Alexander T. Jennette. CONSULS AND COMMODORES: THE INITIAL,
UNSUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BARBARY PIRATES, 1801-1803. (Under the
direction of Dr. William N. Still, Jr.) Department of History, East
Carolina University, November 1985.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the initial attempt of
the United States government to eliminate the threat of the Barbary
pirates to its Mediterranean commerce. It will concentrate attention on
how naval and consular authorities in the region failed to coordinate
the application of seapower with diplomatic effort and the consequences
of this failure. The study will closely consider the ineptitude and
lack of fighting spirit of the naval leaders. The period of concern is
the first two years of the nation's naval commitment in the
Mediterranean.
When Jefferson took office in early 1801, the United States had a
large merchant fleet taking full advantage of Europe's maritime incapac-
ity stemming from the Napoleonic conflict. In the Mediterranean, the
pirate navies of the southern Mediterranean coast, the so-called Barbary
pirates, had sorely afflicted this commerce. The United States had
signed treaties with the sponsors of the piracy, but their terms were
demeaning, and the territorial chieftans were ever alert to use tran-
sient advantages to extract further concessions. Moreover, they vio-
iated the treaties frequently and casually. By 1801, Tripoli had become
the most insistent in the clamor for higher tribute and the most fla-
grantly insulting of the petty states. Jefferson had earlier concluded
that the application of naval force was a cheaper and far more honorable
way to solve the problem. Accordingly, he dispatched the buik of the
fledgling navy on a show of force and diplomatic mission to the area.
Before it arrived, Tripoli had declared war and altered the character of
the task.
There were four experienced United States consuls operating in the
territorial states along the North African coast. Armed with the requi-
site diplomatic authority, they were well suited to lead the naval-
diplomatic foray. However, James Madison, the Secretary of State,
elected to confer primary authority for the undertaking upon the leaders
of the naval squadron, the commodores. Not only did they prove inade-
quate for the diplomatic work, their heart for naval combat was also
wanting. To further compound these difficulties, the interaction be-
tween the consuls and the commodores was abrasive and divisive.
The consequences of inaction, blundering, and uncoordinated effort
were catastrophic for American policy. Aftdr dedicating the greatest
portion of its available seapower to suppressing the Barbary pirates,
the United States, after two years, could show no evidence of progress.
CONSULS AND COMMODORES:
THE INITIAL, UNSUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN
AGAINST THE BARBARY PIRATES, 1801-1803
A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of History
East Carolina University
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in History
by
Alexander T. Jennette
November 1985
CONSULS AND COMMODORES:
THE INITIAL, UNSUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGN
AGAINST THE BARBARY PIRATES, 1801-1803
by
Alexander T. Jennette
APPROVED BY:
DIRECTOR OF THESIS A
a
COMMITTEE MEMBER
COMMITTEE MEMBER —1
CHAIRMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
o, —
DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
"t
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A thesis requires the somewhat unusuai combination of an unex-
pioited subject and reasonabiy available primary sources. Before set-
tling upon this subject, I spent more than a year probing several areas
of study in some depth, only to find the ground previously trodden or
the reservoir of material too shallow. That the frustration was in
considerable measure self-inflicted made it no less real. In the quest
for the elusive combination, I eventually came upon a body of excellent
published primary sources dealing with the nation's first naval-
diplomatic forays, the Quasi-War with France and the Barbary wars. The
latter, especially its first several years, was inviting because of its
relative obscurity. Also, the beginnings of the Barbary clash piquea my
curiosity; however, I might have put the material back after an initiai
probe but for the enthusiasm of Dr. William N. Stili, to whom I casually
mentioned it.
Dr. Still gave me a thorough hearing, assured me of the worth of
such an effort, and organized my investigation of other sources. His
precise directions for entry into the naval papers of the labyrinthine
National Archives saved numberless hours of unproductive searching. Dr.
Still then pointed me to further excellent sources in the East Carolina
University library. This guidance did more than give the project form
and boundaries; it breathed life into it. My indebtedness to him is so
obvious that it hardly requires stating.
The Barbary expedition grew in a poiiticai matrix and was as much a
diplomatic as a naval advance into hostile seas. Dr. John C. Eller.,
Jr., and Dr. Charles P. Cullop were generous enough to give the thesis
draft a detailed inspection with a special view toward its correctness
in matters political and diplomatic. In fact, Dr. Ellen's influence
predated all others. I had earlier written a paper for him on the
political background of the creation of the United States Navy to
satisfy a graduate course requirement. Unbeknownst to me then, this
opened a door into further study of the earliest days of the navy. I
offer a sincere thank you to both of these gentlemen.
I am indebted to a multitude of other moiders and shapers. To
recite them here would but add bulk. I cannot, however, close without
citing two influences, remote in time but profound in effect. My father
and my uncle, upon returning from World War II, began to fire my imagi¬
nation with talk of the sea and of seagoing heroes, real and fictional.
They coaxed me into Norahoff ana Hail, Melville, and C.S. Forrester
before I turned twelve years old. In the time since, my interest in
naval affairs has never gone glimmering despite years of landlocked
military service. I value this guidance beyond calculation and wish to
acknowledge it here.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter Page
1. A New Resolve 2
2. Started Fast, Finished Slow 12
3. Changing the Watch 31
4 . Tall Ships, Short Men 52
5. Conclusion and Lessons Learned 103
Bibliography 111
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Map. Western and Central Mediterranean 110
CHAPTER 1
A NEW RESOLVE
When the youthful American nation set out upon its great adventure
in 1776, it did so without any specific view toward a place of promi-
nence among the commercial nations of the world. It began as a naval
nonentity and with its merchant marine bottled up by British sea-power.
Yet by the turn of the century, fortune, in the shape of a great Euro-
pean war, had lured American merchant ship captains across the seas to a
profitable maritime trade from which disengagement was well nigh impos-
sible in spite of the great hazards with which it was attended. As the
world's preeminent trader, owing to the deadly conflict between revolu-
tionary France and traditional Great Britain, American merchant ships
traversed all seas, but especially those on the rim of Europe. It was a
tenuous neutrality with omnipresent potential for loss of men, goods,
ships, and prestige as the desperate antagonists defined neutrality in
shifting and self-serving ways. Indeed, neutrality nearly slipped from
the nation's grasp in a naval war with France at the end of the eight-
eenth century. Freedom of the seas was the issue. An earlier willing-
ness to compromise or even to overlook entirely blatant indignities was
replaced by bristling resolve in the 1798 faceoff catalyzed by the XYZ
Affair. The sheer might of the British navy, rather than less anger at
their affrontery, precluded a similar clash with Great Britain. As if
rough handling by the first powers of Europe was not enough, American
commerce in the Mediterranean was constantly falling into the hands of a
band of petty pirates operating under the aegis of the chieftains of
2
the North African, or "Barbary" coast. It is at the first and faltering
attempts to chastise these pesky brigands that this thesis is directed.
American troubles with the Barbary pirates began in the earliest
days of nationhood, but the aggressions by these bandits of the sea
predated the United States by a good 400 years. European nations with
the power to excise them from the face of the earth practiced an easy
tolerance, in part because it was a time-honored means of harassing one
another. Subtle encouragement of the coastal nabobs to terrorize the
commerce of a rival could be a cheap way to gouge and prod. At times,
the European nations used the pirates as proxies when the main effort
was in Europe proper. Aside from the achievement of any advantage over
a rival, the Europeans paid to keep their commerce free from molesta-
tion. It was a perfectly acceptable Old World way to play the game.
Money payments or tribute in supplies, particularly naval supplies, were
readily accepted in exchange for immunity from seizure of ships and
cargo and sometimes enslavement of the crew.1
Counter to its idealism, the young American nation had likewise
engaged in this unsavory accommodation with the Barbary chieftains for
eminently practical reasons: the United States, until 1798, quite
literally had no navy. Thus, with a large and growing merchant fleet,
1 Numerous accounts of North African piracy are contained in general
works on the subject. See especially Glenn Tucker, Dawn Like Thunder,
the Barbary Wars and the 3irth of the U.S. Navy (New York, 1963) (cited
hereafter as Dawn Like Thunder), Leonard F. Gutteridge and J.D. Smith,
The Commodores (New York, 1966), and A.E. Sokol, "The Barbary Corsairs,
A Lesson in Appeasement and International Cooperation," United States
Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXV July 1949, 797-803 (cited hereafter as
Sokol).
3
we were acutely vulnerable, especially if payments were late or adjudged
to be inadequate. In consequence, American seamen had, from time to
time, mouldered in Arab confinement to the anguish of the humane and the
prideful. The stances taken by American leaders in the late 1790's
regarding this truckling to bandits is interesting. In a total reversal
of the sentiments usually ascribed to the two men, John Adams elected to
pay rather than fight, and Thomas Jefferson favored forceful means.
Adams, as President, bent to expediency. Jefferson, usually over-
whelmingly sanguine on the prospects of avoiding conflict and an in-
spired author of schemes for winning on the cheap, took a solid stand
against continuing the bribes. He considered the tribute burdensome and
demeaning and early saw the need to destroy the pirates outright rather
than kowtow further. Principle aside, Jefferson concluded that as a
purely economic proposition the payments would soon exceed the cost of
settling the score through naval and military means.2 He was waiting in
the wings for the presidency when he expressed these thoughts, and was
to put tiiem into execution shortly after assuming office.
Numbered among the assets and liabilities Jefferson inherited was a
fledgling navy whose creation by fits and starts he had, for the most
part, opposed. Though slight in total tonnage, it included some of the
most able ships then afloat. The frigate Const.ltution was an exemplar
of the type. These craft could not match a European ship-of-the-line
gun for gun but in respect to speed, agility, and the capacity to extend
naval power arid-wide they had no equals. In grace under sail they
were shaded only by the glorious clippers of the mid-1800's. The
2Sokol, 800-801.
4
frigates were conceived in 1794 when the nation bristled at the arro-
gance of the British who boarded United States merchant ships and ini-
pressed seamen at will, and in response to depredations by Algerine
pirates. Their keels were laid and framing had begun when both threats
subsided; the inchoate hulls rested in the stocks for four years. Grow-
ing friction with France, culminating in the XYZ Affair and the Quasi-war
of 1798 stirred anew interest in naval power, and the completed frigates
became the centerpieces of the new United States navy. They were
longer, wider, and faster than their counterparts of other nations, and
their armament ratings were conservative. Thus Constitution, rated at
forty-four guns, could and sometimes did carry fifty-six guns. Her
sister ships were barely less potent offensively, and all could absorb
more than average punishment being planked with live oak, a scarcer but
tougher material than the generally used white oak.3 In open ocean
combat they were the champions of their class and infinitely the better
of any ship pirates could field on the seven seas. Their only signifi-
cant disability against shallow draft corsairs of the North African type
was the depth of water required for unrestricted maneuvering. Typical
of the larger frigates was Constellation, whose draft of twenty-two feet
restricted her to using American inlets from Chesapeake Bay northward.4
The need for deep water was to be a major determinant in the operational
^Frank Donovan, The Tall Frigates (New York, 1962), pp. 26-32.
4Letter, Captain Thomas Truxtun to James McHenry, 23 June 1798, in
Dudiey W. Knox, ed., Naval. Documents Related to the Quasi-War Between
the Uni t^d States and France, Naval. Operations from February 1797 to
October 1798, I (Washington, D.C., 1935) p. 132 (cited hereafter as
Naval Documents, the Quasi-V-nr).
5
plan against the Barbary pirates, who were quick to appreciate these
depth limitations.
The United States navy was born in 1798 in a fit of anger over
France's unseemly conduct in maritime and diplomatic affairs. Most
Americans seemed to have forgotten for the moment that the real danger
to freedom of the seas and sailor's rights was still the sovereign of
the seas, Great Britain; therefore, when France was successfully—and
luckily—rebuked, Congress directed a reduction of the new navy. When
Jefferson took office early in 1801 the little force was engaged In a
melange of savoring its minor victories, decommissioning ships, training
officers and crewmen, developing procedures, and writing regulations.5
This diminutive navy, waning in strength as it was, did give Jefferson
an instrument of foreign policy with some utility against localized
irritants such as the Barbary pirates. Moreover, the United States Navy
of 1801 should have been ideally suited by temperament for such a mis-
sion, for it had demonstrated flair and courage in abundance to atone
for its small size. Given time, the problem of numbers could be sur-
mounted, for the nation had a burgeoning ship building industry and a
large pool of mariners. The most limiting condition that was apparent
in 1801 was the lark of logistical facilities anywhere beyond the
Captain Thomas Truxtun of the Constellatlon was one of the navy's
foremost leaders in this period. Numerous communications from him to
the secretary of the navy, contained in Naval Documents, the Quasi-War,
attest to his awareness of the importance of precedent setting during
this early phase of the navy's development. His instructions to offi-
cers and senior enlisted personnel of the Constellatlon together with
similar documents of other captains provided a rational and precise
basis for standard shipboard practices. Truxtun knew that he was pro-
ducing traditions while he wrote instructions.
6
continental United States.6 Since the Mediterranean is more than 3000
miles from the eastern coast of the United States and neariy 2500 miles
from east to west, maintenance problems were to have a nearly ruinous
effect on the physical condition of the equipment during the first two
years of the engagement.
Though Algeria had long been considered the greatest irritant, the
actual war was triggered by the declaration of Tripoli on 16 May 1801.
Relations between the United States and Tripoli were partly defined by a
1796 treaty with which the Tripolitan chieftain had become increasingly
unhappy. He prodded the United States for increased tribute in the form
of naval supplies. In light of earlier sea-borne aggressions by
Tripoli, the nonsense of acceding to the demands was becoming ever more
obvious to the United States. Tripoli sensed this refractory American
spirit, but would not retract its demands; the May 1801 declaration
6For that matter, there were few government owned facilities in the
United States. The first ships of the United States Navy had been
either bought and converted merchantmen or ships built by private con-
tractors under the supervision of government representatives called
"naval agents." Furthermore, not only construction, but also routine
maintenance was contracted. Naval agents were paid a percentage of the
cost of construction or repair. This invited padded charges by unscru-
pulous agents. Some, no doubt, used this avenue into the public
treasury. There is, however, evidence that all naval agents did not wax
rich. The Secretary of the Navy, in apologizing for the parsimony of
the government to the agents at Newport, Rhode Island, concluded with
an attempt to actuate them to perform despite the meager rewards: "You
must consider that a part of your compensation will be received in the
satisfaction of rendering a public service." Secretary of the Navy to
Gibbs and Channing, 27 June 1798, Naval Documents, the Quasi-War, I,
pp. 147-148. The response of the agents to thi3 exhortation is unrecorded.
7
ensued. The Tripolitans cut down the flagpole at the United States
consulate to underscore their outrage.7
This event alone, however, did not impel the United States Navy
into the Mediterranean lusting for blood. Jefferson had already decided
to send a squadron to the area in reaction to the saber rattling of the
petty chieftains. The bashaw of Tripoli just happened to be the great-
est offender in the spring of 1801. Jefferson and Madison wished for a
peaceful solution; therefore, the initial, and hopefully only mission of
the squadron was a show of force. Madison sent a circular letter to all
area consuls lest the peaceful intentions be lost behind the canvas,
cannon, and oak of the squadron. 8
Within four days of the Tripolitan declaration, but unaware of it,
acting Secretary of the Navy Samuel Smith ordered a squadron readied
with all speed. It was to be comprised of the frigates President,
Essex, and Philadelphia, and the sloop-of-war Enterprise (sometimes
referred to as a schooner). The commander designate was Captain Richard
Dale. 9 Smith's instructions to Dale were relatively detailed and
7Felix Howlan, "The Blockade of Tripoli," Naval Institute
Proceedings, LXIII, (December 1937) p. 1702; and James Leander Cathcart
to Secretary of State, 16 May 1801, in (no editor cited) State Papers
and Public Documents of the United States, IV (Boston, 1817) pp. 362-363
(cited hereafter as Public Documents of the Uni ted States), Of the
event, Cathcart remarked, "I hope the catastrophe may be happy."
Aggression and pessimism were both prominent in Cathcart's makeup, For
further background on the beginnings of the war, see especially James A.
Field, Jr., America and the Moditcrrancan World 1776-1782 (Princeton,
1969) pp. 27-49.
8
Department of State Circular, 21 May 1801, Public Documents of the
Uri lted States , p. 341.
9Sair.uel Smith, Acting Secretary of the Navy, to Richard Dale,
8
attempted to cover the foremost contingencies. As Smith saw it, these
contingencies were a war deciaration by Tripoli alone, a declaration by
Algeria alone, or a declaration by both Algeria and Tripoli. Dale was
to show the flag around the Mediterranean if peace prevailed, but to
institute an immediate and tight blockade if one of the petty kingdoms
had declared war. Smith also authorized Dale to "convoy when you can
afford it. ..10 Since convoying and blockading tend to be mutually exclu-
sive for a snail squadron, this latter qualification introduced a mea¬
sure of uncertainty into Dale's operations.
Dale's orders encouraged him to send his ships as they reported
readiness for sea. They could even undertake major repairs at sea in
20 May 1801, in Dudley W. Knox, ed., Naval Documents Related to the
United States Wars Against the Barbary Powers, Naval Operations Including
Diplomatic Background from 1785 through 1801, I (Washington, D.C., 1909)
pp. 463-464 (cited hereafter as Naval Documents, Barbary Powers).
10Samuel Smith to Richard Dale, 20 May 1801, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, I, pp. 465-468. In summary, the complete orders stated:
a. Proceed with all speed.
b. Stop at Gibraltar and arrange for its use by provision ships to
follow.
c. If peace prevails, proceed to Algiers and deliver the biennial
present of $30,000. Stores will follow.
d. Go next to Tunis; deliver letters to the consul there.
e. Go to Tripoli; present a gift of $10,000 if the relations are
amicable. If not, retain the money.
f. Show the flag along the Mediterranean littoral.
g. After repetitive stops in sensitive areas, begin return on 15
October 1- • if all is well.
n. If all is not well, deploy ships to punish the enemy; do not
begin return until 1 December 1801.
i. Algeria is the main threat; if at war, blockade Algiers.
j. If at war with Tripoli, blockade that port.
k. Convoy when feasible, but assemble large groups of ships before
departing.
l. Deal with the firm of DeButt3 and Purviance of Leghorn, who
holds a letter of credit for $9000 on the firm of Mackenzie and
Glennie of London. This sum is for repairs and supplies.
9
the interest of a speedy deployment.11 Dale was fortunate in departing
with all of his ships together. A cruise in good weather put him at
Gibraltar on 1 July 1801, with the three frigates. The Enterprise had
broken off from the main body and proceeded alone because of her differ-
ent sailing qualities.12 There were good reasons for stopping at
Gibraltar. Gaining current information and attending to logistics prep-
arations were probably the most compelling. The information came easier
than did a solution to the logistics challenge.
Gibraltar was to be the initial supply and maintenance point.
British acceptance of the American presence in the area was the sine qua
non of success for this aspect of the plan; it stemmed largely from the
successful efforts of Rufus King, the United States minister to Great
Britain. King secured British approval for the squadron to use facili-
ties in Gibraltar, Minorca, and Malta. The British concession included
a promise to permit the Dale squadron to draw from British navy stocks
at these ports.13 Given the stormy character of the relationship
between the two nations during the 1790's, this was something of a
diplomatic tour de force. In practice the accommodation fell far short
of expectations. Nevertheless, Albion's acceptance did lend respect-
ability to the Johnny-come-lately United States force. British bel-
ligerence would have been fatal to the effort.
-» 1
Secretary of Navy to Richard Dale, 23 May 1801, Naval Documents,
3arbary Powers, I, p. 475.
1 ?
Richard Dale to United States Ministers, Lisbon and Madrid, 2
July 1801, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, I, p. 497.
1 ^
"James Madison to James Monroe, 25 July 1801, in R. Worthington,
ea., The letters and Other Writings of James Madison, Fourth President
of the United States, II (New York, 1884); James Madison to Rufus King,
10
Besides the specific directions to Dale to use Gibraltar as a
logistical base, his orders anticipated that the commodore would fre-
quent the central Mediterranean. There, arrangements were made for him
to deal with the firm of DeButts and Purviance in Leghorn, Italy, who
was holding a letter of credit for $9000 on the London house of
MacKenzie and Glennie. Instructions from the Department of State re-
quired consuls in northern Mediterranean ports to serve as logistical
agents. For example, Stephen Cathalan, Jr., the consul at Marsailles,
France, was to work with the Marsailles firm of Samodet and Cushing to
service United States ships in that immediate region.I4 Dale's orders
did not prohibit him from dealing directly with vendors anywhere in the
theater, though this could only follow successful diplomacy with the
national or territorial states concerned. Since the United States did
not have any enemies on the north rim of the Mediterranean, or, for that
matter, any .-.here in the world until 17 May 1801, many possibilities were
open. But pitfalls there were aplenty. There was no acceptable gauge
for determining the status of Great Britain, France, and Spain with
respect to each other from one day to the next. A blockaded French port
was an omni-present prospect as was the burden of a long quarantine at
any European port. As for Italy, It was a case of bending to the
dictates of respective territorial states, there being no Italian
nation-state. The logistics structure was frail in all of its parts,
25 June 1801, in Guillard Hunt, ed.. The Writlngs of James Madison
(New York, 1200).
