THE SCALE OF CONFLICT: A LEVELS OF WAR AND GIS APPROACH TO THE 
BATTLE OF ROI-NAMUR 

By 

Dominic Fargnoli 

December 2023 

Director of Thesis: Dr. Jason T. Raupp 

Major Department: History, Maritime Studies 

ABSTRACT 

The World War II Battle of Roi-Namur represents a culmination of overarching facets of 

planning, tactics, and application. Though taking place in a small region of the Pacific Ocean, 

this battle involved components that originated well beyond the size of its landmass. This thesis 

seeks to combine a Levels of War framework and a Geographic Information Systems approach 

to better understand and analyze the Battle of Roi-Namur. The Levels of War framework 

assigned all components of the battle to its various levels, which established a foundation for 

analytical processes. Geographic Information Systems allowed for a visualization of the 

battlefield through a multiscale approach and provided the means for each component to be 

spatially represented. Using these methods allows all elements of this conflict to be understood 

both independently and holistically. Together these methodologies elicit new understanding and 

interpretations of the conflict while exploring the potential limitations of the Levels of War 

framework in furthering the understanding of conflict.  



   
 

 
 

  



   
 

 
 

THE SCALE OF CONFLICT: A LEVELS OF WAR AND GIS APPROACH TO THE 
BATTLE OF ROI-NAMUR 

 

A Thesis 

Presented to the Faculty of the Department of History 

East Carolina University 

 

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree 

Master of Arts in Maritime Studies 

 

By 

Dominic Fargnoli 

December 2023 

 

Director of Thesis: Jason T. Raupp, Ph.D. 

Thesis Committee Members: 

Jennifer F. McKinnon, Ph.D. 

Nathan Richards, Ph.D.  



   
 

 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

© Dominic Fargnoli, 2023 

  



   
 

 
 

DEDICATION 

To my loved ones, family, and friends.  



   
 

 
 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

 Throughout the process of writing this thesis, there are many who I am beyond grateful 

for and appreciative of all the support, love, and advice. I would first like to thank Dr. Jason 

Raupp for prompting my initial interest in this undertaking and for all your efforts in ensuring 

this thesis is what I wanted it to be. Thank you for the opportunity and for seeing me through 

this with the utmost care and consideration. 

 Secondly, I would like to thank the members of my committee, Dr. Jennifer McKinnon 

and Dr. Nathan Richards. The mental, technical, and moral support provided throughout my 

writing process and graduate school career cannot be thanked enough. I also want to thank 

Daniel Gunter for providing GPS points of sites of archaeological importance and critical 

information about Roi-Namur. 

I would also like to thank the company that saw me through my graduate school 

endeavor, Green Engineering. I am incredibly grateful and thankful for your help and support in 

seeing me through graduate school with a stable and very enjoyable role in this company. 

I also want to thank Dayan, D.J., Ian, Ray, and the rest of my friends in Greenville for 

all your support, advice, and wisdom throughout this process. I am very thankful for your 

advice and the fun activities away from school.  

Finally, I would like to thank my parents, brothers, and significant other Hannah. 

Without all of your love and support, managing my mental health and focus would have proven 

incredibly difficult. Your support is beyond appreciated, and the gratitude I have is 

unprecedented.   



   
 

 
 

Table Of Contents 

List Of Figures .............................................................................................................................. ix 

Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 

Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 2 

Primary Question ............................................................................................................... 2 

Secondary Questions ......................................................................................................... 2 

Justification and Significance ............................................................................................ 3 

Thesis Structure ................................................................................................................. 3 

Chapter 2: A History of the Battle of Roi-Namur ......................................................................... 5 

Pearl Harbor ...................................................................................................................... 6 

Japanese Occupation in the Pacific Ocean and Geography .............................................. 6 

New Strategies and Technology ........................................................................................ 8 

The Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway ....................................................................... 10 

Island Hopping Campaign ............................................................................................... 12 

The Battle of Guadalcanal ............................................................................................... 13 

Gilbert Islands ................................................................................................................. 14 

Operation Flintlock ......................................................................................................... 16 

Battle Of Kwajalein Atoll ................................................................................................ 19 

Impact of the Battle of Kwajalein Atoll .......................................................................... 24 



   
 

 
 

Operation Catchpole and Securing the Marshall Islands ................................................ 24 

Chapter 3: The Battle of Roi-Namur Through the Levels of War .............................................. 27 

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 27 

Battlefield Archaeology .................................................................................................. 27 

History of Battlefield Archaeology ................................................................................. 30 

Levels of War Analysis ................................................................................................... 31 

Strategic ...................................................................................................................... 32 

Operational ................................................................................................................. 33 

Tactical ........................................................................................................................ 34 

History of Levels of War Analysis .................................................................................. 35 

Case Studies .................................................................................................................... 37 

Classification of the Battle of Roi-Namur through Levels of War Approach ................. 40 

Strategic ...................................................................................................................... 41 

Operational ................................................................................................................. 42 

Tactical ........................................................................................................................ 43 

Archaeological Importance ............................................................................................. 45 

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 46 

Chapter 4: GIS in Battlefield Archaeology ................................................................................. 47 

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 47 

GIS Fundamentals ........................................................................................................... 49 



   
 

 
 

GIS In Battlefield Archaeology ....................................................................................... 51 

Planning ...................................................................................................................... 54 

Armament .................................................................................................................... 55 

Outcomes ..................................................................................................................... 57 

The Battle of Little Bighorn ......................................................................................... 58 

The Battle of Monmouth .............................................................................................. 60 

Battle of the Atlantic .................................................................................................... 62 

Multiscale Approach ....................................................................................................... 64 

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 66 

Chapter 5: Methodological Approach ......................................................................................... 67 

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 67 

Methodology ................................................................................................................... 67 

Processes Used to Create Data Analysis Outputs ........................................................... 90 

Levels of War Assignment ........................................................................................... 90 

Range Intersections ..................................................................................................... 92 

Kernel Densities .......................................................................................................... 93 

Bombardment Concentrations ..................................................................................... 94 

Encroachments of Levels of War ................................................................................. 96 

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 96 

Chapter 6: Analytical Results of the Battle of Roi-Namur ......................................................... 97 

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 97 



   
 

 
 

Levels Of War Assignment ............................................................................................. 98 

Range Intersections ....................................................................................................... 101 

Kernel Densities ............................................................................................................ 106 

Bombardment Concentrations ....................................................................................... 110 

Encroachments Of Levels of War ................................................................................. 115 

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 117 

Chapter 7: Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 119 

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 122 

References ................................................................................................................................. 123 

  



   
 

 
 

List Of Figures 

Figure 1 Map of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands (Rottman 2004:10). ...................................... 18 

Figure 2 Image of Kwajalein Atoll (Rottman 2004:11). ............................................................. 21 

Figure 3 Image of the LOW (U.S. Government Publishing Office 2017:77). ............................ 32 

Figure 4 Diagram of the methodology for the study (Image created by Author 2023). ............. 48 

Figure 5 Map of the Battle of Little Bighorn showing points of interest (Scott and McFeaters 

2010:108). .................................................................................................................................... 59 

Figure 6 Map showing a cone of fire through GIS (Sivilich and Sivilich 2015:63). .................. 61 

Figure 7 Map showing a route density analysis through GIS from the Battle of the Atlantic 

(Bright 2011:61). ......................................................................................................................... 63 

Figure 8 Diagram of a multiscale approach (Fanning et al 2013:101). ....................................... 65 

Figure 9 Image of the georeferencing toolbar in ArcGIS Pro (Image created by Author). ........ 68 

Figure 10 Georeferenced image showing Japanese defensive positions and the US plan of attack 

for Roi-Namur (Image created by Author). ................................................................................. 69 

Figure 11 Image of all Japanese defensive positions on Roi and Namur (Image created by 

Author). ....................................................................................................................................... 71 

Figure 12 Image of all US groups involved in the amphibious assault (Image created by 

Author). ....................................................................................................................................... 73 

Figure 13 Image of the US plan of attack for Roi and Namur (Image created by Author). ........ 74 

Figure 14 Image of predominant amphibious assault vessels used for the initial landings on Roi 

and Namur (Image created by Author). ....................................................................................... 75 

Figure 15 Map of all bombardment targets on Roi and Namur (Image created by Author). ...... 77 



   
 

 
 

Figure 16 Map of all amphibious assault elements present at the Battle of Roi and Namur 

(Image created by Author). ......................................................................................................... 78 

Figure 17 Image of a georeferenced track map of USS Hickox (1944) (Image created by 

Author). ....................................................................................................................................... 79 

Figure 18 Map of the vessel tracks of all vessels involved in the preliminary bombardment of 

Roi and Namur (Image created by Author). ................................................................................ 81 

Figure 19 Map of the average area traveled of all flagship carrier vessels and their assigned 

support vessels (Image created by Author). ................................................................................ 82 

Figure 20 Map of all ranges for every component involved in the Battle of Roi and Namur 

(Image created by Author). ......................................................................................................... 84 

Figure 21 Map of the ranges of all calibers of weapons present at the amphibious assault of Roi 

and Namur (Image created by Author). ....................................................................................... 85 

Figure 22 Map of the average ranges of Japanese 127mm guns, LST guns, and remaining 

weapons present on the assault of Roi and Namur (Image created by Author). ......................... 87 

Figure 23 Map showing Japanese 13mm guns, LVT guns, and remaining weapons present at the 

Battle of Roi and Namur (Image created by Author). ................................................................. 88 

Figure 24 Map of the remaining average effective ranges of the calibers present at the Battle of 

Roi-Namur (Image created by Author). ...................................................................................... 89 

Figure 25 Map of the strategic level of war as it pertains to this study (Image created by 

Author). ....................................................................................................................................... 99 

Figure 26 Map of the operational level of war as it pertains to this study (Image created by 

Author). ..................................................................................................................................... 100 



   
 

 
 

Figure 27 Map of the tactical level of war as it pertains to this study (Image created by Author).

