Tobacco Détente: American Leaf in the Cold War, 1964-1977 By Christopher S. Bollow May, 2024 Director of Thesis: Dr. Bennett Major Department: History ABSTRACT Everything changed for the American tobacco industry in 1964. Smoking had long since been suspected of being unhealthy. But now the US Surgeon General made it official: smoking is harmful to one’s health. Suddenly, tobacco found itself in the crosshairs of antismoking forces in Congress and the American public. New regulatory and public relations challenges did not mean tobacco companies would accept losses; it meant they needed to find new markets. American tobacco companies looked beyond the Iron Curtain. While the Johnson administration encouraged liberalized trade with Eastern Europe during the 1960s, and the Nixon and Ford administrations sought to maintain the difficult balance of détente during the 1970s, tobacco delegations made up of private businessmen and members of the US Department of Agriculture visited the Soviet Union, while Soviet delegations visited the United States. Tobacco firms, chiefly Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds, set their eyes on vast, untapped eastern markets. In North Carolina, members of the Export Leaf Association and Tobacco Associates Inc. believed U.S. tobacco exports to the Soviet Union and its satellites would help the North Carolina farmer and called for unrestricted trade between the two superpowers. But, as thousands of industry documents available due to the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement show, which include delegation itineraries, business memos, and RJ Reynolds’, Philip Morris’s, and North Carolina’s Tobacco Associates annual reports, tobacco played a bigger role than a simple commodity in an emerging East-West trade. Using an array of telegrams and memorandums found in the Office of the Historian’s Foreign Relations of the United States and drawing on works such as Tricia Starks’ Cigarettes and Soviets: Smoking In The USSR and Mary Neuburger’s Balkan Smoke: Tobacco and the Making of Modern Bulgaria, this work explores tobacco as a microcosm of détente during the years 1964-1977. During these years, tobacco played a small but important part in foreign policy and the international economy. Plenty of North Carolinian cold warriors did not approve, but plenty did. Despite public and political protest, the proponents of liberalized trade won out. Tobacco was a moving piece of détente, and by the late 1970s, Marlboros were being manufactured and smoked in the Soviet Union. Tobacco Détente: American Leaf in the Cold War, 1964-1977 A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of the Department of History East Carolina University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree Master of Arts in History By Christopher S. Bollow May, 2024 Director of Thesis: M. Todd Bennett, Ph.D. Thesis Committee Members: Christopher Oakley, Ph.D. Richard Hernandez, Ph.D. © Christopher S. Bollow, 2024 Contents Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1 ....................................................................................................................................... 14 Chapter 2 ....................................................................................................................................... 43 Chapter 3 ....................................................................................................................................... 76 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 105 Select Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 117 Introduction: “Almost as Good as Gold” “In these times of tension and difficult international competition,” Alice Widener wrote in the September 1960 volume of her anti-communist magazine U.S.A., “it is good to be able to take pride in an American success, great or small.” She was, of course, talking about American cigarettes. To Widener, they were “almost as good as gold” and indeed as good as currency when traveling abroad. Widener acknowledged the myriad of global tensions in the late summer of 1960. Still, American cigarettes seemed to bridge all cultural gaps, and she even claimed that no matter where one traveled, a pack of American cigarettes was “the only U.S. giveaway sure to make a friend.”1 In 1960, the International House of New Orleans, created after World War II to encourage American trade with foreign nations via missions abroad, foreign language courses, and exchange programs, conducted its “Trade and Travel Mission” beyond the Iron Curtain.2 The trip was International House’s fortieth abroad since its founding. The mission toured Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union. Charles Nutter, International House’s managing director, wrote about the trip. His piece ran alongside Widener’s and presented a controversial opinion: “This visit to Russia left me with the very definite belief that the real Soviet threat is economic, not military.” To Nutter, the Soviet Union was “startlingly successful,” but only because he saw the Soviet population as slave labor in the “all-embracing Soviet monopoly.” “Communism in Russia,” Nutter said, “[was] not communism at all” because it acted as “one gigantic trust.” Nutter proposed a foreign policy that focused on economics, and he concluded 1 Widener, Alice. “Cigarettes An American Success,” September 9, 1960. U.S.A. RJ Reynolds Records; Master Settlement Agreement. 2 Gary A. Bolding. “New Orleans Commerce: The Establishment of the World Trade Mart.” Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association, 8, no. 4 (Autumn, 1967): 351, 359. 2 his article by urging the United States to “take the economic offensive and prove that the capitalistic system is a superior one to theirs.”3 It is fitting that Nutter’s and Widener’s articles ran back-to-back in U.S.A. Soviet struggles with tobacco production, emerging health concerns in the United States, and the ever- present Cold War led to the fusion of Widener’s pride, excitement, and total belief in American tobacco products with Nutter’s goal of economically infiltrating a communist system he viewed as having gone horribly wrong. Undoubtedly, the two did not pen their 1960 pieces as part of a grand new foreign policy strategy. Nevertheless, for better or for worse, by 1964, a new vision of economic and cultural exportation combined with pride and confidence in American tobacco products led to a unique, more unrestricted, and liberalized tobacco trade with the East – communist states beyond the Iron Curtain and the Soviet Union itself. The Birth of Tobacco Détente In the years after World War II, American tobacco firms attempted to expand. But they weren’t the only ones. The Bulgarian state tobacco monopoly, Bulgartabek, also tried to extend its sphere of influence in the Soviet Bloc. In 1947, economic historian Koitko Beltchev identified tobacco as a centerpiece in the emerging East-West struggle. While Bulgaria worked to increase exports into Western Europe and the Americas, Beltchev noted that Virginia tobacco, introduced into Europe by American soldiers during the war years, was gaining popularity across the continent.4 3 “The Soviet Threat.,” 5. U.S.A. provided an editor’s note disagreeing with Nutter and said that “In our opinion, the military and economic threats of the Soviet Union are equally grave and alarming.” 4 Koitko Beltchev. Tobacco in Bulgaria. (Sofia, Plovdiv, Stara Zagora, Milan, Zurich: Marco Beltchev Sons Limited, 1947): 142. Though written in 1947 and translated in the United States in 1950, Beltchev’s analysis of the Bulgaria’s tobacco exportation sphere of influence proved accurate and changed little over the coming decades. 3 During the Twentieth Century, tobacco grew into a massive industry and played an instrumental role in American history. As such, it comes as no surprise that tobacco and tobacco products – this study focuses on leaf and cigarettes – have received plenty of scholarly attention. However, existing literature largely neglects the years of détente, during which tobacco resided at the intersection of geopolitical struggles and played an integral role in foreign policy. This work focuses on tobacco as an economic product and cultural export from 1964 through 1977 at a time when the Cold War was in flux. Scholars often describe the foreign policy of détente as encompassing the years 1969 through 1979. But East-West relations were warming considerably within the tobacco industry by 1964, and the year acts as a starting point to examine the tobacco industry’s new international strategy. By 1965, Soviet-American trade exceeded $143 million. Anticommunist cold warriors expressed concern and even outrage over this new and increased trade and argued that the Free World should not do business with Soviets or Iron Curtain countries. Between the years 1964 and 1977, tobacco was central to U.S. foreign policy. The commodity acted as a conduit for increased communication between U.S. and Soviet governments, a channel for desired scientific and technical cooperation, an arena for continued economic competition, and a U.S. weapon of cultural infiltration of communist markets. The year 1973 saw an influx in communication between men such as Dimitûr Iadkov of Bulgartabek and Hugh Cullman, the CEO of Philip Morris. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the industry evolved into a microcosm of a greater global struggle and became a small but essential piece of détente. Soviet and American delegations visited each other’s countries to learn production techniques, steal ideas, or demonstrate goodwill. This competition, blended with cooperation, was unique within the Cold War and a departure from previous foreign policy. But 4 this departure from the previous policy should not be confused as the United States no longer waging the Cold War. While cooperation did breed an uptick in friendliness in limited circumstances, it reflected a new strategy to win the Cold War, not a decision to quit fighting it. The focus of this research ends two years before détente’s traditional “end date” of 1979. The year 1977 marked the culmination of Philip Morris’s “Mission to Moscow,” when the company successfully signed a licensing agreement with Glavtobek, the Soviet Union’s tobacco monopoly. Marlboros were going to the Soviet Union and were there to stay, while RJ Reynolds’ Winstons were being produced all over the Eastern Bloc.5 Tobacco played a role within détente. But what was that role exactly? Did the increased tobacco trade break down barriers and promote better relations between East and West? Or did Soviet Bloc and American officials see tobacco as an economic and cultural weapon that could work to their opponent’s detriment? This study addresses these and other questions that the existing literature has not fully explored. This thesis situates tobacco in an international context, arguing that the commodity from raw material to finished product played an underestimated part in the ongoing struggle between the United States, the Soviet Union, and their allies. While this struggle occurred in Washington, Moscow, and other capitals, it was also rooted in locales like North Carolina, the heart of the American tobacco industry. As such, this study will examine how corporate spokespersons and other regional stakeholders heavily invested in the tobacco industry and thus highly dependent on exports responded to the challenges and opportunities the tobacco industry faced internationally. 5 Tricia Starks. Cigarettes and Soviets: Smoking the USSR. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2022): 187. RJR. R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., 1975 (750000) Annual Report. 1975, 8. 