^Richard Dale to Stephen Cathalan, Jr., United States Consul,
Marsailles, France, 26 December 1801, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers,
I, pp. 639 640; Richard Dale to Samodet and Cushing, Marsailles, 27
December 1801, Naval Documents, Barbary Fowers, I, p. 646.
11
but nowhere more so than in arrangements for major repairs. For all
their grace and apparent imperviousness to the ravages of the sea, the
frigates had all the frailties of wooden ships under a big spread of
canvas. They were just old enough to exhibit the first cases of rot in
waterline planks and deck beams. Inexplicably, there were to be an
unaccountable number of instances of rot in major rigging. Hard sailing
in heavy weather sprung masts and snapped yards. Some of these repairs
required dry docking, and that generally meant reliance on French or
British facilities. These demands were to settle upon the squadron like
an affliction.
CHAPTER 2
STARTED FAST, FINISHED SLOW
The pot was already boiling when Commodore Dale arrived. The
Bashaw" of Tripoli's declaration of war broke diplomatic relations and
removed from direct influence the United States consul, James Leander
Cathcart. Many of Cathcart's functions were to be assumed by General
William Eaton, the bellicose consul to Tunisia, who would secure for
himself a small page in history.
An experienced diplomat, though far from diplomatic in his atti-
tudes and practices, Eaton was nationalistic to a fault and coupled a
vast store of area knowledge to a venturesome spirit. He continually
took umbrage at the outrages of the coastal chieftains and had long
advocated the application of naval force. By diplomatic message of
20 May 1801, Secretary of State James Madison informed Eaton of the
presidential decision to dispatch a squadron to the Mediterranean and to
allow the area consuls wide latitude in determining its mode of employ-
O
ment. It was not a strategic aberration to have the senior civilian
authority in an area master-mind military operations. This was Eaton's
understanding of the message which required little interpretation. His
subsequent actions consistently demonstrated that he was more anxious
*The titles generally used to refer to the territorial chieftains
were "bashaw" for Tripoli, "bey" for Tunis, "dey" for Algeria, and
"emperor" for Morocco. This usage, however, was not rigid. Sometimes
"bey" and "bashaw" were generic.
2James Madison to William Eaton, 20 May 1801, in Ebenezer Meriam,
ed.. The Life of the Late General William Eaton (Brookfield, Mass.,
1813) (cited hereafter as Life of Eaton).
13
than the naval commanders to exert American influence forcefully.
Events would surely have taken a different path had not the commodores
arrived with orders even more explicit in placing them in charge. The
commodores and consuls collided over the limits of authority with under-
standable bad blood.
At the time of Jefferson's decision to send the squadron, Eaton was
serving in Tunisia, but his heart was in Tripolitan affairs where the
bashaw was, in Eaton's estimation, a usurper and the very embodiment of
all that was evil in an Oriental potentate. This assessment seemed to
come from the interaction of observable facts and Eaton's stern code.
It virtually guaranteed that he would be at odds with the territorial
rulers and their sycophants. So as not to conclude that consul Eaton's
enmity flowed entirely from feelings of Occidental moral superiority, it
must be noted that he came to exhibit the same brand of contempt for
several of the commodores who postured and talked in grand terms while
giving palsied performances.3 By coupling his rectitude and dedication
to keen observation and analysis, Eaton devised a plan to displace the
offending bashaw from which he never retreated more than fractionally.
It proved to be the basis for successful American action, though it was
to be years from formulation to execution.
q
Neither was he devoid of such feelings. Witness the following
condemnation of Arabs in general: "It grates me mortally when I see a
lazy Turk reclining at his ease upon an embroidered sofa with one
Christian slave to hold his pipe, another to hand his coffee, and a
third to fan away the flies, and when I reflect that the sweat of my
countrymen contributes to procure him this ease, it is still more grating
to perceive that the Turk believes he has a right to demand this
contribution.” William Eaton to Samuel Lyman, 12 October 1801, Area
File 1775-1910, National Archives, Record Group 45, M625, Role 3 (cited
hereafter as Area File).
14
Eaton believed that a duly chastised Tripoli would see the other
Barbary states fall into line. Reinstallation of Mohamet Karamanli, the
legitimate ruler, under American aegis was the surest way to foster
these consequences. Eaton summarized his idea well in a brief paragraph
to Madison:
The idea of dethroning our enemy and placing a rightful sove-
reign in his place makes a deeper impression on account of the
lasting peace it will produce with that regency and the lesson
of caution it will teach the other Barbary states, There are
objects which to me seem so clearly within our power that they
ought to command our exertions.
Eaton could hardly have been more pleased when he heard of the
approaching squadron; it accorded perfectly with his scheme. The squad-
ron could conduct a show of force or a blockade while providing a
diversion for a land force led by Eaton and the rightful bashaw. In
order to paint his design in more flattering tones and raise it above
the level of common filibustering, Eaton portrayed, perhaps without
exaggeration, the Tripolitan people as restive and prime for revolt. He
adduced that nothing was wanting but good prospects for success, an
ingredient that United States participation would surely provide.5 This
plan had both real and illusory merits, but to Eaton it became a stand-
ard by which to judge every action of the Mediterranean squadron. Thus,
blockading was good while convoy escort was bad because it removed ships
from possible participation in the Eaton plan. Departures from the
blockade station for logistical purposes were mere dalliance. Unfolding
^William Eaton to Secretary of State, 5 September 1801, Life of
Eaton, pp. 208-209.
5Llfe of Eaton, p. 209.
15
events were to place the commodores and the Tunisian consul at logger-
heads and to prove the latter the better naval strategist. The American
force commanders were soon to discover that Eaton was one of their
biggest challenges. The internecine conflict was to reduce the effect-
iveness of the task force.
This was all ahead of the new commodore. Dale had inquiries to
make in Gibraltar and the pressing logistics coordination to undertake.
When the anchor went down in the Gibraltar harbor, Dale did not even
know whether peace or war prevailed. This information would drive his
actions; it was not long in coming. Every indication was of war with
Tripoli, and the enemy was close at hand. Two Tripolitan war ships were
in Gibraltar harbor, and tactical judgment demanded that they be ae-
tained there at least until the North African situation could be seen
more clearly. Accordingly, the commodore established an overwatch of
the harbor entrance to prevent their departure. One ship, the Meshouda,
was a twenty-six gun man-of-war, which made her a serious threat to all
but frigates or ships-of-the-line. The other was much smaller and more
typical of corsair vessels. The Meshouda might properly be called the
flagship of the Tripolitan fleet. Indeed, her captain was the "admiral"
of that fleet. 6 It would have been preferable to capture the two out-
right, but this would have been a flagrant affront to the sovereignty of
the British. Dale could not afford to accept the potentially cata-
strophic outcome of that act. He assigned Philadelphia to the task of
6Richard Dale to United States ministers in Madrid and Lisbon,
2 July 1801, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, I, p. 497.
16
guarding the entrance.7 In doing 9o, he reduced his available combat
power for other missions by approximately twenty-five percent. Thu3
began over one and one-half years of virtually continuous dedication of
a frigate to a unique mission. Whether the gains equalled the cost
cannot be determined.
While at Gibraltar, the commodore coordinated with the governor
there for the offloading and storage of supplies for the squadron. He
learned early that Gibraltar, despite its impressive facade, was not
without grievous deficiencies. The "Rock" stands on one side of and
commands one of the world's most supremely effective naval choke points.
Logistics aside, Dale could not blithely bypass the British strongpoint.
Upon inspection, the American commodore found that Gibraltar's opera-
tional strengths concealed a sore logistical weakness: there was insuf-
ficient water.® This shortage would later impose upon the squadron's
captains the need to make two stops, one for general purpose supplies at
Gibraltar and one elsewhere on the Spanish coast or across the strait at
Tetuan for water.
Moving with more celerity than was to be typical of the squadron
commanders in the next two years, Dale tarried only a few days in
Gibraltar before sailing for Tripoli. He assigned Essex to convoy
escort and ordered Enterprise to accompany him to blockade duty after
7Richard Dale to Samuel Barron, Philadelphla, 4 July 1801, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, I, p. 497.
8Richard Dale to Secretary Navy, 2 July 1801, and Richard Dale to
governor of Gibraltar, 3 July 1001, both in Navn1 Documents, Barbary
Powers, I., pp. 497-498 and 499-500, respectively.
17
brief stops at Algiers and Tunis.9 In thus fragmenting his already
spare force, Dale set a pattern for future operations. The principle of
war that enjoins concentration of the force at a point of decision was
to be, by and large, lightly regarded in the early years of the
Mediterranean adventure.
Dale made a quick passage to Algiers where he was greeted enthusi-
astically by the United States consul Richard O'Brien.O'Brien was
especially anxious to see evidence that the United States did not intend
to truckle further to the Arabs. His position in Algiers was increas-
ingly uncomfortable because the United States was three years in arrears
in tribute payments. H The dey was demanding that it be paid in naval
supplies and weapons. O'Brien's discomfort might have been alleviated
had he known that at that time the frigate George Washington was loading
the very items in the United States.13 With no supplies, Dale could
offer no immediate answer to that demand, but he did have aboard $30,000
cash as a partial monetary payment. The dey, however, deemed this
*9Dale did not visit James Simpson, the United States consul at
Tangier, at this time. Morocco, fronting on both the Atlantic and the
Mediterranean, had the greatest capacity for trouble of any of the
Barbary states. In 1801, it was not using that capacity. Nonetheless,
Simpson was as pleased as the other consuls at the arrival of the
squadron. Simpson to Secretary of State 10 July 1801, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, I, pp. 508-509.
?^The incongruity between making tribute payments and sending the
squadron to project America's Intent not to knuckle under never fails to
be striking. It defies explanation except In the bizarre terms and
rules that govern diplomatic conduct.
12Ric!iard Dale to Secretary Navy, 19 July 1801, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, I, pp. 520-521.
13Secretary State to Richard O'Brien, 17 July 1801, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, I, p. 517.
18
unacceptable without the supplies in accompaniment. Rather than press
the matter, Dale decided to retain the money until it would make more of
an imprint. This did nothing to remove O'Brien from his prickly posi-
tion, but the consul was most impressed with Dale and the idea of
1 A
American naval power in the area.-1
The two ship squadron moved quickly on to Tunisia where William
Eaton was overjoyed to welcome it. He heaped praise upon Dale in his
exuberance at the prospect of force to support his plan. Eaton was
certain that a strict blockade would remind the bashaw of his folly and
bring the whole scurvy lot to a more contrite point of view. Tripoli's
dependence on food imported from Tunisia made it highly sensitive to
naval restrictions. In a flush of optimism, Eaton proclaimed a blockade
of Tripoli in a typically Eatonian unilateral action.15 The proclama-
tion was almost meaningless standing alone. A blockade in the flesh was
something else, and had Dale the resources and the disposition for a
14Richard Dale to Secretary Navy, 19 July 1801, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, I, pp. 520-521. In general, the Barbary chieftains
preferred naval supplies to money payments. Apparently, the basis for
this was their extensive reliance on naval operations in furtherance of
national policy and their difficulties in maintaining their small
fleets. Receipt of supplies in lieu of money saved one step in the
acquisition process.
15William Eaton to Richard Dale, 25 July 1801, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, I, pp. 528-530. The proclamation as issued has some
interest since it was designed to have the most profound effects upon
everyone concerned. Somewhat florid by current standards, it was a
paragon of brevity and directness by early eighteenth century criteria.
It read: "The Bashaw of Tripoli having declared war against the United
States of America, a squadron has been destined by the American govern-
ment to impede the mischief meditated by that regency against our
commerce and tranquility; it therefore becomes obligatory on us to
advise the agents of all powers in friendship with the United States
that Tripoli is actually blockaded by said American squadron, and that
all vessels attempting to enter that port will be dealt with according
19
firm dedication to the task, the bashaw might have come to heel in the
summer of 1801. But it was not to be.
Dale's initial appearance off Tripoli did, however, send out shock
waves to the Bashaw. He was reported to have turned on some of his more
hawkish advisors and to have begun rethinking his aggressive anti-
American policy. One of his principal targets, in absentia at that
time, was Murad Raiz, the bashaw's son-in-law, grand admiral, captain of
the impounded Meshouda, and ex-officio advisor.16
Dale had gone about his business in a no-nonsense fashion off
Tripoli. He had not, however, gone in with all guns blazing. Working
through the Danish consul, Nicholas Nissen, he transmitted several
diplomatic notes to the bashaw. He stated regret at the war and asked
for some conciliatory gesture. Why was the declaration so arbitrary?
Why was it made without recourse to arbitration by Algeria as specified
in a 1796 treaty then in effect? The bashaw finally replied that he did
not like the 1796 treaty and wished to renegotiate it. Dale stated that
to the laws of nations, applicable in such cases." Circular, Consulate
of the United States of America, Tunis, 23 July 1801, in J.B. Cathcart
Newkirk, ed., Tripoli, First War with the United States, Letterbook by
James Leander Cathcart, First Consul to Tripoli and Last Letters from
Tunis (LaPorte, Indiana, 1901) p. 327). (Cited hereafter as Cathcart
Letterbook).
16William Eaton to James Cathcart, 12 March 1802, Public Documents
of the United States, IV, p. 462. Raiz was a colorful, if reprehen-
sible, character. Raiz was his adopted Arab name; he was born Peter
Lisle in Scotland. His checkered career included service as a merchant
seaman, capture by Barbary pirates, subsequent conversion to the Muslim
faith, and adoption of Tripoli as his new nationality. At least he
professed these changes. They may have been merely part of an extensive
and successful effort to ingratiate himself with the bashaw. Marriage
to the bashaw's daughter and appointment as admiral stand in testimony
to his success. Dawn Like Thunder discusses Lisle/Raiz in scattered but
numerous references.
20
he had no authority to renegotiate treaties.17 And so it went with no
real progress.
President and Enterprise had not been long on station when the
commodore recognized in ciear terms an ineluctable fact of existence in
the Mediterranean summer: water supplies were quickly depleted. He
sent Lt. Sterrett to Malta with the primary mission of taking on and
returning with water and a secondary mission of engaging Tripolitan war
ships as opportunity and compiiance with the priority instructions would
allow.18 The water run to Malta gave Enterprise the first of several
opportunities to upstage her bigger mates.
On 6 August 1801, near Malta, Enterprise came upon the Tripolitan
ship of war Tripoli, and engaged her in a savage three hour battle.
When the Tripolitan finally struck her colors she had suffered thirty
killed and some thirty odd wounded. Enterprise's casualties were one
dead. Though he could have burned Tripoli and left her crew adrift in
small boats, Sterrett left the Tripolitan captain with enough sail power
1 Q
to limp home. It might have been more merciful had the loser been
17Richard Dale to Bashaw of Tripoli, 25 July 1801 and 28 July 1801,
Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, I., pp. 531 and 533-534, respectively;
also, Richard Dale to Secretary Navy, 18 August 1801, Public Documents
of the United States, IV, pp. 385-386.
18Richard Dale to Andrew Sterrett, 30 July 1801, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, I, pp. 534-535. In his orders to Sterrett, Dale author-
ized the use of foreign flags to deceive possible antagonists. Said
Dale: "You will make use of any colors as a deception when necessary,
but on no account to fire under any but your owne." This was common
practice, and scores of log entries recount how ships hoisted several
flags until the situation seemed to justify the true colors.
19Andrew Sterrett to Richard Dale, 6 August 1801, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, I, p. 537.
21
left to perish. When he arrived hack in Tripoli, the bashaw was in a
lather of rage. Tripoli'3 greater size and heavier armament doubtless
were factors In fueling the bashaw's autocratic passions. The igno-
minious defeat cost the captain a ride around Tripoli on a jackass to be
scorned by the populace, and 500 blows on the soles of his feet with a
stick.20
Nearly concurrent with the defeat of the Tripoli, the bashaw suf-
fered another reversal: the crews of the two Tripolitan ships at
Gibraltar mutinied.21 This may have been the nadir of Tripoli's for-
tunes during the 1801-1803 period and certainly offered the commodore a
significant opportunity to unseat the usurper. This, however, is a view
from the commanding heights of history. It was not nearly so clear to
Dale. It is interesting, but utterly academic, to speculate what might
have been done had Dale coordinated with Eaton in a vigorous land-sea
action. But he was not a bold and tenacious person; moreover, his
orders said nothing of ousting rulers and installing new governments.
Having performed his duties well for slightly less than a month, Dale
determined to head for Malta.
The commodore’s professed reason for the mid-August cruise to Malta
O p
was to take on water, food, and other supplies. He violated no ex-
plicit injunction in his orders in doing so. It is unclear how long the
2^Pnb.lie Announcement of Lt. Andrew Sterrett'a victory,
18 November 1801, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, I, pp. 538-o39.
21Lt. John Johnson, Philadelphla, to Commandant of the Marine
Corps, 15 August 1801, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, I, pp. 550-551.
22Riehard Dale to Secretary Navy, 18 August 1801, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, I. pp. 552-551.
22
secretary of the Navy expected the squadron to maintain station off
Tripoli or any other port in the area. Tripoli was the most easterly of
the Barbary ports and the most remote from the succor of a friendly
environment, Malta excepted. It must have been disquieting to Dale to
be so alone in that distant and unforgiving sea. Nor would a prudent
commander have made too sweeping an assumption concerning the certainty
of a friendly reception at the hands of either British or French port
authorities. The United States had just emerged from nearly a decade of
tension with both of the warring behemoths, and that was to be only
temporary. Treaties and conventions notwithstanding, the situation was
delicate. Having said this much in partial defense of Dale's decision
to leave the Tripoli station unguarded it is essential to point out
that blockading demanded much of those who engaged in it. Sealing off a
port usually reached equilibrium between dull and dangerous. The
British navy, which excelled in the burdensome business, approached it
with a singlemindedness from the Admiralty on down. Even at that, the
Royal Navy succeeded only by applying the most extreme personnel control
measures. Moreover, the seventy-four gun British ship-of-the line, fat
and slow compared to the American frigates, had great staying power. In
spite of their determination and superior equipment, the British were
plagued with mutinies by sailors who lived a prisoner-like existence.
This environment was wholly out of character with American notions of
individual liberty. Finally, the United States was well accustomed to
being blockaded, but in 1801 its navy had almost no practice as block-
aders.
23
In any event, Dale did abandon a tactic that was effective and, by
his own admission, necessary. After arriving in Malta he prepared an
analysis of conditions he had observed that would have been a damning
document had he been responding to charges of dereliction of duty. In
summary, the commodore told the secretary:
a) The Tripoli blockade (which he had just terminated) was
necessary.
b) The job demanded two frigates, two sloops, and possibly one
mortar vessel.
c) Two of the ships would be semi-permanent fixtures off of the
harbor entrance, while two patrolled up and down the coast, one
of these going for water as needed.
d) Malta was a good point for water resupply, but not for supplies
in general (the obverse of the Gibraltar case). Too many ships
competed for its limited stocks.
e) There were numerous United States merchant ships in the central
Mediterranean clamoring for armed escort, but his force was
inadequate for the task.23
While Dale was on his resupply voyage to Malta, Eaton rendered one
of his numerous, and frequently accurate, written judgments of the
state of affairs. His evaluation of the early effects of the blockade
was high, but probably not excessively so. In an apparent attempt to
shore up O'Brien's support of the blockade, he told the consul in
Algiers that regardless of any verbal support they might render, he did
23Richard Dale to Secretary Navy, 18 August 1801, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, I, pp. 552-554.
24
not believe the other Barbary states would declare war on the United
States. Eaton ascribed this to desire of the other states to maintain
the inflow of tribute from the United States. In the same communica-
tion, Eaton put in a plug for his plan to unseat the usurper Yusef, as
bashaw. A ground force of 2000 would be adequate for the task with
himself as leader.24
To his credit, Dale remained in Malta but a few days before heading
back for a spirited, but lamentably brief, spell of blockading. On
31 August 1801, he intercepted a vessel inbound to Tripoli and removed
forty-one Tripolitans, military and civilian. Dale requested of the
Danish consul, Nissen, that he inform the bashaw of his intention to
strictly enforce the rules of war in applying the blockade.25 Then,
like one of Abraham Lincoln's early generals, he snatched defeat from
the very jaws of victory. An unspecified contagious disease had hit
President a hard blow putting 152 men on the sick list. Dale informed
Eaton of his decision to depart for Gibraltar leaving the blockade
station untended once more; he also cited in justification a four-week
stock of provisions. He enlisted the aid of Eaton in bluffing the
Tunisians into believing the blockade was active.26 It was a thinly
constructed bluff at best; for the Tripolitans, there was no possibility
of bluffing.
24Wllliam Eaton to Richard O'Brien, 15 August 1001, L_ife of Eaton.
25Rlchard Dale to Nicholas Nissen, 31 August 1801, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, I, p. 565.
26Richard Dale to William Eaton, 6 September 1801, Naval Documents,
Barbarv Powers, I, pp. 570-571.
25
Any commander worth his salt will be solicitous of the physical
well-being of his crew; therefore, it may be harsh to berate Dale for
allowing the pervasive malady to point him westward. But if the men
were in such dire straits, why did he not proceed post-haste to Malta?