 ................................................................................................................................................... 101 

Figure 28 Map showing all counts of intersecting ranges of US calibers (Image created by 

Author). ..................................................................................................................................... 103 

Figure 29 Map highlighting 3 levels of intersecting US ranges (Image created by Author). ... 104 

Figure 30 Map of 5 counts of intersecting US ranges focused on Roi and Namur (Image created 

by Author). ................................................................................................................................ 105 

Figure 31 Map of kernel density analysis of all bombardment and amphibious assault 

components of the Battle of Roi-Namur (Image created by Author). ....................................... 107 

Figure 32 Map of kernel density of all components of Roi and Namur amphibious assault 

including wreckage and dumped vessels from post-battle operations (Image created by Author).

 ................................................................................................................................................... 109 

Figure 33 Map of density of Japanese defensive positions on Roi and Namur (Image created by 

Author). ..................................................................................................................................... 111 

Figure 34 Map of bombardment frequency of targeted zones on Roi and Namur (Image created 

by Author). ................................................................................................................................ 112 

Figure 35 Map showing the density of all US targeted bombardments combined with the density 

of all Japanese defensive positions on Roi and Namur (Image created by Author). ................ 114 

Figure 36 Map of US aircraft travel ranges encroaching the visual representation of the strategic 

level of the Battle of Roi-Namur (Image created by Author). .................................................. 116 

 

  



Chapter 1: Introduction 

Despite all the research and recapitulations of stories pertaining to the Second World War 

(WWII), there remains much to learn about its various theaters and the events that occurred 

within them. Operation Flintlock was part of an island-hopping strategy used during WWII, 

wherein American forces operated with the goal of infiltrating and capturing Japanese-held 

islands and atolls in the Pacific Ocean (Eastern Mandates Campaign 2004:69-70; Waag 2021:9-

10). This operation focused on the taking of the Marshall Islands. Securing these remote but 

strategically significant locations facilitated progress into enemy territory and in turn, helped to 

shift the balance of power in the region. One of the largest concerted efforts of Operation 

Flintlock was the Battle of Roi-Namur. Analysis of this battle forms the core of this thesis which 

illustrates the depth of information that can be extracted through WWII research (Scott and 

McFeaters 2010:105). The Battle of Roi-Namur was given new life through this study and the 

representation of its elements alongside the various analytical processes applied to them. The 

history of events for this conflict is recorded through maps, charts, and other documentary 

sources, as well as archaeological remains. An analysis of this battle of WWII using a Levels of 

War (LOW) approach and a multiscale Geographic Information Systems (GIS) framework 

utilizes each individual component’s potential to elicit new information about the strategies and 

tactics employed throughout the battle (Fanning et al. 2013:101; Geier et al. 2010:56; McKinnon 

et al. 2015:1-2).  

A LOW analysis seeks to fully understand a particular conflict or campaign. By 

separating a war into various components and considering them as an interrelated plan, a holistic 

understanding of a conflict or campaign may be achieved. To better understand the geospatial 

relationships of the strategy, GIS was used to spatially represent all involved components of the 



   
 

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Battle of Roi-Namur to better understand the conflict. A multiscale approach was applied 

through GIS to separate the various levels of war individually. This approach resulted in a 

geospatial representation of the levels the LOW analysis provides. It also created the platform for 

the application of various analytical processes to further the goals of the thesis. While each of 

these methodologies offered a good choice for independently analyzing specific elements of 

warfare, their combination provides new interpretations of this important chapter of WWII. 

Ultimately, the elucidation of new information pertaining to the Battle of Roi-Namur is at the 

core of this study, and the combination of these methodologies resulted in a new approach that 

could be applied to research at other conflict sites (Spennemann 2012:119-120). 

Research Questions 

This study explored the Battle of Roi-Namur through an approach that combined 

battlefield analysis and digital visualization. Though other studies have utilized a LOW 

analytical approach, the scope of this thesis revolved around the union of this framework with 

GIS to further analyze the Battle of Roi-Namur. To guide this research, several research 

questions are proposed: 

Primary Question 

● Can GIS visualization through a multiscale approach and LOW analysis provide new 

insight into the Battle of Roi-Namur? 

Secondary Questions 

● How can a combined LOW analysis and GIS multiscale approach derive pertinent 

information regarding the efficacy of the tactical plans utilized by Allied and Japanese 

forces in the Battle of Roi-Namur?  

● How can historical records pertaining to Roi-Namur be visualized using GIS?  



   
 

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● How can GIS be used to help analyze archaeological data pertaining to the Battle of Roi-

Namur?  

Justification and Significance 

 This study combines two approaches to the analysis of a WWII battlefield. Focusing on 

the Battle of Roi-Namur through a multiscale and LOW approach allows for data outputs and 

viewpoints that were otherwise unknown. These results expand the archaeological understanding 

of the region through data acquired through the GIS processes. Though such data could have 

been collected independently of the LOW framework, its incorporation resulted in a geodatabase 

which encompasses the tactics used at the battle, clarifies battlefield assessments, and highlights 

the site’s archaeological composition as it stands in the present. Ultimately this study presents a 

methodology that could be modified for similar studies to further the knowledge of a conflict. 

Thesis Structure 

This thesis is organized in a manner that facilitates the understanding of all processes 

used for data analysis. Discussions of historical background for the Battle of Roi-Namur and the 

larger events that led to it, the subdiscipline of battlefield archaeology, and the use of GIS for 

analysis to understand conflict all provide context for the study. To achieve these goals and 

fulfill the scope of the thesis, this study is organized into seven chapters.  

The first chapter introduces the study and presents the research questions that guide it. 

Chapter 2 offers an overview of the main events that led to the Battle of Kwajalein Atoll, and in 

turn sets the stage for the Battle of Roi-Namur. Chapter 3 explores the LOW framework and 

provides a comprehensive description of its structure and some previous studies, as well as a 

classification of its elements as they pertain to this study. This information provides a segue into 

Chapter 4, which outlines the subdiscipline of battlefield archaeology and the utilization of GIS 



   
 

4 
 

within it. Chapter 5 discusses the processes used to create the products of this thesis. A showcase 

of the variables that exist within the geodatabase is also given during this chapter. Following 

this, Chapter 6 delves into the analytical results of this study and discusses the meanings of the 

outcomes. Finally, Chapter 7 considers the efficacy of the study itself and the analytical results in 

relation to the proposed research questions.  

 

  



Chapter 2: A History of the Battle of Roi-Namur 

The Pacific Theater of WWII was a major battlefront that sprawled throughout the 

Pacific Ocean. Skirmishes between Allied and Japanese forces were fought through various 

means spread out across thousands of miles of bare ocean and small islands and atolls. The 

expansive Pacific Theater was a brutal yet critical component of WWII that enabled Allied 

forces to defeat Japan and led to the end of the war. Of the many events that took place in this 

theater, the Battle of Kwajalein Atoll holds potential for further study as a critical phase of 

WWII in which Allied forces applied hard learned lessons to secure an early and decisive victory 

in their march toward Japan. Before analyses of any of those events can occur, however, the 

overall history that led to them must first be understood (Shaw et al. 1966:117-154). 

Though there were hints of what was to come in the years preceding WWII, it officially 

began in September of 1939. The conflict began when Germany invaded Poland, prompting 

Great Britain and France to declare war. At that point the war was concentrated primarily in 

Europe, though this would change dramatically in two short years. The war quickly spread 

throughout the rest of the world, with even the most untouched regions being permanently 

affected. With battles fought for several years in predominantly European countries, the 

uncertain direction the war would take led many strategists and members of militaries worldwide 

to plan for various outcomes (Gilbert 2014:1-2). Alongside emerging technology developed 

throughout this war, so too were new military strategies and techniques. The Pacific Theater was 

host to a dynamic format of conflict due to the set of environments and circumstances US troops 

faced. From naval battles at sea to amphibious assaults on thin strips of defended sand, this 

theater of WWII was incredibly diverse (Hart 1970:190). 



   
 

6 
 

Pearl Harbor 

The nations involved in the war changed following the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on 

December 7, 1941.Under the leadership and command of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Japan 

attacked Pearl Harbor with the intention of preventing United States (US) participation in the war 

(Gilbert 2014:139). The result of this action was entirely opposite to its intended goal. The 

surprise attack on Pearl Harbor consisted of 360 Japanese aircraft intent on destroying as much 

of the US naval fleet stationed at the base as possible. The raid resulted in 3,435 US casualties, 

four US battleships sunk and four others severely damaged, several cruisers and destroyers 

wrecked, and many smaller vessels, aircraft, and structures such as oil tanks on the base being 

destroyed. This offensive was also meant to preemptively cripple US naval capacity with the 

hope of prompting surrender before ever joining the war. Instead, the US declared war on Japan 

on December 8, 1941, which prompted Axis powers Germany and Italy to declare war on the US 

on December 11, 1941. With the subsequent US declaration of war on those countries, America 

was officially thrust into WWII (Pike 2016:248-262). The decision to conduct a surprise attack 

on a US naval base held drastic consequences for the Japanese Empire as it was a catalyst that 

eventually led to the defeat of Axis powers. Prior to the attack, Japan largely controlled the 

Pacific region. To turn the tide, an Allied plan was created that would simultaneously prevent 

further Japanese expansion in the Pacific Ocean while also setting the stage for an assault on its 

mainland (CNSG 1994q:1; Hart 1970:213-217; Pike 2016:248).   

