great Britain and Germany know the exact depth to which the Sultan of Zanzibar's claim to mainland possessions was verifiable⁵⁸ as well as discerning the best method by which a delimitation of German and British interests on the coast might be effected. To accomplish these ends a commission was established, to which Lord Kitchener was appointed, for the expressed

...purpose of inquiring jointly with the commissioners to be appointed by His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Germany and by the President of the French Republic into the claims of the Sultan...to sovereignty over certain territories on the East Coast of Africa, and of ascertaining their precise limits.⁵⁹

Besides Kitchener those appointed to the Zanzibar Commission, as it was called, were Dr. Schmidt, the German Consul in Cairo and Patrimonio, the French Consul-General at Beirut. Due to the inability of Patrimonio to attend the hearings of the Commission the French Consul in Zanzibar, Raffray, assumed his place.⁶⁰ In deference to Bismarck's wishes, Salisbury

57

Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 468-470; Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.," p. 71.

58

M. F. Hill, Permanent Way, the Story of the Kenya and Uganda Railway (London: Hazell Watson and Viney, Ltd., n.d.), p. 9.

59

Salisbury to Lieutenant-Colonel Kitchener, October 17, 1885, B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVII, pp. 1123-1124.

60

B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVII, p. 1125.

postponed any action that MacKinnon and his group might wish to take in the area until the Zanzibar Commission had reached a decision.⁶¹

The Commission began its work in December and by the following June had reached a decision. The unanimous opinion of the Commission was that the islands of Zanzibar, Lamu, Mafiu, Pemba, all other islands within a twelve mile radius around them, and the mainland coast from the Minengani River at the head of Tunghi Bay to the Bay of Kipini in the North were under the control of the Sultan. They further agreed that Barghash's authority did not extend to a distance of more than ten miles into the interior of the mainland.⁶² The next month Kitchener wrote to the Foreign Office that it was not generally considered by all the concerned parties that the work of the Commission was at an end but that he could

...only say I deeply regret...that the last act of the Commission should, have necessarily been the recording of one member's...biased opinion as the unanimous one of the Commission.⁶³

From the evidence that is available it is clear that the German member of the Commission was able to secure all that he wanted because of Salisbury's wish to avoid any uneasiness with Bismarck.⁶⁴ The Sultan was willing to

61

McDermott, British East Africa, p. 6.

62

This opinion of the Commission was reached in Zanzibar and is dated June 9, 1886. The entire text may be found in B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVII, pp. 1128-1129.

63

Kitchener to Foreign Office, July 8, 1886, quoted by Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 467-468.

64

For all the letters and correspondence having to do with the Commission see, B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVII, pp. 1099-1139. Also see Coupland, Exploitation, pp. 460-470.

accept the report of the Commission but reserved the right to consider himself not securely bound by the same.⁶⁵

In October negotiations were begun between Great Britain and Germany in London which resulted in an Anglo-German agreement. This Anglo-German Agreement was inimical to the claims of the Sultan since it was merely a bilateral delimitation of East African territory claimed by the monarch into spheres of influence to be possessed by the two powers concerned. The two principles promulgated by the powers in order to give the appearance of legality to this agreement were the hitherland doctrine and the theory of effective occupation.⁶⁶ By the first of November the treaty had been concluded and East Africa was divided into spheres of influence by a line drawn up from the Umba River to the northern base of Kilimanjaro and then to the point where the first degree south latitude strikes the east side of Lake Victoria.⁶⁷ As the American historian William Langer points out, this agreement effectively scrapped the Anglo-French Agreement of 1862.⁶⁸

During the time while British and German officials were negotiating in London, William MacKinnon was engaged in talks with Carl Peters by which he hoped to secure some sort of agreement about the rights of British interests in East Africa. Peters' attitude was that the German Company

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Sultan to Kirk, December 15, 1886, B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVII, p. 1126.

⁶⁶

Lugard, The Rise of Our East African Empire, Vol. II, pp. 599-600; Cecil, Life of Salisbury, Vol. IV, pp. 283-284.

⁶⁷

Edward Hertslet (ed.), The Map of Africa by Treaty (London: Harrison and Sons, 1896), Vol. II, pp. 615-621. (Hereinafter referred to as Hertslet (ed.), The Map of Africa by Treaty.)

⁶⁸

William Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1935), Vol. I, p. 112.

should have all rights. This fact, combined with the conclusion of the Anglo-German Agreement, caused the breaking off of the talks. Kirk wrote to MacKinnon in October telling him that

it is important for you on meeting Peters to know that a definite settlement has been come to and he cannot modify it now....⁶⁹

Thus the Anglo-German Agreement divided the east coast of Africa into two spheres of influence, but surprisingly no provision was made for a western delimitation of these spheres. This lack of foresight was to lead in the very near future to a struggle between the German and the British companies.⁷⁰

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MacKinnon Papers, Kirk to MacKinnon, October 30, 1886.

⁷⁰

McDermott, British East Africa, p. 103.

CHAPTER VI

MACKINNON, STANLEY, AND EMIN PASHA

The center of attention in East Africa in the latter years of the 1880's was the area between Lake Tanganyika and the land immediately to the north of Lake Victoria. The British theory as expressed by Harry Johnson and William MacKinnon was to have a British Cape to Cairo corridor, which would of necessity include the lakes region of east central Africa.¹ The Germans, who arrived on the scene of colonization rather late, had the idea of creating out of the area a German central Africa which would extend across the whole of the African continent from east to west.²

An organization for the importation of either English or German³ interests into the lakes region was already in existence, having been left to guard the approaches to Egypt via the Nile by General Charles Gordon. Appointed by Gordon as the governor of Equatoria province in July of 1878, a German named Emin Pasha⁴ had tenaciously held to his post even after his superior had been killed at Khartoum in January of 1885.

In December of that same year Emin wrote to Charles H. Allen, the secretary of the British Anti-Slave Society, telling him that he was cut

1

See the article by Harry Johnson on this topic in The Times (London), August 22, 1888, p. 3. In 1889, Johnson was in the Tanganyika region attempting to conclude treaties with the natives in order to further this scheme. See Johnson's introduction to Alfred J. Swann, Fighting the Slave-Hunters in Central Africa (London: Seely and Company, Ltd., 1910), p. vii.

2

William Roger Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, 1884-1919 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 10.

3

Peters made an abortive attempt to rescue Emin. See Peters, New Light, Chp. X.

4

Emin's real name was Edouard Schnitzer. He was a medical doctor.

off from the world and that he needed assistance in order to maintain civilization in the deep interior of East Africa.⁵ Stanley revealed that Emin even went so far as to offer the province of Equatoria to Great Britain if an expedition would be sent into the area.⁶ British opinion was aroused by the plight of Emin, and by the autumn of 1886 the press was referring to him as another Gordon.⁷

At the same time MacKinnon's interest in the area was rekindled because of his fears lest the Germans annex the area, Emin and all, before the British did. Undoubtedly he was also prompted to sympathy for Emin because of a genuine humanitarian feeling.⁸ In October of 1886 Hutton and MacKinnon spoke to Henry M. Stanley, who was at the time disgruntled with Leopold and no longer in his employ,⁹ about the prospects of launching an expedition designed to relieve Emin. At the time the only thought of these three men was to carry sufficient ammunition to Emin to enable him to hold out in Equatoria.¹⁰ Stanley considered the matter, and by mid-November he reached his decision and volunteered to command a relief expedition into Africa to rescue Emin Pasha.¹¹ Several routes by which

⁵ Henry Morton Stanley, In Darkest Africa (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1890), Vol. I, p. 26, reproduces the letter. (Hereinafter referred to as Stanley, Darkest Africa.)

⁶ Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. II, p. 420; The New York Times, April 12, 1888, p. 1.

⁷ The Times (London), December 15, 1886, p. 2.

⁸ McDermott, British East Africa, p. 15; Ingham, East Africa, p. 139.

⁹ H. H. Johnson, Story, pp. 117-123.

¹⁰ Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. I, pp. 31-32.

¹¹ Stanley to MacKinnon, November 15, 1886; B.F.S.P., Vol, LXXVII, pp. 1183-1184.

the expedition might reach Emin were discussed, and the upshot of all of them was that any expedition that was dispatched must pass through the eastern region of Africa opposite Zanzibar. Stanley said that at that time he suggested that he could proceed to Emin's position by way of the Congo River more easily than he could traverse the Uganda area.¹² The talks were broken off at that point with Stanley going to America to undertake a speaking tour and MacKinnon attempting to gather the support necessary to field the relief expedition. It was evident that he would receive no direct assistance from the government because of Salisbury's attitude towards any sort of column designed to penetrate the lakes region.¹³

It seemed that MacKinnon was ready and willing to act in response to his East African interests because of the protection afforded him by the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886 and because of government sanction of the proposed relief expedition in December of 1886.¹⁴ This was a radical shift in positions for MacKinnon who, in October of 1886, had been the recipient of a letter from Kirk explaining that he understood the reason for his willingness to embark on an East African venture.¹⁵ By December this same MacKinnon had set up a relief fund which had procured £21,500 to finance an expedition to relieve Emin.¹⁶ For the most part the list of subscribers was identical with the list later drawn up of stockholders

¹²

Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. I, pp. 32-33.

¹³

Cecil, Life of Salisbury, Vol. III, pp. 231-236.

¹⁴

The note affording sanction to the expedition was Foreign Office to MacKinnon, December 3, 1886, B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVIII, p. 1186.

¹⁵

MacKinnon Papers, Kirk to MacKinnon, October 11, 1886.

¹⁶

Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. I, p. 35.

of the Imperial British East Africa Company.¹⁷ Even the Egyptian government got in on the act of relief by a contribution of £10,000,¹⁸ possibly in the belief that Emin would return to Egyptian service when he was rescued.

With both government sanction and the necessary finances in hand MacKinnon could now set into motion the plan to rescue Emin. On December 11 he wrote to Stanley in America to come at once.¹⁹ Stanley telegraphed from New York two days later that he was returning to England,²⁰ and in late December the relief committee met in London in order to finalize its plans. Then, during the first week of January, Leopold's agent, Count Borchgrave, wrote to both MacKinnon and Stanley that since the Belgian King considered Stanley still to be in his employ the expedition intended to relieve Emin should proceed by way of the Congo. Leopold was disposed to put all the resources of that state at the expedition's beck and call.²¹ On the 13th of January MacKinnon and Stanley crossed over to Brussels to confer with Leopold. It is certain that even before Stanley left England the Congo route was chosen as the route in which he would attempt to reach Emin

¹⁷

Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. II, pp. 513-514 contains a full list of the subscribers to the relief expedition. The Founder's Agreement of the Imperial British East Africa Company is found among the papers of the company located in the Commonwealth Office Library, London.