5 Intersecting Historiography: Tobacco, Détente, Sovietology, and North Carolina Drawing on works by diplomatic historians such as John Lewis Gaddis, Raymond L. Garthoff, Walter Hixson, and Anne Hessing Cahn, this study seeks to contribute to existing scholarly literature by examining détente through a “tobacco lens.”6 Any thorough analysis of tobacco is impossible without including North Carolina, North Carolinians, and their perspectives. However, this work crosses state and international borders. The state appears as part of a wider, global history of interregional tobacco exchange. It shows North Carolina headlines, actors, and businesses as overlapping with international tobacco companies, Soviet and American diplomats, and public health officials during the 1960s and 1970s. There is no shortage of literature examining North Carolina and its famed tobacco industry. However, little of this literature covers the Cold War era. Take The North Carolina Historical Review, for example. The volume of the journal’s articles concerning tobacco has sharply declined in recent years. Since the 1970s, the Review has published just three articles covering the tobacco industry in the post-World War II years. Of the three, only one solely focused on the postwar period. Jonathan Adler used the Lorillard Tobacco Company plant, 6 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment; A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.) Especially helpful for this project are two chapters in Gaddis’s work. “Nixon, Kissinger, and Détente” and “Implementing Détente.” Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation; American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985.) Garthoff’s chapter, “Confrontation to Détente” acts as excellent reference material for expanded trade between the United States and the Soviet Union, after the Export Administration Act of 1969 was passed. A prominent American export specifically focused on, is grain.Walter Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1997.) Most relevant to this thesis is Hixson’s chapter, “From the Summit to the Model Kitchen: The Cultural Agreement and the Moscow Fair.” Hixson writes about the U.S. cultural infiltration of the Soviet Union.Anne Hessing Cahn, Killing Détente; The Right Attacks the CIA (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998.) Cahn argues that while détente was popular with the American public, it was a policy brought down at any costs by conservatives. Furthermore, she argues that the money that subsequently went into fighting the Cold War after the abandonment of détente is a national travesty, considering the things the money could have been spent on instead: education and decaying inner cities are just a few. 6 which opened in Greensboro in 1956, as a case study to contrast the harsh treatment African American workers received with the more benign conditions Lorillard officials portrayed.7 Roger Biles’s article, “Tobacco Towns: Urban Growth and Economic Development in Eastern North Carolina,” is illustrative. Using Kinston, Greenville, Wilson, and Rocky Mount as case studies, Biles’s piece asks why the state's eastern half has remained relatively rural. “Tobacco Towns” finds that these locales’ tobacco warehouses effectively served as cultural hubs that worked to slow urbanization in the region. Though influential, Biles’s article is noteworthy for this study in two respects. One, a work of local history, it largely ignores the international context. Two, it pays scant attention to the postwar years, devoting less than one page to the industry's decline after World War II.8 Anthony Badger’s Prosperity Road: The New Deal, Tobacco, and North Carolina similarly focuses on the pre-World War II era. Badger examines the Agricultural Adjustment Act’s (AAA) tobacco program in North Carolina to address two more significant questions: to what extent did the New Deal impose its will on the nation, and how did local conditions constrain or alter federal policy?9 Badger argues that AAA programs succeeded in keeping 7 Jonathan Adler. “‘Brown Skin, Bright Leaf,’ and Brand Image: Racial Discrimination and Public Relations at the P. Lorillard Tobacco Company, 1956-1970.” The North Carolina Historical Review 95, no. 4 (October 2018): 405- 433. In 1955, the Carolina Times began publishing a seven-part series produced by the Lorillard Tobacco Company. The objective of the series was to explain the role African Americans played in the production of tobacco in North Carolina. Jonathan Adler used the newly opened Lorillard plant in Greensboro in 1956, as a case study to compare the reality of treatment African-Americans received as tobacco workers, with that of the reality the Lorillard Tobacco Company sought to present. Adler argues that Lorillard’s practice of discrimination in the workplace was more about profits than a deep-seated racism. He writes that studying the Lorillard Tobacco Company allows the researcher to better understand the relationship between capitalism and systemic racism. This article is important and provides a fresh look at the history of the tobacco industry in North Carolina. However, Adler is using tobacco as a case study for capitalism and racism, rather than as a starting point for someone who wishes to better understand the tobacco industry in North Carolina in the years after World War II. 8 Roger Biles. “Tobacco Towns: Urban Growth and Economic Development in Eastern North Carolina.” The North Carolina Historical Review 84, no. 2 (April 2007): 156-190. Biles briefly writes about the harsh contrast seen when comparing tobacco towns’ heyday with their current socioeconomic status. 9 Anthony Badger, xvi. Prosperity Road: The New Deal, Tobacco, and North Carolina. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980.) 7 tobacco farmers relatively prosperous during the New Deal years. Still, paradoxically, their success only confirmed growers’ cultural conservatism, which generally led them to reject federal incentives.10 Badger’s work, while not directly studying Cold War culture or politics, does serve to historize the worldview of the North Carolina farmer, enhancing understanding of the tobacco industry, government, and its implications. Though Badger writes outside of the intended chronology of this project, an understanding of tobacco programs in place before World War II is required to contextualize North Carolina tobacco culture as a whole. A growing body of literature situates tobacco in international contexts. Howard Cox’s The Global Cigarette: Origins and Evolution of British American Tobacco, 1885-1945, and Maurice Duke and Daniel Jordan’s Tobacco Merchant: The Story of Universal Leaf Tobacco Company provide excellent reference material, especially for understanding Universal Leaf Tobacco Company’s relationship with China. Though both works mainly focus on the pre-World War II years, they shed important light on the boom of the international cigarette market.11 Because Washington attempted to promote American tobacco products during the 1960s and 1970s, it is crucial to understand the government's role in the tobacco game and how official programs and policies directly impacted the farmer, businessman, and laborer. Robert Miles’s Coffin Nails and Corporate Strategies is an excellent source for understanding specific actions the federal government took regarding tobacco throughout the Twentieth Century, specifically after World War II. Topics such as the creation of the Tobacco Research Council and the role of the Surgeon General of the US are detailed.12 Nannie Tilley’s The RJ Reynolds Tobacco 10 Ibid: 216-217. 11 Howard Cox. The Global Cigarette: Origins and Evolutions of British American Tobacco, 1880-1945. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 19-45. Maurice Duke. Daniel P. Jordan. Tobacco Merchant: The Story of Universal Leaf Tobacco Company. (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1995): 2-3 12 Robert H. Miles. Coffin Nails and Corporate Strategies: (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Incorporated, 1982): 61-62. Tilley, Nannie M. The R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Chapel Hill and London, The University of North Carolina Press. 1985. 8 Company also provides excellent reference material, though outside of the chronology of this project.13 Perhaps most valuable for this thesis are Tricia Starks’s Cigarettes and Soviets: Smoking in the USSR and Mary C. Neuburger’s Balkan Smoke: Tobacco and the Making of Modern Bulgaria. Starks provides an exhaustive history of the tobacco industry and culture in the Soviet Union, its role in socialism, the Soviet cessation movement, and Philp Morris’s “tobacco détente.” Similarly, Neuburger studies Bulgaria's tobacco industry and culture, Bulgartabek’s business with Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds, and Bulgaria’s tobacco exports to the Soviet Union. Though hyper-focused on the tobacco industry in the USSR and Bulgaria, Starks and Neuburger come the closest to blending a study of foreign policy concerning Eastern Europe with an international study of tobacco. While focusing on the American tobacco industry, this thesis intends to bridge that gap further.14 A Note on Structure and Sources This study concentrates on 1964 to 1977. Chapter One focuses on 1964 through 1968, during which time the evolving tobacco industry played a limited but essential role in East-West trade and, ultimately, détente. An important theme of the chapter is the American resistance to trade with communists and tobacco’s role on the international stage during the Johnson Administration’s push for liberalized trade, or “bridge building.” Chapter Two examines détente’s beginnings as an official policy during the Nixon Presidency and covers 1969 to 1973. “Red tobacco trade,” or tobacco trade between the 14 Tricia Starks. Cigarettes and Soviets: Smoking the USSR. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2022.) Mary C. Neuburger. Balkan Smoke: Tobacco and the Making of Modern Bulgaria.. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013.) 9 communist Eastern Bloc and the United States, met many obstacles from 1969 to 1971. But 1972 and 1973 were turning points. Executives from American tobacco giants like Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds sat down with their Soviet counterparts as American and Soviet tobacco delegations traveled to each other’s countries. A giant leap forward for the American tobacco industry was the 1972 Soviet and American signing of the Basic Principles of Agreement, which outlined guidelines, though unenforceable, for both nations to follow on their continued path of détente.15 Chapter Three covers tobacco détente’s final act from 1974 to 1977. By 1974, the détente “dance” was becoming a more difficult balancing act and, by 1976, more politically polarizing. Despite this, the tobacco industry persevered and participated in joint production projects, continued to export American cigarettes to Soviet satellite states, and, by 1977, signed licensing agreements with the Soviet Union and multiple Eastern European (EEC) communist states.16 My work links two seemingly disparate things – tobacco and foreign policy – to provide a fresh perspective on a well-studied topic, détente. Several primary source collections exist to draw these connections. East Carolina University’s Special Collections in Joyner Library include Eastern North Carolina community correspondence: the J.C. Peele, M.D. Papers are noteworthy. In 1966, Peele, a staunch anti-communist outraged by reports that RJ Reynolds was purchasing tobacco from the non-Soviet controlled communist Yugoslavia, circulated a petition attempting to bar U.S.-based companies from buying goods from communist states. Peele was not representative of all North Carolinians. Still, his papers provide a glimpse into his Cold War 15 “PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,” May 29, 1972, doc., 116 in Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS,] 1969-1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972, ed. David S. Patterson, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2003). 16 Starks, 187. 