Would a more determined commander have given the mission somewhat more
consideration, since the illness apparently was not taking lives? As
events unfolded, during the passage from Tripoli to Gibraltar from
3 September to 25 September 1801, the sick list went down to thirty-
07
seven men. The prospect of entering a more forgiving quarter of the
Mediterranean may have had a salubrious effect on crew and commodore.
Arriving at Gibraltar, Dale learned that Philadelphia and Essex had
been faithful stewards, Essex in convoy escort and Philadelphia in
guarding against the departure of the Tripolitan ships. Most of the
Tripolitan crewmen had deserted and the ships were partly de-
2ft
commissioned. Otherwise, developments were unfavorable. Spanish
privateers, with the apparent connivance of local authorities, were
badgering American merchant vessels and had captured three of them. The
Spanish did not limit their harassment to merchantmen. The governor of
neighboring Algeciras would not allow Philadelphia to anchor in that
port.29 Dale's protest to the governor produced nothing. On 5 Octo-
ber 1801, Spanish privateers captured the American Packet, the first of
27
Richard Dale to Secretary Navy, 25 September 1801, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, I, p. 580.
28John Gavino, United States Consul, Gibraltar to Secretary State,
14 September 1801, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, I, pp. 574-575.
29Richard Dale to Governor Algeciras, Spain, 28 September 1801,
Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, I, p. 586.
26
the store ships sent to resupply the squadron. It was not released
until 16 October 1801.30 Dale protested the affront through the United
States minister to Spain, David Humphreys, in the belief that the gover-
nor of Algeciras owned three of the privateers.31 In addition to the
usual motives for piracy, Spain seemed to be venting on the United
States frustrations generated by her tormentor, Great Britain.
Dale loitered over a month in Gibraltar writing official letters
(he was a prolific writer) and issuing orders, He switched the missions
of Essex and Philadelphia, assigning Essex the Gibraltar overwatch.32
Captain Barron, with Philadelphia, received a more complex mission; Dale
directed him to sail eastward on convoy escort duty, establish a logis-
tical base at Saragosa, Sicily, make an expedition to Tripoli, and from
time-to-time show the flag in Tunis.33 This was more than Dale ever
accomplished, and had Philadelphla complied to the letter, she would
have been a one-ship task force. As for Dale, the Mediterranean late
summer heat or some other debilitating force had robbed him entirely of
his initial vigor.
30Richard Dale to Daniel Ludlow, 25 October 1801, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, I, pp. 594-595.
O 1
Richard Dale to David Humphreys, United States Minister to Spain,
18 October 1801, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, I, p. 600.
32During Dale's long stay at Gibraltar, the bashaw made his first
attempt to work through an intermediary to secure the release of his two
pirate ships hemmed in at Gibraltar. In this case, he used the dey of
Algeria; he was unsuccessful. David Humphreys, Minister to Spain to
Secretary State, 20 October 1801, Public Documents of the Uni ted States,
IV, p. 387.
3oRichard Dale to Samuel Barron, Phi ladelphla, 25 October 1801,
Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, I, pp. 603-604.
27
It seems incongruous that a nation could send a sizable—in rela-
tion to the population—task force to an area to assert itself, and at
the same time pay tribute to the robber barons of that area. The United
States was doing precisely that in 1801. Even as Dale dawdled and
wrote in Gibraltar, two tribute-bearing ships, George Washington and
Peace and Plenty, were clearing the Pillars of Hercules. The former
bore gifts for Algeria, the latter, for Tunisia.34 It was all the more
demeaning that George Washington, a frigate by design, was pressed into
duty as a cargo carrier.
Orders governing her cruise to the Mediterranean placed George
Washington under Dale's operational control after she completed her
onerous delivery. Dale finally bestirred himself with a cruise to
Algeria arriving on 14 November 1801, shortly after the tribute-bearing
ships. There he presented to the dey the earlier rejected cash gift of
$30,000.35 Thus, the United States ignobly bought a measure of tempor-
ary good will from Algeria. Dale, having complied with his original
orders to deliver the money, could now move about largely as he saw fit.
He ordered George Washington to proceed with Peace and Plenty (an out-
right merchant ship) as an escort to Tunis, and then to proceed about
the Mediterranean escorting convoys and showing the flag. ® The commo-
dore then turned President back toward the northwestern Mediterranean.
04
Richard O'Brien to David Humphreys, 8 November 1801, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, I, pp. 616-617.
35Richard O'Brien to John Gavino, 28 November 1801, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, I, pp. 626-627.
33Richard Dale to John Shaw, George Washington, 14 November 1801,
Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, I, pp. 619-620.
28
Dale had information that Tripoli had bought and fitted out three
ships at Minorca. They were to be used as corsairs flying the British
flag. This appears to have been infirm, unsubstantiated information,
but based upon it, Dale registered a veiled protest to the British
authorities at Port Mahon, Minorca. He qualified his rather impolitic
charge by saying that he knew the British would do no such thing, but if
he happened upon these ships, he would not honor their British flags.
The British denied any connections with Tripolitan purchase of pirate
ships at Minorca. While the unpleasant exchange was being conducted,
President was under quarantine;.37 this virtually prohibited any logis-
tics activities and obviated any chance of crew relaxation ashore. With
his prospects thus limited at Port Mahon, Dale departed.
At this time fate struck the commodore a foul blow. The pilot in
temporary command of President while she maneuvered down the restricted
qo
channel ran the frigate aground on rocks.00 Since a pilot's only valid
claim to existence is his local knowledge and superior ship-handling
ability in close quarters, the grounding was an ill-starred event. The
impact caused the whole ship to shudder, and Dale suspected extensive
damage to the bottom of the hull. However, President was not leaking
uncontrollably, and believing that he would not be allowed to dry-dock
at Minorca because of the quarantine, Dale decided to proceed to Toulon,
France. He believed that extensive cruising in the Mediterranean or the
on
Richard Dale to Governor of Minorca, 19 November 1801, Navai
Documents, Barbary Powers, I, p. 623,
38Richard Dale to Secretary Navy, 13 December 1801, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, I, pp. 633-634.
29
Atlantic In the approaching winter weather was foolhardy without a
damage assessment in dry dock. President arrived at Toulon,
4 December 1801, where Dale promptly ran hard upon another quarantine.39
Greatly vexed, Dale protested the quarantine in stern tones, and
sent packing two French officials on a mission of insuring the American
ship's compliance. The Toulon authorities rejoined by assuring the
commodore that if he did not allow the officials on board his ship, he
would be summarily ejected from the harbor without repairs or supplies.
Sensing teeth in this threat, Dale accepted the French terms.40 Thus
began a long stay in Toulon. This did not mark the end of Dale's
problems in the Mediterranean, but It did terminate his activities
against the enemy. There would be no more patrolling, negotiating, or
blockading. It is ironic that his original orders had President depart-
ing by 1 December 1801. Doubtless, in setting that date, the Secretary
of the Navy did not envision that Dale would have accomplished so
little.
OQ
The standard procedure for inspecting the bottom of a ship afloat
was to "sweep” it longitudinally with a rope. Since most ship bottoms
are either straight or a "fair” curve, the rope would glide along the
bottom if there were no damage. However, it would hang on a protrusion
or curve into, and perhaps hang up in a depression. This was obviously
a very crude technique that might reveal only the most severe damage.
There seems to have been no consideration given to putting a man over-
board to swim beneath the ship to feel for damage. Dale left Minorca on
30 November with only the sketchiest knowledge of his true condition.
The wise course might have been to accept the Insults of Port Mahon
officials In the Interest of damage verification and repair, If necea-
snry. Richard Dale to Richard O'Brien, 28 January 1001, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, pp. 41-42.
40Rlchard Dale to Robert R. Livingston, United States Minister to
France, 9 December 1301, Nava1 Documents, Barbary Powers, I, p. 631.
30
President was not the only logistical liability. The other two
ships (the departed Enterprise had not yet been replaced) had been
consuming supplies at normal rates and experiencing routine repair
requirements. The squadron had drawn down the account with MacKenzie
and Glennie to zero, and Dale had dipped into a diplomatic fund under
his charge. This was a $10,000 "present" from the president of the
United States to the bashaw of Tripoli; the latter's war declaration
made the entire sum available for diversion into other channels. Even
with this money Dale was strapped, for the dry dock inspection at Toulon
revealed damage to President's stem and keel. The commodore addressed a
desperate plea to Rufus King in London for his aid in having the United
States underwrite an overdraft that was to cover the expense of
President's repairs.42 In this makeshift and uncertain way, Dale
attempted to restore his squadron to fully operational condition.
41A good example is replacement of cordage and cables of which
sailing ships had literally miles. Philadelphia's captain, Samuel
Barron, reported that worn cordage and cables posed a threat to the safe
and effective operation of his ship. He purchased replacement items
through the approved ship chandler, DeButts and Purviance of Leghorn.
Samuel Barron to Secretary Navy, 10 December 1801, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, I, p. 632.
42Richard Dale to Secretary of Navy, 13 December 1801 and Richard
Dale to Rufus King, 5 January 1802, both in Naval Documents, 3arbary
Powers, I, p. 633 and I, p. 13.
CHAPTER 3
CHANGING THE WATCH
As Dale agonized far away, preparations proceeded apace In the
United States to organize, equip, and man a replacement contingent for
the Mediterranean. By December, one ship, the frigate Bos ton, was
already on the way, and others were the subjects of the most frenzied
labors. Dale's squadron, through a quirk of good fortune, was practi-
cally a coherent unit when he received his command and the accompanying
orders. Despite the best intentions and most profound exertions, the
replacement ships were readied, departed, and for months functioned
piecemeal. This would go far toward accounting for their uninspired
record.
Before a captain could bring his guns to bear against a Barbary
corsair, he had first to attend to everything short of building the ship
and even a measure of this if she were new construction. A typical
charge to a newly appointed captain included directives to oversee the
provisioning, repair, and refitting of the ship.l There was also the
need to recruit a crew, a demand of the first magnitude. The navy was
competing for seamen with the world's fastest growing merchant marine,
which not only paid better, but offered more human comforts and less
rigid ship-board rules.2 Moreover, the navy's term of service In 1801
Secretary Navy to Captains Richard V. Morris, Thomas Truxtun,
Edward Preble, and Alexander Murray, 12 January 1802, Naval Documents
Barbary Powers, II.
O
‘TMen-of-war wnre physically uncomfortable. The gun deck of a
frigate was "prime" space, and most of a forty-four-gun frigate's
32
typically was one year, which made recruiting an omnipresent administra-
tive burden. It was a curse upon the Mediterranean squadron with its
operationai area 4000 miles from the source of manpower and time in
transit over a month in each direction. The navy's primary home ports
and its natural recruiting grounds were in the New England and mid-
Atlantic regions, also the home of the merchant fleet. It was hard to
sell naval service. Captain Alexander Murray, soon to be the interim
successor commander of the squadron, fell short of filling his comple-
ment aboard Constellation in Philadelphia and considered ranging as far
as New York for men. The problem was not limited to seamen. As late as
ten days before his scheduled departure, Murray was short two of his
three authorized lieutenants and the ship's surgeon as well.3
In finding a suitable commander for the replacement squadron, the
Navy Department encountered a recruitment problem, but at a higher
level. Thomas Truxtun, a navy captain of wide experience, who added
glitter to his reputation during the Quasi-War with France, was the
commander of choice and was offered the ptos.4 He declined on the
grounds that the tendered command would have required him to be both the
cannons were positioned on that deck. The crew either slept with the
guns, moved far forward, or went to a darker, less well ventilated lower
deck. Just how much this influenced a warship's efficiency is
conjectural.
^Alexander Murray to Socrotiry Nuvy, 2 February i802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 44.
4Naval Documents, the Qiies 1-War chronicles Truxton's exploits in
detail. As captain of Constellation, he had a significant hand in
building the mystique which that ship has enjoyed ever since. See also
Eugene S. Ferguson, Truxtun of the Constellaticn, the LIfe of Commodore
Thomas Truxtun, U.S. Navy 1775-1322 (Baltimore, 1956). This extremely
readable biography errs principally in painting Truxtun bigger than
life.
33
captain of his ship and the commodore of the task force. Indeed, this
was the intent of the Navy Department. Had it occurred some three years
later, Truxtun could perhaps have helped his bargaining position by
citing that Nelson was not encumbered with command of HMS Victory at
Trafalgar. But Truxtun's principal objection may well have been his
fear of loss of prestige at not being a commodore in the fullest sense
of the word. He nearly admitted as much when he said he was mindful of
"having a reputation to lose which I am very tenacious of."5 From the
administration's point of view, Truxtun had a disability that would have
been otherwise forgivable: he was a vocal Federalist. In his deciina-
tion of command, Truxtun threatened resignation; whether it was intended
to be an idle threat is difficult to determine.6 In any case, Secretary
Smith promptly accepted the resignation, and Truxtun left the navy never
again to serve.7 By all accounts the nation lost the services of an
5Thomas Truxtun to Secretary Navy, 3 March 1802, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, p. 76. It was then, and is now, typically the
practice for a task force commander to conduct his command functions
from a ship of which he was not captain. This allowed him to focus his
attentions on the situation of the force as a whole, disengaging him
from the distractions of day-to-day operation of the ship. Whether the
example of Nelson at Trafalgar is transferrable to the commodore of a
four-ship squadron is a moot point.
6Thomas Truxtun to Secretary Navy, 3 March 1802, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, p. 76. Truxtun's dander was up. Not only was the
practice of freeing the commodore from specific demands aboard a ship
well established in the major navies of the world, there was an imme-
diate precedent; Dale was not the captain of his flagship. While the
Dale squadron was deployed, President was commanded by James Barron,
brother of Samuel Barron of Philadelphia. Captain of a flagship is an
unenviable task, and James Barron was a non-entity in the Dale squadron.
Later, he had more opportunities to distinguish himself. Garden W.
Allen, Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs (Boston, 1905), p. 94 (cited
hereafter as Our Navy).
7Secretary Navy to Thomas Truxtun, 13 March 1802, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, p. 82.
34
eminently competent, if vain, commander and accepted in his place a
listless dilettante.
The plan to replace the Dale squadron beginning in mid-winter 1802
was not soundly based upon frigate availability. As hurriedly as Dale
had departed in 1801, he was far better off in respect to the condition
of his ships than was the squadron being put together in 1802. Truxtun,
serving before his resignation as captain of the replacement flagship
Chesapeake, reported that vessel in unseaworthy condition. Her bottom
sheathing of copper plates was incorrectly applied. Truxtun was adamant
that Chesapeake go into dry dock for reappiication of the plates. 8 This
was no small matter, for the copper had the function of fending off
marine borers whose passion for wood fiber could reduce the stoutest oak
or pine to a thin shell in short order. The malapplication Truxtun
reported would have allowed such depredations and possibly masked the
damage from early detection. Chesapeake had other infirmities that went
undetected until the stresses of the sea brought them to the fore in the
Mediterranean.
Another of the replacement frigates, Adams, had in her very nature
faults that could only be acknowledged and circumvented, never purged.
Her captain, Edward Preble, judged Adams too sharp and too narrow for a
ship of her gun rating. Furthermore, her draft was disproportionately
great because of the ballast needed to anchor her against the pull of
her excessive spread of canvas. Indeed, the bulk of the ballast
encroached upon storage space for provisions limiting her cruising time,
8Thomas Truxtun to Secretary Navy, 3 March 1802, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, p. 76.
35
perhaps to the great joy of the sea-weary crew.0 in sum, Preble con-
sidered Adams somewhat deficient as a frigate, though he believed her
speed would do something to atone for other failings. He recommended to
the Secretary of the Navy that her armament be decreased from thirty-
eight to thirty-two cannons to ameliorate her weight and internal bulk
problems. Illness would keep Preble from the Mediterranean in 1802;
Adams would go without him and perform in an honorable but not distin-
guished manner, inhibited by some of her inherent imperfections.
The United States did not enter 1802 with a coherent long-term
policy for the Mediterranean, and there was little visible progress
during the year. But there was an effort. The State Department did not
assume away the problem of the Barbary corsairs on the strength of the
initial sanguine reports of the consuls prepared in the first flush of
optimism at Dale's arrival. Congress, too, was aware that a successful
campaign demanded a plan (whose development was not, strictly speaking,
within the Congressional purview) and a set of rules for its prosecu-
tion. The latter was within the Congressional sphere of responsibility.
Accordingly, by act of 6 February, Congress, without an overt declara-
tion of war, set forth rules of engagement that gave naval captains
solid criteria for action. By this Congressional authorization,
captains could now "subdue, seize, and make prize of all vessels, foods,
9I802 predated the advent of ballast tanks. Ballasting was done
with bulky stones that did not necessarily fit into the least valuable
spaces. A few of the oldest commercial buildings in eastern North
Carolina coastal towns are built of stones removed from merchantmen who
entered port in ballast and replaced the stones with cargo.
i0Edward Preble to Secretary Navy, 20 February 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 62.
36
and effects belonging to the Bey of Tripoli or to his subjects."-11 Here
were rules to remove some of the burden of doubt from a commander faced
with a delicate decision in a remote sea. It said nothing of ground
actions of the type envisioned by Eaton, nor in other respects was it
all-inclusive. It was, however, a solid attempt to address the main set
of circumstances.
After Truxtun's casually submitted and precipitately accepted
resignation, the Secretary of the Navy offered the mantle of the
Mediterranean squadron to Captain Richard Valentine Morris on
11 March 1802. The tender included command of Chesapeake as well; there
was to be no subordinate commander of the flagship. Unlike Truxtun,
1 O
Morris had no objections to the dual responsibility; he accepted.
Richard Valentine Morris was a naval officer of wide experience with an
unsullied record of technical proficiency. Moreover, he was of a promi-
nent New York family noted for leadership during the Revolution and the
period of early nationhood. He was vastly more acceptable politically
than Truxtun. In fact, there is even the possibility that his uncle
cast a pivotal vote in the House of Representatives' maneuverings that
finally installed Jefferson where the 1800 election intended that he be.
^Secretary Navy to Lt. Andrew Sterrett, 8 February 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 55. Lt. Sterrett of Enterprise was
the first captain to depart armed with the new rules of engagement when
he sailed on 17 February. Another provision of the act which did not
benefit Sterrett was that authorizing recruitment for two year terms.
The act also contained an authorization for the president to commission
privateers to fight the Barbary corsairs. This was not used at all by
the replacement squadron.
12Secretary Navy to Captain Richard V. Morris, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, p. 82.
37
At all events, there wa3 no reason to question his capacity to perform
well in the Mediterranean other than his lack of command at the squadron
level, a deficiency then virtually universal in the United States
Navy.13
Morris began his mission under more prejudicial conditions than had
Dale before him, although most were not obvious at the time. He did, however,
begin with one advantage: the Secretary of the Navy sent Commodore
Morris forth with a relatively unambiguous mission statement. The
secretary charged the commodore to "keep the enemy's vessels in port, to
blockade the places out of which they issue, and prevent as far as
possible their coming out or going in."14 This statement should have
been sufficient to rivet Morris' attention to the main objective.
Unfortunately, Secretary Smith's instructions also contained a clause
dealing with secondary responsibilities that if brought to the fore
could be a basis for sending ships to and fro across the Mediterranean
on unprofitable excursions, especially along that sea's more pleasant
northern rim. When Smith told Morris, "Convoy must be given to our
vessels as far as it can be done consistent with the plan of block-
ading,"15 he unknowingly added to the forces that seemed to conspire to
spread Morris' naval power ineffectually about the Mediterranean.
The first squadron had suffered mightily from the inadequacy of the
logistics structure; the Morris squadron was to endure equal or greater
^Dawn Like Thunder, pp. 153-154.
14secretary Navy to Richard V. Morris, 20 March 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 92.
1 ^NavoJ. Documents , Barbary Powers, II, p. 92.
38
agonies. The Navy Department was not yet initiated into the harsh world
of suppiy and maintenance, being but four years old. The bitter experi-
ences of the Dale squadron had not had opportunity to filter back. In
consequence, Morris was to find himself trammeled by most of the same
disabilities. The twin plagues of a logistics center of gravity over
1000 miles from the objective, and the absence of American repair facil-
ities in the theater beset him at every turn. In general outline the
logistics plan had the following major characteristics:
a) The government would make an additional deposit to the account
with McKenzie and Glennie in the sanguine expectation that this
sum, combined with the residue (by that time there was no
residue) from the first squadron's allocation, would be
adequate.
b) Morris, as had Dale, would draw from the chandlers DeButts and
Purviance in Leghorn, who, in turn, would present demands for
compensation to McKenzie and Glennie.
c) A provision ship would follow two months after Morris
departure with a cargo of salted and dried foods and naval
stores. It would discharge this cargo at Gibraltar.
d) Morris was to procure anything else at Gibraltar, Malta,
Leghorn, Minorca, Saragossa, or wherever he happened to be.
e) Morris was to inquire into the feasibility of establishing a
hospital in one of the supposedly healthier ports such as
Syracuse.16
16Secretary Navy to Richard V. Morris, 11 March 1802, and
5 April 1802, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, pp. 82 and 106,
respectively.
39
The best that could be said of the plan was that it cited several
ports near the objective as authorized resupply points. But there
remained the reliance on Gibraltar and Leghorn, both of which were well
removed from Tripoli; they also seemed to have an attraction for most of
the squadron's captains that proved very injurious to mission accom¬
plishment.