¹⁸

B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVIII, p. 1189.

¹⁹

B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVIII, p. 1188.

²⁰

Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.," p. 83; Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. I., pp. 35-43.

²¹

The letters are reproduced in Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. I., pp. 43-44.

although the government was not clearly informed of the change in plans at the time.

The British Foreign Office was, however, informed by MacKinnon on February 10, that Stanley, in command of the relief expedition, had left England for Zanzibar and that on his arrival there would decide on the route to be taken.²² Exactly why the expedition should proceed to the mouth of the Congo River by way of Zanzibar is not at all clear unless MacKinnon had already decided to use the mission of Stanley as the means by which he would contact Barghash and begin negotiations which would lead to a concession in East Africa. MacKinnon had sent with Stanley a letter addressed to the Sultan preparing the way for just such a concession.²³ Though Stanley gave the letter to Barghash, he himself engaged in talks with the Sultan about the possibility of Zanzibar entering into an agreement with MacKinnon and his associates. Barghash's answer was as follows:

Please God we shall agree. When you have got the papers ready shall read and sign without further delay and the matter will be over.²⁴

After MacKinnon received this information from Stanley he began the actual work of forming the Imperial British East Africa Company.²⁵

²²

MacKinnon to Foreign Office, February 10, 1887, B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVIII, 1190-1191. On January 12, 1887 MacKinnon had written to Salisbury explaining that there might be a change of plans and that the expedition might proceed through the Congo. See B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 1188-1189.

²³

The letter is reproduced in Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. I., pp. 61-62.

²⁴

Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. I., pp. 62, 68-69.

²⁵

Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.," p. 83.

In the latter part of March 1887 Stanley and his party reached the western side of the African continent and advanced up the river on the first leg of their journey to reach Uganda and Emin. On the 4th of December they emerged from the dense jungle onto the grass land west of Lake Albert which they reached on the 13th.²⁶ Because of difficulties with the rear column Stanley was obliged to turn back into the undergrowth. He did not make contact with Emin until April of 1888.²⁷ On April 29, Emin came to the expedition's camp on Lake Albert by boat.²⁸

Stanley had three propositions to offer Emin. The first two consisted of a choice between serving either the Egyptian state once again²⁹ or entering the service of Leopold's Congo Free State as governor of a province. The third offer, albeit unauthorized, made by Stanley was that Emin enter the employ of the newly formed British East Africa Association, MacKinnon's group, as the company's agent in the area to the northeast corner of Lake Victoria. Not unjustly it may be asserted this was the primary reason why MacKinnon had backed the expedition originally. When the idea of an expedition designed to rescue Emin was first discussed, MacKinnon had written to the British Foreign Office that Emin possessed enough ivory to pay for the trouble of the humanitarians who reached

²⁶

Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. I, pp. 292, 327.

²⁷

For the misfortunes, and the blame, of the tragedy of the rear column see James S. Jameson, The Story of the Rear Column of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition (New York: John W. Lovell Company, n.d.).

²⁸

Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. I, pp. 396-397.

²⁹

Emin was very sure that his men would not go to live in Egypt nor serve the Khedive again. Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. I, p. 410. Stanley does not mention that he ever considered Leopold's offer.

him.³⁰ Stanley himself had mentioned Emin's ivory several times, even commenting that it might be worth as much as £260,000.³¹ Lending further credence to this is the fact that Stanley, upon first meeting Emin, commented that he did not look as though he needed any sort of assistance at all, and in fact looked rather well dressed and neat and not very lost.³²

Emin was, however, taken with the offer made on behalf of the British East Africa Association, and Stanley believed that he would have accepted.³³ If this scheme had been realized, the group headed by MacKinnon would have controlled the entire region of the lakes.³⁴ MacKinnon's designs went even further. He had requested that Stanley conclude treaties with native chiefs in the area between the province of Equatoria and the Indian Ocean on his return journey to Zanzibar.³⁵ As has already been stated Stanley had previously secured the Sultan's agreement to sign a concession. If these two other projects had followed in order, MacKinnon would have had procured territorial privileges from the coast to and beyond the lakes region.

Emin, however, found it impossible to accept the offer made by Stanley because his troops, after apparently losing faith in their leader, revolted and actually imprisoned Emin and one of Stanley's officers, A. J. Mounteney-

³⁰ MacKinnon to Foreign Office, November 27, 1886. B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVIII, p. 1185.

³¹ Letter from Stanley read in the House of Lords, March 31, 1887. The New York Times, April 1, 1887, p. 1.

³² Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. I, pp. 396-397.

³³ Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. I, p. 432.

³⁴ Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.," p. 88.

³⁵ MacKinnon Papers, Kirk to MacKinnon, March 23, 1887.

Jephson, in January of 1889.³⁶ Because of this unexpected situation Stanley decided not to attempt to cross the Buganda region and negotiate treaties with the chiefs as MacKinnon desired. Instead he chose to pass to the south and cross East Africa through the German sphere. He arrived at the coastal port of Bagamoyo, across the strait from Zanzibar, on December 4, 1889.³⁷

The evidence concerned with the whole Emin Pasha relief expedition project points directly to the assumption that MacKinnon planned to use the scheme to further his own ambitions in East Africa. The letter to Barghash³⁸ urging him to confide in Stanley suggests nothing less than a plea to open negotiations which would lead to a concession being granted by the Sultan. That the Sultan was agreeable and the knowledge that the Anglo-German Agreement now gave the sanctity of international recognition to his efforts must have prompted MacKinnon to go ahead with his plans for a large undertaking in East Africa. Therefore the Emin Pasha relief scheme and the concession project are integrally bound together. MacKinnon could use the expedition to open up a route through East Africa since Stanley was to return to Zanzibar that way, thereby blazing a path to the lakes region and the headwaters of the Nile. At the same time he could secure for himself the whole province of Equatoria under Emin's

36

The first hand account of this rebellion is A. J. Mounteney-Jephson, Emin Pasha and the Rebellion at the Equator (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1890).

37

Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. II, pp. 330-332, 454. Stanley did claim to have made several treaties with natives in the area but they had no credibility. See Margery Perham, Lugard, The Years of Adventure (London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1956), pp. 258-259. (Hereinafter referred to as Perham, Lugard).

38

The letter is reproduced in Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. I, pp. 61-62.

able leadership. Because the boundaries were now secure, MacKinnon could simply hold the area until his company was able to penetrate from the coast.

There was also another reason why MacKinnon's interest in East African projects was reawakened at this time. After his abortive attempt to secure a concession in 1877³⁹ he turned to Leopold's Congo,⁴⁰ but in 1885 his association with Leopold came to a distasteful conclusion.⁴¹

His original interest had been in the eastern coast of Africa, and his turning away from that area had been followed by his turning to the Congo. Because of his disgruntlement with the Congo, he again expressed interest in East Africa. It is entirely possible that if the Congo scheme had predisposed MacKinnon, he would have had no energies for the great East African enterprise which he was at this time about to undertake. Now with the government support, the Sultan's agreement, and agents already in the interior, MacKinnon was willing to embark on his project for East Africa.

39

See CHAPTER III, pp. 25-31.

40

See CHAPTER III, p. 30.

41

This culmination of relations with Leopold came as a result of the abortive Congo railway scheme. See Ascherson, The King Incorporated, pp. 146-147.

CHAPTER VII
THE FORMATION OF THE IMPERIAL
BRITISH EAST AFRICA COMPANY

By the terms of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886 the upper half of East Africa was designated as the British sphere of influence. There was no clear delimitation of the internal depth of this sphere. The government assumed no direct responsibility for the area but instead turned the administration of their sphere to a chartered company, the Imperial British East Africa Company.

After Stanley's talks with the Sultan in February of 1887 MacKinnon obtained a concession from Barghash granting the British East Africa Association all territorial rights in the coastal strip which had been left him by the Anglo-German Agreement. By the terms of this concession the Association agreed to pay the Sultan a part of the profits derived from activity in the area, and the Sultan was given a share in the Association itself.¹ Before any effective action could be taken, however, Sultan Barghash died,² and his brother Seyyid Khalifa bin Said Sultan came to the seat of power in Zanzibar.³ At that time the Association was still in existence, and the Company was not yet formed. On the 18th of April, however, the interested parties gathered in London in order to execute their Charter of organization. The avowed objects of the Company

1

See Hertslet (ed.), The Map of Africa by Treaty, Vol. I, pp. 110-117, for the text of this concession, dated May 24, 1887.

2

Stanley, Darkest Africa, Vol. I, p. 69, mentions that the Sultan appeared to be in poor health in February of 1887.

3

This occurred on March 29, 1888.

were: 1) to take over the concession offered by Barghash, 2) to obtain from the Crown a Charter of incorporation, 3) to undertake the administration of the territory ceded by the Sultan, 4) to acquire territory from natives in the area, 5) to establish civil and judicial administration in the districts under the Company's rule, 6) to levy and collect taxes and customs and to exercise all other rights of rule, and 7) to undertake trading operations.⁴ By the Deed of Settlement which was finalized on July 19, the Sultan was to receive the number one share of company stock, called the "Original Founder's Share."⁵

After the death of Sultan Barghash it was necessary that another concession be granted the company. On October 9, 1888 Sultan Khalifa signed this new concession which was merely an amplified copy of the 1887 concession.⁶ The concession was to remain in effect for a period of fifty years, and the company was to enjoy all the rights and powers on the mainland from the River Umbe in the south to Kipini in the north.

During the month of October MacKinnon and his supporters composed a petition to be presented to the Queen requesting that a royal charter be approved and granted to the company.⁷ MacKinnon had requested just such a charter incorporating the company from Lord Salisbury in May of 1887. At that time Salisbury's reaction had been to inform MacKinnon in a rather ambiguous manner that he would receive from the government

4

The full text of the Founders' Agreement is to be found among the Papers of the Imperial British East Africa Company located in the Commonwealth Library. It is reproduced in APPENDIX III below. (Hereinafter referred to as Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company.)