10 mindset, showing that détente and tobacco diplomacy were passionate topics to cold warriors like himself.17 Four digitized collections were indispensable to this project. The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, the official documentary record of U.S. foreign policy published by the Department of State, provides telegrams, airgrams, memorandums of phone and in-person conversations, and other files documenting U.S. policy revealing the centrality of tobacco to international trade and foreign policy. Likewise, the U.S. National Archives Access to Archival Databases (AAD) contains electronic telegrams from the State Department in Washington and U.S. embassies in Sofia and Moscow. Brimming with trade reports, tobacco delegation tour schedules and itineraries, and plans for diplomatic dinner parties and cocktail hours, tobacco is demonstrated to be a commodity that led to cooperation and competition. Sifting through newspaper articles was an illuminating and necessary part of this research. ProQuest Historical Newspapers contains a multitude of pieces involving tobacco, the Soviet Union, and foreign policy. Newspaper articles and editorials served two overarching purposes. First, they served as secondary source information, enabling the establishment of links between events documented in FRUS and AAD and existing literature. Second, they served as evidence of the varying national mood concerning East-West trade and détente and often humanized the web of unfolding business and trade agreements. Lastly, the University of California-San Francisco’s Truth Tobacco Industry Documents is a priceless source for anyone studying the tobacco industry. The UCSF Library created the database in 2002 to “house and provide permanent access to tobacco industry internal corporate documents produced during litigation between U.S. states and seven major tobacco industry 17 “Letter from Mothers’ Crusade.” J.C. Peele, M.D. Papers (#1030), Box 11, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J.Y., Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, USA. 11 organizations.”18 Enormous in scope, Industry Documents contains over fifteen million files. Business memorandums, meeting minutes, newspaper articles, industry publications, and annual reports are all available here. Industry Documents also provide perspective on the industry in North Carolina. Tobacco Associates Inc., out of Raleigh, the self-described “ambassadors for U.S. Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers,” have been promoting North Carolina tobacco and working to expand export markets since 1947.19 All of the annual reports and addresses of their presidents can be found in Truth Tobacco Industry Documents. This profusion of sources, combined with a plentitude of Cold War, foreign policy, and diplomatic historical literature, leads to a new understanding of the tobacco industry and its role internationally and within the context of U.S. foreign policy. A New Industry By the time Alice Widener wrote her article touting the success of American tobacco in 1960, plenty of questions about smoking and its links to cancer were openly discussed. But many Americans remained unconvinced. Widener herself wrote that smoking as a cause of cancer had not been “scientifically proven” and that the anti-smoking movement was led by those who “deriv[ed] a kind of sadistic enjoyment, while at the same time lining their own pockets, by preaching that other peoples’ comforts and pleasures [were] all wrong.”20 In the Soviet Union, doctors openly stated that “Smoking [was] not a cause of cancer.”21 However, in the United States, the debate ended officially in 1964 with the U.S. Surgeon General’s warning. Health 18 “Overview,” Truth Tobacco Industry Documents. https://industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/tobacco/about/overview/ [accessed 2 March 2024.] The database includes all litigation documents. 19 “Who We Are: Ambassadors for US Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers,” Tobacco Associates, Inc. http://www.tobaccoassociatesinc.org/Promotion_about-us/wwaRL_index.aspx [accessed 20 January 2024.] 20 “Cigarettes An American Success,”2. 21 “Soviet Cancer Expert Tells of Mass Check [Exhibit] Cipolione v Liggett, ex DJT - 5000-311. August 7, 1959. Liggett & Myers Records. https://industrydocuments.ucsf.edu/tobacco/about/overview/ http://www.tobaccoassociatesinc.org/Promotion_about-us/wwaRL_index.aspx 12 concerns would persist in the Soviet Union as well, albeit not taken as seriously. RJ Reynolds included in one of its reports that Soviet doctors were less worried about cigarettes leading to cancer, in part because they believed oriental tobacco differed from bright leaf and contained less poisons.22 Tobacco exchanges began in 1962, but there was still little indication of the fundamental shift over the next decade and a half. Even during the first few years of the 1960s, when the Soviet Union struggled with tobacco shortages, business relations between American companies and Glavtobek did not appear to be blossoming. In 1964, Dr. William Dunn, head of the Philip Morris Research Center in Virginia, called Russian cigarettes “vile and nasty.” A Soviet delegation had visited the facility and, according to Dunn, “sadly acknowledged” the inferiority of their cigarettes. The Soviets asked for some of Philip Morris’s secrets, but Dunn turned them down. Maybe Dunn and Philip Morris were adding to the mystique of American cigarettes. Soviets enjoyed their own Oriental tobacco, so perhaps the story of visiting U.S.S.R. dignitaries pining over American industry secrets was embellished. Either way, tobacco détente was in its infancy in 1964.23 But soon enough, all that would change. Tobacco détente weathered domestic firestorms, controversial trade deals, conflicting ideologies, growing health concerns, and international crises. “If peaceful economic competition were to be replaced by forceful communist aggression,” Alice Widener said, “American cigarettes would be a powerful help to our armed forces.”24 The potential war Widener and millions of others feared never happened. But she was 22 Beffinger, IJ. Tobacco Smoking Research. “I am Bringing to your Notice the Latest Report From The Soviet Ministry of Health, Moscow, Which States That...” August 6, 1960. RJ Reynolds Records, Master Settlement Agreement. 23 “Soviet Asks for an American Cigaret Blending Secret – The Answer: Nyet.” October 28, 1964. Philip Morris Records; Master Settlement Agreement. 24 “Cigarettes An American Success,” 2. 13 right about one thing. Throughout the next thirteen years, American leaf and cigarettes finally led to victory, even if not the victory policymakers, generals, and politicians may have imagined. Chapter 1 1964-1968: Tobacco Seeds of Détente “It is now official; it could hardly have been otherwise,” the New York Times announced in a summary of the U.S. Surgeon General’s 1964 smoking report. “To put it bluntly,” The Times continued, “smoking is harmful to health – and remedial action must be taken.” Everything changed in the American tobacco industry in 1964. The U.S. Surgeon General officially declared a link between smoking and lung cancer, a fact that was probably already known or assumed by many.1 In the Soviet Union, there was a tobacco shortage, and to the U.S. tobacco industry’s dismay, Soviet authorities purchased 2.7 million pounds of Ontario leaf from Canada.2 The media, which had previously covered bland stories of exchanges and sales, began reporting on the industry’s new desire to tap into Eastern markets. Between 1964 and 1968, tobacco played a small but essential role in leading the US and USSR toward trade, limited cooperation, and ultimately détente. This chapter explores the evolving tobacco industry, the emerging trade and resistance to it between East and West, and how tobacco played a part on the world stage. No major trade agreements or business deals were reached during these years, leaving many in the industry frustrated that there was not more progress. The public relations hurdle it faced at home was equally challenging to the American tobacco industry. However, the four-year evolution mirrored changes in policies and public opinion in the United States. This change set the stage for a new era of cooperation and competition that would characterize the early 1970s when the American tobacco industry more aggressively pursued business relationships with the East. 1 “The Smoking Report.” The New York Times, January 12, 1964. 2 “Russia Purchases 2.7 Million Pounds of Ontario Tobacco.” Wall Street Journal, January 24, 1964. 15 New Markets Behind the Iron Curtain Nineteen sixty-four marked a turning point, but changes began earlier. During the Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy administrations, policymakers were frustrated at the US's perceived inability to stop the USSR from capitalizing on nationalistic movements in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.3 Deterrence and brinkmanship were the name of the game during the Eisenhower years, while flexible response was the cornerstone of foreign policy during the Kennedy administration. Still, “seeds” of détente were planted during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The US and USSR agreed on education, cultural, and technological cooperation.4 What would this cooperation achieve? For the US, it was a chance to beat the USSR by doing what it did best – produce and create consumers. After the 1959 American National Exhibition at Sokolniki Park in Moscow, Soviet retail began emulating the US. Stores in Moscow started to carry more processed foods and medicines. Khrushchev and Soviet officials knew their citizens wanted to buy American products. In response to the growing desire for Western goods, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) made a special effort to assure its people that their “material existence was improving.”5 Only two months before the Cuban Missile Crisis, Vasili Kopylov, M.J. Parshikow, Victor Sokolov, and other visiting Soviet dignitaries sat down in the United States for a nice steak lunch. The delegation also toured a frozen foods plant and enjoyed the pleasing aroma of country-cured ham. The team even joked that Sokolov, the group's youngest member, might be enjoying American women – though Sokolov good-naturedly said he couldn’t say anything 3 John Lewis Gaddis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005): 175. For an in-depth examination of the Eisenhower administration’s foreign policies, see Gaddis’s sixth chapter, “Implementing the New Look.” Gaddis argues that the U.S. was in a stronger position by the end of Eisenhower’s presidency than at the beginning. 4 Ibid., 187, 274-275. 5 Walter L. Hixson. Parting The Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997): 211. 16 about that since his wife might see the newspapers. Thick steaks for lunch, smiles, and jokes – dark-fired tobacco brought a Soviet delegation to rural America in 1962. The Soviet Federal Planning Commission sent the agricultural experts as part of a cultural exchange to observe American tobacco production methods in Robertson County, Tennessee. Yet despite the goodwill trip, there were no business relations between the US and the USSR. Exchanges like these were themselves relatively new.6 While the Soviet tobacco delegation visited in 1962, fourteen representatives from the American tobacco industry traveled to the USSR. It garnered a brief headline in the Durham Morning Herald. The State Department sent the delegation to observe tobacco growing, harvesting, and marketing techniques in the Soviet Union. Observers included Kenneth Keller of North Carolina State’s Agricultural College, Malcolm Seawell of the Tobacco Associates of the U.S. Tobacco and Leaf Exporters Association based in Raleigh, North Carolina, and Carl Hicks, a tobacco grower from Walstonburg, North Carolina, and representative of the Flue-Cured Tobacco Cooperative Stabilization Corporation. The trip lasted sixteen days and gave exchange members a glimpse into the Soviet tobacco industry. But the Morning Herald did little to emphasize tobacco’s importance as a potential tool of diplomacy. Instead, it merely noted that “The State Department believes such exchanges contribute to the betterment of mutual understanding and to the broadening of cooperation between the people of the two countries.”7 In 1964, the USSR was searching for new tobacco producers. It looked to India, North Korea, Brazil, and Southern Rhodesia. But, as the Wall Street Journal reported, these nations could only provide a little over 100 million pounds of leaf. Canada could provide some – and it 6 Hal Herd. “Russian Like U.S. Tobacco, Ham.” Tennessean. August 28, 1962. Council For Tobacco Research Records; Master Settlement Agreement. 