Japanese Occupation in the Pacific Ocean and Geography 

Prior to WWII, Japan sought to expand its reach following its continuation of escalating 

conflict with China and other Asian powers. By establishing itself as a world power, Japan 

created a buffer zone that would effectively prevent its homeland from being attacked by other 



   
 

7 
 

countries. To do this, Japan created outposts, defensive structures, and strongholds throughout 

the many islands of the Pacific Ocean. Their strongest harbors and fortifications were on Saipan, 

Guam, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. These defensive positions were heavily fortified, making any 

attempt to assault these islands costly for Allied forces. Those fortifications were not the only 

locations upon which defensive positions were constructed. Japanese defensive structures were 

established on many of the islands, island chains, and atolls within their reach (CNSG 1944f:17). 

By the time the US joined the war against them, Japan had already created a strong sphere of 

influence that would make an invasion of Japan incredibly difficult. This prompted strategies by 

Allied forces that would ultimately bring about the defeat of Japan (Hart 1970:617).    

The layout of Japanese positions established throughout the Pacific Ocean varied widely 

but all were designed to effectively defend against Allied attacks. Though the composition of 

each fortification was unique to the island on which it was situated, a common occurrence 

throughout the bases was a network of pillboxes, bunkers, and tunnels that spanned across, 

throughout, and under the landscape. Utilizing the terrain of these islands, the Japanese created 

positions to complement their strength of training and armaments. Taking advantage of the local 

landscape was a common trend for many of the island fortifications, with structures commonly 

created inside hills, mountains, and other naturally occurring land formations. Pillboxes used 

throughout most of the Pacific Theater were often small concrete structures hidden in areas 

suspected to be an eventual host to invading forces. They also incorporated openings that 

allowed for firearms to be used while simultaneously offering good cover from enemy fire. 

Devised from Japanese military expertise in guerilla warfare, such structures posed a difficult 

and dangerous predicament for Allied forces engaging in battle. Not only did they require 

extensive surveillance to determine the positions of these fixtures, but once found, they required 



   
 

8 
 

concentrated attacks to deal significant damage (Headquarters United States Army Forces 

Central Pacific Area 1944:2). 

New Strategies and Technology  

Due to the environment of the Pacific Ocean, the methodologies used for fighting can be 

placed into an array of categories. Battles occurring with aircraft carriers were a new and soon-

to-be defining characteristic of the Pacific Theater. Carriers provided a platform for aircraft to 

extend beyond the typical range of land-based airfields (Hastings 2012:501). The overall area 

where aircraft could be deployed increased with the removal of reliance on land-based airfields. 

The utilization of carriers enabled the creation of dynamic battle plans that would be used for a 

variety of situations. Increasing aircraft range to a suitable location where planes could be 

launched increased fuel efficiency and decreased overall distances to be flown and became a 

fundamental premise of the Pacific Theater. Battles fought using carriers and fighter aircraft took 

place between other carriers, battleships, and defensive positions held throughout the islands and 

atolls of the Pacific. Overall, aircraft carriers were a useful development of technology that 

allowed for the advancement and progression into Japanese territory (7th Infantry Division 

1944a:6-a).  

Alongside aircraft carriers, battleships were another commonly utilized vessel type by 

both Allied forces as well as the Japanese Empire in the Pacific Theater. These vessels were host 

to a wide array of armaments used to attack enemy vessels, aircraft, and defensive positions. 

They could also be used in a variety of fashions for both defensive and offensive operations. 

Battleships proved to be a staple in firepower throughout the Pacific Theater due to their heavy 

armor and capacity for delivering devastating ordnance. They were typically utilized alongside 

other types of watercraft that would in turn supplement one another. Destroyers frequently 



   
 

9 
 

accompanied battleships, as did aircraft carriers; by combining the firepower of the battleships 

and destroyers with aerial support, a wide variety of applications were achievable (USS 

Louisville 1944:10). Submarines were also an offensive component of both Allied and Axis 

powers through their ability to conduct stealth missions that were coupled with torpedoes. 

Altogether, the vessels used throughout this theater varied greatly, since all served specific 

purposes (Gailey 1996:37-44). 

The aircraft used in the Pacific Theater by both the Japanese Navy and Allied forces 

varied, with each type oriented toward a particular set of goals. Often covering long ranges of 

open ocean, common operations included surveillance operations, preliminary bombings, target 

disposal, and providing cover fire for amphibious assaults. The type of aircraft used changed 

depending on the mission, but the Japanese and Allied forces each developed an extensive array 

of aircraft for the different operations. The most common aircraft types used in WWII were 

fighters, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft. Of those, fighter planes offered the greatest 

versatility and were employed to combat enemy aircraft and surface vessels, as well as to act as 

escorts on missions. Fighter planes were predominately equipped with machine guns but could 

be outfitted with bombs and other heavy armaments. Another commonly used type of aircraft 

was bombers. Generally equipped with munitions to bombard vessels and enemy positions, many 

bombers had long range capabilities. Reconnaissance planes were another important type of 

aircraft, though they focused less on engagement and more on stealthily obtaining information 

pertaining to enemy positions, capabilities, and forces. Unique methodologies and battle plans 

were able to be created through the utilization of these aircraft. The combination of 

advancements in aircraft technology and the usage of carriers enabled the creation of a new type 

of warfare for the entirety of the Pacific Theater (Gailey 1996:33-37).  



   
 

10 
 

Alongside the utilization of developing aircraft and ship technologies, new strategies for 

advancing toward enemy-held defensive positions were also devised. Amphibious assaults are an 

excellent example of one of the more commonly utilized strategies. They typically consisted of a 

coordinated attack on an enemy position through the delivery of troops from landing vehicles. 

Launched from landing ships, landing craft (e.g., LCM), amphibious assault vehicles (e.g., 

LVT), and other types of amphibious assault vessels advanced to a shoreline where ground 

troops were then released into the surf so a ground assault could ensue (Joseph 1997:4-5; 

Marston 2011:252). Cover fire from air and surface vessels was typically provided to assist in 

these assaults, with the goal of eventually overwhelming an enemy defensive position (United 

States Fleet 1944:1-18).   

The Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway 

Many WWII battles were waged to control land masses, but there were also several 

conflicts at sea. On May 4,1942, the Battle of the Coral Sea was the first naval battle to occur in 

the Pacific Theater. Japanese Naval forces were enroute to further their southward expansion by 

attempting to invade and take Port Moresby of New Guinea. Comprised of four aircraft carriers, 

two battleships, and several other vessels, the Japanese attacked two Allied aircraft carriers, two 

cruisers, and several destroyers. This battle was fought from these carriers with no direct fire 

occurring between the vessels. As stated by historian B.H. Lidell Hart (1970:349), “The Battle of 

the Coral Sea was the first in history fought out between fleets that never came in sight of one 

another, and at ranges that had been extended, from the battleship's extreme limit of about twenty 

miles to a hundred miles and more”. This was vastly different from how previous battles were 

fought since instead of having a target in sight, conflict ensued when the combatants are within 

range of one another’s aircraft. At the end of The Battle of the Coral Sea, Allied forces were able 



   
 

11 
 

to secure a victory. Through the utilization of aircraft and carriers, it was the first victory against 

the Japanese in the Pacific Theater. This battle was a critical victory for US forces against the 

Japanese, with the results impacting events at the Battle of Midway by weakening their forces. 

Not only did this represent one of the first major sea battles of the Pacific Theater, but many of 

the Japanese aircraft downed at the Battle of the Coral Sea were among those that bombed Pearl 

Harbor; this in turn bolstered the morale of US troops (Gilbert 2004:322-323). 

A month after the Battle of the Coral Sea, another major naval battle took place near 

Midway Atoll. The Battle of Midway was a decisive victory for the US Navy as it allowed for 

further penetration of Allied forces into Japanese-held territory. From June 4 to June 7, 1942, US 

forces destroyed the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) carriers Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu. This 

enabled US forces to hold an advantage over a temporarily weakened Japanese Navy. Aside 

from early sorties against Midway Island, the Japanese engaged US forces exclusively through 

their respective carriers. Although all four of the Japanese carriers were destroyed (Hart 

1970:351-353), the US suffered the loss of the carrier USS Yorktown and the destroyer USS 

Hammann (Marston 2011:123). Not only did the battle prevent the Japanese from expanding 

territory into the center of the Pacific, but it also weakened their forces and allowed US forces to 

drive further into Japanese territory. Alongside weakening Japanese naval forces, it gave more 

space for US troops to recover; as explained by Hart (1970:353), the battle “…gave the 

Americans an invaluable breathing space until, at the end of the year, their new Essex class fleet 

carriers began to become available. Thus, it can reasonably be said that Midway was the turning 

point that spelled the ultimate doom of Japan”. Both the Battle of Midway and the Coral Sea 

showcased the efficacy and viability of using carriers and battleships, and the strategies taken 

from those battles set the stage for events to follow. 



