DD
m3 y.
James I. Martin. FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES: PRINCE PHILIPP
ZU EULENBURG AND WILLIAM II OF GERMANY. (Under the direction
of Loren Campion) Department of History, December 1980.
Philipp zu Eulenburg and Emperor William II of Germany
shared a relationship of both a personal and political
nature. From their initial meeting in 1886 for two decades
both men derived important benefits from their association.
On the one hand, Eulenburg provided William with a companion-
ship which had never been afforded him previously by those
around him. Simultaneously the Emperor provided the politi-
cally ambitious Eulenburg with opportunities for increasing
the influence of himself and his friends, particularly Baron
Friedrich von Holstein of the German Foreign Office. It was
in this second area that the true historical significance of
the relationship lay.
Eulenburg's influence did not really come into its own
until the Bismarck chancellorship crisis of 1888-1890. In
this situation Eulenburg established himself as the inter-
mediary between William and Friedrich von Holstein, Holstein,
by enlisting Eulenburg on opposing Bismarck's anti-Socialist
and anti-labor legislation, and concessions to Russia, helped
to create an environment in which only a minor impetus, in
this case Bismarck's use of the Prussian Cabinet Order of
1852, which required officials of the Ministry of State on
official business to consult with the Prussian Minister
President before confronting the Prussian King, could sever
the ties between Kaiser and Chancellor.
Eulenburg continued his intermediary's role during the
regimes of Chancellors Leo von Caprivi and Chlodwig zu
Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst. Personal ambition and political
expediency caused him to forego his conservative ideological
concerns and usually cooperate with Holstein in maintaining
the Kaiser's support for the chancellors' governments.
Accomplishing this latter goal often proved difficult, for
William possessed adamant conservative convictions and it
required constant persuasion from Eulenburg as well as Hoi-
stein to lead him to modify his stance on such Reichstag
issues as the Big Army Bill (1891-1893),the Zedlitz School
Bill (1892), and the military courts-martial controversy
(1896-1897). Similarly, William's desire to establish a
"personal regime" led him into conflict with his chancellors.
Finally, Eulenburg occasionally collaborated with William
in contravention of Holstein's aims--towards the end of
better serving the interests of family and friends.
The appointment of Bernhard von Bülow as German Foreign
Secretary in 1897 marked the apex of Eulenburg's influence
at the Imperial court. Billow obtained his post through Eulen-
burg's assistance, but once appointed, however, the flatter-
ing, conniving intriguist proceeded to usurp Eulenburg's
position as the Kaiser's chief confidant. Also, as advancing
middle-age and increasing illnesses set in, Eulenburg grew
increasingly critical of tile Emperor, causing the latter to
depend more than ever on Bülow and to steer his own course.
Holstein received his death blow in 1906, when he was caused
to leave the Foreign Office because of his supposed con¬
cessions to France during the Moroccan crisis of 1905.
Almost psychotically paranoid, Holstein, rather than allying
himself with a similarly rejected Eulenburg, chose to blame
the latter for his own fall, and out of revenge inaugurated
a press campaign, the Zukunft affair, which eventually
resulted in Eulenburg's total ouster from the Imperial circle.
The Kaiser never again associated with his older friend,
demonstrating most thoroughly the true nature of the relation¬
ship--an opportunistic association which had lost its reason
for existing after one party failed to continue fulfilling
his role in the association.
X
FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES:
PRINCE PHILIPP ZU EULENBURG AND
WILLIAM II OF GERMANY
>
A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of History
East Carolina University
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in History
by
James I. Martin
II
December 1980
9. Y. YOTNUT. LIBRARY
EAST CAROLINA UNIVERSITY
FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES:
PRINCE PHILIPP ZU EULENBURG
AND WILLIAM II OF GERMANY
by
James I. Martin
APPROVED BY:
\
DIRECTOR OF THESIS v/v v k\ i
Loren K. Campion /
!?-
CHAIRMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
U- ' i
/L‘ tiV'--' >/>iA—
/ Fred D. Ragan
/
DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
J^sephGTToyëtt^^
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to thank my adviser, Dr. Loren Campion, for his
efforts in overseeing the successful completion of the
thesis. Dr. Carolyn Bolt, Dr. Kathleen Dunlop, and Dr.
Herbert Rothfeder also deserve my gratitude, as each con-
tributed suggestions which significantly improved the
quality of my writing. I would like to extend my apprécia-
tion also to Dr. Joseph Steelman. It was he who first
acquainted me with the History Department at East Carolina
University and subsequently helped further my academic
career.
Several other individuals assisted me. Mrs. Agnes W.
Jones uncomplainingly typed my term papers, as well as
this thesis, and always did an outstanding job. My parents,
Mr. and Mrs. Roger E. Martin, gave me generous support,
financial and otherwise, during my years at Duke University
and East Carolina. Finally, my wife Linda sacrificed much
during our courtship in order that I might complete my
master's degree. To all of the people who encouraged me,
God bless you.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
Chapter
I. THE INCEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF EULENBURG'S
FRIENDSHIP WITH WILLIAM II 11
II. EULENBURG AND BISMARCK'S DISMISSAL, 1886-1890. . 77
Ill. EULENBURG AND THE CAPRIVI ERA, 1890-1894 . . 109
IV. EULENBURG AND THE HOHENLOHE ERA 175
V. EULENBURG'S TWILIGHT AFTER 1897 , AND EPILOGUE. . 206
SELECTIVELY ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 251
INTRODUCTION
In May of 1886, two men began a friendship which in-
fluenced the course of German history for the next twenty
years. The older man, Count Philipp zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld,
was a sentimental, artistically-inclined Prussian diplomat
of thirty-nine. The younger was twenty-seven-year-old Prince
William, the future Kaiser William II, grandson of the still
living and reigning William I of Germany, and the possessor
of a nervous, erratic, arrogant personality which contrasted
with that of his new boon companion. Meeting at a hunting
party, the two had little reason to imagine that their shoot-
ing forays and fireside fraternization during its course
would lead to a relationship of great political significance
--one which would steer the destinies of a decade. Although
in the company of others, the new friends set themselves
apart from them, and from this initial meeting of souls,
Philipp emerged as William's chief confidant for many years
to come. So great became Eulenburg's impact, that from 1886
to 1897 he undoubtedly exercised greater influence over
William's decision-making processes than any other figure of
the same era.
A large part of Eulenburg's rise can be attributed to
the historical framework in which his friendship with William
developed. From being a conglomerate of divided principal-
ities, Germany had recently become a unified power, the major
2
one on the continent of Europe hy 1914. Even with unifica-
tion, however, there were many in Germany who still opposed
the idea of the nation-state, especially with Prussia at its
helm. The governmental structure of the Empire, an uneasy
compromise between absolutism and constitutionalism, caused
dissension. When, in 1886, the future Emperor and Eulenburg
went beyond the basis of nodding acquaintanceship they al-
ready had had for many years, Germany was a union of eighteen
states and one administrative territory, the "Reichsland" of
conquered Alsace and Lorraine. The federal government pos-
sessed an executive branch comprising the Emperor and his
Chancellor and their staffs; also a legislative Federal Coun¬
cil, the Bundesrat, composed of delegates from the separate
states; and a national popular representative body with legis-
lative powers, the Reichstag. To the detriment of the demo-
cratic process, the aristocratic Bundesrat could veto legisla-
tion passed by the Reichstag. The Reichstag, however, pos-
sessed some power, as the Chancellor, by constitutional pro¬
vision, needed the approval of the lower house to carry out
his legislative programs.'*'
The key figure of the Empire, in keeping with Germany's
?*"Ernst Deuerlein, ed., Die Gründung des Deutschen Rei-
ches 1870/71 in Augenzeugenberichten (Düsseldorf : Karl Rauch,
1970), 386-392; C.G. Bruns, "Hohenzollern, Preussen, Deut-
schland, Berlin," in Hans Joachim Schoeps, Per Weg ins Deuts-
che:. Kaiserreich (Berlin: Propylaen, 1970), 230; Ernest J.
Passant, A Short History of Germany, 1815-1945 (Cambridge,
England: University Press, 1959), 88-90.
3
monarchical traditions, was the Kaiser or Emperor, and it
was because of this that Eulenburg could emerge as such a
significant figure in German politics. The Kaiser domi-
nated foreign policy, commanded all armed forces in wartime,
and could hire and fire all federal ("Imperial") officials
at will, With him lay the final interpretation of the Con-
stitution.2 The Chancellor, buttressed by a closely-knit,
entrenched ruling class, acted as the Emperor's chief
agent. Under the aged William I, Chancellor Otto von Bis-
marck of course dominated the scene. With the accession of
William II, however, Bismarck assumed a position of lesser
significance in the face of a dynamic, aggressive, young
monarch, and future Reichskanzlers did likewise.
As previously mentioned, the Chancellor required the
backing of the Reichstag in order to govern effectively.
This support had to be garnered among the six major Reichstag
parties. The Conservatives, made up primarily of anti-revo-
lutionary, agrarian Junkers (the Prussian equivalent of
England's landed gentry) usually supported Bismarck. The
Free Conservatives, who represented both agrarian and indus-
trial interests, gave undeviating support to Bismarck's
national policies, and provided many officials for his min-
istries. Less dependable, from Bismarck's point of view,
2F„ ranz Herre, Anno 70/71; Ein Krieg, ein Reich, ein
Kaiser (Berlin: Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1970), 254 ; Gordon
Craig, Germany, 1866-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1978), 39-40, hereinafter cited as Craig, Germany.
4
were the National Liberals, bourgeois businessmen for the
most part, who shared the characteristics of liberal party
members in other nations, favoring centralization, laissez-
faire economics, and secularized education. The Center or
Catholic party, founded in 1870 to guarantee the rights of
Catholics in predominantly Protestant Prussia, reflected a
3
large cross-section of interests. Because of the party's
size, members of the Center were courted ardently by both
conservatives and liberals in their attempts to swing the
Reichstag vote their way. To the political left of the Cen-
ter were the Progressives, who until 1866 had been one with
the National Liberals as the Prussian Progressive Party.
While sharing most of the National Liberals' economic views,
the Progressives, mainly middle-class businessmen, more
fervently advocated strong parliamentary government. Unlike
their sister party, the Progressives also vociferously
criticized the Bismarck government and the influence of the
4
military. Of the five parties mentioned, the National
^Rudolf Lili, "Die deutschen Katholiken und Bismarcks
Reichsgründung," Reichsgründung 1870/71: Tatsachen, Kate-
gorien, Interpretationen, ed. Theodor Schuler and Ernst Deu-
erlein (Stuttgart: Seewald, 1970), 309, hereinafter cited as
Schuler, Reichsgründung 1870/71.
4
Oswald Hauser, "Pole und Polen im Deutschen Reich,"
Schuler, Reichsgründung 1370/71, 29; Arthur Rosenberg, Die
Entstehung der deutschen Republik, 1871-1918 (Berlin: Ernst
Rowohlt Verlag, 1928), 23-27; Michael Balfour, The Kaiser and
His Times (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1964), 31-38, hereinafter
cited as Balfour, Kaiser.
5
Liberals had the largest number of seats in the Reichstag
during most of the Bismarck period (1871-1890).
There existed a sixth party in the Reichstag, much to
the chagrin of the Prussian aristocracy in particular and
the German nobility in general, This was the Social Demo-
cratic Party, which until after 1890 remained more or less
doctrinaire Marxist in orientation. Originally die-hard
advocates of the "workers' revolution," the Social Democrats,
with the advent of Edward Bernstein's revisionism during the
1890's, became increasingly pragmatic, concerned more with
improving the working conditions of the petty bourgeoisie
and artisans than with revolutionary dogma. Marxist ideology
soon assumed a negligible position in the Social Democratic
political philosophy. In addition to the Social Democrats^
there were the parties of the Poles, Danes, French, and even
anti-Semites, none of whom ever exercised a marked influence
over the Reichstag. In the Reichstag one could thus observe
a number of dichotomies—Protestant and Catholic, Teuton
and Slav, Junker and industrialist. Nowhere more than in
this body was the diversity of "the Germans" so apparent.
Materialism and industrial expansion characterized the
period following the war of 1870-1871 with France, molding
the attitudes of government and people. The concession by
France of mineral-rich Alsace-Lorraine, the five-billion-
franc French war indemnity, expanding transportation system—
all contributed to an economic boom during the early 1870's,
6
a decade before Eulenburg came to matter in Germany. When
the bubble burst in 1873, a conservative commercial policy
came into being, emphasizing high tariffs and lessened spec-
ulation. The economic depression encouraged anti-Semitism,
an attitude somewhat reflected in the correspondence that
grew between Eulenburg and William, Chancellor von Bismarck
also took advantage of growing anti-liberal sentiment to re-
new his old battles with the Catholic Center and Socialists.
Such conflicts, needless to say, left their legacy to the
5
reign of William II as well.
The short-lived depression of the 1870's did not keep
Germany from asserting herself in foreign affairs and helping
to create the international political environment in which
Eulenburg and William II would be actors. Bismarck, the
quintessential diplomat, abandoned his "blood and iron"
imperialism and began to pursue a more peaceful policy abroad.
The Iron Chancellor sought a union of Europe's conservative
monarchs against the forces of social subversion. To this
end, he helped formulate an alliance between Germany, Austria-
Hungary, and Russia in 1873, and sponsored the Congress of
Berlin in 1878 in order to maintain a power balance between
these three nations. The Chancellor found the Russians diffi-
cult collaborators, however, and,by 1879, the three-power
5
Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegs-
zielpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18 (Düssel-
dorf: Droste Verlag, 1962), 16-17, hereinafter cited as
Fischer, Griff . . . Welt.
7
alliance had ceased to exist. Then, in 1882, in response
to the French seizure of Tunis, Bismarck arranged the so-
called Triple Alliance between Italy, Austria-Hungary, and
„Germany. 6 In order further to contain the French, especial-
ly under the revenge-minded Boulanger government, Bismarck
in 1887 sponsored a military bill to increase the number of
German troops by 41,000, while simultaneously concluding a
secret treaty with Russia in order to prevent that nation
from courting Germany's restless western neighbor. An Anglo-
Italian agreement of the same year indirectly made England a
party in the Triple Alliance and consequently prevented
7
Russia from expanding her influence into Eastern Europe.
Only Bismarck could have successfully administered such a
conglomerate of treaties.
A brilliant manipulator of foreign policy, he encoun-
tered less success in politics at home, and the contro-
versies existing during his tenure continued afterwards dur-
ing the association between William and Eulenburg. The
Social Democrats, a thorn in Bismarck's side, involuntarily
contributed to his policy-making decisions. Following an
unsuccessful assassination attempt on the life of Kaiser
g
George W.F. Hallgarten, Imperialismus vor 1914; Die
sozialogischen Grundlagen der Aussenpolitik europâischer
Grossmâchte vor dem ersten Weltkrieg (München: C.H. Beck7
1963), I, 201-206, hereinafter cited as Hallgarten, Imper-
ialismus; George P. Gooch, Germany (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1925), 39.
7
Hallgarten, Imperialismus, I, 262-263.
8
William I in June 1878, it hecame increasingly popular to
blame society's ills on the Socialists. Thus Bismarck's
anti-Socialist law of 1878 received widespread acceptance
and simultaneously stifled the trade union movement for a
decade. Yet Bismarck also wished to demonstrate that the
Reich could offer the people more than could the Social
Democrats, and to this end initiated plans for social legis-
lation, including sickness and disability insurance, Never-
theless, the Socialist movement continued to grow until by
1912 the Social Democrats held the largest number of seats
8
in the Reichstag.
Other areas of controversy also existed during Bis¬
marck's chancellorship, and specifically in the early years
of Eulenburg's and Prince William's friendship. During the
administration of the Chancellor's reactionary Minister of
the Interior, Robert von Puttkamer, various members of the
civil service sympathetic toward liberal movements were de-
noted or expelled, including such notables as War Ministers
A.K.G. Kameke and Albrecht von Stosch. Such actions led to
the formation of such groups as the German Free Thought
party, a liberal organization which counted among its adher-
ents the son of William I, Crown Prince Frederick, On the
other hand, the National Liberals, eager to stay in the
Chancellor's good graces, moved to the right and Bismarck
8
Fischer, Griff , . . Welt, 17; Geoffrey Barraclough,
The Origins of Modern Germany (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), 426.
9
was able to keep a hold on the Reichstag only through a
coalition of Conservatives, Free Conservatives, and Nation-
al Liberals. German unity, already precarious at the Em-
pire's founding, would never exist in a cohesive form
until the outbreak of the First World War.
Within this complex, uncertain society, however, in
terms of socio-political ideology there existed a stable
group, the Prussian Junker aristocracy, the class to which
Eulenburg and Bismarck both belonged. Not necessarily
wealthy, the stereotype Junker was a large landowner. At
the beginning of the 1870's, this group comprised a con-
siderable portion of the German diplomatic corps, and
although their influence in this area was declining, they
remained the dominant class from which the Emperor made his
9
appointments and found his political associates. Had
Eulenburg not been a Junker, he would probably never have
had the opportunity to associate with the Kaiser on the level
that came to be the case. Yet the foundations of the rela-
tionship between Eulenburg and William involved far more com-
plex factors than mere class compatibility, and it is con-
sequently the purpose of this study to examine the relation-
ship between the two men—their backgrounds, mutai personal
friendship, political actions—and to illuminate the
9
For a study of the German diplomatic corps , see Lamar
Cecil, The German Diplomatic Service, 1871-1914 (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), hereinafter cited
as Cecil, German Diplomatic Service.
10
influence of Philipp zu Eulenburg upon the social and polit-
ical scene in Wilhelmine Germany.
CHAPTER I
THE INCEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF
EULENBURG'S FRIENDSHIP WITH WILLIAM II
The early, formative experiences of Philipp zu Eulenburg
and William contrasted markedly. Eulenburg, the older of the
two, matured in the traditional manner of the Prussian
aristocracy, having a youth without undue challenge or inten-
sive competition with his age peers. William, by contrast,
developed in an extremely pressured environment, one domi-
nated by his mother and oppressive tutors. The respective
childhoods of the two men would not but have fostered many
of the traits which could later characterize their person-
alities, and thus determine the character of their relation-
ship.
Philipp Alexander Carl Botho zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld was
born in Kfinigsberg, East Prussia, the son of Philipp Conrad
zu Eulenburg, a lieutenant in the Third Prussian Curassiers.
The Eulenburg lineage extended back to 1170, when the knight
Conrad of Hilburg (the name later evolved into Ileburg,
Eilenburg, and finally Eulenburg) acquired his manorial
estates. The family possessed a strong military tradition.
Eulenburgs had fought at Tannenberg in 1410, served as
officers in seventeenth-century Brandenburg, and soldiered
in the Seven Years' War and in the Napoleonic campaigns.
Philipp Conrad, heir to this tradition, figured as the very
embodiment of the militaristic Junker. After completing his
12
education, he joined the Prussian infantry, distinguishing
himself by aiding in the suppression of the Kônigsberg up-
risings of 1848. In 1846 Philipp Conrad married Alexandrine
von Rothkirch, a Silesian lady of considerable artistic
talents and a grandniece of the Hertefelds, whose estate,
Liebenberg, would eventually come into her possession. A
year after their marriage, Philipp zu Eulenburg came into
the world, on February 22, 1847. ^
Contrasting influences shaped Eulenburg's character as
he grew up. The father, a harsh disciplinarian, permitted
his son to have only a select group of companions, mainly
the children of other East Elbian nobles. The boy cultivated
relationships with his cousins, and also counted the scions
of the Dohna family among his friends. The latter possessed
an estate at Prfikelwitz which Eulenburg frequented during
his youth and later, when he became William's companion. By
contrast, Eulenburg's mother, a gentle person of diversified
interests, imbued her son with an appreciation of the esthet-
ic. Alexandrine von Rothkirch, an accomplished painter and
pianist, especially encouraged those talents in her son.
Like her husband, the mother came from a military tradition,
while her people's affinity for the arts was atypical of the
nineteenth-century Prussian aristocracy. Eulenburg's
Reinhold Conrad Muschler, Philipp zu Eulenburg , sein
Leben und seine Zeit (Leipzig: Wilhelm Grunow, 1930) , 1-25.
Hereinafter cited as Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben.
13
maternal grandfather, a volunteer rifleman during the Napo¬
leonic campaigns, had received both the Iron Cross and the
Russian Cross of St. George for his accomplishments. None-
theless he possessed a pacific temperament, preferring the
2
life of a gentleman farmer to that of a soldier. Young
Philipp enjoyed the old man's company immensely, mainly be-
cause of the great freedom that the latter allowed him when
3
the boy visited his Silesian estate. Thus, having this
escape from his father's authoritarianism, Eulenburg seems
to have emerged relatively unscathed by adverse parental
influences--in sharp contrast to his future friend Prince
William.
In 1853, Philipp Conrad moved his family to Berlin,
where the father assumed the position of personal adjutant
to Field Marshal General Friedrich von Wrangel (1784-1877)
who later won fame in the Danish War of 1864. The younger
Eulenburg made friends with the Field Marshal's son, Gustav,
whom he characterized as a loquacious fellow and a practical
joker.^ Young Philipp also made close acquaintanceship with
Eberhard zu Dohna-Schlobittenr a Junker like himself. He
2
Johannes Haller, Aus dem Leben des Fürsten Philipp zu
Eulenburg-Hertefeld, 1st ed « r (Berlin: Gebrüder Paetel,
1924), 5, hereinafter cited as Haller, Aus dem Leben; Musch-
1er, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 35; Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 3.
3
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 35.
4
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 26; Eulenburg, Aus
50 Jahren, 13-23.
14
developed into a rangy, delicate child, often stricken with
various lung and nervous disorders. The city environment
did not appeal to him. Nevertheless, there were happy
times during this period. The Eulenburgs joined the intel-
lectual circles of Berlin society, thus allowing young
Philipp to come into contact with notables such as the
5
painter Gustav Richer. Also, his mother's talented rela-
tives often visited Berlin. Alexandrine and her brother,
an especially versatile pair, often entertained their
families by playing the piano duettes.^ Such activity,
however, apparently created rifts in the Eulenburg house-
hold. Philipp Conrad saw little purpose in these frivolous
entertainments and frowned upon his son's love of the arts.
Young Philipp, it appears, came to resent strongly his
father's lack of cultural appreciation. Looking back, he
saw him as a man without feeling, asserting that, "Just as
unflinchingly as he stood in this Prussianism, so unflinch-
ingly should it have developed in me, in whose manner so much
emotion lay hidden.
Despite this contumaciousness, however, Philipp zu Eu-
lenburg still sought to win the old soldier's approval, The
future course of his life, oriented around a technical
military education, would demonstrate this desire.
^Muschler, Eulenburg . . ? Leben, 30.
^Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 30.
7
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 35.
15
In October 1859, the twelve-year-old Eulenburg entered
the French Gymnasium in Berlin, where he endured a year of
rigorous military training before leaving on account of
illness. While convalescing at home, the boy began to de-
velop his interest in diplomatic affairs. His uncle, Fried-
rich (Fritz) zu Eulenburg served as a Prussian emissary in
the Far East and Philipp read government dispatches dealing
8
with his activities in China and Japan. The youth also
studied with interest the various reports his father
received from the military. Through such sources, Philipp
became increasingly aware of Prussia's emergence as a major
power—a nation which would come to dominate the German
states. The boy, like so many of his contemporaries, de-
veloped an acute sense of patriotism, and his prejudices
against the military lessened. At the age of sixteen,
Philipp enrolled at the Vitzthumsches Gymnasium at Dresden.
A popular and academically competent student, he remained
there until 1866, when the Austrian War gave him the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate his military skills.
Eulenburg's military career, though hardly heroic,
deserves mention from the perspective that this man, raised
by a gentle mother and despising the Prussian affinity for
war, could shackle his prejudices and perform quite well as
a soldier. At the age of nineteen, Eulenburg enlisted in
8
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 41; Eulenburg, Aus
50 Jahren, 6.
16
the Prussian forces against Austria. Though he participated
in little, if any, actual fighting during the seven-weeks'
conflict, he emerged from this experience a far more robust
and confident individual than when he entered. More impor-
tant, the youth felt that he was beginning to win his
father's approval, as he told the older man that military
life made him feel "fit as a fish in water." He also con-
fessed his pride in being a Prussian when corresponding with
9
Philipp Conrad. The further activities of the young
Eulenburg would continue to demonstrate a desire to win his
father's pride.
In 1867, Philipp zu Eulenburg, not content to remain a
mere foot soldier, passed the Fâhnrichsexamen (qualifying
examinations for officers' training) and entered the elite
Garde du Corps. Later that year he enrolled at the War
Academy at Cassel. Here he met Kuno von Moltke, future City
Commandant of Berlin. Like Eulenburg, Moltke was an
esthete, a romantic sharing the other young officer's fond-
ness for musical composition and performance. The two
developed a close friendship, spending their free hours at
local beer taverns, flirting with girls, conversing, and
writing ballads.1^ The friendship continued for the next
forty years. Eulenburg and Moltke would accompany Emperor
9
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 52.
10
Muschler, Eulenburg . , . Leben, 56 ; Eulenburg, Aus
50 Jahren, 49.
17
William II on his North Sea pleasure voyages, and both one
day would be targets of allegations of homosexuality during
the notorious Zukunft Affair.
In spite of this affinity for beer halls, Eulenburg
performed well at Cassel, passed his examinations with ease,
and was commissioned in the "Emperor's favorite" company of
the Garde du Corps at the age of twenty. After receiving
his commission, Eulenburg continued his military training.
Apparently the future diplomat found the instruction boring
and unchallenging as he confided to his mother that he spent
11
every free moment at the piano or at the easel. Eulenburg
also attended balls and other social events during his years
in the military, meeting such celebrities as Vincent Bene-
detti, French minister to Berlin, and Alfred von Waldersee,
later Chief of the German General Staff. Eulenburg and the
latter shared an interest in music, and the two on occasion
12
sang in a quartet. And Eulenburg always had time for
charming young ladies.
In the summer of 1869, an event occurred which would
later bring a measure of stability to Eulenburg's existence.
The young soldier, vacationing at Kreuznach, had spent most
of his time at the gaming table until August of that year,
when he met Countess Augusta Sandels at the resort. This
11
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 60.
12
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 62.
18
beautiful and intelligent woman, the daughter of the
Swedish Count August Sandels, High Court Marshal to King
Oscar II, immediately captivated the young Eulenburg.
Augusta, unlike Philipp, did not come from a predominantly
military background. Although her grandfather had been one
of Sweden's foremost Napoleonic-era generals, her lineage
13
also included clergymen and professors. The young count-
ess took after her more intellectual forebears, possessing
14
talents in the arts, especially painting. Her esthetic
interests, combined with a charming appearance and attractive
personality, made Augusta Sandels seem an ideal match to
Philipp. During the month of September, 1869, the two dined
frequently together and shared their common love of Nordic
balladry. The initial summer romance, however, was cut
short by Eulenburg's recall to Berlin in the fall of
1869 .
With the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in July
1870, Eulenburg again sought the opportunity to demonstrate
his military capabilities. After passing a series of
examinations and receiving a recommendation from his Uncle
"Fritz," the young guardsman went to France, where he parti-
15
cipated in the march on Paris. After the capitulation of
13
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 64; Haller, Aus dem
Leben, 6.
14
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 6.
15
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 69-71.
19
that city on January 27, 1871, Eulenburg reaped the fruits
of victory, receiving both an Iron Cross and appointment as
adjutant to the Governor-General of Alsace-Lorraine. Yet
these accomplishments stood as nothing compared to the sat-
isfaction Eulenburg received from knowing that his father
now looked favorably upon him because he had continued the
family's supposedly glorious military tradition. Reflect-
ing on his good fortune, Eulenburg recalled the past con-
flicts between his artistic mother, his soldier father, and
himself. His winning the Iron Cross gave the father new
hope that the son might come to amount to something, and it
became the elder Eulenburg's wish that his son should now
16
enter the diplomatic service. Philipp, however, while he
shared this latter desire, decided to postpone seeking a
foreign-service post for a few years. In the fall of 1871,
he resigned his army commission and began travelling exten-
17
sively throughout Europe and the Middle East.
Eulenburg lived an interesting though hardly productive
life during the years 1871-1877. His Near East sojourn in-
eluded stops at Constantinople, Beirut, Damascus, and
Jerusalem. At Damascus Eulenburg met Abd elKadr, who would
later lead Algeria against France during the closing decades
16
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 75; Eulenburg, Aus 50
Jahren, 49.
17
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 75; Eulenburg, Aus 50
Jahren, 49.
20
of the nineteenth century. Eulenburg also spent a month in
Cairo with his friend Count Eberhard zu Dohna; from there
the two travelled to Egypt, spending time in Alexandria.
Returning to Germany in March 1872, Eulenburg settled in
Leipzig, where he spent much time visiting museums and
engaging in other cultural pursuits. In March 1873, he
journeyed to Italy, on the way visiting Vienna, and then in
Italy, lingered in Bologna, Florence, Rome, and Naples. The
museums of the last city fascinated the young Prussian
nobleman. After touring Italy, Eulenburg then returned to
Germany by way of Switzerland and then back to Liebenberg,
18
where a typhoid attack laid him low soon after his return.
After two years of this seemingly directionless exist-
ence, Eulenburg decided to study law. He enrolled at the
University of Strasbourg, where, under the tutelage of the
jurist Paul Kayser, he acquired a considerable knowledge of
jurisprudence. One of Eulenburg's associates at Strasbourg
was Alfred von Bülow, the brother of the future Reichskanz-
19
1er. Eulenburg completed his legal studies with ease,
passed his examinations, and graduated magna cum laude in
1875. Immediately after finishing his legal training, Eulen-
burg travelled to Stockholm, where he managed to win the
hand of Augusta Sandels, whom he had been seeing periodically
18
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 81-85.
19
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 88.
21
ever since they became acquainted. On November 26, 1875,
the two were married in St. James Church in the Swedish
20
capital.
During the early years of their marriage, the Eulen-
burgs lived a life without serious restrictions, travelling
as they pleased, and drawing upon an independent income.
After their wedding, the couple journeyed to Dresden,
Weimar, Heidelberg, and Frankfurt, terminating their honey¬
moon trip in Strasbourg. They spent many hours painting and
making music. Unlike other members of Eulenburg's family,
Augusta appreciated her husband's esthetic talents and
encouraged him to pursue his activities. During 1876, the
couple travelled to Naples and Rome, where they attended the
annual carnivals. Returning home to Germany, Eulenburg took
a government post as a clerk for local military operations,
a relatively undemanding position which offered ample
21
opportunity for leisure, In November 1976, Augusta gave
birth to a "young Nero"—Philipp Karl Botho Wend zu Eulenburg.
This leisurely existence ended in 1877, when Uncle
"Fritz" zu Eulenburg, who had influence with the Bismarcks,
secured a minor position in the German diplomatic service
for his nephew. Philipp, Augusta, and their small son
20
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 91-97; Eulenburg, Aus
50 Jahren, 49.
21
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 100.
22
22
therefore moved to Berlin late in that year.
The Eulenburgs adapted easily to the social whirl of the
growing metropolis. One of the first people whose acquaint-
anee they made in Berlin, Alexander von Schleinitz, Minister
of the Imperial Household, organized "salons" where prominent
artists, among them Anton von Werner, Gustav Richter, and
Marianne Burg would come and discuss their works. Eulenburg,
always an amateur in the arts, intensified his own esthetic
interests during this time. He grew increasingly apprécia-
tive of French art and began to attend the theater regularly.
He prepared a number of amateur musical works, of which
Rosenlieder ("Rose Songs") and Skâdelgesânge ("Ballads from
Nordic Sagas") received particular acclaim. The young diplo-
mat also found time to demonstrate his architectural talents
23
by designing a waterside pavilion at Liebenberg. Eulenburg
also possessed a gift for writing children's stories. Both
his Erik und Erika and Abendserzâhlungen ("Tales of the
Evening") won widespread appreciation. Later, in the 1880's,
Eulenburg's play Margot would appear at the Prussian Embassy
Theater while his Seestern ("Star of the Sea'), a passionate
love story, played for ten years at various locations.^
22
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 101.
23
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 7.
24
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 8, 16; Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren,
54-62.
23
During the late seventies, Eulenburg visited various
royal courts as a Prussian emissary. In 1878, he travelled
to Stockholm. In August of the next year he went to Dresden
as an aide to the Prussian ambassador to Saxony, Otto von
25
Dfinhof f. During these years in the diplomatic service,
Eulenburg renewed his friendship with Kuno von Moltke, his
companion from Cassel. Writing to Moltke, Eulenburg
admitted that his position was a difficult though honorable
one. He enjoyed the company of his associates, though it
appears that his musical proclivities hampered his effective-
ness as a diplomat to some degree because of the time he
26
devoted to them.
Eulenburg's charm and talents did not go unnoticed in
major political circles. The first major advancement of his
diplomatic career took place in January 1881, when, through
the influences of the Bismarcks, he was appointed Third
Secretary at the German Embassy in Paris. Here he came into
contact with Bernhard von Bülow, the Second Secretary of the
same establishment. From their initial meeting, the two
developed a respect for each other's political capabilities.
After six months Eulenburg transferred to Munich, where he
served under the highly cultivated Count Georg von Werthern-
Berchlingen. Eulenburg ingratiated himself with Werthern,
25
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 115.
26
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 117.
2 4
who allowed him to assume many of his duties as Prussian
27
ambassador to Munich during his own summer vacations. The
young diplomat also blended well with his social environment.
Both the Bavarian aristocracy and intelligentsia found him
a delightful companion. Eulenburg's domestic life added to
his enjoyment. Although his first son died in 1878, Eulen-
burg rejoiced three years later at the birth of another boy,
eventually followed by two additional sons and two daughters.
While Eulenburg enjoyed his stay in Munich, he did not
find his diplomatic position without challenges. The
particularistic sentiments of the Bavarians posed a constant
problem for Prussia in her attempts to unite the German
nation. The residents of Bavaria gave their primary
loyalties to their own king, Ludwig of Wittelsbach, rather
than to the German emperor. Eulenburg also encountered the
problem of religious sympathies. A Lutheran, he now found
himself in a state where ultramontane political and court
parties held sway, Eulenburg's ultimate challenge at Munich,
however, involved the deposition and death of Bavarian King
Ludwig II in 1886. The diplomat, serving as de facto
mediator between the Prussian Embassy and the Bavarian
regent after Ludwig's fall, worked to prevent the development
of a separatist movement within the South German state. He
performed this task competently, supplying the Foreign Office
27
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 14; Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren,
111-112.
25
in Berlin with necessary information and winning a name for
himself among those in positions of influence, namely Baron
28
Friedrich von Holstein. It was Philipp zu Eulenburg, the
maturing diplomat, then, who met William at Prôkelwitz in
May 1886.
The early life of Prince William of Prussia paralleled
Eulenburg's in several respects. Like his future friend,
William suffered from physical ailments. In addition to his
withered arm, incurred at birth in 1859, the future Kaiser
possessed poor hearing and a chronic nervous condition.
William, of course, also came from a military tradition ex-
tending back to the seventeenth century, though his family
already had produced some "soldier-poets," particularly
Frederick the Great and his own father, the future tragic
Emperor Frederick III. Like Eulenburg, William felt somewhat
alienated from his father, though for different reasons.
Crown Prince Frederick, as Williams's father was until 1888,
a gentle, pliable individual with liberal political views,
contrasted sharply with the domineering Philipp Conrad zu
Eulenburg. William saw little of his father, and their rare
shared activities consisted mostly of walks through the
Brandenburg woods, expeditions to various spas, i.e.,
29
Johannisbad, or visits to ships. Princess Victoria,
28
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 16-17.
29
Kaiser Wilhelm II, Meine Vorfahren (Berlin: Verlag
für Kulturpolitik, 1929), 188; cf. Balfour, Kaiser, 75;
26
William's mother, exercised a far greater influence over
him, and it was probably in the area of mother-son relations
that the contrast between William's and Eulenburg's develop-
ment appeared most pronounced.
Philipp zu Eulenburg loved his mother deeply, sharing
her artistic and intellectual interests. William, by con-
trast, resented the domineering Englishwoman who attempted
to shield him from the Prussian "barbarians." Actually,
mother and son possessed rather similar personalities. Both
had an appreciation of art, acute intelligence, and, probably
most important, indomitable wills. This last shared trait
caused most of their differences, for the two disagreed on
many things. In the realm of music, Victoria despised
Wagnerian pieces with their nationalistic implications, while
William enjoyed all of Wagner's works. The Crown Princess
disdained the authoritarian, militaristic nature of Prussian
society, and asserted on many occasions that she was grateful
that such a social environment did not exist in England. Her
son, by contrast, from his initiation into the Potsdam
Regiment at age ten, possessed a love of the military which
endured throughout his lifetime. Victoria, an aggressive
woman, often meddled in her husband Frederick's affairs. Wil-
liam, repelled by such behavior, determined that his spouse
Virginia Cowles, The Kaiser (New York: Harper and Row, 1963),
40, hereinafter cited as Cowles, The Kaiser.
27
30
would be of the Kinder, Küche, Kirche type. Like Eulen-
burg, William found escape from his oppressive parental
home environment in the company of his grandparents. As a
youth, the future Kaiser had a particular fondness for his
maternal grandmother, Queen Victoria of England, who allowed
him to play relatively unrestricted, and encouraged him to
31
associate with children of all classes. The Prince also
greatly enjoyed the company of his paternal grandfather,
Emperor William I, who nurtured his interest in the military.
Prince William's defensive, compulsively masculine person-
ality, then, almost certainly resulted from a negative re-
action to his mother's dominance and as a positive response
to his grandfather's affection. Other forces, however,
shaped William's character.
William's education also played in integral role to
molding his temperament. While Eulenburg received the typi-
cal military education of the Prussian Junker aristocracy,
the Prince studied a variety of subjects, both in classical
and technical areas. William's grim Calvinist tutor,
Georg Hinzpeter, taught him history and mathematics, while
he learned French and English from native instructors.
Hinzpeter, a severe disciplinarian, forced the young Prince
30
Balfour, Kaiser, 84-85; Kaiser Wilhelm II, Aus meinem
Leben, 1859-1888 (Berlin and Leipzig: K.F. Koehler, 1927),
20-22, 44-46, hereinafter cited as Wilhelm II, Aus meinem
Leben.
31
Balfour, Kaiser, 76.
28
to study, sometimes as long as twelve hours a day. The
tutor sought to imbue him with a strong sense of duty, and
reminded him constantly of his future role as king of
32
Prussia. Indeed, such indoctrination accompanied every
activity of Prince William's. He learned to ride and shoot
like an expert, but the grueling training process, coupled
with his infirmity, left him emotionally calloused and
embittered. During his early childhood, mother and tutor
restricted his associations to the sons of noble military
33
officers and court officials. These circumstances surely
also contributed to William's developing the assertive,
supercilious personality which endured throughout his life¬
time.
William's atypical educational process continued
throughout his adolescence. At the age of sixteen, he
entered the Lyceum at Cassel. Here, in the company of pre-
dominantly middle-class boys, he received further instruc-
tion in the arts and sciences. The future monarch, a dili-
gent, if not outstanding, student, graduated tenth in a
class of seventeen. William continued his studies at Bonn
University, matriculating at the age of eighteen. At Bonn,
32
Joachim von Kürenberg, War Alies Falsch? Das Leben
Kaiser Wilhelms II (Bonn: Athenâum Verlag, 1951), 90-91,
hereinafter cited as Kürenberg, War Alies Falsch?; Balfour
Kaiser, 78; Wilhelm II, Aus meinem Leben, 23-33-
33
Kürenberg, War Alies Falsch?, 91; Balfour, Kaiser,
78; Wilhelm, Aus meinem Leben, 32-33-
29
he broadened his curriculum to include politics, economics,
government, and science, yet never came to excel in any of
these areas. William apparently enjoyed life at Bonn, and
cultivated the members of Borussia, a militarily inspired
student fraternity whose standard emphasized physical
prowess over academic accomplishments. Membership in the
Borussia heavily reinforced William's masculine ego. In
summary, then, the future Kaiser's education, a formidable
contrast to his eventual friend Eulenburg's, played a role
in developing a personality considerably different from that
34
of the more balanced older man.
William's marriage and domestic life contrasted sharply
with that of the scion of the Eulenburgs. Augusta zu Eulen-
burg, nee Sandels, possessed charm, pulchritude, and a
strong will. Well-travelled and cultivated, she presented
a perfect match for her talented husband. By contrast,
Augusta Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augusten-
burg epitomized the Hausfrau—plain, unimaginative, possess-
ing few intellectual interests outside of the home. Augusta
Victoria's exclusive company bored William after he became
her husband in 1881, and it appears to have been primarily
her ability to satisfy his sexual needs that kept him faith-
ful. William's correspondence, when he bothered to write,
did not convey the same affectionate feelings which
34
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 23; Balfour, Kaiser, 86; Wilhelm
II, Aus meinem Leben, 157-172.
30
characterized Eulenburg's letters to his wife. It was only
after many years of marriage, when a number of his favorite
cronies had deserted him, that William began truly to
35
appreciate his spouse.
Like Eulenburg, William experienced a respectable,
though hardly distinguished, military career. He enlisted
in the Life Guard Hussars during the first years of his
marriage, then transferred to the cavalry in 1882. Army
life for William consisted of many social activities such
as "beer evenings" and stag parties. At these gatherings,
he made a number of friends, most of whom belonged to the
conservative Prussian aristocracy which his mother so
despised. As time passed, William advanced steadily through
the ranks. In 1885, he assumed command of his regiment,
proving to be a strict administrator who forbade heavy drink-
36
ing and gambling among his troops. He remained at this
post until January 1888.
William's close association with the military widened
the already existing rift between himself and his parents.
Crown Prince Frederick disliked the influence that his son's
cronies, especially Herbert von Bismarck, exercised over him.
Frederick was considerably annoyed when Herbert's father, the
Chancellor, suggested that William be allowed to work in the
35
Balfour, Kaiser, 88.
36
Kürenberg, War Alies Falsch?, 60-62; Wilhelm II, Aus
meinem Leben, 187-211.
31
Foreign Office in order to gain some knowledge in the area
of diplomatic affairs, The Crown Prince begged him to recon-
sider, asserting that William possessed too immature, inex-
perienced, and conceited a personality to be placed in a
37
position of influence, His urgings went unheeded, how-
ever, and from September 1886 onward, under the guidance of
Herbert von Bismarck, the Prince served in the department,
mainly in clerical capacities, having little to do with the
38
actual formulation of policy. William's mother also came
to criticize her son's independent nature, roundly declaring
to her mother in 1881 that "the son has never been mine. h 39
By the middle 1880's the Crown Princess saw William as her
"clumsy, loutish son" when comparing him to the more handsome
40
and suave Crown Prince Rudolf of Austria-Hungary.
William's mother had hoped that her son's marriage to Augusta
Victoria would make William more docile and considerate. Such
hopes proved futile, for the young wife had little desire to
attempt to govern and so risk angering the future Kaiser. In
37
Balfour, Kaiser, 94.
38
Kürenberg, War Alies Falsch?, 64; Kaiser Wilhelm II,
Ereignisse und Gestalten aus den Jahren 1878-1918 (Leipzig
and Berlin: K.F. Koehler, 1922), 6-11; hereinafter cited as
Wilhelm II, Ereignisse.
39
Egon Cesar, Count Corti, The English Empress, a Study
in the Relations Between Queen Victoria and Her Eldest
Daughter^ intro#by Wolfgang, Prince of Hesse, tr. by M.R.
Hodgson (London: Cassel, 1957), 213; cf. Balfour, Kaiser, 82.
40
Kürenberg, War Alies Falsch?, 65.
32
further defiance to his parents' admonitions about his con-
duct, William grew increasingly close to his "soldier-king"
grandfather, the bastion of political and social reaction,
and sought to pattern his own life after that of the old
Emperor.
William's discontent resulted from other than just pa-
rental pressures. As a young adult the Prince grew increas-
ingly disenchanted with his English relatives. He possessed
little love for his "Uncle Bertie" (the Prince of Wales,
later King Edward VII), while he had long found the company
of his grandmother, Queen Victoria, congenial. After 1885,
however, Victoria grew progressively colder toward this par¬
ticular grandson. In part this could be attributed to
William's by-now arrogant personality, which the Queen found
distasteful. Even more important, she was put off specifi-
cally by the Prince's supercilious attitude toward her
daughter Beatrice upon marriage to Prince Henry of Batten-
41
berg. William's visit to the coming-of-age ceremonies of
his distant cousin, Grand Duke (the future Tsar) Nicholas
of Russia, engendered further difficulties. William attempt-
ed to become friendly with the sixteen-year-old Romanov heir
by sending him letters which blatantly attacked the views of
Frederick and Victoria, and also expressed William's disdain
for the English parliamentary system. Apparently the future
41
Corti, Empress, 226-227; cf. Balfour, Kaiser, 101;
Wilhelm II, Aus meinem Leben, 251-259.
33
Kaiser hoped to find common ground with the young Russian
42
prince, whose conservative attitudes reflected his own.