7 “7 U.S. Tobaccomen Will Make Study of Industry in Russia.” Durham Morning Herald, August 6, 1962. US Tobacco Records on Smokeless Tobacco. 17 did – but The Journal quickly emphasized that the US was the only country that could meet Soviet demand.8 Since 1962, the same year the US sent a tobacco delegation to the Soviet Union as part of the educational, cultural, and technological exchanges agreed upon during the Eisenhower years, the USSR had been in a tobacco crunch. Soviet authorities were some 135 million pounds short of needed tobacco. Cigarette production inside the USSR was down by almost 2 trillion pieces. Production remained virtually stagnant throughout the rest of Eastern Europe, which meant tobacco exporters in satellite states could not meet the needed boost to the USSR. It was a perfect shortage storm. China had previously been the biggest tobacco exporter to the Soviet Union. But in 1962, due to the Soviet-Sino split, its exports fell by half. Bulgaria, another country the Soviets relied heavily on for tobacco, could not meet demand due to mold-damaged crops.9 Inside the Soviet Union, despite an emphasis on production, which included round-the-clock shifts at cigarette factories, the tobacco industry could not meet demand, primarily due to labor shortages.10 8 “Commodities: Russia, Eastern Europe To Seek Big Purchase Of Tobacco This Year.” Wall Street Journal. January 2, 1964. 9 Ibid. Laverne Creek, Tom Capehart, and Verner Grise. U.S. Tobacco Statistics, 1935-1992. (Washington, 1994): 220. Mary C. Neuburger, Balkan Smoke: Tobacco and the Making of Modern Bulgaria, 208 (Ithica and London: Cornell University Press, 2013.) Neuburger dives into the explosion of the Bulgarian tobacco industry and its strong ties to Moscow. Though Bulgaria continued to export more and more products to the USSR through the second half of the 1950s, its stockpiles were not enough to meet quotas once the mold problem struck. 10 Tricia Starks. Cigarettes and Soviets: Smoking the USSR. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2022):160-161. In the decades following World War II, Soviet citizens expected higher living standards. Quality cigarettes, as well as appliances for the home, were desired and sought after. In her sixth chapter, “Recovered: Women’s Kingdoms and Manly Habits,” Starks describes the growing demand for a better lifestyle after World War II, the state’s response to that demand, and the subsequent problems that hampered production in the tobacco industry. Despite Khrushchev’s claim that the USSR would arrive at communism by 1980, there were labor problems. One problem was the result of a 1944 law that kept pregnant and nursing women from working the third shift at factories. Following World War II, pregnancies among unwed mothers were on the rise, which meant that there was often a struggle to find workers to replace them. 18 Labor problems plagued production in the satellite states. Mold was only one of the challenges Bulgaria faced. From 1956 to 1960, Bulgaria implemented a shortened work week, from forty-eight to forty-one hours, including Sundays off. Increased leisure time may have been enjoyable to the average citizen, but it challenged the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) both economically and culturally. Like citizens inside the USSR, Bulgarians came to expect a higher standard of living.11 By 1964, American tobacco companies were eyeing eastern markets. In the United States, Congress began what Richard McGowan has called the second wave of government tobacco regulation. The first wave, which occurred earlier in the century, was the general restructuring of the U.S. tobacco industry. But this new regulatory wave was about the health of consumers. Health warnings, advertising regulations, and new demand for filtered cigarettes all changed the industry’s landscape. It was clear that with the changing environment of tobacco culture, companies would be forced to adapt to the new economic and political climate. Over the next six years, Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds would far and away be the two most successful in this evolution.12 Within a few years of the Surgeon General’s 1964 warning, many Americans decided to give up the habit. But this did not mean that tobacco companies would accept losses. It only meant that new markets needed to be found.13 Nineteen sixty-four marked a change in U.S. foreign and economic policy as well. President Johnson began encouraging U.S. industry to trade with the East, meaning the Soviet 11 Neuburger, Balkan Smoke, 169-174. 12 Richard McGowan. Business, Politics, and Cigarettes: Multiple Levels, Multiple Agendas. (Westport, Connecticut, London: Quorum Books, 1995): 19-21. McGowan highlights one apparent paradox of tobacco regulation. Warning labels, added in 1971, were intended to inform consumers of health risks. It is difficult to quantify how the effects of these labels. However, McGowan notes that labels have provided tobacco companies with plausible deniability. Companies can now point to the labels as evidence that consumers are fully aware of the dangers of smoking. 13 Brandt, Allan M. The Cigarette Century: The Rise, Fall, and Deadly Persistence of the Product that Defined America. (New York: Basic Books, 2007): 449-450. 19 Union and the Eastern European Community (EEC.) One government spokesperson even told the press that it was in the US’s best interest to sell as much tobacco as possible to Eastern Bloc countries.14 However, Johnson’s encouragement of trade between the two powers did not magically boost U.S. tobacco exportation to the USSR. Soviets historically preferred Oriental leaf – In Bulgaria, Russian trade representatives told Philip Morris executives that their taste was “mainly Oriental” – and it would take hard work for U.S. companies to make inroads in the East and convince consumers that American blend cigarettes were of high quality.15 U.S. tobacco companies hoped Soviet doctors and government officials would come to different conclusions about tobacco’s effect on health. In 1965, the Western Tobacco Journal cited numerous studies. Some were undoubtedly detrimental to the tobacco industry; the most damning being a study conducted by the Roswell Park Memorial Institute. The study found that mice subjected to applications of raw tobacco developed cancerous tumors. However, other studies provided ammunition to an industry ready to claim tobacco wasn’t all that unhealthy. One argument claimed cigarette smoke contained chemicals that prevented cancer. Another said that smoking before the age of 45 was safe.16 An entire subsection of the article was devoted to hoping Russians would conclude that smoking was safe. The Journal conceded that Russians had not wholly “exonerated cigarettes as a health peril.”17 For example, Leonid Orlovsky of the All-Union Institute of Health Education in the USSR admitted that cancers of the mouth and lungs were connected to smoking. But he cited cigarettes as only one of numerous possible causes. Neither Orlovsky nor his colleagues believed 14 H.J. Maidenberg. “Tobacco Men Are Seeking Ways to Spur Export Volume.” New York Times. March 15, 1964. 15 Neuburger, 208-209. 16 Western Tobacco Journal. January 1, 1964; December 31, 1965. R. J. Reynolds Records; Master Settlement Agreement. 17 Ibid. 20 “that smoking is the direct and only cause. The theory most Soviet oncologists accept is that cancer may be the result of several factors, including smoking.”18 Orlovsky’s statement would likely do little to ease the mind of a twenty-first-century consumer. But the Journal spun it to minimize smoking’s ill effects. Russian oncologists, the article concluded, theorized that cancer came from factors other than smoking and that smoking merely weakened lungs already harmed by the disease.19 In any case, the US already had its foot in the tobacco door via another product: wheat. When the EEC experienced wheat shortages, United States policymakers sought to exploit the situation by first using tobacco as an economic guinea pig. The State Department wanted the U.S. legation in Bulgaria to proceed with wheat, cotton, and tobacco sales. The State Department deemed this beneficial because it would reduce storage costs and improve the U.S. balance of payments. Bulgaria highly desired U.S. wheat, but the State Department used tobacco as leverage and told the legation in Sofia to sell $8 million worth of tobacco first. They were instructed to hold off on selling wheat for the next seven to ten days. This window was used to “test Bulgarian sentiment.”20 In other words, if Bulgaria wanted wheat, they needed to buy tobacco, too. Suddenly, in 1964, U.S. tobacco was first at the center of health concerns and political controversy, then as a bargaining chip in the international economy and diplomacy. Though such deals fostered cooperation, East-West competition persisted. Six months after the State Department telegrammed the U.S. legation in Sofia, the U.S. minister to Bulgaria, H. Eugenie Anderson, and the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Ivan Bashev, discussed US-Bulgarian 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Department of State to the Legation in Bulgaria, Telegram, Feb. 19, 1964, doc. 28, In Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1964-1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe, eds. David C. Humphrey, Charles S. Sampson, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001.) 21 relations. While Anderson seemed relatively positive – he referenced Bulgaria’s Agricultural Production Minister visiting the US, Bulgaria’s purchase of U.S. agricultural commodities, the US exhibit at the upcoming Plovdiv International Trade Fair in Bulgaria, and what seemed to be the continuing growth of “two-way cultural relations” – Bashev was dismissive. He believed there was “nothing to be pleased about as far as US-Bulgarian relations are concerned.”21 His main concern was Bulgarian exports, which he felt the US hindered. “Trade should be two-way trade,” he said.22 This discussion is especially revealing, for it demonstrates that the superpowers, or their satellites, were only bettering relations as long as they could better their economies at the expense of competitors. The BCP and Bulgartabek (Bulgaria’s state-controlled tobacco monopoly) failed to provide the USSR with needed tobacco. In the spirit of “educational, cultural, and technological cooperation,” Bulgaria turned to the US for American blend leaf. But all parties had ulterior motives, and the common denominator between the US and EEC was a desire for superior and stable economies that satisfied popular demand. Moreover, as the US embarked on its quest for better relations with the East, Soviet officials were vexed that the US did not lump all of “The East” together. Soviet embassy officers in Washington surprised Secretary of State Dean Rusk by being less than enthusiastic about President Johnson’s desire for more significant trade between the US, the USSR, and Eastern Europe. Sure, the Soviets were all for increased trade between the superpowers. Still, the US habit of improving ties with Eastern Europe by “separating these countries from the Soviet 21 Memorandum of Conversation, August 6, 1964, doc., 29 in FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996.) 22 Ibid: Bashev was upset that though Bulgaria purchased commodities such as tobacco from the U.S., the U.S. did not purchase commodities from Bulgaria. When Bulgaria wanted to buy electrical locomotives from the U.S., the U.S. refused. According to Bashev, cultural relations alone were of “small interest to [Bulgaria.]” Bashev believed that trade on an “equal footing” was necessary for truly better relations. 