5

Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company.

6

Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company. See APPENDIX I.

7

Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company.

all the assistance that could possibly be given to such an undertaking. MacKinnon and his group must understand, Salisbury continued, that if they were to ask for any sort of favors or concessions beyond that naturally accorded to any British citizen the answer would be a definite no. Lord Salisbury wanted it to be completely understood that the government of Great Britain was not to be considered or counted upon as a supporter of the Imperial British East Africa Company in any manner or form whatsoever.⁸ It was clear that the government wanted to maintain its freedom of action be it affirmative or negative in regards to the projects and actions of the company. MacKinnon was, in other words, to undertake the company entirely on his own with no assistance from the government. Salisbury simply did not wish to become involved or entangled in the coming administration of the British sphere in East Africa. The government's opinion as expressed by Lord Salisbury was that the other European powers, especially Germany, would respect the territory that composed the British sphere of East Africa.⁹ It was evident that Lord Salisbury was concerned, by 1888, about the control of the headwaters of the Nile River and hence the lakes region of central East Africa.¹⁰ However, he was not in any way disposed to commit himself to any sort of direct governmental operation in that area. He had even refused a request by the humanitarians that the government dispatch assistance to the missions located in the Nyasa regions on the basis of

8

Salisbury minute, Foreign Office 84/1863, dated May 7, 1887. Quoted in Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.," p. 75.

9

Parliamentary Papers, (Commons), 1888, Vol. LXXIV, Cmd. 5315, p. 457.

10

See p. 79, footnote No. 14.

his conviction that it was not his duty to do it.¹¹ Because of increasing British interests in East Africa in the latter part of 1888 speculation arose in London that the government was about to declare a protectorate over the island of Zanzibar. It is certain that Salisbury himself never entertained any such notions since he realized that Parliament would never consent to finance such a move.¹² It thus was evident that when the charter was finally granted it would be entirely a private venture financed with private funds.

The charter was approved and granted on September 3, 1888.¹³ By its terms the I.B.E.A. Company was empowered to accept the concession offered by Barghash¹⁴ and, by the wording of Article Two, was also accorded the authority to make treaties with any authorities or powers of any description whatsoever.¹⁵ The condition was also stipulated that the I.B.E.A. Company must always remain completely British in every conceivable manner and form and that the directors themselves must in every case be natural born subjects of the Queen.¹⁶ There was a further stipulation set forth that insured that the company would at all times be subject to the opinions and desires of the government. The wording of Article Eight states that the Secretary of State, who might be any one of the principle secretaries,

¹¹

Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CCCXXVIII, p. 550, July 6, 1888.

¹²

Salisbury to Queen Victoria, Buckle (ed.), The Letters of Queen Victoria, third series, Vol. I, p. 459.

¹³

Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company. See APPENDIX IV.

¹⁴

Barghash had died by the time the charter was issued.

¹⁵

See APPENDIX IV.

¹⁶

See APPENDIX IV, Article Five.

had the final word in all matters and projects having to do with the company's actions and schemes. It was thus understood that the dissent of the Secretary would be enough to abnegate any actions of the company.

It seems that although the government did not commit itself to any positive action on behalf of the I.B.E.A. Company it was not about to allow East African administration to proceed without its sanction. Therefore, the company, albeit having all the rights and privileges of the chartered companies of old, had no concrete authority to act in any matter or manner which was not to the liking of the powers that be in London. Under the terms of the charter the government had the powers of control over the company, but there were no clear provisions for reciprocal responsibilities on the part of the government. Very possibly the company was merely an expedient, a surrogate for governmental action providing nominal control over an area of the world that London had not yet quite decided was important enough for direct responsibility.

The authority thus delegated to the board of directors of the company was exercised by an odd assortment of men. MacKinnon, Buxton, and Hutton have already been discussed to some extent. All three were wealthy businessmen. Hutton was already sitting on the board of directors of the Niger Company which was formed to undertake identical work in West Africa. William L.A.B. Burdett-Coutts had been the husband of the Baroness, a tireless foe of slavery, since 1881. Alexander L. Bruce was an Edinburgh brewer who was very active in mission work. George Sutherland MacKenzie was a partner of MacKinnon's in the British India Steam Navigation Company. Robert Ryrie was a London merchant of means, and J. M. Hall was a Scots' merchant. The Rt. Honorable Lord Brassey was

a M.P. and had served as the Civil Lord of the Admiralty and as the Secretary of the Admiralty during the first half of the 1880's. He was at the time very active in Parliament because of his work to gain higher wages for the working man by an act of Parliament. This diverse range of personalities gave the company a gargantuan, complex character, seeming all at once to be philanthropic, imperialistic, and commercial.

The I.B.E.A. Company presented a picture not of the classical new imperialistic European enterprise moving out to annex backward lands for love of country and personal gain but rather of a group of late Victorian men joined together in the belief that annexation of the east coast of Africa would benefit the natives of that area just as much as they themselves would benefit from their capitalistic venture.¹⁷ The visionary, altruistic appeal which dominated the African travel books of the period may be identified as the paramount concern of the court of directors of the I.B.E.A. Company.¹⁸ This is not to say that the classic imperialistic tone was not present and did not compose at least a small part of the company's character. Alfred Tucker, a bishop connected with the missions in East Africa, commented that the need for new markets was most definitely a part of the reason why Lord Salisbury and William MacKinnon were able to reach a rapprochement concerning the need for a charter to be granted to the company. Tucker seems to bear out the theory that the British government did not wish to arouse international rivalry or jealousy in East Africa and thus appointed the I.B.E.A. Company as the silent partner

¹⁷

Perham, Lugard, pp. 712-713.

¹⁸

Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.," p. 104.

of the Queen in this area. Tucker was of the opinion that any sort of direct action by the government would have given vent to untold problems and disputes in East Africa.¹⁹

It has been asserted that the whole of the I.B.E.A. Company was but an enterprise created with only pecuniary ends in mind and that to assign any sort of philanthropic attitude to it is but a fabrication. Perhaps then the company attempted to pass itself off as a noble undertaking in order to conceal its imperialistic character.²⁰ The attitude taken by the press was that the chartered company's philanthropic plan was made to cover less noble ends,²¹ and that the company should be able to take out of East Africa all that was worth having.²² Mrs. de Kiewiet-Hemphill, however, in her exhaustive study of the I.B.E.A. Company has pointed out that MacKinnon and the other members of the board of directors very rarely wrote or spoke, in the manner in which an imperialistic-minded concern would be expected, of the necessity for discovering and developing new overseas markets for British capital and goods.²³ Though obligated to develop a large area of East Africa, the company was grossly under-capitalized. From the beginning it was destined to a short existence because of this fact and would never realize its expectations in East

19

Alfred R. Tucker, Eighteen Years in Uganda and East Africa (London: Edward Arnold, Publisher to the India Office, 1908), pp. 4-6. (Herein-after referred to as Tucker, Eighteen Years in Uganda).

20

Richard J. Hammond, "Economic Imperialism: Sidelights on a Stereotype," The Journal of Economic History. XXI (No. 4, 1961), 582-598.

21

The New York Times, May 27, 1888, p. 1.

22

The Times (London), October 15, 1889, p. 2.

23

Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.," p. 104.

Africa.²⁴ It might be said that the short life of the company was pre-ordained simply because the government expected entirely too much from a private undertaking which was not given the necessary government support to succeed.

²⁴Vere-Hodge, East Africa Company, p. 23.

CHAPTER VIII

THE I.B.E.A. COMPANY AND EAST AFRICA

THE FIRST YEAR

In 1887 because of the fear of both Great Britain and Germany that the other power would reach the rich, prosperous country lying to the north of Lake Victoria before the other, an agreement was reached between the two powers that forbade the annexation of any territory that lay behind their spheres of influence in East Africa. More specifically, this von Plessen agreement assured the Germans that Stanley's Emin Pasha relief expedition was indeed not a political move on the part of William MacKinnon and the British East Africa Association.¹ It would seem that Salisbury's motive for agreeing to this convention was that of merely holding off the German East Africa Company until its British counterpart could arrive on the scene. His concern for East Africa was revealed in an even more lucid manner during the next year.

In August of 1888 a full scale rebellion against German occupation occurred at the coastal towns of Pangani and Bagamoyo. It seems that the German authorities at Bagamoyo had attempted to saw down the flag pole of the Sultan, and the resulting skirmish had given vent to the distaste which the Arab and Swahili traders of the area felt for the German company. One Bushiri, a Swahili chief, took up the battle standard and led his followers to a direct confrontation with the German

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The text of this agreement may be found in B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXVIII, p. 1047.

administrators.² Bismarck, determined to crush the incipient revolution, decided to dispatch a fleet to East African waters.³ MacKinnon, fearful of unbounded German power in these waters, wrote to Salisbury pointing out the anomalous character of the German proposal.⁴ Salisbury, albeit realizing that a wide-spread uprising along the entire expanse of the East African coast was eminent, did not wish to see a German fleet alone in coastal waters. He therefore dispatched a British squadron to the area to assist in the blockade and, more importantly, to maintain British influence on the coast.⁵ He was of the opinion that British and Indian interests in the maintenance of the Sultan's power were too strong for him to give up.⁶ Because of the advice of Euan-Smith, the new British Consul at Zanzibar, the blockade proclaimed on December 1,⁷ was not extended to include the British sphere of influence.⁸

It was at this juncture that George MacKenzie arrived at Mombasa accompanied by General Mathews. They found that the natives, while

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Euan-Smith to Salisbury, August 25, 1888, B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXIX, pp. 345-348. The situation was in fact menacing. During the first week of September, General Mathews, of the Sultan's service, had crossed to Pangani and found approximately 8,000 natives under arms and ready to expel any Germans in the area. See, McDermott, British East Africa, p. 16.

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B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXIX, pp. 365-366.

⁴

McDermott, British East Africa, p. 20.

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Cecil, Life of Salisbury, Vol. IV, pp. 235-237; B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXIX, p. 363.

⁶

Salisbury to Malet, September 18, 1888, quoted in Cecil, Life of Salisbury, Vol. IV, pp. 234-235.

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B.F.S.P., Vol. LXXIX, pp. 383-384.