Crown Prince Frederick and his wife, of course, did not
respond kindly to such oblique attacks, and the tension be-
tween the two generations increased. Finally, William's
objection to the engagement of his sister Victoria to the
opportunistic Prince Alexander of Battenberg caused several
of his relatives to turn against him. One can envision, then,
how by the time William met Eulenburg in 1886, he figured as
a lonely, confused individual, searching for a confidant,
for escape from his unhappy environment. This, to a degree,
Eulenburg could provide.
William's relationship with Eulenburg began under purely
apolitical circumstances. When the two met on a hunting
party at Prttkelwitz, the hunting lodge of Count Richard zu
Dohna-Schlobitten, Eulenburg belonged to the Prussian legation
at Munich, while William functioned as a commander of the
first batallion of the Prussian Light Hussars. The diplo-
matic emissary's personal characteristics attracted William
from the beginning—the broad forehead, carefully trimmed
43
beard, and large stature impressed the Prince, Their
mutual interest in music served as a second basis for
42
Balfour, Kaiser, 100.
43
Karl Friedrich Nowak, Kaizer and Chancellor: The Open-
ing Years of the Reign of William II (New York: Macmillan,
1930), 110, hereinafter cited as Nowak, Kaiser and Chancellor.
34
developing the friendship, as they shared a common interest
in Bavarian ballads and Wagnerian operas. William also
admired Eulenburg's own musical abilities, During the
evenings at Prdkelwitz, the future Kaiser would sit next to
the versatile diplomat while the latter played the piano,
begging him to perform his Sk&delgesânge so that he, William,
could sing the melodies. Never had Eulenburg encountered
44
someone with so much enthusiasm for his work.
The actual hunting expeditions afforded Eulenburg the
opportunity to experience the force of William's personality.
He was amazed by what he considered the Prince's indomitable
will and desire to overcome his physical infirmities. Eulen-
burg remarked on William's riding ability when writing in his
diary, and though Eulenburg personally detested the sport of
hunting, he could not help but admire his new friend's
talent for stalking, noting that he pursued nine bucks for an
entire day and managed to bring down several in the same
45
time period—no small feat for a man with only one good arm.
From this initial meeting, then, Eulenburg sensed future
greatness in William, and sought to build the friendship.
Soon after the Prfikelwitz meeting, Eulenburg enhanced
his standing with William by sending him a copy of his
Skâdelges&nge. The Prince gratefully accepted the gift and
44
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 135.
45
Muschler, Eulenburg . , . Leben, 153.
35
46
responded with an autographed photo. The two men began
to correspond regularly, praising each other's talents in
their letters. William later asserted that "Eulenburg's
poetic imagination ,,47was capable of anything. Eulenburg
praised the Prince's "spontaneous, energetic character,"
and found William "congenial to my artistic soul" and a
48
flatterer. Eulenburg's letters to his wife also con-
tained words of praise--William's convictions, clearness of
comprehension, and sharpness of judgment all impressed his
49
friend.
During the initial years of the friendship, Eulenburg
served as a "father-confessor" figure to the young Prince.
The terminal throat cancer of William's father, developed
during the first year of their acquaintance. The young man
assured Eulenburg of his confidence in his father's German
physicians, while expressing disdain for Morrell MacKenzie,
the English specialist whom his mother, Victoria, had employ-
ed. Like the majority of their countrymen, William and Eulen-
burg disliked Crown Prince Frederick's wife, considering her
50
unsympathetic to the people of her adopted land. William
46
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 152.
47
Balfour, Kaiser, 90.
48
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 24; c.f. Cowles, The Kaiser, 80.
49
Muschler, Eulenburg , . . Leben, 152.
50
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 136.
36
and his friend spent many hours together during Frederick's
illness, playing cards, attending concerts, riding, singing,
gambling--anything to divert William from his depressed
environment. When Eulenburg could not be present, he would
send encouraging messages to the future Kaiser:
God preserve you in this indescribably dif-
ficult time, which must make so many adversities
yet a thousand times harder.
I see much that is pleasant in the future as
do many hundred thousands who do not know Your
Highness; because I know of the strength and 51
sense of duty in you which will be our defense.
Despite these glowing encouragements, Eulenburg possessed
little optimism concerning the fate of the monarchy. When
corresponding with others or writing in his diary, he
emphasized the problems of the succession and possible in-
trigues of the Berlin Court. As William I and Frederick
moved closer to death, Eulenburg's letters expressed an in-
creasing concern that should young Prince William be thrust
into the position of Emperor, he would not be prepared nor
possess the abilities demanded of that post, In essence, the
diplomat considered his friend too immature to rule and
believed that under William, the office of emperor would lose
52
a great deal of its prestige.
In March 1888, the worst came to pass. William I ("the
old angel" as Eulenburg called him) died in his ninety-first
51
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 145.
52
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 140.
37
year and it became apparent that Prince William would be
ascending the Imperial throne within a few months. His
father, the direct heir, could no longer talk, and after
the famous interlude of the ninety-nine days, he too passed
away. The second new German emperor of the year, shakily
confronting unprecedented responsibilities, now besought
Eulenburg to continue his role as friend and confidant,
emphasizing his political abilities. Eulenburg of course
assented, simultaneously accepting appointment as Prussian
ambassador to the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg. From June 1888,
Eulenburg continued for the next ten years as the Kaiser's
53
most influential advisor.
During the early years of William's reign, he and Eulen-
burg developed their personal relationship in several areas.
The Kaiser worked hard to have his friend assimilated into
the ranks of the Imperial entourage. William and Eulenburg
dined frequently with various notables! When Eulenburg met
Hinzpeter, the Emperor's ex-tutor, William II, perhaps in
order to spite Hinzpeter at this meeting, called Eulenburg
"my bosom friend, the only one I have, ,,54 The two began to
travel frequently, and Eulenburg, despite his nervous con-
dition, ignored his physician and joined William in 1889 on
the first of thirteen Nordlandsreisen("Scandinavian voyages").
53
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 90-91; Haller, Aus
dem Leben, 38-39.
54
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 46.
38
Eulenburg also went with his chief to the Imperial hunting
lodges at Prôkelwitz and Rominten, where he served both as
William's secretary and to entertain the Kaiser's friends.
Serving in the latter capacity included acting as master of
ceremonies during mealtimes, moderating conversation in such
a way that it should be "spiced with merriment without be-
coming noisy. ,,55 Eulenburg would also perform his ballads
and play the piano, often until one o'clock in the morning.
The Kaiser's friend helped in coordinating birthday parties,
talent contests, and other special events. Eulenburg seemed
to enjoy his role, though it often wearied him to serve as
56
William's entertainer.
There were, moreover, certain aspects of his outings
with William which disgusted Eulenburg. He complained of the
disorderly company that would strew their cigar ashes and
57
assorted trash all over the lounge areas. Eulenburg did not
approve of his master's practical jokes (i.e., kicking his
comrades in the posterior and turning waterhoses on them),
although he himself enjoyed immunity from these abuses, He
freely criticized his chief for uniforming his visitors in
55
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 48.
56
Philipp zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld, Mit dem Kaiser als
Staatsmann und Freund auf Nordlandreisen (Leipzig: Carl
Reissner Verlag, 1931), I, 181, hereinafter cited as Eulen-
burg, Mit dem Kaiser.
57
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 124.
39
"un-Prussian fiddle-faddle of dress for hunting and shoot-
58
ing"—i.e., the likes of tan riding boots with spurs.
Eulenburg would go as far as he dared in reprimanding
William for neglecting his political duties during these
trips, bemoaning his horseplay in the presence of such
59
burning political issues as the Boxer Rebellion. Private-
ly Eulenburg complained of the Kaiser's seeming hyperactiv¬
ity, which often left him exhausted after a day of trying to
keep up with His Majesty. Although the Kaiser's friend en-
joyed displaying his musical talents, the constant repetition
of "Ich muss" in his diary suggested that he often performed
against his wishes, especially late at night when he sought
sleep rather than companionship. Finally, Eulenburg often
regarded William's chorts from a critical perspective:
Count Hochberg: sings, Lieutenant von Chelius:
plays. Captain Count Moltke: plays, Lieutenant
von Hülsen: does conjuring tricks. Count Herbert
Bismarck: drinks . . Brother-in-law Count Kal-
nein: makes bad puns .... My brother, Count
Kessel, Keszycki, Cousin Karl Eulenburg, Cousin
Walter Esebeck: can do nothing whatsoever.^
William readily acknowledged the correctness of his
friend's criticisms, and rarely admonished him for his insu-
61
bordination. He needed Eulenburg; the latter was
58
Kürenberg, War Alies Falsch?, 156.
59
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 235.
60
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 49.
61
Kürenberg, War Alies Falsch?, 156.
40
indispensible as a morale booster. The older man recogniz-
ed the Kaiser's insecurities--and he praised his accomplish-
ments. Eulenburg also shielded William from any disappoint-
ments, carefully scrutinizing the messages which his chief
received and exercising caution in his own conversation with
William. Thus, by devoting a large part of his life to
William's needs, Eulenburg created the basis for a friendship
that would endure twenty years.
Nothing did more to bond the closeness between William
and Eulenburg than their activities while travelling together.
Eulenburg frequently accompanied his master to various places.
During the Nordlandreisen, for instance, the Imperial yacht
Hohenzollern would dock for days at Scandinavian ports, and
William and his friends would visit prominent officials during
these interludes. One emissary at Oslo, a man named Jensen,
was a welcome host. In July 1890, Eulenburg accompanied his
chief to the Jensen residence, where he found the hospitality
"a mixture of Roman gaiety and Northern sentiment. h 6 2
William enjoyed such visits at least as much, receiving
flowers from the Jensen children as they gathered about him
63
and in return giving them gifts. Little Erika Jensen was
the imp of the litter, and on a later visit, she demonstrated
her mischievousness by riffling the Kaiser's writing desk and
6 2
Muschler, Eulenburg... Leben, 249.
63
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 76.
41
64
appropriating her father's cigars, The food in the Jensen
home apparently fluctuated in quality. Eulenburg had no com-
plaint during the 1890 excursion but later likened the
65
cuisine to that found in a pot de chambre. For the most
part, however, the Jensen household remained a favorite spot
for the Northern travellers and they stopped there during a
number of visits to the Scandinavian regions.
Eulenburg also accompanied his master to Cowes on the
Isle of Wight (England). William enjoyed the regattas there,
attending them annually from 1889 to 1895. A visit to
England in 1891 seems typical—a chilly reception at Queen
Victoria's court, a tour of the London art museums, a festi-
val, a drive in the country. Eulenburg played a minimal role
on this trip. He also accompanied William to England includ-
ing Cowes in 1893.
As previously mentioned, there was little love lost be-
tween the Kaiser and his English relatives, especially
"Uncle Bertie," Prince of Wales. Their personalities clashed.
Edward, the soigné,indolent man of the world,contrasted sharp-
ly with the hyperactive, self-righteous William. The latter
distrusted his English uncle because of the latter's affinity
for France. William even came to believe that Edward constant-
ly weaved plots against Germany in hopes of precipitating an
64
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 363.
65
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, I, 294.
42
66
international crisis. Political difficulties between
England and France, both in Siam and in the Middle East,
added to the tension of the general situation, making the
atmosphere at Cowes extremely uncomfortable at times.
Eulenburg served as a kind, of social intermediary for
William during the visit. The older man enjoyed some
aspects of the Victorian court, commenting on the charm of
various ladies and the admirable formality of the British.
The royal family, however, did not impress him. Eulenburg
found Queen Victoria friendly but generally dull and un-
67
attractive. He disliked her maternal pampering of William
during the visit and thought the Kaiser behaved like a child
in her presence. The Kaiser's friend also found Victoria's
disapproving glare annoying when he conversed with the charm-
68
ing Lady Ormonde. In general, Eulenburg felt the court
atmosphere pretentious, typifying the British affinity for
pageantry.
Eulenburg had occasion to spend time with the Prince of
Wales during the visit. The two became well-acquainted dur-
ing the Queen's Cup Race. William those days took exceptional
66
Cowles, The Kaiser, 123-126.
67
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 313.
68
Philipp zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld, Das Ende Kfinig Ludwigs
II und andere Erlebnisse, ed. Augusta zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld
(Leipzig: Wilhelm Grunow, 1934), 223, hereinafter cited as
Eulenburg, Das Ende Kflnig Ludwigs.
43
pride in his sailing ability and in this contest challenged
"Uncle Bertie's" ship, the Britannia, with a craft of his
own, the Meteor I. Determined to demonstrate his prowess as
a navigator, the Kaiser stayed aboard his ship during the
69
entire event, steering and supervising various activities.
Eulenburg, for his part, took it upon himself to entertain
Edward in his liege's stead. He and "Bertie" discussed a
variety of subjects—the Franco-Russian alliance, and German
colonial expansion and the Far East. Eulenburg ultimately
found Edward a distasteful person, especially when the latter
70
made a condescending remark concerning William's bad arm.
The Kaiser, meanwhile, defeated the Britannia in the Queen's
Cup Race. Needless to say, both he and Eulenburg took great
delight in the victory, knowing how it disappointed Prince
Edward. From this time forward, Eulenburg cautioned his
chief to be wary of his uncle, warning that "He is not our
friend. » 71 In view of William's own Anglophobia, such an
exhortation was hardly necessary. The older man merely rein-
forced his master's prejudices, an act which later influenced
William's own political behavior.
William and Eulenburg also made journeys to the Mediter-
ranean. In 1894, the pair travelled to Venice. During this
69
Eulenburg, Das Ende Kttnig Ludwigs, 223.
70
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 86.
71
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 85-86.
44
trip, Eulenburg's major concern seems to have been the
Kaiser's safety, and the impression remains that he did not
enjoy himself, In one instance, as the two approached a
bridge in a gondola, a swarm of filthy street urchins
jammed the bridge, extending their hands to within a hair's
breadth of the Kaiser's head. Eulenburg found the sight
72
appalling. Similarly, though he found the Morosini family,
whose ancestors had contributed doges since the eleventh
century, entertaining and their women beautiful, the Kaiser's
friend appears to have been more at ease in the company of
73
Kaiserin Augusta and her young sons. Given Eulenburg's
nature, such an attitude seemed out of character for him.
Whether it could be attributed to health problems, homesick-
ness, or his unfamiliarity with Mediterranean customs that
made him shy away from the city emotionally—or to unknown
factors—he apparently did not enjoy his stay. Nevertheless ,
he dutifully accompanied his chief back to Venice in 1896.
When the Kaiser and Eulenburg travelled to Vienna that
same year, the latter enjoyed himself in what had become his
adopted city since his becoming German ambassador there two
72
Philipp zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld, Erlebnisse an deutschen
und fremden Hflfen, ed. Augusta zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld
(Leipzig: Wilhelm Grunow, 1934), 23-24, hereinafter cited as
Eulenburg, Erlebnisse an deutschen und fremden Hôfen.
73
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 113; Eulenburg, Erlebnisse an
deutschen und fremden Htifen, 24.
45
74
years earlier. Eulenburg, being familiar with the Austro-
Hungarian court, acquainted William with the various facets
of its composition. They attended court balls, gala events
where, during an 1897 visit, Eulenburg joined members of the
German and Austro-Hungarian royal parties in serenading the
75
Kaiser and Emperor Francis Joseph, Both William and Eulen-
burg made distinguished acquaintances of both sexes during
their stays in Vienna. Eulenburg enjoyed the company of one
of the Esterhazy princes and Count Constantino Nigra, the
Italian diplomatic emissary, who shared Eulenburg's passion
76
for songwriting. Nigra's work, "Canti populari del Pied-
77
monte" received Eulenburg's praise. Countess Pauline
Metternich in 1895 swept William off his feet with her charm,
78
tact, and social ability. Katherina "Kathi" Schratt, the
"official" mistress of Emperor Francis Joseph, also demon-
strated the qualities of a charming hostess. Naturally, the
Kaiser and Eulenburg visited with the Austrian emperor. Like
large numbers of contemporaries, the two men found Francis
Joseph somewhat dull. That notwithstanding, Eulenburg
74
For his lyrical description of the lower Danube Valley,
see Eulenburg, Das Ende Kflnig Ludwigs, 268.
75
Eulenburg, Das Ende Kfinig Ludwigs, 120-128.
76
Eulenburg, Erlebnisse an deutschen und fremden Hflfen,
167; Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 383.
77
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 383.
78
Eulenburg, Erlebnisse an deutschen und fremden Hflfen,
142.
46
succeeded in delighting him and William with some amusing
79
anecdotes.
The Vienna sojourns involved more than social gather-
ings, however. For example, the Franco-Russian alliance
generated considerable concern among officialdom in the
German-speaking empires. William also experienced personal
frictions, including some that extended outside the
imperial circle. His tendency to be rude to policemen and
military officers precipitated admonitions from Eulenburg
80
and perhaps for that reason were not compounded. Finally ,
it appears that William secretly felt guilty about making
such journeys unaccompanied by his wife. Eulenburg believed
that he saw this feeling reflected in the nature of the
Kaiser's gift-buying. William seemed to purchase out of
guilt rather than true affection. The Kaiser's friend re-
marked cynically on this occasion that William would spend
thirty or forty thousand francs on a diamond for a woman who
81
already had access to the Prussian crown jewels, Yet,
until the advent of the First World War, the Kaiser usually
travelled unaccompanied by Augusta Victoria preferring the
company of his cronies to hers.
79
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 137; Eulenburg, Erlebnisse an
deutschen und fremden Hflfen, 114-116.
80
Eulenburg, Erlebnisse an deutschen und fremden Hflfen,
34.
81
Eulenburg, Erlebnisse an deutschen und fremden Hftfen,
27.
47
Eulenburg and William paid a memorable visit to Sweden
in 1895. The former, for obvious reasons, thought quite
highly of the Swedes and King Oscar II. One of the amusing
highlights of the trip concerned a liquor purchase. The
Kaiser's friend, whose command of Swedish apparently left
something to be desired, almost received a bottle of perfume
in response to his ill-expressed request for a flask of
82
spirits. In his memoirs Eulenburg often satirized the
Swedish "bumpkins," but one feels that he indeed had a great
deal of affection for this Scandinavian people. He long re-
called traversing the countryside, meeting farmers and their
8 3
families, and giving them gifts. There seems little doubt
that the Kaiser's friend found considerable contentment in
his wife's homeland.
In 1898 the Kaiser and Eulenburg passed through the
Mediterranean area enroute to the Middle East. Their itine-
rary included a visit to the Italian royal family. William
treated its members graciously though he secretly mocked the
"dwarf" Victor Emmanuel and his wife from "the wild mountains
of ,,84Cernagora.
Eulenburg and his chief shared a number of intellectual
82
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kadser, I, 328-335.
83
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, I, 328-335.
84
Bernhard von Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, ed. Franz von
Stockhammern (Berlin: Verlag Ullstein 1930), I, 543, herein-
after cited as Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten. Cernagora refers,
of course, to the Balkan state of Montenegro.
48
pursuits during their friendship. When Eulenburg first made
William's acquaintance, the royal prince, while possessing
a number of talents, still held only a limited appreciation
of the esthetic. Within a few years, however, William's
interests blossomed in several areas. Both men, as prev-
iously mentioned, enjoyed playing instrumental music. Often
the Kaiser would accompany Eulenburg on the piano. In 1894
the two collaborated on Poem to Aegir, which was released on
85
December 11 of that year. Ragtime and sacred songs also
interested William though Eulenburg found ragtime distaste--
86
ful. William, of course, never became a "serious musician."
Volume rather than quality characterized the Kaiser's style.
William loved loud orchestra music, much to Eulenburg1s cha-
grin, and the latter once complained of such "noise" rattling
87
the china in an adjacent room.
The Kaiser and Eulenburg shared an interest in art and
related fields. The latter, a frustrated architect, often
visited historical edifices with his master during their
88
walks. When the two travelled in the Mediterranean lands,
they examined Greek, Roman, and Egyptian ruins. Eulenburg
85s. Hammer, William the Second as Seen in Contemporary
Documents and Judged on Evidence of His Own Speeches (New
York: Houghton Mifflin, 1917), 164.
86
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 194-95, 345.
87
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, I, 295.
88
For Eulenburg's ability to appraise an edifice, see
his Mit dem Kaiser, I, 336.
49
and William shared an interest in the theater. During the
Nordlandreisen, they often joined their comrades in putting
on amateur productions. Finally, the Kaiser and Eulenburg
could intelligently share their views on painting, believing
that modern artists sought truth in "smut and pessimism" and
possessed too great a concern with "realism. » 89
Eulenburg also admired William's knowledge of ancient
art and civilization. It seems, however, that much of Eulen-
burg's praise had a superficial tone, as, according to other
sources, William's esthetic capabilities left something to
be desired. To be sure, the Kaiser read widely and was
particularly fond of Dickens, Scott, Bernard Shaw, and
90
Kipling. (The last was a rather ironic literary choice,
considering Kipling's anti-German sentiment.) William did
not, however, appreciate those who criticized German society
from within, and considered authors such as Gerhard Haupt-
91
mann subversive. In the realm of painting, the Kaiser, as
previously mentioned, preferred traditional artists. Paint-
ers such as Max Liebermann he found hard to interpret.
William's architectural tastes, as evidenced by the statuary
erected during his reign, bordered on the flamboyant and
grotesque. To the Kaiser, art had to glorify culture; therein
89
Balfour, Kaiser, 161.
90
Balfour, Kaiser, 161-162.
91
Balfour, Kaiser, 162.
50
92
lay the root of his conservative artistic tastes.
William, by general agreement, possessed excellent con-
versational abilities though he tended to dominating discus-
sion. Eulenburg appreciated his patrons conversational
ability and confided to Friedrich von Holstein that
William's "disinterested friendliness gives him quite a
peculiarly fascinating charm . . . he is one of those
people who by their nature arouse spontaneous sympathy. » 93
Eulenburg remarked on his companion's knowledge of Mideast
politics, and his capacity to write and speak several
94
languages, especially English and French, Such talents,
however, were not exceptional among monarchs of this period,
contrary to Eulenburg's implications, and it appears he was
again flattering William.
Religion played an important role in the relationship
between the Kaiser and Eulenburg. The latter saw his chief
as a study in ironic contrasts. During the Nordlandreisen,
for example, William joined in the buffoonery, ribaldry, and
telling of lewd stories of his cohorts. Yet at the same time
he evidenced an almost fatalistic trust in God which
92
Balfour, Kaiser, 162.
93
Norman Rich and M.H. Fisher, eds., Die gehelmen Papiere
Friedrich von Holsteins (Gfittingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag,
1957), III, hereinafter cited as D.g.P. with volume and page
no.; cf. Balfour, Kaiser, 140.
94
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 117.
51
95
especially manifested itself on the Sabbath, Thus Eulen-
burg sought to portray the Kaiser as an accomplished Sunday
preacher, holding that his chief's speaking ability sur-
passed that of the ship's chaplain, The Kaiser preached
humble and unpretentious messages, and he once confided to
the Archbishop of Canterbury that he had no use for "dogma-
tic trash. ti 9 6 The guests on the Nordlandreisen appreciated
97
such simplicity and agreed with Eulenburg's assertions.
The Kaiser's friend lauded William's knowledge of the Old
and New Testaments. Pope Leo XIII himself, perhaps not mere-
ly for diplomatic reasons, commented on William's ability as
an exegecist, and discussed with him the feasibility of pro-
ducing a Bible made especially for circulation in Asia
98
Minor.
One can, however, seriously challenge the veracity of
Eulenburg's laudatory correspondence. Most of his letters
concerning travel activities went to the Kaiserin. Eulenburg
may well have been trying to appeal to her well-known
religious affinities. He realized that if he presented his
friend as a pious figure to Augusta, such action would
95
Jacques Charnier, Fabulous Monster (New York: Longmans,
Green,and Co., 1934), 91.
96
Edward F. Benson, The Kaiser and English Relations
(New York: Longsmans, Green, and Co., 1936), 97.
97
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 280.
98
See Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 337.
52
enhance William's standing with his spouse, making her less
resentful of his long sojourns away from home. Other
sources challenge Eulenburg's contentions. Judging from his
behavior during the week, one would assume that William did
not possess Augusta's moralizing fervor. Bernhard von
Bülow in his memoirs also undermined Eulenburg's portrayal
by asserting that the Kaiser never wrote a sermon nor spoke
extemporaneously on a religious subject. Rather/he merely
99
reiterated those sermons composed by the ship's chaplain.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that William possessed
speaking abilities and religious convictions far superior to
those of many of his contemporary monarchs, and that had he
been called upon to preach extemporaneously, the Kaiser
would have performed well in this capacity. Thus, Eulenburg,
in his desire to glorify his master, may have exaggerated
the latter's abilities, but his basic contentions rang true.
The practice of mysticism attracted the interests of
both Eulenburg and Prince William during the initial years
of their relationship. Though both men were unflinching Pro-
testants, they shared a curiosity about the spiritual world,
mainly as a diversionary activity. Eulenburg during the
1880's had become convinced of the existence of transcen-
dental souls which one could reach through a variety of
99
Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, I, 582.
53
100
mediums. William, on the other hand, seemed to place
little weight on the revelations produced by such activity:
Kaiser: Well, what have the mediums told
you?
Eulenburg: Amazing landscapes! Women in
gorgeous raiment! Flowers, a wealth of flowers.
Kaiser: All this we have on this earth! I don't
need any mediums or spiritual wrestlings for
that! I can arrange all that myself; nothing
supernatural in it.
When William ascended the throne, Eulenburg apparently
102
promised to refrain from his spiritualistic practices.
Whether or not he carried out his word, brings up a point of
contention. Bülow, in spite of his misanthropic tendencies,
implied in his memoirs that Eulenburg never used his alleged
conjuring powers to influence his master once the latter be-
103
came Emperor. Count Alfred von Waldersee, head of the
General Staff during the initial years of Williams's reign,
held a different opinion, contending that Eulenburg continued
104
his spiritualistic practices with William as late as 1894.
One may take the General's assertions with a grain of salt,
however, as Waldersee, writing in 1894, indubitably wished
100
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 29.
101
Nowak, Kaiser and Chancellor, 111.
102
Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, I, 451.
103
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 29.
104
Alfred von Waldersee, Aus dem Briefwechsel des General-
feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, ed. Heinrich
Otto Meisner (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag Anstalt, 1928), II,
300, hereinafter cited as Waldersee, Briefwechsel.
54
to defame Eulenburg for personal reasons. First, the
Kaiser's friend had helped secure Waldersee's departure
105
from the office of Chief of the General Staff in 1891.
Second, Waldersee wrote in the midst of the Kladderadatsch
affair (see below) when suspicions against Eulenburg and
his influence over the Kaiser precipitated extensive gossip
among those close to William. Thus it appears that the
practice of mysticism rather served as a mere diversion for
William and Eulenburg, something they took lightly during
the initial years of their relationship, and had no use for
once William assumed his imperial role.
Philipp zu Eulenburg remained a close confidant of
William during his twenty years at the imperial court and had
the Kaiser's undying gratitude. Others members of the
Imperial family, particularly the Kaiser's mother and wife,
were not so easily charmed by the cultivated diplomat. The
Empress Frederick disliked Eulenburg's carefree ways while
he in turn condemned her for placing her English loyalties
106
above those of her adopted land. Eulenburg's relationship
with Kaiserin Augusta possessed somewhat ambivalent charac-
teristics. When corresponding, Eulenburg and the Empress
105
Cowles, The Kaiser, 109.
106
Alfred von Waldersee, Denkwürdigkeiten des Generalfeld-
marschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee, ed. Heinrich Otto
Meisner (Stultgart: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, 1922), I, 240,
hereinafter cited as Waldersee, Denkwürdigkeiten.
55
always maintained a cordial air, as the latter's letters to
her husband's friend indicated. (See below.) Nevertheless,
some aspects of William's relationship with Eulenburg dis-
turbed the Kaiserin greatly. She confided to associates
that her husband should cultivate persons who worked
107
steadily rather than wasted their time dabbling in music.
Eulenburg's journeys with William sometimes aggravated her
possessive nature, especially when they caused her husband
to miss a birthday or other special event. The Kaiser some-
times treated her rudely in Eulenburg's presence. Whenever
William and his friend performed in the music room of the
Imperial Palace, the former gave orders that the Kaiserin not
108
be permitted to enter the sanctuary. For a woman who
clung to her husband at every opportunity, such aloofness
generated resentment. Nevertheless, Eulenburg eventually
managed to win her affection through a variety of means. One
practice involved his making constant mention of his wife,
mother, and children when corresponding with the Kaiserin,
keeping her up to date on their various accomplishments,
109
illnesses, and birthdays. The Prussian nobleman also
107
Augusta Victoria, Kflnigin von Preussen; Bekenntnisse an
eine Freündin (Dresden, 1935); cf. Friedrich Kracke, Prinz
und Kaiser—Wilhelm II im Urteil seiner Zeit (München : Günter
Olzog, 1960), 50, hereinafter cited as Kracke, Prinz und
Kaiser.
108
Kürenberg, War Alies Falsch?, 117.
109
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, I, 269.
56
appealed to the Kaiserin's maternal and altruistic instincts,
presenting William and himself as gentle, sympathetic
figures in his correspondence. Several examples demonstrated
this situation. If William and Eulenburg encountered a come-
ly maiden on one of their walks, they would sometimes give
110
her a gift such as a brooch or other trinket. Youths
Ill
would receive gold pieces from His Majesty. Eulenburg
waxed sentimental about all this when writing Empress Augusta:
The Kaiser went somewhat late with me alone
through the countryside. After about two hours we
returned. Along the way a young girl (a Norwegian
with flaxen hair and a wry mouth) came travelling
on her bicycle, jumped off of it twenty paces ahead
of us and photographed us at close range without a
word or even a friendly smile. Then she got back
on her bicycle and rode off. This she repeated
audaciously three times, without even showing a
faint sign of embarrassment or friendliness. I was
enraged and bade His Majesty to allow me to say
something rude since I can not only speak Norwegian
but am able to scold in the language as well, But
the Kaiser was so good as to merely laugh. 12
Such a description typified Eulenburg's portrayals where he
also made much of a child's beauty, piety, or innocent senti-
ment.
Eulenburg designed other ways for appealing to the
Kaiserin. He emphasized William's love of animals, especially
Dachshunds. The Kaiser coddled them and even allowed himself
110
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, I, 365.
Ill
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, I, 189.
112
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 212.
57
113
to be photographed engaged in such activity. Eulen-
burg above all informed the Empress of William's chivalry
toward women, even those whom he disliked. One of the
latter, Frau von Kflnig, visited the Imperial yacht during
one of its mooring periods. Though William and Eulenburg
thought little of the noblewoman, they willingly escorted
114
her aboard ship and gave her a tour of the vessel.
Finally, the Kaiser's companion brought out William's gene-
rosity to various causes. In one instance the Emperor
offered an autographed menu to an auction, where it sold for
115
3500 Marks ; Reports of such altruism apparently pleased
the Kaiserin and she responded with praise for her husband's
friend, commenting on the sedative effect that his presence
116
seemed to have on the Kaiser's nerves.
Eulenburg sometimes enhanced his prestige and William's
integrity by acting as a mediator in the latter's domestic
disagreements. In September 1900, William sent his wife a
note from Rominten, ordering that three of their sons, Oscar,
Auwi (AugustWilliam) and Joachim be sent to school at Pión.
The Kaiserin, a possessive mother, would not hear of the idea.
Bülow claims that she went into "paroxysms of rage" over her
113
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, I, 170.
114
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 281.
115
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 282.
116
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, I, 343.
58
117
husband's dictates.
These difficulties compelled William to consult his
friend. Eulenburg suggested that the Kaiser send Oscar and
Auwi away to Pión while allowing Joachim, a frail lad, to
stay at home. The diplomat also advised his friend to
surround the Empress with more educated ladies and that, if
she continued to "carry on" in the future, the Kaiser must go
to his chamber, lock the door, and lie down. Although
William may have followed Eulenburg's advice, he experienced
little success in dealing with his spouse on the matter.
The Empress continued to display bad temper after the inci-
118
dent, much to her husband's chagrin.
William and Eulenburg showed considerable affection for
each other's children. The Kaiser enjoyed his visits to
Liebenberg castle, where the Eulenburg children found him a
delightful companion. The artistic talents of Eulenburg's
daughter, Augusta, impressed William. On one occasion he
119
gave her two thousand marks for two of her paintings.
The Kaiser became godfather to young Victoria (Tora) Eulen-
120
burg, and her father kept him informed of her activities.
The Emperor also held Countess Sandels, Eulenburg's
117
Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, I, 331.
118
Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, I, 331.
119
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 507.
120
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 58.
59
mother-in-law, in high regard. During his own mother's
illness, in 1901, William did not neglect to question his
121
friend concerning the health of the Swedish noblewoman.
Eulenburg enjoyed good relations with the scions of the
Imperial family. He pampered the Kaiser's children, buying
them gifts, playing tennis with them, or entertaining them
with tales of "Mad Ludwig. M12 2 Thus he earned their affec-
tion as "der netteste aller Herren. „12 3 The diplomat dis-
cussed children freely with the Kaiser and his wife, giving
them advice on how to deal with the challenges that all
parents face. He remembered the children's birthdays and
exaggerated the significance of such events as confirmations
124
or tooth-cuttings. On the other hand, in his diary, Eu-
lenburg criticized William in his role as a father. He saw
him as a chameleon-like figure—a genial Vati one moment, a
rigorous drill sergeant the next. The Kaiser expected great
things of his sons, and indoctrinated them with masculine
ideals based on Prussian militarism. He demanded that his
sons obey him and at all times required them to be meticulous
125
in dress and flawless in behavior. In view of these
121
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 241.
122
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 327.
123
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 218.
124
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 126.
125
Cowles, The Kaiser, 243; Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 221.
60
factors, then, it hardly seems strange that the princes would
find the mild-mannered, cultured Eulenburg preferable to their
forceful father. William, however, apparently raised no
objection to this situation. As German Emperor, he could
not have possibly engendered the same warm relationship with
his sons that Eulenburg developed, and apparently he did not
wish to do so.
One of the keys to Eulenburg's success lay in his
ability to endow William with a sense of power. Neither
Emperor Frederick nor his wife had considered their son
William a desirable heir. They found his physical deformity
and arrogant personality revolting. Courtiers as well con-
sidered William an immature princeling, incapable of ruling
an empire. Eulenburg, however, from the outset of his rela-
tionship with the future Kaiser, lauded, though not always
with sincerity, his friend's accomplishments at every
opportunity. Such treatment bolstered William's self-confi-
dence while simultaneously winning for Eulenburg the grati-
tude of his master.
Eulenburg employed a number of methods when attempting
to reinforce the Kaiser's self-image. He exaggerated the
importance of William's accomplishments, making them appear
as gargantuan challenges which the Kaiser successfully over-
came. For example, during the 1890 Nordlandreisen the
Emperor landed an eight-point fish. Eulenburg described in
61
126
extensive detail how William accomplished the feat.
Although he disliked hunting, Eulenburg lauded his friend's
ability with a rifle. The Kaiser's confidant wrote in a
similar manner when describing a whale hunt, contrasting
William's bravery when pursuing the behemoth with his own
127
self-proclaimed cowardice. The Kaiser hiked with enthu-
siasm, and Eulenburg, though finding such activity fatiguing
and demoralizing, praised his friend's endurance capacities.
The Kaiser's health was of primary concern to Eulenburg, and
he mentioned William's robustness and slim physique on a
128
number of occasions.
Eulenburg also admired William's ability to withstand
pain; at least he conveyed this impression when writing the
Kaiserin. The Emperor bore eye and knee injuries unflinch-
ingly during the Nordlandreisen. 129 Eulenburg's view, how-
ever, contrasted sharply with accounts of other close
associates,who saw William as a complainer. In one instance,
the Kaiser, when his physician informed him that he had a
small cold, replied, "No, it is a big cold! Everything about
130
me must be big!I If Nevertheless, for Eulenburg the Emperor
126
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, I, 93.
127
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, I, 244.
128
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 141.
129
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, I. 182; II, 18.
130
Robert Zedlitz-Triitschler, Zwfllf Jahre am deutschen
Kaiserhof Stuttgart : Deutsches Verlag-Anstalt^ 1924) , 199 ,
hereinafter cited as Zedlitz, ZwBlf Jahre.
62
retained a rugged facade.
Eulenburg found some aspects of William's "compulsive
masculinity" annoying, however, and he frequently admonished
his chief for these weaknesses. The Kaiser's passion for the
military particularly disturbed Eulenburg. The latter often
criticized William's love of uniforms, considering such gar-
131
ments foppish and superficial, Eulenburg also disdained
the Kaiser's military field maneuvers, with ample justifica-
tion as those conducting the events always made sure that
William's side would emerge victorious. The Kaiser's
friend felt such practices to be detrimental on two accounts.
They inflated the Emperor's ego to dangerous proportions,
while simultaneously causing the military to lose face in
the eyes of other nations. As Hans Bernd Gisevius observes,
William had no idea of the realities of warfare, and himself
132
became a victim of Prussian militarism and self-hypnosis.
The Kaiser's eventual subservience to members of the General
Staff during the First World War alone demonstrated the
veracity of this statement.
The Kaiser's speeches figured as another manifestation
of William's masculinity which thwarted Eulenburg's attempts
131
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, X, 50; Eulenburg, upon seeing
William outfitted as a Grand Admiral of the British Fleet,
said that his master "acted like a child."
132
Hans Bernd Gisevius, Per Anfang vom Ende, wie es ist
mit Wilhelm II (Zurich; Droener, Knauer Verlag Scholler, 1971) ,
104, hereinafter cited as Gisevius, Per Anfang vom Ende.
63
to improve his friend's public image. In an 1891 speech to
the Brandenburg Provincial Parliament, William likened him-
self to one of the Margraves of Bradenburg, comparing the
latter's military abilities with his own. This "saber-
rattling" disturbed Eulenburg greatly. In 1892, the Kaiser,
in response to the denunciations of pro-Bismarckian forces
and the ex-Chancellor's own attacks, spoke of subduing "a
spirit of insubordination in the land." Eulenburg admonished
William for his allusion, saying frankly that the latter made
133
too free use of his gift of eloquence. To further en-
lighten the Emperor as to the influence of this speech, Eulen-
burg collected negative press comments and sent them to
Foreign Secretary Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, who in
134
turn sent the releases to William—all to little avail.
William achieved notoriety for inscribing "régis
voluntas suprema lex" (the king's will is the highest law) in
the City of Munich's Golden Book. Eulenburg sent the Kaiser
no less than a reprimand concerning this action, which he con-
sidered an affront to the particularist Bavarian government:
In the first place the phrase has given much
offense in the highest quarters and to the Govern-
ment, because here régis voluntas is—insanity!
(the insanity of two kings). And also because the
people, quite apart from this, thought to perceive
as it were an Imperial will predominant over the
Bavarian will, All parties without exception have
been offended by Your Majesty's inscription; it was
133
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 118.
134
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 118.
64
liable to be exploited in a manner most injurious
to Your Majesty.1^5
A militaristic speech in which William promised to lead the
Germans to "days of glory" evoked a similar response from
136
Eulenburg.
William reacted unpredictably to his friend's admoni-
tions. Once, after Eulenburg had reprimanded him for his
attitude toward the South Germans, William implored him not
to lose "his head over those idiotic Bavarian loyalists, who
fall into every trap laid for them by the Berlin free-
thinkers. h 137 Sometimes the Kaiser would take offense at
Eulenburg's remarks, refusing to speak to his friend for a
138
few days. In other instances William would promise to
mend his speech, to use his mouth solely for "eating, drink-
ing, and smoking. „139 William rarely kept such promises,
however, and continued to repeat his mistakes. Eulenburg's
guidance could not cure his master's indiscriminate loqua-
ciousness.
Eulenburg and William shared, among other traits, an
ethnocentric world view. The Kaiser's conviction of Ger-
many's superiority, demonstrated by his famous "Hun speech"
135
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 119.
136
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 120.
137
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 121,
138
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 124,
139
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 251.
65
and other addresses, hardly needs further elaboration. His
wife likewise possessed deep-seated prejudices, considering
the Russians barbaric, the French immoral, and the English
140
selfish and hypocritical. Eulenburg did little to
discourage this intolerance and occasionally even reinforced
the convictions of the Emperor and his spouse.
The Kaiser and Eulenburg possessed mixed feelings about
Great Britain. William, in his early years, at least, con-
sidered himself something of an Anglophobe. Eulenburg con-
sidered this situation a response to the influence of his
grandfather, William I, combined with a distrust of his
English mother, Victoria/and of his father Frederick. The
old Emperor, known as "Grapeshot" in his soldiering days,
composed a one-man bastion of reaction, having little use
for representative governments and related institutions, His
son Frederick, however, considered his father's attitudes
outmoded. The younger man's personal inclinations, in large
part stemming from the influence of his wife, were widely
believed to be toward the liberal tenets of the English
parliamentary system. As Crown Prince, Frederick hoped,
upon his accession, to initiate some governmental reforms in
this direction. A chasm developed between father and son.
William I dreaded the day when his heir would rule Germany;
the nation's military influence would diminish under
140
Cowles, The Kaiser, 183.
66
141
Frederick's liberal reign. Dismissing the Crown Prince
as hopelessly idealistic, the old man focused his attention
Prince William, whom he called "his « 14 2on son. The future
Kaiser apparently felt destined to execute his grandfather's
wishes. This factor, then, coupled with the poor relation-
ship existing between William and his mother and the chilly
receptions at Cowes (see above, p.32), fostered the develop-
ment of an Anglophobic attitude in William.
Eulenburg did little to discourage William's prejudices,
though he recognized some redeeming qualities of Englishmen.
Both men satirized constantly the English affectations of
143
Prince Albert (Abby) von Holstein. In Eulenburg's
opinion, English tourists were hateful people. The Kaiser's
friend spoke of the "dirty English cities" in his writings.
At the same time Eulenburg could laud the technological
development, extensive museums, and the polished etiquette
144
of the ruling classes.
Eulenburg and William also shared similar views of
Americans. On the positive side, the two men enjoyed read-
ing American literature (William especially liked Bret Harte)
and felt some sense of awe for the nation's mushrooming
141
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 187.
142
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 187.
143
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 103.
144
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, I, 141, 148.
67
145
development. Still, like many of their European contem-
poraries, both men considered the more opulent American
citizenry to be uncultivated "Yankees" frantically in pur-
suit of the almighty dollar. For instance, Eulenburg, upon
meeting a scion of the Jay Gould dynasty, characterized the
146
man as a nervous wreck with bitten fingernails. Snobbery
showed itself here, of course. As the heir to an established
and noble fortune, Eulenburg's code allowed him to disdain a
family such as the Goulds, whose founder began as agimcrack
peddler in upstate New York. The Emperor's associate also
possessed little respect for American tourists:
A small, stocky woman with gray poodlelocks
and an impertinent nose wore a dark blue skirt, a
canary yellow satin blouse and a yachting hat with
a brim. A woman of truly gigantic girth,clothed in
white like a vestal virgin, was being pushed up the
steps by her shoulders and arms by three gentlemen—
apparently her sons.-*-47
Circumstances sometimes influenced the attitude of the
Kaiser and Eulenburg toward various ethnic groups. Eulenburg
complained during the 1894 Nordlandreisen of having to ride
in a crowded coach with "Englishmen, Hollanders, and French-
» 14 8
men. Yet the two enjoyed greatly meeting the passengers
on board the ships of other nations. When, in the summer of
145
Balfour, The Kaiser, 89, 165.
146
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 160.
147
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 271.
148
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, I, 317.
68
1899, the Hohenzollern sighted the French Iphigenie at sea,
the latter obligingly raised the German flag on her mast,
much to Eulenburg's delight. On this occasion he wrote
lovingly 149of the French people and their hospitality.
A meeting with the wife of the French diplomat Louis-Maurice
Fenelon produced a similar impression, Eulenburg considered
both her and the daughter of the Duke de Bassano very beau-
tiful and charming. Similarly, William took this oppor-
tunity to discuss shipping, canals, and trade unions with the
150
Duke. When the Hohenzollern came upon an English vessel,
Eulenburg could similarly dispel his Anglophobic sentiments.
On one occasion he portrayed the royal yacht's encounter with
one of Her Majesty's ships as a delightful occasion. The
crews of the two vessels mixed freely, consuming 1500 rolls
and 115 liters of beer between them. The Kaiser, of course,
151
joined in with his usual vigor.
William and Eulenburg shared an ambivalent attitude
toward Jews. Both possessed friends of that faith (such as
Albert Ballin, chairman of the Hamburg-American steamship
line). Both the Kaiser and his friend could, however,
express anti-Semitic feelings in the right environment.
William had been involved in Albert Stficker's Christian
149
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 128.
150
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 260-261.
151
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 133,
69
Social movement as a young man and likened the anti-Semitic
152
preacher to Luther. Eulenburg also found Stacker a
capable pastor but discouraged his friend from participating
in Stficker's movement, one imagines, out of political
153
expediency. (William's opponents had enough to criticize
without the future Kaiser branding himself a "Jew-baiter"!)
Yet Eulenburg himself occasionally made a bigoted comment,
complaining implicitly, for instance, about the number of
154
Jews at an English theatrical performance.