As the Morris squadron attended to its late winter and spring
preparations, Dale ended his tour with a whimper. He spent December and
January inactive with President in the Toulon dry dock; repairs were not
completed until 7 February 1802.^ It is tempting to speculate that a
more vigorous captain might have expedited the process. Dale's crew
enlistments did not terminate until 1 June 1802;^8 therefore, had he
been able to shepherd his ship quickly through the Toulon yard,
President could have been at least another two months before the enemy's
gates. The counter to this proposition is that Dale's original orders,
raentioned earlier, authorized him to depart for home as early as
1 December 1801. It seems probable he would have sailed from the
Mediterranean sometime in that period had the Port Mahon damage not
interposed itself. In casting about to assess blame, one inevitably
encounters the commodore's proclivity for expedient courses of action.
1 7
Richard Dale to Rufus King, 7 February 1802, Naval Documents,
Powers, II, p. 54.
1 ft
Secretary Navy to Alexander Murray, 5 December 1001, Naval
Documents, Baj"bary Powers, I, p. 627. The actual date for most of the
crewmen must have been somewhat earlier. Dale departed in late May;
presumably, his crew did not all enlist on the sailing date. Neverthe-
less, a point is well made in this instance. The brief term of the
enlistment placed severe strictures on planning. Dale was in the tliea-
ter only five months when the Navy Department began feverishly to plan
for its replacement. Even that was not soon enough.
40
Perfectly In character with this nature were the homing instincts Dale
expressed to the Secretary of the Navy on 16 January 1002: "I did not
make arrangements to be ,.19so long away.
In mid-winter of 1802, Dale's squadron was down to two effective
ships, and as far as Tripoli was concerned, did not exist. Miserable
weather that reduced all maritime activity may have done what Dale's
desultory blockading had failed to do. The arrival in mid-January of
the frigate Boston under Captain Daniel McNeill might have given Dale a
new ax to wield against Tripoli. Dale transmitted orders to McNeill to
find Philadelphia in the central Mediterranean, get an appraisal of the
situation, and proceed on to blockade Tripoli, if warranted.20 Boston
eventually pursued approximately this course, but whether in response to
the commodore's direction or at McNeill's whim is difficult to deter-
mine. The Boston's commanding officer was the most erratic performer of
all of the captains to serve in the squadron. After an Initial call at
Gibraltar, he stopped at Malaga and exhibited a sample of some of his
aberrant behavior by departing without several of his officers and crew.
At Toulon he made a false official statement concerning his first stops
apparently to avoid any possibility of quarantine. He left Toulon on
?^Richard Dale to Secretary Navy, 16 January 1802, Naval Documents,
Parbary Powers, II, p.23.
“^Richard Dale to Daniel McNeill, 18 January 1802, Naval^ Documents,
Borbary E-25§?L2> II, PP- 25-26. Bo§_ton was behind when she arrived at
Gibraltar, having first attended to her initial mission of delivering
minister Robert Livingston and his family to France. She left the
United States in early October, thus was well into her overseas cruise
upon arrival. Also see Secretary Navy to Daniel McNeill, 1 October
1001, Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Navy to Officers, 1798-1846
(National Archives, Washington, I960), Microcopy 149, Roll 5 (cited
hereafter as Letters to Officers).
41
19 January, with unauthorised and reluctant passengers; three local
French officials and the chaplain of President made an unhappy cruise
aboard Boston.2* In spite of the inauspicious beginning, this ship of
the bizarre captain gave a better than average performance as a block-
ader. She also was to become involved in some of William Eaton's diplo-
matic scheming.
If the Dale squadron went into a form of naval winter quarters,
Eaton did not allow bad weather to suppress his activity. Under the
stress of some physical malady, and thinking a change would be therapeu-
tic, he sailed on board George Washington in December 1801, for Leghorn.
Leghorn was a good place from which to survey the situation and to
scheme. There with the ex-consul of Tripoli and the pretender to the
Tripolitan throne, Mahamet Karamanli, Eaton had positioned himself well
to observe and to gain and pass along intelligence.22 He did all with
enthusiasm and without solicitation.
In late winter of 1802, Eaton remained optimistic about his plans.
He transmitted to Madison one of his several commentaries on the success
of the squadron (this praise was destined to turn to ashes by summer) in
21Richard Dale to Secretary Navy, 24 January 1802, Naval Documents,
Carbary Powers, II, pp. 27-28. The tone of most later correspondence
suggests that McNeill and Dale never met face-to-face. It would be
accurate to say that Dale never directed Boston's employment other than
to head her eastward. McNeill never received any orders from Morris.
In brief, he was not a member of either squadron.
22John Shaw, George Washington, to Secretary Navy, 11 January 18U2,
Naval Documents, Darbary Powers, II, pp. 17-18. Leghorn was a much
favored haven both by the diplomatic corps and the captains of the
squadron. William L. Cathcart, the ousted consul to Tripoli, had been
there since May 1801. The captains, and to a lesser extent the
commodores, made frequent and long stops there.
42
dampening the aggressive spirit of the Tripolitan usurper. Yusef's
corsairs feared to go to sea, his people were hungry, and he was in
general bereft of resources. 3 This buoyancy was typical of Eaton's
propensity for either unfettered optimism or abysmal despair. Two
weeks earlier he had questioned to Madison the wisdom of allowing mer-
chant ships to roam the Mediterranean, without consular clearance, to
fall into dangerous and embarrassing situations.34 On balance, however,
before spring unleashed the corsairs, there were signs that Tripoli
might be willing to mend her ways.
During his visit to Leghorn, Eaton purchased for his own use a
merchant ship, the Gloria. Operation of such a ship, although not
standard practice for consuls, was perfectly in character for Eaton, who
could use her to facilitate his machinations. She was armed and could
serve well as a dispatch ship despite the corsair threat. She also of-
ferea some potential for profit, which was not beyond the interests of
Eaton. The Tunisian consul apparently concluded that she could do all
of these things better if she wore the mantle of a United States public
vessel. Using powers he assumed to be ex officio as United States
consul to Tunisia, Eaton commissioned Gloria as a United States ship.
He informed her master, Joseph Bounds, that he was therewith empowered
23William Eaton to Secretary of State, 22 February 1802, Life of
Eaton, p. 113.
24William Eaton to James Madison, Secretary of State, 3 February
1802, Public Documents of the United States, XIV, p. 460. From time to
time the other consuls requested the authority to restrict merchant ship
movements in more threatened regions without armed escort. The merchant
captains welcomed such escort, but did not like having to wait for a
convoy to be constituted.
43
to draw supplies direct from United States warships or from United
States agents in any Mediterranean port.25 The official justification
advanced for commissioning Gloria was use as an armed dispatch ship.26
This was a function of merit, but in Eaton's case it is reasonable to
assume that the added flexibility of an official Gloria made the action
irresistibly attractive. It proved a troublesome proceeding.
Eaton's return to his post in Tunis came about in reaction to a
plot by Yusef to lure Mahamet back to Tripoli, there to dispose of him
once and for all. For whatever reasons, Eaton had developed a sense of
07
guardianship over Mahamet, and he was deeply alarmed when he heard
rumors of the threat. As Eaton understood the circumstances, Yusef had
extended an olive branch in the form of an offer of the governorship of
Derne, a Libyan province, to Mahamet. Yusef's real intention was frat-
ricide to forever silence his threatening brother. In late March, Eaton
returned to Tunis, to where Mahamet had already returned. There he
concentrated his most intense persuasive effort on the pretender, who
was preparing to accept Yusef's offer. Eaton diverted Mahamet from the
voyage to Tripoli and convinced him that even Tunis was not safe; he
William Eaton to Joseph Bounds, 24 March 1802, Naval Documents.
Barbary Powers, II, pp. 94-95. Lines between public and private actions
by public officials were less clearly drawn in the early 1800's than
now. Eaton's transgression lay not so much in owning Gloria, a
condition he made no attempt to camouflage, as in his manner of her use.
26William Eaton to Daniell McNeill, 24 March 1802, Naval Documents
Barbary Powers, II, p. 96.
27No doubt there was a self-serving element in Eaton's concern for
the deposed brother. Mahamet was essential to endow the consul's anti-
Yusef design with legitimacy. But Eaton was not without principle, and
the concern was justified and real.
44
should find asylum in Malta until the new American squadron arrived.
Then, shored up by the new commodore and his superior firepower, he
could sail to Tripoli and present his rightful demands. In the face of
this irrepressible American strength, Yusef would step down. So went
Eaton's argument; Mahamet accepted it as gospel. The successor comrao-
dore did not give it full faith and credit, to the chagrin of both Eaton
and Mahamet.
William Eaton was inclined to assume much and speak in terms of
certainty that later would cause grief. Before condemning Eaton for
precipitate actions well beyond the scope of his authority, it is
necessary to understand that the boundaries of that authority were
distant and vague. Where the installation of Mahamet as chieftain of
Tripoli was concerned, Eaton was a true beilever. He was prepared, if
need be, to hold Mahamet in some form of detention rather than see him
OQ
stumble into the clutches of the murderous Yusef.
The least troublesome of the Barbary states had been Morocco, but
any navy captain or administration policy maker who could appreciate the
implications of location could readily understand the latent power of
that feudal domain. When 1802 began, Morocco had no war ships, but the
ruler, Muley Soliman, was becoming restive and threatening a naval
buildup. He requested of the United States, in what was more nearly a
veiled demand, 100 gun carriages. This rather minor imposition, given
28William Eaton to General S. Smith, Member of Congress. 19 August
1802, Life of Eaton.
29William Eaton to James Madison, 18 March 1802, Life of Eaton,
p. 214.
45
Morocco's capacity for mischief, was passed along by the United States
consul, James Simpson.30 The gun carriages would have been no cause for
great concern, and would not have pushed Morocco into Tripoli's status
as a major nuisance. By increasingly acting as Tripoli's champion,
Soliman did, however, gain a greater share of American attention.
An ascending level of friction between Morocco and the United
States involved Dale in his last incursion into diplomacy. As noted,
Tripoli failed to secure the release of Meshouda because of the falter-
ing actions of Tunisia. The bashaw now solicited the intercession of
Morocco for the same purpose, and to enlist Moroccan support in
augmenting the Tripolitan food supply. Soliman undertook compliance
with both requests. He requested that Simpson issue in the name of the
United States a passport giving safe conduct to Meshouda to depart
Gibraltar, and other passports to allow Moroccan merchant ships to
transport wheat to Tripoli. From his vantage point Just across the
strait from Gibraltar, the Moroccan leader knew that the blockade of
Meshouda was effective. The ineffectiveness of the Tripoli blockade was
not yet well known. Soliman's considerable potential to cause discom-
fort did not extend to forcefully breaking one blockade and penetrating
another, although unbeknownst to him at that time, he could have sent a
o -i
hundred wheat carrying ships through the paper blockade of Tripoli.
^James Simpson to Secretary State, 8 January 1802, Naval
Documents, 8aj~bary Powers, II, p. 465. Simpson was a technically
competent, but unspectacular diplomat. As will be noted, he was more
amenable to compromise than his colleagues to the east.
aiExtract from journal, USS Essex, 1 February 1802, Area File, Roll
3; also, James Simpson to James Madison, 20 February 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbery Powers, II, p. 468.
46
Simpson, deferring to Dale's diplomatic seniority in such things (or
possibly just passing the buck), sent the passport request to the
commodore. Dale replied that he would not grant any portion of such an
absurd request. It was nonsensical to create a blockade on the one hand
and puncture it on the other. He included in his reply to Simpson that
he hoped Soliman would not go to war with the United States as "he can
do us more injury than all the other powers put together," only slightly
overstating the case.33 Shortly after this decision, Dale headed home.
When Dale put his bow into the Atlantic in early March, there was
little in the way of accomplishment upon which to reflect. Had Spruance
been a Dale, there would have been no Midway victory; had Nelson been
afflicted with his malaise, Trafalgar would be but a Spanish cape.
Dale's orders left much to his imagination, and at the same time in-
hibited him, a most unfortunate combination. There were legitimate
questions over his authority in such matters as disposing of prizes.
Logistics demands beset him at every turn; he could not ignore empty
water casks or dwindling food stocks. It is unlikely that any commander
would have sparkled in the circumstances. Apologies cover Dale to a
degree, but there remain too many failings exposed. By far the greatest
is his lack of tenacity, his penchant for following an easy path away
from the goal, and his inability to press ahead in spite of the licks he
r>2
Richard Dale to James Simpson, 8 March 1802, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, pp. 80-81. Near the end of the Mediterranean tour,
while still in the Toulon drydock, Dale made one other decision of a
diplomatic character. On 24 January, the senior Swedish naval officer
in the region put into Toulon. He visited Dale and proposed that the
American commander join forces with his three frigates to mount a deci-
sive attack on Tripoli. Dale declined; he did not take the offer
seriously.
47
was bound to take. After making every conceivable deduction, we still
find him sorely deficient. Sad to say, the next two commodores would be
worse.
As Dale was preparing to return home, his successor commander,
Alexander Murray, of the previously mentioned recruiting predicaments,
was winding up his pre-departure business but only with repeated sty-
mies. Before iiuxtun resigned and Morris was appointed, Murray assumed
he would be going to the Mediterranean as just another replacement
captain, albeit of an illustrious ship, Constellation. But Truxtun's
unceremonious dismissal, and Morris' late appointment and departure
conferred upon Murray interim commodore status. Murray, too, was slow,
but he had a running start on Morris. It was sufficient to overcome
some painful mishaps at the outset. Constellation drew twenty feet of
water empty; loaded, she could not clear the bar out of Philadelphia.
Murray was obliged to negotiate the shifting channel while empty and
provision "in the stream" while taking on the remainder of his crew, all
in rough weather. Most were new, many were sick, and two died within
days.33 This unpropitious beginning was prophetic of a lacklustre
cruise.
oo
Alexander Murray to Secretary Navy, 7 March 1802, Naval Docu-
ments, Barbary Powers, II, p. 79. Many of Murray's difficulties and
those of other captains preparing for duties far from the United States
could have been ameliorated if not eliminated. Preparations were afoot
to build navy bases on the east coast that could repair and provision
ships while giving them protected anchorage with unimpeded access to
deep water. The virtues of Norfolk to serve these needs were just
beginning to be appreciated as well as those of other deep water ports.
See, for example, William Pennock, Navy Agent, Norfolk, to Secretary
Navy, 17 April 1302, Naval_ Documents, Barbary Powers, II, pp. 123-124.
Strangely enough, Washington, U.C., sorely deficient in most character-
istics of good naval f 'illty, was the subject of much correspondence.
48
Murray arrived at Gibraltar in late April, but did not go a3hore
immediately. The weather was bad (ill winds seemed to follow Murray
throughout). He had lost an anchor and refused to commit the ship to
the Mediterranean's mercies with his sole remaining anchor.34 Except
for this almost inconsequential inconvenience, Murray had the basis for
a good beginning. He was aware that his seniority made him acting
commodore, and he had a reasonably good grasp of the dispositions of
friend and foe. Fortuitously, when his departure was imminent and no
replacement was in sight, Dale prepared a letter for his successor
detailing the situation of the squadron.35 Also, both Bainbridge of
Essex, who was blockading in the area and the consul, John Gavlno, could
provide a considerable store of information for the interim commander.
Thus, Murray was vastly better informed that had been Dale in the pre-
vious spring. Gloria was shortly to arrive with fresh Information from
the central Mediterranean.
In late March, Eaton, still concerned that Mahamet might take the
bait offered by Yusef, directed Gloria to find Boston off Tripoli and,
in effect, between the two of them to intercept ships headed for Tripoli
with a particular view to apprehending a gullible Mahamet. Once Gloria
had passed the information (directive?) to McNeill and seen the situ-
ation in good order, she was to sail to Gibraltar with an account of
^Alexander Murray to Secretary Navy, 30 April 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 139.
35Richard Dale to Commodore, United States replacement squadron, 28
February 1802, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, pp. 68-70.
49
all that Eaton had done to foster Yusef's ultimate defeat by Mahamet.36
Many of Eaton's exorcises of authority, even with the broadest interpre-
tation, were of questionable legality. Gloria carried with her the
potential basis for an early termination of her public service and the
beginnings of an unbridgeable rift between the forceful consul and his
naval opposites of wavering spirit.
Hardly had the Gloria's master informed Murray of his status and
his employer's activities than the interim commodore released Gloria
from government service.3,7 This is hardly surprising; the boldest of
commodores would probably have done the same thing. Eaton had conferred
upon Gloria approximately the status of privateer. He had no such
prerogatives nor had he the funds to underwrite quasi-navai operations.
Eaton's career as a naval planner and operator was lively, if brief.
In the spring of 1802 as the replacement squadron was infiltrating
into the Mediterranean and part of the original squadron was exfiltrat-
ing (the arrival of the original squadron was the only unitary action of
the entire period), Eaton maintained a high level of activity with only
Boston in the region to give him credibility. His assertiveness and
diligent application to advancing the interests of the United States
kept him in bad odor with the bey of Tunis. Eaton lived on the verge of
deportation. He refused to sign passports for Tunisian ships whereupon
the bey's minister told him that though they would cease employing their
36William Eaton to General S. Smith, Member of Congress, 19 August
1802, Life of Eaton and William Eaton to Joseph Bounds and Daniel
McNeill, 24 March 1802, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, pp. 94-95.
^Alexander Murray to Joseph Bounds, 6 May 1802, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, p. 145.
50
bigger cruisers, the smaller ones would go out to "vex" American com-
merce. Eaton bristled and was as ready to leave as the bey was to send
him packing. In discussing a possible replacement, the bey's minister
rejected James Cathcart because of his enmity with Tripoli, a sentiment
o o
in which Eaton himself was unequalled.
The American blockade was thin, but the possibility that it might
tighten combined with troubles at home to incline the bashaw somewhat
toward peace negotiations. In late spring of 1802, the bey of Tunis
approached Eaton, who had survived the threat of expulsion, on behalf of
Tripoli. He offered to mediate peace between the United States and
Tripoli; the chief concession of the United States was to be a small
yearly present. The consul either did not take the overture seriously,
or he felt the United States position to be strong enough to reject any
accommodation. In classic Eatonian bombast he averred that "four or
five years of warfare with that state [Tripoli] will be but a pastime to
our young warriors."39 In a report to Madison he recommended staying
with the pian to restore the legitimate bashaw, Mahamet.40 If there was
any substance in the attempted mediation, Eaton shattered it into frag-
ments with his response.
38William Eaton to James L. Cathcart, 26 April 1802, Life of Eaton,
pp. 214-215.
39William Eaton to Secretary State, 25 May 1802, Life of Eaten,
pp. 216-218.
40Eaton was a most volatile person. He blew hot and cold over
prospects for a successful prosecution of the campaign against the
pirates. Later he would resign in a fit of despair, but in his report
to Madison on the attempted Tunisian mediation, he said, "We never
supposed our commerce in this sea more secure than at present; notwith-
standing the war with Tripoli; and as to the expense of armaments we
accumulate nothing on that score from making the Mediterranean the
maneuvering ground of our seamen. We shall probably always have a
squadron In this sea." William Eaton to Secretary State, 25 May 1802,
Li_fe of Eaton, pp. 217-218.
CHAPTER 4
TALL SHIPS, SHORT MEN
Morris finally arrived in Gibraltar on 31 May 1802 after a passage
that began on 27 April 1802. This was nearly three months after his
predecessor had departed Gibraltar for home. Enterprise and
Constellation had put in at Gibraltar and departed eastward well ahead
of Morris.1 Arriving piecemeal in this fashion, the squadron rarely was
employed in a coordinated way.2 It was never employed as a unit. Iron-
ically, the last orders issued to Morris before his departure, but which
he did not receive until he had been in the theater several months,
directed him to operate with the entire squadron. An addendum to his
basic orders dated 20 April 1802, enjoined Morris to pick up the former
Tripolitan consul, James Cathcart, at Leghorn and with him to conduct
negotiations with Tripoli. He was to conduct a show of force with the
entire squadron concurrent with the negotiations. It is impossible to
extrapolate how this addendum would have affected the commodore's initial
actions had he known its contents upon departure. It stated in part:
You will proceed with the whole squadron under your command
and lay off against Tripoli taking every care to make the
handsomest and most military display of your force and so
conduct your maneuvers as to excite the impression that in
^Dawn Like Thunder. p. 157.
^The squadron never had an effective arrangement for the use of
rendezvous points where ships would report and wait for Instructions
when in doubt of their status. Gibraltar and Malta served the function
to a limited degree, having qualities of position and logistical capa-
city to commend them. Leghorn seems to hove served the purpose on
occasion, but only by the sheerest accident.
53
the event of negotiations failing you intend a close and
vigorous blockade.3
Not only did Morris anchor in Gibraltar with his command scattered,
he arrived with a sorely crippled ship. Four days out of Norfolk,
Chesapeake's mainmast was sprung, and she ran the remainder of the
crossing with a jury rig.4 After the incident, Chesapeake personnel
found the mast girdled with rot all the way around to a depth of three
inches. Morris wondered why the carpenters at Norfolk had not dis-
covered this grievous deterioration. Equally inexplicable is why Morris
and his officers did not detect it during the rather lengthy prepara-
tions. The ship was taken to the British naval facility at Gibraltar
where repairs required fourteen days.^ The layover at Gibraltar is a
good example of how the nearly total absence of a Navy Department con-
trolled or influenced logistics structure could file the claws of a
formidable force. Acres of canvass and scores of imposing naval cannon
might have won the battle out of sheer magnitude of its bristling
appearance had it been forcefully displayed. Instead, the American
warships spent unnumbered days in the hands of foreigners attempting to
correct deficiencies that had existed before departure. The pian to
construct shipyards was too slow to materialize to benefit the Morris
squadron; hence, there was the real risk, even likelihood, that naval
vessels would be sent in harm's way in less than "Bristol" condition.