⁸

McDermott, British East Africa, p. 22.

disposed to place their trust in the British company, were in such a state of excitement and agitation that it proved necessary that the Englishmen tread very softly.⁹ In view of the serious state of affairs which prevailed in the German sphere to the south, it is surprising that neither MacKenzie nor Mathews made any mention of acts of violence in Mombasa.

In addition to the electrified situation to the south, MacKenzie found himself confronted by irate slave owners who were concerned lest their property be set free by the meddling foreigners.¹⁰ MacKenzie was able to win the confidence of these people, thereby winning his first encounter with the natives of the coast.

A short time later, however, he found himself solicited by a delegation of runaway slaves who asked that he intercede on their behalf with their owners for the purchase of freedom for themselves. MacKenzie faced up to the situation and, realizing that the prestige of the company rested on the outcome, brought the slave owners and the slaves together in order that a solution might be arrived at by means of negotiations. The upshot of the affair was that MacKenzie was able to obtain the freedom of some one thousand, four hundred, twenty-two men, women, and children.

The arrangement, however, was not quite that simple. There was also a payment of money involved--some £ 3372 was paid to the owners. Of this amount, £ 800 was contributed by the government, and the remainder

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Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company, Report of Directors, June 6, 1889.

10

Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company, Letter from MacKenzie to the Consul-General at Zanzibar, February 12, 1890.

was made up of private gifts, primarily from the mission societies.¹¹ Quite taken with the plight of the slaves in East Africa, MacKenzie purposed to raise by private subscription in England a sum of about 3,000 which would enable him to secure the freedom of about twelve hundred slaves. The company would assume the responsibility for collecting the installments to be paid by the freed slaves in order that a perpetual fund might be maintained for the purpose of annually purchasing the freedom of some three thousand slaves.¹² MacKenzie and the directors of the company in London hoped to gain the confidence of the Arabs and the natives by treating both fairly in their efforts to eradicate slavery in East Africa. The confidence of the peoples of the area was necessary if the company was to achieve its great object of opening up and developing the interior.

Salisbury by 1889 had decided that British forces could not be withdrawn from Egypt at any time in the foreseeable future.¹³ He also realized that if Egypt were to be secure Uganda would have to be placed under the control of the British.¹⁴ Insofar as the government was concerned, therefore, the I.B.E.A. Company was chartered and set into motion

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Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company, Report of Directors, June 6, 1889.

12

Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company, MacKenzie to Euan-Smith, February 12, 1890. See Tucker, Eighteen Years in Uganda, pp. 7 ff. for a vivid description of the new year's day 1889, freeing of a large group of slaves at Rabai.

13

Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CCXXXIX, pp. 1003-1004.

14

In mid-1888, Salisbury had discussed this problem with his advisors. Cecil, Life of Salisbury, Vol. IV, pp. 139-140, 252-253, 280-288.

primarily for the purpose of occupying Uganda.¹⁵ The emphasis of the board of directors of the I.B.E.A. Company was thus upon the task and problem of passing from the coast through the area to the east of Lake Victoria and thence to the region of Uganda. The middle expanse of land in East Africa was considered to be completely without value of any sort and was referred to by the Foreign Office as a sterile region.¹⁶ A member of the board of directors believed that the chief goal of the company was to discover the best method of reaching Lake Victoria.¹⁷

This overriding concern and preoccupation with the lakes region determined the manner in which the company's funds were used and the end to which the energies of the administrators were directed. Three days following the arrival of MacKenzie at Mombasa a caravan composed of six of these administrators and three hundred, twenty-three porters departed from the town, bound for the interior region of Baringo.¹⁸ During the final week of November Frederick Jackson arrived in Mombasa and was immediately dispatched at the head of another caravan for the region beyond the Tzavo River, the Ulu country. His mission was to establish a station in the area that might afford a haven for future trading expeditions on their way to the lakes region.¹⁹ In the months of December and January Jackson

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Note by Percy Anderson of the African section of the Foreign Office, March 31, 1890, quoted in Perham, Lugard, p. 181.

16

McDermott, British East Africa, pp. 103-104; Perham, Lugard, p. 175.

17

MacKinnon Papers, Sir Lewis Pelly to MacKinnon, September 5, 1889.

18

Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company.

19

Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company.

pushed on into the interior establishing stations, to be fortified at a latter date, at six sites. The farthest was at Machakos some two hundred fifty miles distant from the coast. Jackson then passed on to the shores of Lake Victoria itself hoping to meet Henry M. Stanley on his return from the Emin Pasha relief expedition.²⁰

The primary object of both these caravans was to explore, define, and open the best possible routes for future expeditions to follow into the interior.²¹ Since the caravans were equipped with goods for trading purposes, it was hoped that they would pay for themselves. It was also believed that as a result of these expeditions the natives would gain in their confidence for the company.²² The high hopes which the directors and administrators held for the rich trade of the interior completely shattered any chances that the middle lands would be taken seriously enough to attempt any developments or improvements therein.

All the material build-up undertaken by the company in East Africa was directed with a view to making it easier for caravans to penetrate to the lakes region. By mid-1889 a road of sorts had been constructed linking Mombasa with Mbungu fifty miles from the coast and was to be continued so as to tie the stations established by Jackson and Pigott²³

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Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company, Jackson's report.

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Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company, Report of Directors, June 6, 1889.

²²

Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company. A caravan had been dispatched even before the charter was granted the company, and had returned to the coast with sufficient ivory in its possession to allay the cost of the expedition.

²³

J.R.W. Pigott's caravan had been dispatched shortly after Jackson's had departed from Mombasa. His mission was to explore and define a route towards the interior via the Tana River (i.e., the southern approach to Lake Victoria). Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company, Report of Directors, June 6, 1889.

together. A steam launch was dispatched to Mombasa for the purpose of conveying stores and materials up from the coast towards the station at Mbungo.²⁴ Camel, ponies, mules, and donkeys were purchased in Egypt and Aden in order that the company's reliance on native porters might be lessened somewhat, but the animals proved to be too disease-prone to serve for any length of time in East Africa.²⁵

The coastal towns themselves, when they were improved to any extent, were always looked upon as merely essential if goods and men were to be transported to and from the interior. During the last month of 1888 MacKenzie made a tour of all the important port towns in order that he might inquire into the physical makeup of each and, more importantly, determine the best means of improving and developing each particular town's trade with the far interior.²⁶ There was no lack of doubt in the minds of the directors and administrators of the I.B.E.A. Company that if these port cities were developed, their trade with the interior would grow and expand because of the better facilities afforded East Africa.

During the latter months of 1889 the I.B.E.A. Company expressed, through the board of directors, its concern for what it felt was a matter of the utmost importance; the construction of a railway to connect Mombasa to Lake Victoria. In conjunction with these projects it was planned that new steamers be placed on the lake itself in order that the area

24

Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company.

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Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company, Report of Directors, June 6, 1889.

26

Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company, Report of Directors, June 6, 1889.

of Uganda and the thickly populated districts on the shores of Lake Victoria might be directly connected with the coastal port of Mombasa.²⁷ It was hoped that the government might be persuaded to lend its material support to the company since the result of the establishment of such rapid means of communication would be to restrict the trade in arms, liquor, and slaves.²⁸ The point here is, however, not that the illegal trades might be arrested but that the assistance of the government was already being considered necessary for the successful completion of a company project.

The relations of the I.B.E.A. Company with the local populations were never a problem in any sense. Even before the company had been granted its royal charter treaties had been negotiated with several tribes²⁹ and by May 18, 1890 some sixty-one treaties had been finalized by expeditions of the company.³⁰ Jackson's caravan was still in the interior in 1890, but reports from him indicated that Mwanga, the King of the country of Uganda, had contacted him and had offered to place his entire dominion under the protection of the I.B.E.A. Company.³¹ The company was naturally elated at this turn of events since the lakes region

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Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company, Report of the Directors to the Stockholders, July 17, 1890.

28

Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company, Report of the Directors, July 17, 1890.

29

It will be remembered by the reader that H. H. Johnson had signed over his treaties with the chiefs of the Kilimanjaro district to MacKinnon. See CHAPTER V, p. 54.

30

A complete listing of the treaties signed as well as reproductions of these treaties is to be found in the Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company.

31

Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company.

was felt to be a sort of garden of Eden³² with a climate approaching that of England.³³ It is also true that by 1890 Uganda, after five years of civil war, had fallen into the hands of a Christian pro-British group which was favorably inclined towards the prospects of a British advance into the area.³⁴

It has been seen that George MacKenzie was the driving force of the I.B.E.A. Company in East Africa even to the exclusion of William MacKinnon, who remained in London. The fact of the matter is that by 1890 the government's opinion as voiced by Salisbury was that MacKinnon possessed none of the qualities necessary for extending British influence into Uganda.³⁵ As early as 1888 Kitchener had advised that the best thing to do was to get rid of MacKinnon as the director of British efforts in East Africa.³⁶ For the first year of the life of the company, however, MacKinnon achieved almost dictatorial powers as the head of the I.B.E.A. Company. He even went so far as taking action on his own private initiative and without bothering to consult the other members of the board of directors.³⁷ Due to the interest and activity of members of the board like MacKenzie by 1890 MacKinnon's authority was on the wane.

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Tucker, Eighteen Years in Uganda, p. 207.

³³

Tucker, Eighteen Years in Uganda, p. 208.

³⁴

Donald Low and Cranford Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule, 1900-1955 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 1-24. Captain Lugard was subsequently dispatched to the area to negotiate the treaty.

³⁵

Salisbury to Goshen, April 10, 1890, quoted in Cecil, Life of Salisbury, Vol. IV, p. 281.

³⁶

Kitchener's note, July 1888, quoted in Coupland, Exploitation, p. 469.

³⁷

Kiewiet-Hemphill, "I.B.E.A.," p. 102.

A major problem faced by the company in East Africa besides the terrible transportation system was the staffing of the company's offices and stations there with competent officials. By 1890 Hutton, Sandys, and several other company officials in East Africa had died due to disease. The replacement of men of this caliber was for all practical purposes impossible. Men were drawn from London and from India in order to attempt to fill their posts, but these arrangements were not successful.³⁸

It was also evident by 1890 that the company was in financial difficulties. In East Africa alone the company had found it necessary to spend some £132,451 primarily for improving and developing systems of transportation connecting the coast with the interior. The assets of the I.B.E.A. Company at that same time totaled some £32,377, a part of which was in silver and copper coinage in East Africa.³⁹

And yet at this critical juncture the company was taking on even more responsibility because of its plans to declare protection for the kingdom of Buganda. The projected railway from Mombasa to Lake Victoria never extended more than a few miles up from the coast and was in fact merely a fiasco⁴⁰ which was never used except for pleasure trips by the staff of the Mombasa office.⁴¹

38

Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company, Report of Directors, June 6, 1889, and Report of Directors to Stockholders, July 17, 1890.