William and Eulenburg, in keeping with their ethno¬
centric tendencies, counted among their acquaintances Houston
Stewart Chamberlain, noted anti-Semitic philosopher and the
progenitor of some of Nazism's ideological foundations. The
Kaiser and Eulenburg both corresponded extensively with
Chamberlain and supported the latter's assertions concerning
the superiority of the Teutons. William especially commended
the English expatriate for "singing the high song of the
152
Otto von Bismarck, Gedanken und Erinnerungen (Stutt-
gart: Cotta, 1922), 584; cf. Balfour, Kaiser, 114.
153
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 178; Hans Wilhelm
Burmeister, "Prince Philipp Eulenburg-Hertefeld (1847-1921) :
His Influence on Kaiser Wilhelm II and His Role in the
German Government," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Oregon, 1972), 50, hereinafter cited as Burmeister
"Philipp Eulenburg-Hertefeld."
154
Eulenburg, Das Ende Kflnigs Ludwigs, 253.
70
Germans. h 155 Neither Eulenburg nor the Kaiser raised objec-
tions to Chamberlain's often irrational opinions, such as
his contention that "Abraham, far from being a historical
figure was a distant memory in the moon worship of
Harar. ,.156 One doubts, however, that either of the men took
such assertions seriously.
In spite of adversities, the relationship between
William and Eulenburg continued, reaching its peak in 1897,
when, on Eulenburg's recommendation, William appointed Bern¬
hard von Bülow Foreign Secretary. From this point onward,
a series of factors led to a loosening of ties between the
two men. Health reasons contributed to this situation.
Eulenburg in 1897 had a bout with influenza and a recurrence
-of his chronic gout condition. Always a nervous individual,
the Kaiser's friend experienced increased disorders of this
nature, often resorting to morphine in order to calm himself.
Eulenburg carried on uncomplainingly as a courtier for about
three more years, but by 1900 he was experiencing constant
tremors and fainting spells, necessitating his decision to
retire from public life. Other factors also added to Eulen-
burg's unhappy situation. The Kaiser had made him his
155
Houston, Stewart Chamberlain, Briefe, 1882-1924, und
Briefwechsel mit Kaiser Wilhelm II (München: F. Brückmann,
1928), III, 200; cf. Balfour, Kaiser, 164.
156
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 273; Balfour, Kaiser,
160.
71
unofficial secretary during the Scandinavian journeys, and
157
the older man complained bitterly of his workload. His
disdain for the buffoonery of William's other comrades had
not diminished. He became increasingly critical of their
personalities, dismissing, for example, General von Hülsen-
Haeseler as a hypochrondriac and Kiderlen-Wâchter as being
158
indecisive and overly loquacious. The rowdiness of the
Norwegian sailors who periodically visited the Hohenzollern
159
also disturbed Eulenburg. Family problems, such as the
illnesses of his mother and his children added to his dis-
160
pleasure.
Eulenburg, responding to this combination of factors,
approached the Kaiser in 1900, asking to be relieved of his
official duties. William refused him and granted his friend
the title of Prince, one suspects, in order to give Eulen-
burg an inducement to remain at court. The older man en-
dured his lot for two more years, but in the summer of 1902,
having suffered excessive headaches, stomach disorders, and
heart trouble, he again went to William. This time, the
Kaiser, after considerable reflection, granted his friend
three months' temporary leave. After that time span had
157
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 38.
158
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 52.
159
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 210.
160
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 173.
72
passed, William formally allowed Eulenburg to resign, giving
him the Grand Cross of the Red Eagle with Oakleaves, the
161
highest award a Prussian ruler could bestow on a subject.
Save for the 190 3 Nordlandreisen, and a few visits by William
to Liebenberg, the personal relationship became dormant.
While health appears to have been the chief reason be-
hind the relationship's decline, other factors contributed
materially to this development. Eulenburg's increased dis-
enchantment with his role as the Emperor's principal friend
weighed heavily too, especially during the summer of 1899.
Political difficulties abounded. The parties of the Reich-
stag were bickering over the House of Correction Bill (pro-
tection for non-strikers) and German policy in the Far East,
and Eulenburg as William's political mediator experienced
tremendous strain. Also, Bismarck's scathing memoirs, re-
162
cently published posthumously, offended the Kaiser deeply.
With Billow as his Foreign Secretary, William increasingly
163
ignored Eulenburg's political advice. Like many on board,
the Kaiser's friend became a victim of typhoid. Finally,
William's negative disposition, reflecting the cares of his
164
present position, complicated matters. Thus the 1899
161
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 291.
162
Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, I, 449.
163
Billow, Denkwürdigkeiten, I, 343-349.
164
Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, I, 351.
73
Norlandreisen held few pleasures for Eulenburg.
The advent of China's Boxer Rebellion placed an addi¬
tional strain on the relationship. William became in¬
creasingly irritable, decrying his European allies in China.
He also suspected that the Conservatives in the Reichstag
were favoring the prolongation of the conflict out of their
165
own, rather than Germany's, self-interest. Eulenburg
shared the Kaiser's displeasure but found it difficult to
sympathize with him on several occasions. The older man
complained freely in his correspondence of the enforced
physical exercises and other activities aboard the Hohenzol-
lern. He contended that the Kaiser, in all his youthful
enthusiasm, could not realize that he, Eulenburg, had become
too old (fifty-three) to participate in such fatiguing pur-
suits as the Nordlandreisen. Rarely, however, did Eulenburg
complain to the Emperor.
The Nordlandreisen of 1901 appears to have been another
"floating hell" for Eulenburg, judging from his correspondence
with his wife Augusta. He fought another bout with typhoid
fever, suffered from gout, and confronted further political
difficulties. Eulenburg's own mother lay near death at this
time, while William's bereavement over the death of the
166
Empress Frederick, his mother, further complicated matters.
165
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 304.
166
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 237.
74
It stands out from Eulenburg's correspondence that the
Kaiser's feelings of guilt and sorrow made him extremely
difficult to live with during this time, as the latter,
clothed in a dressing gown, would pace the deck of the
Hohenzollern. He urged Eulenburg to prattle with him and
dispel his anxieties through his jokes. The pressure of
167
the situation, in Eulenburg's opinion, was indescribable.
After Eulenburg resigned from his ambassadorial post at
Vienna, William initially clung to his friend, asking him to
attend on the 1903 Nordlandreisen. This final trip, judging
from Eulenburg's writings, was the last straw. The Kaiser's
friend now abandoned his inhibitions when corresponding with
his wife and harped on his desire to be relieved of his
courtier's obligations to His Majesty. Eulenburg complained
of the parties, told of how he refused to attend them, and
related unpleasant events. The man who for so long had pre-
tended an interest in regattas now frankly admitted that he
had no understanding of ships and that he found sailing con-
tests boring. More than ever, Eulenburg emphasized the petty
annoyances of ship life—the piped-in music, the uncomfor-
168
table beds, the bad food and coffee. William continued to
utilize his friend's skills as a secretary, which Eulenburg
found irksome. In the Kaiser's presence he suffered in
167
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 309.
168
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 325.
75
silence, but his pen expressed extreme resentment. He had
come to feel himself a relic, unhappy and out of place dur-
169
ing the trips.
William, during this last year of their close associa-
tion, not insensitive to his friend's discontent, became
increasingly quiet around Eulenburg. Definitely the rol-
licking conversation diminished. Showing the considerate-
ness of which he was capable, the Kaiser granted his com-
panion a flexible schedule, permitting him to come and go
at his leisure. This availed little, however, if it con-
cerned restoring Eulenburg's spirits. The Prince would with-
draw from the Imperial entourage, preferring the company of
his friend, Kuno von Moltke (see above, p. 16.) or some
170
other individual. As indicated above, the 1903 trip
remained Eulenburg's last extensive sojourn with the Kaiser.
Until 1906 he would stay out of the limelight of the Imperial
court, a voluntary recluse from the rambunctious crowd that
once cherished his company.
In retrospect, it stands out that the personal relation¬
ship between William and Eulenburg derived its sustenance
from several sources. The two long enjoyed their European
travels, though the Kaiser's friend often disguised certain
of his feelings about these journeys when in his master's
169Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 354-355.
170
Eulenburg, Mit dem Kaiser, II, 351.
76
presence. In the area of esthetic and intellectual pursuits,
Eulenburg helped to develop William's interests, though they
never became as cultivated as his own. The older man per-
ceived the Kaiser as a religiously inclined person, though
he may have exaggerated the Kaiser's preaching abilities to
the Empress Augusta. Both men found themselves at ease with
each other's families, however much the Kaiserin resented
her husband's neglect of herself during Eulenburg's visits.
A critical side to the relationship also existed, one
that sometimes generated minor schisms between Eulenburg and
his chief. Eulenburg reinforced William's ego by praising
the latter's masculine prowess; at the same time, however, he
remained astute enough to deprecate the Kaiser's expressing
this macho trait in his speeches and general behavior.The
two men shared similar ethnocentric tendencies, being firm¬
ly convinced of Germany's greatness and sometimes express¬
ing these feelings in prejudice-laden statements. Thus
Eulenburg obviously would not be one to discourage William
from voicing his own opinions in this direction. Finally,
certain insurmountable difficulties existed in the relation-
ship. Eulenburg's health, combined with political strains,
William's hyperactivity, and the older man's increasing isola-
tion from the Kaiser's chosen circle, eventually caused the
friendship to wane. The once-powerful bind which had manifest-
ed itself in so many facets of both men's existence, twenty
years after its initiation had ceased to function meaningfully.
CHAPTER II
EULENBURG AND BISMARCK'S DISMISSAL, 1886-1890
Philipp zu Eulenburg's role as a political intermediary
formed an integral part of his relationship with William.
The year 1886 became a crucial one for Eulenburg in this re-
gard. In addition to making the acquaintance of Prince
William in that year, thanks to Herbert von Bismarck, the as-
piring diplomat also met Friedrich von Holstein, Senior
Councillor at the German Foreign Office. Born in the East
Elbian region of Prussia, not far from Frankfurt am Oder,
Holstein had been a philanderer in his youth while serving in
London and Washington, D. C., in minor diplomatic posts.
It is well known how Bismarck then used him as a spy in
Paris in order to discredit the German Ambassador there,
Count Harry von Arnim. Arnim's friends soon discovered the
incident and Holstein emerged with a tainted reputation,
one which caused him to become a recluse. Yet his shunning
of society apparently only intensified a ruthless power
mania. From his post in the German Foreign Office, Hoi-
stein continued to manipulate officials, especially those on
his private blacklists. He considered all of his asso¬
ciates political foils, and it appears that he found in
Eulenburg yet another individual through whom he could
execute his political maneuvers. Though Holstein never met
William until well into the Emperor's reign, he early
78
realized that Philipp zu Eulenburg could be used as a con-
duit for insinuating the proper ideas in the imperial mind.
From the time of their initial acquaintance until 1894,
Holstein influenced Eulenburg's dealings with William more
than any other individual.^"
A number of controversies soon demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of the bond that developed between Eulenburg and
Holstein. There was the Septennate Bill laid before the
German Reichstag in 1887, which called for large increases
in military manpower and appropriations for the seven-year
span, 1887-1893. The liberal parties of the Reichstag dis-
approved of such long-term bills, claiming that they prevent-
ed the parliament from controlling much of the government
budget. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck nevertheless supported
the proposal, and his allies—the Free Conservatives, Con-
servatives, and National Liberals, stood behind it. By
themselves, these parties could not obtain a majority in the
Reichstag; the success of the Septennate depended upon the
support of the Catholic Center party. Bismarck, whose anti-
Catholic views, manifested ten years before in the Kulturkampf,
Michael Tyler-Whittle, The Last Kaiser: A Biography of
Wilhelm II, German Emperor andHKing of Prussia (New York:
New York Times, 1977), 134-36, hereinafter cited as Tyler-
Whittle, The Last Kaiser; Norman Rich, Friedrich von Hoi-
stein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and
William II (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1965) , I,
229-233, hereinafter cited as Rich, Holstein; Cecil, German
Diplomatic Service, 267.
79
had mellowed considerably, now catered to his former oppo-
nents. He promised the Catholic Church special concessions
2
if they would support the Bill.
Eulenburg entered the picture when Pope Leo XIII, hav-
ing gotten wind of the seven-year proposal, sent a letter
to Bismarck in which he expressed his support for the Bill.
The Chancellor, seeing in the letter material for wooing
the Center, published and circulated the document. Prince
William found this situation suspicious and consulted
Eulenburg concerning the significance of Bismarck's actions.
The diplomat contended that the circulation of such a
missive damaged the Bill's chances for passage. The Bavar-
ian ultramontanes, the core of the Center, usually stood be-
hind the Pope. At this time, however, so Eulenburg assert-
ed, the same group would feel it necessary to limit the
powers of the Holy See in the realm of Bavarian political
affairs. They would oppose the Septennate proposal in spite
of the papacy.^ In this instance Eulenburg's contentions
proved incorrect. The Center, rather than opposing Leo's
stance, abstained entirely from voting on the issue, allowing
4
its passage by default.
Eulenburg played a far more significant role in the
2
Rich, Holstein, I, 226.
^Haller, Aus dem Leben, 2 7.
4
Balfour, Kaiser, 106.
80
events which eventually climaxed in Bismarck's dismissal.
He served both as an intermediary between William and the
opponents of Bismarck (headed by Friedrich von Holstein and
Alfred von Waldersee, Chief of the General Staff), and as a
confidant to the Kaiser during the latter's conflict with
the aged Chancellor. To be sure, it is difficult to
determine the precise extent to which Eulenburg actually
influenced William's final decision to dismiss Bismarck.
From their initial contact, the Chancellor and Eulenburg
found few redeeming qualities in one another. The two met
formally during the 1880's, and while Princess Johanna von
Bismarck found Eulenburg a charming conversationalist and
accomplished pianist, her husband made out the aspiring
diplomat to be a mere hack, a fop—a flatterer whose talk
centered around French cuisine and other inconsequential
subjects.5 In fact the Chancellor once likened Eulenburg
to an eel with "eyes that could spoil the best breakfast."^
He looked upon William's relationship with the young
Prussian nobleman with considerable disdain:
This type is quite dangerous for the dramatic
temperament of the Kaiser . . . When(ever) Eulen-
burg is near His Royal Highness, he takes on the
posture of flattery, in my opinion quite openly.
As soon as the Kaiser glances up he is sure to find
Maurice Baumont, L'Affaire Eulenburg et les origines
de la guerre mondiale (Paris: Payot, 1933), 41, ‘ hereinafter
cited as Baumont, Eulenburg.
g
Kürenberg, War Alies Falsch?, 68; Bismarck, Gedanken
und Erinnerungen, III, 142-143 ; Cowles, The Kaiser, 82.
81
the admiring eye of the Count directed toward
him. 7
In return, according to Baumont, Eulenburg considered the
8
Chancellor an uncultured and inhospitable individual.
On the other hand, Eulenburg's friendship with Herbert
von Bismarck more than compensated for the Chancellor's un-
pleasantness. The younger Bismarck had known Eulenburg
since 1879, and had found him a delightful companion and
confidant. Unlike his father, Herbert thought it splendid
that Eulenburg should cultivate the future Kaiser's friend¬
ship, believing that Eulenburg would have a settling in-
fluence on the restless Prince William. Herbert considered
Eulenburg a trustworthy personal confidant as well, and
freely confessed to him such problems as the Chancellor's
disapproval of Elizabeth von Carolath-Beuthen, a Catholic
divorcee whom Herbert longed to marry. Even during the
Chancellor crisis of 1886-1890, Eulenburg constantly
flattered Herbert while asking him to influence his father on
issues which divided William and the old man. Likewise, Eu-
lenburg expressed sincere regret when Herbert resigned his
position as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and joined
9
his father in retirement. Thus Eulenburg’s ambivalent
7
Hugo von Lerchenfeld-Koefering, Erinnerungen und Den-
kwürdigkeiten, comp, and ed. by Hugo von Lerchenfeld Koe-
fering (Berlin : E. S. Mittler, 1935), 513; cf. Kracke, Prinz
und Kaiser, 51.
8
Baumont, Eulenburg, 42.
^Baumont, Eulenburg, 43; see Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren,
290-91.
82
relationship with the Bismarck dynasty makes it difficult to
draw a simple conclusion regarding his role in the actual
conflict. The fact remains, however, that Eulenburg gave
much advice to the Kaiser before the dismissal, and the con-
sidération must be entertained that when he did give his
approval to William's action, he did so only after a long
period of soul-searching and consideration of the political
consequences.
Bismarck's dismissal resulted from a series of events
which served to alienate him from William and Eulenburg. As
early as 1886, William had opposed the Chancellor's "rail-
roading" of the appointment of his son-in-law, Kuno von
Rantzau, as Prussian ambassador to Bavaria. Eulenburg and
his new confederate, Friedrich von Holstein, also opposed
Rantzau. In addition to this situation, Bismarck's conclu-
sion of a secret alliance with Russia, the Reinsurance Treaty,
made him enemies in military circles. The representatives of
the army in turn conveyed their dissent to William, over whom
they exercised a powerful influence. Bismarck's uncompro¬
mising attitude toward the political left, manifested in
the expulsion paragraphs of the 1889 anti-Socialist bill
(see below) alienated many of his more moderate contempo-
raries, and also the Kaiser more than ever. William's
support of labor legislation, encouraged in part by Eulenburg,
evoked little sympathy from the Chancellor, whose own social
programs had not checked the growth of German socialism.
83
Finally, the personalities of William and Bismarck, each
marked by arrogance and an inability to compromise, inten-
sified the conflict between the two men. In the midst of
their two-year struggle, Eulenburg played an important
role as the intermediary between William and the parties
which contributed to the Chancellor's fall.
Eulenburg, both in the interest of himself and others.
wished to prevent Count Rantzau from taking over the
Prussian ambassadorship at Munich. Since 1886, Rantzau
had been engaged in a campaign to remove Count Georg
Werthern-Berchlingen, Eulenburg's beloved chief during his
previous years in Munich, from his position as ambassador
to Bavaria. Friedrich von Holstein, however, led the
opposition against Rantzau, considering the latter's
caustic personality and ties with the Bismarck family a
detriment to Prussia's relationship with the South German
states. It stands out that the cooperation of Eulenburg
with Holstein during this crisis enhanced their association
greatly, and that it was from this point that the role of
both men in influencing the policies of Emperor William II
actually began.^
10
John G. C. Rfihl, ed • / Philipp Eulenburg's politische
Korrespondenz (Boppard am Rhein: Boldt Verlag, 1976-1978),
I, 184, hereinafter cited as E. p. K * r with volume and page
no.; D. g. P., III, 243-247; Burmelster, in "Philipp Eulen-
burg-Hertefeld," 66, erroneously holds that primarily
William II and Eulenburg wanted Eulenburg's one-time super-
ior, Werthern-Berchlingen,to remain at the Munich post, and
thus expressed opposition to the Chancellor's intentions of
84
In keeping with his plans to prevent Rantzau's
appointment, Holstein wrote to Eulenburg, who seemed to have
obtained the trust of influential parties at the Bavarian
court. Holstein asked him to inform Herbert von Bismarck
of Count Werthern's high political competence. Additionally
he requested that the young diplomat at Munich convince
Prince Luitpold, Regent of Bavaria, of the desirability of
keeping Werthern at his ambassadorial post. Holstein appa-
rently hoped that Luitpold would convey a message in this
desired spirit to Kaiser William II, and that he would com-
11
ply with the Bavarian ruler's request, Eulenburg, for his
part, did as Holstein suggested, only to have Luitpold
execute his part of the plan unsuccessfully. Instead of
informing Emperor William directly of his desire to keep
Werthern in Munich, the Prince Regent asked Werthern to send
a personal self-recommendation to Berlin. The Prussian
ambassador, of course, could not expediently do this and
12
Holstein's plan fell through.
The struggle over Rantzau's candidature continued for
two years. Eulenburg, who at first had supported Werthern,
grew increasingly skeptical of Holstein's attempts to prevent
replacing him with Rantzau. Burme is termakes no mention of
Holstein's actual part in the affair, and that it was Hoi-
stein not Eulenburg who really led the opposition.
11*
j-i • Pu K., I, 177-183; Rich, Holstein,I, 231.
12
Rich, Holstein, I, 232.
85
Rantzau's appointment. Eulenburg himself, in fact, had his
sights set on the ambassadorial post but did not want to
13
agitate the Bismarcks. After consulting with Holstein,
Eulenburg, now the intimate friend of Prince William,decided
that rather than continuing to oppose Rantzau's appointment,
it would be better merely to postpone the event. Bismarck's
son-in-law officially received his ambassadorial position in
March 1888; Eulenburg, however, remained as charge
d1 affaires at Munich until October of the same year. Both
Holstein and Eulenburg hoped that the latter's competent per-
formance would influence the soon-to-be Emperor William to
appoint Eulenburg to the Bavarian post. (Emperor Frederick's
cancerous condition had reached its final stages by this
time.) William, however, had little desire to alienate the
Bismarcks at the outset of his reign, and therefore allowed
14
Rantzau to take his post at Munich. The new Kaiser
assigned Eulenburg as Prussian envoy to the Grand Duchy of
Oldenburg, a position which the diplomat, though disappoint-
ed, accepted with grace. In a true display of sympathy for
Eulenburg's plight, Herbert von Bismarck took this opportuni-
ty to write his friend, promising that should Rantzau
relinquish the Munich post, the younger Bismarck would
13
Rich, Holstein, I, 232.
14
Rich, Holstein, I, 234,
86
15
recommend Eulenburg as his brother-in-law's successor.
Such actions naturally strengthened the relationship be-
tween Herbert and Eulenburg, and thus made the latter more
willing to tolerate the elder Bismarck's domineering ways.
Bismarck's foreign policy, however, also aggravated
William, Eulenburg, and their close associates. In 1887 the
Chancellor, as mentioned previously, had formulated the
secret Reinsurance Treaty, which stood in direct contradic-
tion to the quasi-anti-Russian coalition of Germany, Austria-
Hungary, and Italy which Bismarck had helped institute in
1881. To the designers of that "legitimate" agreement, among
them Friedrich von Holstein, Bismarck's dealings with the
Russians suggested treachery. Holstein's Russophobic
tendencies, shared also by many men in high military posi-
tions, thus contributed notably to Bismarck's eventual
16
ouster.
The year 1889 witnessed a number of important events,
some of which led directly to the Chancellor's fall. In
that year Eulenburg, acting on the advice of Friedrich von
Holstein, helped precipitate a controversy in Bavaria by
urging William to oppose the re-establishment of the
Redemptorist monastic order in that state. Undoubtedly
both Eulenburg and Holstein wished to undermine Count von
15e. p. K., I, 315.
16
Lerchenfeld, Erinnerungen/ 336; Rich, Holstein, I, 250.
87
Rantzau during his Munich tenure and saw this as a method
for accomplishing that goal. It was also of paramount
importance, in the opinion of both men, that papal domina-
17
tion be kept out of Bavaria.
The Wohlgemuth affair of 1889 further demonstrated
Bismarck's desire to appease Russia,and thus further con¬
tributed to his enemies' suspicions. Neither Eulenburg
nor Holstein, however, attempted to exploit the episode.
It commenced in April 1889 when a German police inspector
named Wohlgemuth crossed the Swiss border, where authorities
arrested him on the charge of acting to enlist Swiss under¬
cover agents against German Socialists. Bismarck seeing in
the situation an opportunity to strengthen the common con¬
servative ties between Germany and Russia, accordingly called
upon the latter to join him in 'hsking" Switzerland to put an
end to the asylum enjoyed by foreign agitators in that
country. Russia agreed to the proposal. Nevertheless, as
the German government began to exert pressure on Switzerland
by tightening passport and customs regulations on the Swiss
frontier, it found that its action also adversely affected
the economy and tourist trade of the South German states.
These entities grew increasingly unhappy with Bismarck's
proposal, and their discontent eventually reached the Kaiser
through his Uncle Frederick, Grand Duke of Baden, who urged
17e. p. K., I, 216-270, 360.
88
18
him to oppose the Chancellor. Apparently, William ser-
iously considered Frederick's advice, judging from the urgent
note which Eulenburg, after consulting with Herbert von
Bismarck and Holstein, sent him in June of 1889:
If the Chancellor admonishes caution regard-
ing Russia, and even raises the Cabinet question,
justifiably one must also be careful of Switzer-
land, inasmuch as this matter simultaneously affects
the interests of the Reich. For Bavaria, Baden,
etc. shall follow us only forcibly, if we exercise
reprisals now. 9
The note suggested that for the most part Eulenburg, always a
political pragmatist, could not find a suitable alternative
to Bismarck, for the time being.
Bismarck's proposal that Russian railroads market a
quantity of their securities on the German stock exchange fur¬
ther strained relations between William and the Chancellor.
The Emperor and many others, including Eulenburg, viewed Bis¬
marck's move as another attempt toward a Russian alliance,
and a measure that would weaken Germany in the event that the
two nations went to war. In such a situation, the vast
number of Russian railroad securities in German hands would
have given the Slavic nation a means for fostering a harmful
outflow of German currency. In June 1889, William demanded
18 «
Waldersee, Denkwurdigkeiten, I, 217; cf. Rich, Holstein
I, 251.
19
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 284; E. p. K., I, 341; Bur-
meister in "Philipp Eulenburg-Hertefeld" fails to make any
mention of the Wohlgemuth affair, and how it involved Hoi-
stein and Eulenburg.
89
that Bismarck terminate this securities conversion operation.
The Chancellor refused to cooperate and again the threat of
20
a political schism emerged. Both General von Waldersee
and Holstein entered the picture at this point, wishing to
see Bismarck dismissed over the issue. Political expediency,
however, made such a move unfeasible, although Waldersee, who
distrusted Bismarck intensely, had been advocating the
Chancellor's removal for almost a year. (Waldersee himself
wanted the Reichskanzler post.) In keeping with this line of
action, Holstein wrote to William.. He urged that rather than
engaging in open controversy with Bismarck over the secur-
ities issue, the Kaiser should order a vigorous newspaper
21
campaign against these investments. Holstein also express-
ed similar views to Eulenburg. He asserted that the Kaiser's _
direct involvement in the controversy would serve to widen
the breach between himself and Bismarck, and that this situ-
22
ation could make Germany vulnerable to war. Apparently
Eulenburg heeded Holstein's advice, for William, although he
privately opposed his Chancellor's actions, held his tongue
through the crisis.
20
Waldersee, Briefwechsel, I, 301-304; Rich, Holstein,
I, 251.
21
Waldersee, Briefwechsel, I, 302; Rich, Holstein, I,
252.
22
E. p. K., I, 341; Rich, Holstein, I, 252; Burmeister,
in "Philipp Eulenburg-Hertefeld" ignores the Russian
securities question and Eulenburg's and Holstein's involve-
ment.
90
Bismarck himself eventually sensed William's dis-
approval. By July 1889, he had begun to question the wisdom
of the securities issue, and realized that his resistance
could place his own political position in jeopardy. On
July 5, 1889, the Kaiser received news that the government,
with the Chancellor's approval, would continue to permit
the conversion of Russian securities on the German stock
exchange. At the same time, however, the Emperor got word
from Bismarck that the latter had issued orders to his
mouthpiece, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, to warn
the German public against buying the securities. The Chan-
cellor, then, successfully worked his way out of the
securities crisis and retained the Kaiser's toleration.
Eulenburg, having played a small role in the Russian
securities question, soon confronted a new Russian crisis.
The announcement by Tsar Alexander III in the summer of 1889
that he planned to visit Berlin in October revived old
apprehensions. Holstein especially feared that the Kaiser,
when confronted by the Russian Emperor's massive physique
and forceful personality, would be moved to make dangerous
concessions to Germany's eastern neighbor. Holstein con-
veyed these fears to Eulenburg, informing him of the
23
necessity of keeping the Kaiser firm in his convictions.
Holstein's move proved expedient, While the German Emperor
23JE. P- K., I, 364; Rich, Holstein, I, 258.
91
prepared for Alexander's visit, reports of Russian army
divisions on that nation's western boundary filtered into
Berlin. Eulenburg's influence, combined with this impetus,
apparently impressed William, for no premonitions of German
concessions or conflicts with Russia came out of his meet-
24
ing with Alexander on October 11-13. Nevertheless, the
Kaiser's request that he be allowed to visit the 1890
Russian army maneuvers again sent Holstein and his Russo-
phobic associates scurrying. Either of his own volition or
under Holstein's influence, Eulenburg wrote General von
Waldersee requesting that he "enlighten His Majesty about
the true state of affairs" so far as Russian armaments were
concerned. Waldersee agreed to do so but also asked that
he be allowed to inform the Kaiser on other than military
25
affairs. Eulenburg, fearful that the General would per-
petuate any disagreements already existing between his mas¬
ter and Bismarck, replied to Waldersee concerning this
matter. He emphasized his high regard for the General but
simultaneously held that the military were taking too hard
a line toward Russia—an approach which could engender
extremely negative results. Eulenburg also emphasized the
conflict between the military and Foreign Office that such a
24d. g. P., III, 383; Rich, Holstein, I, 258.
25
Waldersee, Briefwechsel, I, 329.
92
26
Russophobic policy could create. Finally Eulenburg,
using Holstein as his mouthpiece, also sought to criticize
the General for his conduct of military maneuvers, farci-
cal events which gave the Kaiser victory at every turn,
and bolstered his ego to dangerous propositions. Holstein
too found Waldersee trying his patience when the latter, in
response to the question of labor reform, asserted that
"only religion and faith could help, ii 2 7 Holstein undoubt-
edly considered the General's naivete unbecoming for one who
aspired to the Chancellor's position. Nevertheless he would
be better than Bismarck. Thus Holstein, responding to this
circumstance, resolved to keep peace with the General, at
least until the Chancellery crisis had run its course.
Conflicting views on social questions also precipitated
differences between William and Bismarck. An 1889 coal
strike in the Ruhr region aroused the Kaiser's sympathy for
the miners, and he sought to bring about labor reform legis-
lation throughout the initial years of his reign, much to
28
Bismarck's chagrin. It was probably because of the
Chancellor's intensified anti-Socialist proposals, however,
that he and William continued to remain at odds. In October
26
Waldersee, Briefwechsel, I, 335.
27
Rich, Holstein, I, 260.
28e. P- K., I, 396; Rich, Holstein, I, 200; Alan Palmer,
The Kaiser: Warlord of the Second Reich (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, (1978), 43, hereinafter cited as Palmer,
Kaiser.
93
1889 Bismarck asked the Reichstag to alter the anti-Socia¬
list law of 1878 and include in the legislation "explusion
paragraphs" which gave police the right to remove Socialists
from their homes and transfer them to other locations
29
throughout Germany. The parties of the pro-Bismarck
"cartel" (Free Conservatives, moderate Conservatives, and
National Liberals), which dominated the Reichstag, accepted
the anti-Socialist Bill in principle but disagreed on the
explusion paragraphs. The two conservative factions
favored the Chancellor's alteration of the law while the
30
National Liberals rejected them.
At this point Friedrich von Holstein joined forces with
Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, Baden's Minister to Berlin,
and also enlisted Eulenburg in an effort to prevent the
"cartel" from violently splitting over the anti-Socialist
issue. Marschall and Holstein met with leaders of the
Bismarckian parties, urging them to accept the anti-Socialist
proposal without the expulsion paragraphs. The Free Conser-
vatives responded favorably to Holstein, and sent their lead-
er, Otto von Helldorf-Bedra, to talk with the Chancellor at
Friedrichsruh, his country estate near Hamburg. Failing to
convince Bismarck to retract the explusion clauses, Helldorf
then went to Emperor William, hoping that his Majesty would
29
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 226; Rich, Holstein, I, 262.
30
Wilhelm II, Ereignisse, 32-35; Palmer, Kaiser, 44-45;
Rich, Holstein, I, 262.
94
commit himself to the more moderate anti-Socialist legisla-
31
tion and thus change the Chancellor's opinion. In this
instance Eulenburg as well as Helldorf found themselves
employed by Holstein in an effort to influence William's
stance. The Foreign Office functionary's reaction to a
speech made by William at Frankfurt on December 11, 1889 in-
dicates that the henchmen had succeeded with William:
Today, however, I would like to compliment
Your Majesty on the speech in Frankfurt and on
the toast to Miquel. You are quite a fellow!
The speech has been interpreted everywhere as an
accentuation of cartel politics. 2
Holstein's efforts, however, worked to little avail.
Bismarck would not retract the explusion clauses and William
refused to give a commitment to support the anti-Socialist
law in its modified form. Without William's backing, the
moderate bill found no support from the conservative parties
33
when it came up before its respective Reichstag committee.
Only political maneuvering by Ludwig Windthorst, a leader of
the Reichstag's Center party, secured the acceptance in
34
committee of the bill in its modified form.
31
Otto von Helldorf-Bedra, "Der Fall des Sozialisten-
gesetzes," Deutsche Revue, 1900, 277, hereinafter cited as
Helldorf-Bedra "Der Fall des Sozialistengesetzes"; cf. Rich,
Holstein, I. 263.
32e. P- K., I, 385; Rich, Holstein, I. 263.
33
Helldorf-Bedra, "Der Fall des Sozialistengesetzes";
cf. Rich, Holstein, I, 203.
34
Erich Eyck, Bismarck (Erlenbach-Zürich: Rentsch, 1955),
III, 562, hereinafter cited as Eyck, Bismarck.
95
Eulenburg involved himself in another controversy
similar to that surrounding the anti-Socialist Bill, that of
labor reform. Beginning in 1889, William, as previously
mentioned, had been asserting his views on the labor question
with increased frequency. The Kaiser found support from
both Holstein and Eulenburg, both of whom agreed that,
especially in the areas of Sunday work and employment of
women and children, changes had to be made. Their backing
apparently gave William confidence in his cause, for he
then proceeded to express his opinions to Karl Heinrich von
Boetticher, who in turn presented the Kaiser's views to
Bismarck. Bismarck, who had been away from Berlin since
April 1889, asserted that he would oppose any labor reforms
presented to the Reichstag, fearing that they would enhance
the power of the Socialists. In expressing this feeling, the
old man was expressing the opinion of many of his class
that such changes would merely precipitate unrest among the
35
working classes. The Chancellor's response, of course,
angered William and those around him. Eulenburg, however,
upon hearing of the situation urged William to retain his
Holstein, I, 263.
35
Otto von Bismarck, Die gesammelten Werke (Berlin:
Hollberg, 1924), XV, 483; hereinafter cited as Bismarck, Die
gesammelten Werke; Bismarck, Gedanken und Erinnerungen, III,
50-51; Wilhelm II, Ereignisse, 33; Rich, Holstein, I, 264;
Palmer, Kaiser, 45.
96
36
composure.
Although unsuccessful in convincing Bismarck to support
the modified anti-Socialist proposal, Boetticher had re-
ceived strong support for labor legislation from party
leaders in the Reichstag. It appears that William sensed
the power of such backing, for he decided to ignore Bis-
marck's denunciations and place the labor proposals before
Germany's legislative body. Here Eulenburg again entered the
picture. Drs. Franz Fischer and Paul Kayser (Eulenburg's
preceptor in his Strasbourg days), fervent supporters of
labor reform, were engaged in producing a series of memoranda
pointing out the necessity for such legislation. Both
Fischer and Kayser realized that Eulenburg exercised a special
influence over William and those in government, and therefore
directed many of their proposals to him through correspon-
dence. Fischer presented theoretical arguments for labor re-
form, emphasizing among other things that reduced working
37
hours improved workers' attitudes. Kayser took a his-
torical view of the labor question, pointing to the worker
discontent which government delays would engender, All
revolutions throughout history, according to Kayser, could
have been prevented if necessary reforms had been made.
These same workers, now well-organized and informed, could
36
Waldersee, Briefwechsel, I, 87; cf. Rich, Holstein, I,
264.
37e. p. K., I, 410; Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 244.
97
again start a revolution under the influence of the Socia-
38
lists; Such statements impressed both Eulenburg and his
cohort Holstein. Holstein especially found the statements
persuasive, and asserted to Eulenburg that the labor ques-
tion would not be settled with a curt "no." Holstein also
informed his associate that the state of Saxony planned to
raise the labor question in the Bundesrat Cupper house of
parliament), and that William, always the supporter of labor
reform, had ordered Interior Minister Boetticher to cast
Prussia's votes in favor of such a proposal when it came
39
under discussion. (Each German state was represented in
the Bundesrat.) Eulenburg, impressed by both Fischer's and
Kayser's writings, as well as by Holstein's announcements,
wrote to Baron Freyschlag, the adjutant of Prince Regent
Luitpold of Bavaria, and to Bavarian Prime Minister Johann
40
von Lutz. He informed both of William's opinions. After
Eulenburg had accomplished this task, Holstein took it
upon himself to meet with Herbert von Bismarck on January
23, 1890. The Gray Eminence (Holstein's nickname in court
circles) told Herbert that the Chancellor stood virtually
alone in his opposition to the labor proposals, and that he
hoped the old man would willingly cooperate at a Crown
38e, p. K., I, 415.
3V P- K., I, 411; Rich, Holstein, I, 265.
40e. p. K., I, 422; Rich, Holstein, I, 266.
98
Council meeting which William had scheduled for the 'follow'-
41
ing day. Herbert gave no committing reply.
On January 24, the council met with William, Eulenburg,
and other officials to discuss labor legislation. Only
Bismarck was absent, for William, wishing to dominate the
proceedings, had called the Chancellor at the last minute.
It appears that he also wanted to prevent Bismarck from in-
42
fluencing any of the Crown Council members. When the
Chancellor finally did arrive at the Berlin meeting from
Eriedrichsruh , the Kaiser commenced with a series of reform
proposals which, if initiated, would presumably serve as a
safeguard against revolution, (Such phraseology reflected
the influence of Kayser’s memorandum.) The Kaiser also
pressed for the passage of an anti-Socialist law without
the expulsion paragraphs. Bismarck for his part refused at
first to accept William's proposals, considering his efforts
to appease the workers unfeasible. If William still wished
to carry out his program, the Chancellor asserted, perhaps
he, Bismarck, had outlived his usefulness and should
43
retire. (Bismarck had used resignation threats on numerous
41e. P- K., I, 422; Rich, Holstein, I, 266.
42
David Burnett King, "Marschall von Bieberstein and
the New Course, 1890-1897," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Cornell University, 1962); cf. Rich, Holstein, I, 267.
43
Georg von Eppstein, ed, Fürst Bismarcks Entlassung:
Nach den hinterlassenen bisher unverflffentlichten Aufzeich^
nungen des Staatsekretà*rs des Innern, Staatsminister Dr.
Karl Heinrich von Boetticher und des Chefs der Reichskahzlei
99
occasions in order to keep himself in power.) Relating the
day's activities to Eulenburg, William expressed privately
the temptation to fire the Chancellor after his remark.
44
Eulenburg lauded him for resisting this impulse.
Bismarck's presence in Berlin soon made itself felt.
When the Reichstag voted on the anti-Socialist proposals
(January 25, 1890), the parties of the right refused to
support the Emperor. Thus, while the National Liberals
backed the modified bill, both the Conservatives and Free
Conservatives refused to consider the legislation without
the expulsion paragraph. The parties of the Left, of
course, opposed anti-Socialist legislation in any form.
Consequently the modified anti-Socialist law failed and Bis-
marck's "cartel" again seemed ready to split apart. It
appeared, much to the chagrin of Eulenburg and Holstein,
that the Chancellor now possessed the opportunity to emerge
as a hero and win the Kaiser's support. If the parties of
the right, including the National Liberals, would back
his anti-Socialist proposal, and if he could enlist the
votes of the Center, Bismarck would then see the enactment
of the expulsion paragraphs. Holstein, aware of this possi-
bility, informed Eulenburg of its unfavorable consequences.
unter dem Fürsten Bismarck Dr. Franz Johannes von Rottenburg
(Berlin: A. Scherl, 1920), 46, hereinafter cited as Eppstein,
Fürst Bismarcks Entlassung; cf. Rich, Holstein, I, 269.
44e. p. K., I, 425.
100
Bismarck's catering to the Center would bolster that party's
influence throughout Germany, especially in Bavaria, where
the ultramontanes held sway. The papacy would exert its
influence unhampered, something which both Eulenburg and
Holstein viewed as catastrophic. As a precaution Holstein
urged Eulenburg to have William advise the National Liberals
and the Prussian Ministry of State of such possibilities—
45
before the bill again came under consideration. Eulen-
burg wrote William concerning this matter and the latter
called a Crown Council meeting on January 26. Bismarck, as
Holstein expected, appeared at this meeting, where he spoke
in a conciliatory way to William and asserted that he would
46
yield to the Kaiser's wishes on the labor question.
William for all his skepticism believed Bismarck and invited
him to his birthday reception the next day.
Neither Eulenburg nor Holstein took an active role in
th events following the Council meeting when Bismarck re-
vealed his true intentions. On January 28, 1890, Count
Wilhelm von Hohenthal, Saxon emissary to Berlin, informed
Interior Minister Boetticher that the Saxon government intended
to introduce legislation for the protection of laborers at the
45e. p. K., I. 423; Rich, Holstein, I. 469-470.
46
Robert Sigmund, Freiherr Lucius von Ballhausen, Bis-
marck-Erinnerungen des Staatsministers Freiherrn Lucius von
Ballhausen (Stuttgart and Berlin: Cotta, 1924), 512-513,
hereinafter cited as Lucius, Erinnerungen; cf. Rich, Hoi-
stein, I. 270.
101
next meeting of the Bundesrat. Bismarck upon hearing this
news, confronted Hohenthal and forcefully commanded him that
Saxony would propose no such bill under any circumstances.
Hohenthel reported this incident to his home government and
to William. The latter now saw that Bismarck had no inten-
tion of going along with his labor improvement programs or
47
the modified anti-Socialist law. Unable to contain him-
self any longer, William burst into the Chancellor's Office
on January 31, 1890, and demanded to know what Bismarck
intended to do about the Kaiser's social proposals. The
Chancellor responded calmly and explained that he was
directing the preparation of two imperial manifestos on the
labor question--one concerning the international aspects of
the problem, the other dealing with a labor law for the
48
Reich. This explanation temporarily pacified the Kaiser,
as he did not seek advice from either Eulenburg or Holstein
for almost a week. A conniving move by Bismarck, however,
brought them back into the picture.
On February 4, 1890 Bismarck ordered the publication of
the two imperial proclamations, without his customary
counter-signature. This move thus placed the responsibility
for the words exclusively on the Kaiser, whose signature
47
Eppstein, Fürst Bismarcks Entlassung, 52; cf. Rich,
Holstein, I, 270.
48
Eppstein, Fürst Bismarcks Entalassung, 52; cf. Rich,
Holstein, I. 270~ '
102
customarily graced such documents. Additionally, the
Chancellor had worded the proclamations so as to make them
seem threatening to private enterprise, and thus discredit
49
the Emperor in the eyes of his capitalist subjects.
Bismarck's intriguing shocked Holstein, and on the Foreign
Office official's urging, Eulenburg urged William that he
appoint a committee to design social proposals more agree-
50
able to those in positions of wealth.
Eulenburg also sought other ways to aid his master in
opposing the Chancellor. The imperial proclamations had
called for an international labor conference, which the
Crown had hoped would meet in Berlin. Bismarck, receiving
this news, responded by writing letters to the German
ambassadors in France, England, Belgium, and Switzerland,
instructing that they instead attend a similar conference
51
sponsored by the Swiss government. This behavior angered
William, and he sent Eulenburg to the Swiss ambassador in
Berlin, hoping that through Eulenburg's influence, the
emissary would be able to persuade his government to cancel
the labor conference. The Swiss ambassador accomplished this
49
Bismarck, Gedanken und Erinnerungen, III, 77; Eppstein,
Fürst Bismarcks Entlassungÿ 515 ; D.g.P,, III, 289-292; Rich,
Holstein, I, 272.
50
Rich, Holstein, I, 272.
51
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 231-232; Bismarck, Die gesam-
me1ten Werke, XV, 501; Lucius, Erinnerungen, 515; cf^ Rich,
Holstein, I, 272.
103
task most successfully, and the Kaiser's labor meeting
52
materialized.
Bismarck's delinquent actions did not prevent him from
meeting with the Kaiser on February 25, 1890, in order to
discuss the formation of a new parliamentary "cartel." In
view of the outcome of the anti-Socialist controversy and
breakup of the three pro-Bismarck parties, it seemed logi^
cal to the Chancellor that William would be willing to sub-
mit to his demands. On that point Bismarck's confidence
seemed justified. When the Kaiser and Bismarck met to plan
the formation of a new "cartel," the Chancellor urged that
in order to win the support of the National Liberals and
Conservative parties, someone had to introduce more potent
legislation concerning control of the Socialists and in-
creased military appropriations. After that person or group
had achieved these goals, Bismarck said, he would be willing
to allow the introduction of a labor reform bill in the
Reichstag. At this point the Kaiser approved the Chancellor's
plan, mainly because of the last provision. On March 2, 1890,
Bismarck presented his ideas to the Ministry of State. Be-
sides proposing a new social legislation bill similar to that
supported by William in January, the Chancellor backed a
stronger anti-Socialist law, one which would expel the
"revolutionaries" from Germany rather than merely moving them
52
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 232-233; Rich, Holstein, I,
272.
104
within the confines of the nation. Bismarck asserted that
the Kaiser had supported this last idea; he obviously
believed that William's alleged backing of the bill would
53
increase its popularity.