22 Union” disturbed Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin.23 Yes, the Soviets did feel optimistic about increased trade, Dobrynin said, and were pleased and surprised that some American media were interpreting Johnson’s 1965 State of the Union as an invitation to Soviet officials to the United States – though Dobrynin made it clear that Soviet leaders could not “rush off” to Washington.24 But Johnson’s credibility was lessened by treating Eastern European countries as sovereign states, even using “self-determination” when speaking about East Germany. Still, the fact that both parties were showing a desire for trade and other improvements like the opening of consulates and an air agreement demonstrated a collective new attitude.25 Shifting opinions of tobacco at home, and not for the better as far as the tobacco industry was concerned, along with new markets overseas – what better product than tobacco to improve this trade? Though it would be slow and arduous, both powers were open to the idea. It was Americans who ultimately proved most resistant. Citizen Cold Warriors and Red Trade Resistance While big U.S. tobacco companies wanted to sell to countries beyond the Iron Curtain, they also began buying from a communist state to produce a specific cigarette blend. The supplier was Yugoslavia. By 1965, six U.S. tobacco companies were purchasing leaf from Yugoslavia. The imported leaf was mixed with American Bright Leaf and Burley to blend Camel cigarettes. Once again, tobacco found itself in the middle of controversy. The Johnson Administration had pushed for greater trade with the East, or “bridge building.” But this did not mean American cold 23 Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, Telegram, January 8, 1965, doc., 84 in FRUS, 1964- 1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union, ed. James E. Miller (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996.) 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 23 warriors who viewed communism as a genuine threat to the country were willing to do business with the enemy. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and Commerce Secretary John Connor insisted that importing Yugoslavian tobacco was “entirely consistent with our national security.”26 But that didn’t matter to Americans at the grassroots and anti- communist politicians who mobilized against East-West trade. Protesting Americans cited two main reasons for their resistance. First, Christian Americans recognized communism as a godless ideology that directly conflicted with American values and constitutional government. Second, trade with communist states appeared treasonous when American soldiers were being sent across the globe to fight a communist enemy in Vietnam. After all, this was 1964. The Cold War was at its height. Unsurprisingly, many viewed doing business with communists as no less than trading with the enemy. Efforts to block trade with the East had a mixed record of success. Glenard Lipscomb, a Republican Representative from California, did his best to inform ordinary Americans of business dealings and export licenses American companies were receiving. He spoke on the subject to Congress in 1965. He did not specifically mention tobacco. But his speech raised concerns about the need for more transparency concerning East-West trade. He listed countless business deals that he claimed were unknown to average Americans. For example, the US granted an export license in July of 1965 to ship chemical wood pulp, a substance used for tires, to the Soviets. Lipscomb argued that selling the pulp would benefit the Soviet military. Around the same time, the Department of Commerce authorized a shipment of grinding machines, mainly used in automotive crankshafts and camshafts, valued at almost $2.5 million. Earlier that 26 B. Gwertzman. “Three Top Cabinet Officers Back Buying Tobacco From Reds.” October 12, 1965.Washington Evening Star. Philip Morris Records; Master Settlement Agreement. 24 year, the US sold technical data to the USSR to aid in constructing an ethylene plant. The plant would produce hydrogen propane, propylene, butane, butylene, and gasoline. “The Department of Commerce does not know what the end use of the products would be,” stated Lipscomb.27 Lipscomb may have exaggerated the threat. Selling chemical wood pulp to Moscow did not necessarily contribute to the Soviet military buildup. But East-West trade deals were undeniably controversial. Take the failed proposal to build a Firestone synthetic rubber plant in Rumania. Lipscomb claimed that the Johnson administration hand-picked Rumania for “special treatment.”28 Rumania proposed paying for the plant with just 15 percent cash and 85 percent credit through the Export-Import Bank (EXIM.) EXIM also announced that similar terms might apply to future Rumanian deals, possibly including a $20 million fertilizer plant. Firestone refused to assume any of the risks.29 Public outcry followed. Many Americans were outraged not only by the proposed Firestone deal but also by any East-West trade at all. They argued that it was immoral for America to trade with totalitarian states who had pledged to destroy the US, that trade with the East would strengthen communist economies and damage American national security, and that communist states had little to offer the US anyway.30 Firestone quietly canceled its plans. Lipscomb heralded Goodyear’s earlier decision not to build a plant, also in Rumania, as an example for the rest of U.S. industry to follow: “You cannot put a price tag on freedom,” 27 “Life Lines: What We Should Know about Red Trade. Speech By U.S. Rep. Glenard Lipscomb (Calif.) In Congress.” Life Lines 7, no. 118. (October 1, 1965): 1-2. 28 Ibid., 2. 29 Memorandum of Conversation, February 15, 1965, doc., 148 in FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe, ed. James E. Miller (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996.) 30 Richard B. Bilder “‘East-West Trade Boycotts: A Study in Private, Labor Union, State, and Local Interference with Foreign Policy.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 118, no. 6 (May, 1970): 848-849. 25 Goodyear explained, adding that technical knowledge, in its view, should not be sent beyond the Iron Curtain.31 Firestone’s cancellation, as well as Lipscomb’s speech, demonstrated two things. One, Americans were paying attention, and many were adamantly against trade with communist states. Trade associations, including the North Carolina Tobacco Associates, which had considerable influence among North Carolina tobacco farmers, were pushing for trade with the East.32 But many Americans strongly disapproved. Their disapproval was enough to slow or even stop some business deals. Two, anti-trade efforts faced considerable pushback from the Johnson Administration and the mainstream media. Lipscomb’s speech appeared in Life Lines, a conservative newspaper that described itself as “a patriotic voice of freedom.” Life Lines and the publications of other like- minded organizations, such as the Christian Crusade and the John Birch Society, allowed citizen cold warriors to network and pressure representatives. According to a Washington Post report, Firestone’s decision to withdraw from the deal was primarily due to the Young Americans For Freedom. This conservative group picketed outside numerous Firestone plants in Ohio.33 Many U.S. officials blamed these efforts for blocking attempts to warm Cold War relations and expand East-West trade. Senator William Fulbright of Arkansas, chair of the Senate 31 “Life Lines,” 2. “Universal Oil Products Proceeds on Building Refinery for Rumania. Firm Says It Completed Accord Despite Furor on Firestone’s Dropping Talks With Nation.” Wall Street Journal. July 27, 1965. The Journal covered Goodyear’s involvement in the story differently than Congressman Lipscomb did. It reported that Senator Fulbright, D-AR, charged the company with providing its salesmen “right-wing” publications to use against Firestone. Despite Goodyear’s public decision not to build and sell a plant in Rumania, followed by Firestone’s decision to do the same, Universal Oil Products Corp. still built an oil refinery in Rumania. Universal Oil’s Vice President George Orescan told the media that the company wasn’t trying to “set foreign policy” and was only following the policy of the Federal Government. 32 “Palmer Wants Trade With China, Soviet Bloc.” Southern Tobacco Journal. May, 1966. Council For Tobacco Research Records; Master Settlement Agreement. 33 “Rumania Plant Deal Cut Off by Protests.” The Washington Post. April 30, 1965. 26 Foreign Relations Committee, accused groups such as the Young Americans of having a bad case of “profit-sacrificing patriotism” and only having “got religion” to look good to the American public.34 But most importantly, Fulbright hinted that the federal government had not adequately supported Firestone and criticized the Young Americans for inserting themselves into foreign policy.35 When the Firestone deal fell through, policymakers quickly looked for new ventures to “fill the gap.” There was no policy reversal or acknowledgment of American concerns about trading with a communist country. Instead, David Klein of the National Security Council Staff told Johnson’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, that though the deal was over, it was “important to bring key members of the government into agreement with what has generally been understood to be this government’s policy.”36 Even so, the Johnson Administration’s support of tobacco leaf purchases from Yugoslavia met stiff opposition. In October 1965, Alexander Galloway, President of RJ Reynolds, received a letter from L.B. Ensey, a retired Navy Commander disillusioned with the United States Government and RJ Reynolds. “I have been a Camel smoker for twenty years,” Ensey’s letter opened. “Propaganda” that smoking was linked to cancer had not led him to quit. 34 “Fulbright Says Pressure Blocked Rumanian Deal.” New York Times. July 26, 1965. 35 Willliam D. Smith. “U.S. Concern Sets Rumania Project. Universal Oil Will Go Ahead Despite Earlier Controversy.” New York Times. July 27, 1965. Fulbright accused the Young Americans of calling for a national boycott of Firestone products. The Young Americans denied that they had called for a nationwide boycott but did admit that some local chapters did. The exact details of Firestone’s decision remain unclear. Bad press and the efforts of Americans against the U.S. trading with communist states had an impact. But the company never made an official statement, and Bill Moyers, Johnson’s press secretary, said that he was under the impression Firestone’s decision was due to projected losses from the public pressure. Still, Moyers argued that the business deal would have been in everyone’s “best interest.” 36 David Klein to Bundy, memorandum, doc., 151 in FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe, ed. James E. Miller, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996.) Anatole Shub. “Rumania Destalinizing Without a Lot of Fuss.” The Washington Post, Times Herald. May 23, 1965. The Post covered a changing Romania, comparing it to other Eastern bloc countries, specifically Bulgaria. The standard of living in Rumania was on the rise, Rumanian officials worked to ensure the safety of Americans at the American embassy, and Rumania was generally more welcoming of and in tune with the West, the story argued. This was in heavy contrast with Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. 