39

Papers of the I.B.E.A. Company, financial statement, April 30, 1890.

40

R. P. Ashe, Chronicles of Uganda (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1894), p. 7.

41

For a full account of life and work in East Africa under the I.B.E.A. Company, see Frederick Jackson, Early Days in East Africa (London: Edward Arnold and Company, 1930).

To the disgruntlement of Salisbury with MacKinnon and the company's troubles in East Africa was added another reason for direct government action on the eastern coast of the dark continent. In December of 1888 Prince Bismarck had decided that his real interest lay in Europe.⁴² By the autumn of 1889 he asked Lord Salisbury for a further settlement in East Africa.⁴³ Salisbury responded by presenting to the German ambassador in London an outline of what proved to be the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890.⁴⁴ The only major concession proposed by Salisbury was the cession of the island of Heligoland to Germany for use as a naval base. The only deterrent to the smooth completion of this agreement was the emotional opposition to it by the Queen and several of her ministers.⁴⁵ Salisbury was able to allay their fears, however, and the agreement was signed on July 1, 1890.⁴⁶ By the terms of this treaty Germany recognized a British protectorate over the island of Zanzibar and abandoned her own claims to northern East African territories, notably the town of Witu to the north of the British sphere. The two countries also agreed that Uganda would from that time on be considered a part of the British sphere of influence in East Africa. In return Britain vowed to persuade the Sultan to sell his rights to his narrow coastal strip to the east of

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Quoted in Langer, European Alliances, p. 497.

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Cecil, Life of Salisbury, Vol. IV, p. 248.

⁴⁴

Salisbury presented this outline in mid-May of 1890. Cecil, Life of Salisbury, Vol. IV, pp. 277-290.

⁴⁵

Buckle (ed.), Letters of Queen Victoria, third series, Vol. I, pp. 610-615.

⁴⁶

The text of this agreement may be found in B.F.S.P., Vol LXXXII, pp. 35-47.

the German sphere to the representatives of Bismarck. Leopold came to London, the scene of the negotiations, and agreed to modify the eastern boundary of the Congo Free State so that Great Britain would have a narrow strip of territory connecting Uganda and Lake Tanganyika to the south.

The British government thus assumed direct responsibility for East African affairs when the Sultan of Zanzibar, Ali bin Said,⁴⁷ accepted the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 thankfully.⁴⁸ The end of the I.B.E.A. Company was in sight.

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Ali bin Said succeeded Khalifa in February of 1890.

⁴⁸

Consul Euan-Smith to Salisbury, June 19, 1890, cited by L. W. Hollingsworth, Zanzibar Under the Foreign Office, 1890-1913 (London: Macmillan and Co., 1953), p. 43.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Britain's first interest in the east coast of Africa came as a result of her efforts to suppress the slave trade. Diplomatic relations were established with Seyyid Said, the Sultan of Zanzibar, in 1822 with the signing of the Moresby Treaty and were furthered through the treaties of 1839 and 1845. Each of these treaties was a direct attack on the slave trade, and the final one gave Great Britain the right to confiscate Said's subjects' ships if they were involved in slave trading. In 1861 Great Britain took a direct hand in the internal affairs of East Africa when she divided the possessions of Said into two distinct political units, Zanzibar and Oman. To further cement relations with Said's successor, Barghash Britain in 1866 sent John Kirk to the island of Zanzibar to serve as the chief consul there. Britain still was not satisfied with merely the measures provided by the above treaties, and therefore, in 1873, the Sultan signed yet another anti-slave trade treaty which outlawed the exportation of slaves from the African continent. British influence increased even further in 1877 with the arrival of William Lloyd Mathews. Mathews responded to the request of the Sultan Barghash for a capable military leader who could form a force of Zanzibar troops in order to combat the slave traders on the mainland by subduing them by force.

During the time of the anti-slave trade treaties British explorers on their own initiative penetrated into the region of the great lakes of east central Africa. The British government, however, at the time was not

interested in this exploration. The government of Egypt was the only official body to take action. Because of the Egyptian ruler Ismail's desire to eradicate the slave trade in his southern provinces he secured the services of an Englishman, Samuel White Baker, to be governor of the province of Equatoria, immediately to the north of the lakes region. White's tenure of office was a failure because he was not able to effect any reduction in the volume of slaves exported from the region. In 1873 Ismail secured the services of Colonel Charles George Gordon, the famous "Chinese Gordon," as governor of the province. Gordon and Ismail planned to effect the eradication of slavery in Equatoria by securing a base of operations on the east coast of Africa opposite the area of the lakes. In 1875 H. F. McKillop of the Khedive's armed forces was dispatched with a force of men to the region of Kismayu in order that he might establish an Egyptian base there. The Khedive was pressured to withdraw his force from two sides. On one side, Great Britain urged Ismail to remove his troops from the east coast in order that he might avoid a conflict with the Sultan. Great Britain had promised to see that the integrity of the Zanzibari Sultan's territory was maintained by the Anglo-French Treaty of 1862, and in this case she was true to her word. The other source of pressure on Ismail at this time was Gordon's failure in Equatoria. Gordon was unable to pacify the native chief, Mutesa, either by force or negotiations. The Khedive accordingly withdrew his troops from the east coast in January of 1876. From this time on, Barghash looked upon Britain as his helpmate. The British, however, took no positive action to further enhance their position in Zanzibar, and it

was left to another European country to take the first positive step in the opening up of the dark continent.

By the mid-1870's a new attack on African territory was in the planning stages in Europe. Leopold II of Belgium was interested in securing commercial advantages on the dark continent. In order to insure that the major powers did not interfere with his scheme he concocted an international organization with the announced purpose of civilizing Africa. The British government did not participate in the plans of Leopold in any manner, but Sir William MacKinnon, who held varied shipping interests in India, and James Hutton, an English merchant of means, formed an English chapter of the organization in order to provide an outlet for their desires to civilize Africa. Leopold arranged for the American, Henry Morton Stanley, to undertake the task of exploring and opening up the central region of the dark continent, the Congo. At this same time, MacKinnon's interests turned to the east coast of Africa. He wanted to construct a road from the coastal town of Dar-es-Salaam into the interior. Because of the favorable reaction he received from the Sultan, he asked for a larger concession than he originally intended in order that he might open up the entire costs of East Africa. The British government gave him enough verbal support to convince him to proceed with his plans in 1878, and negotiators were sent to Zanzibar to conclude the concession with Barghash in March of that same year. But because of the behind-the-scene maneuvers of the Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, the negotiations came to nothing. The government of Great Britain was in no way disposed to accept responsibility

for the east coast of Africa. MacKinnon's interest lagged, and no further British activity was undertaken in East Africa for the next seven years.

There were opportunities during these years if the government of Great Britain had been willing to accept them. Barghash offered a quasi-protectorate to London in 1881 but the Foreign Office refused to accept any sort of commitment to the Sultan. Three years later Barghash unilaterally promised to have no dealings with any other foreign power without first consulting Britain. There was not even a British reply to this proclamation.

The most outstanding opportunity offered to Great Britain came in 1884 as a result of Harry Hamilton Johnson's Kilimanjaro expedition. Johnson, an ardent exponent of British expansion, was provided with funds in order that he might undertake a botanical expedition to East Africa, and he was further authorized to make treaties with the native chiefs of the Kilimanjaro region. Johnson concluded several treaties with these chiefs which gave him or any other person designated by him exclusive rights to colonize the area. This time the Foreign Office of Great Britain was disposed to a positive response, but the negative attitude assumed by John Kirk destroyed any chance for positive action on the part of British interests.

Great Britain meantime was engaged in negotiations with Portugal concerning the territory around the mouth of the Congo River. Britain was disposed to allow Portugal to annex this territory, but, due to pressure exerted both at home and abroad, she was forced to participate

in the Congress of Berlin. This conference abrogated the Anglo-Portuguese treaty and instead allowed Leopold exclusive rights to the Congo area. The conference further opened the way for European expansion into Africa by setting up rules of annexation which were to be adhered to by all the powers which signed the Berlin treaty.

Within one week of the signing of the treaty, Bismarck gave official recognition to Carl Peters' Gesellschaft für Deutsche Kolonisation. This organization was formed by Peters for the expressed purpose of securing East African territory for German interests. In 1884 Peters visited the region of East Africa directly opposite Zanzibar and concluded twelve treaties of dubious value with the natives of the area. Barghash appealed to his protector Great Britain for assistance in warding off this German threat but received no guarantee of positive action.

After Lord Salisbury assumed the post of Prime Minister for the second time, in 1885, he persuaded H. H. Johnson to sign over his treaties in the Kilimanjaro region to William MacKinnon. Because of these British treaty claims in East Africa, Great Britain and Germany realized that a case for arbitration existed. A commission was appointed to determine the extent of the Sultan's dominions and to divide East Africa into two spheres of influence. Although the commission came to no permanent settlement, direct negotiations ensued between Great Britain and Germany in the fall of 1886. The Anglo-German Agreement of 1886 provided for two spheres of influence in East Africa and allowed the Sultan to maintain his authority over the islands of Zanzibar and

Pemba and to retain control of a ten mile wide stretch of coast within both spheres of influence.

By 1886 William MacKinnon's interest in East Africa had been rekindled, and he was willing to embark on a venture with Leopold and Stanley which would open the region of the great lakes of east central Africa. The plan developed by these men was to penetrate to the region of the lakes and offer the German, Emin Pasha, who had been left in the region by Gordon, a deal whereby he was to remain as governor of the area but under the authority of either Leopold or MacKinnon. MacKinnon used Stanley as an intermediary to contact Barghash concerning another concession. Barghash was agreeable and when MacKinnon was informed he proceeded with his plans to form a British East Africa Company. When Stanley finally reached Emin's position in 1888, Emin's troops rebelled and he was thus unable to accept any offer that Stanley might make. MacKinnon's scheme had failed as regards Emin, but he now had governmental sanction to set his plans in motion on the east coast of Africa.