   
 

12 
 

Island Hopping Campaign 

Japan’s influence in the Pacific region reached far from their homeland, as they occupied 

most of the small islands and atolls north and east of Australia. Japanese expansion in the Pacific 

Ocean began before the US entered the war, through the precautionary establishment of a 

presence suitable to defend against Allied advances (Hart 1970:199). When the US entered the 

war, Australia and Hawaii were the closest Allied-held regions which could serve as the primary 

areas for penetration into Japanese territory. With the goal of eventually neutralizing the Axis 

threat, Allied forces developed a plan for an invasion of Japan through an island-hopping 

campaign (Toll 2015:8). Island-hopping is a methodology wherein forces could conquer enemy-

held islands to expand their advances, and once held, would provide support for later assaults 

(Morison 2001:226). An important concept and heavily utilized strategy by Allied forces in the 

Pacific Theater, the island-hopping methodology enabled captured enemy bases to be renovated 

and recycled (Toll 2015:232). 

The use of the island-hopping campaign requires much consideration, as a core 

component of it revolves around attacking and taking specific Japanese defensive positions that 

were relatively less fortified than other defensive positions in the area. By focusing on territories 

viewed as less important by the Japanese, Allied forces were able to minimize loss while 

maximizing progress. This strategy also allowed for the closing of Japanese supply routes, which 

ended their expansion. By minimizing expansion and instead forcing Japanese forces to 

withdraw while simultaneously weakening them, Allied forces continued to use this 

methodology through the end of the war. The importance of these battles is significant as they 

allowed for deeper intrusion into Japanese territory. Though considered the “outer ring” of the 



   
 

13 
 

Japanese claim, the conflicts on those remote islands and atolls paved the way for future battles 

closer to its mainland (Toll 2015:9).  

The plan of attack necessitated the creation of multiple campaigns designed around the 

goal of taking these relatively weaker Japanese positions. The operations generally had many 

steps, with each one focusing on specific regions or islands. Operations to gradually capture and 

maintain Japanese-held bases on these areas of interest were a major focus of Allied groups. For 

instance, Operation Galvanic focused on the capture of Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands in 

November 1943; Operation Flintlock on the capture of the Marshall Islands in January and 

February 1943; and Operation Catchpole on the capture of Eniwetok Atoll (Marshall Islands) in 

February 1944 (Toll 2015:315-386). Each captured region or island served as a location for 

further expansion into Japanese waters (Gilbert 2014:272). Both old and new tactics were 

commonly used upon the approach of each territory, with every battle progressing the overall 

strategy used for subsequent invasions. Though US forces sent to fight on the European Front 

had their own challenges, the Pacific Theater and the island-hopping campaign were entirely 

different due to the vastness of the ocean and the tactics needed to seize their desired objectives 

(Toll 2015:8).   

The Battle of Guadalcanal 

Following the Battle of Midway, the island-hopping campaign began to take advantage of 

the recently weakened Japanese navy. The island-hopping campaign first started at the Battle of 

Guadalcanal, taking place from August 1942 to February 1943 in the Solomon Islands. The 

purpose of this battle was to acquire the region to stage further advancements deeper into 

Japanese territory (Hopkins 2009:107-122). The Solomon Islands were in a suitable location to 

start the island-hopping campaign as they were far enough away from strong Japanese control 



   
 

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whilst still providing a suitable staging ground for later attacks that would serve Allied forces 

well (Toll 2015:221). 

The battle consisted of attacks from aircraft carriers, battleships, and amphibious 

landings. The attack on the island against the Japanese resulted in many casualties for both sides. 

Throughout the months-long battle, many strategies were employed by both sides. Allied forces 

continuously conducted bombardments from their battleships while simultaneously assaulting 

with aircraft. Troops followed the bombardment and charged the shores, where hand-to-hand 

combat took place (Joseph 1997:4). Ultimately, the Japanese suffered 25,000 casualties in total. 

This included deaths due to combat, disease, and starvation because the drawn-out battle forced 

them to be holed in the fortifications that were not destroyed. Suicides were also a common 

occurrence in the Japanese ranks. When faced with an inevitable defeat, “…a quick suicide was 

the path of least suffering” (Toll 2015:342). US forces suffered over 7,000 troop casualties and 

lost approximately 600 planes. Following the battle, Guadalcanal became a suitable base of 

operations for Allied forces to stage further advancement. This battle was important to the 

island-hopping campaign as it showed the effectiveness of capturing enemy islands that would 

then serve as outposts. Additionally, it provided the opportunity for the creation of a supply 

chain that reduced the time needed to transport reinforcements and supplies to the advancing 

front. The established US outpost on Guadalcanal was the first of many that would serve the 

island-hopping campaign well throughout the remainder of the war (Hart 1970:362).  

Gilbert Islands 

Following the start of the island-hopping campaign, the next area that served as a major 

base of operations following its capture was the Gilbert Islands (now Kiribati). Important 

battlefields for the next step in the island-hopping campaign were Makin and Tarawa Atolls. 



   
 

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Once captured, these atolls provided an effective staging base for the further advancement of the 

Gilberts, akin to how the Battle of Guadalcanal assisted in the capture of the Solomon Islands. 

To better understand the progression of this portion of the war:  

Admiral King had wanted to start with a thrust at the Marshall Islands, but this 
idea was discarded for the lack of shipping and trained troops needed to ensure 
success. Instead, it was decided to begin by a stroke at the Gilbert Islands, 
although they were a little farther from the Hawaiian base at Pearl Harbor, as their 
capture seemed a less exacting task while it would provide practice in amphibious 
operations and bomber bases for a subsequent attack on the Marshall Islands. In 
the Gilberts, the two most westerly islands, Makin and Tarawa, were to be the 
main objectives (Hart 1970:510). 
  

This quote offers context for the argument behind taking the Gilbert Islands prior to the Marshall 

Islands. Understanding the logic behind why certain island groups were targeted before others is 

crucial in comprehending the progression of events.   

 Taking place synchronously, the Battles of Tarawa and Makin were critical to 

understanding of the correct methods for assault at these types of defensive positions. For the 

attack on Makin, Allied forces consisted of 7,000 troops, while another 18,000 were sent to 

Tarawa. According to Lidell Hart, a critical development of this battle was the addition of the 

Service Force, which was comprised of vessels to supplement the attacking vessels to ensure 

their service was operational and that troops had appropriate accommodations. The 800 Japanese 

troops on Makin were significantly less prepared for battle compared to Tarawa’s 3000 strong 

defensive force (Hart 1970:511).  

Due to the large number of Allied troops and frequency of naval bombardments and 

aerial strikes, the battle for Makin only took four days. Following the bombardment, Allied 

troops overtook the Japanese defenders and quickly captured Makin at a cost of 305 casualties. 

Tarawa proved to be a much more difficult target, resulting in a greater loss of life for both the 

Allied and Japanese troops. After only two and a half hours of naval bombardment and aerial 



   
 

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attacks, Allied forces commenced the amphibious attack. Due to Tarawa being more heavily 

fortified than Makin, taking it proved to be much more deadly with the assault resulting in over 

1,000 Allied and 3,000 Japanese casualties. Tactics like the intense bombardment of enemy-held 

territory from naval vessels to weaken enemy defenses prior to a combined amphibious and air 

assault commenced. These were among the major lessons learned through the battles at Makin 

and Tarawa. The tactics used throughout that and previous assaults on similar atolls and islands 

were educational in demonstrating effective methods for assaulting similar defensive positions. 

The overall capture of the Gilbert Islands was critical to this portion of the island-hopping 

campaign, as Allied forces slowly drew closer to the main “sphere of influence” of Japan (Shaw 

et al. 1966:103-104).  

Operation Flintlock 

Following the capture of the Gilbert Islands, Operation Flintlock commenced. This 

operation consisted of the capture of the Marshall Islands, a series of islands and atolls that 

would serve as a prime location for furthering the island-hopping campaign. Figure 1 displays a 

map of both the Gilbert and Marshall Islands to aid in the understanding of this portion of WWII 

(Rottman 2013:10). Operation Flintlock was planned in battle phases, with each building upon 

the previous success. The campaign for the Marshall Islands began soon after the hard-fought 

victories of Allied forces at the Gilbert Islands (Gilbert 2014:476). The entire region was 

important as control of it allowed US forces to continue attacking territories near Japan and 

provided an end to the long resupply journey from Pearl Harbor and neighboring territories. 

Following the capture of the Marshall Islands and the completion of smaller scale connected 

missions, the final stages of the Pacific Theater were established. The tactics for developing 

these areas changed through trial and error, with each addition honing techniques that maximized 



   
 

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the overall success of future missions (Toll 2015:7). Though Operation Flintlock consisted of 

nine major phases, and each was dedicated to the capture of specific islands through various 

methods, some proved to be larger in overall scope and several required a multitude of steps 

(Commander Task Unit 58.2.2 1944:1-4). The first few phases of Operation Flintlock focused on 

the capture of the most heavily defended positions of the Marshall Islands, Kwajalein, and 

Eniwetok Atolls:  

Operation ‘Flintlock’ was divided into nine phases. The main phase was the first, the 
seizure of Kwajalein and Majuro Atolls between 29 January and 8 February. Phase II was 
the seizure of Eniwetok Atoll scheduled for 17-23 February. This was essentially a 
separate operation – ‘Catchpole’. The remaining phase would become known as 
"Flintlock, Jr." and involved the clearing of the largely unoccupied remaining Marshalls 
between March and April (Rottman 2013:18). 