27 Neither had pestering from his wife. But trade with Yugoslavia was too much for the retired Navy man. His letter was scathing: Probably the only thing that could have made me stop smoking has occurred. When I found out that you are supporting the enemies of the United States of America by buying tobacco from a Communist country, that did it, I quit. Let’s give some thought to the fact that Communists are killing Americans in various places of the world. Let’s don’t try and fool ourselves that there are good Communists and that there are bad Communists.37 Ensey cited Article III, Section III of the Constitution and accused RJ Reynolds of treason by giving aid and comfort to enemies of the United States. He concluded by pleading with RJ Reynolds to stop buying Yugoslavian tobacco and to “have the courage to announce this change publicly.”38 Anger over U.S. importation of Yugoslavian tobacco was a classic case in which the principle of the matter was more important than the actual impact. The Wall Street Journal reported that the 10.2 million pounds imported from Yugoslavia for tobacco flavoring was only about 10 percent of the total amount the US imported.39 But 10 percent was still significant to the tobacco farmer, who wanted tobacco companies to buy and export his leaf rather than import from Europe. Over the previous decade, more and more tobacco farmers had closed up shop. In 1954, there were over 500,000 tobacco farms in the United States. By 1964, there were approximately 330,000. The decline in tobacco crop acreage, down to 1.03 million acres in 1964 from 1.55 million acres in 1954, roughly paralleled the decrease in total farms.40 37 Ensey, L.B, “In View of the Recent News Item to the Effect that the Reynolds Tobacco Company is Buying Tobacco from Communist Yugoslavia, I Thought That You Would be Interested in Giving Some Thought to the Following...” October 24, 1965. R.J. Reynolds Records; Master Settlement Agreement. 38 Ibid. There is no record of a response to Commander Ensey. However, it can be assumed that the letter made some impact, as it was saved and filed by Galloway. It was later digitized and can be found in UC-San Francisco’s Truth Tobacco Industry Documents database. 39 Journal of Commerce. Tobacco Firms Praised. “Six Big Cigarette Firms Use Yugoslav Tobacco, Snub Pressure Groups.” Wall Street Journal. October 12, 1965. Philip Morris Records; Master Settlement Agreement. 40 Laverne Creek, Tom Capehart, and Verner Grise. U.S. Tobacco Statistics, 1935-1992. (Washington, 1994): 67. 28 The debate continued through late 1965 and into 1966. Newspapers all over the country weighed in. Many echoed Fulbright’s sentiments that freedom of speech did not justify hijacking foreign policy. The Des Moines Register emphasized “building bridges,” which Congressman Lipscomb had denounced. American tobacco firms that sought to trade with Yugoslavia or other Eastern Bloc countries might lead to Iron Curtain countries seeing through anti-US propaganda. East-West trade might convert communists to free-marketeers, suggested the Register.41 In any case, the Register praised the Johnson administration for “wheeling out its big guns,” Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, and John Connor, to defend the companies buying Yugoslavian tobacco.42 The Louisville Courier-Journal, based in tobacco-producing Kentucky, weighed in too. Perhaps surprisingly, it defended the companies and their decision to import. The Courier- Journal’s opinion of red-trade protesters was summed up in its headline: “More Volunteer Trade Experts Evoke A Washington Protest.” The editorial reiterated many of the arguments made by other outlets – that Yugoslavia was Western-looking, that Americans didn’t have the right to disrupt the foreign policy process, and that imports from Yugoslavia were a drop in the bucket anyway. The Courier-Journal was notable in calling for the Johnson Administration to take a more substantial lead in East-West trade deals. The paper wanted more trade, not less, and a firm governmental hand to guide it.43 American Heart Association; American Cancer Society; Campaign For Tobacco Free Kids. False Friends: The U.S. Betrayal of American Tobacco Farmers. December, 1999. Brown & Williamson Records; Master Settlement Agreement. By 1999, the number of tobacco farms in the U.S. had dropped to 85,000. “The President’s News Conference of August 18, 1967: Farm Prices” in The Johnson Presidential Press Conferences, vol. 2. (New York: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises Inc., Publishers): 822. Johnson referenced the decreasing number of farms when advocating for price support. He told the press in 1967 that “I do think that people are leaving the farms by the thousands and going into the cities. I do think that this is creating a very serious problem for us.” 41 “Trade With Communists.” Des Moines Register. October 13, 1965. Ligget & Myers Records. 42 Ibid. 43 “More Volunteer Trade Experts Evoke A Washington Protest.” Louisville Courier-Journal. October 13, 1965. Philip Morris Records; Master Settlement Agreement. 29 Nineteen sixty-five turned to 1966, and cold warriors who opposed doing business with communists were still upset. In Eastern North Carolina, Dr. J.C. Peele networked with other anti- communists inside and outside the state. Much like Commander Ensey from California, Dr. Peele was adamantly against any “peaceful coexistence” or “aid and trade” with communists.44 To anti-communists like Peele, trade with the USSR or any of its satellite states, including Yugoslavia, was not an effective strategy for injecting capitalism into communist nations. If anything, it was the other way around. In one of his hundreds of letters to various newspaper editors across Eastern North Carolina, he told Jack Rider of Lenoir County News that the US was playing directly into Lenin’s metaphorical hands. Unsuspecting U.S. citizens, Peele argued, were helping communists reach their ultimate objective. “Lenin explained it this way,” he said. “‘Without an alliance with non-Communists in the most varied spheres of activity, there can be no question of any successful constructive work.” U.S. oil refineries in Yugoslavia, wheat sales and tobacco trade with countries behind the Iron Curtain, Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds’ exploration of business with Moscow, and the purchase of Yugoslavian leaf – according to Peele, all of this was the alliance Lenin spoke of.45 Peele and like-minded people he communicated with around North Carolina and the nation would not allow trade with communists to continue without a fight. A prominent ear, nose, and throat doctor from Kinston, North Carolina, he had the respect and attention of North 44 “Letter to Peele from Gloria Hardee.” March 12, 1966. J.C. Peele, M.D. Papers (#1030), Box 11, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J.Y., Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, USA. 45 “Letter to the Editor.” January 28, 1966. J.C. Peele, M.D. Papers (#1030), Box 11, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J.Y., Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, USA. Peele’s letter to the editor mainly focused on the communist organization American Institute for Marxist Studies (AIMS) and its activity within academia. Much of the letter’s purpose was to identify communists in prominent places, most notably the director of AIMS, Herbert Aptheker. Peele cited the anti-communist newspaper Tocsin, out of Oakland, California, for much of his claims. “Our Last Issue: Tocsin to Quit Publication.” Tocsin. January 29, 1964. Tocsin’s last publication was approximately a month before Dr. Peele’s letter to the editor. 30 Carolina politicians. By the summer of 1966, Peele was involved in a protest that grabbed the attention of U.S. senators and congressmen from all over the country and at least peripherally, the president of the United States. Dr. Peele regularly corresponded with an organization called Mothers’ Crusade For Victory Over Communism. Based in Mesa, Arizona, the all-volunteer group of anti-communist mothers tirelessly distributed informational pamphlets about communism, organized petitions to Congress, and focused on “helping in any way we can to save our country for our children”46 To protest red trade, the organization sent letters to President Johnson. Aiming to influence public opinion, they raised funds to print anti-communist newspaper advertisements nationwide.47 In 1966, Mothers’ Crusade sent Peele 200 copies of a sheet titled “Facts and Opinions You May Not Have Read Concerning United States And Allied Trade With Communist Nations.” In a letter to Mothers’ Crusade, Peele agreed to distribute the literature. “I can get this material out in about 30 days to the 200 contacts I have in 21 states,” Peele wrote.48 Peele also sent Mothers’ Crusade the “Reynolds Memorandum,” detailing RJ Reynolds’ importation of Yugoslavian tobacco. Now, Peele and Mothers’ Crusade set to work. Together, 46 “Letter from Mothers’ Crusade.” J.C. Peele, M.D. Papers (#1030), Box 11, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J.Y., Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, USA. Peele often received answers to his numerous letters to U.S. senators and congressmen representing North Carolina. For instance, in early 1966, U.S. Senators Sam J. Ervin Jr. and B. Everett Jordan and Representatives Alton Lennon and L.H. Fountain responded to Peele’s letter urging them to vote against extending federal minimum wage and hours to agricultural workers. Like Peele, all four men opposed the proposed Federal Minimum Wage Law amendments. “History of Changes to the Minimum Wage Law,” U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/minimum-wage/history [accessed 3 December 2023]. Despite opposition, amendments to the Fair Labor and Standards Act passed in 1966 and took effect in February 1967. Amendments included extended coverage to numerous industries and, as feared by Peele, farms that had employment reaching over five hundred man-days of labor during their best quarter of 1966. 47 “Form Letter from Mothers’ Crusade for Victory Over Communism.” J.C. Peele, M.D. Papers (#1030), Box 11, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J.Y., Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, USA. Mothers’ Crusade had the attention of U.S. Congress Republicans. 48 “Mothers Crusade for Victory Over Communism.” January 11, 1966. J.C. Peele, M.D. Papers (#1030), Box 11, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J.Y., Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, USA. “Form Letter from Mothers’ Crusade for Victory Over Communism. “Mother’s Crusade for Victory Over Communism.” March 4, 1966. J.C. Peele, M.D. Papers (#1030), Box 11, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J.Y., Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, USA. https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/minimum-wage/history 31 they began a petition to U.S. Congress to stop U.S. companies from importing products from communist states. The movement seemed to be picking up steam.49 A lady called me from High Point, North Carolina and asked me to please send her 5 more ‘Petitions.’ She said that when people she had contacted in High Point found out that tobacco companies in the United States were buying tobacco from Communist countries, they got boiling mad. One store owner was in the process of putting up a sign in his store saying that he didn’t buy merchandise made in Communist countries, when my lady contact walked in his store and showed him that the cigarettes he was selling were made by United States tobacco companies who were buying tobacco from Communist countries. He was furious and volunteered to help the lady get more ‘Petitions’ signed.50 While Peele and Mothers’ Crusade pushed to get the word out about the East-West tobacco trade, Congressman Lipscomb worked tirelessly to alarm the American public. Focusing on chemicals and agricultural machinery rather than tobacco, he found that the East-West trade had jumped from approximately $50 million in 1962 to $409 million by 1964. “I am utterly unable to understand how it makes any sense to help equip the Communists who are assisting aggressors to kill and maim our soldiers in Viet Nam,” Lipscomb said.51 It was a common sentiment in Mothers’ Crusade literature and pamphlets. In a form letter the group sent out, Representative John Buchanan Jr. of Alabama echoed Lipscomb’s feelings. He endorsed the organization’s work, stating, “This is one Congressman who does not believe that you can fight the enemy in Vietnam and try to shake his hand in Europe.”52 Senator Peter Dominick was also quoted as endorsing the group and said that if the nation continued pursuing trade with communist bloc nations, then it was “asking our boys [in Vietnam] to sacrifice too much.”53 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 “LBJ Pushes Ahead on Red Trade.” Manchester Union Leader. May 12, 1966. J.C. Peele, M.D. Papers (#1030), Box 11, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J.Y., Joyner Library, East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, USA. 52 “Form Letter from Mothers’ Crusade.” 