^Secretary Navy to Richard V. Morris, 20 April 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 130.
4Dawn Like Thunder, p. 157, and Richard V. Morris to Secretary
Navy, 31 May 1802, Naval Documents, Barbarv Powers, II, p. 162.
5Pawn Like Thunder, p. 162.
54
The expense of foreign repairs was great, and the financial loss to the
United States was nearly complete since payment went entirely to foreign
suppliers and artisans. But the monetary outflow paled beside the
ships' loss of operational time.6 Moreover, such time in port increased
the inclination of many skippers to dawdle ashore. Legitimate require-
ments for maintenance on the ships or relief for the crews did not
account for all of the time thus spent.
Other than his ship's physical condition, Morris' first challenge in
the theater seems to have been one that bedeviled Murray at his depar-
ture: the increasingly adventuresome emperor of Morocco. Solimau re-
newed his demand that the blockade of Meshouda be lifted and that Simpson
issue passports for Moroccan ships to sail into Tripoli. Simpson passed
this along with a favorable recommendation; Morris said no. Soli man's
response was to declare war on the United States forcing Simpson to
withdraw on 25 June 1802.^ The war never went beyond the declaration.
The proximity of United States naval power and Soliman's lack of the
means to fight relegated the declaration to a hollow threat. None the-
less, the prospects of an active conflict were disquieting to Morris, and
he relented to the extent of allowing Moroccan vessels carrying wheat to
enter Tripoli.8 It was to be a concession that would prove embarrassing
to the United States when Soliman blatantly breached its terms.
6The psychological effect of the American flagship's incapacitation
can only be surmised. The fourteen day layup of Chesapeake was actually
rather modest by the squadron's standards. Witness the two month stay
of President at Toulon.
7
Our Navy, p. 113.
80ur Navy, pp. 114-115.
55
Murray, after a brief stop at Gibraltar, moved straightaway (he
would not again move with such agility) toward Tunis and Tripoli. Ills
arrival and first contacts with Eaton helped to throw the mercurial
consul into a depression. Not only had Murray decommissioned Gloria,
when presented with Eaton's plan for the salvation of Tripoli, he
promptly disagreed. Having encountered the same reaction from captains
Bainbridge and Barron, Eaton came to see the senior naval officers as so
many obstructionists with the souls not of warriors but of mice. Only
two weeks earlier, Eaton had given Madison a sanguine evaluation. Now he
painted a picture in the darkest hues sparing only McNeill of Boston in
ascribing the impending disaster to the inconstant blockade of the
captains. He alleged that while a stout blockade would almost certainly
have done the job, Tripoli was blockaded only forty days from his pro-
clamation of 24 July 1801 until the early spring arrival of Boston.
Later Eaton would make Murray and Morris the subjects of his ire, but in
this 8 June 1802 dispatch to Madison, Dale was the main target:
If commander Dale's squadron had continued on its post till
relieved, as appears to have been intended, and had seized
the occasion which my project with the bash,.:, offered; the
United States ere this, perhaps might have had a peace on
terms equally honorable and advantageous.9
Murray sailed on to Tripoli to begin his contribution to the block-
ade; unfortunately, Tripoli already had corsairs abroad. In June of
1802, five Tripolitan row galleys stopped, boarded, and took as a prize
the American merchant brig Franklin. This piracy was committed in the
broad reaches of the Mediterranean, not in some confined area where
9Letter, William Eaton to Secretary State 8 June 1802, Life of
Eaton, pp. 220-223.
56
Tripolitan corsairs enjoyed sanctuary.10 It pointed to a porous or
nonexistent blockade. The Franklin's capture also tended to make of
Eaton a man of clear vision rather than a petulant Jeremiah. The cor-
sairs sailed the captive brig into the harbor of Algiers as if to
register for the benefit of all observers that Tripoli enjoyed a special
relationship with Algeria. O'Brien believed the relationship real
enough, but not close enough to prompt Algeria to blatantly harbor
pirates with United States frigates near at hand. There was also
Algeria's treaty prescribed role as intermediary between Tripoli and the
United States. To this obligation O'Brien appealed in a request to the
dey for intercession on behalf of the crew and ship. With respect to
the United States' interests, the dey's performance as intermediary was
little more than half-hearted. However, he did offer the pirate captain
$5000 for the release of the American captain and crew. The Tripolitan
declined saying that his instructions were to bring the captain and crew
to Tripoli to gain bargaining leverage.H He did relieve the dey's
discomfort by sailing the Franklin from Algiers to Tripoli passing
unchallenged through the American blockade which, at that time, was
maintained by two frigates, Boston and Constellation. Franklin's cap-
tive master later made stern protests over this appearance of blithe
1 ?
disregard by the blockaders.
10Richard O'Brien to Secretary State, 14 June 1802, Public
Documents of the Uti l ted States, IV, pp. 460-465.
1:IRichard O'Brien to Secretary State, 14 June 1802, Public
Decumen ts of the Uni ted Statues, IV, pp. 462-465.
1^Dawn Like Thunder, p. 159, and Andrew Morris, master of brig
Franklin, to James L. Cathcart, 22 July 1802, Public Documents of the
United States, IV, pp. 453-459.
57
The loss of Franklin (she would be regained through neutral diplo¬
matic effort) caused accusations to fly and promoted much re-examination
of strategy and tactics. It is not clear how the prize crew sailed
through the blockade;. 13 the free roaming galleys are easily explained.
They could have sailed unimpeded from Tripoli virtually at will almost
anytime during the preceding fall or winter when there was no blockade
except on paper. Once in the open Mediterranean they had nearly un-
limited short-range or tactical mobility. Furthermore, they could be
rowed or sailed in shallow water, qualities that imparted stealth to
their movement in reduced visibility and a degree of physical immunity
to larger, deep draft ships. Thus, the row galleys succeeded in doing
what the larger Tripolitan corsairs such as Tripoli and Meshouda could
not do; break free of the United States frigates and bring havoc to
unprotected commerce. They could glide with impunity over shoals and
navigate without wind, conditions that limited the frigates as surely as
a barrier anchored to the sea bottom.
1 ^
One explanation is that the blockade was beginning to evaporate
again. Before he had been on station more than a few days, before he
could have learned the nuances of the environment, Murray was edgy to
sail away to Malta or Syracuse to take on water. As the senior captain,
Murray suggested, but did not direct, that McNeill remain on station.
Boston, with nearly two months on station, had already set a squadron
record in that respect. McNeill was thinking of home with repairs en
route, being fearful that his copper sheathing had deteriorated allowing
shipworms to invade his hull. Murray tried to assuage these fears by
assuring McNeill that Boston's copper was of a superior kind and would
last much longer; if there were worm damage, it would be obvious. There
is no record of how angry McNeill became over Murray's arrogant
assumption of superior knowledge of Boston's construction. If the
intent was, indeed, to persuade McNeill to tarry longer off Tripoli, it
failed. Boston departed the station on 26 or 27 June 1802 (there is
some confusion on the date). Alexander Murray to Daniel McNeill, 11
June 1802 and 27 June 1802, both in Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II,
pp. 172 and 187.
58
Until the Frank 11 n disaster cut like a sword, there seems to have
been little open disaffection with basic American strategy, although not
necessarily with its execution. The success of the row galleys either
crystallized incipient concern with the blockade strategy, or i t fert.i-
lized the ground for the blooming of hindsight. In either case, dis-
senting opinions emerged. In general, they were critical of blockading
as the sole strategy for reducing the pirate threat, and an over-
reliance on the large, deep draft frigates. James L. Cathcart, speaking
from Leghorn, decrying the loss of American prestige in the Franklin
incident and its corrosive influence in any negotiations with Tripoli,
began to advocate convoying to protect merchant ships. He felt that the
frigates were admirably suited for convoying and should be diverted
primarily to that purpose. Cathcart also sought consular authority to
hold merchantmen in port pending arrangements for convoy escort, but he
doubted that merchant captains could be well disposed to wait while
convoys were formed.14 Murray, hardly an expert on the strength of his
short stay off Tripoli, offered a similar opinion: blockade with smal-
ler ships for the most part, and convoy with frigates.15 The United
States vice-consul at Cadiz, Anthony Terry, when relaying word of the
Franklin's capture to the Secretary of State, had his own unsolicited
and inexpert opinion. He recommended a higher proportion of small brigs
14Jnmes L. Cathcart to Secretary State, 4 July 1802, Public
Documents of the Uni ted States, IV, pp. 456-457, and James L. Cathcart
to Secretary State, 15 July 1802, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II,
p. 204.
^Alexander Murray to Secretary Navy, 5 July 1802, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, pp. 192-193.
59
in the squadron.16 As for William Eaton, his Olympian plans to change
the destiny of Tripoli were too dependent upon a blockading fleet to
recommend cashiering the whole strategy, but he too made an alteration
in course. Eaton believed, with good reason, that Enterprise, the only
ship in the squadron which was not a frigate, was the most effective
blockader. He concluded that the same fundamental strategy should be
pursued, but with greater determination using ships of the Enterprise
type.17
Could the United States have made short work of the brazen North
Africans by using the frigates for convoy escort and substituting as
blockaders sloops-of-war and other small vessels? It is easy, but
probably inaccurate, to give an unqualified affirmative answer. In
making an estimate based upon the conditions obtaining in the summer of
1802, there are two variables contending in indeterminate degrees.
First, since the frigates were not used to anything like their full
capacity, it cannot be said that their intrinsic shortcomings were
responsible for the early failure of the blockade. If the frigates did
not handle as handily in close quarters or glide over shoals as readily
as smaller ships, they did offer the prospect, under most wind and wave
16Anthony Terry to Secretary State, 22 July 1802, Naval Documents.
Barbary Powers, II, p. 208. It is extremely unlikely that Terry had
sound credentials as a naval strategist. His comments are included to
illustrate how the region's diplomatic corps were as much given to
dabbling In naval matters as the naval officers were to preempting the
field in questions diplomatic. It was a deadly combination.
17William Eaton to Summent and Brown, merchants, Philadelphia, 9
July 1302, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 196.
60
conditions, of greater speed. Among the other consequences of this
phenomenon are the capacity to patrol a greater area and, if unimpeded
by shoals and propelled by sufficient wind, to run down an offender who
might have slipped through. This considerable virtue (and others such
as more and bigger guns) of the frigates becomes nearly academic when It
is recognized that the big ships were so seldom found even in the
vicinity of Tripoli. The second variable that confounds the historian
is whether the performance characteristics of the smaller craft were
actually that ideally suited to the conditions of the moment? Was
Enterprise representative of the type, or did she sparkle throughout the
operation because of superior leadership, the benign hand of fortune, or
other conditions? Would the glitter have been absent had Enterprise
been commanded by Dale or Murray? It is apparent why contemporary
observers became attracted to small ships and heaped opprobrium upon the
frigates and the blockade strategy. It did not produce any radical
changes in strategy or a redirection of the frigates to new endeavors.
During the greater part of the summer of 1802, Murray prosecuted
the blockade with as much determination as he ever mustered in the
Mediterranean. As acting commodore in that part of the theater, he
directed briefly, but never ail during the same period, the employment
of Philadelphia, Boston, and Enterprise. In this function he exhibited
his knack for taking actions at odds with his own stated opinions.
^Small does not equal fast in displacement sailing vessels. Other
factors held constant or raised proportionally (e.g., sail area) the
longer the ship, the faster. There are equations that predict this
relationship rather accurately, but they are beyond the scope of this
study and the ken of this writer.
61
Having extolled the merits of Enterprise-type ships as blockaders, he
promptly dispatched Enterprise on convoy escort to Gibraltar.10 With
Poston's departure in late June, and a stay of but a few days by
Philadelphia, Murray with Constellation constituted the blockade during
practically all of July and the first half of August.20 At the end of
July, with provisions getting low, he informed the Secretary of the Navy
that he planned to leave the station unguarded within ten days if no
help arrived. He concluded in typical Murray fashion, part apology, part
mild self-praise, and some subtle condemnations of his contemporaries
mixed with ruminations on strategy:
I am sorry to say none of our ships have ever been here more
than a day or two except the Boston who hath been about a
month, tho possibly they might have been as well employed
elsewhere, yet I think we ought to shew ourselves off Tripoli
as often as possible.21
Murray stayed longer than the promised ten days; when no relief did
arrive, he departed on 14 August, leaving Tripoli unguarded. With more
than two months of blockading, he exceeded McNeill's record; also, he
19Alexander Murray to Secretary Navy, 30 July 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, pp. 217-218.
on
Most commentators on McNeill castigate him for ineffective wan-
dering about the Mediterranean which he did do from late June until
September. See, for example, Leonard P. Gutteridge and Jay D. Smith,
The Commodores (New York, 1969), p. 67. Also, his anomalous conduct in
leaving his personnel ashore and taking reluctant non-crewmembers to sea
is reprehensible. Notwithstanding his deficient performance, he remains
one of the most effective of the captains while on-station. The Navy
Department did not appreciate this. Shortly after Ills return, Secretary
Smith informed McNeill that he was relieved from active duty for failing
to qualify for retention under the "principles of selection which have
been adopted." Letter, Secretary Navy to Daniel McNeill, 27 October
1802, Letters to Officers, Roll 6.
^Alexander Murray to Secretary Navy, 30 July 1802, Naval
Documents, Carbary Powers, II, p. 219.
62
was at the business a far greater time than Morris or anyone else in the
replacement squadron was to be. However, the tour off Tripoli took
something out of Murray. As modest as were bis accompilshraents there,
they were flares in the darkness beside his practically nonexistent
achievements after that time. Upon his departure, Murray even depre-
cated the very idea of a blockade, asserting that it was too easily
defeated by the small Tripolitan ships.^2 It is hard to divine whether
the departing commodore really felt this or was merely trying to salve
his conscience at leaving Tripoli unguarded.
Nearly everything is relative. William Eaton adjudged Murray to be
a miserable failure, along with most of the other American captains. By
later summer of 1802, Eaton was at loggerheads not only with the Barbary
chieftains but with the senior American officers as well. The consul
craved action and had seen very little of it.23 This, with the rejec-
tion of his Tripoli plan by most of the naval officers and the deco^mis-
sioning of Gloria, turned Eaton's hand against the naval contingent.
The abrasive relationship wouid number his days as consul at Tunis.
Eaton's censure of Murray to Madison is a piece of inspired invective:
op
Alexander Murray to Secretary Navy, 14 August 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 234.
This timorous nature of the naval leaders in the Mediterranean in
the 1801-1803 period and the slashing techniques advanced by Eaton were
in pronounced opposition to each other. One notes with astonishment how
roles can change. In 1980 with the United States attempting to counter
another brigand nation, Iran, the diplomat Cyrus Vance resigned from the
Carter administration over the abortive ex cution of a plan with an
obvious military stamp aimed at freeing hostages. Eaton would surely
have sougiit a seat in the lead aircraft.
63
Government may as well send out Quaker meeting-houses to
float about this sea as frigates with Murrays in command.
The friendly salutes he may receive and return at Gibraltar
produce nothing at Tripoli. Have we but one Truxton [sic]
and one Sterrett in the United States?24
Personal enmity is obvious in this denunciation, but Eaton was also
capable of reaching sound conclusions after calm deliberation. He could
envision nothing but growing contempt for the United States after more
than a year of irresolute, helter-skelter operations. Financially
strapped from applying personal funds to public purposes, insulted by
the oppressive bey, in poor health, and humiliated by Murray, Eaton was
at the end of his tether. With regret he submitted his resignation to
Madison on 23 August 1802.25 Did Eaton expect a suppliant reply with
urgings from the administration that he stay on? Did he expect that
circumstance would intervene in his favor before a reply could reach
him? Either is possible; the resignation couid as easily have been
utterly genuine. It cannot be doubted, however, that the consul was
deeply distressed over the hand that fortune had dealt him and United
States policy on the North African coast.
Morris arrived at Gibraltar only three weeks after Murray. To use
the psychological power of his squadron or its guns, if necessary, to
sway the bashaw was his main business. It would have been reasonable to
expect his arrival off Tripoli approximately three weeks after Murray.
This would have had several salutary effects, the two most important
24William Eaton to Secretary State, 9 August 1802, Life of Eaton,
p. 224.
25William Eaton to Secretary State, 23 August 1802, Life of Eaton,
p. 227.
G4
being a strengthening of the blockade and a commander's station at the
point of decision. But the currents that dictate events had diverted
the new commodore. He had reasons, convenient and to a degree valid, to
remain for a time in the vicinity of Gibraltar. First, there was the
previously cited damage from rot to Chesapeake's main mast that required
work in the British yard at Gibraltar. These repairs were not discre-
tionary, and no indictment can be issued against Morris for giving
priority to restoring the structural integrity of his ship. The second
factor in Morris' delayed advance upon the enemy's coast is much more
questionable. When Chesapeake arrived at Gibraltar, Essex was standing
guard over the long impounded Meshouda, but Essex was due to return to
the United States. Meshouda. shorn of much of her potential for mis-
chief by crew desertion and partial deactivation, still demanded some
consideration. Morris decided to undertake the Meshouda overwatch with
Chesapeake.2^ He erred not in taking the mission initially but in not
transferring it sooner to another ship. Most egregiously of all, he
failed in not leaving the northwestern Mediterranean even after having
made the transfer.
The "war" between Morocco and the United States that had driven
consul Simpson from Tangier died on the vine, and he returned to that
capital. Yet accusations and threats continued. When the frigate Adams
arrived on 21 July 1802, Morris assigned her to patrol the Strait of
Gj braltar.27 This was a questionable, indeed probably wrong, decision.
26Richard V. Morris to unspecified addressee, 14 June 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 173.
27Dami Like Thunder, p. 157.
65
Morocco, though refractory with words, had no real warmaking capacity at
sea. Soliroan craved regional influence and while he attempted to build
some semblance of a navy, he maintained a high level of vocal activity
in the diplomatic sphere as intermediary for Tripoli. During the summer
of 1302 he resumed and strengthened his already strident call for pass-
ports to permit cargo ships to enter Tripoli, and for the release of the
Meshouda. Simpson resisted Soliman's entreaties until the latter dis-
armed him with a new tactic: the emperor declared that Meshouda was his
ship and would fly the Moroccan flag. This act of a sovereign nation
not at war with the United States left both Simpson and Morris without a
valid objection.28
Toward the end of the summer some of the strong sentiment among
area consuls for convoying merchant ships began to impress Morris.
Enterprise had arrived with a convoy from the central Mediterranean, and
Adam3, cruising the strait without much purpose, was available to play
watchdog over Meshouda. Morris reassigned Adams to the Gibraltar sta-
tion and with Enterprise he accompanied a flock of merchantmen to
Leghorn. When Morris sailed with this thirteen ship convoy on 18 August
1002,29 he had been in and around Gibraltar nearly three months. Pangs
of conscience must have been the final prod that pushed him eastward.
The availability of three ships gave Morris virtually unlimited
freedom to move to a better position to accomplish his mission. John
Paul Jones, Oliver Hazard Perry, or Bull Halsey would have gone to
28James Simpson to Secretary State, 3 September 1802, Public Papers
of the Uni ted Sta tes, IV, pp. 477-478.
2®James Gavino to Secretary State, 19 August 1802, Naval Documents,
Birbary Fowers, II, p. 241.
66
Tripoli. That Morris went convoying says much about the man. However,
it should be recalled that in Morris' basic orders, convoy escorting wa3
a specifically stated secondary mission. After professing to agonize
over the possible conflict between the primary and secondary missions,30
it is not surprising that Morris elected to chaperone the merchantmen.
The decision moved the commodore in the right direction; however, it
almost certainly did not send the bashaw a clear signal of American
capability and will to call him to account.
Morris was not the only generator of unclear signals. Back home,
the administration was in the throes of indecision. The State Depart-
ment prepared new instructions that signalled a partial withdrawal from
the stiff-spined policy that prompted the deployment of the squadron in
the first place, and a partial return to blatant, supine bribery.
Morris was to deliver $30,000 to the dey of Algeria in a continuation of
the ongoing effort to buy that autocrat's good will. Further, Morris
was authorized to dispense between $20,000 and $30,000 to the chiefs cf
Morocco, Tripoli, and Tunisia in conciliatory gifts, the exact amounts
to each recipient unspecified. In addition to the money, he was to
deliver to the emperor of Morocco the 100 gun carriages in response to
on
Richard Dale to Joset Yznardy, United States consul to Cadiz, 11
August 1802, Nayal Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 230. Use of war-
ships as convoy escorts, per se, is no misapplication of naval power.
The practice has saved innumerable ships and men. It was the delive-
ranee of Great Britain in 1941-1942. Convoying colocates tlie shepherd
witli the sheep, a merit of note. However, to pursue further the shep-
herd analogy that fits so well, it does nothing to seek out the wolves
and bring them to an accounting. Convoying is a negative strategy that
can stave off disaster; an offensive strategy must ultimately be adopted
in most instances.