During this March 2 session, Bismarck also released
evidence of a Prussian Cabinet Order of September 8, 1852,
which provided that in the course of official business, the
members of the Ministry of State could confer with the
Prussian King only after having met with the Prussian Prime
54
Minister to discuss the issue. By executing this order,
the Chancellor hoped to form a homogeneous ministry which
would stand by him when he locked horns with William.
This action, which initiated the last phase of the
struggle between Kaiser and Chancellor, precipitated a
series of events which involved Eulenburg. For some time
Bismarck's enemies had sensed that the Emperor was reaching
the end of his patience, and they were now beginning to
add fuel to the fire. Friedrich von Holstein contacted
Eulenburg and asked him to inform William of Bismarck's
dealings at the Ministry of State meeting. Simultaneously,
53
Lucius, Erinnerungen, 515; Bismarck, Die gesammelten
Werke, XV, 508; Waldersee, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, 100;
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 293-294; Eppstein, Fürst Bis-
marcks Entlassung, 55; cf. Rich, Holstein, I, 273-27^.
54
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 233-234; Bismarck, Die
gesamme1ten Werke, XV, 511; cf. Rich, Holstein, I, 277.
105
he asked him to urge William to appoint a special Council of
State to study the Socialist question. By "enlightening" the
Kaiser, then, Holstein hoped to prevent the introduction of
Bismarck's proposals in the Reichstag. Additionally, Hoi-
stein asked Eulenburg to advise his imperial friend to
"summon his generals," for he knew they longed for the
chance to thwart the Chancellor's legislation. Also, these
individuals, led by General von Waldersee, could exercise
influence over their conservative civilian allies and counter
Bismarck's plans for the reestablishment of any "cartel* » 55
Even more important, the Chancellor's influence over William
56
would diminish if his plans did not succeed. Thus Eulen-
burg, and later Marschall von Bieberstein and Otto von
Helldorf-Bedra, all found themselves essential chessmen in
57
Holstein's game to undermine the Reichskanzler.
Holstein, through Eulenburg, also found other allies,
to help execute his plans. Hinzpeter, the Kaiser's one-time
tutor, wrote Eulenburg conveying the impression that Bismarck
58
had overstepped his bounds. Such a letter, which under the
circumstances Eulenburg assuredly showed to William, must
55
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 235; Rich, Holstein, I, 276.
56e. p. K. , I, 482,
57
Bismarck, Die gesammelten Werke, XV, 510; cf. Rich,
Holstein, I. 277.
58e. p. K., I, 436.
106
have influenced the latter's decision. To further aid
Holstein's cause, Paul Kayser wrote Eulenburg, asserting
59
his belief that Bismarck had lost his mental capabilities.
Their opinions, conveyed by Eulenburg, also doubtlessly
affected William. During the second week of March, 1890,
the Kaiser, in contrast to his former line of action, told
Bismarck that he could no longer support his anti-Socialist
60
proposals. Eulenburg and Holstein now proceeded to sit
back and wait.
The last three days of Bismarck's chancellorship
witnessed the culmination of four years' developments. Un-
able to obtain William's support through cooperative pro-
posais, the Chancellor now sought to form a coalition
against him. He first called on Ludwig Windthorst, then on
Empress Frederick. There is evidence also that he may have
been planning a military coup d'etat against the Socialists
in order to win conservative support, and that Eulenburg
61
reported such information to his master. The Kaiser, upon
hearing of the Chancellor's plans, called upon Bismarck at
the latter's residence on the morning of March 15, 1890.
William demanded that the Chancellor inform him of the
59e. p. K., I, 436.
60
Bismarck, Die gesammelten Werke, XV, 511; cf. Rich,
Holstein, I, 277.
61
Palmer, Kaiser, 48.
107
transactions at his meeting with Windthorst, and also that he
rescind the Cabinet Order of 1852. Bismarck, responding to
William's demands, defended the necessity for the order, but
his cause was lost when he showed William a document which
contained a reference to William as an "ill-bred and dis-
honest „62boy. This statement came from the pen of Tsar
Alexander III, and William, shocked by the implications of
such messages, left the Chancellery in a huff. He definitely
viewed Alexander's statements as congruent with Bismarck's
own feelings about him.
On March 16, William received a number of reports from
Count Raffauf, the German consul at Kiev, which asserted that
the Russian army was again planning troop movements on the
Tsarist empire's western frontiers. - The Kaiser, stunned by
this news, sent off a letter to Bismarck, reprimanding him
for not informing his Emperor of this situation. William
also sent word, first through General Wilhelm von Hanke,
head of the Imperial War Cabinet, and then in the form of his
own direct request, that Bismarck cease his use of the Cabi-
net Order of 1852. Bismarck refused, leading the Kaiser on
March 17, 1890, to send Herbert von Lucanus, head of the
Civil Cabinet, with a note demanding that the Chancellor
62
Bismarck, Gedenken und Erinnerungen, III, 81-87;
Bismarck, Die gesammelten Werke, XV, 515; Nowak, Kaiser and
Chancellor, 103; Rich, Holstein, I, 278; Palmer , Kaiser, 49;
Cowles, The Kaiser, 95.
108
63
resign. That evening, the Kaiser and Eulenburg nervously
awaited the Chancellor's reply. William was especially
irritable; filled with hesitancies, he demanded that Eulen-
64
burg entertain him and calm his nerves. The anticipated
answer came finally the next morning, when the Chancellor,
without objection, acceded to William's request for his
resignation.
63
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 237; Bismarck, Die gesammelten
Werke, XV, 517-518; Waldersee, Denkwiürdigkeiten , 117;cf. Rich,
Holstein, I, 278.
64
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 236-237; Gisevius, Der Anfang
vom Ende, 143-144.
CHAPTER III
EULENBURG AND THE CAPRIVI ERA, 1890-1894
On March 20, 1890, Count Leo Georg von Caprivi assumed
the office of German Imperial Chancellor. A firm, upright
military man of impressive physical stature, the new
Chancellor also possessed an uncompromising nature which,
almost from the beginning of his administration, would bring
him into conflict with his young sovereign. During the
four and a half years of the Caprivi ministry, Eulenburg
acted as an intermediary between the two men. The most im-
portant aspect of this role of Eulenburg's was the way it
cast him as the vehicle through which Friedrich von Holstein,
the domineering force of the German Foreign Office, extended
his influence over William. In essence, then, the Kaiser's
friend occupied a position of political significance second
to none during the post-Bismarck period.
Eulenburg's first major political task during the
Caprivi era concerned aiding in finding a replacement for
Herbert von Bismarck, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
who had resigned his own post at the time of his father's
dismissal. Chancellor von Caprivi, at this juncture on
relatively good terms with Friedrich von Holstein, asked
him to suggest someone to fill the vacant position, At
first Holstein recommended Count Friedrich Johann von Al-
vensleben, German Ambassador to Belgium. Alvensleben, when
110
contacted, refused the Foreign Office post. Baron von
Holstein then turned to Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein,
Baden's minister to Berlin. Marschall accepted the offer
with enthusiasm; however, Holstein needed the Kaiser's
approval before the appointment could take effect. For this
purpose he enlisted the aid of several individuals. Fried-
rich, Grand Duke of Baden, acting both of his own volition
and the Privy Councillor's influence, recommended Marschall
both to Caprivi and the Kaiser. Philipp zu Eulenburg also
played a role in securing the appointment. First, he
mentioned the erstwhile ambassador as a possible Foreign
Secretary to Count Alfred von Waldersee, Chief of the Gene-
ral Staff and the German military's most influential connec-
tion with the Imperial Court.1 Eulenburg also took it upon
himself to recommend Marschall directly to Emperor William.
He emphasized the Badenese ambassador's South German back-
ground, implying that Marschall's appointment would appease
the anti-Prussian South. He also praised Marschall's
familiarity with both foreign and domestic political arenas
2
and his ability as a worker. In the face of international
crises, Marschall could provide the solutions, At Holstein's
suggestion, Chancellor von Caprivi also recommended Mar-
schall's appointment.
1Lerchenfeld, Erinnerungen,36 8-36 9 ; Rich, Holstein, I.
291.
2E. p. K., I, 513.
Ill
To be sure, the actions of Holstein, Eulenburg, and
Caprivi in securing Marschall's appointment met with
opposition. A number of government officials such as Count
Karl von Wedel, the Kaiser's aide-de-camp, favored a second
attempt to secure Alvensleben's candidacy for the Foreign
Secretary post. Many conservatives preferred Count
Friedrich Wilhelm zu Limburg-Stirum, who had been an interim
State Secretary for Foreign Affairs during the Bismarck
regime. Bernhard von Bülow, then Prussian Minister to
3
Rumania, also possessed the support of some conservatives.
Count von Wedel especially made concerted efforts to prevent
Marschall's appointment in view of the Badenese ambassador's
limited experience in the realm of foreign affairs (contrary
to Eulenburg's allegations), such objections seemed valid.
Chancellor von Caprivi and Holstein, however, won the day.
Both, by threatening to resign, secured William's approval
of their candidate. Undoubtedly Eulenburg's influence had
4
contributed to this final decision.
Eulenburg, after he was appointed Prussian ambassador to
Württenberg in March 1890, continued his close collaboration
with the Kaiser in the realm of political affairs. Although
he got on well with the royal family at Stuttgart, his real
interests lay in Berlin. In September 1890 Eulenburg
3
Rich, Holstein, I, 291.
^Rich, Holstein, I, 291.
112
involved himself with the re-election of Max Forckenbeck,
the left-wing Lord Mayor of Berlin. Forckenbeck, in order
to retain his office, needed to have his re-election
ratified by the Prussian Ministry of State. This the
Ministry did with little objection. Emperor William, how¬
ever, opposed such action, mainly because Forckenbeck had
spoken out against William's Army Bill in the Reichstag.
The Kaiser expressed his views to Hermann von Lucanus, Chief
of the Prussian Civil Cabinet, who wrote to Chancellor von
Caprivi concerning this matter. The Chancellor responded by
informing the Ministry of State that the Kaiser's rejection
of Forckenbeck's remaining Lord Mayor of Berlin would un-
boubtedly alienate the parties of the Center and the Left and
prevent the government from effecting any further legislation.
In response to Caprivi's pleas, the Ministry voted to oppose
the Kaiser's decision. This action did not, however, change
the Kaiser's mind. Philipp zu Eulenburg entered the picture
at this juncture, and wrote the Emperor on the matter. In
his letter he mentioned the threat of a Bismarckian resur¬
gence if the Reichstag did not cooperate with the government.
This approach, along with notes form Caprivi, apparently
made headway, and the Emperor finally approved the ratifica-
5
tion of Forckenbeck's re-election.
5Haller, Aus dem Leben, 116; John G. C. Rôhl, Germany
Without Bismarck: The Crisis of Government in the Second
Reich, 1890-1900 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1967), 71, hereinafter cited as Rôhl,
113
Eulenburg played an even more significant role in the
events surrounding the dismissal of Alfred von Waldersee
from his post as Chief of the German General Staff. Follow-
ing Bismarck's dismissal, Friedrich von Holstein and other
officials in the Foreign Office grew increasingly disen-
chanted with Waldersee for several reasons, primarily because
of the influence which he exercised over his sovereign. It
was freely gossiped in court circles that the General had
designs upon the Imperial Chancellorship, and the numerous
modes of flattery which he employed when dealing with the
Kaiser seemed to substantiate these beliefs. One ploy which
aggravated Holstein (and Eulenburg) in particular was
Waldersee's manipulation of the Emperor's military maneuvers.
As previously mentioned, the General bolstered William's ego
to dangerous proportions by allowing his constant victory
in these unrealistic activities. Holstein, for his part, also
thought Waldersee was becoming less of a Russophobe, more
willing to compromise with the czarist empire, perhaps to
the extent of even negotiating.
Holstein reacted to the state of affairs by employing
Eulenburg as his "hatchet man." He urged him to inform the
Kaiser that Waldersee was deceiving him through his cajoling.
Eulenburg obliged Holstein but to little avail. William
Germany Without Bismarck.
^Tyler-Whittle, The Last Kaiser, 144; Rich, Holstein,
I, 259-260.
114
faced down his friend and informed him that he knew of Wal-
dersee's underlying ambitions and attitude toward Russia.
He further asserted that Waldersee neither would assume the
chancellorship nor dictate foreign policy. Eulenburg then
tried to convince the Kaiser that the General had been
deceiving him during various maneuvers. Once again his
words proved futile, as William contended that the "sieges"
7
had been conducted fairly. To further his point, the
Kaiser went on to say that he only assumed command of his
troops when they were in retreat; thus he did not always
8
win. It appears also, judging from this correspondence,
that Eulenburg, either out of fear or loyalty to his chief,
did not wish to carry the matter further. As far as he was
concerned, the situation could rest.
Holstein, however, persisted in his attempts to have
Waldersee removed. The Gray Eminence barraged Eulenburg with
letters, all aimed at convincing the Kaiser's friend of the
need to take action. Holstein appealed to the diplomat's
personal feelings, and asserted that the General's removal
would make both Caprivi and William independent forces,
9
confident of their abilities. Holstein did not fail to add
that Waldersee's dismissal would benefit Eulenburg
7D. g- P., III, 315.
8p. g. P., Ill, 316.
^Rich, Holstein, I, 303.
115
politically. Once the General left his post, Caprivi's
difficulties would lessen and the Kaiser would possess the
prerogative of asking the Chancellor to do a few favors for
him. One of these could involve transferring Count von
Rantzau, Bismarck's son-in-law, from his Bavarian ambassa-
dor's position and appointing Eulenburg to that post. Eulen-
burg fervently coveted that post and one may say with
assurance that despite his assertion that he would never
dream of undermining Rantzau, Eulenburg swallowed Holstein's
bait. In the autumn of 1890, through a series of intrigues,
he and his associates engineered the removal of Bismarck's
son-in-law and paved the way for Eulenburg's succession to
10
the Bavarian post.
Rantzau, by virtue of his personal performance, had con-
tributed heavily to his own demise. He lacked the support
of the Munich intelligentsia, many of whom found a supposedly
uncouth Prussian unappealing. The Bavarian press denounced
Rantzau, and called him a tool of the Bismarcks. The Bavar-
ian State Ministry, headed by Christoph von Crailsheim, dis-
liked Bismarck's son-in-law, and believed that he purpose-
fully kept Munich uninformed concerning the actions of the
Berlin government. Only the influence of ex-Chancellor von
Bismarck could really stand in the way of Rantzau's dismissal.
An outside circumstance afforded Eulenburg the
10
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 57-59; Rich, Holstein, I, 304.
116
opportunity to wrench the Prussian ambassadorial post from
11
Rantzau. Chancellor von Caprivi visited Munich at the
beginning of November 1890 and announced to the government
there that Kaiser William had intentions of visiting the
Bavarian capital during the following month, and wished to
inspect the troops of the kingdom. Luitpold, the Prince
Regent of Bavaria, loathed riding horseback and found the
prospect of having to do so during the Kaiser's visit
appalling. The Prince Regent's fears apparently reached
formidable proportions, for, by the beginning of December,
Luitpold was already beginning to threaten abdication if the
inspection ceremony took place. Such a proposal upset the
Crailsheim ministry greatly. Its members feared a resurgence
of the ultramontanists if the Prince Regent abdicated. In
order to help alleviate this difficulty, Crailsheim wrote
Eulenburg, begging him for aid in preventing William's visit
to the maneuvers. Eulenburg advised the Kaiser concerning
this matter, but apparently sensed no immediate danger in
the situation. Thus he merely attempted to assure Crail-
sheim that William would do his utmost to "ride slowly" and
refrain 12from embarrassing the Prince Regent. More impor-
tant, in his note to William, Eulenburg took the opportunity
implicitly to bring out the inadequacies of Prussian ambassador
11
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 158.
12e. p. K., I, 597.
117
Rantzau. He emphasized Rantzau's supposed tendency to
scheme behind the backs of his associates, and that William's
13
keeping him in his position would be fatal to His Majesty.
This note apparently garnered results. On November 27, 1890,
Eulenburg learned through Friedrich von Holstein that Emperor
William would be assigning him to Munich before the year was
14
out. Eulenburg of course found this prospect appealing,
but he also feared Bismarck might seek revenge for his son-
in-law's dismissal. Bernhard von Billow, close to Eulenburg
since the latter's early twenties, no doubt played a role in
sparking this logical fear, as he himself hinted broadly in
his memoirs:
But what Prince Bismarck and his family never
forgave was that Philipp Eulenburg, with Holstein's
support, did not rest until Prince Bismarck's son-
in-law, Count Cuno Rantzau, had been transferred,
much against his will, from Munich to the Hague.
Eulenburg made a great mistake in taking the post at
Munich made vacant by Rantzau's transfer. . . . He
should, however, have known that Prince Bismarck,
once injured or angered, never forgot, and that thé
removal of his son-in-law and daughter from the
Munich post to which they had become attached would
deeply incense the old Chancellor and that he would
not forgive it.^
Bülow also contended that, in addition to angering Bismarck,
Eulenburg's promotion precipitated a number of ugly rumors
13e. p. K., I. 601.
14
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 59.
15
Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, I, 225.
118
pertaining to the Kaiser's friend's alleged homosexuality.
(The future scathing attacks of the journalist Maximilian
Harden thus partially had their roots in the attempts of
Count Rantzau and his supporters to undermine Emperor
William's favorite and their adversary.) Whatever the
degree of accuracy contained in Billow's statements, Eulen-
burg, soon after he assumed the Bavarian post, found himself
one of the "whipping boys" of the pro-Bismarck faction. He
had emerged as a national figure and thus stood vulnerable to
the criticism likely to be heaped upon any person of
16
influence.
Eulenburg's appointment did not resolve another pressing
issue—the attempt by Holstein and others to secure Walder-
see's dismissal. The General had retained his position as
Chief of the General Staff, and in January 1891 Holstein
again called on Eulenburg. This time he held that Eulenburg
was damaging William's image by refusing to take a strong
stance against Waldersee. To the public it seemed that the
Kaiser feared the General; he was a puppet in everyone's eyes
but his own. Holstein continued by suggesting to Eulenburg
that rather than blatantly working upon William to fire his
Chief of Staff, he should urge the Kaiser to make Waldersee
a commander of an army corps. Such an appointment, among
other things, would keep the General out of the political
16
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 57; Rich, Holstein, I, 305.
119
arena. Judging from the events of the following weeks,
Eulenburg, both through his own direct influence and that
of others, apparently complied with this request. On
January 27, 1891, the Kaiser called Waldersee to his office
and asked him to take command of the Ninth Army Corps at
Altona (near Hamburg). Waldersee, numbed by this action, at
first suspected that Caprivi and Holstein had engineered the
act. Only later would he realize that Eulenburg had also
17
contributed to his removal. Unsurprisingly, a friend of
Holstein's, General Alfred von Schlieffen, replaced Waldersee
18
as Chief of the General Staff.
The problems of Bismarck and Waldersee aside, Eulenburg
soon found other challenges which made his tenure at Munich
less pleasant than anticipated. The ultramontanists exercised
formidable influence in Bavaria and,though the faction did
not control the Crailsheim ministry, Eulenburg, a Prussian
Protestant, found himself resented by many in his adopted
city. Also the anti-Prussian newspaper, Bayerisches Vater-
land, attacked Eulenburg from every corner, causing him to
19
remark on occasion that a united Germany did not exist.
17
Waldersee, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, 177-188; Rich, Holstein,
I., 205; E. p. K., I, 625, 637.
18
Rich, Holstein, I, 305; Burmeistej; "Philipp Eulenburg-
Hertefeld," does not indicate that it was above all Holstein's
constant belaboring of Eulenburg to do so that virtually drove
the Kaiser's friend to prevail upon William II to sack Wal-
dersee.
19
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 62.
120
Some aspects of Bavarian court life, however, diverted
Eulenburg from the cares of his office. Unlike his prede-
cessor, Eulenburg did enjoy popularity with intellectuals of
Munich and impressed them with his knowledge of arts and
cultural affairs. In spite of his religious affiliation,
he also initiated favorable relations with the Catholic
Church hierarchy of that city. The Papal Nuncio, Cardinal
Agliardi, one gathers, found Eulenburg a fine host, especially
when the latter expressed sympathy for the Catholic's attempt
20
to obtain control of the Christian churches in Jerusalem.
Cardinal Hohenlohe, primate of the Bavarian Church, also got
on well with Eulenburg Finally, Eulenburg acted as an inter-
mediary between Pope Leo XIII and William II when the latter
visited Rome, emphasizing to his chief the common conserva-
tive bond shared by the Catholic Church and the German
21
government. For the most part, then, it may be assumed
that Eulenburg found his Munich post satisfying—a difficult
position but one which allowed him to demonstrate his social
and diplomatic talents to an outstanding degree.
Though Eulenburg may have been officially stationed
at Munich during the initial years of the Caprivi regime,
this situation did not prevent his continuing to exercise his
political influence upon the Kaiser and others back in
20
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 63; El p. K., I, 698; Eulen-
burg did, however, find Agliardi's network of spies annoying.
21
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 63.
121
Berlin. Two major controversies which involved Eulenburg
during this time were the Army Bill of 1891 and the Zedlitz
School Bill crisis of the following year. Eulenburg, along
with Holstein, also played a greater role than anyone else
in fostering the superficial reconciliation between
William and Bismarck which occurred in January 1894. Finally,
Eulenburg influenced the turn of events surrounding the
resignation of Chancellor Leo von Caprivi. These and other
situations brought Holstein and Eulenburg to the zenith of
their influence in the realm of German domestic policy.
The Army Bill emerged from various schemes, some dating
from the Bismarck era, to reorganize the German military. A
so-called "Little Army Bill," calling for increases in
military personnel and the development of artillery, passed
the Reichstag in 1890. Emperor William and his General
Staff, especially General von Schieffen, however, found the
proposal too confining and wished to see a more potent
piece of legislation enacted, one which among other things
would provide for a compulsory three-year military service
period for German youths. William expressed his views to
Chancellor von Caprivi, who, despite his military back-
ground, considered such a proposal unfeasible and offensive
to the Reichstag parties of the Left and Center. The Chan-
cellor wished to retain the present two-year compulsory
service, and therefore met with General Hans von Kaltenborn,
Prussian Minister of War, to draw up a plan whereby increases
122
in appropriations for the army could be facilitated only if
compulsory military service remained at two years. The
Kaiser, upon hearing this news, immediately expressed
opposition to this limitation, next acceded to Caprivi's
proposal, and then went back to his original stance. The
Chancellor apparently did not take William seriously. Re-
fusing to concede to the Kaiser's demands for a three-year
service period, Caprivi threatened resignation. Such an
action, he calculated, would draw his chief back into the
moderates' ranks and prevent his government from losing the
22
support of its more liberal constituents.
Eulenburg and Holstein did not regard William's behavior
with Caprivi's casualness. Holstein called Eulenburg to
Berlin, where he informed him of the necessity for the Kaiser
to agree to the two-year proposal. First Holstein empha-
sized the need for appeasing the South German states,
because they would never approve the "Prussian" three-year
plan. The Gray Eminence also saw the Kaiser's approval of
the two-year plan as a counter to General von Waldersee and
Herbert von Bismarck, both of whom he believed were attempt-
23
ing to foment a Reichstag crisis. Holstein thus urged
Eulenburg to influence the Kaiser's decision, a difficult task
22
John Alden Nichols, Germany After Bismarck (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), 206-208, hereinafter
cited as Nichols, Geimany After Bismarck; Rich, Holstein, I,
376.
23
Rich, Holstein, I, 376.
123
for one who personally favored the three-year proposal but
did not wish to see the dissolution of the German parliament
over the issue. Holstein's imploring apparently worked
wonders, for within a few days after he made his sugges-
tion to Eulenburg news came that William had agreed to
Caprivi's Army Bill. Moreover, whereas the Kaiser had pre-
viously demanded immediate action on the military proposal,
he now agreed to postpone the legislation until a more
24
feasible time.
Eulenburg was to discover that Holstein nevertheless
refused to believe, in view of William's erratic nature,
that the Kaiser would stand by this commitment. Wishing to
prevent the Kaiser from overextending his personal influence,
Holstein wrote to Eulenburg on July 17, 1891, and asked that
he ensure that William understand his imperial prerogatives
under the Constitution of 1871. He also requested that
William be advised concerning his influence in the South
German states, hoping that through Eulenburg's instruction,
William would approve the more politically expedient
military proposal, and thereby prevent a resurgence of
24
Rich, Holstein, I, 376. Burmeister, "Eulenburg," 118-
119, barely mentions that Holstein instigated Eulenburg's
action in bringing William II to modify his position on the
duration period of universal military service, Burmeister
also fails to pay adequate attention to the fact that Eulen-
burg actually shared William's original viewpoint on the
matter. Had it not been for Holstein's pressuring him at
every turn, it is highly doubtful that Eulenburg would have
had any interest in changing the Kaiser's mind.
124
25
particularism throughout the south.
Holstein's precautions proved necessary. Soon after
Eulenburg received Holstein's request concerning the Kai-
ser's prerogatives, the Foreign Office functionary got a
report from Alfred Kiderlen-Wáchter, one of the Imperial
circle, asserting that the Kaiser had again placed a large-
scale army reorganization plan under consideration.
Undoubtedly the three-year plan would again become a subject
of controversy. Furthermore, Kiderlen held this time that
William planned to overcome the opposition of Chancellor von
Caprivi by obtaining the support of individual members of
the imperial government. Holstein found this prospect
alarming and again contacted Eulenburg, asking him to prevent
William from executing this plan. The Gray Eminence, also
aware that Eulenburg might be loath to step on the Kaiser's
toes, then contacted Chancellor von Caprivi and asked him to
align himse-lf with General von Schlieffen in support of
the two-year proposal. Judging from Eulenburg's account of
his conversation with William regarding the bill, this action
constituted a wise move on Holstein's part. The Kaiser
apparently would not listen to his friend's imploring,
believing that both his three-year "apprenticeship" in
government service and divine right of monarchs prevented
25
Helmuth von Rogge, ed • / Friedrich von Holstein: Leben-
sbekenntnis in Briefen an eine Frau (Berlin: Ullstein, 1932),
160, hereinafter cited as Rogge, Lebensbekenntnis; Rich,
Holstein, I, 378.
125
him from compromising on the issue. The Reichstag, not he,
should change in the event that the legislation failed to
'
26
pass. Thus Eulenburg proved ineffective in this situation.
For that reason, Holstein now decided that only through the
combination of Caprivi1s and Schlieffen's influence could
27
William be made to see the light.
Holstein's efforts seemed to receive a notable setback,
however, at Kiel, where the Altona Commandant, nowadays
Waldersee, came to meet with William on the latter's Nord-
landreise and halfway persuaded him to oppose the Army Bill.
True to his erratic personality, however, the Kaiser changed
his mind when he came back to Chancellor von Caprivi's
proximity on his return to Berlin, and agreed to an "experi-
mental" two-year service. He also agreed to delay army
reorganization until the winter of 1892-93. A month after
his return from Kiel, however, William again changed his
mind and in a conversation with Eulenburg again confided
that he would consider dropping Caprivi if the latter con¬
tinued his resistance to Imperial proposals. At this point,
the Chancellor, apparently informed of the Kaiser's plans
by Eulenburg, Holstein, or some other source, began to give
ground. Rumors of an impending Franco-Russian alliance
during the autumn of 1891 probably contributed in large part
26e. p. K., I. 701.
27
Rogge, Lebensbekenntnis, 160; Rich, Holstein, I, 378.
126
to his decision. An event such as this would evoke popular
28
sympathy for increased military appropriations. Eulen-
burg also perceived this situation,and in a letter of
October 1891 urged the Kaiser to be wary concerning a visit
of Tsar Alexander III to Germany. All Germany suspected
Russian intentions, and it seemed that this issue might
29
unite the parties of the Reichstag on the Army Bill.
Unfortunately, the beginning of another government crisis
in January 1892, on the Prussian state level, hampered
Eulenburg's efforts at maintaining peace between the Kaiser,
Chancellor, and Reichstag.
Count Robert von Zedlitz-Trütschler, a Silesian aris-
tocrat whom William, contrary to the advice of Holstein and
Eulenburg, had appointed Prussian Minister of Ecclesiastical
Affairs, introduced a bill for the implementation of a con-
fessional system into the schools of Prussia. This legisla-
tion, first presented to the Prussian Landtag in 1891,
stipulated that all schools would be confessional and that
children belonging to unrecognized or to no specific
religious sects would be compelled to receive either the
Catholic or Evangelical religious instruction given at the
28d. g- P. , III, 346-34 8; Johann Werdermann, Per Heeres-
reform unter Caprivi (Griefswald: E. Hartmann, 1928), 34,
hereinafter cited as Werdemann, Heeresreform; Nichols,
Germany After Bismarck, 138-153; cf. Rich, Holstein, I, 378-
379.
29
See E. p. K., I, 719.
127
particular school each child happened to attend. Local
church officials (usually parish priests or pastors) and all
teachers would belong to the denomination which was most
30
heavily represented at the individual school. Such a
proposal, which promised to favor the Catholic Church espe-
cially, would definitely antagonize the liberal parties and
precipitate a parliamentary battle. Chancellor von Caprivi,
also Prime Minister of Prussia, favored the Zedlitz propo-
sal, however, and believed that the Centrists and Conserva-
tives would align themselves with his government if he backed
the legislation. Eulenburg, nominally of the Conservative
persuasion, also favored the proposal. Others in positions
of influence, however, among them Friedrich von Holstein,
considered the Zedlitz Bill a means for precipitating
31
another government crisis.
Eulenburg found Holstein turning to him when the latter
saw no hope in successfully manipulating Caprivi, who stood
firm in his convictions. Eulenburg was to bring the Kaiser
to accept the School Bill as an unfeasible piece of
30
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 160-162; Rôhl,
Germany Without Bismarck, 78; Bogdan von Hutten -Czapski,
Sechzig Jahre Politik und Gesellschaft (Berlin: E. S. Mittler,
1936), I, 193, hereinafter cited as Hutten-Czapski, Sechzig
Jahre.
31
Ludwig Raschdau, Unter Bismarck und Caprivi: Erinne-
rungen eines deutschen Diplomaten aus den Jahren 1885-1894
(Berlin: E. S. Mittler, 1939), 249-250, hereinafter cited as
Raschdau, Unter Bismarck und Caprivi; Rich, Holstein, I, 380.
128
legislation. In a letter to William's good friend, Holstein
thus asserted that the German people would never tolerate a
government which catered to the interest of a "conservative-
clericalist group." He further held that Eulenburg should
ask Chancellor von Caprivi to oppose any amendment which the
Prussian Landtag Committee (the body which examined a pro-
posai before allowing it to be admitted to the main body of
the diet) might make in the School Bill. Finally, Holstein
advised Eulenburg that the Kaiser should pressure certain
members of both the Landtag Committee and Prussian House of
Lords to amend the Bill so as to make it less objectionable
to liberals and moderate Conservatives. These actions, Hoi-
stein felt, would appease both ends of the political spec-
32
trun.
Eulenburg responded to Holstein's request in a way not
entirely pleasing to the latter. He asserted that he
personally favored the Zedlitz Bill because of his religious
affinities, but simultaneously realized that the government
possessed primarily political motives in attempting to acquire
Conservative and Centrist support for the proposal. The
South German states, especially, which favored Austria's
plans for an alliance with England and wished to see Germany
do likewise, needed to be drawn back into the fold. Never-
theless,Eulenburg did not think that the Zedlitz Bill in
32
Rich, Holstein, I, 380.
129
itself could align the Reichstag parties behind the Caprivi
government. Rather, the enlisting of Conservative and Cen¬
trist support with the motive of reforming the German
parliamentary system served as a possible method for in-
33
directly acquiring backing for the proposal. Still, one
surmises that Eulenburg, in view of his constant complaining
about the Bavarian ultramontanes , loathed granting any con-
cessions to the members of the Center party.
Eulenburg's concept soon fell by the wayside, however.
Within a month after sending his memorandum to Holstein,
he became convinced that the government possessed no inten-
tion of initiating parliamentary changes. He therefore wrote
William as Holstein had recommended, encouraging opposition
to Zedlitz's proposal, which he now saw as a means merely for
34
enticing the Center. He also held, when writing his master,
that a government alliance with the Center would make that
group the most powerful party in the Reichstag and shatter
the influence of the more moderate groups which had been the
Empire's pillars of strength. He urged William to reconsider
the modifed Zedlitz proposal, and appealed to his patriotic
sentiments. In the note Eulenburg also emphasized the
importance of the unity of the Reich, and how the Center's
opposition to the Crown could tear away the South Germans
33
D. g. P., III, 358-359; Rfihl, Germany Without Bismarck,
80-81; Rich, Holstein, I, 381.
34
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 65; Rich, Holstein, I, 381.
130
from their nominal support of the Imperial government, but
also observed that the dominance of the Center apparently
was too great a price to pay for this continued support. He
then concluded the note with an implication that Zedlitz
lacked an understanding of these pitfalls and needed to be
"set straight. » 35
To further his cause, Eulenburg also appealed to Hoi-
stein, and warned that the latter must make efforts to con-
vince Chancellor von Caprivi of the modified bill's feasi-
bility. Holstein agreed to this advice, both because of
Eulenburg's pleas and also because he had begun to suspect
Zedlitz-Triltzschler of haboring designs on the Imperial
Chancellorship. What, at any rate, could be a better rea-
son for undermining the present government? After careful
consideration, the Foreign Office functionary warned both
Caprivi and William of Zedlitz's motives while simultaneous-
ly urging Eulenburg to persuade the Kaiser to make it clear
to the Prussian ecclesiastical minister that His Majesty
wanted a "moderate" solution to the School Bill contro-
36
versy.
Eulenburg, after receiving this suggestion, thereafter
got a whole series of letters from Holstein beginning
January 30, 1892, when the School Bill came before the
35
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 66; E. p. K., II, 796-798.
36
Rich, Holstein, I, 381; Rfihl, Germany Without Bis-
marck, 83.
131
Prussian Landtag Committee. Holstein proposed that Eulen-
burg have William pressure Conservative members of the
committee to oppose the original Zedlitz Bill, even though
he inferred that the school proposal would engender contro-
versy in its modified form. This newly aroused reservation
came in large part from the Privy Councillor's receipt of a
communication from Georg von Kôller, President of the
Prussian Chamber of Deputies, in which Kôller asserted that
the Zedlitz Bill could not be passed even with amendments.
It would be easier to kill the proposal in committee and
37
Kôller felt that he could accomplish this task. Holstein
wrote Eulenburg about this matter, and asserted that he wished
to avoid controversy and thus considered the Reichstag
deputy's idea a commendable one. Holstein also added that
Kôller's suggestion would prevent controversy by not providing
the pro-Bismarck parties, who opposed the Zedlitz Bill, an
38
opportunity to precipitate dissension.
Philipp zu Eulenburg, as before, acted for reasons of
political expediency rather than out of personal conviction.
Secretly, on the margin of Holstein's letter, he wrote that
he had no intention to writing the Kaiser and extolling the
virtues of Kôller's ideas. Nevertheless, he continued to
deceive Holstein. In a note dated February 22, 1892.
37
Rich, Holstein, I, 382.
38
Rich, Holstein, I, 382.
132
Eulenburg held that he possessed reservations about drawing
the Kaiser's attention to the consequences of the School
Bill. In his attempt to bring Kaiser and Chancellor to an
understanding he might instead heighten the growing rift
between them. Eulenburg suggested alternatively that Caprivi
appoint a new Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs. This
would provide the circumstances for the proposal's withdrawal
39
under the pretext of a change in ministers. Holstein,
however, wished to retain KOller's ideas. He found support
when William, addressing the Brandenburg Provincial Landtag,
asserted that "My course is the right one and I shall continue
to steer it." Holstein immediately interpreted the Kaiser's
speech as an expression of praise for the original Zedlitz
proposal, and held that a "discreet hint to Kfiller would be
,40
necessary to get William back in line’ Again the Foreign
Office official asked for Eulenburg's help.
Eulenburg, still wary of the Center's opportunities
under the original bill, believed that a compromise proposal
could evolve out of the controversy, Holstein thus momen-
tarily turned his attention to Konstantin von Rfissler, head
of the Foreign Ministry's press affairs, and asked him and
Otto von Helldorf-Bedra, a leader of the moderate
39d. g. P., III, 363; Rich, Holstein, I, 382.
40
Rich, Holstein, I. 382.
133
41
Conservatives, to support his stance. Such actions, how-
ever, as future events would demonstrate, bore little fruit.
After Holstein and Eulenburg had set their crucibles
glowing, another party entered the picture. William II
apparently found Eulenburg's advice worthy of consideration,
for on March 17, 1892, at a meeting of the Prussian Crown
Council, the Kaiser expressed the desire for a School Bill
that would satisfy Conservatives and the Center as well as
the moderate parties. Such a suggestion met with disdain
from Caprivi, who asserted that he did not think the Center
would be willing to make the required concessions. It
followed then that/if the proposal still did not satisfy the
Center, he would still not acquire support for his adminis-
tration.
Rather than arguing with his Chancellor at this time,
the Kaiser suggested that the School Bill "be postponed for a
while. " At the same time he remained adamant in his convie-
tion that regardless of what the future held, the proposal
42
should have the support of the moderate parties, Zedlitz,
who had also attended the Crown Council meeting, responded to
William's challenge at the end of the session by holding that,
since the Kaiser would not support the original School Bill,
it was mandatory that the Prussian Ecclesiastical Minister
41
Rich, Holstein, I, 383.
42
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 181; Rich, Holstein,
I, 383-384.
134
resign his post. At this juncture Caprivi, who had always
favored Zedlitz's proposal, now demonstrated his loyalty to
the legislation by asking that he be relieved of his office
43
as Prussian Minister-President. It appears that the
Chancellor feared that the defeat of the School Bill in the
Prussian Landtag would cause him to lose the body's support
because of his identification with that controversial act.
William refused to accept either resignation and
demonstrated his capacity for bad timing by leaving for a
hunting trip at Rominten in the midst of the crisis. Fortu-
nately for those in Berlin, Eulenburg accompanied his chief
on this expedition. Holstein especially found the situation
pleasing, simultaneously keeping in contact with the Emperor
while informing Eulenburg of the School Bill's progress in
the Reichstag. Holstein continued to advise Eulenburg
regarding the legislation, holding that Caprivi's resigna-
tion would create an avenue for the resurgence of pro-Bis-
marck forces. Therefore Eulenburg should work on William to
install Zedlitz as Prussian Minister of the Interior, a posi-
tion formerly held by Botho zu Eulenburg, Philipp's cousin.
By giving the Ecclesiastical Minister this new office, so
Holstein felt, the Kaiser could satisfy Zedlitz and at the
same time retain Caprivi in his dual position as Prussian
43
Hans Goldschmidt, Das Reich und Preussen im Rampf urn
die Führung von Bismarck bis 1918 (Berlin: C. Heymann, 1931) ,
321-322; Rfihl, Germany Without Bismarck, 84.
135
44
Minister-President and German Chancellor.
Caprivi, the uncompromising military man, only grasped
the consequences of his resignation after actually taking
the step of tendering it. On March 20, 1892, he consulted
with William and "reassumed" his post as Chancellor and his
membership in the Prussian Ministry of State. Naturally
enough Chancellor von Caprivi refused to be reinstated in his
former position of Prussian Minister-President. This situa-
tion precipitated another crisis—whom would the Kaiser
appoint to fill the vacant post? Philipp zu Eulenburg
recommended his cousin Botho zu Eulenburg to Holstein as a
"good natured fellow" who admittedly might have some diffi-
culty in getting along with Caprivi. Holstein himself
seemed to prefer Georg von Kfiller for the position. The lot
fell to Botho, however, and this former Prussian Minister of
the Interior's appointment undoubtedly raised eyebrows
throughout the Reich. The new Minister-President possessed
reactionary views on most issues and would be the last to
compromise on the Zedlitz proposal. Even more important, the
appointment focused the Empire's attention on Philipp zu
Eulenburg. Was the Kaiser's best friend attempting to "rail-
road" the School Bill by his cousin's elevation to the Prus-
sian ministerial post? Or was he merely trying to undermine
the Caprivi government by indirectly prolonging the crisis
44
Rich, Holstein, I, 383-384.
136
through his kinsman? Attacks began to emanate from various
45
circles.
The appointment of Botho zu Eulenburg made the parties
of the Left and Center increasingly hostile toward the
Zedlitz proposal. Believing now that the Minister-President
would not accept a compromise School Bill and that the
liberal parties would not accept the original legislation,
the supporters of Zedlitz withdrew the bill. Zedlitz him-
self resigned and Robert Bosse, an old friend of Botho,
replaced him. The controversy, however, left its political
scars. Chancellor von Caprivi's support of the School Bill
had lowered his standing with moderates and liberals. They
saw him as an uncompromising Junker aristocrat who placed
his own interests before those of the Reichstag. On the
other hand, members of the Conservative and Center parties
now viewed Caprivi as weak and vacillating because of his
inability to secure the bill's passage. Philipp zu Eulen-
burg undoubtedly suffered because of his suspected engineer-
46
ing of his cousin's appointment. Friedrich von Holstein,
on the other hand, emerged relatively unscathed. Through
Eulenburg and others he would attempt to rebuild support for
the Caprivi government. Though such a response seemed
45
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 68-69; D. g. P., III, 365;
Raschdau, Unter Bismarck und Caprivi, 249-250; Rühl, Germany
Without Bismarck, 78-88,
46
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 191; Rich, Holstein,
I, 385; Rôhl, Germany Without Bismarck, 89.
137
unusual in view of his opposition to Caprivi's stance on many
issues, Holstein still saw the strong-willed Dickkopf as
a superior alternative to Bismarck or Waldersee.
After the School Bill fiasco, Eulenburg found Holstein
conferring with him to devise a plan whereby Caprivi could
obtain both moderate and conservative support for his govern-
ment. To this end, Holstein suggested to Eulenburg that he
"cause" the Kaiser to summon Rauchhaupt, the Conservative
leader in the Prussian Landtag. William should then inform
Rauchhaupt that he hated extremists, many of whom, because
of their alignment with Otto von Hammerstein, publisher of
the rightist Kreuzzeitung, found themselves branded as
members of the "Kreuzzeitung clique." However, the meeting
which came about did not accomplish what Holstein had intend-
ed. In the Conservative caucus following the School Bill
crisis, moderates such as Rauchhaupt and Friedrich Limburg-
Stirum went over to‘the extreme right and Otto von Helldorf-
Bedra, leader of the moderate Conservatives, lost his post
47
as party whip in the Reichstag.
Holstein, however, refused to let this setback thwart
his attempts for obtaining support for Caprivi. Once again
he appealed to Eulenburg, and asserted that it would be
necessary for William publicly to acknowledge his support
for the moderates in the Reichstag. The Foreign Office
47
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 188; Rich, Holstein,
I, 392.
138
representative also sought to enlist the aid of Botho zu
Eulenburg and Alfred von Kiderlen-Wâchter to acquire the
Kaiser's support for a moderate government. Finally, Hoi-
stein asked Eulenburg to use any means possible in order to
regain for Helldorf-Bedra his former influence in the Con-
servative party. These suggestions Eulenburg executed, but
to no avail. The Conservatives would not back the Chancel-
48
lor.
Eulenburg's services again got enlisted when Holstein
realized that he could not obtain the support of the conserva-
tive parties. Eulenburg was to garner the backing of private
individuals who could piece together a coalition to save
Caprivi. He urged Eulenburg to influence Botho, who
possessed influence in Conservative circles, to obtain support
for the Chancellor. The Kaiser's friend apparently carried
out Holstein's requests concerning his cousin, for he wrote
from the 1892 Nordlandreise that "His Majesty charges Botho
to establish the closest possible contact with Caprivi and
to stand by him against all » 49press problems. It is also
probable that Eulenburg out of self-interest urged Botho to
stand by Caprivi. During the year 1892 Caprivi had
recommended Eulenburg as the successor to Prince Reuss for
the German ambassadorship to Vienna, and one assumes that the
48
Rich, Holstein, I, 392.
49d. g. P., III, 372; Rich, Holstein, I, 392.
139
latter put forth an extra effort to obtain backing for the
50
Chancellor when consulting with Botho. In the midst of
the chancellorship crisis, however, an old monster again
reared its ugly head, and thwarted the attempts of Eulenburg
and Holstein to form a pro-Caprivi coalition.
The Army Bill controversy had remained unresolved during
the interim School Bill crisis. Shortly after the defeat of
the Zedlitz Bill, Caprivi, meeting with Hans von Kaltenborn,
Prussian Minister of War, and Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief
of the German General Staff, drew up a new military proposal,
one that contained a definitive provision for a compulsory
two-year service. This bill, when presented to the Reichstag,
met with strong opposition from the Conservatives. To make
matters worse, William, who for so long had expressed ambiva-
lent feelings about the Army proposal, hurt Caprivi's cause
in August 1892, when, in an address to his commanding offi-
cers, he criticized the Reichstag's clamor for two-year
service and held that he would make any necessary changes in
the Army's service requirements, The Kaiser also stated that
he would retain the three-year service.^ Caprivi expected
50
Holstein, upon hearing this news, urged the postpone-
ment of Eulenburg's appointment so as not to incite public
opinion against William for placing his best friend in this
post. Rich, Holstein, I, 393.
51
Raschdau, Unter Bismarck und Caprivi, 271; Rich, Hoi-
stein, I, 395.