 
Though Operation Catchpole was its own operation that consisted of tactics pertaining to 

the overall goal of capturing Eniwetok, it still fell under the structure of Operation Flintlock as 

part of the second phase. Due to the victories obtained from previous battles, choosing the 

appropriate plan of attack was easily selected. Along with the lessons learned from battles fought 

before Operation Flintlock, several other considerations were in place that allowed for the 

highest rate of success. Such considerations consisted of having more time to plan, as well as 

having access to a higher quantity of materials (CNSG 1994p:53-58). Preliminary bombardment 

of defensive positions was another lesson taken from these battles that proved the value of this 

tactical plan, as it would thin out the enemy to ease the application of amphibious assaults 

(CNSG 1994i:1-7). These recommendations contributed greatly to the upcoming success of 

Operation Flintlock (Commander Task Unit 58.2.2 1944:3-4).  

 



   
 

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Figure 1 Map of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands (Rottman 2004:10). 



   
 

19 
 

The first phase of Operation Flintlock focused on the capture of Kwajalein Atoll. This 

atoll holds a high number of small islands, the largest of which were Roi, Namur, and Kwajalein. 

Though Kwajalein Atoll was the primary goal of this stage, the capture of Majuro Atoll was also 

a minor focus. Due to these atolls all having separate islands, attacks were conducted at the same 

time from January 29 to February 8, 1944. To prepare for the overall assault on these islands, 

secondary islands were first taken to provide artillery fire that worked in conjunction with 

battleship and carrier attacks focused on Roi, Namur, and Kwajalein. This strategy was taken 

directly from previous battles, with enemy defensive positions being much easier to capture after 

they were weakened by bombardments. On December 4, 1943, US forces began shelling the 

main islands of Kwajalein Atoll to weaken their defenses and prepare for the future invasion of 

the atoll later in January (CNSG 1994i:1-4). Majuro Atoll was one of the first targets to prepare 

for later assaults of this section of Operation Flintlock and what would later become known as 

the Battle of Kwajalein. US forces landed on Majuro Atoll after it was determined that there 

were no Japanese defenders present. Following that development, the remainder of the assault on 

the Marshall Islands commenced. The attacks on Kwajalein Atoll are all unique, with a multitude 

of events occurring in sync (Shaw et al. 1966:117-120).  

Battle Of Kwajalein Atoll 

While the Battle of Kwajalein Atoll was a part of the larger Operation Flintlock, the 

diverse and unique circumstances surrounding the multi-faceted approach of this part of WWII 

requires further examination. This battle consisted of multiple attacks on the islands throughout 

the atoll, with each having its own in-depth tactics planned and carried out using the materials 

and methods available to the appropriate landing forces. The battles consisted of aircraft attacks, 

naval bombardments, shelling, and amphibious assaults. Tactics employed were taken from 



   
 

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previous island-hopping campaign battles and were developed over time to suit each mission. 

One successful plan did not necessarily mean that it would work without fail, but in the case of 

the Battle of Kwajalein Atoll, previous tactics applied to this terrain were incredibly beneficial 

for Allied forces (CNSG 1944c:1-50).  

The Battle of Kwajalein Atoll, which took place from January 31 to February 3, 1944, is 

an excellent example of learning from past mistakes and opened the door to further analyze how 

applied tactics impacted the remainder of the war (Toll 2015:384). As mentioned above, the 

Battle of Tarawa had a heavy influence on this tactical approach since without preliminary 

bombardment, many US troops perished (Shaw et al. 1966:124-125). Preliminary naval and 

aerial bombardment resulted in devastation for the islands themselves and proved to be effective 

at hindering Japanese defense (USS Cabot 1944:1-5). Bombardment made way for amphibious 

assaults, effectively resulting in the capture of the islands (Rottman 2013:38). The effectiveness 

of these tactics is illustrated through the quote, “The bombardment and bombing plans, as 

prepared for the Kwajalein operation, worked out admirably because of the general similarity in 

type between above ground fortifications there and at Tarawa” (Headquarters United States 

Army Forces Central Pacific Area 1944:5). This combined assault strategy, in turn, paved the 

way for Operation Catchpole (CSNG 1994k:1-19; Gilbert 2014:499).  

Kwajalein Atoll is part of the Marshall Islands and is the largest coral reef atoll in the 

world, composed of many small islands. It contains 93 islands and has a total land area of 6.35 

square miles. Of the main islands, Roi-Namur is situated at the Northeastern end of Kwajalein 

Atoll, and the island of Kwajalein lays at its southeasternmost portion. Figure 2 illustrates the 

layout of Kwajalein Atoll, the islands of which are primarily strips of sand surrounded by an 



   
 

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extensive coral network, with coconut palms and sparse vegetation comprising the landscape of 

the sandy land strips (United States Fleet 1944:126; Rottman 2013:12).  

 
Figure 2 Image of Kwajalein Atoll (Rottman 2004:11). 

The plan for the assault on the main islands of Kwajalein Atoll consisted of two main 

groups: the Northern Troop and Landing Force (NTLF) and the Southern Troop and Landing 

Force (STLF). The NTLF focused on Roi and Namur while the STLF focused on the Island of 

Kwajalein. The NTLF consisted of 20,778 Marines while the STLF consisted of 21,768 Army 

soldiers (United States Fleet 1944:5). Alongside these troops, several aircraft carriers, fighter 

planes, and battleships were utilized for the preliminary shelling of the islands. The defenders 

consisted of the Japanese 4th Fleet, with 5,000 troops positioned on the island of Kwajalein, and 

3,000 defenders positioned on Roi and Namur (Rottman 2013:30-31).  



   
 

22 
 

The Japanese defensive positions were like those found on Tarawa and other islands with 

a similar landscape composition to that of Kwajalein. On Kwajalein, Roi, and Namur, 

predominant Japanese positions included fixtures to defend against air, naval, and ground 

attacks. Coastal defense installations mounted four 127-millimeter (mm) guns to protect against 

both aircraft and naval vessels; two were situated on Kwajalein, and one on both Roi and Namur. 

Several 76mm guns were also used to defend against these attacks. To defend against 

amphibious assaults, trenches, and pillboxes were created for infantry to occupy. There were also 

independent rifle holes created away from these trenches (CNSG 1994f:17). Though the anti-air 

and anti-naval guns were established in tactical locations, they suffered from a lack of cover 

which led to them being destroyed by aerial and naval bombardments quite easily (CNSG 

1944b:21). This resulted in the bulk of the Japanese defenders having to resort to rifle fire and 

being overtaken with relative ease due to the superior firepower of Allied forces. According to 

the Joint Intelligence Center (1944:1), an accurate assessment of every defensive position 

established by the Japanese is unlikely to be ascertained due to the intensive destruction that 

occurred during the assaults. 

The day of the attack was referred to as D-Day, and preliminary bombardments of 

Japanese defensive positions began on January 31, 1944. Following the D-Day bombardment of 

the major islands of Kwajalein Atoll, the NTLF commenced an amphibious assault on Roi and 

Namur in sync with the assault on the Island of Kwajalein (CNSG 1994u:2-9). The amphibious 

assault consisted of three battleships, five cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, and various other 

support craft (Rottman 2013:38). Like the assault on Kwajalein Island, naval support fire 

softened the landing of the amphibious assault (CNSG1994l:1-24). After suffering the loss of 



   
 

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approximately 1,000 troops, the NTLF secured victory and effectively captured Roi and Namur 

on February 2, 1944 (CNSG 1994h:192-203).  

The Kwajalein assault was carried out by the STLF the same time the battle of Roi-

Namur was initiated by the NTLF. Alongside the troops needed for the amphibious assault, four 

battleships, three cruisers, eighteen destroyers, and other support vessels participated. The assault 

began with an attack on small, minimally defended islets such as Ninni and Gea. With cover fire 

from the vessels situated 6-10 miles southwest of Kwajalein Island, the amphibious assault 

commenced (CNSG 1994h:192-203). This resulted in waves of attacks and counterattacks by 

both Allied and Japanese forces. The STLF suffered seven casualties and 82 wounded before the 

island was captured on February 4, 1944 (Rottman 2013:38-66).  

Following the capture of Kwajalein Atoll, the remaining phases of Operation Flintlock 

continued. After the war, there were still events and occurrences that tie into the overall 

progression of the Battle of Kwajalein, even though by that point the war had concluded. 

Following the arrival of the news that those stationed at Kwajalein Atoll were allowed to return 

home to the US, considerations were made to clear out the unusable vessels and vehicles that 

were no longer service-ready. To do this, a large majority of the wrecked vehicles were loaded 

onto barges and dumped inside the lagoon near Roi and Namur. Though there were vessels and 

aircraft in this vicinity that were downed during the battles that occurred, over 150 vehicles were 

intentionally dumped to clear the island of dangerous material so that the island inhabitants did 

not suffer from them. The expedient dumping of unneeded materials also quickly cleaned up the 

island which in turn expedited troop departures (Mueller 2018:19).  



   
 

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Impact of the Battle of Kwajalein Atoll 

Following the Battle of Kwajalein Atoll, the main islands were converted into a base of 

operations for further advancement of the island-hopping campaign. The causeway between the 

two islands was expanded using concrete, which eventually connected the islands of Roi and 

Namur and created a single island known as Roi-Namur. The remaining phases of action in the 

Pacific Theater were heavily dependent upon the security of the Marshall Islands. The capture 

and securing of Kwajalein Atoll resulted in increased Allied control of Axis territory in the 

Pacific, while allowing for the further securing of the Marshall Islands. This territory was the 

start of the final steps of penetration into the main sphere of Japanese control, as the homeland of 

Japan was seen as being merely a few battles away (Eastern Mandates Campaign 2004:63-70).  