53 Ibid. 32 These voices did not necessarily speak for most Americans or North Carolinians. Peele’s network and influence were extensive – his variety of correspondence and consistent letters to editors of Eastern Carolina newspapers printed as full-length articles prove that – but so were the voices of other North Carolinians who believed liberalized trade with communist states was pro- American and pro-farmer. “There is a demand in the Soviet bloc for U.S. leaf as well as for manufactured cigarettes,” John Palmer of North Carolina’s Tobacco Associates said in 1964 before reemphasizing the point in 1966.54 Created in 1947, Tobacco Associates (TA) was striving, and still does, to promote U.S. flue-cured tobacco worldwide. Its role was and is “assistance and promotion.”55 As president of TA, Palmer had two main objectives concerning international trade. The first was to begin business anew with mainland China. To Palmer, this was admittedly unrealistic in 1966, when the US was engaged in Vietnam. But his other goal seemed attainable: “initiating a volume business with those countries in the Soviet bloc.”56 To Palmer, the positive impact trade with the East could bring to North Carolina was simple. At the time, the combined population of China and the Soviet bloc was over one billion. Ideology was not crucial to Palmer. He lamented that China had been one of the biggest U.S. flue-cured tobacco buyers a mere thirty-five years earlier. China becoming a communist state made no difference to TA’s president. What mattered was the economic well-being of the North Carolina farmer, tobacco agent, businessman, or warehouseman.57 54 “Palmer Wants Trade With China, Soviet Bloc.” May, 1966. Council for Tobacco Research Records; Master Settlement Agreement. 55 “Who We Are: Ambassadors for US Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers,” Tobacco Associates, Inc. http://www.tobaccoassociatesinc.org/Promotion_about-us/wwaRL_index.aspx [accessed 20 January 2024.] 56 “Palmer Wants Trade With China, Soviet Bloc.” 57 Ibid. http://www.tobaccoassociatesinc.org/Promotion_about-us/wwaRL_index.aspx 33 The Johnson Administration pressed ahead. During the Summer of 1966, Johnson continued to tell the American public that he wanted to develop “peaceful cooperation” with Eastern Europe and the USSR and that he wanted to continue “building the bridges of friendship.”58 Corporations pressed ahead as well and worked with policymakers. In October 1966, executives from twenty-four American businesses took a tour of Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia. Time magazine sponsored the trip, which chartered the delegation’s private jet. Besides supporting the trip, Time hinted at which side of the red trade debate they fell. “The importance of the trip was enhanced by the Johnson Administration’s decision to liberalize trade with Eastern Europe,” the magazine reported. The delegation’s mission was to put together a report for administration officials about the future of continued financial and trade relations.59 To the Johnson Administration, the trade Palmer envisioned was not the treasonous betrayal of American troops seen by the store owner in High Point or Mothers’ Crusade. It was a method of weakening the Soviets.60 Congressmen like Lipscomb may have given strongly worded anti-communist speeches in Congress, but Johnson was a cold warrior, too. Though his tactics may have differed from those of his opponents across the aisle and detractors across the nation, his objective of winning the Cold War did not. Mothers’ Crusade, Peele, and conservative newspapers like Tocsin and Livewire were all efficient at spreading the word about liberalized trade with the East. But as loud as protests against East-West trade were, so too were those who favored it. Editorialists at Time, The Des Moines Register, Louisville Courier-Journal, and the 58 Mitchell Lerner. “‘Trying to Find the Guy Who Invited Them’: Lydon Johnson, Bridge Building, and the End of the Prague Spring.” Diplomatic History 32, no. 1 (2008): 87. 59 “24 U.S. Executives Visiting Red Bloc.” New York Times. October 21, 1966. Philip Morris Records; Master Settlement Agreement. 60 Simon Miles. “Envisioning Détente.” Diplomatic History 40, no. 4. (September 2016): 744. 34 New York Times were influential in denouncing Americans who protested against business with the East. American tobacco firms and associations such as Tobacco Associates, all of whom employed blue-collar Americans, consistently pursued new markets beyond the Iron Curtain. Despite the best efforts of those who fought against it, U.S. trade and foreign policy were moving in a decidedly new direction. A liberalized freer trade policy would continue. Bridge Building Johnson pushed forward with his trade policies and assured the USSR and its Eastern European allies that the US would go “step by step with them just as far as they are willing to advance” in improving relations and building trade.61 By late 1966, the policy seemed to be winning public approval. Johnson assured the press that he wasn’t abandoning deterrence, urging the US to let go of “old enmities” and striking a “healthy balance” between it and improved East-West relations.62 Many in the US, and beyond the Iron Curtain, approved of Johnson’s plan as a turning point toward reproachment.63 Policymakers had reason for optimism. Earlier in 1966, the US had been encouraged by its relationship with Bulgaria. Relations had greatly improved since the summer of 1964 when Bulgaria had expressed displeasure over the US's lack of “two-way trade.”64 Not that things had become affable. One airgram sent from the legation in Sofia to the Department of State described American personnel getting “manhandled” repeatedly.65 The escalation of fighting in Vietnam had infuriated Bulgarians, who launched assaults on the legation offices and displayed violent 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., 744-746. 63 Ibid. 64 Legation in Bulgaria to the Department of State, Airgram, Jan. 26, 1966, doc., 32 in FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVII, Eastern Europe, ed. James E. Miller (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996.) 65 Ibid. 35 anti-American propaganda. Angry Bulgarian citizens found pictures of coffins coming home from Vietnam, which glorified American death. The pictures were put on full display in the legation office windows.66 Despite this, expanded trade between East and West seemed to be working, slowly but surely; “cautious improvement,” American minister Nathaniel Davis called it.67 The violent images in office windows disappeared. Bulgaria showed interest in more cultural and technology exchanges. And American business and Bulgarian state monopolies struck deals – among the most significant objectives of bridge-building. A contract was signed to build a Coca-Cola plant, and an agreement was made with Standard Oil of Ohio. On the tobacco front, no American leaf was exported to Bulgaria. However, a multimillion-dollar deal was made with American Machine and Foundry to renovate multiple Bulgarian tobacco factories.68 RJ Reynolds was immersed in shaping public opinion. After the bad publicity surrounding the importation of Yugoslavian tobacco, the company began formulating ways to convince customers best that trade with the East would benefit all. The company conducted a study to gauge American attitudes about Yugoslavian tobacco. It wasn’t the first study undertaken concerning the imported leaf. RJ Reynolds previously found that most customers were unaware of business dealings with Yugoslavia. But what concerned the company was that most customers who were aware looked unfavorably upon the Yugoslavian imports. Now, RJ Reynolds worked to provide various kinds of “background information” to their customers.69 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Stuart J. “Yugoslavian Tobacco Attitude Study MRD#CR-67-29.” May 22, 1967. R.J. Reynolds Records; Master Settlement Agreement.” 36 Participants in the study were read one of five different versions of “background information.” All versions focused on four facts. Fact number one was that RJ Reynolds was hardly the only company importing Yugoslavian tobacco. Not only that, but the amount imported was a tiny sum. Fact number two: there was an organization called the Committee against Communist Trade that had been attacking RJ Reynolds for doing business with a nation that used its money to buy weapons for North Vietnam. Simply put, according to the committee, RJ Reynolds was contributing to US servicemembers killed in action. Fact number three asserted that the government, since the days of Eisenhower, had supported RJ Reynolds and confirmed that Yugoslavia did not send weapons to Vietnam. Fact number four was more of a warning; RJ Reynolds was considering legal action against the Committee Against Communist Trade.70 The Committee Against Communist Trade managed to grab the attention of RJ Reynolds and the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Based out of Miami Shores, Florida, the group led the boycott against RJ Reynolds. Operations were shadowy. Bowman Gray, RJ Reynold’s Chairman of the Board, mentioned in his 1967 annual report that the group surfaced in various spots around the country and used names of various American Legion posts despite being told to stop by the actual American Legion. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara sent the group a letter and explained that the Committee’s accusations that RJ Reynolds was indirectly aiding the enemy in Vietnam were “distortions or, at least, misconceptions.”71 At any rate, Version IV had the most favorable responses. Participants had numerous choices and picked favorable and unfavorable answers. In Version IV, RJ Reynolds noted that the United States Government “says that Yugoslavia is not a part of the communist Bloc and that 70 Ibid. 71 RJR; Galloway AH. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company Summary Report. Annual Meeting of Stockholders and First Quarter of 1967 (670000.) April 19, 1967. RJ Reynolds Records; Master Settlement Agreement. 