140
William to change his mind, however, for he continued to
work with Kaltenborn and Schlieffen, finally drawing up a
bill which would preserve the three-year service in
principle but in practice reduce compulsory conscription time
52
to two years.
Eulenburg and Holstein held mixed attitudes toward
Caprivi's new proposal. Eulenburg wrote the Foreign Office
functionary and told him that the Chancellor's proposal
would pass the Reichstag, but that the Center, the pivotal
party, would demand huge concessions in return for their
votes. One gathers that Eulenburg, who had supported the
three-year military service proposal anyway, considered
ultramontane ascendancy a greater threat to the Reich than
another skirmish in the national assembly. Holstein agreed
that concessions would probably have to be made to the
Center party but that they should be kept to a minimum.
Like Eulenburg, he believed that it would be better to post-
pone or shelve Caprivi's military bill than to allow the
53
Center to dominate the Reichstag. Later in 1892, however,
as Caprivi's position became increasingly tenuous, Holstein
abandoned this stance and decided that, even at the risk of
an ultramontane resurgence in Bavaria, every effort should
be made to obtain support for Caprivi's Army Bill.
52
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 213; Rich, Holstein,
I, 395.
53e. El K. , II, 926; Rich, Holstein, I, 396.
141
To this end Holstein continued to work for the passage
of the Chancellor's de facto two-year proposal. Again he
called upon Eulenburg to obtain William's support for the
Army Bill. Eulenburg responded somewhat half-heartedly. He
wrote a long letter to William,appealing to his friend's
desire for both popular acclaim and respect in the eyes of
his fellow monarchs. He further emphasized that an adminis-
tration unable to increase its military forces would appear
feeble in the eyes of the rest of the world. He held that
Bismarck and Waldersee were attempting to defeat the Bill
and discredit William. Eulenburg asserted finally that if
William attacked the Reichstag's passage of the compromise
bill, it would appear to other nations that that body, not
54
the Kaiser, dominated Germany's political arena.
Eulenburg's pleading seemed to succeed. On September
30, 1892, he wrote Holstein and asserted that William had
given his oral approval to the legislation, and that the
Chancellor could proceed with his preparations as origi-
nally intended. In October 1892, the Kaiser formally approv-
ed the Army Bill (with its implied two-year service), and on
November 23 Chancellor von Caprivi submitted his proposal to
the Reichstag.
The Caprivi Army Bill precipitated numerous hours of
54
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 89-91; E. p, K,, II, 961-963;
Rôhl, Germany Without Bismarck, 213-214; Burmeister,
"Philipp Eulenburg-Hertefeld," 147.
142
controversy. That master of intrigue Friedrich yon Holstein
went from faction to faction trying to rally support for the
modified act. He first approached the moderate Conservative
Helldorf-Bedra and attempted to convince him of the bill's
feasibility, promising a Conservative resurgence in the
Reichstag if the proposal were approved. Simultaneously
Holstein attacked the reactionary "Conservative Party Con-
gress," a group of Kreuzzeitung and pro-Stficker (see above)
forces which met in Berlin in December 1892 to adopt, among
other things, a series of anti-Semitic resolutions. Hoi-
stein's objections to this convocation included a letter to
Philipp zu Eulenburg in which he asked the diplomat to con-
vince the Kaiser that these rightists, in addition to their
prejudicial and militaristic affinities, stood for the elimi-
nation of private property. Holstein further extended his
opposition to the convocation by contacting Chancellor von
Caprivi and asking him to have the Kaiser denounce the
55
demagogic Conservative Party Congress. William, in his
usual dynamic, if not to say foolhardy, manner, did not
effectively carry out this desire. The Kaiser merely con¬
fronted Otto von Manteuffel, a leader of the Conservatives,
and told him that he and the other members of his party
"should all be hanged"—an ineffectual reprimand. ^
55
D.g.P., III,,378-379 ;Rich,Holstein, I, 397-398; Nichols,
Germany After Bismarck, 238.
56
Rich, Holstein, I, 398.
143
Nevertheless,the indefatigable Holstein refused to be daunted
by the mishap. Again he urged Eulenburg to make William
deliver more effective lines to opponents of the Army Bill.
After a short lull in their correspondence, Eulenburg
received another communication,dated December 26, 1892.
This time he reminded the diplomat that the Kaiser would be
addressing his generals in his annual New Year's Day speech,
and that Eulenburg must see that William used that occasion
for expressing support for Caprivi's Army Bill. Eulenburg
executed the request by appealing once again to William's
desire for peer recognition. Like the Reichstag, William's
57
generals needed to know who was in command. Eulenburg's
plan consequently worked effectively as the Kaiser took a
bullying approach when addressing his generals, and even
went so far as to threaten to "sweep away the Reichstag," if
the Army Bill did not pass. This performance nevertheless
proved a hollow accomplishment in view of what followed when
the Army Bill came before the Reichstag.
William's exhortations did not sway the parties of the
Right (National Liberals, Conservatives) from their stance
regarding the three-year military service. Holstein now
reluctantly enlisted, with Eulenburg's assistance, the aid
of the Center and eventually the Papacy in order to secure
the Army Bill's passage. Early in 1893 he received word that
57
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 92; E. p. K., II, 1001.
144
Pope Leo XIII had recently hinted to the Prussian Minister
at the Vatican, Otto von Billow, that he would appreciate
some type of gift from the German government for his jubilee
celebration. Holstein reasoned that if William would make
the desired donations, perhaps a few thousand marks, the
Center would support the Army Bill. He conveyed this idea
to Philipp zu Eulenburg. The latter possessed doubts con-
cerning the idea's workability, but nevertheless passed it on
to Chancellor von Caprivi. Holstein also contacted Foreign
Secretary Marschall about the proposal, and sought to enlist
the aid of Bavarian Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillings-
fürst, Governor of Alsace and an influential Catholic, and of
Alfred von Kiderlen-Wâchter concerning the "bribe" scheme.
Holstein's ploy bore no fruit, however. Neither the Chancel-
lor nor Marschall would support the idea of a Papal bribe,
feeling that the proposal degraded the government's integ-
rity. Furthermore, both believed that the Pope's pleasure
would not change the attitude of the Center toward the Army
58
Bill.
58
Helmuth Rogge, Holstein und Hohenlohe: New Beitrâge zu
Friedrich von Holsteins Tâtigkeit ais Mitarbeiter Bismarcks
und ais Ratgeber Hohenlohes (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag-
Anstalt, 1957), 396-398, hereinafter cited as Rogge, Holstein
und Hohenlohe; Rich, Holstein, I, 399; Rflhl, Germany Without
Bismarck, 107; Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schilingsfürst, Denk-
würdigkeiten des Choldwig Fürst zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst,
ed. K. A. Müller (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt, 1931),
II, 496, hereinafter cited as Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten.
145
Holstein continued his attempts to woo the Center,
advising Eulenburg that the Kaiser might tell leaders of the
party that he would not oppose the recall of the Redemptorist
monastic order to Germany if the military bill passed the
Reichstag. Although the Kaiser's resultant action caused a
number of Catholic leaders to declare openly their support
for Caprivi's Army Bill, Holstein soon experienced disappoint-
ment. William, in one of his public utterances, now openly
asserted that he would not concede to the Center and support
the modified proposal. With nowhere to turn, Holstein
ceased his activities and allowed the government's bill to go
to the Reichstag's examining committee, which rejected the
59
proposal on March 17, 1893.
Holstein, at this point forced to leave Berlin in order
to have a cataract operation, continued to enlist the services
of Eulenburg in spite of this absence. This time Eulenburg
served as an informant on Reichstag activity. Holstein had
good reason to maintain a watch on that body, for a movement
to redesign Caprivi's Army Bill, led by the Chancellor and
Karl von Huene, a leader of the conservative Centrists, had
gained momentum after the original military proposal had met
defeat at the hands of the Reichstag committee. From mid-
March until the end of April 1893, these men conferred,
finally drawing up a compromise bill that would contain
59
Rich, Holstein, I, 400.
146
unprecedented concessions to the Center Party, Paramount
among them was a provision increasing the total peacetime
strength of the Army to sixth-sevenths of that suggested by
60
the original Army Bill. Other parties appeared to support
the new proposal's passage. The Kaiser and his wife paid a
courtesy call at the Vatican, thus unintentionally garnering
support for a bill which granted the Center increased in-
61
fluence in the Reichstag. This gesture, generally bene-
ficial to the proposal, nevertheless alienated many Centrists,
especially the Bavarian ultramontanes, who found the Papacy's
affinity for France disturbing and therefore refused to
62
cooperate with the Huene-Caprivi proposal. Eulenburg, for
his part, had accompanied the Kaiser on his visit to Rome and
63
assisted in obtaining the Pope's support for the new bill.
This time, it seemed the measure would have a chance.
On May 3, 1893, Huene, full of optimism, presented his
bill to the Reichstag. His feelings soon changed when after
three days the majority of the assembly (including the Center)
rejected the proposal. Chancellor von Caprivi at this point
dissolved the Reichstag and called for new elections to be
held on June 15. Obviously he hoped for the removal of the
60
Werdermann/ Heeresreform, 98-100; cf. Nichols, Germany
After Bismarck, 252.
61
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 252.
62
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 252.
63
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 252; Rich, Holstein,
147
die-hard conservatives who would not compromise on the new
bill. At the same time he and others used this opportunity
on election day, when the parties of the Right brought a
number of supporters of the modified Army Bill into the
Reichstag. When the third reading of the Huene-Caprvi
Bill took place on July 4, 1893, fate smiled on Caprivi and
64
his proposal passed by a vote of 201 to 185. The two-year
military service remained and the Center party now found it-
self more influential than any previous administration.
Eulenburg's ability to persuade Emperor William to modify his
stance undoubtedly contributed to this success.
Philipp zu Eulenburg, in the midst of the Army and
Zedlitz School Bill controversies, also found himself con-
fronting yet another challenge looming over the Caprivi admin—
istration. Otto von Bismarck, living in retirement at Fried-
richsruh, consistently lashed out against his successor's
government during its initial years. The ex-Chancellor
vehemently attacked, through his mouthpiece the Hamburger
Nachrichten, Caprivi's moderate stance toward labor, his
advocacy of limiting diplomatic relations with Russia, and
the misunderstandings with the Kaiser, The government could
endure this demoralizing treatment for only a limited time.
Thus a number of parties, almost from the day of Bismarck's
I, 400.
64
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 254-257.
148
dismissal, wished to facilitate a reconciliation between
William II and Bismarck. Here Eulenburg entered the picture,
this time as one of the major persons involved in formulating
a truce between the Emperor and ex-Chancellor.
Eulenburg had passively accepted William's dismissal of
Chancellor von Bismarck in March 1890. At the same time,
however, he had refrained from encouraging further animosity
between the two men. In a message to the Kaiser soon after
Bismarck's departure, Eulenburg asserted that under no cir-
cumstances would he "discredit the name of Bismarck," and
65
begged for William's cooperation concerning this matter.
Eulenburg also attempted to maintain his personal ties with
the Bismarcks, especially with Herbert, whom he had known
since childhood. Shortly after the old Chancellor's resig-
nation, he wrote Herbert, and urged that he retain his post
as Foreign Secretary, although he personally suspected the
younger Bismarck of having designs on the Imperial Chancel-
66
lery. In this instance Eulenburg even went so far as to
enlist William's aid in keeping Herbert in office:
I really regret what I hear from Berlin about
our friend Herbert. He seems to have lost his head
and Your Majesty will have a difficult time^holding
him. I am very sorry to have to say this.67
65
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 95.
66
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 238.
67e. P- K., I. 511.
149
Several factors seemed to make opportunities for recon-
ciliation few and far between. Only William could initiate
a truce between himself and the ex-Chancellor. Bismarck, a
national hero, possessed no real reason for extending him-
self to the Emperor. Both the military (represented by
General von Waldersee) and Foreign Office (especially Fried-
rich von Holstein) resented the old man and wished to per-
petuate the animosity between him and the Kaiser. Finally,
Bismarck's own behavior, characterized by such actions as
granting interviews to anti-Prussian journalists and impli-
citly attacking Emperor William in the Hamburger Nachrichten,
further lessened the possibilities for reaching an under-
68
standing between himself and the Kaiser.
In the spring of 1891, after having unsuccessfully
attempted to persuade William to send birthday and Christmas
greetings to the Bismarcks, Eulenburg finally saw a new
opportunity for engineering a peace between the Kaiser and
ex-Chancellor. Obviously attempting to form a coalition
against the Caprivi government, Bismarck announced in Febru-
ary that he planned to run as a National Liberal for a seat
in the Reichstag. Eulenburg, undoubtedly aware of the ex-
Chancellor's motives, nevertheless wrote Friedrich von
Holstein and expressed the opinion that in the event that
Bismarck took a seat in the German Reichstag, the Kaiser
68
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 96.
150
could offer Bellevue Palace in Berlin as a residence for the
new deputy. Holstein refused to cooperate in this gambit.
Maybe in part because William now appeared also to support
reconciliation, Eulenburg, then, uncharacteristically, acted
against the wishes of the Foreign Office functionary. He
wrote William, implying that a political rapprochement
between himself and Bismarck would promote the growth of
Russian hegemony in East Europe, and simultaneously alienate
Austria, Italy, and the South German states from the Second
Reich. Simultaneously, a personal "handshake" and a super-
ficial meeting with the old man could do much to improve the
Kaiser's public image:
Your Majesty's personal posture in the Empire
has not improved because of the severe accentuation
of your personal regime on the most diverse occasions.
A great resentment against Your Majesty exists in the
nation. We must get out of this situation, With
such a negative atmosphere in the country, experi-
ments of such a dangerous nature can lead to catas-
trophes, the character of which we are unable to
foresee. But, on the other hand, precisely because
Your Majesty has stressed the personal element so
strongly, the arm's distance from Bismarck means the
most horrible fiasco.
At the same time, however, Eulenburg shrewdly informed Hoi-
stein that he saw no hope of reconciliation between William
and Bismarck in the near future. In this way he allayed Hoi-
stein's suspicions concerning his stance on the ex-Chancellor's
69
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 284; cf. Burmeister
"Philipp Eulenburg-Hertefeld," 152.
151
70
relationship with the Emperor. Nevertheless, these actions
had little immediate effect on William's decisions in dealing
with Bismarck, as he told Eulenburg "not to lose himself in
such foolishness" by designing a reconciliation between him-
71
self and Bismarck. Eulenburg's planned rapprochement, in
the Kaiser's opinion, seemed a mere dream.
The year 1892, however, witnessed softening in William's
view of reconciliation. Eulenburg's influence, combined with
that of the Hamburger Nachrichten, had apparently moved the
Kaiser, for,on April 24, he paid a visit to Baron Carl von
Stumm, a wealthy industrialist and outspoken partisan of ex-
Chancellor Bismarck. Negotiations between the Kaiser and
Stumm resulted in the latter obtaining William's permission
to negotiate with Bismarck. This action in turn encouraged
others to join in fostering an "understanding." Reichstag
Deputy Wilhelm von Kardorff, for instance, visited Friedrich-
sruh and reported the "Kaiser's favorable disposition" to the
72
Chancellor and his son. William himself went so far as to
send a congratulatory telegram to Herbert von Bismarck on the
occasion of his engagement to Countess Marguerite Hoyos (May
4, 1892). For two years previously William had neglected even
to send birthday greetings to members of the Bismarck clan—
70
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 103-104.
71
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 285.
72
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 193-194.
152
now he wanted to make peace with the family.
Holstein re-entered the picture at this juncture,
attempting to thwart these reconciliation measures. He
wrote Eulenburg and asserted that William's actions would
undoubtedly undermine Germany's ascendancy in Europe. The
nation would witness, with the renewal of the Bismarck in-
fluence, the dissolution of the Triple Alliance. Eventually
Germany would fall subject to Russia, so Holstein held.
Eulenburg handled this situation with his usual dexterity.
He wrote reassuringly to Holstein on May 18, 1892, holding
that "His Majesty doesn't wish to hear of a reconcilia-
tion. „73 In further correspondence from a Rominten hunting
trip, Eulenburg, while in reality attempting to foster recon¬
ciliation, deceitfully conveyed to Holstein the impression
that he was doing his best to discourage the "shake hands. ,,74
Holstein in fact did not find Eulenburg's alleged efforts
to harness William satisfying, and thus sought other allies
in his struggle against Bismarck. One of these, Chancellor
von Caprivi, agreed to involve himself in the sending of what
was to become known as the "Uriah telegram," and thus
seriously undermine efforts at reconciliation, The Chancellor,
who himself feared usurpation by the Bismarcks, consulted with
Holstein shortly after Herbert von Bismarck announced his
73
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 295-296; Rich, Hoi-
stein, I, 387; Rogge, Holstein und Hohenlohe, 387.
74
Rich, Holstein, I, 387,
153
engagement to Countess Hoyos (see above). Holstein urged
Caprivi to send a telegram to Vienna, where Herbert had
planned to hold the wedding festivities. The message would
request Prince Reuss, German Ambassador at the Austrian capi-
tal, to restrict his relations with the Bismarcks during the
75
wedding celebrations. Caprivi agreed to the proposal, and
unknowingly contributed to his own political demise.
Holstein's plan, when discovered, generated formidable
opposition. Count von Waldersee, recently deposed from his
General Staff chieftaincy and undoubtedly attributing his
misfortune in part to Holstein, visited Emperor William and
impressed upon him once again the need for reconciliation
between himself and Bismarck. Holstein, hearing of Walder-
see's activities, sought to counter his influence by writing
Eulenburg. This he did, urging him to inform William that
Bismarck had designs for stirring up support in Saxony and
Austria. Thus it was the Kaiser's duty, Holstein held, to
write the rulers of these states and urge them to resist Bis-
76
marck's influence. William, after listening to Eulenburg,
agreed to execute Holstein's urgings. On June 13, 1892, he
wrote a letter to Emperor Francis Joseph, reminding him of
the ex-Chancellor's secret dealings with Russia and his under-
mining of the Triple Alliance. The Kaiser concluded by
75
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 197-199.
76e. P- K., I, 889; Rich, Holstein, I, 387.
154
asking his fellow monarch not to receive the contumacious
vassal when he came to Vienna for Herbert's wedding. On
June 14, 1892, William wrote a similar note to the Saxon
77
military attache in Berlin. The Vienna recipients com-
plied with these requests but the plan did not fulfill Hoi-
stein's expectations. Bismarck, angered by the rebuff, con-
tinued his attacks. At the same time, when word of the
"Uriah incident" reached the press, the Caprivi government
found itself an object of public indignation. Simultaneously,
Bismarck returned from Vienna a hero, denouncing the Chancel-
78
lor amidst the cheers of the multitudes.
At this point Eulenburg and others realized that a recon-
ciliation between William and Bismarck, whatever Holstein's
objections, would__have to be engendered. An opportunity for
such action came in September 1893, when the ex-Chancellor
fell ill with a lung inflammation. At first only Bismarck's
physician, Dr. Schweninger and the old man's family knew of
the infirmity—Eulenburg apparently received the news of the
illness through secret means. Having obtained the informa-
tion, Eulenburg then implored the Kaiser to telegraph a
message in which the latter would express a hope for the ex-
Chancellor's recovery. At first William refused to listen,
but his friend's persistence finally led him to send a note
77
Rich, Holstein, I, 387.
78
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 203.
155
to Schweninger in which he inquired as to the state of Prince
Bismarck's health. Chancellor von Caprivi also indirectly
aided Eulenburg by suggesting to the Kaiser that he offer
one of the imperial palaces to Bismarck as a winter abode.
Even Holstein, much as he feared a reconciliation, found the
Chancellor's proposal agreeable, for it seemed that by this
method Caprivi could pacify the pro-Bismarckian forces with-
out sacrificing the authority of his position. Holstein
warned Eulenburg, however, that further attempts at recon-
ciliation would produce unfortunate consequences, especially
79
in regard to the Russian question, and should be avoided.
The good intentions of Eulenburg and Caprivi accomplish-
ed little. Bismarck politely refused the palace offer, caus-
ing William to renew his bitterness toward the ex-Chancellor.
Those surrounding the Kaiser, however, refused to see their
efforts at reconciliation fail. On January 21, 1894, various
court parties sent a message to Herbert von Bismarck, asking
him to attend an official function in Berlin. The move
failed, however, because the Kaiser, upon seeing Herbert,
deliberately ignored him during the entire affair, At this
juncture William again displayed his erratic nature, Less
then twenty-four hours after the court festivity, the Kaiser
sent his aide-de-camp, Count Kuno von Moltke, to Friedrichsruh
79
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 106; Rich, Holstein, I, 407;
Raschdau, Unter Bismarck und Caprivi, 301-303.
156
with a choice bottle of Steinberger Kabinett wine. Moltke
also put forth an inquiry concerning Bismarck's health and
extended him an invitation to attend the January 27 cele-
80
bration of William's thirty-fifth birthday. Eulenburg,
for his part, found these moves toward reconciliation pleas-
ing. At the same time, however, he urged the Kaiser to
exercise discretion when dealing with Bismarck:
It is now, as ever, the intention of the
collected fronde to ruin Your Majesty's present
government and place Your Majesty personally in
a [position of] dependence similar to that which
one uses for a recalcitrant child. . . . With sat-
isfaction, I recognize in both dispatches the
finesse with which Your Majesty has operated.
Your Majesty has "overlooked" Herbert—but has
sent personally a greeting to the old Prince.
Only by the continuation of such a tactic will
Your Majesty's dignity not suffer.81
This letter contrasted formidably with the pleadings of Hoi-
stein, Kiderlen-W&chter, and Marschall, who between them sent
five telegrams and six letters urging Eulenburg to prevent
Bismarck from coming to Berlin. Undoubtedly Eulenburg
realized that a full-fledged reconciliation between Kaiser
and Chancellor could lead to dangerous political repercussions.
Yet if the Caprivi regime and William were to regain the con-
fidence of the public, the parties would have to foster at
least a superficial peace-making gesture, The Kaiser's
friend thus sought to sponsor such a development, and
80
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 199,
81
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 258.
157
therefore encouraged his chief to go through with the meet-
82
ing.
Events turned out favorably. Bismarck entered Berlin
in triumph and received embraces and kisses from William and
his cohorst when he visited the Imperial Palace. The old
man spent the afternoon of January 26 receiving callers, in-
eluding his opponent Botho zu Eulenburg. Caprivi and Mars-
chalí, also political enemies of Bismarck, sent their calling
cards to the ex-Chancellor's abode. Meanwhile, William and
Bismarck spent their time together discussing the mundane,
and avoided political topics. On February 19, 1894, the
Kaiser returned Bismarck's call at Friedrichsruh. In the
83
eyes of the populace, the two had made peace.
Yet all was not well for the Caprivi regime. The Chan-
cellor undoubtedly felt threatened by Bismarck's return.
82
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 207; Erich Eyck, Das persfln-
liche Regiment Wilhelms II : politische Geschichte des deut-
schen Kaiserreiches von 1890 bis 1914 (Erlenbach-Zürich:
Rentsch, 1948), 82-83, hereinafter cited as Eyck, Wilhelm
II; Raschdau, Unter Bismarck und Caprivi, 331; cf. Nichols,
Germany After Bismarck, 300.
83
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 301. Burmeister,
"Philipp Eulenburg-Hertefeld," in general seriously de-empha-
sizes Holstein's role in the William II-Bismarck reconcilia-
tion affair. He gives little consideration to the fact that
Holstein attempted to prevent Eulenburg from achieving a re-
conciliation between the Kaiser and Prince Bismarck while
Eulenburg himself was trying to formulate such an accommoda-
tion. It was Holstein who urged the Caprivi government to
send the "Uriah Letter" to Vienna (cf. Nichols, Germany After
Bismarck, 197-199; E. p. K., II, 889; Rich, Holstein, I, 387).
When Bismarck became ill in 1893, Holstein, who had softened
to the point of favoring Caprivi's idea of offering one of the
imperial palaces to Bismarck as a winter abode, nevertheless,
still urged Eulenburg against any further concessions to the
158
Was William attempting to tell him that his predecessor stood
next in line for the Reich's second office? The scribblings
of an unknown journalist in the satirical weekly Kladder-
adatsch, however, did even more to suggest public dissatis-
faction with the Caprivi administration. On December 24,
1893, Kl'adderadatsch published an article entitled "A Fourth
at Skat" in which three card players discussed the need for
an additional party to complete their foursome. The partici¬
pants—Oyster—Lover (Friedrich von Holstein) , the slovenly
backstabbing Spâtzle (Alfred von Kiderlen-Wâchter, whose
Swabian background the journal satirized), and Count Troubador
(Philipp zu Eulenburg)—had been exercising considerable in-
fluence in Imperial circles, slandering "many of the truest
knights so that they had lost their positions and had been
84 •'
sent away from the palace. The writer found Oyster-Lover
and Sp&tzle especially despicable, whereas he depicted Eulen-
burg as a mere clown whose major intrigues concerned his own
appointment to Vienna and his engineering the appointment of
his friend Baron Axel Varnbüler as Württemberg's Minister to
Berlin. The journal also accused Eulenburg of usurping the
Vienna 85post of the Bismarckian Prince Reuss.
Bismarcks. Ccf. Haller, Aus dem Leben, 106; Rich, Holstein, I,
407) . Eulenburg's disregard of Holstein's "instructions"
eventually precipitated a split between the two men.
84
Rogge, Holstein und Hohenlohe, 401; Nichols, Germany
After Bismarck, 325.
85
Rich, Holstein, I, 403-405; Burmeister, "Philipp
159
While Kiderlen found the journal's satire amusing and
hardly offensive, both Eulenburg and Holstein considered the
Kladderadatsch's attacks subversive,and a threat to their in-
fluence. Holstein instantly focused on safeguarding his own
personal reputation, and thus fervently sought to counter the
weekly's attacks. He wrote Eulenburg, requesting that he
approach Emperor William and ask him to order a search for
the author of the Kladderadatsch article. Eulenburg executed
Holstein's request, and, when addressing William, emphasized
the shame that a man- of "Holstein's good nature" and indis-
pensibility experienced because of the journal's attacks.
The Kaiser, however, at that time more concerned with the Bis-
marck reconciliation, let the matter slide. Undaunted by his
master's lack of cooperation, Eulenburg then attempted to find
the culprit on his own, and to this end consulted with Ludwig
Raschdau, an editor of the Kladderadatsch. Immediately after
their meeting the periodical ceased defaming "Troubador" and
86
directed its allegations solely at Kiderlen and Holstein.
Eulenburg found no repose, however, for Holstein, still
determined to find his detractor, again sought to enlist the
former's help in accomplishing this task. After considering
legal and governmental intervention, Holstein decided that
the only way to terminate the attacks in Kladderadatsch
Eulenburg-Hertefeld," 175.
86
Raschdau, Unter Bismarck und Caprivi, 320; Rich, Hoi-
stein, I, 405. ' ~ r
160
would be to challenge the author of the articles to a duel.
In January 1894, Holstein received word that Herbert von
Bismarck had written "A Fourth at Skat." On questioning
the ex-Chancellor's son, Holstein however received a flat
denial of any affiliation with the journal's satirical work.
This statement did not satisfy Holstein though, and he sent
his seconds (one of whom,Count Kuno von Moltke, had served
with Eulenburg in the Franco-Prussian conflict) to demand
that Herbert issue a formal statement in the Hamburger
Nachrichten substantiating his assertions of non-complicity.
If the ex-Foreign Secretary refused, Holstein added, the two
men would face each other on the field of honor. Remarkably,
Herbert complied with this request, presenting the required
87
statement on March 6, 1894.
Holstein's search for his detractors became so obsessive
at this point that even Eulenburg seriously began to ques-
tion the rationality of his actions. Holstein now enlisted
the aid of Kiderlen-Wâchter (alias Spâtzle), who in turn took
it upon himself to challenge another editor of the Kladdera-
datsch, one Doctor Polstorff, to a duel. In the ensuing con-
frontation, Polstorff suffered an armpit wound, enough to
convince Holstein that the publisher did not write the
libelous "A Fourth at Skat." With little place to turn, Hoi-
stein sent a challenge to Guido von Henckel-Donnersmarck ,
87
Rich, Holstein, I, 408; Rich seems to question the
integrity of Herbert's statements.
161
editor of the Berliner Neueste Nachrichten. The latter had
previously maintained close ties with the Foreign Office
official's nemesis, Count Harry von Arnim, whom long ago in
his Paris embassy days Holstein had spied upon at Chancellor
von Bismarck's behest. Holstein was attempting to pressure
Henckel into revealing the Kladderadatsch author's name,
which, in view of Henckel's pro-Bismarck affinities, may
have constituted a logical action on Holstein's part. Never-
theless, many individuals, including Eulenburg, held that
both Kiderlen and Holstein had treated Henckel unjustly,and
that the matter had reached the point of "senselessness. » 8 8
Holstein refused to listen to his colleagues, however, and
sent a duel challenge to Henckel through the journalist
Moritz von Busch, an intimate associate of the Bismarcks.
Henckel responded to Holstein through the former's mediator,
of all people, Alfred von Waldersee, with a flat denial of
participation in the Kladderadatsch affair. Later he con-
veyed the same denial of guilt in the April 2, 1894 edition
89
of the Berliner Neueste Nachrichten.
Eulenburg entered the picture when Holstein, finally
realizing that his search for his attacker had reached
ridiculous extremes, turned to the diplomat and asked that
he convince Emperor William of the justifiability of his
83
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 339; Raschdau, Unter
Bismarck und Caprivi, 328.
89
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 168; Rich, Holstein, I, 411.
162
challenge to Henckel. While Eulenburg promised to convey
such a sentiment to William, no evidence suggests that he
did anything to influence the Kaiser in this regard. This
rebuff pushed Holstein past the limits of his endurance.
The hapless official now vented his frustrations on Eulen-
burg, threatening that "As I perceive that you are working
. . against me, I shall be obliged to show my claws in
H 9 0
some way. Eulenburg received this message and reacted
sharply. The note now confirmed the opinion of both him-
self and the Kaiser that Holstein's behavior bordered on the
pathological. At the same time, however, Eulenburg feared
the political repercussions if he did, in fact, try to
"corral" Holstein's moves. The Kladderadatsch affair did
not merit the concern which so many had displayed—he, Eulen-
burg, could let "sleeping dogs lie":
In the evening a grand departure in the im-
perial special train. The day was horrible! Work,
parting from countless people, all of whom wanted
something. Almost everyone wants to have a medal.
I didn't know where my head was—and then the royal
family!—as though there weren't even a departure.
The same daily schedule, tennis, etc.--enviable!
Not once having to pack a handkerchief themselves
and never having to take a ticket—half gods!91
Obviously the diplomat possessed far more pressing concerns
than Holstein's personal battles.
90
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 327; E. p. K., II.
128; Rich, Holstein, I, 411.
91
Eulenburg, Erlebnisse am deutschen und fremden Hfifen,
34.
163
After four months of directionless conniving on Hoi-
stein's part, the Kladderadatsch affair came to an end. In
April 1894, General Moritz von Busch submitted documents
regarding Holstein's challenges to the directorship of the
Berlin Casino (officers' club and supreme authority over
"affairs of honor" in Prussia), which in turn declared that
it could not "adopt an attitude in regard to the affair be¬
tween Herr von Holstein and Count Guido von Henckel-Donners-
marck. M 92 Indeed, to this day, the real author of the
satirical "A Fourth at Skat," surmised by many to have been
93
Raschdau, has never been definitely ascertained.
After the Kladderadatsch affair had run its course,
Eulenburg might be expected to have experienced a period of
unparalleled happiness. In April 1894, he received the
German ambassadorship at Vienna. Undoubtedly his aid to
the Kaiser in the Bismarck reconciliation helped him to
achieve this goal. This elevation, while in itself signifi-
cant, also deserves mention because it offered Eulenburg the
opportunity to establish intimate political relations with
Bernhard von Bülow. This latter figure, rather ironically,
would eventually replace Eulenburg as the most influential
92
Rich, Holstein, I, 412.
93
Raschdau, Unter Bismarck und Caprivi, 320; cf. Rich,
Holstein, I, 413. Burmeister, "Philipp Eulenburg-Hertefeld,"
makes no mention of Eulenburg's attempts to identify Hoi-
stein's anonymous attackers, erroneously interpreting the
situation as one which did not ruffle Eulenburg in the least,
(cf. Raschdau, Unter Bismarck und Caprivi, 320-327; Lerchen-
feld, Erinnerungen, 383-384; Rich, Holstein, I, 405).
164
personality of the Wilhelmine court.
Eulenburg and Billow had been acquainted since 1875,
when, as previously mentioned, Eulenburg had an integral
part in securing the consent of Emperior William I to
Bülow's marriage to the Italian and Catholic Princess Maria
Camporeale. Both men had served in diplomatic capacities
and remained on excellent terms throughout the eighties.
Billow, two years younger than Eulenburg, consistently urged
his friend to avoid Holstein and other members of the anti-
Bismarck circle. To a larger degree than did Eulenburg,
the future Chancellor von Billow possessed the qualities of a
political conniver and could detect these same characteris-
tics in the Foreign Office's most infulential figure. As has
been demonstrated above, Eulenburg rarely heeded Billow's
advice concerning this matter. Nevertheless, the personal
affection between the two men could rise above the political
differences, at least to surface appearances. Billow often
encouraged Eulenburg during his trying experiences with
William, resorting to veritable flattery. In one instance
he referred to the Emperor's "genuineness, most kind heart,
and leading hand," obviously all contradictory to the
94
Emperor's true character. It can also be surmised that
Eulenburg thought highly of his cohort, though probably not
as much as the flattery and "small talk" that he employed in
94
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 109; cf. Muschler, Eulenburg
. . Leben, 320, regarding Eulenburg's Vienna appointment.
165
95
his correspondence with Bülow may have suggested.
In the early years of their careers, at any rate, the
two could remain on good terms. Bülow's ambitions (e.g • t
the ambassadorship to Italy) were realized through Eulen-
burg's efforts,and he ceremoniously cultivated his influ-
ential friend. Likewise, he used his own position in the
Foreign Service to place his friends, including Eulenburg,
in various capacities. Indirectly, Bülow contributed to
Eulenburg's appointment as ambassador to Austria-Hungary be-
cause Emperor William, who had become increasingly dissatis-
fied with Foreign Secretary Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein,
had made it clear to Bülow, Caprivi, and others that he was
taking Eulenburg under consideration for Marschall's post.
Eulenburg, however, when informed of the situation, express-
ed distaste for this post,desiring, in the opinion of Haller,
to stand clear of the intrigue and corruption which suffused
96
the Foreign Office. Of even more significance, Eulen-
burg's increasing dislike of Holstein's misanthropic and
paranoid tendencies added to his reservations about taking
over Marschall's post. For example, he found Holstein's
fear of Russian hegemony so intense that it "has driven him
insane. » 9 7 Finally the Army and School Bill controversies
95
Eulenburg, Aus 50 Jahren, 288.
96
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 108; Burmeister "Philipp Eulen-
burg-Hertefeld," 168.
97
Rich, Holstein, I, 407.
166
had helped make Eulenburg a prominent and (in the eyes of
some) a notorious figure, subject to periodical press abuse.
Undoubtedly he wished to avoid exposure which might result in
a recurrence of his unfortunate Kladderadatsch experience.
Emperor William, when informed that Eulenburg would not
take Marschall's post, still resolved to reward his friend
in some other manner. After considerable debate with his
advisors and a consultation with Bernhard von Bülow, the
Kaiser decided to post Eulenburg to Vienna. This appoint-
ment thus laid a debt of gratitude on Eulenburg which, as
will be seen later, he would eventually repay by recommend¬
ing Bülow for the post of German Foreign Secretary in 1897.
First, however, Eulenburg played an important part in
the events which eventually climaxed in the resignation of
Leo von Caprivi from the Imperial Chancellorship in 1894.
Mention has been made of Eulenburg's role in the Zedlitz
School Bill crisis, which resulted in Caprivi's resignation
from the Prussian Prime Ministership and Botho zu Eulen-
burg's accession to that post. Contrary to Eulenburg's
statements about "too many Eulenburgs" (see above), it is
difficult not to believe that the Prussian nobleman did have
chancellor ambitions for his cousin and would work to secure
them. In this endeavor he would have been helped by Capri-
vi's comparatively advanced age, uncompromising nature, and
his general intractability against any changes which
William wished to inaugurate. Under such circumstances,
167
opponents of the sixty-three-year-old general could easily
bring about a break between Kaiser and Chancellor.
The immediate circumstances surrounding Caprivi's dis-
missal centered upon the introduction of an anti-revolution-
ary bill in the Reichstag. Eulenburg, from 1890, had urged
his sovereign to steer clear of such legislation; extra-
neous circumstances, however, led William to urge the passage
of such a program in spite of his friend's advice. The
summer of 1894 had witnessed an unsuccessful anarchist
attempt on the life of Italian Prime Minister Francesco
Crispi and the murder of French President Sadi Carnot. Such
events alarmed heads of state throughout Europe, especially
Germany's Kaiser, who proceeded to consult with Chancellor
von Caprivi on the matter Caprivi proposed an anti-revolu-
tionary program almost identical to that of Bismarck four
years earlier. This action drew applause from conservative
groups, especially from the military and from Prussian Prime
Minister Botho zu Eulenburg, who unequivocally expressed his
reactionary leanings. On the other hand, moderates and
liberals found the new proposal appalling and refused to
98
support such a supposedly oppressive measure.
Eulenburg's role in the controversy began when Holstein
wrote him a letter which asserted that William's new legis-
lation would initiate dissension between the Kaiser and the
98
Rich, Holstein, I, 418; Haller, Aus dem Leben, 148;
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 331-339; Rtihl, Germany With-
168
more liberal factions of the German parliament. Also, in
Holstein's opinion, the supporters of Bismarck could use the
anticipated governmental crisis as a basis for undermining
the Caprivi administration and resurrecting their fallen
hero. In view of these impending difficulties, the Foreign
Office functionary urged Eulenburg to meet with the Kaiser
in order to inform him of the controversy which such a bill
would engender. Eulenburg, apparently also foreseeing a
government crisis, agreed to present Holstein's ideas.
William, however, refused to withdraw his support from the
anti-revolutionary proposal. Attempts by Eulenburg to
change William's mind by arranging imperial conferences, one
with Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein and one with Botho zu
99
Eulenburg, met with a similar lack of success. It appears
that once again William's friends in the Conservative party
and in the military contributed to his adamant stance.
William's position on the anti-revolutionary bill upset
Holstein considerably and he sought to draft a more moderate
proposal, one which would appease both the Left and the Cen-
ter,and thereby make William realize the futility of trying
to push forward with his oppressive legislation, Seeing this
situation, the Kaiser would then attempt to cooperate more
fully with the Caprivi goverment and its Chancellor in an
out Bismarck, 112-113.
99
Rich, Holstein, I, 418,
169
effort to secure the passage of the legislation favored by
Holstein. At the same time, Holstein worked to convince
Caprivi of the modified bill's feasibility. The Chancellor,
after listening to him, agreed to talk to William in hope of
modifying the monarch's anti-revolutionary policy position.
Holstein, however, encountered difficulties which
caused him to enlist the services of Philipp zu Eulenburg.
William, in keeping with his temperamental personality,
vacillated in his opinion of Holstein's anti-revolutionary
proposal. While to all appearances agreeing to the modified
plan, the Kaiser took advantage of the bill's creation of
new army batallions to "toast" Caprivi with a sardonic "I
shall thank you when the half-battalions have been made into
full battalions," thus implying that the Chancellor's support
of the new proposal would prevent Germany from developing a
100
more powerful military. This last comment offended
Caprivi to the extent that he wrote an angry letter to Hoi-
stein, in which he asserted that he planned to resign the
Chancellorship (again!). Caprivi undoubtedly expected Hoi-
stein to come to his defense in persuading the Kaiser to
accede to the demands of the modified bill's supporters.
Thus he must have experienced considerable shock when Hoi-
stein, finally tiring of all this controversy, raised no
objection to his proposed departure. Nevertheless, the Gray
100
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 150-151; Nichols, Germany After
Bismarck, 348-349.
170
Eminence knew propriety dictated that Caprivi resign on his
101
own accord, rather than be fired by the Kaiser.
In order to facilitate Caprivi's removal and still pre-
vent a government crisis, Holstein called on Eulenburg to
exercise his influence. He advised the Kaiser's friend to
persuade Frederick, Grand Duke of Baden, to visit his Imper-
ial nephew, William II, and convince him that he should re-
tract his statements against Caprivi. Eulenburg, who himself
did not favor the action, nevertheless complied with Hoi-
stein's requests, probably in the interest of preventing a
Chancellery crisis. Such action served little purpose, how-
ever, for Frederick bluntly rejected the plea. William, it
seemed, would deal with Caprivi on his own terms.
As early as July 3, 1894, William had, in lengthy corres-
pondence, insisted to General Albrecht von Stosch on the need
102
for a "younger, more practical man" to fill Caprivi's post.
Eulenburg had received consideration, though the Kaiser found
him too"dreamy," too esthetically inclined, and "too nice a
103
fellow" to fit the role. Kuno von Moltke stood as another
possibility. William also considered, on Eulenburg's advice,
the latter's cousin, Botho zu Eulenburg, and in September 1894
101
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 348-349.
102
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 352; Muschler, Eulen-
burg . . . Lebeñ^ 349-351, '
103
Nichols, Germany After Bismarck, 352.
171
the Kaiser informed the Minister President that if Caprivi
continued his obstinancy toward the anti-revolutionary bill,
104
he, Botho, would become Germany's next Chancellor.
Against the background of this mosaic of ambitions, then, the
Kaiser, frustrated more than ever by Caprivi's attitude, pre-
pared to spring the trap.
William, in preparing his final maneuvers for dismiss-
ing Caprivi, relied heavily on Eulenburg. On October 21,
1894, he called his friend and informed him that he was ready
to let Caprivi go, referring to the problems generated by the
various Reichstag controversies, the Chancellor's stubbornness,
his use of resignation threats, and the Kaiser's inability
to get his own programs implemented. Ironically, Eulenburg
as formerly in the case of Bismarck, raised no objection to
William's decision. It may well be asked whether Holstein's
influence or the hope of Botho zu Eulenburg's accession to
the Imperial Chancellorship caused him to act indifferent on
this particular occasion. Eulenburg's own frustration at
seeing the interests of the Conservatives (his own party)
thwarted in the cases of the Army and Zedlitz Bills undoubt-
edly gave him a distaste for Caprivi. At any rate he did
105
nothing to dissuade William from carrying out his plans.
104
Rûhl, Germany Without Bismarck, 114.
105
Anton von Monts, Erinnerungen und Gedanken des Bot-
schafters Anton Graf von Monts, ed. Karl Friedrich Nowak und
Friedrich Thimme (Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1932), 34,
hereinafter cited as Monts, Erinnerungen; Nichols, Germany
172
Eulenburg continued to exert powerful influence on
William II during the two days prior to the ultimate dismiss-
al. In spite of his desire to remove Caprivi, William still
hesitated to approve the formal resignation which Caprivi
submitted on October 23, 1894. The Kaiser's hesitancy
stemmed from the problem of finding a successor to the old
General. (Botho zu Eulenburg had made it clear soon after
his conference with William, that he would not accept the
Chancellorship in the face of a dissident Reichstag.)
Philipp, at this point, had he wished, could have easily
asserted that no one of Caprivi's caliber could be found.
Thus the Chancellor would have retained his post. Instead,
on the advice of Frederick, Grand Duke of Baden, he presented
the name of Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, a
moderate Catholic who, in addition to being one of the old-
est (aged seventy-five) and most respected members of the
Reichstag, was serving as governor general of Alsace-Lorraine,
106
giving him a close tie to the South Germans. Eulenburg
carefully portrayed Hohenlohe to William as a person who
After Bismarck, 354; Raschdau, Unter Bismarck und Caprivi,
370; Rôhl, Germany Without Bismarck 116-117. Burmeister,
"Philipp Eulenburg-Eertefeld," fails to reveal the degree to
which Holstein was behind Eulenburg's actions during the in-
ternal crisis arising from the Kaiser's determination to rid
himself of Chancellor von Caprivi (cf. Nichols, Germany After
Bismarck, 348-349).
106
Rfthl, Germany Without Bismarck, 118-119; Raschdau,
Unter Bismarck und Caprivi, 370.
173
could be easily manipulated to suit the Kaiser's whims. Be-
cause he held moderate religious and political views, he
would have no strong political commitments—just the type of
Chancellor that the Kaiser desired. Similarly, conflicts in
107
the Reichstag could be expected to lessen. By appealing
to the Kaiser's dislike of Bismarck and his idolization of
his own Imperial grandfather, Eulenburg emphasized that he,
William II, could operate with the same success as William I.
In this manner, then, Eulenburg paved the way for Hohenlohe's
appointment on October 26.
Finally in this chapter, mention must be made of Eulen-
burg's rather limited role in the formulation of German
foreign policy during the Caprivi era. In February of 1891,
acting as Holstein's intermediary, Eulenburg prevented
William from meeting with the family of Tsar Alexander III
when the latter came through Danzig on a trip to Denmark,
home of Tsarina Maria. In this instance Eulenburg merely
wrote William and told him fraternization between himself and
the Russian Emperor would be viewed by the Germans as "run-
ning after the Tsar" and kowtowing to his expansionist
designs. This note, coupled with cautions of a similar kind
from Holstein and Kiderlen-Wâchter, led the Kaiser to cancel
his 108trip to the Baltic city. Eulenburg also played some
107
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 372-373; Rogge, Hoi-
stein und Hohenlohe, 409-410.