After Stanley's talks with Barghash in 1887 a concession was granted to MacKinnon by the Sultan. MacKinnon arranged for the formation of an association designed to open East Africa at once, and in the spring of the next year he and his friends formed the Imperial British East Africa Company in order to undertake the administration of the British sphere of influence created by the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886. The British government provided sanction for the undertakings planned by the company but was careful to allow itself no direct responsibility for any of the company's actions. It was understood that the British government was not to be counted on for any sort of assistance or to aid in the administration of East Africa. In fact the charter granted by the government

in September of 1888 allowed the government to intervene in the affairs of the company, but it granted no governmental assistance to the company.

The Imperial British East Africa Company was a composite body of many diverse interests, giving it a character seemingly philanthropic, imperialistic, and commercial all at once. There was, however, one belief held by all the members of the board of directors of the company. They felt that their work in developing East Africa would be of as much benefit to the natives of the area as to themselves.

Although an imperialistic tone was certainly present the company cannot be said to have been vitally concerned with forwarding British markets. The board of directors spoke very rarely of the need to develop new markets in the region of East Africa in order to provide an outlet for surplus production in England.

When the Imperial British East Africa Company assumed control of East Africa, the whole coast was in turmoil because of German mismanagement in the area to the south. George MacKenzie, the company's first administrator in East Africa, also found himself embroiled in problems arising from the practice of slavery. He was able, however, to secure an amicable settlement between the slaves and the slave owners. But in doing so, he involved the company in unnecessary financial problems. By 1889 Lord Salisbury had decided that in order to protect the back door to Egypt by way of the Nile River, the company would be forced to move out to the Uganda area in order to secure it for British interests. The I.B.E.A. Company was thus expected to expand into the interior without having even consolidated its position on the coast. A company administrator, Frederick Jackson, founded several advance posts for the company in the

region between the company's base at Mombasa and the Uganda area. These bases were not maintained, however, because of the difficulty involved in transporting men and material in East Africa. No development was undertaken in the region between Mombasa and Uganda, then, since the company was preoccupied with the deeper interior. Further problems were forthcoming because of the inability of the Imperial British East Africa Company to staff its East African offices and posts with capable men. The company was in dire financial troubles by 1890 because of under-capitalization. At the same time Lord Salisbury became disgruntled with MacKinnon because of the other's apparent unconcern for the problem of securing Uganda.

One further reason prompting direct governmental action in East Africa arose between 1886 and 1890. This was Bismarck's desire to forego further rivalry in East Africa in order that he might concentrate on European matters. The two countries came to an agreement by 1890 whereby direct British control over her sphere of influence in East Africa was to be recognized, and in return Germany was to be allowed to occupy the island of Heligoland in the North Sea. In 1890 Great Britain assumed direct responsibility for her young colony in East Africa and declared a protectorate over the island of Zanzibar.

APPENDIX I

CONCESSION GRANTED TO THE

IMPERIAL BRITISH EAST AFRICA COMPANY

by Sultan Khalifa

Article I

His Highness the Sultan makes over to the Imperial British East Africa Company all the powers and authority to which he is entitled on the mainland on the Mrima, and in all his territories and dependencies from Wanga to Kipini inclusive, also the Islands embraced in such territory, the whole administration of which he concedes to and places in their hands to be carried out in His Highness' name, and under his flag, and subject to His Highness' sovereign rights; but it is understood that the Company will conduct all the affairs and administration of that part of His Highness' dominions included in this Concession, and that His Highness the Sultan shall not be liable for any expenses connected with the same, nor for any war or "diya" (blood-money), or for any claim arising therefrom, none of which His Highness shall be called upon to settle. No other but themselves shall have the right of purchasing or dealing with public lands on the mainland or anywhere in His Highness' territories, possessions, or dependencies within the limits aboved named except through them as is the case now with His Highness. He also grants to the Company, or to their Representatives, the sole right and power levying taxes upon the people of the mainland within the limits above named. His Highness further agrees to do all acts and deeds that may be necessary to give full effect to the terms of this Concession, to aid and support the Company, or their Representatives, with all his authority and force so as to secure to them the rights and powers hereby granted.

It is further agreed upon by the Contracting parties that nothing in the following Articles of concession shall in any way infringe on or lessen the rights accorded by His Highness to the subjects or citizens

of Great Britain, the United States of America, France, Germany, or any other foreign Powers having Treaty relations with His Highness, or to the obligations which are or may be imposed upon him by his adhesion to the Berlin General Act.

Article II

His Highness authorizes the Company, or their Representatives, to appoint in his name and on his behalf Commissioners to administer the districts in His Highness' possessions included in the limit of territories named above, except as hereinafter provided; to appoint such subordinate officers as may be required; to pass laws for the government of districts; to establish Courts of Justice; and generally to adopt such measures as may be necessary for the protection and government of the districts and interests under their rule.

His Highness further authorizes the Company, or their Representatives, to make Treaties with subordinate and other native Chiefs, such Treaties and engagements to be ratified and confirmed by him in any cases in which they are made in the name of His Highness. His Highness also agrees to cede to the Company, or to their Representatives, all the rights which he himself possesses over the lands in the Concession, only excepting the private lands or "shambas," and gives the Company all forts and public buildings as His Highness may wish to retain for his own private use, a Schedule of such buildings, plantations or properties to be drawn up and agreed to between His Highness and the Company. Further, he authorizes and empowers them to acquire and regulate and dispose of the occupation of all lands not yet occupied; to levy and collect local and other taxes, dues, tolls; to do all these and such other acts as may be necessary for

the maintenance and support of such local Governments, forces, administration of justice, the making and improving of roads or water communication or other public works, defensive or otherwise, and for the liquidation of debts, and payment of interest upon capital expended. The Judges shall be appointed by the Company, or their Representatives, and the Sultan shall confirm all such appointments, but all the "Kathis" shall be nominated by His Highness.

In aboriginal tracts the law shall be administered by the Company or their officials.

The stipends of the Governors, and all other officials in the territories occupied and controlled by the Company, or their Representatives, shall be paid by them.

Article III

His Highness grants to the Company, or their Representatives, the right to trade, to hold property, to erect buildings, and to acquire lands or buildings by purchase or negotiation anywhere within His Highness' territories included in the limits of this Concession, with the consent of the proprietors of any such lands and houses.

Article IV

His Highness grants to the company, or to their Representatives, special and exclusive privileges to regulate trade and commerce; also the navigation of rivers and lakes, and control of fisheries, the making of roads, tramways, railways, canals, and telegraphs, and to levy tolls and dues on the same; also the power to control or prevent the importation of any merchandise, arms, ammunition of all sorts, intoxicating liquors,

or any goods which, in the opinion of the Company or their Representatives, are detrimental to law, order, and morality, and in whatsoever His Highness is not bound towards other Governments. But it is clearly understood that all exercise of these privileges and powers shall be in conformity with existing Treaties between His Highness and foreign States.

Article V

His Highness authorizes the Company, or their Representatives, to occupy in his name all ports and forts at the mouth or mouths of any river or rivers, or elsewhere in his dominions included in the limits of this Concession, with the right to establish Custom-Houses, and to levy and collect dues on any vessels, goods, etc., arriving at, or departing from such port or ports, and to take all necessary measures for the prevention of smuggling, subject in all cases to the Treaties above-named.

Article VI

His Highness grants to the Company or to their Representatives the exclusive privilege to search for and work, or to regulate, lease, or assign, in any part of His Highness' territories within the limits of this Concession, any mines, or deposits of lead, coal, iron, copper, tin, gold, silver, precious stones, or any metal or mineral, or mineral oils whatsoever; also the exclusive right to trade in the same, free from all taxes and dues, excepting such moderate royalty on minerals only, not exceeding 5 per cent on the first value of the article, less the working expenses, as may be hereinafter agreed by the Company and their Representatives to be paid to His Highness; also the right to use all forest trees and other woods and materials of any kind whatsoever for the purpose of

the works aforesaid, and also for trade. But the wood used for building and for burning, commonly known as "Borti," may be cut on the mainland by others, as now, by payment of such dues to the Company, or to their Representatives, as they may agree upon; but no such dues shall be required for wood cut for His Highness' use.

Article VII

His Highness grants to the Company, or to their Representatives the right to establish a bank or banks anywhere in His Highness' territories above mentioned with the exclusive privilege of issuing notes.

Article VIII

All the aforesaid powers and privileges to extend over and be available for the purposes and objects of the Company, or their Representatives during the whole of the term of 50 years next, and dating from the time of this Concession being signed.

At the conclusion of the said term all the public works and buildings may revert to the Sultan, his direct heirs, and successors nominated by him, if desired, at a valuation to be fixed by Arbitrators chosen by both parties, subject to conditions of Article XIV.

Article IX

His Highness grants to the Company, or to their Representatives, the "Regie" or lease of the Customs of all the ports throughout that part of His Highness' territories above defined, for an equal period of time to the other Concessions upon the following terms, namely: --The Company hereby guarantees to His Highness the whole amount of the custom duties

which he now receives, both from import and export trade from that part of His Highness' dominions included in this Concession. The definite amount of the annual average shall be fixed after one year's experience. During the first year the Imperial British East Africa Company shall have the right to claim all and every pecuniary or other advantage connected with the administration of the coast and customs which is guaranteed under similar circumstances to the German Company in their Concession.

For the first year also the Company guarantees to His Highness the amount of the customs which he now receives, as shown by the books, to be paid by monthly instalments, post numerando, according to the Arab reckoning of the year.

After the first year's experience the annual average of the sum to be paid to His Highness by the Company shall be fixed. The Company, however, shall have the right, at the end of every third year, according to the results of the previous three years, as shown by their books, to enter into fresh negotiations with His Highness in order to fix a revised average. Further it is understood that His Highness shall not claim the duty on any part of this trade twice over, and that the Company shall therefore be entitled to claim a drawback for the amount of any duties which may hereafter be paid direct to His Highness on any imports to, or exports from, the ports included in this Concession; and the Company further guarantees to pay to His Highness 50 per cent of the additional net revenue which shall come to them from the custom duties of the ports included in this Concession after payment of all expenses, and His Highness grants to the Company all rights over the territorial waters in or appertaining to his dominions within the limits of these Concessions,

particularly the right to supervise and control the conveyance, transit, landing, and shipment of merchandise, and produce within the said waters by means of a Coast-guard service both on land and water. Finally, in addition to all that is stated in the foregoing Article, the Imperial British East Africa Company shall have the right to claim and exercise every right, privilege or power granted by His Highness the Sultan to the German East African Association in Article IX, or in any other Article of their Concession.