The securing of the Marshall Islands proved to be an important part of the island-hopping 

campaign that would serve as a base to conduct further operations. Following this, the final 

battles and campaigns of the Pacific Theater commenced, using the Marshall Islands as a staging 

ground for the remaining assaults. The accessibility of the Marshall Islands eventually allowed 

Allied forces to mount operations against Saipan, Guam, Peleliu, Iwo-Jima, and Okinawa. 

Though these brutal battles would cost thousands of US and Japanese lives, they also led to the 

decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which forced the Japanese 

Empire to surrender and ended WWII in the Pacific Theater (Hart 1970:696). 

Operation Catchpole and Securing the Marshall Islands 

Following the capture of Kwajalein Atoll, the second phase of Operation Flintlock began. 

This phase focused on the capture of Eniwetok Atoll, dubbed Operation Catchpole. Starting on 

February 17, 1944, shelling of the islands surrounding Eniwetok Atoll began in preparation for 

the direct assault. This made way for an amphibious assault, though it was not without struggle. 



   
 

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The Japanese defenders positioned themselves throughout the island, hidden away in positions 

designed to defend against a direct assault (CNSG 1994k:1-19). The series of battles fought 

throughout Operation Catchpole ended up costing over 1,200 US and 800 Japanese lives (CNSG 

1944a:1-2). The newly developed tactics employed at Eniwetok were of mixed success (Hart 

1970:536). The landscape of the island and troop strength were different from those found at 

Kwajalein Atoll. Instead of long strips of land, sand, and vegetation, Eniwetok had more crevices 

and positions for Japanese troops to use as “spider holes,” which surprised and devastated US 

troops upon landing (Toll 2015:389). Although this battle ultimately resulted in another US 

victory of the Pacific Theater, the tactics taken from the Battle of Kwajalein were useful to a 

point, as the outcome proved to be elucidatory in the following stages of the war (CNSG 

1994s:3). Though Operation Catchpole was only a part of Operation Flintlock, it was still 

important to the overall goal of securing the Marshall Islands (Hart 1970:512).  

Following the main phases of Operation Flintlock, a sub-term was applied to it that 

would focus on the “mop-up” of the remaining islands in the Marshalls group (7th Infantry 

Division 1944b:1). Dubbed Operation Flintlock Jr. since it was still a constituent of the overall 

operation, it benefitted from the lack of in-depth strategy compared to the taking of Roi, Namur, 

Kwajalein, and Eniwetok. Operation Flintlock Jr. began on March 8, 1944, focusing on several 

islands:  

Operation Flintlock, Jr., dealt with five areas. Included in the West Group were Wotho, 
Ujae, and Lae Atolls. The South Group embraced Namu, Ailinglapalap, Namorik, and 
Ebon Atolls, as well as Kili Island. Bikini, Rongelap, Ailinginae, and Rongerik Atolls 
formed the North Group, while Bikar, Utirik, Taka, Ailuk, and Likiep Atolls and Jemo 
and Mejit Islands were assigned to the Northeast Group (Shaw et al. 1966:217). 
 

Primary elements of this phase of Operation Flintlock consisted of sending out 

surveillance aircraft to determine the level of defensive opposition Allied forces faced upon 



   
 

26 
 

attack. Most of these islands had few Japanese defenders, as the main islands of the Marshall 

chain required more Japanese troops. This component of Operation Flintlock ended on April 5, 

1944. Though several small-scale “wrapping up” missions occurred after the official end of 

Operation Flintlock Jr., its overall goal was completed with relative ease (Shaw et al. 1966:216-

218).   

The full completion of Operation Flintlock enabled Allied forces to hold dominion over 

the Marshall Islands after a relatively quick rate of capture of Japanese defenses. The level of 

success achieved during this operation provided total control of the main and outlying islands, 

which proved incredibly significant to the remainder of the war. Following Operation Flintlock, 

the Marshall Islands served as a staging ground for the final components of the Pacific Theater. 

Major battles that would take place at Saipan, Guam, Peleliu, Iwo-Jima, and Okinawa were all 

possible due to the bases established at locations made accessible through Operation Flintlock. 

The progression of those battles led directly to the establishment of the base on Tinian Island, 

which served as the deployment point for the atomic bombs that resulted in the surrender of the 

Japanese Empire on September 2, 1945 (Toll 2015:142).  

 



Chapter 3: The Battle of Roi-Namur Through the Levels of War  

Introduction 

This chapter focuses on providing basic knowledge of the concepts of battlefield 

archaeology and Levels of War analysis. Along with a general overview, a developmental 

history of each is provided. This offers a clear understanding of the topics and facilitates their 

application to the study. An in-depth description to explain the purpose of each level within the 

LOW methodology and case studies of LOW analysis are also considered. These studies do not 

only focus on the classifications of relevant aspects of a conflict, but on the efficacy of the LOW 

methodology and the benefits of using the approach. Finally, the Battle of Roi-Namur and the 

events leading to it are classified using LOW. This creates an inventory of all elements of this 

part of WWII and the level with which they correspond and set up ArcGIS Pro analysis. In doing 

this, the LOW methodology is utilized to identify and segment facets of the conflict into distinct 

categories to allow for clarification when analyzed. 

Battlefield Archaeology 

Battlefield archaeology is a subdiscipline of archaeology that focuses on human conflict 

and the sites where battles occurred. This field of study is closely related to conflict archaeology, 

which focuses on human conflict more holistically, rather than focusing solely on battlefields 

(Scott and McFeaters 2010:104-105). Human behavior, tactics, and history are all surmised 

through conflict in battlefield archaeology, with each having its independent foci and 

methodologies for achieving goals pertaining to conflict. Under the term of battlefield 

archaeology, much can be further understood through the remains of battlefield sites (Knutson 

2018:18-22). Fired armaments, troop positions, and structural remains are but a few examples of 

what can be left behind on a battlefield site. Altogether, battlefields become part of the 



   
 

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archaeological record and have great potential for further analysis and understanding of what 

occurred. Alongside a primary focus on the physical remains of a battle site, other forms of 

archaeological material such as historical records, documents, and other forms of data can be 

utilized to better understand a battle (Scott and McFeaters 2010:104).  

Within the field of battlefield archaeology, battle sites are the prime topic of study. Sites 

where battles were once waged are studied in this field through the combination of the historical 

and archaeological record to answer questions about a particular conflict (Scott and McFeaters 

2010:103-104; Spennemann 2012:119-120). This subdiscipline allows for many methodologies 

to be applied to determine aspects like armaments used, and positionings of vehicles, troops, or 

vessels. It oftentimes requires the collection of artifacts for conservation and further study. 

Altogether, findings are interpreted to further understand a given site and a particular history. 

The study of battle sites can also add insight to a historical record that might be missing critical 

data to gain a complete understanding of a site and of the larger conflict (Scott and McFeaters 

2010:106-110).  

With the study of battlefield and conflict archaeology, a fundamental grasp of the core 

components of what constitutes a battlefield must be understood. In preparation for every battle 

throughout history, some semblance of a proposed plan was made before the engagement. The 

scheme for any battle would likely have been established to direct the landing and initial 

placement of troops or vessels, areas that are better or worse for an approach, and the general 

directions individuals will take (USAF 1997:1). These examples highlight the importance of the 

battle plan before fighting begins and its components can be sourced in a variety of ways and are 

oftentimes best represented through data and maps.  



   
 

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Battlefields host a wide array of elements that make up the overall composition of a site, 

with each variable being subject to different circumstances. Many components of battlefields 

change over time, though there are several components that are not altered easily. In larger-scale 

modern battles, landing areas or the initial placement of elements of a battle are very important. 

The areas of attack at the beginning of any conflict are critical in the development of strategies 

and in the analysis of its aftermath. For instance, with amphibious assaults, sections of a beach 

are oftentimes given names to differentiate them. Differences in terrain, enemy positioning, and 

capabilities of either side play major roles in determining where a party would initiate primary 

assaults, since knowledge of where the initial attack will occur is required for planning of most 

conflicts (Spennemann 2012:119-120). 

Following the planning of landing sites and the locations for vessel or troop deployment, 

planned directions of a battlefield is another important consideration to factor in when trying to 

study historic conflict. This consists primarily of the areas of approach that troops or vessels will 

use to following landing. The direction of attack has numerous underlying elements that are 

crucial when planning a battle. As mentioned before, the placement of assets on both sides, and 

the methods being enacted to best attack an enemy all come into play. The direction of these 

components needs to be understood to keep track of elements of a battle and for additional 

tactical consideration. From the beginning to the end of a conflict, these considerations all 

contribute to the development of better strategies that will in turn influence future battles. This is 

seen time and again in the archaeological record and is critical in showing the progression of 

battlefield methodologies (Scott and McFeaters 2010:105). 



   
 

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History of Battlefield Archaeology  

Many subdisciplines of archaeology exist, and battlefield archaeology is one of them. 

Within the subdisciplines that focus on components of the natural world, particular global 

regions, and particular eras, battlefield archaeology intersects many other subdisciplines. 

Douglas Scott developed the concept of battlefield archaeology in the 1980s with his research at 

the Battle of Little Bighorn. Battlefield archaeology’s foundation was laid through the 

development and progression of conflict archeology (Scott and McFeaters 2010:104). While 

conflict archaeology focuses on human interaction with one another in the context of a violent or 

conflict-oriented manner, battlefield archaeology focuses on battlefield sites and all the 

components that lead to the battle and the combatants, as well as all other constituents of it. To 

better understand the progression of time with regards to this subdiscipline of archaeology, the 

history of its origins must be examined. 