67
the request Simpson had passed along In January of that year.31 F1na1-
ly, and thoroughly at odds with the otherwise kowtowing character of the
instructions, the administration directed Morris to "use every exertion
to terminate the affair with Tripoli and to prevent a rupture with any
of the other Barbary Powers. -.32 Had the State Department set about to
enshroud the master strategy in mystery it could have done no better.
This confusing document did not contribute to Morris' wavering course in
the first months of his tour because he did not receive it until several
months later. But the new instructions do illustrate how the national
government could be as fluid in its deliberations and decisions as its
Mediterranean commander was in his execution of them.
Mutability in strategy does not necessarily brand national leaders
as incompetents in that nearly unbounded field called foreign relations.
Far from being a flaw, flexibility in dealing with scheming tyrants can
be a supreme virtue. United States strategy in 1802 had flexibility
aplenty. Unfortunately, it was too riddled with senseless changes and
destructive inconsistencies to be easily applied in the field. Never-
theless, the policy might have weathered these flaws had It not divided
responsibility among the Mediterranean agents who were charged with
applying it.
As Morris sailed east he was certain to become involved with the
two most contentious consuls of the area, William Eaton and James L.
3^James Simpson to John Gavino, 27 September 1802, Public Documents
of the Uni ted StaJ.es, IV, p. 480. Simpson believed the carriages would
normalize relations for years to come.
32Secretary Navy to Richard V. Morris, 13 August 1802, Naval
Documents, Darbary Powers, II, p. 232.
68
Cathcart. His tempestuous relationship with both would revolve about
the central issue of ultimate authority. Unless specific mandates to
the contrary are issued, senior diplomatic officials in a region or
country are presumed to hold a degree of authority superior to that of
military commanders who share the same area of interest. Two issues are
implicit. First, were the consuls diplomats? In the early 1800's, to a
greater extent than now, consuls were technically commercial agents
without the authority and immunities of full-fledged diplomats.33 For
example, William Eaton was not officially empowered to act in the same
capacities as was Rufus King in London. The inferior position of con-
suls did not simply spring out of common usage; the Constitution rele-
gates consuls to a different status when it enjoins the President, "to
appoint Ambassadors, and other public Ministers and Consuls," with the
advice and consent of the Senate.34 In the flesh, however, the consuls
of the Barbary coast were practically ambassadors in their functioning.
Certainly Eaton felt no restraints upon his activities by dint of being
a mere consul, and Cathcart shared these sentiments to a considerable
extent. They approached the commodores as ambassadors.
The second issue rests upon the intent of the administration's
instructions in the matter of delegating authority to Morris. The
earlier referenced first addendum to Morris' basic orders directed him
to transport Cathcart to Tripoli for negotiations and to work with him
OO
Tracy Hollingsworth Lay, The Foreign Service of the United States
(New York, 1925), pp. 10-11.
34The Constitution of the United States of America, Article II,
Section 2.
69
(see page 52). This would seem to distribute prerogatives equally
between the two or give slightly greater weight to Cathcart, depending
upon interpretation. If these provisions were equivocal, the Secretary
of the Navy's letter transferring diplomatic funds (see page 66) to
Morris seemed plainly to superimpose the commodore over Eaton, Simpson
and O'Brien in diplomacy. The Secretary of State sent parallel communi-
cations to his consuls so that they would understand Morris terms for
dispensing the funds. Madison was quite direct in explaining to Simpson
his subordinate position counseling him to, "consult with and receive the
sanction of Commodore Morris, whenever he shall be within a communicat-
ing distance. .,35
Eaton's interpretation of his consular authority was exceptionally
broad as already noted. Madison's letter to him concerning the funds
left some room for inference and deduction, a dangerous allowance in
Eaton's case. Money and arms were the two most persuasive forces on the
North African coast. Control of this rather sizable reservoir of diplo-
matic funds was a good measure of authority, and it rested with the
commodore. Eaton could avail himself of a portion of the fund to the
extent that Morris could "be led to see the necessity of it."36 As will
be seen, Eaton paid no heed to Madison's qualification; he pillaged the
fund with unauthorized commitments. Having given rise to as many
questions as it answered, the administration finally answered (at leant
36Jamos Madison to James Simpson, 22 August 1802, Nava.1 Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, p. 245.
36James Madison to William Eaton, 22 August 1802, Naval Documents,
Oarbary Powers, II, p. 245.
70
to Morris) the question of the iocus of ultimate diplomatic authority.
In a 27 August 1802 letter to Morris, the Secretary of the Navy trans-
mitted a summary of administration policy that left virtually nothing to
interpretation. Morris was to have "superintending agency" in the
forthcoming negotiations with Tripoli. It made him diplomatic lead
horse beyond dispute by authorizing the commodore to conduct the Tri-
politan negotiations even if he could not find and transport Cathcart to
Tripoli. While not as specific as when speaking of Tripoli, the letter
also empowered Morris to deal with the other Barbary states as senior
United States diplomat along that coast.37 This dramatic shift in the
center of gravity from consuls to commodores was certain to be abrasive.
Indeed, stormy relations in the Mediterranean did not await Morris
receipt of this new grant of power. Before the 27 August letter arrived
(apparently Morris did not receive it until late autumn), even before
Secretary Smith wrote it, the bellicose consuls, Eaton and Cathcart,
were firing salvos at the navy. Not having encountered the inert
Morris, their target was Murray. Eaton had worked himself into a thick
lather over Murray. Dipping his pen in acid, Eaton writing to the
Secretary of State, pointedly accused Murray of lack of aggressiveness
and ineffectiveness. He cited the bey's expressed approbation of Murray
as a sure sign of the latter's timidity. Having already tendered a
^Secretary Navy to Richard V. Morris, 27 August 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 257. Morris did not record his eitto-
tions upon receipt of the letter, but they were probably mixed, Sm i th
did not cease with the diplomatic instructions; he proceeded to give all
manner of suggestions on tactics Morris should use with his squadron.
He went so far as to specify the employment of specific ships, No
commander with pride in his ability could welcome such interference.
71
resignation, Eaton now threatened once more to resign if the squadron
did not confront the enemy with "more active measures."38
Cathcart also contributed to the fusillade against Murray even
though he had little or no direct knowledge of the interim commodore's
performance. Being something of a confederate of Eaton's in the basic
strategy against the bashaw, the two maintained an exchange of let-
ters." Cathcart alleged that Murray had done much to unravel the
efforts of himself and Eaton. In a more abstract vein, Cathcart ques-
tioned to Madison the wisdom of any policy that allowed ship captains to
encroach upon diplomatic territory.40 Knowing nothing of the 27 August
letter fundamentally shifting negotiating responsibility (it was written
two days later), Cathcart did not know how deep would be the naval foray
into the province of diplomats. With a touch almost of clairvoyance he
objected that it would be unwise to "subject men [diplomats, consuls] to
the caprice of ,41every gentleman who may command our vessels of War.
OO
At the time, Murray deserved better of Eaton. During his first
three months in the theater Murray spent a much higher proportion of his
time blockading, albeit porously, than any other captain or commodore
during the period under consideration. This petulant attack is more a
function of personal animosity than of substance. William Eaton to
James Madison, 23 August 1802, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, pp.
248-249.
on
See, for example, letter, William Eaton to James L. Cathcart, 4
August 1802, Area File, Role 3. Eaton unburdened his soul to Cathcart.
Of the squadron he asked, "What have they done but dance and wench?" Of
Samuel Barron, captain of Philadelphia, he said that officer would have
been even leas energetic except for "an apprehension that my vigilance
would betray his inactivity."
49James L. Cathcart to Secretary State, 25 August 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers. II, p. 252.
4*James L. Cathcart to Secretary State 25 August 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 252.
72
The consuls, while mightily resenting naval Incursions into their
bailiwick, were never averse to unsolicited utterances on naval strategy
and even tactics. As a group they were partial to convoy protection
over blockading, but there were notable exceptions. The United States
squadron had not blockaded Tangier, but its presence operating around
Gibraltar could be readily sensed in Tangier. This, rather than the
loose Tripoli blockade which Simpson had never observed, probably en-
couraged his recommendation to Madison endorsing a tight and visible
blockade before the main harbor of any truculent chieftain.42 Eaton,
who was much nearer the Tripoli blockade than Simpson, knew full well
that it had been porous from the beginning. Despite its unsatisfactory
implementation, he had lost none of his passion for the strategy in the
abstract. In September 1802 he reiterated to Madison his frequently
expressed opinion that a tighter cordon around Tripoli would turn the
trick. In the same letter he condemned the squadron's effort up to that
time lamenting, "Thus ends the expedition of 1802."43
After leaving the blockade station in mid-August, Murray took
Constellatlon on an ambling trip back toward Gibraltar. He seems to
have lost heart for using his ship to project American power. After a
stop at Naples in September 44 he put in at Leghorn in early October.
There he encountered Cathcart. The two had a sharp divergence of
42James Simpson to Janies Madison, 3 September 1802, Public
Documents of the Uni ted States, IV, pp. 477-478.
43Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 272.
44AIexander Murray to Secret' 'y Navy, 18 September 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, IT ) . 278.
73
opinion on how to bring Tripoli into line. Murray, according to
Cathcart, believed it in the interest of the United States to buy peace
for another two years after which the nation would be stronger for
political reasons.45 This was a strange point of view—with something
of an unsavory flavor—for a senior naval officer to express to a diplo-
matic official. It seems to reflect conviction on Murray's part that
the administration bore responsibility for the woes with Tripoli and
that a new president would handle the situation more effectively. It
may also have been a technique convenient for Murray in rationalizing
his move away from Tripoli. He had already registered with Eaton his
view that the blockade was unworkable and that "repeated convoy" was the
only solution.46 He had already acquired the disenchantment with
blockading that appeared to strike American commanders like a virulent
disease.
While Murray was at Leghorn, Cathcart felt spurred to send Morris a
letter heavy with spontaneously rendered advice. He did not know, of
course, that the commodore was about to put in at Leghorn. The diplomat
in Cathcart spoke for an attempt at conciliation initially, but if that
failed, to engage in the most spirited naval maneuvers. First, he said,
the two of them should go to the bashaw under a flag of truce having
behind them in the bay as much of the Mediterranean squadron as could be
mustered. As Cathcart offered his plan, It was a combination of earnest
^5James L. Cathcart to Secretary State, 8 October 1802, Naval
Documents, Ba^bary Powers* II, p. 288. Jefferson was far more aggrea-
sive with the Barbary chieftains than were his predecessors.
46Alexander Murray to William Eaton, 5 September 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 266.
74
attempt to negotiate, show of force, and reconnaissance. He iaid great
store by the show of force, but he aiso recognized the curative powers
of applied force should that fail. Cathcart was perfectly amenable to
firing on Tripoli with special attention to the bashaw's castle which
was within naval cannon range. He hastened to counsel Morris that in no
event should the two of them convey the notion that the United States
would sue for a dishonorable peace merely to protect shipping interests.
Finally, Cathcart charged the commodore with exercising a quality the
American officers seemed to leave at the Pillars of Hercules: "It is
absolutely necessary that our operations should be characterized by
their ..47energy.
Morris had already exhibited a nearly disabling listlessness as a
commander, and he never improved. But if a surfeit of advice could have
compensated for his deficiencies of energy, he would yet have carried
the day. Eaton had not met Morris, and his contempt for the commodore
had not yet flowered, but it was plain that the consul expected action
and felt obliged to influence its course. The bey was demanding as a
gift a thirty-six gun frigate,48 a demand, Eaton believed, that had
issued indirectly from American lethargy in the Tunis-Tripoli region.
Accordingly, the consul exhorted the commodore to action both direct and
forceful; to reject sole reliance on treaties and other instruments of
47Letter, James L. Cathcart to Richard V. Morris, 12 October 1802,
Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 291. The graduation from show
of force to applied force was perfectly in accord with classical
strategic doctrine then and now. Nations that employ a show of force
without the capability or intent to escalate if necessary usually end
with the bluff being exposed.
4®William Eaton to Secretary State, 12 September 1802, Life of
Eaton, pp. 230-231.
75
diplomacy, and by all means to place no stock in the proffered assis-
tance of the Europeans in purging the Mediterranean of corsairs. Eaton
even ventured that the pirates served a purpose for the Europeans who
could have created them had not the Barbary coast produced them by
natural means.49 Eaton sent a parallel note to Madison adding that no
United States frigate had cruised the waters off Tunis since 29 January
1802, despite units of the squadron having spent ten days at Cagiiori,
Sardinia, only a day's sail away.50
In mid-October Morris arrived at Leghorn after a fifty-five day
convoy from Gibraltar. There he encountered Murray and Cathcart for the
first time (Murray for the only time).51 It should have been, and
possibly was, an opportunity to gain intelligence and lay great plans.
It was certainly one of those exceptional circumstances that colocated
three of the principals. While neither spectacular nor deep and lasting
results can be ascribed to the meeting, it did have consequences; United
States interests were advanced, if only fractionally.
In planning future operations, Morris was not without fairly seri-
ous constraints in the shape of maintenance problems. Constellation had
broken a rudder pintle in early September during the trip from Tripoli.
CO
Murray did not consider her fit to challenge heavy weather. * Morris
49William Eaton to Richard V. Morris, 16 October 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 297.
50
William Eaton to James Madison, 22 October 1802, Naval Documents.
Barbary Powers, II, p. 305.
51Richard V. Morris to James Madison, 15 October 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 296.
52
Alexander Murray to Richard V. Morris, 18 September 1802,
76
had troubles with his siiip as well. He had just detected that
Chesapeake's bowsprit was extensively rotted.53 With repairs to both
ships being the first required actions, Morris finally laid out a plan
whose execution would have been consonant with his basic mission.
Constellation would sail to Toulon for repair to the rudder pintle.
From there Murray would go west to Gibraltar and then to Tangier where
he would assist in solidifying good relations with the emperor. This
would include a reaffirmation of the decision to allow the wheat carry-
ing ships to pass the blockade. After repairs to the bowsprit, Morris
would take Cathcart on board and go to Tripoli to begin the much delayed
negotiations. Enterprise would be committed to convoy escort duty from
Leghorn westward.54 There was no mention of how the other ship of the
squadron, Adams, would be used.
Naval Documents, Barbary Powers. II, pp. 293-294. The pintle is the
metal member that hinges the rudder to the hull. Without doubt, the
damage was serious, but surely a captain of purpose and imagination
would have seen to its repair much sooner than did Murray. Comparisons
with the restoration of the shattered USS Yorktown to combat condition
in three days before the battle of Midway come to mind. In defense of
Murray it can be said that the absence of an early 1800's equivalent of
Pearl Harbor was a severe limitation. The lamentable state of repair
arrangements in the theater plagued the force again and again.
53Richard V. Morris to Secretary Navy, 15 October 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, pp. 296-297. It is not clear whether the
rot was insipient and unobserved or noted and then disregarded. It
seems unlikely that a major canvass carrying member could have suffered
catastrophic rot under watchful eyes. Perhaps a degree of negligence on
the part of captain and crew can reasonably be imputed. Morris' extreme
caution In conducting naval operations may not have had a counterpart In
careful Inspection of the ship.
54St.ephen Cathalan, commercial agent, Marsailles to James Madison,
25 October 1802, Area File, Roll 3, and Richard V. Morris to Secretary
Navy, 15 October 1802, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, pp. 296-297.
77
Morris had formulated a design, far from brilliant, but at least
one that could have guided him to a measure of success. But in the same
breath he explained that he would not begin the most important segment
of the plan, the negotiations at Tripoli, for several months. In bla-
tantly exculpatory fashion he pointed out for the Secretary of the
Navy's consideration that the squadron was practically out of money and
that the weather would not allow operations near Tripoli until January.
Also, he needed more ships of the Enterprise type for effective block-
ading;55 this was an accurate statement, but it did not square well
coming from a man who had just sent Enterprise on convoy escort. The
remainder has the ring of an alibi for inaction.
The commodore might have considered a dramatic course had he but
realized how rapidly United States prestige and influence were slipping
away. The Barbary chieftains recognized irresolution and laxity in the
application of policy when they saw it. In Algiers, the dey had heard
of a plan to replace O'Brien with Cathcart. He stated pointedly in a
letter to Jefferson that Cathcart was a troublemaker and unacceptable.
He followed this up with a refusal to accept a tribute payment of
$30,000 in lieu of stores.57 It was the previous year replayed regard-
ing the tribute.
55Richard V. Morris to Secretary Navy, 15 October 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 297.
56Dey of Algiers to President Thomas Jefferson, 17 October 1802,
Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 300.
57Richard O'Brien to James Madison, 23 November 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 321.
78
In Tripoli an event had occurred with potential consequences most
grave for the fate of the American effort. Tripoli concluded a peace
with Sweden on 21 October that boded ill both as a precedent setter and
through its elimination of a co-belligerent who had been of some value
in restricting the activities of the Tripolitan corsairs. The peace
smacked of dishonor for Sweden. The most onerous term of the treaty
required a Swedish payment of $200,000 to the bashaw within six
months.58 With Morris doing little to strengthen his bargaining posi-
tion it is easy to understand how the bashaw could adopt the Swedish
settlement as a standard to be applied against the United States.
After leaving Leghorn, Murray required nearly six weeks to reach
the western Mediterranean counting his stop at Toulon.59 From mid-
August to late November his contribution to the operational effective-
ness of the squadron was essentially nil. It is probably a3 well that
Constellation did not blunder into harm's way. Not only was she limping
with the broken pintle, there is reason to believe she was neither a
happy nor a well run ship. If duelling be taken as an extreme manifes-
tation of friction within an organization, Constellatlon was riddled
with dissention. While in Leghorn, one of her officers, Lt. Lawson,
fought a duel with the commander of her Marine detachment, Captain
McKnight. Lawson killed Mcknight. The tragedy apparently caught Murray
58Nicholas Nissen, Danish consul, Tripoli, to James L. Cathcart, 22
October 1802, Area File, Roll 3.
®9Alexander Murray to Secretary Navy, 21 November 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 319.
79
completely by surprise even though the conflict between the two men did
not arise overnight.60
As impotent as Murray became in the last part of his tour, he had
spent considerable time lying off the enemy's coast and he had made a
fair sampling of the difficulties intrinsic to the Mediterranean opera-
tion. As much could not be said of Morris. Based upon his experience
Murray made several observations on how to improve the squadron's effi¬
ciency. First, he commented on the Inefficacy of the supply system.
Off-loading and stocking supplies at Gibraltar was but little better
than having them in the Untied States (it was at least sixty operational
days better, but the exaggeration is understandable). Establish a
supply base at Malta, said Murray.61 This was a meritorious if not a
sparklingly new idea. It prompts the question of whether or not Murray
would have returned to the Tripoli blockade had he been able to resupply
from American stocks at Malta. His second suggestion was considerably
®°Captain Daniel Carmick, USMC to Commandant USMC, 15 October 1002,
Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, pp. 293-294. There is considerable
correspondence in reference to the duel; none of the accounts contain
substantial disagreement. Murray was blind to a catastrophic problem.
After the event he was incensed, perhaps because it was sure to reflect
unfavorably on him as captain. Duelling among officers in the United
States Navy was unlawful and viewed with the strongest opprobrium. It
was still a relatively frequent practice in the United States, especial-
ly in the South, but it was illegal in most states. It is worth noting
that two years later, after the Hamilton duel, Aaron Burr was wanted for
murder in several states.
61Alexander Murray to Secretary Navy, 21 November 1802, Naval
Documents, Ba.rb.ary Po???!!?.' II* P- 319- The supply system worked hand-
somely for ships operating near the strait. Essex and Phlladelph la
routinely drew from the Gibraltar stocks while guarding the Gibraltar
harbor entrance. See, for example, requisition from William Bainbridge,
Essex to John Gavino, consul, Gibraltar, 25 March 1802, Area File,
Roll 3.
80
more novel. Guarding Meshouda had tied up a frigate nearly without
interruption for almost eighteen months. Allow her to leave Gibraltar,
Murray advised, and promptly capture her on the high seas.62 An obvious
oversimplification, the idea, nonetheless, had much to commend it.
Murray's idea did not steer the course of events, but he approximately
described the culmination of the Meshouda affair the following spring.
Morris remained nearly three weeks in Leghorn after seeing Murray
off. This was a typically lengthy stop for the commodore. Unlike his
predecessors, Morris rarely sent reports to Secretary Smith,63 which,
among its several consequences, obviated the need to offer frequent
alibis for his unbusinesslike conduct. Aside from the chance meeting
with Murray, there was one other noteworthy aspect of the Leghorn stop:
the commodore finally met Cathcart. This marked the beginning of a
blustery relationship between the two that was to be a drogue on the
United States campaign in the Mediterranean.
Cathcart had been in Leghorn since the Tripolitan declaration of
war in May, 1801. As already noted, he shared most of Eaton's views
regarding how to win in the Mediterranean. This assured that he would
be at odds with the naval leadership. Cathcart was a competent and
experienced civil servant well thought of at home,64 but his long and
62Letter, Alexander Murray to Secretary Navy, 26 November 1802,
Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 328.
63James L. Cathcart to Secretary State, 25 January 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 348.