Article X

In consideration of the foregoing Concessions, powers and privileges being granted by His Highness, the Company, or their Representatives, allot to His Highness the dividend on the value of that part of the Company's Capital which is corresponding to one Founder's Share of the Imperial British East Africa Company, free of cost, which shall entitle him to one-tenth of the net profits, as shown by the books of the Company, after payment of all expenses and depreciations, and after interest at the rate of 8 per cent shall have been paid upon the shareholders' paid-up capital.

Article XI

The Imperial British East Africa Company shall enjoy all the rights, privileges, immunities, and advantages which are or hereafter may be enjoyed by or accorded to any other Company or particular person to whom His Highness may have given, or may give, Concessions in any other part of his dominions similar to those granted by this Concession to the Imperial British East Africa Company, or of a different character.

Article XII

These Concessions do not relate to His Highness' possessions in the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, nor to his territories south of Wanga or north of Kipini; and it is understood that all public, judicial or Government powers and functions herein conceded to the Company, or to their Representatives, shall be exercised by them only in the name and under the authority of the Sultan of Zanzibar.

Article XIII

It is hereby agreed by both parties that these Concessions, and the corresponding obligations set forth, shall be binding upon both parties, their heirs, successors, and assigns during the term of fifty years, for which they have been agreed upon.

Article XIV

All railways, tramways, caravanserais (rest houses), roads, canals, telegraphs, water works, gas works, and other works of public utility, also mines constructed by the Company or parties authorized by them with all their lands, buildings, and appurtenances shall be the property of the Contracting Company in perpetuity or of any Company which may be formed by the said Company to make them, and they shall be free forever from taxation of any kind, excepting only the Royalties on minerals previously provided for in Article VI.

Article XV

Pending such reasonable period after the date of the final ratification of this agreement as may be required by the Imperial British East Africa Company to make their arrangements for administering the territories

and revenues conceded to them herein, the officials and troops of His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar shall continue in possession of such territories until the aforesaid Company intimate their readiness to take over the whole Administration, including the collection of revenues. The Company shall be responsible to the Sultan for the payment of the amount to which he may be entitled under the provisions of Article IX of this agreement, only from the date on which they take over charge of the Administration as above specified. It is further understood that the time of the transfer of the customs, lands and buildings aforesaid shall be fixed by special agreement, but it is understood that such transfer shall be made before the 1st January, 1889, at latest.

Article XVI

The present agreement has been made out in four copies, two of which are written in the Arabic and two in the English language. All these copies have the same issue and meaning. Should differences, however, hereafter arise as to the proper interpretation of the English and Arabic text of one or other of the stipulations of this Concession, the English copy and meaning shall be considered decisive.

Source - Papers of the Imperial British
East Africa Company

APPENDIX II
AGREEMENT REGARDING SPHERES OF INFLUENCE
BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY
OCTOBER-NOVEMBER, 1886

ARTICLE I. Zanzibar, Pemba, twelve miles radius, Lamu, Mafia on Mainland to Sultan. Coast from Minengani River at head of Tunghi Bay to Kipini, line commences on the south of the Minengani River, follows the course of that river five sea miles, and continues thence on the line of latitude to the point where it strikes the right bank of the Rovuma River, then crosses the Rovuma, and runs down its left bank.

.....

The coast-line has an internal depth of ten sea miles measured from the coast direct into the interior from high-water mark.

ARTICLE II. Great Britain agrees to support negotiations of Germany with the Sultan for the leasing to the German African Company of the customs duties of the ports of Dar-esSalaam and Pangani, in return for an annual payment to the Sultan by the Company.

ARTICLE III. Both powers agree to establish a delimitation of their respectable spheres of influence The territory to which this applies is bounded on the North by a line which starts from the mouth of the Tana River, follows it to the Equator and 38th degree longitude and thence to the point of intersection of the first degree of North latitude with the 37th degree East longitude, where it terminates

The line of demarcation starts at the mouth of the River Wanga (Umbe) and runs to Lake Jipe. Thence along the east side of the lake and the north side across to the Lumi River, between the territories of Taveita and Chagga, north of Kilimanjaro to the east side of Lake Victoria Nyanza where it is intersected by the first degree of south latitude.

APPENDIX III

FORMATION OF IMPERIAL BRITISH EAST

AFRICA COMPANY

APRIL 18, 1888

1. The Undersigned hereby agree to form themselves into an Association or Company (hereinafter referred to as "the Company") under the name or style of the "IMPERIAL BRITISH EAST AFRICA COMPANY" (hitherto called "The British East African Association") having a nominal Share Capital of £1,000,000 or such other sum as the Company may hereafter agree upon with power also to raise further Capital at any time by the issue of Ordinary or Preference Shares or Debentures and if at any time so determined to convert such Preference Shares and Debentures into Preference and Debenture Stocks.

2. The objects for which the Company is formed are inter alia as follows--

- (a) To take over, acquire, accept, hold and enjoy the concessions dated the 24th day of May 1887 granted by H. H. The Sayyid Barghash-Bin-Said Sultan of Zanzibar for himself, his heirs successors and assigns to the British East African Association under the presidency of Mr. William MacKinnon which Association is now to be called the Imperial British East Africa Company.
- (b) To apply for and obtain from the Crown a charter or charters incorporating the Company as a British corporate body and under British protection or otherwise, the liability of its Shareholders being limited to the amount for which they severally subscribe and its business and affairs being controlled or directed by a President, Vice-President and a Court of Directors consisting of fourteen persons or such other number as may hereafter be agreed upon, or as the Charter may direct.

- (c) To undertake under the terms of the said concessions, the entire management and administration of those parts of the mainlands and islands of the Zanzibar dominions on the east coast of Africa appertaining to the territory lying between Wanga and Kipini both inclusive, which are recognized in the Anglo-German Treaty of 1886 as reserved for the exclusive exercise of British influence, together with any further rights of a similar or other nature in East Africa or elsewhere which the Company may hereafter acquire.
- (d) Also to acquire from rulers, chiefs or others, within the districts reserved for British influence and elsewhere in Africa, (with due observance of international obligations) lands, territories and stations, with or without sovereign rights, by concession, purchase or otherwise and to administer and govern the same and to exercise all the powers and rights incidental thereto.
- (e) To make and enforce laws for the government of districts, to establish courts of justice, to appoint judges, magistrates and other officials and generally to adopt all or any such measures as may be deemed necessary, in the interest and for the protection and government of the districts for the time being under the rule of the Company.
- (f) To grant or withhold licenses, to levy taxes, customs, imposts and other dues of any sort or kind whatsoever within such districts.

- (g) To construct and regulate, either directly or through others, all roads, harbours, railroads, tramroads, telegraphs, telephones and other public or private works of any kind soever. To erect waterworks, wharves and any and every kind of building. To establish banks, issue notes and coin money, and generally to discharge and perform within the sphere of their operations the functions which appertain to such rights of sovereignty or ownership as may now or hereafter vest in the Company by charter, concession, purchase or otherwise.
- (h) To undertake all such trading or other operations as may hereafter be decided upon within such territories and districts or elsewhere.
- (i) And generally to acquire, hold, enjoy and exercise all other powers, privileges and rights of every kind and description whatsoever and upon any terms or conditions whatsoever which the President and Court of Directors for the time being of the Company may in their absolute discretion think advisable to apply for, seek to obtain or acquire.

3. The Capital of the Company shall be divided into Ordinary Shares of £100 each and in respect of every ten of such Shares on which all calls made thereon have been paid, the holder thereof shall be entitled to one vote.

10. The said William MacKinnon mentioned in the concession referred to in clause 2(a) of this Agreement as the President shall be such first President, the undersigned The Right Honourable Lord Brassey, K.C.B., shall be the first Vice-President, and the undersigned General Sir

Donald M. Steward, Bart., F.C.B., Sir T. Fowell Buxton, Bart., Sir John Kirk, G.C.M.G., General Sir Arnold Burrowes Kemball, R.A., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-General Sir Lewis Pelly, M.C., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., Colonel Sir Francis De Winton, R.A., K.C.M.G., C.B., W. Burdett-Coutts, M.P., A. L. Bruce, R.P. Harding, George S. MacKenzie, Robert Ryrie, shall constitute the first Court of Directors with power to fill up any vacancies which may arise and to add to their number, but not exceeding sixteen in all, including the President and Vice-President. At the expiration of three years from the date of incorporation, three of such Directors shall retire annually, but such retiring Directors shall respectively be eligible for re-election.

11. Anything herein before contained is subject to such alteration or amendment as may be imposed by the terms of any other concession which may be accepted by the Company or by any charter or charters which may be granted to the Company by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council or by the deed of settlement executed in pursuance thereof.

Dated this 18th day of April 1888.

Witness	Signatures and Addresses of Subscribers	Amounts of Subscriptions
Charles W. Howard, Clerk 13 Austin Friars, London, E.C.	W. MacKinnon, Twenty-five thousand pounds	£ 25,000
H. Goodwyn Stephenson, Solicitor, 31, Lombard Street, London, E.C.	Brassey, Ten thousand pounds	£ 10,000

H. Goodwyn Stephenson	R.P. Harding, Ten thousand pounds	£ 10,000
H. Goodwyn Stephenson	P. MacKinnon, Fifteen thousand pounds	£ 15,000
H. Goodwyn Stephenson	Wm. Vaughan Morgan, Ten thousand pounds	£ 10,000
A.R. Warren, Lombard Street Solicitor's Clerk	S. Vaughan Morgan, Ten thousand pounds	£ 10,000
H. Goodwyn Stephenson	W. Vaughan Morgan, Five thousand pounds	£ 5,000

Source - Papers of the Imperial British
East Africa Company

APPENDIX IV
CHARTER GRANTED TO THE IMPERIAL BRITISH
EAST AFRICA COMPANY
September 3, 1888

Victoria by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen Defender of the Faith. To all to whom these presents shall come, GREETING:

WHEREAS a humble Petition has been presented to Us in Our Council by WILLIAM MACKINNON, of Loup and Balinakill, in the County of Argyll, Scotland.