The archaeological excavation of the Battle of Little Bighorn in 1989 is the study that 

initiated the foundational interest in the study of battlefields in an archaeological context (Scott 

et al. 1989). The Battle of Little Bighorn was fought June 25-26, 1876, between several Native 

American groups and the US Army in Montana. Metal detectors were utilized to systematically 

locate and classify artifacts found on the battlefield, and later analysis provided a better 

understanding of the true locations and progression of the battle. Alongside metal detection, 

other archaeological methodologies were used to garner a better understanding of the conflict 

and battlefield. This example was the beginning of a process of employing a systematic approach 

to the collection and recording of metal-detected objects in an archaeological context. Through 

the flagging and categorization of artifacts identified, a map was created showing the 

composition of artifact types on the battle site. This methodology resulted in a cohesive 



   
 

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archaeological report of the battlefield of the Battle of Little Bighorn (Scott et al. 1989:148-149). 

This study was important and formative for conflict and battlefield archaeology as it was the 

beginning of a methodological approach to mapping and understanding battlefields through 

artifact analysis (Scott and McFeaters 2010:106-110).  

The categorization of artifacts allowed for better identification of positions of individuals 

on the battlefield, since “this information provided a means for tracking the movement of 

firearms around the battlefield and, by association, the combatants” (Scott et al. 1989:148-149). 

With the categorization of different components of firearm artifacts, the individual who owned it 

could be surmised, which in turn, allowed for the general positioning of the individuals involved 

to be estimated. Also, through the identification and flagging of artifact locations, higher 

concentrations of artifacts were identified with the hopes of finding human remains, or the 

“hotspots” of points potentially indicating other findings (Scott and McFeaters 2010:108-109). 

Ultimately, the outcome of studying this battlefield resulted in a new understanding of the 

conflict. This example of the beginning of the subdiscipline of battlefield archaeology depicts the 

efficacy of researching battlefields and other forms of human conflict due to the various amounts 

of information available.  

Levels of War Analysis 

The LOW is a form of military identification and analysis where a conflict can be viewed 

and interpreted according to various classifications (U.S. Government Publishing Office 2017:I-

7). This method is used to better understand and analyze war through multiple set “levels” to 

which every major conflict naturally abides (USAF 1997:1). LOW allows for a more focused 

analysis of large-scale conflicts by separating the entirety of war into three levels: the strategic, 

operational, and tactical. “The three levels allow causes and effects of all forms of war and 



   
 

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conflict to be better understood—despite their growing complexity” (USAF 1997:1). LOW 

analysis has been utilized by many the militaries of many countries since its creation (Harvey 

2021:76). Figure 3 provides a visual representation of the LOW framework and the structure it 

follows.  

 
Figure 3 Image of the LOW (U.S. Government Publishing Office 2017:77). 

Strategic 

The strategic is the first of the three levels and focuses on the overall scope of the war. As 

explained by the United States Air Force College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and 

Education (CADRE), “The strategic level focuses on defining and supporting national policy and 

relates directly to the outcome of a war or other conflict as a whole” (USAF 1997:1). Governing 

bodies involved in a particular conflict actively participate in this scope as it encompasses 

overarching information and the reasonings behind them. This is the level at which the other two 



   
 

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are directly dependent upon, with strategy, scale, and overall goals being its core (USAF 

1997:1).  

The overall political agenda of governments or other involved entities in a conflict are the 

direct participants at the strategic level. National goals, overall security objectives, and overall 

military directives are the fundamental portions that make up the strategic level (Pirnie and 

Gardiner 1996:xiv). Leading figures in the government of each participating entity directly 

influence and sway the overall goals and progression of the conflict based on the initial plans. 

Every following component of a conflict corresponding to the LOW framework is a constituent 

of these decisions and goals, with the following operational and tactical levels being a product of 

the commitments born at this level.   

Operational 

The operational level is where most campaigns and plans of a particular scope are carried 

out. It is defined as being “concerned with employing military forces in a theater of war or 

theater of operations to obtain an advantage over the enemy and thereby attain strategic goals 

through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations” (USAF 

1997:2). Though all levels of this approach involve their own format of strategy and methods, 

the operational level concerns different tangible sections of war, such as campaigns and other 

major operations. Campaigns that operate within a theater of war are classified at the operational 

level. While the strategic level focuses on the entirety of the war and the geopolitical 

environment, the operational level’s strategy revolves around the tactics of each campaign that 

would best serve each side (Pirnie and Gardiner 1996:81-83).  

The operational level is a direct link between the strategic and tactical levels, in that it 

directly follows the scope set out by the strategic level and relevant entities. The operational 



   
 

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level is headed by governing individuals or groups that head widespread campaigns and 

operations in accordance with the strategic level’s parameters. The commanders of the 

operational level dictate the fundamental directions for the war, while considering the logistics of 

warfare such as widespread campaigns, locations, and direction of the conflict, as well as 

determining how overall goals correspond to the operational level.  

Tactical 

The tactical level is the final level to understand in a LOW approach. Again, all levels 

share similarities in terms of overall strategy and tactics, but each focuses on its own independent 

aspects. Thus, the tactical level concentrates closely on individual battles and specific 

maneuvers, especially within the scope of the previous level. As further explained, “Tactics deal 

in the details of prosecuting engagements and are extremely sensitive to the changing 

environment of the battlefield” (USAF 1997:3). Whereas the strategic and operational levels 

focus on more widespread concepts of war such as overall planning, the tactical level focuses on 

actual conflict and the deployment of armaments and troop deployment, and the conflict that 

follows.  

The tactical level is the point at which direct contact and confrontation with enemy forces 

intersect. The culmination of the previous levels leads to the direct battles that occur within the 

tactical level. These conflicts directly progress the plans set up at the operational level. Also, by 

furthering the progression of the war and therefore achieving the specific goals that were 

fundamentally created and surmised at the strategic level, a direct connection between all levels 

can be seen. By understanding the overlapping nature of the concept of a LOW approach, in-

depth classification and understanding of a war can then be understood.  



   
 

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History of Levels of War Analysis 

Comprehension of the origins of the LOW approach allows for a deeper and more 

nuanced understanding of the concept. The approach originated in the 19th century when a 

broader view was being taken to understand warfare. From that point, names for various 

components of warfare were added, resulting in what is utilized by militaries today. For this 

study, the modern, most common form of the LOW approach is utilized. It is important to note 

that without understanding where it came from, the importance of each individual level is 

lessened. Before its current form, the classification, capabilities, and overall utility of the 

approach granted to aid in the understanding of a war were limited.  

The LOW approach began in the 19th century with Carl Von Clausewitz, following the 

publication of his 1832 book On War. Rather than viewing warfare as a simple series of battles, 

fighting, or even the people planning it, Clausewitz expanded upon the concept of an overall 

structure of war and the reasoning behind its existence (Clausewitz 1832:75-76). Throughout the 

work, components of war are explained and broken down into various classifications. This was 

revolutionary since it allowed for clearer discussion and identification of warfare as understood 

through concise classification. Alongside identifying the components of a war, the underlying 

motifs of its planning and execution are explored. Rather than viewing battles as being fought 

independently, Clausewitz explained that they are directly dependent upon the overarching 

wants, wishes, and ideologies of those who have set the battle in motion. The concept of levels in 

this context was introduced in the form of the strategic and tactical. All facets of command, 

planning, and fighting are described as having their own host of individuals responsible for their 

command (Clausewitz 1832:83). The strategic level is addressed and referred to as the 

overarching reasonings behind a war while also accounting for the individuals that create it, as 



   
 

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well as addressing its overall goals. The tactical level is addressed as being host to the actual 

combat taking place in individual battles, on the battlefield. Although this realization aided in 

recognizing those responsible for various orders and executions of command, it later set the 

foundation for further elaboration upon those levels (Clausewitz 1832:75-89).   

Following the initial construction of the strategic and tactical levels, Soviet Red Army 

member Aleksandr A. Svechin furthered the Clausewitz concept by establishing the operational 

level as the final component (Svechin 1927:159). In his book titled Strategy (1927), Svechin 

introduced the operational level of war as a connection between the previously established 

strategic and tactical levels. This new level revolves around the individuals, plans, and 

widespread operations conducted within the scope of the strategic level that leads to combat. It 

also serves the purpose of being what ultimately dictates the progression and components of the 

tactical level. Through this, the concept that all levels are interconnected surfaced, becoming a 

commonly held notion of the LOW approach.  

The introduction of the operational level allowed for further contributions from other 

prominent military strategists from around the world, wherein these concepts of “levels” would 

become commonplace in the instruction of new military members in the form of a fully 

developed LOW approach. Starting in 1982, all members of the US military were first introduced 

to the concept of the “Levels of War” through “Field Manual 100-5, Operations” (Harvey 

2021:76). Since the introduction of that concept to military members, the LOW approach has 

been taught to instill in all personnel the ways in which warfare can be classified, and how the 

identification of the components allows for further clarity in the comprehension of war. Through 

this, the LOW approach became a prevalent concept to all involved in some manner of warfare. 



   
 

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Case Studies 

Any war can be viewed through the lens of the LOW due to its encompassing structure. 

The outcome of studies that utilize this approach allows for a better understanding of a particular 

element’s position in the overall scope of war. Its utilization also allows for further analysis and 

the formulation of research questions that pertain to comparison, evaluation, and discussion. For 

the scope of this study, the classification aspect of LOW approach is the basis from which further 

analysis and understanding can be found. To better understand the methodology and the way 

warfare can be attributed to the LOW, examples of past use are considered.  