108
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 78-79.
174
role in securing a successor for elderly General Alfred von
Schweinitz, German ambassador at St. Petersburg, who, by the
autumn of 1892, found himself being criticized increasingly
because of his age and supposed diplomatic incompetence.
Schweinitz's personal choice for a successor was General
Anton von Werder, a former German military attache to the
Russian court and a favorite of the Romanov dynasty. Eulen-
burg, along with Holstein, successfully sought through
letters to pressure the Kaiser into giving Werder the post.
Eulenburg also helped sponsor the appointment of Bernhard von
109
Btilow as German ambassador to Italy. The secondary sig-
nificance of these activities, however, contrasted sharply
with Eulenburg's achievements at the Berlin court in the
realm of domestic politics.
109
Muschler, Eulenurg . . . Leben, 192,
CHAPTER IV
EULENBURG AND THE HOHENLOHE ERA
From the outset of the Hohenlohe regime, Eulenburg
found himself confronting political situations which he
believed demanded his intervention. Almost immediately he
received a barrage of complaints from Friedrich von Hoi-
stein. The unpredictable statesman found Hohenlohe's age
and policies to his dislike, especially when the new
chancellor attempted to improve relations between ex-Chan-
cellor Bismarck and the Imperial government. (Both Hohen-
lohe and his son Alexander visited Friedrichsruh on May 13,
1895). Holstein attributed Hohenlohe1s overtures to the
influence of various ultraconservative advisors, including
August zu Eulenburg, High Marshal of the Imperial Court;
Hermann von Lucanus, Chief of the Kaiser's Civil Cabinet;
and Oswald von Richthofen, Chief of the Berlin Police. All
of these men, Holstein felt, should leave their positions.
Realizing that Philipp zu Eulenburg only with reluctance
would influence William to dismiss these individuals, Hoi-
stein even went so far as to suggest that Eulenburg himself
assume one of these positions held by the present advisors.'*'
While Haller, "court biographer" to Eulenburg, would have one
^E.p.K./ II, 1396-1397; Hutten-Czapski, Sechzig Jahre,
I, 237-238, 260.
176
believe that the diplomat refused Holstein's suggestion
that he seek such a position because of his "unswerving
loyalty" to the Emperor, Eulenburg probably ignored Hoi-
stein's overtures for more practical reasons. Eulenburg,
for instance, had wanted the office of Minister of the
Imperial Household. Several factors, however, prevented
2
him from actually taking this or any other court position.
An idealist and a dreamer, he lacked, as previously men¬
tioned, the practical orientation needed to hold such an
administrative post. Even more important, Eulenburg
realized that if he were to assume a court post his politi¬
cal activities, often conducted behind William's back, would
become increasingly visible to his master. Finally, the
Kaiser and Eulenburg both feared that the diplomat's being
placed in an official position of influence would encourage
Friedrich von Holstein to exercise his manipulative powers.
The Gray Eminence would view Eulenburg's appointment as a
3
surrender to the former's whims. Thus, when an offer to
assume the Imperial Household post came from Hohenlohe,
Eulenburg politely declined, citing his loyalty to his
ambassadorial duties in Vienna as the major factor behind
2
Hohenlohe, Denkwurdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit,
10-11, cf. Rich, Holstein, II, 485.
3
Rôhl, Germany Without Bismarck, 130-132; Rich, Hoi-
stein, II, 486.
177
his refusal. (An ironic statement, considering the amount
of time he spent in Berlin!) Eulenburg, in fact, would
never hold a formal court position.4
Holstein, for his part, however, remained undaunted
in his attempts to secure more political power. He con-
tinued to write Eulenburg about the omnipresent "Bismarck
cloud" and the need for the diplomat to counter, through
William II, Hohenlohe's attempts at effecting a reconcilia-
tion between the government and ex-Chancellor. Eulenburg,
in return, paid lip-service to Holstein's views, but did
little to honor his requests. Holstein also wrote Hohen-
lohe, requesting that he enlist Enlenburg's advice when
executing his policies. Finally, the Gray Eminence for-
warded a message to Bernhard von Billow, then ambassador in
Rome, urging his cooperation in securing a position for
Eulenburg at the Imperial Court. Neither Hohenlohe nor
Billow would agree to this, however, and Eulenburg remained
5
in Vienna.
As the year 1895 began, Eulenburg found himself sur-
rounded by minor turmoil, especially in the field of foreign
affairs. Russia and France had concluded a treaty of
4Rich, Holstein, II, 487.
5
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 378; D.g.P. Ill,
4 38-440; Hohenlohe, Denkwilrdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit,
23-24, 29-30; Billow, Denkwilrdigkeiten, I, 518; E. p. K. , II,
1406; Rich, Holstein, II, 490; Palmer, Kaiser, 67.
178
alliance the year before in response to Germany's having
permitted the Reinsurance Treaty to expire in 1890. German
sentiments now were divided—should the Fatherland culti-
vate Russian friendship or remain with Austro-Hungarian
allies who seemingly favored an alliance with England? To
add to the difficulty, Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein,
State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, believed that a German
agreement with France, as opposed to one with England,
would benefit the Reich more. Most of the conservatives in
the government, especially Friedrich von Holstein and
Bernhard von Bülow, found such an arrangement distasteful,
and Bülow foresaw the formation of a French and South German
coalition against Prussia. The opposition Marschall
received, then, contributed heavily to his eventual ouster.^
Eulenburg soon found himself in the thick of the
crisis. By February 1895, both Marschall's stance toward
France and Russia and his previous concessions to the Center
Party had caused Emperor William to level some serious
attacks against him. In the case of the Center Party,
William felt that the Foreign Secretary had proved himself
overly accommodating towards it when he invited Dr. Wilhelm
Lieber, one of the party's leaders, to an Imperial court
ball. Two persons in particular, however, were attempting
^Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 366; E.p.K., II,
1417, 1427, 1432; Palmer, Kaiser, 73.
179
to prevent William from locking horns with Marschall.
Chancellor von Hohenlohe, himself a Catholic, opposed the
Kaiser's attacks on his Foreign Secretary, asserting that
government needed the Center's support in order to carry
out its policies. The loss of that party's backing con-
ceivably could compel Hohenlohe to resign. (The new chan-
cellor obviously had learned the old political trick of
threatening resignation in order to get one's own way.)
Friedrich von Holstein, wishing to avoid a chancellor
crisis, also sought to prevent Marschall's dismissal, and
7
for this purpose enlisted Eulenburg's assistance.
Eulenburg did not share Holstein's beliefs. While not
supporting the Center, he had grown tired at least tempo-
rarily as a cat's-paw for the Gray Eminence. Yet he con-
tinued to act out of political expediency rather than
personal conviction. In a letter to Holstein of February
20, 1895, Eulenburg asserted that, while in his opinion the
Hohenlohe regime would possess greater strength if Marschall
resigned, it would nevertheless be wiser if this were
accomplished after the Reichstag's present session ended.
While implicitly promising to prevent William from dismiss-
ing his Foreign Secretary, Eulenburg still sought an oppor-
tunity to secure Marschall's resignation at the same time. He
7
Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, 40;
Rich, Holstein, II, 491-492.
180
conveyed this impression to Holstein in a letter of the
8
same day.
Eulenburg meanwhile involved himself in a number of
other controversies during the year 1895. From the begin¬
ning, the Hohenlohe administration had concerned itself
with affairs in the Far East. Germany like other European
nations was looking toward China for territorial acquisi-
tions. The Kaiser particularly wanted a base of operations
on Taiwan. The German Foreign Ministry under the direction
of both Marschall and Holstein, however, attempted to
9
thwart these aims. The Foreign Secretary conveyed his
opinions to Chancellor von Hohenlohe, asserting that Eng-
land would protect China's integrity^ and thus prevent Ger-
many from fulfilling her territorial ambitions. The
Fatherland should therefore content itself with a role in
China similar to that of the United Kingdom. Berlin
initially took this position, and joined London in warning
the Japanese, who had obtained Korea in an 1895 war with
8
D.g.P., III, 449-452; cf. Rich, Holstein, II, 493;
D.g.P., III, 450-451.
9
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 385; Johannes,
Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and Friedrich
Thimme, eds • r Die grosse Politik der europâischen Kabinette,
1871-1914 (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik
und Geschichte, 1922-1927), IX, 453-458, hereinafter cited
as Grosse Politik; Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reich-
skanzlerzeit, 52; cf. Rich, Holstein, II, 436; D.g.P., Ill,
465-467.
181
China, not to overextend their territorial demands when
dealing with that defeated nation. When the Japanese
ignored this warning, Germany decided to support a Russian
protest against Japan's annexation of Port Arthur. This
request was reinforced by the united efforts of Russia,
France, and Germany, and eventually led Japan to withdraw
her demands. The success in this matter pleased both
opponents and supporters of Marschall alike. Even Philipp
zu Eulenburg, who disliked Marschall's policies in many
instances, approved the Foreign Secretary's handling of the
Japanese issue. Such actions, he felt, in addition to hold-
ing that nation in line, also served to show England,
Europe's major colonial power, that other nations would not
let her dominate affairs in the Far East. Under these cir-
cumstances, Eulenburg and other influential government
personnel willingly reconciled themselves to permit Mar-
10
schall's retaining his post as Foreign Secretary.
Controversy nevertheless soon made its appearance,
when, after the Treaty of Shimonoseki between China and
Japan, the Kaiser agreed to support Russia in her demand
for a reduction of the sum of 50 million tael in reparations,
which Japan had requested as a war-indemnity from China, to
30 million. (Japan had been forced to forego acquisition
10
Grosse Politik, IX, 308, 358-360; cf. Rich, Holstein,
II, 441-444; Balfour, Kaiser, 187-190; D.g.P., III, 457-458;
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 393.
182
of the Liaotung Peninsula and thus sought compensation for
that concession). The German Foreign Office in this in-
stance opposed the Kaiser's pro-Russian stance. Friedrich
von Holstein, always paranoid where Russia was concerned,
immediately singled out Philipp zu Eulenburg as the one who
had influenced William to support Russia. He expressed his
views to Chancellor von Hohenlohe. Hohenlohe, though he
distrusted Russia, believed that William, though influenced
by Eulenburg, had acted correctly in backing that nation
during this controversy. By supporting Russia, the Chancel-
lor told Holstein, Germany could retain a free hand in the
11
Far East. Further problems arose, however, when Russia,
dissatisfied with Japan's promise to reduce her indemnity
requirements, now demanded a prompt Japanese evacuation of
the Liaotung peninsula upon China's payment of the 30
million tael. It appeared that Russia herself now wished
to obtain the peninsula and increase her power in the Far
East. This alarmed the members of the Foreign Office. Much
to their displeasure, the Kaiser still insisted on
supporting the demands of the Tsarist empire, and many sus-
pected that Eulenburg had helped William in reaching his
decision. The major reason for the Kaiser's position
proved unfounded. He offended Austria, who thought that
11
D.g.P., III, 480-481; cf. Rich, Holstein, II , 444;
Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanslerzeit, 507 68-70.
183
William's cooperation with Russia would enhance Russia's
position in the Balkans. It seemed William's fear that
Germany would be left out in the cold by a Franco-Russian
trade agreement, and thus be excluded from Far Eastern
trade, overrode his desire to appease the Dual Monarchy.
Matters grew increasingly complex when, in September
1895, William offered additional concessions to the
Russians with the hope of turning their attention away from
their frontier with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The
Kaiser wrote to Tsar Nicholas II proposing an alliance to
the exclusion of France. Germany would defend Russian in-
terests in the Far East if Russia would grant her a few
minor territorial concessions in the same region. After
sending this message to Nicholas, William sent Hohenlohe an
inaccurate copy of his proposal. He also urged the Chan-
cellor to hide the copy from Holstein and other members of
the Foreign Office whom he knew opposed negotiations,
especially secret negotiations, with the Russian Empire.
Such an action could have stirred a tremendous controversy
inside Germany, but fortunately Nicholas refused the
12
offer. The Kaiser saw his hopes for a Pacific empire
dwindle.
12
Grosse Politik, IX, 365-370; cf. Rich, Holstein, II,
446; Isaac Don Levine, ed., Letters from the Kaiser to the
Czar (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1920), 16-19;
Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, 88-91.
184
True to his Anglophobic nature, Eulenburg worked at
least indirectly to discourage the Kaiser from establish-
ing better political relations with England. Austria-
Hungary, for a considerable time, had been growing in-
creasingly impatient with Germany's failure to reach an
alliance with England and by the middle of 1894 had seri-
ously considered withdrawing from the Triple Alliance.
Eulenburg, as German ambassador to Vienna, thus saw him-
self in the unenviable position of attempting to preserve
the friendship between the two major powers of central
Europe. In November and December 1894, when Austro-
Hungarian Foreign Minister, Gustav Kalnoky von Korospatak,
presented some serious complaints concerning Berlin's
failure to reach any agreement with England, Eulenburg,
not wishing to force William into fostering a British
alliance, simply did not report the matter to the Kaiser,
nor to German Foreign Secretary Marschall. This forced
Kalnoky to work through the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in
Berlin in order to convey the Vienna government's dis-
pleasure over Germany's unwillingness to conclude a
British alliance. Meanwhile, William, unaware of Austria-
Hungary's discontent, continued his drive for a Russian
alliance, and it was only after a lapse of six months that
the Kalnoky report first reached Berlin and the Kaiser
learned that Austria favored a German treaty with Britain
rather than Russia. At the last minute, then, due to the
185
influence of Kalnoky and Friedrich von Holstein, William
retreated from his pro-Russian policy and started courting
13
Britain. Eulenburg's conniving in this instance had thus
proved a miserable failure.
Eulenburg scored his real success at "statecraft" dur-
ing the Hohenlohe era in the area of domestic policy. As
noted above, Eulenburg had reluctantly acquiesced to Fried-
rich von Holstein's insistance on retaining Foreign
Secretary Marschall, even when the Kaiser himself had push-
ed for Marschall's removal. In the fall of 1895, however,
a situation developed which eventually triggered the
Foreign Secretary's resignation. The Prussian Minister of
War, Walter Bronsart von Schellendorff, proposed reforming
the national military penal code to include provisions for
public procedures in certain court-martial cases. Emperor
William opposed this and persuaded Bronsart to postpone the
project. On November 4, an article appeared in the
Münchener Neueste Nachrichten, which stated that the
Prussian Ministry of State, having taken over Bronsart's
proposal reform, was presenting the Kaiser with the draft
of an order for limited public procedures in Prussian
military-court cases. It further reported that Ernst
Matthias von Koller, Prussian Minister of the Interior, had
13
Gross Politik, IX, 174-179; cf. Rich, Holstein, II,
448-449; Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit,
118.
186
been the only member of the Ministry of State opposing the
proposal.
The news article precipitated a quarrel between Bron-
sart and Roller. Bronsart accused the Interior Minister
of having leaked secret information about the reform to the
press. Bronsart also charged Roller with having informed
members of the Raiser's court that he himself had voted
against the Bill, and with letting them know that he hoped
that they too, responding to the Interior Minister's stance,
would oppose the measure. Roller eventually confessed to
the second charge—of having informed two of the Raiser's
aides-de-camp, Generals Wilhelm von Hanke and Hans von
Plessen, of his action. Roller's underhandedness in turn
led to requests from Chancellor von Hohenlohe and the
Prussian Ministry of State that William force the Interior
Minister to resign. The Raiser, however, refused to honor
the request, and this prompted Hohenlohe to send in his
14
resignation.
Eulenburg entered the picture at this point, urging to
his master that Roller's loyalty did not justify the loss
of Imperial Chancellor von Hohenlohe and all the members of
the Prussian Ministry of State, and that if the occasion
14
D.g.P. Ill, 501-502 ; Haller, Aus dem Leben, 159;
Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, 123, 126;
cf. Rich, Holstein, II, 495-496 ; Muschler, Eulenburg , . .
Leben, 409.
187
15
demanded he should dismiss Koller. Koller made such
action unnecessary, however, by submitting his resignation
on December 2, 1895. Eulenburg viewed this action skepti-
cally, and implied to Chancellor von Hohenlohe that Koller
might be up to something. With bad grace the Kaiser
accepted Koller's statement, and simultaneously proposed
that the entire membership of the Ministry of State turn in
their resignations. No one responded, and William on
December 8 allowed Koller to depart unhindered. The Kaiser,
nevertheless still had the last word, as he immediately
appointed Baron Eberhard von der Reche von dem Hast, a
personal favorite from Düsseldorf, to the Interior Minis-
16
ter's post. This rapid action on William's part suggests,
then, that Eulenburg helped persuade Hohenlohe and the
Emperor that an easily-manipulated new minister would
compensate for the loss of Koller.
Eulenburg also used the Koller incident to secure the
resignation of Foreign Secretary Marschall. He again wrote
the Kaiser, holding that he regretted Koller's departure
and that such an event would have never occurred if the
15
D.g.P., III, 509-512; Haller, Aus dem Leben, 160;
Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, cf. Rich,
Holstein, II, 496.
16
D.g.P., III, 510-512; Haller, Aus dem Leben, 160-163;
cf. Rich, Holstein, II, 496; Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten
der Reichskanzlerzeit, cf. Rich, Holstein, II, 496.
188
Ministry of State had consisted exclusively of Prussians.
The last remark plainly alluded to the Badenese Marschall
in his capacity of Prussian Foreign Minister. Eulenburg
even went so far as to say that the South German Foreign
Secretary, and Foreign Minister, because of his beliefs in
constitutional rather than absolute government, had con-
tributed to William's difficulties. Eulenburg then turned
to Holstein, and attempted to convince him that Marschall's
liberal views had hurt William's public image and that he
should be removed. Holstein, however, disagreed strongly
with his associate, believing that Marschall had performed
rightly in preventing William from overextending his powers.
Dissension between the two men began to develop. When
Holstein informed Eulenburg of some remarks which the
Emperor had made to Colonel Leopold Swain, the British
military attache in Berlin, which implied that Germany,
Austria, and Italy would support Britain against Russia
should she seek control of the Dardanelles, Eulenburg re-
fused even to excuse himself for his unwillingness to inter-
vene in the matter. He asserted simply that he was
William's "friend. » 17 At Christmastime, when Chancellor
von Hohenlohe visited Vienna, Holstein wrote Eulenburg and
urged him to persuade the old man to force William to keep
17
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 160-163; cf. Rich, Holstein,
II, 497-499.
189
himself out of foreign affairs. In direct opposition to
Holstein's pleadings, Eulenburg merely asked Hohenlohe what
he, Eulenburg, could do about the situation. The Chan-
cellor replied that he should do nothing under such petty
circumstances 18as those presented by Holstein.
Eulenburg soon found, nevertheless, that he would have
to moderate his views of monarchical supremacy and
acceded to Holstein's whims. Bernhard von Bülow wrote
Eulenburg during the last week of 1895, asserting that
Hohenlohe and Marschall now believed that William had over-
stepped his imperial prerogatives in the realm of foreign
affairs. Should those three join forces and jointly
threaten resignation in the face of William's stubbornness,
the Kaiser would be immensely discredited, as would Eulen-
burg. Someone after all had to put a stop to William's
interference in foreign and domestic issues. Bülow thus
urged Eulenburg to draft a letter on the subject for Chan-
19
cellor von Hohenlohe to send to the Emperor.
Eulenburg submitted to Bülow's urging and himself
wrote directly to William. He compared his master's inter-
vention in foreign affairs to efforts of a master of the
hunt to track down a fox independently of his gamekeeper,
18
Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit,
146; cf. Rich, Holstein, II, 500.
19
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 185-186; cf. Rich, Holstein,.
II, 502.
190
who was also on the fox's trail. As both hunters con-
verged on the fox, the animal thus had a chance to scent
both and escape. On a more concrete level, Eulenburg
suggested that William handle his foreign policy with the
collaboration of Hohenlohe and Marschall, rather than
making his own rules as he went along. Eulenburg also
took the position that Hohenlohe should express his
opposition to William's meddling in foreign affairs. The
Chancellor, however, would not argue with the Kaiser over
such an issue, especially in the face of a new crisis in-
volving the latter and Bronsart. William consequently
ignored the urgings of the latter and continued along his
own course. The plan of Eulenburg and Billow therewith
20
failed.
The furor over the Kruger Telegram further illustrated
William's political ineptness. The situation resulted from
the Kaiser's praising Boer President Paul Kruger for his
"heroic" defense of the Transvaal against invading British
raiders under Dr. Leander Jameson in December 1895.
(Foreign Secretary Marschall had encouraged the Kaiser to
react in this manner.) Eulenburg again found himself in a
difficult position. He was torn between his loyalty to the
Emperor and concern over the anger of the British populace
20
Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit,
151; cf. Rich, Holstein, II, 503; D.g.P., III, 519-520;
Rfihl, Germany Without Bismarck, 160-163.
191
and, especially, William's royal kin. A number of German
statesmen regarded the Emperor's move as unwise. Friedrich
von Holstein particularly attacked his behavior. Couldn't
Eulenburg control his master?—so the Foreign Office func-
tionary demanded in a dispatch soon after reports of the
Kruger Telegram reached the press. Rather uncharacteris-
tically, Eulenburg this time agreed with Holstein that
William had acted foolishly. Nevertheless, he did not seek
to reprimand the Kaiser. With no one to control him, then,
William despite the public storm refused to retract what he
21
had stated in the telegram. Eulenburg apparently con-
sidered it futile to oppose the Emperor in the matter.
Controversies continued to develop, and Eulenburg found
himself involved in the "Big Fleet" versus "Little Fleet"
question. At the beginning of 1896, a Reichstag conflict
erupted when William began pushing for an enlargement of the
German fleet. This action undoubtedly came as a response to
the Jameson raid, which the Kaiser viewed as imperalist
aggression in the Transvaal by Britain, which at this time
had the world's largest navy. Chancellor von Hohenlohe, how-
ever, opposed such a course, primarily because an increased
21
Muschler, Eulenburg . . v. Leben, 417; Haller, Aus dem
Leben, 190; Lerchenfeld-Koefering, Erinnerungen, 373-374;
Hutten-Czapski, Sechzig Jahre, V, 276-277; Balfour, Kaiser,
193-195; Cowles, The Kaiser, 140-145; Palmer, Kaiser, 76;
Rûhl, Germany Without Bismarck, 164-165.
192
fleet would involve huge budgetary appropriations. In coope-
ration with Admiral Friedrich von Hollmann, the Chancellor
set out to persuade the Kaiser to abandon his plans. He
wrote William, asserting that the Emperor's demands might be
too much for the Reichstag, and might even jeopardize the
passage of the current Imperial naval budget. William
would not abandon his position, however, and Hohenlohe's
further efforts to deter the monarch's ambitions met with
similar results. The Chancellor thus turned to Holstein
and Eulenburg for assistance. Holstein responded by
attempting to convince Eulenburg that William should go to
the extreme of changing chancellors in order to get his bill
passed. Such action, Holstein stated, could well lead to
an increase in field-artillery appropriations. The appro-
priations could be covered by lowering the interest rate on
Prussian bonds, and consequently transferring the money
saved to the military. The lower bond rates, in turn would
drive Prussian capital abroad, leading to a deflationary
spiral. Eulenburg nevertheless refused to listen to Hoi-
stein's frantic summons, causing the latter to accuse him of
"barking up the wrong tree" with his unflinching faith in
the Kaiser's judgment. Fortunately for Holstein, Hohenlohe's
influence, coupled with that of Hollmann and Marschall
carried some weight with the Kaiser, and William finally
agreed to postpose his plans for a large-scale reorganization
193
of the fleet. This crisis only ended in the face of
another, however, and without any constructive contribu-
22
tions from Eulenburg.
In February 1896, the liberal press on the one hand
and Holstein on the other renewed their attempts to force
the Kaiser to include public legal procedures in the mili-
tary penal code. To this end Holstein again enlisted the
services of Eulenburg, urging him to do his best to over-
come William's opposition to the legislation dealing with
public legal procedures. Eulenburg again, however, refused
to carry out the request, and in fact urged Chancellor von
Hohenlohe to be wary of Holstein's attempts to get the
judicial reform bill passed in its modified form. The
Foreign Office eminence presumably received word of this
action, for in April 1896 the Kfllnische Zeitung carried
an article asserting that Philipp zu Eulenburg, the opponent
of reform, was under consideration for the Imperial Chan-
cellorship. Obviously the article's author fashioned the
statement as a means for explaining why Eulenburg submitted
to his master's desires. Friedrich von Holstein apparently
inspired the article's publications, for only he could have
known that Eulenburg, who on several occasions had openly
22
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 195-196; Hohenlohe,
Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, 151-164; D . g. P.,
III, 526-532; cf. Rich, Holstein, II, 504-508; Rôhl, Germany
Without Bismarck, 166-171. A commendable volume concerning
194
expressed his support for military judicial reforms,
secretly opposed such measures. Additionally, Holstein
would have been only one of a few persons aware of Eulen-
burg's possible candidacy for the Chancellor's post. Still,
the Foreign Office's old wizard denied participation, to
23
the credence of none.
The Kaiser found the newspaper's allegations upsetting
and wished to begin hunting down their author. Eulenburg,
hoping to prevent William from overextending his influence,
attempted to counsel his chief, urging him to exercise cau-
tion in uncovering the identity of the culprit. Eulenburg
also realized that William's unflinching position regarding
the bill had precipitated the press attack. Thus he also
sought to win the Kaiser over to a compromise solution re-
garding the legislation—one which would allow some reforms
in military court-martial procedures though not to the ex-
tent suggested by Holstein or Bronsart, Minister of War.
The solution, simply put, provided that "a prearranged
question in the Reichstag and an unambiguous announcement
by the Kaiser 'that this question, being a purely military
William's naval policy is Eckart Kehr's Schlachtflottenbau
und Parteipolitik, 1894-1901: Versuch eines Querschnitts
durch die innenpolitischen, sozialen, und ideologischen
Voraussetzungen des deutschen Imperialismus (Berlin: E. Eber-
ing, 1930).
23
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 198-199; cf. Rich, Holstein,
IT, 510; D.g.P., III, 532-533; Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten
der Reichskanzlerzeit, 201-203.
195
one, has been submitted to the army and that these dis-
eussions were now in f IIprogress —would put many people in a
24
more compromising mood. With the carrying out of these
actions, so William and Eulenburg hoped, moderates and
liberals, including Chancellor von Hohenlohe, would likewise
relinquish their stand on the public procedures question.
The hopes of the two men soon evaporated, however. The old
Chancellor refused to serve as the Kaiser's mouthpiece, and
rather presented the military judicial proposal to the
Reichstag in a way which conformed to his views. A skir-
mish between Kaiser 25and Reichstag seemed in the making.
To further complicate matters, Bronsart, who had received
word of William's disapproval of the act, now threatened to
resign. This move would definitely precipitate a Reichstag
battle. In view of these circumstances, it is not surpris-
ing that Friedrich von Holstein now came to the fore,
asserting to Eulenburg that he should not allow William to
support Bronsart's removal over the public procedures
clause. Eulenburg complied with this request, and eventual-
26
ly persuaded his chief to keep the War Minister.
24
Undated from Eulenburg Papers in Rich, Holstein, II,
511.
25
Rich, Holstein, II, 511; Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten
der Reichskanzlerzeit, 233-235.
26
Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit,
224-233; cf. Rich, Holstein, II, 512; D.g.P., III, 554-556,
559-561; Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit,
196
In June 1896, Bronsart however again announced his
intention to resign. This time Chancellor von Hohenlohe,
tired of controversy, also threatened to leave if War Min-
ister Bronsart left and if the modified reform bill were
not passed. Once again, Eulenburg, responding to Holstein
and his own common sense, attempted to persuade William to
give in on the military reform bill. The Kaiser, unaccus-
tomed to compromising, remained adamant in his convictions
and even spoke of firing, in addition to Bronsart, Foreign
Secretary Marschall and Karl Heinrich von Boetticher,
Prussian Minister of the Interior, because of their moder-
ate stance concerning the legislation. Eulenburg, frus-
trated by William's arrogance, but not wishing to anger
his liege, now announced to his court associates that if
they wished to stay in office, they would have to support
the Kaiser's views. Many officials, including Friedrich von
Holstein, found this suggestion appalling and responded
to Eulenburg that William's stubborness would lead to a
breakup of the Reichstag. Holstein also implied that the
Kaiser would find no backing from the German princes re-
garding the reform bill. Eulenburg later insisted that he
presented Holstein's arguments to the Kaiser in a most con-
scientious manner, but at least initially to no avail. Fur-
ther notes to William from Hohenlohe and Eulenburg, the
240, 249-252.
197
latter of which summarized the dangers of changing minis-
ters in times of crisis, met with a similar lack of sue-
27
cess. At this point, once again, Eulenburg willingly let
the Kaiser have his own way; it seems safe to assume that
he himself had sympathized with his chief's position all
along.
Seeing that Eulenburg had faltered, William now sought
to send him to Alt-Aussee, the temporary seat of Chancellor
von Hohenlohe, in order to persuade him to alter his stand
on public military trial procedures. Holstein, however,
would not give up his attempts to sway William, and upon
hearing of Eulenburg's proposed visit, decided to cue
Hohenlohe regarding the plan and persuade the Chancellor not
to accede to the Kaiser's whims. Thus when Hohenlohe con-
fronted Eulenburg he greeted the latter with, "So you are
bringing me the silken cord," an allusion to Eulenburg's
supposed intention to throttle the Chancellor into accept-
ing William's opposition to the modified military penal
code. Eulenburg, however, ever the diplomat, replied, "I
would not exactly say that." Eulenburg then proceeded to
portray himself as a "regular fellow," finally asserting
that William would not give in on the question of public
27
Haller, Aus dem Leben,2Q0-202; Rich, Holstein, II,
515; Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit,
240, 249-252 ; D.g.P., III, 554-556, 559-561.
198
procedures in court-martials—considering his standpoint a
matter of personal royal honor. Eulenburg nevertheless
also quickly emphasized that the Kaiser would make one con¬
cession to the Chancellor regarding the bill. As previously
mentioned, William, tired of Bronsart's resignation
threats, had planned to relieve the War Minister of his
duties unless he agreed to cooperate with him in instituting
an unmodified courts proposal. As Eulenburg explained it
to Hohenlohe, rather obviously attempting to keep the
Chancellor from resigning, the Kaiser intended to carry out
this plan, but instead of dismissing Bronsart outright, he
would make him Adjutant General. Eulenburg even went so
far as to assert that as far as military judicial reform
was concerned, any new legislation would contain so many
judicial innovations that the section of Bronsart's bill
which provided for public court-martial procedures would
serve little purpose. Why, then, could Prince Hohenlohe
not support the Kaiser?
The Chancellor, however, refused to let Eulenburg's
soothing tones deceive him. He squarely asserted that
Bronsart's appointment as Adjutant General would not
adequately conceal the humiliation of his dismissal as
Minister of War. Similarly, other innovations in the mili-
tary judicial code would not disguise Hohenlohe's abandon-
ment of his support of the principle of public procedures.
Bronsart would emerge as a martyr and Hohenlohe a political
199
Judas who sacrificed his political convictions for personal
gain. The Chancellor also drew Eulenburg1s attention to
the fact that, since 1871, the question of military judi¬
cial reform had occupied the public mind, and that his,
Hohenlohe's, rejection of public legal procedures in mili-
tary court-martials undoubtedly would cause him to lose his
Reichstag backing, ruining him politically. Eulenburg thus
left Alt-Aussee empty-handed, for the time being believing
that a compromise bill, pleasing both to the Kaiser and
28
moderates alike, could not pass the Reichstag.
Eulenburg decided now to enlist the services of
Friedrich von Holstein. He therefore telegraphed him and
requested aid in persuading Hohenlohe to abandon his posi-
tion on the court-martial procedures. Holstein, however,
believing still that an unmodified bill would tear the
Reichstag apart, refused to stand in the Chancellor's way.
Eulenburg, nevertheless could not bring himself to see
Hohenlohe lose his post because of his stand, for he knew
that dismissing the Chancellor would discredit both himself
and his Imperial chief. Once again the exhausted Eulenburg
turned to William in hopes of persuading him to change his
position on the legislation. The Emperor, to everyone's
28
Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit,
249-250? D.g.P., III, 569-573, 574-576, 578-579; cf. Rich,
Holstein, II, 516-517; Rdhl, Germany Without Bismarck,
194-199.
200
surprise, now successfully took matters into his own
hands. He formally approached Hohenlohe and overwhelmed
him with his aggressiveness. The Chancellor thereupon
timorously agreed to Bronsart’s dismissal while simultan¬
eously consenting to consult the opinion of various army
commanders concerning the military judicial reform bill
before taking any action. The Emperor and the forces of
the right thus won the day. On August 14, 1896, William
removed Bronsart and replaced him with Heinrich von Gossler,
much to the disappointment of the liberal parties who
tended to resent Prussian Junkers. Hohenlohe's stature
shrank; the elder statesman now found himself looking weak
and vacillating in the public eye. No longer would he be
29
able to achieve his hopes for court-martial reform.
Eulenburg, having emerged victorious from the long
struggle, soon confronted another controversy. On Septem-
ber 5, 1896", Tsar Nicholas II came to Breslau, where in
reply to a toast proposed by the Kaiser he had stated
"que votre Majesté." A German news agency, however, re-
ported the incident incorrectly, quoting the Tsar as having
said, "que feu mon pere," implying that Nicholas possessed
29
Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit,
256-257; D.g.P., 581-583; cf. Rich, Holstein, II, 519;
Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Denkwürdigkeiten
des Fürsten Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, ed.
Friedrich Curtius (Stuttgart and Leipzig: Deutsche Verlag-
Anstalt, 1907), II, 526, hereinafter cited as Hohenlohe,
Denkwürdigkeiten ; Hutten-Czapski, Sechzig-Jahre, II, 295.
201
the same feelings toward the "Teutons" as his Germanophobe
father, Alexander III. On October 4, 1896, Die Welt am
Montag, a newly founded journal, alleged that Foreign
Secretary Marschall had provided this misinformation to the
paper. Marschall responded to the accusation by instituting
a libel suit against the periodical and initiating a
government investigation. The investigation revealed that
Heinrich Leckert, a nineteen-year-old journalist, had
written the article. It also appeared that he had received
encouragement from Karl von Lützow, a Berlin police agent,
and Eugen von Tausch, Chief Inspector of the Berlin police,
30
when composing the passage.
Eulenburg involved hiself in this case primarily as an
intermediary between William II, who possessed connections
with Tausch, and Friedrich von Holstein. Holstein sus-
pected Tausch of having been, over the previous six years,
at the center of many intrigues against the government.
He now, in Holstein's opinion, was attempting to facilitate
Marschall's removal as Foreign Secretary. Even more
shocking and reflective of Holstein's suspicions was his
belief that the Kaiser had cooperated with Tausch in this
endeavor. Yet this suspicion held substance in the eyes
of many, for Bronsart's replacement, Heinrich von Gossler,
30
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 456; Rich, Holstein,
II, 520; Rflhl, Germany Without Bismarck, 202-205.
202
had informed Chancellor von Hohenlohe and others that
William had instructed him to bring about a conflict in the
Reichstag. Through these means Gossler had given the
Emperor the pretext to dissolve the Reichstag and indirect-
31
ly engineer Marschall’s dismissal.
At this point, Eulenburg entered the conflict. Hoi-
stein, more than anyone, knew that Marschall's removal
would be certain to generate controversy in the Reichstag,
and for this reason he enlisted Eulenburg to urge the
Kaiser to refrain from dissolving the Reichstag in the
face of Gossler's accusations. Even more important, Hoi-
stein sought to keep Marschall at his Foreign-Secretary
post by requesting that Eulenburg have William censure
some remarks which Admiral Gustav von Senden, Chief of the
Naval Cabinet, had made concerning Germany's construction
of a fleet comparable to Britain's. This issue, irrelevant
to the Tausch controversy, nevertheless would divert the
Kaiser's attention from Marschall temporarily and thus
keep the Foreign Secretary in office until the libel
32
crisis passed.
31
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 204-205; Rich, Holstein, II,
521; D.g.P., Ill, 585-589.
32
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 455-456; Haller, Aus
dem Leben, 204-205; Rich, Holstein, II, 522; D.g.P., Ill,
588-591.
203
Eulenburg beset William but to no great avail.
Although the Kaiser outwardly gave his approval to the
libel suit against Tausch, his sympathy for the editor,
whom he felt had been unjustly maligned, made the Foreign
Secretary's removal a likelier possibility. Eulenburg,
who also disliked Marschall, consequently refrained from
doing more to prevent William from carrying out his
33
plans.
Nevertheless William hesitated. December 7, 1896, saw
the arrest of Chief Inspector von Tausch and the condemna-
tion of both Leckert and Lützow to one-and-a-half years'
imprisonment, a victory for Marschall who now saw public
opinion shifting to his side. This outcome of events
apparently also made up the Kaiser's mind to keep Marschall
at least temporarily. For William now issued, on Eulen-
burg's advice, a statement to the Reichstag which emphasized
his confidence in the Foreign Secretary's abilities. Other
events, nevertheless, soon demonstrated the insincerity of
the Emperor's words. On December 10, Eulenburg wrote to
Bernhard von Bülow, ambassador to Rome, and informed him
that he, Bülow, was under consideration as a candidate for
the Foreign Secretary's post. On January 5, 1897, William
displayed his true feelings beyond any doubt when, in a
33
Haller, Eulenburg, 206-207; Rich, Holstein, II, 522.
204
letter to Eulenburg, he emphasized the need to "clean
house. ,,34
While Eulenburg, who disliked Marschall's liberal
leanings, could accept the latter's dismissal, other
individuals, including Friedrich von Holstein, could not.
Holstein feared William's inclination to abuse his consti¬
tutional powers. Once started, the Kaiser would attempt
to remove Hohenlohe as well as Marschall from the Imperial
court, inviting a Reichstag conflict. Holstein conveyed
his fears to Eulenburg, who responded that the need for a
35
new Foreign Secretary had made itself felt. Simultaneous-
ly Eulenburg did emphasize the necessity for accomplishing
such a transition with finesse. He held that William
should place Marschall in another ministerial position
rather than blatantly fire him. Eulenburg also wrote the
Kaiser and urged him to exercise caution when dealing with
36
the Foreign Secretary's removal.
Eulenburg thus found himself playing a role in events
that eventually led to the appointment of Bernhard von
Bülow as State Secretary for Foreign Affairs. William II,
34
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 207-210; Muschler, Eulenburg
. . . Leben, 461; Rich, Holstein, II, 523; Hohenlohe,
Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, 288.
35
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 212; Rich, Holstein, II, 525.
36
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 213; Rich, Holstein, II, 525.
205
in February 1897, once again renewed his drive to increase
the size of the German fleet, much to the disapproval of
Admiral von Hollmann and Chancellor von Hohenlohe, both of
whom wished to maintain a steady program of naval expan-
37
sion. Frustrated by their response, and encouraged by
Admiral Gustav von Senden, William considered dismissing
both Hollmann and Hohenlohe and replacing Hohenlohe with
Botho zu Eulenburg, an active proponent of naval expansion.
At this point Holstein stuck in an oar, foreseeing a
Chancellorship crisis. To this end he wrote Eulenburg on
February 3, 1897, and asked him to prevent the appointment
of the latter's reactionary kinsman Botho. Eulenburg,
although he did not share Holstein's apprehensions, agreed
to comply with the request, mainly for the sake of keeping
38
Hohenlohe in office.
37
Rich, Holstein, II, 526; D.g.P., IV, 12; Hohenlohe,
Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, 298; Rflhl, Germany
Without Bismarck, 211.
38
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 215; D.g.P .,IV, 8-11 ;cf. Holstein,
II, 527; Rflhl, Germany Without Bismarck, 213; Burmeister,
"Philipp Eulenburg-Hertefeld," 261, gives Eulenburg too much
credit for deciding that William II should tone down his
plans for unlimited expansion in order to keep the "mode-
rate" Chancellor von Hohenlohe from resigning in protest
over the extreme position. In actual fact it was at Hoi-
stein's request that Eulenburg confronted the Kaiser in order
to persuade him to sanction slower naval expansion, Addi-
tionally, the influence of Chancellor von Hohenlohe himself,
of Admiral Fredrich von Hollmann, and of Marschall, also
played a role in changing the Kaiser's mind. (cf. Hohen-
lohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, 311-313; Rich,
Holstein, II, 529; Rflhl, Germany With Bismarck, 213-215).
CHAPTER V
EULENBURG'S TWILIGHT AFTER 1897,
AND EPILOGUE
The appointment of Bernhard von Bülow as Foreign
Secretary led to the apex of Eulenburg's career as a politi¬
cal intermediary. Simultaneously, however, the event sig¬
naled the beginning of Eulenburg's demise as an influential
figure in the Imperial Court. Bülow took office with the
blessing of both of Eulenburg's closest associates, Fried-
rich von Holstein and Emperor William II. Neither of the
two last named could have expected the new Foreign Secretary
to behave in so passive a manner as had Marschall von
Bieberstein. Bülow, nicknamed "the eel" in Foreign Office
circles, would undoubtedly exploit his position in hopes of
achieving his political ambitions. Self-confident and
capable, this intrigue-loving politician himself eventually
would help trigger the exit from the public stage of the two
who had brought him to power, Holstein and Eulenburg. As
the second William's "Bismarck," Bülow would seek to equal
the Iron Chancellor, if not in diplomatic finesse, then at
least in mastery of political manipulation.
The year 1898 found Germany beset by a number of con-
troversies involving her relations with neighboring coun-
tries—situations which elicited Eulenburg's intervention.
One particularly notable event occurred soon after Bülow's
assumption of the Foreign Secretary post, and one which
207
seemed to forecast Eulenburg's lessening influence in
Imperial circles. The accession of a representative of the
Bohemian nobility with Czech sympathies, Count Friedrich
von Thun, to the Austrian Prime Ministership initiated a
period of differences between the Dual Monarchy and
Germany. Unlike his predecessors, Thun, because of a
number of reasons, including his Czech and other Slavic
affinities, looked to France and Russia rather than Germany
for political support, and sought an Austro-Hungarian alii-
anee with these two countries. Much to Germany's disadvan-
tage, on November 29, 1898, Thun made a point of attacking
Emperor William's policy of expelling certain Austrians from
Prussia because of their sympathy for the Galician Poles
who earlier that year stages an uprising in East Prussia.
William II, deeply offended by Thun's attitude, wrote an
angry letter to Emperor Francis Joseph, in effect reprimand-
ing him for his prime minister's action. William's gratu-
itous message upset the Austrian ruler greatly. Eulenburg
as well found the Kaiser's behavior offensive, especially
because he himself, as German ambassador, would be consider¬
ed responsible for the Kaiser's hostile attacks on Thun.
Worse still, as future events would illustrate, William per-
sisted with additional diplomatic blunders.'*'
Other problems abounded from Eulenburg's point of view.
^Haller, Aus dem Leben, 262-265; Muschler, Eulenburg
. . Leben, 482; Lerchenfeld, Erinnerungen, 374-375.
208
For some time he and Holstein had, for a number of reasons,
been becoming increasingly alienated from one another. Hoi-
stein believed initially that Eulenburg had engineered
Marschall's dismissal for primarily unselfish motives. When
he learned otherwise, the Foreign Office official began to
eye Eulenburg with increasing suspecion, wondering whether
he would be the next to depart.. Holstein also disliked the
reactionary tendencies of Eulenburg's cousin Botho. Finally,
Holstein, paranoid by nature, eventually singled out the
Kaiser's friend as the root of all his troubles. From
October to December 1898 he did not respond to any of Eulen-
burg's written correspondence. When the latter sent New
Year's greetings to the "Gray Eminence," Holstein responded,
in Haller's words, with a "masterpiece of referred malice."
urging that he and Eulenburg "bide our time and drink to
2
each other in goodness knows what—tea for choice!" Offend-
ed but not flustered, Eulenburg attempted to calm Holstein
in April 1899 with a genial reply meant to molify him. To
the former's frustration, Holstein refused to respond again.
This situation, much as it irritated Eulenburg, could be
overlooked for the present, however, for neither man so far
had publicly defamed the other. Additionally, it is likely
that Holstein now believed Billow to pose a more formidable
threat to his own influence in the Foreign Office. He merely
2Haller, Aus dem Leben, 265; D.g.p., IV, 95; Rich, Hoi-
stein, II, 552.
209
wished to prevent Eulenburg from allying himself too closely
with the Foreign Secretary and aiding him in crushing Hoi-
stein's power. Not until 1906, therefore, would Holstein
begin the venomous correspondence which eventually led to
Eulenburg's complete ouster from the Imperial circle.