640ne historian has called Cathcart an "idler." See William M.
Fowler, Jr., Jack Tars and Commodores (Boston, 1984), p. 73. Meddler
yes, idler no. This judgment is incorrect. Jefferson himself was
nearer the mark when he said of Cathcart, "He is personally known to me
81
frustrating period of inactivity made him a poor candidate for an exten-
ded and seemingly useless cruise on board Chesapeake. As consul-
designate to Algeria, transportation to Algiers was the primary reason
for his embarkation.65 This was not to be, nor was he destined to
participate in the ill-starred attempt at negotiations with Tripoli.
Late fall and early winter of the 1802-1803 period may have marked
the nadir of American activity against the pirates. Incongruously
enough, it was the time of maximum strength (on paper at least) of the
squadron. By most other criteria, as well, it was imposing. In late
1802, the squadron was comprised of the frigates Chesapeake,
Constellation, and New York (a recent arrival), mounting forty-four guns
each; the frigates Adams and John Adams, thirty-two guns each; and the
fourteen-gun sloop Enterprise.66 However, the squadron was a painfully
wounded eagle. Several conditions had eroded its capacity as an instru-
ment of policy; its claws were dull. First, the piecemeal arrival of
the ships and the absence of rendezvous points precluded coordinated
action. Morris did not command a squadron, but a loose collection of
individual ships. Moreover, Murray, with little stomach for taking the
action to the enemy, had been in the process of heading homeward for
four months, and Morris had yet to see the enemy. Finally, and second
and pretty well known; he is the honest and ablest consul we have with
the Barbary powers; a man of sound judgment and fearlessness." See
Cathcart Letterbook, statement of Jefferson, initial un-numbered page.
65James L. Cathcart to Secretary State, 25 January 1802, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 348.
66Alexander Murray to John Graham, Secretary, United States
Legation, Madrid, 14 December 1802, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II,
p. 332.
82
only to the flagging spirit of the senior captains as a detriment to
efficiency, there was the omnipresent affliction of ship unservice-
ability. The tribulations of Consteilation and Chesapeake have been
noted; the new arrival, New York was similarly beset. In late November
she was unseaworthy and undergoing repairs to a sprung mainmast at Port
Mahon.67 For a time, and in varying degrees, the three major ships of
the Morris squadron were hors de combat.
During this season of passivity Eaton remained the most steadfast
proponent of maintaining pressure on the Barbary chieftains. To main-
tain his diplomatic momentum, Eaton had resorted to questionable tech-
niques in spending money. Taken to task by Madison for loose accounting
of expenditures, he offered a combination of weak alibis and a frank
admission that the attempt to promote the cause of Mahamet had exhausted
his diplomatic funds. Eaton confessed to having borrowed from local
lenders some $23,000,68 a bold presumption upon his somewhat circum-
scribed consular authority. But even Eaton's fortitude was not limit-
less. In that winter of his great discontent the consul, in a strongly
exculpatory tone, said to Madison:
My means and my resources of resistance are totally exhausted
at this place. The operations of our squadron this season
have done less than the last to aid my efforts. Only one
frigate of this squadron has been hitherto seen on the
enemy's coast. I can no longer talk of resistance and coer-
cion without reciting a grimace of contempt and ridicule.a9
®7Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 332.
68Willlam Eaton to Secretary State, S November 1802, Life of Eaton,
p. 235.
69W.tlliam Eaton to Secretary State, 20 ?r 1802, Life r?X
Eaton, 20 December 1802, pp. 236-237.
83
Morris sailed from Leghorn on 3 November 1802 with Cathcart aboard
having as one of his purposes to deliver the consul-designate to
Algiers. It was not, however, a purpose to which Morris assigned a high
priority, for he put in first at Malta in a continuation of the attempt
to repair the bowsprit. While the bowsprit deserved the closest atten-
tion, so, it developed, did Cathcart.70 In their intimate association
of over four months, the consui was continually exposed to Morris at his
worst. His observations of Morris' spendthrift use of seapower and his
diplomatic ineptitude were frequently made and carefully chronicled.
The commodore spent thirty-five days in Malta engaged in
Chesapeake's bowsprit repairs in an ample demonstration of the folly of
relying on British naval facilities for major repairs. The long stay at
Malta, punctuated by an ineffectual ten day cruise to Sicily, did serve
at least one other good purpose in addition to the bowsprit repairs. It
permitted the largest concentration of squadron ships in one place since
the original squadron sailed into Gibraltar. Enterprise, New York, and
John Adams all arrived within a two week period in late December and
71
early January. For a change, Morris was not plagued by the limita-
tions of a diffused force.
A dark counterweight for Morris to the fortuitous assembly of most
of his squadron was receipt of information that both Morocco and Algeria
70
The dey would not, of course, have accepted Cathcart who did not,
in November, know of the unqualified rejection. A good faith effort to
deliver Cathcart might have divested Morris of one of his most observant
and damaging critics. Having tried and been spurned by the dey, Morris
could have deposited Cathcart at virtually any port along the way.
7*James L. Cathcart to Secretary State, 25 January 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 348.
84
were increasingly contemptuous of America's ability.to hold sway along
the troubled North African coast. Morris and Cathcart learned of the
dey's rejection of his consul-designate and his refusal to accept the
$30,000 cash payment in substitution for supplies.72 The emperor of
Morocco manifested his low regard for the United States by violating the
terms to which Morris had consented in his issuance of safe conduct
passports for wheat carrying ships. Morris received intelligence infor-
mation on this breach in time to react, a rarity in the Mediterranean
theater in 1801-1803. The Paollna, a Moroccan cargo vessel, was re-
ported to have made a stop at Tunis where she picked up some contraband
cargo to be run through the blockade into Tripoli. Morris ordered
Enterprise to intercept the Paollna and inspect her cargo. The small
but worthy Enterprise, in her usual stalwart fashion, espied the offend-
er near Malta on 17 January 1803, boarded her, and found the suspect
cargo. Enterprise returned to Malta with the Moroccan ship as a prize.
This decisive action by Morris pleased Cathcart and, in principle,
comported well with the course the other consuls wished to steer.'3 In
practice, it created some knotty problems, especially for Eaton.
The action against Paolina was disturbingly similar to British and
French outrages against American shipping. It was a high seas capture
of a ship thought to be in the process of running a paper blockade.
The bey of Tunis was outraged. He threatened reprisal against American
74
commerce. Morris apparently felt obliged to send an explanation to
72Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 348.
73pur Navy, p. 119.
740ur Navy, pp. 119-120.
85
the Tunisian chief. He defended the action on the grounds that Paoiina
was obviously about to run the Tripoli blockade. He would, however,
submit the entire affair to a prize court at Gibraltar.75 Morris was
more than a month transmitting this explanation to the bey (in fact, his
ship was anchored in Tunis harbor when he wrote the letter). In the
interim Eaton lived under extreme duress bordering on physical danger.
He wrote the commodore praising in the strongest terms the salutary
effect of a Tunisian visit by the United States squadron. In an unchar-
acteristically prompt reply, Morris agreed to a visit, but deferred it
until he completed a diplomatic trip to Tripoli.76 When Morris finally
arrived at Tunis, Eaton was existing under circumstances so strained as
to undermine his effectiveness in diplomacy.
On 29 January 1803, lacking only two days of having been in the
theater eight months, the commodore finally set out for Tripoli to
discharge his main business. John Adams and New York accompanied
Chesapeake, giving Morris a small flotilla with which to put backbone in
his diplomacy. His announced intent was to secure a reasonable peace,
or failing that, to destroy the bashaw's fleet. Alas, the weather, so
frequently the hub of excuses for inaction, was genuinely bad, and the
force returned to Malta on 10 February, after battling a gale for eleven
77
days. Before having his enthusiasm shattered by the weather, Henry
75Richard V. Morris to Bey of Tunis, 24 February 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 364.
76Richard V. Morris to William Eaton, 29 January 1803, Area File,
Roll 3.
77Richard V. Morris to Secretary Navy, 30 March 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 387.
86
Wadsworth, an ensign aboard Chesapeake (and uncle of Henry Wadsworth
Longfellow), hurled this challenge at Tripoli: "And ye Tripolitans
beware, for the Chesapeake, New York, and John Adams are coming towards
.,78
you in battle array. The boast sprang from the purest naivete and is
historically insignificant, but it does manifest a combative spirit of
the kind so woefully absent in the commodore.
Morris was a man of transient enthusiasms, and did not wait for a
weather change to mount another foray against Tripoli. Instead, he
looked westward toward Tunis where fate was preparing to ambush him with
the most painful imbroglio of his tour. Eaton's nearly untenable situa-
tion and Morris' basic orders both placed Tunisia well within his pur-
view. Given the prevailing winter winds, a trip to Tunis was more
feasible than one to Tripoli.^9 In fairness to Morris, it must be
concluded that a mission to Tunis was not unreasonable at the time.
When Morris left Malta in late February 1803, he was sailing into a
hornets' nest. Eaton's questionable borrowing, the natural animosity
n o
Journal of Midshipman Henry Wadsworth, USS Chesapeake, 31 January
1803, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 356.
7Q
Bad weather gave Morris his official reason for truncating his
January cruise to Tripoli. It was almost certainly a valid reason as
well. Despite this, Morris, in a very undignified attack, sought to
transfer blame to Murray. When Murray departed Leghorn in October 1802,
Morris told him, apparently orally, to bring or send supplies back to
the central Mediterranean when his other business was done. Murray did
not comply for various reasons cited in several letters to Morris; he
departed for America in January with the job not done. In an official
report to the Secretary of the Navy, Morris laid at Murray's feet the
responsibility for his not having soundly defeated the Tripoli corsairs
during the winter of 1803. That Murray was deficient there is little
doubt; that the deficiency restrained Morris from a great victory is
almost absurd. See Report of Morris to Secretary Navy, 30 March 1803,
Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 382.
87
between him and the bey, and the general deterioration in Tunisian-
American relations had all converged on the consul. The problems on
snore would have strained Morris' modest abilities. Cathcart, who might
have helped save the day, was aboard, but his alienation added to the
commodore's intolerable load. In three months aboard Chesapeake
Cathcart had developed a deep-running contempt for the commodore. He
had also come to distrust some of his fellow diplomats, O'Brien being
the most suspect. Cathcart felt that O'Brien had undercut him with the
dey of Algiers; furthermore, he feared that the Algerian consul was in
thrall to a group of Algerian Jewish financiers whose interests were
inimical to those of the United States. To further acidify his outlook
on the eve of the mission to Tunis, Cathcart was harboring the convic-
tion that Morris was withholding from him diplomatic information.80 For
all of his ability, experience, and fidelity to the United States,
Cathcart was an absolute liability in the already hostile atmosphere of
Tunis.
It would have been too much to expect Morris and Eaton to get on
well. Nonetheless, after Morris' arrival on 22 February 1803, they did
O 1
begin to reach a tenuous accommodation. As two Americans threatened
by a hostile chieftain, they found some common ground in the name of
survival. Before any attempt to deal with the bey in person, Morris had
endeavored to explain in writing the United States position relative to
80Letter, William L. Cathcart to Secretary State, 25 January 1803,
Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, pp. 348-349.
81William Eaton to Secretary State, 5 March 1803, Life of Eaton,
p. 238.
88
the capture and detention of the Paoiina with its partly Tunisian
cargo.82 If he succeeded, it was not apparent. When Morris came
ashore, he fell into the bey's clutches. It seems beyond dispute that
the Tunisian chief arranged everything that followed to embarrass the
Americans to the fullest extent possible. Morris was met by the bey's
commercial agent; no diplomatic amenities were observed and no cour-
tesies extended. The agent forthwith demanded that Morris pay a $23,000
debt owed by Eaton to commercial financiers. Eaton interjected that he,
himself, stood as security on the loan of which the United States gov-
ernment was not aware. There was no promise made binding the government
of the United States, far less did Morris have personal knowledge or
responsibility. Despite this importuning by Eaton, the Tunisian offi-
O O
cials placed Morris under virtual house arrest.
Backed against the wall, the Americans, as well as the western
consular community, displayed a rare measure of unity. The French
consul volunteered to advance the entire sum as a loan. Eaton knew of
another source, Morris' diplomatic fund. He believed, correctly, that
it was sufficient to pay the debt. To persuade Morris to pay the debt,
he offered to assign ail of his personal and real property to the
O A
government of the United States and place it in Morris' hands. Morris
82Richard V. Morris to Bey of Tunis, 24 February 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 364.
83Letter, William Eaton to Secretary State, 5 March 1803, Life of
Eaton, p. 238.
84William Eaton to Secretary State, 5 March 1803, Life of Eaton, p.
239. It is likely that Eaton had known for months of Morris' sizable
diplomatic fund (see page 63) and that he incurred some of his heavy
obligations in support of Mahamet with the expectation that Morris would
back him unflinchingly.
89
believed that Eaton, protestations of innocence notwithstanding, had
already committed the United States, and Morris in particular, to stand
behind the debts. Morris did not immediately accept the offer; however,
there was some movement away from the impasse. Morris, his party, and
Eaton finally made their way to a personal audience with the bey. The
exchanges were generally acrimonious; topics included the Paolina af-
fair, the $23,000 debt, and Eaton's unsuitability as consul. Morris
finally agreed to assume the debt and to remove Eaton and find a re-
placement. The bey allowed Morris to return to Constellation, holding
Q C
part of his party, one being Cathcart, as hostages. The hostages
experienced some anxiety when bad weather prevented the commodore from
ft
sending the money ashore, but he was eventually able to do so.
In the final settlement, Eaton had agreed to apply the proceeds
from the sale of Gloria and to pledge all of his other property as
on
security; this was the collateral for Morris' assumption of the debt.
Using the authority conferred upon him by the August 1802 instructions,
he relieved Eaton (who promptly returned to Leghorn) and replaced him as
ft 8
consul with Dr. Davis, the fleet surgeon. There was one other signi-
ficant aspect of the brief person-to-person relationship between Eaton
85Life of Eaton, pp. 240-241.
86Richard V. Morris to James L. Cathcart, 1 March 1803, Area File,
Roll 3.
87Richard V. Morris to Secretary Navy, 30 March 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 384. Also see Dawn Like Thunder,
pp. 166-169, for a good outline of the clash at Tunis.
88Journal of Henry Wadsworth, 14 March 1803, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, p. 374.
90
and Morris: it gave Eaton a prime opportunity to present his case for
the enthronement of Mahamet. Eaton struck hard. Mahamet, he said,
could wrench the throne from Yusef with partisans already sworn to the
cause. American aid was the missing ingredient that could bring the
scheme to fruition. $50,000, 10,000 rifles, a few light cannon, and
some gunpowder would turn the trick. Morris would have none of it.
Mahamet's 89only concession of a "favorable treaty" was too ethereal.
The true believer in Eaton did not infect the skeptical Morris.
When Morris left Tunis bay in mid-March, the brief unity that had
been forged among the Americans lay in fragments. Not only had the
commodore of little experience in statecraft blundered into a trap, once
enmeshed he had failed to use his few assets. Cathcart, abrasive though
he was, was one such ready at hand. Morris had used him mainly as an
interpreter, largely disregarding his proven ability in dealing with the
capricious Barbary nabobs. Cathcart's chagrin at being so downgraded
knew no bounds. When he challenged Morris in Tunis and on subsequent
occasions for this cavalier treatment, the commodore replied that he
held superior, overriding instructions.90 It is obvious that he was
referring to his superintending agency warrant of the preceding August
from Secretary of the Navy Smith (see page 70). Technically, Morris
spoke from a solid position. In practice he was arrogant, perhaps even
foolhardy. In so gracelessly ignoring and then rebuffing Cathcart,
Morris put a snake in his own bed.
89Richard V. Morris to Secretary Navy, 30 March 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 383.
90James L. Cathcart to James Madison, 5 May 1803, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, p. 398.
91
Morris sailed to Algiers, but out of his painfully gained wisdom
declined to go ashore. It was well that he made this decision. Algiers
was fast becoming a festering sore in the manner of Tunis. The consul,
Richard O'Brien, came on board Chesapeake in the harbor and out of shore
battery range. There he and Morris exchanged information while Cathcart
sat in the background and formulated harsh judgments of both men.
O'Brien confirmed that the dey would not accept the money payment. In
spite of this, he intended to hold the money pending an acceptable
settlement. O'Brien also reiterated that the dey would under no condi-
tions accept Cathcart as consul; therefore, it would be pointless for
him to leave. Morris accepted O'Brien's evaluation and departed.
Cathcart was incensed and sent Madison a dispatch condemning O'Brien for
his cupidity and his unsavory association with Jews (all of the Barbary
consuls expressed anti-Jewish sentiments at one time or another). He
averred that the dey and other rulers up and down the coast would react
Q 1
boldly to Morris' skulking performance at Tunis.
With Algeria and Tunisia only a step from active belligerent sta-
tus, naval judgment should have directed Morris to take some form of
direct action along the Barbary coast. Instead, he decided to sail to
QO
Gibraltar for resupply after little more than a day off Algiers. The
logistical decision to go to Gibraltar defies comprehension. Presumably
the shortages were food and water. Other than the chronic troubles with
91James L. Cathcart to Secretary State, 30 March 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 379-380.
92Richard V. Morris to Secretary Navy, 30 March 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 384.
92
Chesapeake's canvas carrying members, there were no reported structural
deficiencies. Certainly it was not ammunition, for the entire squadron
had expended but a few shot. If there were pre-existing shortages why
did Morris leave Malta knowing he could conduct a mission of only a few
weeks duration? Having discovered a problem, why did he not head for
one of the central Mediterranean ports which were approximately the same
distance from Algiers as was Gibraltar? Morris states unequivocally in
his after action report that he believed the entire squadron should have
QO
been employed in patrolling the Tunisian and Algerian coasts. This
capacity to act exactly counter to a stated belief seemed not to disturb
Morris. His trip to Gibraltar is one more manifestation of the repre-
hensible lack of tenacity that characterized his entire performance.
Thus, the Barbary coast was left unattended once more and at a period
when weather would allow increased activity.
The commodore anchored off Gibraltar 23 March 1803, for what must
have been a comfortable three week stay. It was also an agreeable
locale for the other ships; by 30 March the entire United States squad-
ron was there.94 Morris was not inert the entire time. He took this
opportunity from his great labors to send his first operational report
in four months to Secretary Smith. He prefaced the body of this commu-
nication with one of the most egregious lies ever fabricated by a United
States officer:
93Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, pp. 379-380.
94James L. Cathcart to Secretary State, 30 March 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 380.
93
Sir, There has been a greater length of time elapsed than I
could have wished, since I had the honor of writing to you-
The want of opportunity has been the cause.90
While at Gibraltar, Morris decided to transfer his flag to New
York. It had been nearly eleven months since Chesapeake departed the
United States. She had been an undistinguished performer, in part
because of nearly continuous maintenance deficiencies. On 6 April 1803,
New York became the squadron flagship, and Chesapeake was released for
return to the United States.96 With a competent commander this might
have been one of those symbolic events that is a point of departure when
a long spell of ill fortune is reversed. It served no such function
under Morris' tutelage.
On 11 April 1803, New York, John Adams, and the ever reliable
Enterprise departed Gibraltar bound for Tripoli and the "season's"
blockade.97 It was preceeded by Meshouda, now unfettered after her long
internment. The action of the Moroccan emperor in adopting her as a
95Richard V. Morris to Secretary Navy, 30 March 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 381. In combat operations superiors
value few things more than timely reporting of information by subordi-
nates. Morris must certainly have been one of history's most deficient
subordinates in this regard. The report does not improve after the
preface. It is a shameful mosaic of excuses and charges. Murray's
early winter failure to send supplies, maintenance problems with his
ships, the weather, and the "cupidity" of Eaton worked in concert to
deny Morris a sure victory (pp. 381-384).
96Journal of Midshipman Henry Wadsworth, 6 April 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 388.
97Journal of Midshipman Henry Wadsworth, 12 April 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 389. That Wadsworth, with the eager-
ness of youth, should have acquired the notion that blockading was
seasonal says something of the tenor of the Morris directed operation.
The corsairs recognized no such limitation. Throughout the
Mediterranean venture in 1801-1803, there is the appearance of a "winter
quarters" mentality among the American skippers.
94
Moroccan ship and consul Simpson's conviction that this imperial aegis
imparted immunity had swayed Morris. He decided to release Meshouda on
condition that she not trade at any port under American blockade. With
this understanding, Meshouda had refitted, emerging an armed merchant-
98
man. A tight blockade of Tripoli would have denied her direct entry
there and discouraged subtle attempts at circumvention (Meshouda was a
deep draft vessel). The sometime blockade of the Morris squadron was an
open invitation to mischief.
As was his wont, the commodore went to Tripoli by a circuitous
route. He stopped at Leghorn apparently for no other reason that to put
Cathcart ashore." This was an act of doubtful wisdom, for Morris had
in mind negotiations at Tripoli. Having demonstrated painful weaknesses
in statesmanship, he could well have used someone with Cathcart's back-
ground and self-assurance. However, having squandered diplomatic talent
at nearly every turn, it is not surprising that Morris disdained it in
this instance. Cathcart's ignored pleas and his discharge at Leghorn
occasioned one of his most punishing salvos at Morris:
I declare I cannot account for our commodore's conduct in any
way but by supposing that he intends to spend the summer in
inactivity and occasionally give convoy, or is jealous lest
my presence at the negotiations might diminish his share of
the glory achieved by its success."