37 Yugoslavia has not supported communist aggression.” The version shrewdly closed with an argument that RJ Reynolds was helping fight communism – “This trade helps keep Yugoslavia free from Russian control,” it bragged.72 Each version received plenty of unfavorable responses. Unfavorable participants commonly chose “We grow enough tobacco here/in US/don’t need their tobacco.” Another common choice stated, “I don’t like buying anything from communist countries.” But there were encouraging responses, too – encouraging not just for RJ Reynolds but also for policymakers. Many favorable responses chose “I’m for it if it’s helping the US/creating peaceful relations.” Many people chose versions indicating that if the government approved, they approved: “It’s ok if the Government supports this trade” was one. Yes, many citizen-cold warriors were vehemently against any trade with a communist state. But there were many Americans who, maybe, did not trust big tobacco companies but at least trusted the government and Johnson’s foreign policy. Many participants were in the middle. Of the four hundred people who responded, 153 provided favorable-only responses, and unfavorable-only responses clocked in at 146. The other 101 participants gave a mixture of answers. In any case, the study’s objective was not to figure out American ideology. It was how to spin information best.73 The debate continued, but the pursuit of importation and licensing deals with Iron Curtain countries quietly continued. By the Summer of 1967, Johnson was meeting with Soviet Premier Kosygin in New Jersey near the United Nations headquarters. While the meeting was not without tense moments – Kosygin was frustrated and contended that it was challenging to understand U.S. policy – Johnson felt it was successful overall. He admitted to Kosygin that U.S. policy was 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 38 sometimes poorly communicated. But the summit set a new tone for American-Soviet relations.74 Redefining an economic relationship was, after all, hard work. A “new tone” of relations between the superpowers did not mean agreements were reached in short order. The meeting between Johnson and Kosygin at Hollybush, New Jersey, may have been historic, but it led to no significant trade agreements. There were some questions about how much power and influence Kosygin even had. Shortly after the meeting in Hollybush, a reporter asked Johnson about “Mr. Kosygin and his place in the Soviet scheme of things.” Johnson tactfully held off on analysis of the Soviet government. But he did say diplomatically that Kosygin was a “very able exponent of [Soviet] viewpoint and a well-prepared speaker for Soviet interest.”75 No doubt, Johnson’s answer was politically safe. Yet trade with the USSR and its satellites seemed to be in sight. So, while the administration continued its trade endeavors, American tobacco companies, chiefly Philip Morris International but followed by RJ Reynolds, kept their eyes on Moscow. Chipping away at the Eastern Bloc, Philip Morris gained what historian Tricia Starks has called their “soft entry” into the Soviet Union.76 At the same time, in North Carolina, Tobacco Associates continued supporting President Johnson’s liberalized trade plans. Happily reporting that TA sold “substantial quantities of our flue-cured” to East Germany in 1966, John Palmer clarified in his 1967 annual report that his vision was of expanding future trade with the East. 74 Miles, “Envisioning Détente:” 746-749. Miles aptly notes that “the Cold War didn’t end in Glassboro, New Jersey.” He does argue that Sovietologists and historians, who have often been criticized for “not getting it right” or failing to predict future events in the Cold War, have been subject to unfair analysis. “This approach expects policy- makers and academics to see both the present and future, and ignores the fact that most turning points in the Cold War were highly contingent phenomena.” Miles argues that after Khrushchev’s ousting in 1964, Sovietologists who had early visions of détente “mostly got it right.” 75 “The President’s News Conference of August 18, 1967: Arms Shipments in Middle East.” in The Johnson Presidential Press Conferences, vol. 2. (New York: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises Inc., Publishers): 799-800. Media interest in Johnson’s discussions with Kosygin seemed to be limited. A reporter asked if the President and Premier came to an agreement about arms shipments in the Middle East and of the president’s assessment of the Kosygin’s role in the Soviet government—the majority of questions focused on proposed tax increases and Vietnam. 76 Starks, 175. 39 “Trade with East Germany is only one small step toward our ultimate goal of unfettered global trade in tobacco,” Palmer said. He called for an East-West trade bill allowing Eastern Bloc merchandise to enter the US at equal duty rates to Western European countries. “Only then can Eastern Bloc countries buy our tobacco in volume and pay for it,” Palmer concluded.77 TA hoped to broaden its exports to communist countries, while Philip Morris searched for factories to renovate and use beyond the Iron Curtain. The company was exploring potential sites to produce American blend cigarettes. In Yugoslavia, fourteen factories were examined. Philip Morris provided a report for each. There were problems with many of them. Obsolete machinery in some factories, such as in Zagreb, would require severe overhauls before producing at levels Philip Morris required. Factories in Sarajevo and Ljubljana were relatively modern but needed to be bigger to handle the envisioned operation. Factories in Vanja Luka, Novi Sad, Kumanova, Mostar, Zardar, Titograd, Vranje, and Rovinj could be shut down soon due to post- 1965 Yugoslavian economic reforms.78 American firms, including the seemingly ever-present TA who ran trade fair exhibits in Greenville and Wilson, North Carolina, in the same year, participated in the Leipzig International Trade Fair in East Germany in 1968. The fair gave TA the “added opportunity to contact tobacco officials from every country in that part of the world.”79 Once again, Palmer proudly announced that Tobacco Associates had exported over three million pounds of dry-weight leaf to East 77 John Palmer, Tobacco Associates. Tobacco Associates Inc. Annual Report. March 7, 1967. Council for Tobacco Research Records; Master Settlement Agreement: 6. According to “Exports of U.S. Tobacco By Types and Countries, 1966” on page 12 of TA’s annual report, East Germany was the only country beyond the Iron Curtain that purchased from TA. 78 R. Jones. “Possible Factories in Yugoslavia Where American Blend Cigarettes Could Be Manufactured.” May 1, 1967. Philip Morris Records; Master Settlement Agreement. Jones provided a report for fourteen factories. He bunched some of the factories, such as the ones he believed would be closed soon. His report included an analysis of the primary, making, and packaging departments and a general overview. According to Jones, production in the smaller factories likely to be shut down would be consolidated in Nis, Prilep, and Skopje. 79 John Palmer, Tobacco Associates. Tobacco Associates Inc. Annual Report. March 7, 1967. Council for Tobacco Research Records; Master Settlement Agreement: 3-4. 40 Germany. He admitted that the three million pounds in and of itself were not very much but added that “the potential is of great significance.”80 TA’s position on red trade remained consistent. “We look to the day when political and trade relations between the United States, East Germany, and other Eastern European countries will be normalized and when they will be able to buy our tobacco in impressive quantities.”81 However, questions surrounded the future of LBJ’s trade visions with the EEC. In late March, Johnson announced he would not seek or accept the Democratic nomination for President.”82 Lame duck status did not stop his push for liberalized trade with Eastern Europe. But by the waning days of his presidency, full of pressure and questions surrounding the war in Vietnam, the future of bridge-building and liberalized trade was unknown. Shortly before Nixon’s election in November, Johnson was asked if he planned to travel to Europe for a summit meeting with the Soviets. Johnson put a bit of a damper on the prospect. He dismissed the question by saying reports of his desire to travel were greatly exaggerated and that he didn’t “see the trip in the offing.”83 Johnson may have been done traveling, but industrialists and agricultural specialists were not. In June, a farming trade mission, which included TA’s John Palmer, left for Eastern Europe. The mission explored Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The delegation was warmly received everywhere it went, and in Palmer’s words, “there was an unconcealed eagerness to do business.”84 But the missions seemed to be stagnating. Goodwill, 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 C-SPAN, “Reel American Preview: LBJ Announces He Won’t Run 3/31/68.” YouTube, video file, 1:50. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJeLoMCF6Jo 83 “The President’s News Conference of September 6, 1968: Reports of Possible European Summit Meeting.” in The Johnson Presidential Press Conferences, vol. 2. (New York: Earl M. Coleman Enterprises Inc., Publishers): 980. 84 John Palmer, Tobacco Associates. “Tobacco Associates Inc. Annual Report.” February 5, 1969. Council for Tobacco Research Records; Master Settlement Agreement: 3-4. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJeLoMCF6Jo 41 cultural, technological, and agricultural exchanges were good. However, no new trade agreements eased barriers between the East and the West. Palmer was frustrated by high tariffs. If a country did not have Most Favored Nation status (MFN,) Bulgaria, for example, then the duty rate for its imports was 35 cents. An MFN country’s imports sat at 12 cents.85 Two months after the agricultural trade mission visited Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, along with four of its Warsaw Pact allies, invaded Czechoslovakia in response to the Prague Spring. Now, there was another obstacle to liberalized trade. Palmer recognized the damage brought on by the invasion and wrote in TA’s 1969 annual report that it “postponed even more indefinitely the normalization of economic and political relations between the East and the West.”86 On November 5th, 1968, Richard Nixon won the presidency. After taking a call from a conceding Hubert Humphrey at 11:30, he met supporters in the ballroom at the Waldorf-Astoria. “Having lost a close one eight years ago and having won a close one this year, I can say this – winning’s a lot more fun,” he triumphantly announced to the eruption of cheers.87 The following day, the president-elect and his family left for some post-election relaxation in Key Biscayne. But after the five-day trip, Nixon flew back to New York City. A few days later, he met with Johnson at the White House to discuss the transition. But his first order of business was to put together an administration. The future of trade with the EEC remained to be seen.88 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Richard Nixon. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. (New York: Grosset and Dunlap: 1978.): 334-336. 88 Ibid. 42 Conclusion Nineteen sixty-four saw uncertainty in the tobacco industry. Health concerns, covered by American media, raised doubts that American tobacco companies could continue turning a profit. At the same time, early cultural exchanges between the US and USSR appeared to be little more than human interest stories. But by the time Johnson left office in 1969, trade with the EEC was growing and did not appear to cease anytime soon. To be sure, questions surrounded the new administration concerning the direction of foreign policy and trade. Rapid reform could and would not happen due to ongoing international events – the Vietnam War and the suppression of the Prague Spring. But the perseverance of large American companies such as Coca-Cola, Standard Oil, Philip Morris, and R.J. Reynolds, who struck or sought lucrative deals in the East meant that a new administration was unlikely to dismantle existing trade practices. Despite the lack of blockbuster trade deals and the continued efforts of Cold Warrior citizens and congressmen, American tobacco growers and companies were the closest to selling leaf and cigarettes in the East, as they had been during the entire Cold War. Liberalized trade policies remained intact. Public opinion was shifting, albeit not dramatically. During the 1960s the tobacco industry faced new health and image problems in the United States. Nevertheless, the industry continued to push for new markets and set its sights beyond the Iron Curtain. In 1964, these markets seemed barely attainable. Though still distant in 1968, the growing potential for a significant and lucrative red tobacco trade began to emerge. Chapter 2 1969-1973: Tobacco Détente Perseveres “We are entering a period when tariff and non-tariff walls between imaginary lines of East, West, North, South should start tumbling down,” said Joseph Williams, who succeeded John Palmer as president of Tobacco Associates (TA.) “The United States should follow the lead of Europe and reestablish full economic and political relationships with Russia and Eastern Europe,” he added in his 1973 annual address, delivered at Raleigh’s Sir Walter Hotel.1 Williams was certainly bullish a