Eulenburg also enjoyed some positive experiences dur-
ing the years 1898 to 1900. Diplomatically, he achieved
success in cultivating the friendship of Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, the haughty heir-apparent to the Austro-Hungarian
throne. Considering the German Kaiser's personality, this
accomplishment may well have helped offset the conflict be¬
tween himself, Emperor Francis Joseph, and Prime Minister
von Thun. To further improve relations between Austria and
Germany, Eulenburg played an integral role in arousing
German interest in the Paris Exposition of 1900. He assured
his master that the Empire's participation in such an event
would indirectly give her the opportunity to reinstate, for
the first time since the Franco-Prussian War, a military
representative in Paris. This action could improve relations
with France and consequently Austria. Neither William nor
Foreign Secretary Billow, however, supported Eulenburg ' s
idea, much to the displeasure of the Austro-Hungarian govern-
ment, which was attempting to re-establish its military
emissary in Paris. Eulenburg, seeing that William's behavior
could engender further difficulties between Germany and
A.ustria-Hungary, thus took it upon himself to contact Count
210
Agenor von Goluchowski, Austrian Foreign Minister, and urged
him to refrain from establishing a military mission in the
French capital. Goluchowski agreed to the plan, though he
and Eulenburg both favored improving relations between the
Germanic empires and France. Politics rather than personal
3
preferences again won the day.
Life grew increasingly complex for Eulenburg with the
advent of the year 1899. Influenza and nervous disorders
plagued him; he found the 1899 Nordlandreise a heinous
experience. Further crises occurred which demonstrated how
Eulenburg's influence had waned in the realm of domestic
policy. William, apparently going through one of the
phases in which he wished to appear as the "workingman's
friend," attempted to institute a bill which would provide
for the protection of non-strikers during labor disputes.
This proposal, called the House of Correction Bill, encoun¬
tered considerable opposition from the parties of the Left,
as well as from individual sources. In the face of a possible
Reichstag controversy, Eulenburg also opposed the measure,
and hoped that his friend and sovereign would retract his
proposal. William, however, refused to compromise on the
matter, and proceeded to irritate Eulenburg by making some
remarks at the dedication of a statue of the Great Elector
at Bielefeld. Here William asserted that the ceremony
3Haller, Aus dem Leben, 271-272; Hohenlohe, Denkwilrdig-
keiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, 433.
211
symbolized that "in my ancestors as in myself there resides
an inflexible will which will proceed in the face of all
4
resistance to the goal felt to be right." In essence
William, as the Reichstag interpreted his message, would go
to the point of dissolving that body if its members did not
cooperate with him. Such a declaration earned the bombastic
Emperor a severe tongue lashing from Eulenburg. He asserted
that public antipathy toward the House of Correction Bill
could lead to a movement for the Kaiser's abdication. Eulen-
burg felt that William's moderating his stance would be far
more effective in achieving the legislation's passage. Eu-
lenburg, himself true to his conservative leanings, could
understand William's feelings for the non-strikers, yet
simultaneously he realized that political expediency made
the demonstrations of such sympathies unfeasible. Despite
his friend's urgings, however, the Kaiser continued to stand
by his House of Correction proposal, and thus witnessed its
squelching by the Reichstag legislation committee.^
In 1900 Eulenburg encountered a series of unfortunate
circumstances which had the effect of diminishing his sway
over William II. The outbreak of China's Boxer Rebellion,
particularly the assassination of Hans von Ketteler, German
Ambassador to Peking, placed the Kaiser in an extremely
^Haller, Aus dem Leben, 254.
^Haller, Aus dem Leben, 254; Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten
der Reichskanzlerzeit, 538-542.
212
excited frame of mind. From the very first day of the 1900
Nordlandreise, Eulenburg experienced difficulty with the
Emperor, whose initial reaction to the turmoil in the Far
East centered upon involving Germany in suppressing the
rebellion. Eulenburg objected to William's ideas and be-
came incensed when the latter gave his notorious "Hun
speech" at Kiel. Here William in an access of tactlessness
likened the German Chinese Expeditionary Force to Attila
and his hordes. William furthered aggravated his friend by
wiring messages to the heads of other European nations, pro-
posing that Germany, England, and Russia unite to combat the
g
"yellow menace." By refusing to listen to the cautionary
advice of the Foreign Ministry regarding this matter, he
angered both Eulenburg and Foreign Secretary von Bülow, The
latter especially found William's behavior appalling, and it
appears that he sincerely feared that the Kaiser was attempt-
ing to manipulate the Foreign Office and destroy his, Bülow's,
chances for assuming the coveted Chancellor's position. Yet
both men continued to support William.
Eulenburg found other moves by William equally upsetting,
especially when he learned that Bülow, eager to remain in the
Kaiser's good graces, had decided to acquiesce with the
monarch's irrational policies. At the Kaiser's request,
^Haller, Aus dem Leben, 256-259; Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten,
I, 97-103; Hutten-Czapski, Sechzig-Jahre, 379-383; Balfour,
Kaiser, 229.
213
Bülow carried through an Imperial demand that China yield
up persons responsible for the murder of European, and
especially German, victims of the Boxer Rebellion, Eulen-
burg, in spite of his strong nationalistic tendencies, con-
sidered such action unnecessary. He believed that the
Emperor's proposal would arouse the suspicions of other
European powers concerning Germany's territorial motives in
the Far East. Germany's relations with Russia and England,
none too good at this point, would hardly improve under such
circumstances. Eulenburg's assumptions proved correct. Soon
after William's declaration became public, both Russia and
England fervently stated their refusal to cooperate with the
7
Kaiser's plan.
Eulenburg, fearing that the Kaiser's reaction to this
"snub" would generate unfortunate international consequences,
now took it upon himself to write William, begging that he
retract the demand that he had given Bülow for China to sur-
render the "murderers." Common sense, not threats, would help
alleviate the complexities of the Far Eastern situation. To
further his request, Eulenburg, according to Bülow's later
recollections, even went so far as to "inform" the Emperor that
the Foreign Secretary, who supported William's China policy,
was suffering from some skin disease which affected his
"^Haller, Aus dem Leben, 259-260; D.g.P. IV, 185? cf.
Rich, Holstein, II, 622.
214
8
decision-making capabilities. William, in spite of Eulen-
burg's possibly somewhat underhanded pleadings, continued to
pursue his own course. He reprimanded his friend and asserted
that he found no use for independent thinking at this point.
This sign of rebellion, coupled with the Emperor's appointing
Bülow to the Imperial Chancellorship in 1900, more than ever
demonstrated to Eulenburg that his influence stood as only a
shadow in comparison to its dimensions of a few years previous-
iy-
Still, the appointment of Bülow did not cause Eulenburg
to resign any political post or sever his ties with the
Emperor. The Kaiser, for one thing, continued to extend Eulen-
burg at least superficial patronage. Aware of his friend's
disgruntled condition, William entertained fears that the dip-
lomat would resign his Vienna post if his personal situation
did not improve. Such a development might reflect poorly on
the Kaiser's ability as an administrator. In January 1900,
therefore, the Kaiser elevated Eulenburg to the rank and
dignity of Prince, hoping that this step would keep him within
the Imperial circle. Political motives, as well as altruism,
however, almost certainly dominated William's move. For a
long time the Kaiser had considered enlarging the number of
Prussian princely families, the majority of whom professed
Catholicism, by adding some Evangelical ones. Naturally
8
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 260; Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten,
I, 387.
215
Eulenburg received first preference. One could not say that
the Kaiser's friend accepted his title with great happiness,
for he perceived the reasons behind William's action. Never-
theless, he accepted the honor in good grace, as he had done
. 9
for so many years.
Problems continued to mount, straining relationships
between Eulenburg and other members of the Imperial Court.
One such case involved Eulenburg and Count Boiko Eochberg of
the Berlin Royal Theater. Although Eulenburg and Hochberg
had enjoyed a pleasant relationship for a number of years,
Eulenburg's latter-day attacks against Hochberg's secretary,
Pierson, precipitated a dispute which eventually resulted in
a lawsuit. Supposedly Pierson had defaulted on a debt to a
Viennese contractor, leading the contractor to inform Eulen-
burg regarding the situation. Eulenburg responded by telling
Hochberg of his secretary's financial ineptness. Hochberg,
however, took his secretary's side, and Pierson, backed by
his employer's support, instituted a libel suit against Eulen-
burg. Rather than attempting to prove his innocence, the
Kaiser's friend apologized to Pierson and thus induced the
10
latter to withdraw his action.
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 270; Muschler, Eulenburg . .
Leben, 491; Cowles, The Kaiser, 176; Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten,
I, 381; Hohenlohe, Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit, 553,
537, 600.
10
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 277-278; Muschler, Eulenburg
. . Leben, 532-533.
216
The Pierson controversy would have possessed little
significance had it not been for the intrigue apparently
generated by the case. According to Bülow, Eulenburg had
previously alienated Dietrich von Hülsen-Haeseler, Chief of
the German Military Cabinet, with some remarks which he made
in letters to the Kaiser. The diplomat thus sought to regain
Hülsen's favor by gaining the appointment of the latter's
brother Georg, Director of the Court Theater at Wiesbaden, to
the post Hochberg presently held. In essence, then, Eulen-
burg had attempted to use Pierson's default as a means for
11
attaining this goal. The veracity of this allegation, how-
ever, like so many of Bülow's, may be challenged on a number
of counts, but mainly because no other major souce makes
reference to Eulenburg's role in the incident. Also, in
view of the fact that Hülsen and Hochberg had close associa-
tions, it was highly unlikely that General von Hülsen would
desire his friend expelled from the Royal Theater even for
Georg von Hülsen's benefit. Still, the plausibility of
Bülow's assertions, particularly in the setting of the Berlin
court circle, cannot be totally dismissed, Philipp zu Eulen-
burg, like his fellow courtiers, certainly did not hold him-
self above such methods of operation, and would rely on such
if necessary in order to accord with the whims of his Imperial
master.
11
Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, I, 604-605; Muschler, Eulen-
burg . . . Leben, 532-533; Hutten-Czapski, Sechzig Jahre, 411.
217
Eulenburg's difficulties continued as he involved him-
self in a controversy concerning a riotous assembly of
Polish-speaking school children at Wreschau, Posen, and
similar anti-German demonstrations in Warsaw and Lemberg.
The Posen children, who refused to answer in German when under
religious instruction in their schools, were subjected to
severe restrictions by the German government, Such action
alienated many Hapsburg subjects of Polish nationality, who
up to this time had been leaning toward Germany rather than
France in their sympathies. Eulenburg, at this point, realized
that William II could severely damage relations between Ger-
many and Austria, if, in his characteristically belligerent
manner, he continued to enforce the restrictions approved by
the Reichstag. Nevertheless, save for uttering a mild warning,
Eulenburg did little else to prevent his master from sanction-
ing the desires of the Berlin bureaucrats. Bülow, for his
part, added fuel to the fire by reprimanding Count Ferdynand
Radziwill, the Polish-party leader in the Reichstag, for his
12
inability to keep his people loyal to the German government.
Thus Eulenburg cannot be condemned too severely for his in-
action, as any positive move on his part would have been
countered by one from the for-the-moment nationalistic
Chancellor. Considerations of Prussian domination, then,
overrode Germany's need to keep favorable relations with
12
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 278; Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten,
I, 545; Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 531.
218
Austria.
Eulenburg certainly had encountered political difficul-
ties such as these before. Now, however, he began to think
of resigning his Vienna post, and thus his diplomatic career.
Undoubtedly the state of his health contributed most notably
to this attitude. As mentioned earlier, the diplomat had
periodically endured bouts with various diseases since child-
hood. During his early youth he had been plagued with a lung
difficulty which supposedly left his "internal organs" weak
and increasingly susceptible to disease. An attack of
typhus in 1872 indeed laid him low and permanently affected
his digestive tract. He experienced a dangerous case of
adult measles in 1884, and also underwent surgery for a neck
13
tumor in the same year. Psychologically, as the years
passed, growing melancholia (today it would be termed depres¬
sion) further complicated matters.
Eulenburg's continued physical decline markedly parallel-
ed his period of political decline from 1897. He suffered from
influenza, a disorder which brought with it the appearance of
the gout ailment. Cures at Bad Gastein and Carlsbad brought
little relief, and as the months and years progressed Eulen-
burg grew increasingly nervous and impatient. A second siege
of gout in 1898 seemed further to affect his nervous system.
Some of these problems the diplomat could keep hidden in an
13
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 283.
219
attempt to prevent other people, especially the Kaiser, from
ascertaining that things were not going well for the aging
courtier. He continued to keep a hectic social schedule, and
remained a popular figure at Vienna, although he confided to
Bülow that he found his social obligations "corroding, heart-
and dance of death. h 14rending, gruesome as the More and
more the responsibilities of entertaining fell to his wife,
Augusta, who patiently accepted his depressed state. Never-
theless, Eulenburg told himself that "loyalty to the Kaiser"
would not permit him to relinquish his ambassadorial position.
By 1900, however, Èulenburg concluded after all that he
could no longer continue in his duties. His physical decline
was causing his physician to insist that he resign. Nervous-
ness, constant fainting fits coupled with mental fatigue, had
rendered Eulenburg incapable of even writing as he once had.
At times the melancholic ambassador could not even open a
15
letter. On the 1900 Nordlandrejse, then, Eulenburg initially
requested that the Emperor permit him to resign. William,how-
ever, far more concerned with foreign affairs than with his
friend's physical well-being, refused to let him depart. A
second request by Eulenburg met with the same rebuttal.
Eulenburg finally succeeded in gaining a de facto accep-
tance of his resignation from his Vienna post only in 1902,
14
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 288.
15
Haller, Aus dem Leben; Muschler, Eulenburg, 534.
220
primarily because of obviously failing health coupled with
influence exerted by Chancellor von Bülow. On January 13,
1902, he wrote the Chancellor, asking that he choose the best
moment for him, Eulenburg, to retire, and that Bülow aid him
in achieving this goal with the Kaiser. Eulenburg emphasized
to Bülow how years in the Imperial service had broken his
spirit and health, and that his physician had advised that he
take at least a year's leave from his ambassadorial duties.
At first Bülow, fearing that Eulenburg's resignation would
constitute a setback for his administration, refused to com¬
ply with the diplomat's request. Apparently several discrete
considerations accounted for the Chancellor's attitude. Un-
doubtedly the entire Imperial Court realized that Eulenburg's
influence over the Kaiser had declined, and suspected that
Bülow wanted to take advantage of that to remove him from the
Imperial circle in order permanently to enhance his own politi-
cal position. Bülow, of course, hoped to stifle any enlarge-
ment of such speculation. The Chancellor also realized that
Eulenburg possessed a horde of enemies in Berlin, and that the
individuals involved might suspect him, Bülow, of aiding
Eulenburg in some scheme. It would be better for Eulenburg
to stay in Vienna, away from this crowd. Finally, and seeming-
ly almost in direct contradiction to the first-stated reason,
it may be assumed that Bülow, by virtue of his close associa-
tion with the Kaiser and Holstein, could count on stifling any
remaining influence which Eulenburg still might try to exercise
221
over William II. As long as the diplomat remained in Vienna,
he would not be so likely to influence William's policy-making
decisions.
Eulenburg, however, refused to let the Chancellor stand
in his way, and wrote him again on March 8, 1902. He urged
Bülow to consider the sensibleness of his resignation. The
Kaiser's friend first asserted that he held Bülow in the
highest esteem and implicitly urged, however mendaciously, that
he did not consider him a rival for William's favor. Addi-
tionally, Eulenburg devoted much space to a summary of various
ailments which he possessed and declared that his doctor had
suggested that he refrain from pursuing his political activi-
ties with hitherto fervency. Finally, Eulenburg spoke of his
family and domestic obligations, both of which he had sorely
neglected. Surely the Chancellor could sympathise with his
16
cause and aid him in persuading the Kaiser to let him depart.
This correspondence apparently caused Bülow's attitude
to mellow, for he now agreed to handle Eulenburg's departure,
though with extreme caution. In April 1902, Eulenburg's
mother died, giving both himself and the Chancellor a further
rationale for requesting the ambassador's leave. On May 2 3,
Eulenburg, in response to Bülow's instructions, approached
the Kaiser and requested a three-months leave from his Vienna
post, pointing again to his failing health, now evidencing
16
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 288; Muschler, Eulenburg . .
Leben, 534; Burmeister, "Philipp Eulenburg-Hertefeld," 303,
222
itself in a resurgence of his gout condition. In this note
the diplomat also emphasized that it would be for the good of
the "Fatherland and all who love your Majesty" that he
17
retire. He emphasized, in essence, that his love for
William dominated his determination to leave. To Bülow, how-
ever, he now presented a different set of reasons for retir-
ing, reasons which superseded his immediate health problems:
Your anxiety to give me a clue which might
guide me through the labyrinthine paths of my com-
plex life and still more complex situation, showed
me with appalling precision the many dangers arising
from the frightful jealousies with which I am sur-
rounded--dangers to which, in my enfeebled state of
health, I am no longer equal . . In our last
conversation at Berlin you said so truly: 'The
Prussian genius is hard and ruthless. Subtle na-
tures like yours . . . are not attuned to it.' I
have known that from my youth. And I have also
been well aware that only the very warm friendship
of the most powerful person in the State--combined
with good luck--could possibly have nullified the
contradiction between my nature and the Prussian
genius. The instant that friendship fell off in
the smallest degree, the contradiction bro^g all
bounds—and especially as luck failed too.
Such a reflection stands in direct contrast to the out-
look of the Eulenburg of fifteen years earlier. The younger
Eulenburg could retain his composure in the face of political
adversity. Formerly he had possessed confidence in his politi-
cal abilities. Now he abased himself and considered himself
unable to cope with the political intrigue that surrounded him.
He who had once professed unrelenting loyalty to his chief now
17
Quoted in Haller, Aus dem Leben, 289.
18
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 290.
223
questioned his own ability to harmonize with the "Prussian
genius. " Eulenburg also mentioned, as when corresponding
with William, a need to spend more time with his family—a
rather ironic declaration in view of the fact that his chil-
dren had all reached adolescence or maturity and possessed
less need of his attention than during their formative years.
Obviously the diplomat, and courtier, in addition perhaps to
being a physically broken man, also considered his political
and courtly world a shambles and wished to depart from it.
Eulenburg's efforts to retire eventually succeeded. In
May 1902 Emperor William agreed to allow his friend a three-
months' leave from his ambassadorial duties and excused him
from going along on the 1902 Nordlandreise. During that
summer Eulenburg spent his time at various spas under the
care of a medical specialist, attempting to regain his health.
The physician, having recommended the three-months' leave,
now instituted various treatments—none of which, however,
generated any positive results. Giddiness, heart problems,
breathlessness, stomach disorders—all continued to plague
Eulenburg, and, by his own testimony, to affect the coherency
of his thinking processes. Diagnoses by additional physi-
cians revealed that Eulenburg's years of being under pressure
had also taken their toll in the form of his having contract-
ed rheumatoid arthritis, a disease for which these learned
men knew no cure. At best one could only lessen the pain
through rest; the disease would plague its victim for the rest
224
of his life. Such a situation, then, brightened only by his
son Sigwart's receiving his Gymnasium diploma and the
engagement of another son, Friedrich Wend, dominated that
19
summer of 1902.
In August, Eulenburg once again took it upon himself to
submit a final resignation request—and William still refused
to comply with his wishes, because of Bülow's advice and
also because of his own preoccupation with such affairs as
the Boer conflict and the formation of an alliance with
Britain. In view of such circumstances, Eulenburg's health
seemed of petty concern. The Emperor also did not want to be
bothered with finding a replacement for the Vienna ambassador.
Thus, rather than permitting his friend to resign, the
Emperor merely extended Eulenburg's leave for another three
20
months. Not until the following November was William
finally moved to place Eulenburg en disposition, an indica-
tion that he would finally accede to his friend's beseechings.
After a month's time, and several more letters, the Emperor
formally permitted and received Eulenburg's resignation from
his Vienna ambassadorial post, so that on December 16, 1902,
the diplomat's formal career came to an end.
Eulenburg's resignation did not generate formidable
19
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 290; Muschler, Eulenburg . .
Leben, 539.
20
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 291; Muschler, Eulenburg . .
Leben, 541.
225
political repercussions. He realized that William still
held him in high esteem from some regards, and took the
opportunity of the resignation to request that the Emperor
appoint his, Eulenburg's, secretary, Karl Kistler, to the
position of Court Councillor—Hofrat. The Kaiser assented,
and perhaps to reinforce in Eulenburg a continuing sense of
loyalty and obligation, also conferred on the aging diplo-
mat the Grand Cross of the Red Eagle With Oakleaf, the high-
est honor he could bestow on a Prussian subject. Eulenburg,
as he had to anticipate, went through a number of departure
ceremonies which included exchanging notes of regret with
the Austrian Foreign Minister, Goluchowski; attending various
testimonial dinners; and receiving a tearful farewell from
Emperor Francis Joseph. All wished the diplomat a restora-
tion of health, seemingly an idle ceremonial hope in view of
Eulenburg's decrepit condition. The newly-resigned ambassa-
dor expressed no regrets over his departure. Now he could
return to Liebenberg castle, where, though ailing, he would
be able possibly to renew his artistic and cultural pursuits
21
as well as spend time refurbishing his home.
Eulenburg hardly succeeded in fulfilling these idyllic
desires. The three years following his resignation, long ago
entitled by Johannes Haller "the chronicle of a sickbed,"
found the ex-diplomat in a constant state of depression,
21
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 292.
226
fighting pleurisy, endocarditis, and other diseases. His
physical condition temporarily improved during the year 1903,
permitting him to participate in the Kaiser's Nordlandreise
of that year. That September, however, Eulenburg suffered
a spasm of muscular rheumatism while he was the Kaiser's
guest at Rominten. This attack necessitated his return to
Liebenberg. The next year saw his condition further weaken-
ed with megacarditis, thrombosis, and other disorders.
Eulenburg thus again drifted into the role of a recluse, un-
able to accompany William on either his 1904 or 1905 summer
voyages. In 1906, after a brief period of relative well-
being, he experienced an attack of bronchitis which further
22
damaged his system, besides confining him to his estate.
In spite of his illness, Eulenburg engaged in some pro-
ductive activities at Liebenberg. He instituted a number of
improvements on his expansive estate and found new joy in
family outings. The Emperor ‘patronizingly visited his friend
annually and assured him of his continued love and devotion.
On May 21, 1904, William attended the Liebenberg wedding of
Eulenburg's son, Friedrich Wend, and the Countess of Stubenburg,
and one of his royal sons entertained Friedrich Wend with a
festivity in Berlin. William also came to Eulenburg's estate
on the latter's fifty-eighth birthday, in February 1905, and
again in November 1906, at which latter time he appeared to
22
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 298. Eulenburg's Mit dem Kaiser
contains a detailed portrayal of the 1903 trip.
227
23
delight in the musical talents, of the Eulenburg children.
The middle-aged former diplomat, for his, part, visited the
Kaiser in June 1905 on the occasion of Crown Prince William's
marriage to Duchess Câcilie of Mecklenburg. He likewise went
to Berlin for the simultaneous 1906 celebration of the
Imperial couple's silver wedding anniversary and the marriage
of their son Prince Eitel Friedrich to Sophie Charlotte of
Oldenburg. William also bestowed the Order of the Black
Eagle on Eulenburg in that year. Family life continued to
hold its pleasant moments for Eulenburg. His daughters,
especially, Alexandrine and Viktoria, continued to entertain
their father with their musical accomplishments. His son
Karl received his Gymnasium diploma in March 1905. His wife
Augusta continued her role as his dedicated spouse of thirty
years. Outside of his family circle, however, Eulenburg saw
few people nowadays. Only Count Kuno von Moltke, his friend
from the Franco-Prussian War, continued visiting him on a
regular basis. Still, the idyllic environment at Liebenberg
could compensate for any loneliness he might have experienced
during the years immediately following his resignation from
24
the Vienna ambassadorial post.
Despite his weakened condition, Eulenburg continued to
retain a passing interest in the political scene. He read
23
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 291
2 4
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 291; Muschler, Eulenburg . .
Leben, 597-602; Rogge, Lebensbekenntnis, 217.
228
the Berlin Lokalanzeiger, the Kreuzzeitung, and the Vossische
Zeitung avidly even though he no longer played any direct
role in events which determined the destiny of a nation. He
urged Emperor William II to back the Russian Empire during
the Russo-Japanese conflict of 1904-05, simultaneously
recommending a three-way alliance with Russia and France.
Eulenburg now could and did vociferously criticize his
master's policies, something he had formerly considered taboo.
He could not help but note what he interpreted as a gradual
psychological decline in William II. Eulenburg continued as
before to find the latter's behavior during the Nordlandreisen
Byzantine and juvenile, and expressed to Bülow his concern
over a forty-five-year-old man behaving in such an immature
manner. The Kaiser, pressured by the cares of office and his
own nervous personality, increasingly displayed temper ten-
trums and related outbursts, prompting his physician to con-
25
elude that his nervous system had deteriorated, Eulenburg
confided similar feelings to Bülow, hardly a wise idea in
view of the latter's abilities as a political manipulator.
Yet Eulenburg also began without inhibitions to criticize
William directly, The Emperor's "individuality" annoyed the
ex-diplomat particularly, and no longer would he allow the
Kaiser's possible subsequent ire to interfere with his
expressing his true feelings to the former:
25
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 304.
229
You are hard and inconsiderate at--the expense
of the heart which belongs to you. Your contempt for
your fellow-beings has increased. As you once said
to me on a walk in Norway, your main characteristic
is self-will. I will not dispute the justice of that
view. But in any case, the line between certain
actions of a ruler and the manifestations of his self-
will is likely to be very hard to draw—if he really
is self-willed. This brings with it impatience of
contradiction and rejection of the good advice which
others are anxious to give you. In a word: Auto-
cracy at the expense of the autocrat's usefulness to
himself—and to his people and his country.^6
Eulenburg also criticized William's expanionist foreign policy
and his drive for the Big Fleet Bill. The ex-diplomat also
now saw the Prussian class structure, which William had helped
to perpetuate, as stifling to Germany's cultural progress be-
27
cause of its emphasis on the military. Such statements,
coming from a Junker aristocrat, obviously demonstrated that
Eulenburg had relinquished the role that both his Emperor and
peer group had wanted him to play.
Although Emperor William now only paid lip-service to
Eulenburg's advice, the former nevertheless found his friend's
disenchantment disturbing; this in turn moved him to grant
Eulenburg opportunity anew to perform diplomatic services for
his country. The year 1904 witnessed the birth of an Anglo-
French entente, and France, confident of England's support,
attempted to extend her hegemony into Morocco. Germany, which
saw France as trying to develop her own trade interests at her
Teutonic neighbor's expense, now entered the picture in
26
Quoted in Haller, Aus dem Leben, 304.
27
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 307-308.
230
September 1905 when Emperor William visited Tangiers and
made it clear that Germany would support Morocco's integ-
rity and not let his country's interests in that country be
slighted. Eventually war threatened, causing the French
government to send its Foreign Minister, Raymond Lecomte, to
Berlin. At this juncture, Eulenburg found a new opportunity
28
to apply his diplomatic finesse.
Lecomte, a personal friend of Eulenburg, met with him
privately, and explained that France, while not wishing for
war, still found William's obstinance a catalyst for moving
in that direction. The retired Prince in effect responded to
the Frenchman by first consulting with General Helmuth von
Moltke, new Chief of the German General Staff. The latter
assured Eulenburg that Germany too had little desire for con-
flict and would cooperate with the French government in nego-
tiating over Morocco. Reassured by Moltke's statements,
Eulenburg then visited Bülow and informed him of the General's
stance. Bülow willingly subscribed to Moltke's decision, but
29
Eulenburg soon encountered a barrier to his plans.
Friedrich von Holstein, who had distanced himself from
Eulenburg some years before, now emerged to criticize the
latter's actions. Wishing to see Germany demonstrate her
28
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 311-312; Muschler, Eulenburg
. . . Leben, 609; Rich, Holstein, II, 721; Lerchenfeld,
Erinnerungen, 420-427.
29
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 312; Muschler, Eulenburg
. . Leben, 609; Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, 312.
231
military prowess, Holstein expressed his disgust by demon-
stratively firing off his well-known note of resignation from
the Foreign Office, assuming that it would be rejected, Much
to his surprise, also well-known, his superiors, the Emperor
included, accepted his action, apparently feeling no need for
the Gray Eminence's services from then on. Extremely per-
plexed and indignant in the face of such events, Holstein
began to look for a scapegoat, and eventually focused his
resentments on Philipp zu Eulenburg.
The fall of Eulenburg, so thoroughly covered in Harry
F. Young's Maximilian Harden, Censor Germaniae, will be dis-
cussed only briefly as regards those facets of the affair
which did not involve Eulenburg's friendship with William II.
Holstein and Maximilian Harden (real name Felix Ernst
Witkowski) publisher of the Berlin journal, Die Zukunft,
acted as Eulenburg's foe , and, through Harden's efforts
especially, Eulenburg suffered explusion from the Imperial
circle. Holstein initiated his campaign against Eulenburg,
hoping to use press editorials to undermine the ex-diplomat,
and expressed this idea to Theodor Schiemann, former editor
of the Kreuzzeitung. Apparently Schiemann considered the idea
unfeasible, for in the spring of 1906 the now-retired official
instead began to barrage Eulenburg with threatening letters,
accusing him of engineering his, Holstein's, falL Eulenburg,
surprised by these accusations, at first considered responding
with a challenge to a duel, reflecting the suggestion of Axel
232
von Varnbüler, Minister of Württemberg to Berlin. After con-
suiting with Heinrich von Tschirschky and Otto von Mühlberg
of the Foreign Office, however, Eulenburg decided to retract
his challenge. Instead, the ex-diplomat sent Holstein a
letter denying any role in the resignation affair, to which
Holstein gave a rude reply, continuing his accusations. After
receiving this response, Eulenburg decided to refrain from
carrying the matter further, sidestepping the issue for
30
almost a year.
Holstein too might have let the situation rest had not
a press campaign attacking his failure to obtain more for
Germany in the Moroccan crisis gotten underway during the
winter of 1906-07, and served to heighten his paranoid
instincts. In imagined self-defense, then, on May 4, 1907,
Holstein wrote Harden of the Zukunft, telling him that Eulen-
burg posed a threat to the Imperial household, and implicitly
requesting help in countering the ex-diplomat's influence.
Harden, who likewise distrusted Eulenburg, leaped at the
chance to assist the former Foreign Office official in his
attempt to degrade the former ambassador to Vienna. Harden,
according to most sources, had journalistically served the
interests of the Bismarcks during the Kladderadatsch affair
of 1894, and had leveled further attacks against Eulenburg in
30
D.g.P., IV, 419-20; Haller, Aus dem Eeben, 329-330;
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 606-607; Rogge, Lebensbekennt-
nis, 256, 265; Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, 290-291; Rich,
Holstein, II, 760.
233
a Zukunft editorial, asserting that the Kaiser's friend
wished to bring about the downfall of Chancellor von Billow
and replace him with Kuno von Moltke. (Billow later aided
Holstein and Harden by informing on Eulenburg's relationship
3 2
with Raymond Lecomte.) Soon Harden found additional fuel
for demeaning Eulenburg. The autumn visit of Emperor William
toLiebenberg in 1906 aroused suspicions of a resurgence of
Eulenburg's influence, as did a visit by Raymond Lecomte to
the estate in the same year. Courtiers and officials such as
Chancellor von Bülow had also expressed concern over Eulen-
burg's role in the Moroccan crisis, Believing himself to
possess a number of important allies, then, Harden launched
the campaign which would eventually banish Philipp zu Eulen-
33
burg completely from the entourage of William II.
Harden's attacks commenced on November 17, 1906, when,
in an article entitled "Praeludium," he gave a summation of
Eulenburg's political career and of how the "exile had" now
31
Zukunft, Nov. 9, 1901, 207; cf. Harry F. Young, Maximil-
ian Harden, Censor Germaniae; The Critic in Opposition from
Bismarck to the Rise of Nazism (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1959), 89, hereinafter cited as Young, Harden ; B. Uwe Weller,
Maximilian Harden und die Zukunft (Bremen Schünemann, 1970), l8l
hereinafter cited as Weller, Harden und Zukunft.
32
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 314-317; Weller, Harden und
Zukunft, 181.
33
Rich, Holstein, II, 768; Haller, Aus dem Leben, 333;
Muschler, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 608, 615-616 ; Baumont,
L'Affaire Eulenburg, 210ff; Helmuth Rogge, Holstein und Har-
den: politisch-publizistisches Zusammenspiel zweier Aussen-
seiter des Wilhelminischen Reichs (München : C. H. Beck, 1959) ,
99-104, hereinafter cited as Rogge, Holstein und Harden.
234
returned to the Imperial circle. More potent, however, was
the Zukunft's article "Dies Trae" of November 24, which con¬
tained allusions to a homosexual relationship between a "Harp¬
ist" (Eulenburg) and a "Sweetie" (Kuno von Moltke), as well
as conveying their joint fondness for "Liebchen" (The Kaiser).
Such attacks did not stand entirely without substance. As
Eulenburg's sensationalized homosexuality trial would later
reveal, the former diplomat did seemingly possess some lean-
ings, at least implicitly, toward such a sexual orientation.
Rumors of such behavior acquired sufficient significance that
during the 1890's the Berlin Police Commandant had entered
Eulenburg's name to a list of individuals suspected of homo-
sexual inclinations. In 1897, Foreign Secretary Billow confi-
dentially informed Eulenburg that in the archives of the
Foreign Office there existed a protocol concerning an illicit
connection between Eulenburg and the superintendent of a Ber¬
lin bathing establishment. Finally, Friedrich von Holstein
had informed the Police-President of Berlin of Eulenburg's
supposed abnormal sexual behavior. Harden's accusations, then,
merely served to set off an intrigue that had been developing
34
potential for over twenty years.
34
Haller, Aus dem- Leben, 318^326; Hans von Tresckow, Von
Fürsten und anderen sterblichen: Erinnerungen eines Kriminal-
kommis gars (Berlin : F~, Fontane and Co. , 1922) , 168 herein-
after cited as Tresckow, Von Fürsten; Young, Harden, 96.
Harden's information sources included Emperor William's sister
Charlotte of Saxe-Meiningen, Count Dietrich von Hülsen-Haese-
1er, Chief of the Kaiser's Military Cabinet, and Prince Max
Egon von Fürstenberg, who replaced Eulenburg as the Kaiser's
235
Eulenburg received Harden's accusations with a surface
calm. Others sought, however, to prevent any scandal from
erupting. Eulenburg's friend Baron Alfred von Berger
approached Harden, and promised that the Prince would retire
from the Imperial circle if this would mean an end to the
Zukunft's attacks. Harden complied, and in December 1906
35
Eulenburg left for Lake Geneva. His return to Germany in
January 1907 to receive the Order of the Black Eagle, however,
precipitated a new Zukunft campaign, beginning on January 5
with references to "Fürst Manriko" (Eulenburg) and "Zücker^
36
süss (Kuno von Moltke). Eulenburg found himself under fire
because of "selling out" to the French in the Moroccan crisis.
At this point, Holstein, who had allowed Harden to handle the
accusations alone, now entered the picture. He asserted to
the Zukunft editor what while he approved of Harden's basic
intentions, the unwarranted attacks on French Foreign Minister
Lecomte could precipitate an international crisis. This access
of national concern soon deserted Holstein, however, when
rumors began to leak out that he had worked as the sole party
behind the Zukunft1s campaign to undermine Eulenburg.
chief confidant. See Haller, Eulenburg, 346; Rich, Holstein,
II, 771; Robert von Zedlitz-Trtitzschler, Zwiilf Jahre am
deutschen Kaiserhof (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt, 1924) ,
241-242, hereinafter cited as Zedlitz, Zwôlf Jahre
35
Young, Harden, 93; Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, 310-311.
3 6
Young, Harden, 97; Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, 311.
236
Holstein, while he frankly acknowledged his previous role in
the campaign to undermine Eulenburg, now also reinstated his
attacks to a formidable degree. He well knew that others such
as Bernhard von Billow, Otto von Hammann of the German govern-
ment's Press Bureau, and Foreign Secretary von Tschirschky
probably wished to use him, Holstein, as their foil and there-
by prevent a resurgence of Eulenburg's influence, Why should
he take on the brand of "intriguist" when so many others to
some degree had involved themselves in the Zukunft campaign?
Unable to come up with an acceptable answer, Holstein again
faded into the background, leaving Harden and others to
37
attack Eulenburg according to their own impulses.
Harden's second round of attacks led Eulenburg to demand
a meeting with the editor in April 1907. The meeting
accomplished little, however, and on the 27th of that month
the Zukunft carried an article dealing with the Prince of
Monaco, who had just received the Order of the Black Eagle,
Germany's highest non-military decoration. In the piece Har-
den wrote of Eulenburg's receiving the award earlier that year:
Because Prince Friedrich Heinrich suffered from
. . . perversion of the sexual drive, he was forced
to renounce the mastership of the Order of the
Knights of St. John. Do more liberal statutes stand
for the Order of the Black Eagle? There we can find
at least one whose vita sexualis deviates no less
than that of the banished Prince.^
37
Rich, Holstein, II, 770-775.
38
Zukunft, April 27, 1907, 118; cf. Young, Harden, 97.
This last article also accused Eulenburg of having had sexual
237
This last article elicited a strong reaction from the Imperial
Family on May 2, 1907, when Crown Prince William, supposedly
urged on by members of the Kaiser's military entourage,
brought the Zukunft articles to the attention of his father.
William II did not hesitate a moment, ordering Eulenburg to
be either "cleared or stoned"—a hasty and thoughtless decis¬
ion which put the entire responsibility of proof on Eulenburg.
The Emperor, to add insult to injury, then asked to see the
police files on Eulenburg. On finding his friend and Kuno
von Moltke listed as homosexual suspects, William immediately
declared that the two were "finished" so far as he was con-
cerned. On May 4, 1907, the Kaiser made good his outburst by
removing Moltke from his Berlin Commandant's post and firing
off a letter to Eulenburg in which he demanded that the latter
tell him what legal steps he had taken against Harden in order
to clear himself. Obviously William believed the Zukunft's
accusations held some substance. Eulenburg responded on.May
5 and asserted that he had done nothing so far about Harden's
articles, primarily because he wished to "shield the throne"
from any sort of scandal. Illness as well, so he alleged, also
prevented him from taking action. This answer did not please
William, and, with Chancellor von Billow as the intermediary,
relations with Count Wilhelm von Hohenau and Count Johannes
von Holman, both of whom were expelled from the garde du corps
for their alleged sexual perversion.
238
he sent a letter to Eulenburg demanding that he leave the
39
Imperial circle.
A series of complicated legal battles followed. In the
first, in the Berlin suburb of Charlottenburg, Eulenburg, who
had deposed with the district attorney at Prenzlau a request
that his life be investigated, demonstrated his innocence of
the Zukunft's charges. Nevertheless, because the presiding
magistrate, Nolting, had been a friend of Eulenburg, the
results hardly seemed credible, at least in the eyes of the
Kaiser. Multiplying Eulenburg's difficulties, Count Funo
von Moltke now resolved to take severe legal action against
Harden, a decision that was bound to drag in Eulenburg
again and, as things developed, hasten his utter downfall.
Possibly at the suggestion of Baron Alfred von Berger, Moltke
sent his cousin Otto to the Zukunft's editor. Confronting
Harden, Otto demanded that the journalist sign a statement
declaring that to his knowledge the ex-Commandant had never
engaged in abnormal sexual practices. Harden agreed to do
this and had prepared to send a statement when Holstein, ever
the behind-the-scenes manipulator, contacted him and per-
suaded the editor not to give in to Moltke's demands, Such
obstinance made up the Count's mind for him and he proceeded
39
Otto Hammann, Urn den Kaiser: Erinnerungen aus den Jah-
ren 1906-1909 (Berlin: R. Hobbing, 1919), 17-18; Bülow,
Denkwürdigkeiten, II, 331; Haller, Aus dem Leben, 345; Musch-
1er, Eulenburg . . . Leben, 621-624; Zedlitz, Zwfilf Jahre, 161;
Rich, Holstein, II, 779; Young, Harden, 100.
239
to bring a private suit against Harden on June 6, 1907. Here
occurred one of the ironies of the scandal. Although Count
von Moltke had a great deal of evidence at his disposal,
the misconduct of the civil trial, combined with the defama-
tory allegations of his ex-wife, Lili von Elbe (she asserted
that Eulenburg had tried to separate her from her husband dur-
the early years of her marriage), and with the court's
liberal interpretation of "libel" as the term applied to
Harden's accusations, spelled doom for the ex-Commandant's
cause. Eulenburg, his friend, did not attend the proceedings—
another detriment to Moltke's case. The court acquitted
Harden, and the accuser found himself as "established" homo-
40
sexual.
Kuno von Moltke possessed too many friends in the Imper-
ial circle, however, for the court's decision to be allowed
to stand unchallenged. The government now decided to inter-
vene in hopes of getting Moltke acquitted. Seeing what
appeared to be a certain victory for his comrade, Eulenburg,
probably on the advice of Moltke, now decided to institute his
own proceedings against Harden. The editor, defended by Max
Bernstein, a prominent Munich attorney, could not counter the
government's accusations. The sham trial lasted from December
19, 1907 to January 3, 1908, with the court's verdict going
40
Vorwârts, October 24, 1907; cf. Young Harden, 104;
Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, 307-308; Rich, Holstein, II, 780-
784.
240
unanimously in favor of Kuno von Moltke. Harden received a
four-month prison sentence in addition to having to pay the
41
court costs of both the first and second trials. Eulenburg,
a witness at the Moltke trial, also took this opportunity to
vindicate himself of any homosexual allegations. He
asserted to Max Bernstein that he had never committed any
such "obscenities. ,,42 (This testimony would eventually lead
to his downfall on charges of perjury.) Eulenburg now hoped
that he would be able to return to the Imperial circle. Such
optimism lasted only briefly, however, for now Harden appeal-
ed his conviction.
The third trial, which opened in Leipzig in 1908, re-
suited in a victory for Harden, primarily because of an ob-
scure newspaper article. On March 25, 1908, the Neue Freie
Volkszeitung of Munich accused Harden of having accepted a
bribe of a million marks to suppress evidence against Philipp
zu Eulenburg. Harden, angered by this accusation, proceeded
to bring a libel suit against the paper's editor, Anton
Stâdele. Such an action would have served little purpose
save for the fact that two of Harden's witnesses, Georg Riedl
and Jakob Ernst, had previously had dealings with Eulenburg
41
Young, Harden, 107; Rogae, Holstein und Harden, 274-
275; Rich, Holstein, II, 789-791.
42
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 335; Zukunft, May 2, 1908, 158;
cf. Young, Harden, 107.
241
during his previous Munich Tenure. Both mentioned Eulenburg
during the proceedings. Riedl, at that time an indigent
milkman with convictions on thirty-two counts, spoke
maliciously and incoherently about Eulenburg's "misbehavior."
Ernst, on the other hand, spoke positively of Eulenburg, at
least at the beginning of his testimony. Constant prodding
by Harden's attorney and the court, however, let Ernst to
"reveal" that he had engaged in homosexual acts with the
43
Prussian nobleman.
Other materials likewise served to undermine Eulenburg's
defense. Investigators found a letter from Eulenburg to
Ernst asserting that their affair was long past and best-for-
gotten. At Liebenberg, these examiners also found homo-
sexual literature on which Eulenburg had inscribed the name
of Count Edgar Wedel, a known homosexual, in order to dis-
claim possession of the works, so his accusers said. A
sailor from the Hohenzollern testified that Eulenburg had made
advances on a cruise. Through these testimonies, then, how-
44
ever dubious, Harden gained evidence for his cause.
The results of the Munich trail led the Prussian Min-
ister of Justice to demand a new trial for Harden. In May
1908 the Imperial Court at Leipzig handed down a decision that
43
Young, Harden, 109; Rogge, Holstein und Harden, 274-
275; Rich, Holstein, II, 789-791.
44
Zukunft, August 1, 1908, 172; May 2, 1908, 166; July
25, 1908, 138; cf. Young, Harden, 110; Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten,
II, 315.
242
the Zukunft editor's trial had been conducted illegally,
and scheduled a new set of proceedings. On May 7, 1908,
the ailing Eulenburg met with Riedl and Ernst at his Lieben-
berg estate. In spite of his urgings, both refused to retract
their respective previous testimonies. The next day, offi-
cers of the court arrived to charge Eulenburg with perjury.
They arrested him and took him to Berlin, where, despite his
illness, he was stripped of his Order of the Black Eagle and
imprisoned to await trial. This action later caused him to
45
return every medal which Emperor William had ever given him.
The new trial opened in Berlin on June 29, 1908. From
the outset of the trial Eulenburg pled his innocence and
emphasized his love of family. This testimony, however
poetically presented, achieved little for Eulenburg. Ill and
shaken by the damage he had received at the hands of Ernst
and Riedl, the aging ex-diplomat in essence provided the
court with a defense both blundering and weak. He declared,
for instance, in one thoughtless moment, that he was a victim
of Bismarck and the Bavarian clericals. Chancellor von Bis-
marck, so he asserted, had set the rumors of his homosexual-
ity into the world. The Bavarian clericals supposedly also
wished to help perpetuate the homosexuality myth. They saw
Eulenburg as a North German Protestant standard-bearer, a
45
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 421-423; Muschler, Eulenburg
. . Leben, 645.
243
46
resentment which went back to his days in Munich. Such
statements, to say the least, found credence with hardly
anyone and instead alienated many.
Eulenburg persisted for three weeks, finally becoming
so ill that he had to enter the Charité Hospital in Berlin.