The Right Honourable Lord Brassey, Knight Commander of Our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, of Normanhurst Court, Sussex.

General Sir Donald Steward, Baronet, Knight Grand Cross of Our Most Exalted Order of the Star of India and a Companion of Our Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, of Harrington Gardens, London.

Sir John Kirk, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, of Wavertree, Sevenoaks, Kent.

William Burdett-Coutts, a Member of the Commons House of Parliament, of HolyLodge, Highgate, Middlesex.

Robert Palmer Harding, of Wetherby Gardens, Kensington, Esquire.

George Sutherland MacKenzie, of 13, Austin Friars, London, Merchant.

And Whereas the said Petition states amongst other things: ---
That the Petitioners and others are associated for the purpose of forming a Company of Association, to be incorporated, if to Us should seem fit, for the subjects in the said Petition set forth under the corporate name of the Imperial British East Africa Company.

That His Highness the Sayyid Barghash Bin-Said, Sultan of Zanzibar and its E.A. Dependencies, by his grants of concessions dated the 24th May, 1887, granted and conceded to the Petitioners, or some of them, under the name or description of the British E.A. Association, all his powers, and

the rights and duties of administration, and other privileges specially named on the mainland of E.A.M. in the territory of the Mrima, and also on the Islands embraced in such territory, and in all his Territories and Dependencies on the Coast of E.A. from Wanga to Kipini, both inclusive, such powers, rights and duties to be exercised and performed in his name and under his flag, and subject to the provisions of the said grants and concessions.

That divers preliminary agreements have been made on behalf of the Petitioners with Chiefs and Tribes in regions which adjoin or are situate of the landward of the territories included in the said grants of concessions, and which are included in the sphere of British influence, agreed on behalf of ourselves and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in 1886, by which powers of government and administration in such regions are granted or conceded to or for the benefit of the Petitioners.

That the Petitioners desire to carry into effect the said grants, concessions, agreements, and treaties as they may hereafter obtain with the districts already referred to as being within the sphere reserved for British influence and elsewhere, as We may be pleased to allow with the view of promoting trade, commerce and good government in the territories and regions which are or may be comprised in such grants, concessions, agreements, of treaties, as aforesaid, and the Petitioners believe that, if the said grants, concessions, agreements, or treaties can be carried into effect, the condition of the natives inhabiting the aforesaid territories and regions would be materially improved, and their civilization

advanced, and an organization established which would tend to the suppression of the slave trade in such territories, and the said territories and regions would be opened to the lawful trade and commerce of Our subjects and of other nations.

That the possession by a British Company of the coast-line, as above defined, and which includes the Port of Mombasa, would be advantageous to the commercial and other interests of Our subjects in the Indian Ocean, who may otherwise become compelled to reside and trade under the government and protection of alien powers.

That the success of the enterprise in which the Petitioners are engaged would be greatly advanced if it should seem fit to Us to grant them Our Royal Charter of Incorporation as a British Company under the said name or title, or such other name or title, and with such powers as to Us may seem fit for the purpose of more effectually carrying out the objects aforesaid.

That the Petitioners have already subscribed large sums of money for the purposes of the intended Company, and are prepared to subscribe or to procure such further amount as may hereafter be found requisite for the development of this enterprise in the event of Our being pleased to grant to them Our Royal Charter of INC., as aforesaid.

Now therefore, We having taken the said Petition into our Royal consideration in our Council, and being satisfied that the intentions of the Petitioners are praiseworthy and deserve encouragement, and that the enterprise in the Petition described may be productive of the benefits set forth in the said Petition by our prerogative Royal, and of our special grace, certain knowledge and mere motion have constituted,

erected and incorporated, and by this our Charter for us and our heirs and Royal successors do constitute, erect, and incorporate into one body politic and corporate by the name of THE IMPERIAL BRITISH EAST AFRICA COMPANY the said WILLIAM MACKINNON, the Right Honorable Lord Brassey K.C.B., General Sir Donald Stewart, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., C.I.E.; Sir John Kirk, G.C.M.G.; William Burdett-Coutts, M.P.; Robert Palmer Harding; George Sutherland MacKenzie; and such other persons and such bodies as from time to time become and are members of that body, with perpetual succession and a Common Seal, with power to break, alter, or renew the same at discretion, and with the further authorities, powers, and privileges conferred, and subject to the conditions imposed by this Our Charter, and we do hereby accordingly will, ordain, grant, and declare as follows (that is to say): ---

1. The said Imperial British E.A. Co. (in this Our Charter referred to as "the company") is hereby authorized and empowered to hold and retain the full benefit of the several Grants, Concessions, Agreements, and Treaties aforesaid, or any of them, and all rights, interests, authorities and powers necessary for the purposes of government preservation of public order in, or protection of the said territories, or otherwise, of what nature or kind soever, under or by virtue thereof, or resulting therefrom, and ceded to or vested in the Company, in, over, or affecting the territories, lands, and property comprised in those several grants, concessions, agreements or treaties, or in, over, or affection any territories, lands, or property in the neighbourhood of the same, and to hold, use, and exercise the same lands, property rights, interests, authorities, and powers respectively for the purposes of the Company, and on the terms of this Our Charter.

2. The Company is hereby further authorized and empowered, subject to the approval of one of Our Principal Secretaries of State (herein referred to as Our Secretary of State) to acquire and take by any grant, concession, agreement or treaty, other rights, interests, authorities, or powers of any kind or nature whatever in, over, or affecting the territories, lands, or property comprised in the several grants, concessions, agreements, or treaties, as aforesaid, or any rights, interests, authorities, or powers of any kind whatever in, over or affecting other territories, lands, or property in Africa, and to hold, use, enjoy, and exercise the same for purposes of the Company and on the terms of this our Charter.

3. Provided that none of the powers of this Our Charter shall be exercised under or in relation to any grant, concession, agreement, or treaty, as aforesaid, until a copy of such grant, concession, agreement, or treaty in such form and with such maps or particulars as Our Secretary of State approves and verified as he requires, has been transmitted to him, and he has signified his approval thereof, either absolutely or subject to any conditions or reservations.

4. The Company shall be bound by and shall fulfill all and singular the stipulations on their part contained in any such grant, concession, agreement, or treaty as aforesaid, subject to any subsequent agreement affecting those stipulations approved by Our Secretary of State.

5. The Company shall always be and remain British in character and domicile, and shall have its principal Office in Great Britain, and the Company's principal representative in East Africa, and all the Directors shall always be natural born British subjects or persons who have been naturalized as British subjects by or under an Act of Parliament of Our United Kingdom.

6. The Company shall not have power to transfer wholly or in part the benefit of the grants, concessions, agreements, or treaties aforesaid, or any of them, except with the consent of Our Secretary of State.

7. In case at any time any difference arises between the Sultan of Zanzibar, or the Chiefs or Tribes which are included in the sphere of British influence, as hereinbefore recited, and the Company, that difference shall on the part of the Company be submitted to the decision of Our Secretary of State, if he is willing to undertake the decision thereof.

8. If at any time Our Secretary of State thinks fit to dissent from or object to any of the dealings of the Company with any foreign power and to make known to the Company any suggestions founded on that dissent or objection, the Company shall act in accordance therewith.

9. If at any time Our Secretary of State thinks fit to object to the exercise by the Company of any authority or power within any part of the territories comprised in the several grants, concessions, agreements, or treaties aforesaid, or otherwise acquired by the Company, on the ground of there being an adverse claim to that part, the Company shall defer to that objection until such time as any such claim has been withdrawn or finally dealt with or settled by Our Secretary of State.

10. The Company shall, to the best of its power, discourage, and, so far as may be practicable and as may be consistent with existing treaties between non-African powers and Zanzibar, abolish by degrees any system of slave trade or domestic servitude in the Company's territories.

11. The Company as such, or its officers as such, shall not in any way interfere with the religion of any class or tribe of the peoples of

its territories or of any of the inhabitants thereof, except so far as may be necessary in the interests of humanity, and all forms of religious worship or religious ordinances may be exercised within the said territories, and no hindrance shall be offered thereto except as aforesaid.

12. In the administration of justice by the Company to the peoples of its territories or to any of the inhabitants thereof, careful regard shall always be had to the customs and laws of the class or tribe or nation to which the parties respectively belong, especially with respect to the holding, possession, transfer, and disposition of lands and goods, and testate or intestate succession thereto, and marriage, divorce, and legitimacy, and other rights of property and personal rights.

13. If at any time Our Secretary of State thinks fit to dissent from or object to any part of the proceedings or system of the Company relative to the peoples of its territories or to any of the inhabitants in respect of slavery or religion, or the administration of justice or other matter, he shall make known to the Company his dissent or objection, and the Company shall act in accordance with his directions duly signified.

14. The Company shall freely afford all facilities requisite for Our ships in the harbours of the Company without payment, except reasonable charges for work done or services rendered, or materials or things supplied.

15. Except in the Dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar (within which it is required to use His Highness's flag), the Company may hoist and use on its buildings and elsewhere in its Territories and on its vessels such distinctive flag indicating the British character of the Company, as Our Secretary of State and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty shall from time to time approve.

16. Nothing in this Our Charter shall be deemed to authorize the Company to set up or grant any monopoly of trade, provided that the establishment of or the grant of concessions for banks, railways, tramways, docks, telegraphs, waterworks, or other similar undertakings, or any undertakings or system of patents or copyright approved by Our Secretary of State, shall not be deemed monopolies for this purpose.

17. Subject to the Customs' duties and taxes, hereby authorized, and subject to such restrictions as may be imposed by the Company on importation of spirits, opium, arms, and ammunition, and to restrictions on other things similar to those restrictions which may be applied in Our United Kingdom, or in Our Indian Empire, or as may be approved by Our Secretary of State, there shall be no differential treatment of the subjects of any power as to trade or settlement, or as to access, to markets; provided that foreigners as well as British subjects shall be subject to administrative dispositions in the interest of commerce and of order.

Source - Papers of the Imperial British
East Africa Company

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