The utility the LOW framework provides allows an archaeologist to clarify the 

interwoven components of a conflict. In “World War II Archaeology in Fiji: Assessing the 

Material Record”, Allison Young uses the LOW as a tool to clarify the position Fiji had in the 

grand scheme of WWII (Young 2012:90-91). A chronological overview of Fiji’s involvement in 

WWII allowed Young to explain the effects on physical locations, as shown by “The levels of 

war are excellent conceptual tools to better understand the objectives and subsequent actions of 

military forces.” (Young 2012:80). Throughout the work, the author claims that the LOW allow 

a user to better understand the physical changes that occur because of variables existing within 

the framework. Utilizing the archaeological record in conjunction with the LOW grants a user 

understanding of how material ended up in its position because of the outcomes of events 

existing with the LOW.  

In Peter Bleed’s and Douglas Scott’s “Contexts for Conflict: Conceptual Tools for 

Interpreting Archaeological Reflections of the North Platte Campaign of February 1865”, the 

LOW is used to classify components of conflict and better explain the events of a historic battle 

through the archaeological record (Bleed et al. 2018:342-354). The authors sought to use the 



   
 

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LOW to explain the differences in combat between Cheyenne warriors and Civil War soldiers, as 

the archaeological record shows different outcomes even though the participants were the same 

(Bleed et al. 2018:349). The archaeological record is the focus, with the LOW being used to 

determine the cause for the physical material showing variation in positioning as a result of 

changing strategic, operational, and tactical goals. When discussing the strategic goals of a 

conflict changing, “…it shifted their strategic priority from plunder and valorous action to 

community security” (Bleed et al. 2018:351). In battlefield archaeology, the LOW can be applied 

to the archaeological record to determine the context and positioning based on all three levels. 

When the overarching goals and means to achieve them are known, physical outcomes can be 

better found and studied. The authors of this work further elaborates on the utilization of the 

LOW framework and the intricacies involved when using this methodology to better understand 

conflict in an archaeological setting in “Contexts for Conflict: Conceptual Tools for Intercepting 

Archaeological Reflections of Warfare” (Bleed et al. 2011:41-64).  

In “Illustrating the Levels of War – Operation Zitadelle (Kursk), 5-14 July 1943, A Case 

Study”, James Jacobs defines and classifies the various components of this conflict to each level 

through clear description and explanation (Jacobs 2005:79). Operation Zitadelle was a German 

plan in WWII that eventually led to the Battle of Kursk. As explained, Adolf Hitler’s goal of 

taking over the Soviet Union and establishing Germany as a European superpower are examples 

of the strategic level. By segmenting the various levels, the author allows for a better 

understanding and stronger insight into the overall composition of the conflict (Jacobs 2005:92). 

Following this analysis, the importance of understanding each level of war prior to the 

presentation of an analysis of the topic avoids confusion, while also garnering the best 

understanding of the conflict. The study of Operation Zitadelle serves as an exercise in placing 



   
 

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the components of a conflict into the various criteria defined by the levels of war. Though this 

example does not include analysis, the fact that the author classifies the elements of the operation 

into the various levels of war provides an avenue for future research. This study is an example of 

how other works can utilize a LOW approach to the components of a particular war.  

Another relevant study that uses the LOW to identify and classify relevant components of 

a war is that of “Crete and the Three Levels of War: An Individual Study Project” (Miller 1989). 

This study relates the history of the Battle of Crete which took place from 20 May to 1 June 1941 

between German and British troops. Following the introduction of context pertaining to the 

battle, the components of the battle are categorized according to the LOW with a focus on British 

forces. It was stated initially that the British did not have a strategic plan, which heavily 

contributed to their defeat. The strategic level in this regard pertains to Britain’s lack of holding 

clear national goals and overall aspirations for this event. Due to the lack of these critical 

components, the strategic level for this event was nonexistent, thus leading directly to 

uncertainty and poor considerations regarding the following levels. For the operational level, the 

author claimed that the British had little guidance and direction for where to direct their overall 

strength. Due to this confusion and uncertainty, the operational level for the British in this 

portion of the war resulted in poor and minimal directives that would dictate the progression and 

outcome of the tactical level. According to author Lieutenant Colonel John M. Miller, the tactical 

level of this conflict suffered due to the lingering trend of orders being given throughout the 

battle from commanders in their safe headquarters. This resulted in a lack of overall troop action 

and a failure to take advantage of opportunities set before them, with a quick British defeat due 

to lack of organization and command from those overseeing this level. Nevertheless, the battle 

was devastating for both sides, resulting in many casualties and the destruction of many vessels. 



   
 

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Overall, the conflict resulted in a German victory over Britain, which the author attributed to the 

lack of a British strategic plan. This resulted in the operational and tactical levels suffering 

greatly from disorganization and poor command. Through this study, Miller conveys that the 

classification of components of warfare through the LOW can be greatly elucidatory in 

determining why certain outcomes occurred, and what could have been done to change them 

(Miller 1989:27-34).  

In “Revisiting the US military ‘Levels of War’ Model as a Conceptual Tool in Conflict 

Archaeology: A Case Study of WW2 Landscapes in Normandy, France”, the authors use the 

LOW to relate impact craters that were created during WWII battles in Normandy to the 

overarching goals of the strategic level of the conflict (Passmore et al. 2018:18-20). The 

advancement and utilization of LiDAR data in battlefield archaeology is a core aspect of this 

study, with the technology surfacing craters created during this conflict. This dataset illustrates 

how the tactical results stem directly from the overarching strategic goals of a conflict. The paper 

also highlights the importance of the landscape and the changes that were made to it due to the 

battle. In the case of this study, craters formed throughout the conflict are sourced from the 

overarching goals of the conflict and spark the potential for these sites to become heritage assets 

(Passmore et al. 2018:33). The evolution of technology available to archaeologists when 

studying battlefields constantly change what forms of data is available, and this paper 

demonstrates how this advancement requires adaptability in the theoretical frameworks needed 

to properly address the available archaeological dataset.  

Classification of the Battle of Roi-Namur through Levels of War Approach 

For the scope of this study, the Battle of Roi-Namur will be analyzed through various 

means. A core component of this research is organizing and identifying this battle by following 



   
 

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the LOW approach. Through this, the Battle of Roi-Namur and all relevant events that led up to 

it are classified and categorized. Following this classification, further study and analysis can then 

be conducted as all elements are divided into core components. Rather than analyzing the Battle 

of Roi-Namur on its own, the utilization of LOW facilitates further study of GIS analysis by 

allowing for the creation of a multiscale framework, wherein every variable can be identified to 

its corresponding level. The methodologies that will be used to better understand the Battle of 

Roi-Namur will also be foundational in aiding similar studies to achieve related goals. A core 

goal of this study is to determine the efficacy of using this methodology for further analysis. To 

do this, all relevant aspects and elements That led to the battle, as well as the smaller battles 

within it, will first be identified and classified in accordance with the LOW.   

Strategic 

To utilize the LOW approach, each relevant component of the Battle of Roi-Namur was 

classified according to corresponding levels. The starting point for this process consisted of 

classifying the strategic level from pertinent features of this chapter from history. The strategic 

level within the scope of the Battle of Roi-Namur is multifaceted, as it is part of the overall scope 

of the Pacific Theater, but also within the overall context of World War II. For this study, the 

enveloping militaristic entities that governed the overall direction of the war pertain within the 

realm of the Pacific Theater. Rather than focusing on the entirety of WWII, the content explored 

is within the Pacific Theater. Though it could be argued that WWII was the environment to 

which the strategic level pertained for this study, the Pacific Theater is diverse and large enough 

with its own interests that, for the purposes of this study, the strategic level will remain apposite 

to.   



   
 

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Given that the establishment of the Pacific Theater of WWII is synonymous with the 

environment in which the strategic level resides, the classification of elements relevant to this 

level is clarified. The Pacific Theater had its own objectives, directives, and overall outcomes as 

dictated by those in the governing bodies. All facets of direction, planning, and widespread 

concerns and considerations for this theater are part of this level. Conducting operations and 

battles throughout the Pacific Theater with the overall aim of stopping Japanese expansion and 

further attacks on American forces is a clear example of one of the overarching goals attributed 

to the strategic level of the Pacific Theater. Viewing all constituents of the war allows the 

widespread classification of each level to be obtained.  

In relation to the Battle of Roi-Namur, the strategic level includes a wide array of 

components. The components listed are all the core elements at the root of the Pacific Theater. 

This in turn means that all following levels are directly contrived from this one, with all 

constituents being represented and wholly influenced by the factors composing the strategic 

level. Within this level, overall operations and campaigns envelop the operational level, which in 

turn dictates the overall battles and similar events that make up the tactical level. 

Operational 

Following the assessment of what constitutes the strategic level regarding the Battle of 

Roi-Namur, the operational level was next considered. Multiple operations and campaigns 

spread throughout the Pacific Theater, with several pertaining to the Battle of Roi-Namur 

directly, indirectly, and alongside entities focused on completely different objectives. For this 

study, those relevant to the research questions are addressed and identified.  

Though several operations and campaigns constitute parts of the operational level for this 

study, the most prominent are the island-hopping campaign and Operation Flintlock. Within 



   
 

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these, there were of course other operations and campaigns that had their own goals and 

purposes, but these two are at the core of the operational level of the Battle of Roi-Namur. The 

island-hopping campaign covers the entirety of the premise of the operational level as its goals 

are widespread throughout the Pacific. Though it focused on leapfrogging from island to island 

to avoid strongly fortified Japanese defensive positions, it also focused on further advancement 

into Japanese territory. Directly related to the island-hopping campaign is that of Operation 

Flintlock. This operation inherent