That development did not end the proceedings, however, as
the court decided to transfer the trial to the hospital,
reflecting the prosecution's belief that Eulenburg was
feigning his physiological difficulties, On July 17, the
trial came to a standstill when Eulenburg collapsed in the
hospital courtroom, One year later, on July 9, 1909, the
trial reopened and again the ex-diplomat broke down after
a few hours,mainly in response to a judge's assertion that
he was using his illness as a convenient means of postponing
47
the trial. The case ultimately remained undecided, yet
Ernst's testimony had already done its damage. Never again
did Eulenburg enjoy even passably good health, and the
psychological repercussions left by the trial permanently
affected him. Clearly considered by the court to be guilty
of the charges presented by Harden, Eulenburg could never
return to the position of prominence which he occupied be-
fore 1902. Both he and Moltke, who settled his differences
with Harden out of court in March 1909, went into
4 6
Zukunft, August 8, 1908, 233-234; cf. Young Harden,
111.
47
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 354; Young, Harden, 112.
244
48
retirement. For the next twelve years, doctors examined
Eulenburg twice a year, and each time declared him unfit to
participate in a trial. Not until the initial years of the
Weimar Republic did the government finally call the case
49
closed.
Although Philipp zu Eulenburg and William II ceased
associating following the former's fall from moral respect-
ability, Eulenburg did not disappear into oblivion totally.
He remained at Liebenberg, an invalid, yet managing his
estates and writing apologetics concerning his role as the
Kaiser's advisor. He also continued to receive visitors, in-
eluding members of the Imperial court. Most important, he
wrote profusly before, during, and after the First World War,
criticizing Germany's diplomatic blunders. Although many
of his reflections concerning this subject lacked adequate
substantiation, his role during this time nevertheless merits
brief discussion.
From the turn of the century, Eulenburg with his perva-
sive nationalism, desire for increased German unity, and
Anglophobia, was quite inclined to see advantages in a war.
Yet he felt that his nation was preparing for the conflict
in the wrong manner. During the first years of his retirement,
48
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 361-373; Rogge, Hostein und Har-
den, 300-302; Treschow, Von Fürsten, 210-215.
49
Haller, Aus dem Leben, 362; Young, Harden, 112.
245
both Konrad Hausmann, a South German democrat, and Axel von
Varnbüler, former ambassador from Württemberg to Prussia
visited Eulenburg at his estate. Both men brought reports
of Reichstag activity to the aging ex-diplomat, and it was
on the basis of their information that he proceeded to make
his pronouncements. His connections at the Imperial court
aided Eulenburg in following events, especially his cousin
August zu Eulenburg, Minister of the Imperial Household, and
military associates Kuno von Moltke and Paul von Lesczyn-
50
ski. Thus it can safely be taken for granted that Eulen-
burg's statements were based on first-hand information, how¬
ever subjectively "filtered" by the minds of his sources.
Because of his connections, Eulenburg had an "inside
line" concerning Germany's bellicose policies. In April 1912
he wrote an essay entitled "The German Fleet" in which he
placed responsibility for a future war with German naval
ambitions. The aim of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz's Battle
Fleet, so he felt, was to fight a war. German trade and the
German coastline would have been safeguarded both more
effectively and more cheaply by a small fleet of cruisers, and
the money saved could have been used to build up the Army,
51
with which Eulenburg's loyalties lay.
50
John Rôhl, ed., 1914: Delusion or Design: The Testimony
of Two German Diplomats (New York: St. Martins, 1973), 57,
hereinafter cited as Rôhl, 1914.
51
Rôhl, 1914, 59.
246
For Eulenburg did still advocate a war between Germany and
Britain, merely seeing the expansion of the Navy under
Tirpitz as the wrong means for achieving that end. He
wished rather for the Fatherland to adhere to what he re¬
garded as the basic guidelines of German foreign policy
before Tirpitz's advent. All the powers of the European con-
tinent could rally around Germany and thus pose a united
threat to England, the nation which he considered the biggest
hindrance to German expansion. Eulenburg, unlike most of his
contemporaries, even went so far as to suggest that France
could play a role in unifying Europe if Germany and herself
could agree to "a neutralization of Alsace along Belgian
lines. „ 52 Eulenburg's perspectives actually were consistent
with those of an earlier time, when he opposed William's "Big
Fleet" operations. Yet his arguments which once persuaded
William to refrain from his particular expanionist dreams
would hardly have been effective in 1912, when the Kaiser had
become such an enthusiast of naval power. It is also rather
doubtful, especially with the accession of Poincare to the
presidency in France, that that nation ever would have con-
sidered any "Alsatian deal" with Germany. Surely Eulenburg
must have been aware of this state of affairs, and his pro-
posai for a unified Europe seems a mystery.
When war broke out in August 1914, Eulenburg, for all
52
Rflhl, 1914, 61
247
denunciation of the government's naval policy, considered
the conflict necessary. By September, however, his attitude
had changed markedly. He now blamed Germany for the events
of July 1914, when the fatal Austrian ultimatum reached
Serbia following Sarajevo. Drawing from his long personal
knowledge of the court and statesmen at Vienna, Eulenburg
held, in a letter written to Reichstag Conservative Wolfgang
Gans Edler Herr zu Putlitz, that the Austrian ultimatum had
been written in Berlin. Both the belligerent attitude of
the note and the form and manner in which it was written re-
fleeted a German, rather than Austrian author—"Prussian to
the „53marrow. Eulenburg did not believe that it was
necessarily the Kaiser or others at the apex of the diploma-
_tic service who were responsible for the note, but rather
suggested that a middle-range official at the Foreign Office,
such as Privy Councillor Arthur Zimmermann, might have been
54
responsible for altering the tone of Austrian ultimatum.
It is rather curious that Eulenburg did not mention William
and his associates in connection with the note, and it may be
wondered if he was fearful of the repercussions involved if
the total truth were revealed.
Writing to historian Kurt Breysig in 1919, Eulenburg
went even further in denouncing Germany's alleged authorship
53
Quoted in Rflhl, 1914, 116.
248
of the 1914 conflict. Official documents, he held, had been
so carefully formulated that it was still possible for the
Berlin government to deny that it had been responsible for
provoking war. In sharp contrast to these diplomatic notes.
he contended, stood the Kaiser's inflammatory marginalia on
the same diplomatic records. William II, the military, and
the German Foreign Office expected a two-front war while
simultaneously believing that England would not attack Ger-
many. The scribblings included such phrases as "Why should
we not accept war, after we have prepared ourselves so long
55
for it"—clearly aggressive in tone. These pronouncements,
Eulenburg admitted, may well have exaggerated William's true
sentiments, but nevertheless did not guarantee that those
56
reading the comments would not take the Kaiser at his word.
Also contained in the letter to Breysig were statements
in which Eulenburg inflated the dimensions of his own diplo-
matic finesse. No Austrian official would have "pushed
around" the Serbians without provocation from Berlin, and if
he had been in Vienna, Eulenburg claimed, the war would have
been averted. He would have explained away the communica-
tions from Berlin, and prevented Austrian statesmen from
5 7
accepting domination by the German High command. Other
55
Quoted in Rûhl, 1914, 127.
56
Rûhl, 1914, 127.
57
Rûhl, 1914, 127
249
circumstances seem to counter Eulenburg's claims in this
case. A British proposal to secure an international confer-
ence in 1914 fell on deaf ears in Berlin and Vienna, demon¬
strating that neither Germany nor Austria was particularly
enthusiastic about preserving the peace. Cooler heads, such
as Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg had attempted to prevail, but
with little success. Also, Eulenburg's associates undoubted-
ly knew that he favored war; they would have considered his
plea for arbitration ironic in view of these circumstances.
Finally, and most important, Emperor William II had allowed
himself to be dominated by the military, and would not listen
to his Chancellor or Foreign Secretary Gerhard von Jagow.
Certainly the influence of these last two individuals would
have been greater than Eulenburg's at this juncture. From
1897 onward, the aging diplomat had taken a second seat to
advisors such as Bernhard von Bülow and later Max Egon zu
Fürstenberg. War would have been extremely difficult to avert
after Sarajevo, no matter who represented Berlin in Vienna.
It is true that Eulenburg possessed the ability to
bring conflicting agencies into harmony. His finesse in deal-
ing with the Austrians, both as friends and political associ-
ates, won him popularity at the Viennese court, Yet the
situation of 1914 differed markedly from that prevailing dur-
ing the Eulenburg ambassadorship (1894-1902). Too many
strains in international relations had emerged during the
years 1902-1914— the Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911, the
250
Franco-English alliance of 1907, the Daily Telegraph
Affair, the expansion of the German fleet, the Zabern Affair
—all spiced with William's intermittent "saber-rattling."
Austria-Hungary damaged the international balance when she
acquired Bosnia-Herzegovina, a fiercely independent strong-
hold of South Slav nationalism, in 1908. This aggressive-
ness on Austria's part was something that Eulenburg would
have found difficult to come to terms with, as he seemed to
view that country's diplomats as satisfied with the status
quo. All of these factors seem to demonstrate, in large
part, that Eulenburg wished primarily to justify himself
ex post facto in a time of new crisis, to seek vengeance on
those who had cast him out of their circle and then led
Germany into disaster. The situation afforded him an
illusory final opportunity to attempt to regain a measure
of his old political influence. It was all to no avail.
He had had his day.
251
SELECTIVELY ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. PRIMARY SOURCES
Arndt, Rudolf, ed. Die Reden des Grafen von Caprivi im deutschen Reichs-
tage, preussischen Landtage und bei besonderen Artless en, 1883-1894.
Berlin: E. Hofmann and Co., 1894. This volume demonstrates
Caprivi's role as a traditionalist. Of particular note are his
speeches dealing with Britain's naval power and her colonial ventures.
Arren, Jules. Wilhelm II. Was er sagt, was er denkt. Leipzig: His-
torischer-politischer Verlag (R. Hofstetter), 1911.
Bachem, Karl. Vorgeschichte, Geschichte und Politik der Deutschen Zen-
trumspartei, zugleich ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der katholischen
Bewegung, sowie zur allgemeinen Geschichte des neueren und neuesten
Deutschland, 1815-1914. Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1927-32. The author
depicts Eulenburg as a hypocritical political conniver who wished
to undermine the Center Party.
Ball, Richard. Bilanz liber 25 Jahre Regierungszeit Wilhelms II.
Basle: Novitas-Verlag, 1913.
Bamberger, Ludwig. Bismarcks grosses Spiel: die geheimen Tagebücher
Ludwig Bambergers. Ernst Feder, ed. Frankfurt: SocietHts-
Verlag, 1933.
Bentinck, Nora Ida Emily. The Ex-Kaiser in Exile. New York: George
H. Doren Co., 1921.
Berlepsch, Hans Hermann von. Sozialpolitische Erfahrungen und Erin-
nerungen. MBnchen-Gladbach: Volksverein=Verlag, 1925
Bismarck, Otto von. Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman. A.J. Butler,
tr. 2 vols. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1899.
. Gedanken und Erinnerungen. Stuttgart: Cotta, 1924.
This source contributes substantially to the discussion of the
legislation at issue during Chancellor Bismarck's last days in
office.
. Die gesammelten Werke. 15 vols. Stuttgart:
Cotta, 1919.
. New Chapters of Bismarck's Autobiography.
Bernard Miall, tr. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1921.
Brauer, Arthur von. Im Dienst Bismarcks: PersBnliche Erinnerungen
252
von Arthur von Brauer. Helmuth Rogge, ed. Berlin: E.S.
Mittler, 1936. Brauer refers to Eulenburg primarily in
connection with the appointment of Adolf Marschall von Bie-
berstein a German Foreign Secretary.
Billow, Bernhard von. Denkwllrdigkeiten. Franz von Stockhammern, ed.
4 vols. Berlin: Ullstein, 1930. The first volume of this
work contributes greatly to an understanding of the relation-
ship between Eulenburg and Bulow, besides being an apology
for the former's connivings.
. Prince Billow and the Kaiser. Oakley Williams, tr.
London : T.Butterworth, Ltd • 9 1931. This volume attributes to
Eulenburg some role in German dealings with Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Witte in 1905.
Busch, Moritz. Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of His History. New
York, London: Macmillan, 1898.
Bussmann, Walter, ed. Staatssekret^r Herbert von Bismarck: Aus seiner
politischen Privatkorrespondenz.Gottingen: Vanderhoeck and
Rupprecht, 1964. Herbert von Bismarck's correspondence reveals
his great attachment to Eulenburg. He maintained contact with
the latter even after Eulenburg had been involved in the elder
Bismarck's departure from the Chancellorship.
Crispi, Franceso di. The Memoirs of Francesco Crispi. Mary Prichard-
Agnetti, tr. 3 vols. London: Houghton and Stoughton, 1912-
14. Crispi reveals Eulenburg acting as an intermediary between
the former and Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph regarding treat-
ment of the Italian minority inside the Austro-Hungarian state.
Ebel, Gerhard and Michael Behnen, eds. Botschafter Paul von Hatzfeldt:
Nachgelassene Papiere, 1838-1901. 2 vols. Boppard-am-Rhein:
Harald Boldt Verlag, 1976. As German Ambassador to the Court
of St. James, Hatzfeldt's connection with Eulenburg centered
around the former's effortsto draw Austria into an alliance
with Germany and England.
Eckardstein, Hermann von. Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwtlr-
digkeiten. 2 vols. Leipzig: P. List, 1920-1921.
Eckardt, Julius von. Berlin-Wien-Rom: Betrachtungen liber den neuen
Kurs und die neue europ&ische Lage. Leipzig: Duncker and
Humblot, 1892.
. Lebenserinnerungen. 2 vols. Leipzig: S. Hirzel,
1910.
Eppstein, Georg von. Fürst Bismarcks Entlassung: Nach den hinterlas-
senen bisher unverHffentlichten Aufzeichnungen des Staatssekre-
253
tHrs des Innern Dr. Karl Heinrich von Boetticher und des Chefs
der Reichskanzlei unter dem Fürsten Bismarck Dr. Franz Johannes
von Rottenburg. Berlin: A. Scherl, 1920. Although Eppstein
makes no mention of Eulenburg specifically, I found this work
valuable for its information concerning Baron von Holstein
and the Caprivi Era.
Eulenburg-Hertefeld, Philipp zu. Aus 50 Jahren: Erinnerungen, Tage-
bûcher und Briefe aus dem Nachlass. Johannes Haller, ed. 2nd
edition. Berlin: Gebrllder Paetel, 1925. This work contains
much factual information about Eulenburg's early life. Also,
description of his early years of association with Otto von
Bismarck, Herbert von Bismarck, and the future Emperor William
II added inestimably to my understanding of the personal side
of the relationship between Eulenburg and those men.
. Das Ende KtJnig Ludwigs II. und andere
Erlebnisse. Augusta zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld, ed. Leipzig: F.W.
Grunow, 1934. This volume offers much information about the
travels of Eulenburg and William II to various royal courts
and vacation spots.
. Erlebnisse an deúfeschen und framden
Hofen. Augusta, aii. Eulenbarg-r-Hertefeld, ed¿ Leipzig:-:?.W» -er
Grunow, 1934. This work is a sequel to the7foregoing one.
. Mit dem Kaiser ais Staatsmann und
Freund auf Nordlandsreisen. 2 vols. Dresden: C. Reissner,
1931. Covering the years 1889-1903, this work provides an in-
valuable amount of material on the personal relationship bet-
ween Eulenburg and William II.
Ever ling, Friedrich and Adolf Gllnther, eds. Der Kaiser wie er war, wie
er ist. Berlin: Traditions-Verlag Kolk and Co., 1934.
Fischer, Henry William Hubert. Behind the Scenes With the Kaiser,
1888-1892: The True Story of the Kaiser As He Lived, Loved,
Played, and Worked. New York: Hertag, 1922.
Frederick, The Empress. The Letters of the Empress Frederick. Sir
Frederick Ponsonby, ed. London: Macmillan, 1929. A highly
romanticized biography that in reality contains little of the
correspondence of the mother of William II.
Frederick III, The Emperor. Briefe, Reden und Erlasse. Georg Schu-
ster, ed. Berlin: Vossische Buchhandlung, 1907. The virtual
absence of the name of William II from his father's correspon-
dencègives mute witness to the antipathy existing between
father and son, and helps to explain one of the facets of Eulen-
burg's role as William's elder friend.
254
Gauss, Christian, The German Emperor as Shown in His Public Utterances.
New York: Scribners' Sons, 1915.
Gontaut-Biron, Elie. Mon Ambassade en Allemagne (1872-1883). 2nd
edition. Paris: Plon-Nourrit et cie, 1906.
Hammann, Otto. Per neue Kurs: Erinnerungen von Otto Hammann.
Berlin: R. Hobbing, 1918. This work proved extremely use-
ful when I investigated Eulenburg's involvement in the Klad-
deradatsch,-affair.
. Um dem Kaiser: Erinnerungen aus den Jahren 1906-1909.
Berlin: R. Hobbing, 1919. This volume was helpful in examin-
ing the Zukunft affair.
. Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges: Erinnerungen aus
den Jahren 1897-1906. Berlin: R. Hobbing, 1918.
Hammer, Simon C. William the Second as Seen in Contemporary Documents
and Judged on Evidence of His Own Speeches. Boston and New
York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1917,
Harden, Maximilian. KHpfe. 3 vols. Berlin: Erich Reiss, 1910-1913.
The third volume of these memoirs deals in part with Eulenburg
and his part in the Zukunft affair. Every member of the Wil-
helmine imperial court is made to appear decadent.
Hill, David Jayne. Impressions of the Kaiser. New York and London:
Harper and Brothers, 1918.
i ' ' . i M. U' ....
Hinzpeter, Georg. Kaiser Wilhelm II. Eine Skizze nach der Natur ge-
zeichnet. Bielefeld: Velhagen und Klassing, 1888.
Hoche, Jules. L'Empereur Guillaume intime. Paris: Juven, 1906.
Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Kraft zu. Aus meinem Leben: Aufzeichnungen aus
den Jahren 1848-1871. W. von Bremen, ed. 2nd edition. Berlin:
E.S. Mittler, 1915.
Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Alexander zu. Aus meinem Leben. Frankfurt:
Frankfurter Societïts-Drückerei, 1925. This son of the third
chancellor under William II presents Eulenburg as a lying, con-
niving politician who controlled the emperor's ear.
Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Chlodwig zu. Denkwürdigkeiten. Friedrich
Curtius, ed. 2 vols. Stuttgart and Leipzig: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1907. The onetime Chancellor mentions Eulenburg in con-
nection with the Zedlitz School Bill controversy, and also goes
into Eulenburg's relationship with Holstein and Marschall.
. Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichs-
kanzlerzeit. Karl Alexander von Müller, ed. Stuttgart and Berlin:
Deutsche-Verlags-Anstalt, 1931.
255
. Denkwürdigkeiten der Reichs-
kanzlerzeit. Karl Alexander von Müller, ed. Stuttgart and
Berlin: Deutsche Verlags=Anstalt, 1931.
Holstein, Friedrich von. Lebensbekenntnis in Briefen an eine Frau.
Helmuth Rogge, ed. Berlin: Ullstein, 1932. In his correspon-
dence with Ida von Stulpnügel, Holstein reveals a genuine af-
fection for the Eulenburg family, but also the vehemence that
could be directed against the head of the family after Holstein's
forced retirement in 1906.
Hutten-Czapski, Bogdan von. Sechzig Jahre Politik und Gesellschaft.
2 vols. Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1936. The author views William
II as a sort of slave to Eulenburg's whims and demonstrates the
mistrust with which many individuals in the Imperial entourage
regarded Eulenburg.
Keen, Edith. Seven Years at the Prussian Court. New York: J. Lane Co.,
1917.
Kiderlen-WMchter, Alfred von, Kiderlen-Wüchter, der Staatsmann und
Mensch: Briefwechsel und Nfechlass. Ernst JÜckh, ed. Stuttgart:
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1924. This German diplomat enjoyed
cordial relations with Eulenburg and stood by him in the Zukunft
affair.
Lancken-Wakenitz, Oskar von der. Meine dreissig Dienstjahre, 1888-1918,
Potsdam-Paris-BrUssel. Berlin: Verlag fUr Kulturpolitik, 1931.
Lavis se, Ernst. Trois Empereurs d *Allemagne : Guillaume I_, Frederic III,
Guillaume II. 2nd edition. Paris: A. Colin, 1888.
Lerchenfeld-Koefering, Hugo von. Erinnerungen und Denkwürdigkeiten.
Hugo von Lerchenfeld-Koefering, ed. 2nd edition. Berlin: E.S.
Mittler, 1935. I found this chiefly valuable for its vivid descrip-
tions of the Reichstag in action during the Bismarck era.
Leudet, Maurice. Guillaume II intime. Paris: F. Juven, 1897.
Levine, Isaac Don, ed. Letters From the Kaiser to the Czar. New York:
Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1920.
Lucius von Ballhausen, Robert Sigmund Maria Joseph. Bismarck-Erinnerungen
des Staatsministers Freiherm Lucius von Ballhausen. Stuttgart
and Berlin: Cotta, 1921. Lucius was of considerable value with
his description of Bismarck's last days as Imperial Chancellor.
Meinhold, Paul. Kaiser Wilhem II. 25 Jahre Kaiser und Künig. Berlin:
E. Hoffmann and Co • > 1912.
256
Mittnacht, Hermann von. Erinnerungen an Bismarck, 1877-1889. 2nd edi-
tion. Stuttgart and Berlin: Cotta, 1904.
Moltke, Helmuth von. Die deutschen Aufmarschplüne, 1871-1890. A.D.
von Schmerfeld, ed. Berlin: E.S. Mittler, 1929.
Monts, Anton von. Erinnerungen und Gedanken des Botschafters Anton
Graf Monts. Karl Friedrich Nowak and Friedrich Thimme, eds.
Berlin: Verlag flir Kulturpolitik, 1932. A close friend of
Eulenburg Monts exchanged considerable correspondence with
him concerning the Zukunft affair.
Niemann, Alfred. Wanderungen mit Kaiser Wilhelm II. Leipzig: K.F.
Koehler, 1924.
Noussane, Henri. The Kaiser As He Is, Or the Real William II. Walter
Littlefield, tr. New York and LOndon: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1905.
Germanophobie in general, this work emphasizes the directionless,
erratic behavior of William II.
Poschinger, Heinrich von. Furst Bismarck und die Diplomaten, 1852-
1890. Hamburg: Verlagsanstalt und DrUckerei Actien-Gesell-
schaft, 1900. Ironically, this work does not mention the dip-
lomat Eulenburg.
Puttkamer, Albert von. Staatsminister von Puttkamer, ein Stück preus-
sischer Vergangenheit, 1828-1900. Albert von Puttkamer, ed.
Leipzig: K.F. Koehler, 1928.
Radowitz, Josef Maria von. Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen. Hajo
Holborn, ed. 2 vols, Biblio-Verlag: Osnabrück, 1967. The
author's recollections testify vividly to how hard Eulenburg
worked to keep Herbert von Bismarck at his Foreign Secretary's
post after his father's resignation as Chancellor.
Raschdau, Ludwig. Unter Bismarck und Caprivi: Erinnerungen eines deut-
schen Diplomaten aus den Jahren 1885-1894. Berlin: E.S. Mittler,
1939. This memoirist tries to be relatively objective concerning
Eulenburg, referring to him chiefly in connection with the Zed-
litz School Bill and Army Bill crises.
. In Weimar als Preussischer Gesandter: Ein Buch der
Erinnerungen an Deutschen FürstenhBfe, 1894-1897. Berlin: E.S.
Mittler, 1939.
Reischach, Hugo von. Unter drei Kaisern. Berlin: Verlag ftir Kultui- -
politik, 1925.
Rich, Norman and M. H. Fisher, eds. Die geheimen Papiere Friedrich von
Holsteins. 4 vols, GBttingen: Musterschmidt, 1957. Much in-
257
formation is to be found here concerning the personal rela-
tionship between Eulenburg and Holstein, especially during the
controversies of the Caprivi era.
Robolsky, Hermann. Am Hofe Kaiser Wilhems II. Berlin: R. Eckstein
Nachfolger, 1889.
RBhl, John G. C., ed. Philipp Eulenburgs politische Korrespondenz.
2 vols, Boppard-am-Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1976-1978.
This collection of Eulenburg's papers offers copious insight
concerning his connection with a variety of personalities, in-
eluding Holstein. The nature of the relationship with William
II stands out clearly, including the aspect of William's reli-
anee on his friend's political counsel. A third volume of cor-
respondence is in preparation, the above volumes taking it only
to 1895. (John G. C. RBhl wrote me this personally.)
Roggenbach, Franz von. Im Ring der Gegner Bismarcks : Politische
Briefe Franz von Roggenbachs, 1865-1890. Julius Heyerdorff,
ed. 2nd edition. Leipzig: Koehler und Amelang, 1943. Rog-
genbach viewed Eulenburg as the logical successor to Caprivi
following the latter's dismissal as Chancellor.
Rothfels, Hans, ed. Bismarck Briefe. GBttingen: Vandenhoeck und Rup-
recht, 1955. This collection involves a substantial list of
prominent individuals of the Bismarck era. The prominence in
Prussian life of Eulenburg's larger family stands out clearly.
Schiemann, Theodor. Deutschland und die grosse Politik anno 1901.
Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1902
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Schweinitz, Hans Lothar von. Briefwechsel des Botschafters General v.
Schweinitz. Berlin: R. Hobbing , 1928. Schweinitz credits
Eulenburg with helping to promote better relations between
Germany and Russia, as we].l as between Germany, Austria-Hungary
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. Denkwürdigkeiten des Botschafters General
von Schweinitz. 2 vols. Berlin: R. Hobbing , 1927.
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eines Kommissars. Berlin: F. Fontane and Co., 1922. These
memoirs of a police commissioner concern themselves largely with
the Zukunft affair.
Victoria, Queen. The Letters of Queen Victoria. Third Series. George
Earle Buckle. London: J. Murray, 1926-1928
Waldersee, Alfred von. Aus dem Briefwechsel des Generalfeldmarschalls
Alfred Grafen von Waldersee. Heinrich Otto Meisner, ed. Stutt-
gart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1928, Waldersee tries to demon-
strate that animosity existed between Eulenburg and Kiderlen
during the Kladderadatsch affair—a state of affairs not recog-
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. Denkwürdigkeiten des Generalfeldmarschalls
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mount among those who influenced the dismissal of Bismarck and
then Caprivi.
Wedel, Carl von. Zwischen Kaiser und Kanzler: Aufzeichnungen des
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burg’s influence.
Werner, Anton von. Erlebnisse und Eindrücke, 1871-1890. Berlin: E.S.
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259
. Aus Meinem Leben, 1859-1888. Berlin and Leipzig: K.F.
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Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1924 • &
II. SECONDARY SOURCES
A. General Histories and Monographs
Balfour, Michael. The Kaiser and His Times. Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin, 1964. This volume offers an immense amount of infor-
mation concerning the early life of William II.
Barraclough, Geoffrey. The Origins of Modern Germany. Oxford: Black-
well, 1957.
Barriere, Michael. Guillaume II et son temps. Paris: Editions du
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Baumont, Maurice. The Fall of the Kaiser. £. Ibbetson James, tr.
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. L'Affaire Eulenburg et les origines de la guerre
mondiale. Paris: Payot, 1933. Although Germanophobie, this
volume furnished some thought-provoking material in xts por-
crayal of the Zukunft affair.
Benson, E.F. The Kaiser and English Relations. New York: Longmans,
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Berger, Karl. Kaiser Wilhelm II. Bielefeld: Velhagen und Klasing,1913.
260
Bergenhahn, Volker. Per Tirpitz Plan: Genesis und Verfall einer innen-
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Verlag, 1971.
Beumelburgs, Werner. Wilhelm II. und BÜlow. Oldenburg: G. Stalling,
1932.
Buchner, Maximilian. Kaiser Wilhelm II. Seine Weltanschauung und die
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Burmeister, Hans Wilhelm. "Prince Philipp zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld (1847-
1921): His Influence on Kaiser Wilhelm II and His Role in the
German Government, 1888-1902." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Oregon, 1972. Contrary to my view, Burmeister sees
Eulenburg as pushing the German Emperor to expand his "personal
regime" at all costs. I find Burmeister mistaken in not seeing
Eulenburg as a compromiser, much more interested in furthering
good relations between William II and the Reichstag than in encour-
aging him to enlarge his personal prerogatives still further. Bur-
meister exaggerates Eulenburg's role in the controversy of 1889
over the anti-Socialist bill while ignoring his involvement in the
Russian securities question and the Wohlgemuth affair in the same
period. In the Big Army bill, Zedlitz school bill, and Kaiser-
Bismarck reconciliation controversies, Burmeister mistakenly ascribes
to Eulenburg what were in actuality the roles of Baron Friedrich von
Holstein. On the other hand, Eulenburg's genuine role in the Klad-
deradatsch affair goes unnoticed.
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University Press, 1976. This volume provides an informal discus-
sion of German diplomats' political and social lives during the
Second Reich. Though entertaining, the book contains no central
thesis and seems a sort of potpourri of statistics about members of
the German diplomatic corps.
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Fabulous Monster. London: Edward Arnold, 1934.
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biography, contemporaneous with Balfour's takes an informal, sym-
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four, Cowles devotes an entire chapter to William's association with
Eulenburg.
Craig, Gordon. Germany, 1866-1945. This general work gives particular
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261
Deuerlein, Ernst, ed. Die Gründung des Peutschen Reiches 1870/71 in
Augenzeugenberichten. Düsseldorf: Karl Rauch, 1970.
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Scherl, 1920, The author refers to Eulenburg in connection with
the Kaiser's labor program of 1889.
Eyck, Erich. Das persHnliche Regiment Wilhelms II. Politische Gesch-
ichte des deutschen Kaiserreiches von 1890 bis 1914. Erlenbach-
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Unlike Rühl, however, Eyck makes virtually no mention of Eulenburg.
. Bismarck und das deutsche Reich. Erlenbach—Zurich:
Rentsch, 1955.
Fischer, Fritz. Griff nach der Weltmacht: Die Kriegszielpolitik des
des kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914/18. Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag,
1962.
Fraley, Jonathan D. "The Domestic Policy of Prince Hohenlohe as Chancel-
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University, 1971. Fraley largely concentrates upon tracing well-
known Eulenburg quotations to their original source—as far as his
attention to Eulenburg is concerned. Above and beyond that, he
contends, in contradistinction to my findings, that Eulenburg was
"completely the Kaiser's man."
Frederic, Harold. The Young EmperofWilliam II of Germany : A Study of
Character Development on a Throne. London: T.F. Unwin, 1891.
Frekse, Friedrich, ed. Menschliche Rechtfertigung Wilhelms II. Nach
seinen Rundbemerkungen in den Akten des Auswürtigen Amtes. Munich:
Rüsl und Co., 1920. N
Gooch,.George^Peabody, Germany. New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1925.
Haller, Johannes. Aus dem Leben des FÜrsten Philipp zu Eulenburg-
Hertefeld. Berlin: BebrUder Paetel, 1924. There can be no missing
the author's apologist purpose in writing the book. Nevertheless,
much factual information can be had from the quoted correspondence
between Eulenburg and his friends, and the book is basic for research
on Eulenburg.
Hallgarten, George W. F. Imperialismus vor 1914. Die soziologischen
Grundlagen der Aussenpolitik europaischer GrossmHchte vor dem ersten
Weltkrieg. 2 vols. Munich: C.H, Beck, 1963.
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262
. Per neue Kurs. Erinnerungen von Otto Hammann. Berlin:
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Harnisch, Johannes. Harden, Eulenburg, Moltke. Berlin: H. Walther,1908.
Heinig, Kurt. Hohenzollern. Wilhelm II und sein Haus: Per Kampf urn
den Kronbesitz. Berlin: Verlag fUr Sozialwissenschaft, 1921.
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Studie. Zurich: Scientia, 1954.
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Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1970.
Ho fmann, Hermann. Fürst Bismarck, 1890-1898. Stuttgart: Union Peutsche
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1913.
Hollyday, Frederic B. M. Bismarck’s Rival: A Political Biography of
General and Admiral Albrecht von Stosch. Purham, N.C.: Puke Uni-
versity Press, I960.
Howard, Burt Estes. The German Empire. New York, London: Mamillan,1906.
Kehr, Eckart. Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik, 1896-1901: Versuch
eines Querschnitts durch die innenpolitischen, sozialen, ideologi-
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Krausnick, Helmut. Holsteins Geheimpolitik in der Ara Bismarck, 1886-
1890. Zwèite Auflage. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1942.
This work attributes Bismarck's fall to Eulenburg's connection with
Holstein and Waldersee.
Kllrenberg, Joachim von. War ailes falsch? Pas Leben Kaiser Wilhelms II.
Bonn: AthenHum Verlag, 1951. This work deals primarily with the
personal relationship between Eulenburg and William II, and tends to
lose itself in the anecdotal.
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Geschichte des Reichsheeres und der Flotte seit 1871. Berlin: C.A.
Weller, 1902.
Kurtz, Harold. The Second Reich: Kaiser Wilhelm II and His Germany.
London: Macdonald and Co., 1970.
Mahn, Paul. Kaiser und Kanzler: Per Beginn eines VerhHngnisses. Berlin:
A. HMgler, 1924.
263
Mann, Golo, Wilhelm II. Munich: Scherer, 1964.
Meyer, Klaus. Theodor Schiemann als politischer Publizist. Frankfurt :
Rlltten und Loening, 1956. This volume covers the dealings of the
historian and political journalist Theodor Schiemann with Baron
von Holstein, but there is little about Eulenburg.
Müller, Ernst. Kaiser Wilhelm II, eine historische und psychiatrische
Studies Ein Beitrag zur Physiognomik der Hohenzollern. Gotha:
Kommissionsverlag Evogt, 1927.
Muret, Maurice. Guillaume II, d'apres les plus recents temoighages.
Paris: Editions des portiques, 1930.
Muschler, Reinhold Conrad. Philipp zu Eulenburg, sein Leben und seine
Zeit. Leipzig: Wilhelm Grunow, 1930. This work, along with Haller’s,
provides indispensable factual information about Eulenburg's life.
Muschler deals with the more personal aspects of the association
between Eulenburg and William II, and penetrates into the lives of
their families.
Nichols, John Alden. Germany After Bismarck: The Caprivi Era, 1890-1894.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. The author takes a sym-
pathetic view of Caprivi, seeing him as a competent, upright admini-
strator in the face of various political mishaps. Eulenburg figures
prominently in this volume, and I found it especially valuable for
its coverage of Eulenburg's role in the Army and School Bill contro-
versies.
Niemann, Alfred. Kaiser und Heer: Das Wesen der Kommandogewalt und ihre
Ausübung durch Kaiser Wilhelm II. Berlin: Verlag fUr Kulturpolitik,
1929.
Nowak, Karl Friedrich. Kaiser and Chancellor : The Opening Years of the
Reign of William II. New York: Macmillan, 1930.
Paleologue, Georges Maurice. Guillaume II et Nicholas II. Paris: Plon,
1934.
Palmer, Alan. The Kaiser : Warlord of theSecond Reich. London: Weiden-
feld and Nicolson, 1978. This work contains some new and sympathe-
tic insights into the psychologocal and physiological bases of the
Kaiser's personality—although it is written on the order of a popu-
lar biography.
Perris, George Herbert. Germany and the German Emperor. London: Mel-
rose, 1912.
Pfeil und Klein Ellguth, Hans Joachim Friedrich von. Mein Kaiser: Der
Fall Zedlitz-TrUtschler und Wilhelms II. wahres Gesicht. Leipzig:
Graphische Werke, 1924.
264
Pinson, Koppel. Modem Germany : Its History and Civilization. New
York: Macmillan, 1954.
Reventlow, Ernst Christian zu. Kaiser Wilhelm II. und die Byzantiner.
Munich: J.F. Lehmann, 1906.
. Von Potsdam nach Doom. Berlin: M.A.
Klieber, 1940.
Rich, Norman. Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the
Era of Bismarck and William II. 2 vols. Cambridge, eng.: Uni-
versity Press, 1965. These volumes will continue indefinitely to
be indispensable for all investigations into policymaking in Wil-
helmine Germany.
Ritter, Gerhard. Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk: Das Problem des
"Militarismus" in Deutschland. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1962.
Ritthaler, Anton. Kaiser Wilhelm II, Herrscher in einer Zeitwende.
Cologne: Verlag Tradition und Leben—Heinrich Freiherr von Mas-
senbach, 1958.
RBhl, John G. C. Germany Without Bismarck: The Crisis of Government
in the Second Reich, 1890-1900. Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 1967. This work, particularly useful in dealing with
the Caprivi and Hohenlohe eras in German politics, portrays the
gradual decline of the chancellors' powers during the 1890's.
While emphasizing the absolutist tendencies of William II, RBhl,
the leading authority on Eulenburg, also discusses that individu-
al's role in the formulating of the Kaiser's political decisions.
. 1914: Delusion or Design? The Testimony of Two
German Diplomats. New York: St. Martin's, 1973. Eulenburg's
activities after his "banishment" to Liebenberg receive some il-
lumination here.
Rogge, Helmuth. Holstein und Harden: Politisch-publizistisches Zusam-
menspiel zweier Aussenseiter des Wilhelminischen Reichs. Munich :
Beck, 1959. This monograph gives an extremely intricate if not
pedantic description of the Zukunft affair.
. Holstein und Hohenlohe: Neue Beitrklge zu Friedrich
von Holsteins Tïtigkeit ais Mitarbeiter Bismarcks und ais Rat-
geber Hohenlohes. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1957.
Rosenberg, Arthur. Die Entstehung der deutschen Republik 1871-1918.
Berlin: Ernst Rowohlt Verlag, 1928.
Reichssgründung
Schuler, Theodor and Ernst Deuerlein, eds. ~TB7 0-71": Tatsachen, Kate-
gorien, Interpretationen. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1970.
265
Schllssler, Wilhelm. Kaiser Wilhelm II. Schicksal und Schuld. G8t-
tingen: Musterschmidt, 1962. Some facets of the Kaiser's per-
sonality are rather clearly revealed in items from his correspon-
dence contained in this volume's appendix.
Sethe, Paul. Berlin/Wien. Frankfurt: SocietHts Verlag, 1936.
. Im Banne der Grauen Eminenz: Charakterbilder aus der
Regierungszeit Wilhelms II. Zweite Auflage. Stuttgart: Franck-
heit, 1936.
Sexau, Richard. Kaiser oder Kanzler, der Kampf urn das Schicksal des
Bismarck Reiches. Berlin: Vier Falken Verlag, 1936.
Sonntag, Josef. Schuld und Schicksal: Die Tragédie Wilhelms II.
Sonderdrtlck der Grtlnen Briefe. Berlin-Steglitz, Leipzig: F. Foer-
ster, 1927.
Stein, Adolf. Billow und der Kaiser. Berlin: W. Bischoff, 1931.
Stern, Fritz. Gold and Iron: Bismarck, BleichrUder and the Building
of the German Empire. New York: Knopf, 1976,
Stutzenherger, Adolf. Die Abdankung Kaiser Wilhelms II. Die Entstehung
und Entwicklung der Kaiserfrage und die Haltung der Presse. Ber-
lin: Verlag Dr. Emil Ebering, 1937.
lyler-Whittle, Michael. The Kaiser: A g rep tvr of Wilhelm ll, German
Emperor and King of Prussia.. New York: New York i’imes, 1977.
Sympathetic in its portrayal of the Kaiser, Lhis work contains in-
teresting details concerning the monarch:s-dealings with Eulenburg
in the last days of the Bismarck chancellorship.
Viviani, Rene. As We See It. Thomas R. Y'barra, tr. New York: Har-
per and Row, 1923.
Waters, Walburt Hutchinson. Potsdam and Doom. London: John Murray,
1935.
Weller, B. Uwe. Maximilian Harden und Die Zukunft. Bremen: Schtlne-
mann, 1970. A number of details are provided here that get over-
looked in Young's monograph (see below).
Werdermann, Johannes. Der Heeresreform unter Caprivi. Greifswald:
E. Hartmann, 1928.
Young, Harry F. Maximilian Harden, Censor Germaniae: The Critic in
Opposition, From Bismarck to the Rise of Nazism. The Hague : Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, 1959. A comprehensive analysis of the Zukunft affair,
the author does an impressive job of synthesizing the complexities
of the Eulenburg-Harden trials.
266
Zechlin, Egmont. Staatsstrcichpl&nc Bismarcks und Wilhelms II. Stutt-
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Zentner, Kurt. Kaiserliche Zeiten. Wilhelm II und seine Hra in Bil-
dern und Dokumenten. Munich: Bruckmann, 1963.
B. Journal Articles
Andrews, Herbert D. "Bismarck's Foreign Policy and German Historiogra-
phy, 1919-1945." Journal of Modern History, XXXVII (September 1965),
345-356.
Cecil, uamar. "The Bismarck Papers." Journal of Modern History, XLVII
(September 1975), 505-511. The author provides a useful summary of
the material contained in the Bundesarchiv at Koblenz which deals
with the Bismarck period.
Fraley, Jonathan D. "Government By Procrastination: Chancellor Hohen-
lohe and Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1894-1900." Central European History,
VII (June 1974), 159-183. This discussion of the Hohenlohe admini-
stration includes a section which performs the essential service of
clarifying the elements involved in the military courts controversy.
Gall, Lothar. "Die europüischen Müchte und der Balkan im 19. Jahrhun-
dert." Historische Zeitschrift, CCXXXIII (June 1979), 551-571.
. "Liberalismus und "Bilrgerliche Gesellschaft" : Zum Charak-
ter und Entwicklung der Liberalen Bewegung in Deutschland." Histo-
rische Zeitschrift, CCXX (April'1975), 324-356.
Golds chmidt, Hans. "New Light on Bismarck's Fall." Contemporary Review,
CLII (November 1937), 584-591. The author denotes Holstein as the
key figure in the struggle between Chancellor Bismarck and the Kai-
ser, and also discuss Eulenburg's role in the labor controversy of
1889.
Gordon, Michael R. "Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World
War: The British and German Cases." Journal of Modern History,
XLVI (June 1974), 191-226.
Herz, Ludwig. "Holstein, Harden, Eulenburg." Preussische JahrbUcher,
CCXXIX (July-September 1932), 246-254. The author demonstrates
that the Zukunft affair was merely the culmination of Harden's at-
tacks on Eulenburg. Various excerpts from the journal were in-
eluded.
. "RÜthsel urn Fritz von Holstein. Glossen zu seinen Briefen
267
an Ida von Stlllpnagel." Preusslsche Jahrbücher,CCXXXI (January-
March 1933), 155-173.
Hollyday, Frederic B. M. "Love Your Enemies! Otherwise Bite Them!:
Bismarck, Herbert, and the Morier Affair, 1888-1889." Central
European History, I (March 1968), 56-79.
Meisner, Heinrich Otto. "Der Reichskanzler Caprivit Eine biograph-
ische Skizze." Zeitschrift ftir die gesamte Staatswissenschaft,
CXI (1955), 669-752. This nearly book-length article contains num-
erous references to Eulenburg and also serves to underpin much of
Norman Rich's (see above) analysis of the Caprivi era.
. "GesprHche und Briefe Holsteins." Preussische
Jahrbücher, CCXXIX (July-September 1932), 229-246,
Mommsen, Wolfgang J. "Zur Kriegsschuldfrage, 1917." Historische Zeit-
schrift, CCXII (June 1971), 606-612.
Naujoks, Eberhard. "Bismarck und die Organisation der Regierungspresse."
Historische Zeitschrift, CV (August 1967), 46-80.
Pols, Werner. "Bleichrüder und die Arnim Affüre." Historische Zeit-
schrift, CCXI (August 1970), 65-76.
Raschdau, Ludwig. "Zum Kapitel Holsteins." Deutsche Rundschau, CCI
(October-December 1924), 237-247. For this article the author, a
journalist, draws upon his own correspondence with Chancellor von
Hohenlohe. The episode of the dismissal of Foreign Secretary Adolf
Marschall von Bieberstein receives special attention.
Rühl, John G. C. "Staatsstreichplan oder Staatsstreichbereitschaft?
Bismarck-Politik in der Entlassungskrise." Historische Zeitschrift,
CIII (December 1966), 610-624. The author presents new insights
concerning William's and Eulenburg's attitude toward the Center
Party. Rühl sees Bismarck's "accommodating" of the Center as a
primary reason for the rupture between Chancellor and Kaiser.
Rogge, Helmuth. "Die Kladderadatsch AffHre." Historische Zeitschrift,
CXCV (1962), 90-130.
Snyder, Louis L. "Political Implications of Herbart von Bismarck's
Marital Affairs, 1881-1892." Journal of Modern History, XXXVI
(June 1964), 155-169. The intensity of the friendship between
Herbert and Eulenburg shows through clearly in the latter's role
of confidant when the former was courting Princess Elisabeth von
Carolath. In general Snyder depends heavily upon the Haller bio-
graphy of Eulenburg and Eulenburg's own Aus 50 Jahren(see above).
Sbsemann, Bernd. "Die Sog. Hunnenrede Wilhelms II. Textkritische und
interpretorische Bemerkungen zur Ansprache des Kaisers vom 27.
Juli 1900 in Bremerhaven." Historische Zeitschrift, CCXXII (April
1976), 342-358.