98Pawn Like Thunder, pp. 172-173.
"james L. Cathcart to Secretary State, 5 May 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 398.
100Naval Documents, Barbary Powers II, p. 395. This was but one
of several instances in which Morris reminded Cathcart of the latter's
inferior position. It is true that the commodore's charter extended
beyond the limits imposed on the consuls. It is also true that Cathcart
would not even have been available had not the dey of Algiers spurned
95
After leaving Leghorn, New York experienced a fire that was tragic
for a number of the crew and nearly catastrophic for the ship as a
whole. It may illustrate, in combination with other mishaps, oversights
and the general inefficiency of the force the real depth of Morris
command ineptitude. Off the coast of Sardinia, on the night of 25 April
1803, a fire broke out in the gunner's storeroom. Any shipboard fire is
a significant threat, in this case all the more so, for the gunner's
storeroom was next to the main powder magazine. With the efficiency of
desperation the crew extinguished the fire, but not before nineteen
sailors were burned. Fourteen of these died then or of burn complica-
tions. 101
Never one to rush headlong into either negotiations or armed con-
flict, Morris made one last stop, this time at Malta. After some
repairs to Enterprise, he sent the sloop and John Adams on ahead to
reestablish the long dormant blockade. 102 He remained at Malta in all
likelihood because his wife and son were there. Indeed, they, with a
female servant, had spent most of the cruise with him aboard Chesapeake
having been put ashore at Malta before the cruise to Tunis in February.
At the time Mrs. Morris was well along in pregnancy, which would have
dissuaded him from carrying her into the February seas, not to mention
him as consul. The fact remains: Morris allowed personal animosity and
hubris to submerge whatever judgment he had.
101Dawn Like Thunder, p. 171 and Journal of Midshipman Henry
Wadsworth, 12 May 1803, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 403.
102Dawn Like Thunder, p. 172.
96
the threat of combat. 103 To what extent wife and son on board
restrained Morris from audacity earlier in his tour can only be sur-
mised. Combat with women and children on board a warship would be
almost unthinkable today. Cannon balls and oak splinters could shatter
human bodies as irreparably as modern weapons; the prospect of subjec¬
ting family members to these hazards must have been repugnant, therefore
inhibiting.
On 12 May 1803, only four days on station, John Adams intercepted a
large cargo ship inbound to Tripoli. She was Meshouda, violating the
terms of the passport with weapons and other contraband aboard along
with Tripolitan subjects. Captain John Rogers of John Adams ordered
Meshouda's crew aboard John Adams and put her in tow. He arrived at
Malta on 17 May 1803, and found Morris still in the harbor. Meshouda's
capture did not press upon the commodore the same dilemma as had Paolina
earlier in the year. Meshouda had sailed with permission of Morris and
Simpson; the terms of release were plain. Now she was exposed in bla-
tant violation. It was evident that Meshouda had stopped after ieaving
Gibraltar and altered her cargo and passengers. Morris upheld Rogers'
action, held Meshouda for prize court adjudication, and sent a protest
103Journal of Midshipman Henry Wadsworth, 20 February 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 364. There were other women and
children aboard as well. No official communication mentions them except
in roundabout ways. No commander could relish airing for official
perusal and comment problems connected with the presence of women
aboard. But Wadsworth was under no such constraints in writing his
journal. He noted that there were five women aboard besides Mrs.
Morris, one bf whom bore a child aboard ship in February. Wadsworth
expressed pity for a lady who was, "so unfortunate as to conceive and
bare [sic] on the Salt Sea." Wadsworth journal, 2 April 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 387.
97
to the Moroccan emperor by way of Simpson. 104 Capture of Meshouda was
one of the most decisive and wisest actions of the Morris squadron. If
it is a truism that a commander is responsible for everything his subor-
dinates do or fail to do, Morris deserves praise. In this case, how-
ever, the words stumble before they emerge. Morris was sometimes pre-
cipitate, but that does not equate to decisiveness. Had he been on the
scene with Rogers, the interception and capture might have taken a
different turn. 105
After a two day voyage Morris finally arrived on the Tripoli block-
ade station on 22 May 1803, almost one year from his arrival in the
theater. 106 That span of time, considered apart from, any other circum-
stances, would have made a damning prima facie case for a charge of
dereliction of duty. Morris conducted his long deferred blockade with
due regard for the treacherous shoals and shore batteries of Tripoli,
both reasonable 107concerns. The American ships traded ineffectual
shots with small Tripolitan vessels—nearer boats than ships—who took
104Richard V. Morris to James Simpson, 19 May 1803, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, pp. 408-409.
105Second only to Enterprise, John Adams, under Rogers, gave the
most notable performance of the period. This captain of iron
determination never flinched from duty or decision. Had fortune
afforded him more opportunities he would have written his name larger in
naval history. Charles Oscar Paullin chronicles his life in Commodore
John Rogers, Captain, Commodore and Senior Officer of the American Navy
1773-1838 (Cleveland, Ohio, 1910).
106Journal of Midshipman Henry Wadsworth, 22 May 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, pp. 416-417. As already observed, there
were many contributors to this dismal showing. Morris' final
distraction seems surely to have been his wife about to give birth in
Malta. There is no other discernible reason for his remaining there
while John Adams and Enterprise went to Tripoli early in May.
98
advantage of the shoals and their oars to maintain immunity from the
overwhelmingly superior American firepower. On 27 May, fortune almost
smiled on Morris. He had nine of the small gunboats hemmed in against
the shore but in relatively deep water. Then the wind died and the
Tripolitans able to elude him. 108were The sparring continued in this
way for several days.
At the end of May, Morris finally generated a serious attempt to
enter into negotiations with the bashaw. There being no accredited
United States diplomat in Tripoli, Morris had to create an initiative
from scratch or work through the consul of another nation. He chose the
latter course. He sent overtures through the Danish consul, Nicholas C.
Nissen, who, as already noted, had been a valuable intermediary since
the declaration of war in May 1801. The bashaw would have none of it.
Spurning the Danish consul, the Tripolitan tyrant sent word that only
direct communications from Morris would have 109any effect. Prospects
for success plunged. Whether Cathcart could have moved the bashaw is
problematical, but he could hardly have been less successful.
Morris continued the blockade showing as much determination as he
ever mustered during his tour. He now had the entire squadron at the
most likely point of decision. Adams had arrived on 26 May, having
completed her assignment of convoy escort duty; the rest of the
107Dawn Like Thunder, pp. 175-176.
108Journal of Henry Wadsworth, 27 May 1803, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, p. 425.
109Journal of Henry Wadsworth, 29 May 1803, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, pp. 428-429.
99
Mediterranean was unguarded. 110 Morris deployed his ships, displaying a
sense of purpose in pressing the blockade. It did not produce monumen-
tal results, for the shallow draft Tripolitans were adroit in exploiting
the shoal waters. Finally, on 2 June, Adams and Enterprise trapped ten
small cargo vessels against the shore. When their crews beached and
then abandoned the boats, Morris approved a reconnaissance party to
investigate. The party, which included young Wadsworth, was fired on,
but returned ebullient with the prospects of a successful followup
action. They convinced Morris who sent a fifty man expedition to burn
the beached boats. The shore party set them afire, but as soon as they
left, the Tripolitans put out the fires. Morris declined to send the
shore party back fearing an ambush. 111
The commodore continued to work through Nissen, but the bashaw
reiterated that he would not work through a broker. Only Morris himself
would suffice. Even then, said Nissen, the Tripolitan chieftain would
be a tough nut to crack. He was emboldened by adequate food supplies
from a good harvest and the favorable settlement with Sweden. Nissen
ventured that the bashaw's opening demand would be a money payment of
$500,000. 112 He did not say so to Morris, but the squadron's uninspired
110Journal of unknown person aboard John Adams, 26-27 May 1803,
Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 425. The squadron had no more
than sailed from the northwestern Mediterranean than corsairs began to
appear there. Cathcart, now in Madiera, reported Algerine pirate
cruisers off of the coasts of Spain and Portugal. See James L. Cathcart
to James Madison, 1 May 1803, Area File, Roll 3.
IllJournal of Henry Wadsworth, 2 June 1803, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, p. 430.
?^^Nicnolas q. Nissen to James L. Cathcart, 4 June 1803, Naval
Documents, Barbary Powers, II, pp. 437-440.
100
performance must also have been on his mind as a condition infusing the
bashaw with arrogance.
Despite his rumblings, the bashaw was not intransigent. He sent
some underlings to Morris' flagship, and this renewed the prospects for
formal negotiations. In the exchange, Morris agreed to come ashore
under a blanket of safeguards. A truce would go into effect during the
negotiations, there would be no firing, ships could enter but not leave
Tripoli, and Morris would be under the diplomatic protection of the
French consul. 113 In light of North African perfidity (then and now)
these were little more than words until proven by events. Nevertheless,
Morris, despite his humbling experience at Tunis, must have sensed a
good faith offer. He accepted the risk.
The bashaw's terms were outrageous: an immediate $200,000 cash
payment (a page obviously straight from the book of the Swedish settle¬
ment), $20,000 annually, United States payment of all war expenses from
its inception, and a substantial quantity of military and naval stores
annually. Morris rose to the occasion. He replied that the United
States would not honor the demand if it were issued by all of the
nations of the world combined. He did agree to a consular present
whenever there was a change of consuls. 114 The negotiations had been
doomed from the outset by the rigidity of the basic positions. The
parties had defined away too much of that contestable ground on which
pawns can be pushed about; there could be no give and take. The
bashaw's position was that of a thief and hostage taker. Morris,
114 Dawn Like Thunder, pp. 180-181 and Journal of Henry Wadsworth, 9
June 1803, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers, II, p. 449.
101
perhaps, ascribed too much coercive power to the nearness of his squad-
ron.115 At all events, the failure was nearly total.
With the negotiations deflated, Morris departed almost immediately
with New York for Malta, leaving the other ships to continue the block-
ade. He arrived at Malta on 14 June, and was immediately placed in
quarantine for fourteen days because of the North African contact. Mrs.
Morris had given birth to 116a son on 9 June 1803. It is difficult to
ascribe Morris' quick return to Malta to anything but his wife's condi-
tion. Had the commodore approached action as straightaway as he retired
from it, he might have stood a good watch in the Mediterranean.
Thus ended the first two years of the United States engagement
against the petty kings of the Barbary coast. Morris would remain in
the Mediterranean until the end of August, but his accomplishments would
be miniscule. In late June, John Adams and Enterprise did isolate a
large armed Tripolitan cargo ship resulting in her destruction by her
own crew. To apportion any credit for this to the commodore would be a
rank injustice. The blockade was lifted for the rest of the summer;
Tripolitan commerce flourished untrammeled until the United States sent
an unwavering champion 117to set matters right.
115 It is well to bear in mind that for all of its capacity to
influence events at sea and along a coastline by direct means, and for
all of its psychological value, a force of ships may be severely
constrained. With cannon that could not range inland more than a few
hundred yards, and unable to assemble a landing party of more than a few
dozen men, Morris could bark louder than he could bite. A tenacious
blockade and high seas interception of Tripolitan corsairs were his best
weapons.
116Journal of Henry Wadsworth, 15 June 1803, Naval Documents,
Barbary Powers, II, p. 453.
117Dawn Like Thunder, pp. 183-185.
102
By June of 1803 the Secretary of the Navy had seen a flood of
correspondence condemning the fiasco being played out by Morris. By
parallel letters dated 21 June 1803, the secretary notified Morris of
his relief as commodore and John Rogers of his appointment as interim
commodore. Edward Preble, scheduled to leave the United States about
1 August 1803, was to be the new commodore. The instructions to Rogers
show one very valuable insight gained during the two unproductive years:
he was not to resupply at Gibraltar. Instead, he was to contract with a
merchant ship to deliver supplies to him in the central
Mediterranean. 118
118
Secretary Navy to Richard V. Morris and John Rogers,
respectively, both dated 21 June 1803, Naval Documents, Barbary Powers,
II, p. 457.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNED
In the summer of 1803 the United States seemed little nearer to a
solution with the Barbary pirates than it had been two years earlier.
This was in part illusory, for in the initial period of groping the new
administration and the fledgling navy learned much through the multi-
tude of negative experiences. From their niches in obscurity these
experiences commend themselves to modern inspection. If nothing else,
it is gratifying to find that the United States has not invented incom-
petence, mendacity, lack of purpose, and naivete in this century.
Distance alone would have made the endeavor a challenge. A quick
glance at a map or globe reveals that the central Mediterranean and the
United States east coast are an immense distance apart. This span
presented problems beyond the ken of most of the principals. Though the
United States had dealt with the European powers from afar and had
fought a small naval war with France, it had not previously been plagued
by a communications line 4500 miles long. Moreover, its agents on the
remote end of this line were not Jays, or Jeffersons, or Franklins. Its
naval representatives were unrehearsed in the complexities of diplomacy
combined with command above the single ship level.
Fortunately, there was some strength, even brilliance, at home, but
it was largely restricted to the highest levels. Even Jefferson and
Madison were new to their jobs. To Madison's credit, the implementing
instructions that grew out of his basic policy conveyed the mission
without denying freedom to the operators to execute that mission.
104
However, Madison's directives, transmitted directly to the consuls and
through Smith to the commodores, demanded subtlety and competence. Sad
to say, the consuls were not subtle and the commodores were incompetent.
In pitting naval authority against diplomatic authority, Madison asked
of both consuls and commodores more than they could give. Assigning
naval authority to the superior position was ultimately fatal.
Neither Dale nor Morris, nor Murray during his long interim com-
mand, had the knack for gracefully wielding power usually within the
diplomatic province. Distance aggravated the resultant misunder-
standings. In many instances, the consuls, to their dismay, first
learned of new allocations of authority from the commodores. Regardless
of what path such information took, the consuls would have been disgrun-
tied. The likes of Cathcart and Eaton would never have been happy work-
ing at the sufferance of Dale, and especially of Morris.
Distance impinged more on logistics than it did the passage of
information. Operational planners and operators who are not clever are
vulnerable to the weakness of treating logistics as a nagging intruder.
Undeniably it lacks glamor, In fact, logistics, as often as not,
drives operations.1 Blame for the painful failure to supply and main-
tain in the 1801-1803 Mediterranean operation must be apportioned
1Many famous commanders have been victims of supply and maintenance
insufficiencies. Many authorities—Patton himself not the least of
them—believe that George S. Patton's Third Army could have penetrated
in force deep into the heart of Germany in early autumn of 1944 with
sufficient fuel. Less well known is that the entire American force in
France bogged down in September 1944 because of a wholesale logistical
insufficiency. Omar N. Bradley, the American commander, who was both a
slave to its vagaries and somewhat contemptuous of the subject, had this
105
between the planners and operators. The supply ships that off-loaded at
Gibraltar, the arrangements with foreign suppliers in France and Italy,
and the agreement of the British to provide certain naval base services
were ail half-measures. The absence of an American owned or leased
repair facility was a monumental handicap. An inordinate number of the
frigates had major structural failures, some requiring dry docking.
Some of the grossest deficiencies were of pre-cruise origin. The parsi-
mony of the administration and the Navy Department's inexperience
account for these woes.
The commodores and individual ship captains never tired of declaim-
ing against the burdens under which they labored. At the same time they
took unconscionable advantage of the opportunities supply and mainte-
nance offered for sailing to and loitering about the more pleasant
reaches of the Mediterranean. The commodores and their subordinates
spent far more time between Gibraltar and Italy than off the coast of
North Africa. As practiced by the commodores, routine resupply was
devastating to the maintenance of the blockade. Morris developed it
from a science into an art. In fairness to Dale and Murray, they did
initially try to remain on the blockade station by using expedient means
of resupply. They did not, however, pursue this to exhaustion.
One year enlistments of seamen affected combat operations detrimen-
tally. From the point of view of the sailor, a one year cruise requires
staying power. For the naval planner and operator viewing the matter
to say of logistics: "On both fronts [the dual axes of advance across
France in late summer 1944] an acute shortage of supplies—that dull
subject again!—governed all our operations." Omar N. Bradley and Clay
Blair, A General' s Life (New York, 1983), p. 320.
106
with respect to time on station, the transit time reduced availability
in the Mediterranean unacceptably. No one has ever devised an entirely
satisfactory scheme for keeping men bound to lonely and arduous duty in
a harsh place without some loss of morale. Despite the detractions of
extended sea duty, the mission required nearly constant availability of
men and ships. The commodores could count on neither.
Design of the frigates was both a blessing and a curse. Their
strategic mobility—the strength and endurance for long cruises in all
weather—was unexcelled. The capacity to move with faciiity in close
quarters or shallow water, tactical mobility, they lacked in varying
degrees. Both their captains and the corsairs were acutely aware of
these limitations. To ignore these boundaries of a ship's performance
was to incur a great risk. The commodores were generally not risk
takers. Enterprise, with her shallow draft, had more latitude around
shoal water, and this partly accounts for her more sparkling
performance.
Given the acknowledged constraints of the frigates and the bril-
liance of Enterprise, it is tempting to conclude that a fleet of small
ships would have served better. Such an estimate would be wrong. It
ignores the danger of the Atlantic to a small ship, slower cruising
speed in heavy weather, and reduced staying power. Nor would it give
proper weight to the heavy firepower of some of the Barbary ships.
p
The frigate captains were justified in giving the shoals a wide
berth. Grounding a ship is not a light matter. Later in the Barbary
conflict Philadelphia was lost through grounding, capture, and subse-
quent burning by an American spoiling party.
107
Perhaps more to the point, smaller ships do not exude power and majesty.
These are priceless characteristics in a show of force. The aeficien-
cies lay more in the people who employed them than in the vessels
themselves. A better balance between large and small ships was in
order. The commodores said much of how to capitalize on the strength of
both and then proceeded to disregard their own advice. Thus, Enterprise
spent months escorting convoys, a mission better suited to the frigates.
The squadron was grievously undermanned for sending landing forces
to project its power ashore. Other than the small shipboard Marine
detachments, there were no personnel for the purpose other than ad hoc
assemblages of sailors. Historically, navies have been profoundly
effective instruments of policy. They arrive early and, properly sup-
ported, stay late. But without a significant landing force, a navy
cannot make a deep imprint on the land. In the military aphorism, it
cannot "take and hold ground." When Dale arrived in 1801, the chief-
tains did not fully appreciate this limitation; the squadron overawed
them for a time. In Morris' case they were wiser. With a support base
in the hinterlands they could, to a disconcerting degree, ignore raw
seapower. The chieftains railed against the restrictions the squadron
imposed in the waters of the region; this show of righteous indignation
notwithstanding, they won in most of the diplomatic encounters. Eaton
was correct in his assessment that the final disposition of the
Tripoline tyrant would require ground action. He was to play a major
role in its execution.
In 1801-1803 the United States was poorly prepared to deal with the
mad dog mentality that permeated much of the Mediterranean, and the
108
situation is little changed today. The administration leaders were
accustomed to relations with European nations that were governed by the
tenets of a common western morality and a generally accepted set of
rules that prescribed the basis for international conduct. The Barbary
chieftains did not formally recognize these rules; far less did they
allow their day-to-day operations to be influenced by a European code of
behavior. The area consuls, on the other hand, understood the cupidity
and ruthlessness that were, ipso facto, part of the region's life.
Eaton and Cathcart both espoused courses of action based upon such an
understanding. Had they found listeners, the course of events along the
Barbary shores might have been different. They did not, and circum-
stance combined with their own excesses rendered them ineffective, at
least for that moment. Nevertheless, they should be recognized for
their appreciation of the challenge that unprincipled autocrats can pose
for an open society. Not much has changed in that part of the world.
How badly did the squadron and United States policy fail in the
Mediterranean? If the determination is made by comparing aspirations
and the dedication of available resources with results attained, it was
nearly total. In 1801 the United States government had six executive
departments of which two, War and Navy, had a force of arms capacity.
The standing army was virtually nonexistent, leaving the navy as the
only agency able to execute a policy based upon threatened or consum-
mated force. During the 1801-1083 period most of the navy's ships were
either going to, operating in, or returning from the Mediterranean. The
remainder furnished the replacement base for the Mediterranean force.
Thus, practically all of the combat power of the United States was
209
committed against the pirates. Despite this, in 1803, the corsairs were
more active and their governments more truculent than in 1801. In these
terms, a ratio of results to national assets available and applied, it
was the greatest diplomatic-military failure in the nation's history.
None of this is to state or imply that the Barbary chieftains were a
clear menace to republican government in the United States. They did,
however, awaken in American leaders clearer comprehension of the price
of commercial involvement in previously obscure places, together with a
more worldly approach to worldwide relationships.
Judgments of the founding fathers and other early leaders of a
lower order of magnitude tend to run to extremes. They are either
deified or assailed by iconoclasts who would destroy all. Deification
has been the prevailing propensity. Indeed, many of the early political
and military leaders had the qualities of demi-gods as seen from afar.
This has made some of the lesser figures virtuous by association. In
fact, the period of early nationhood saw its share of the faint-hearted
and the incompetent. It also spawned policies, issuing from such
inspired pens as Madison's and Jefferson's, that seemed direct and clear
in the abstract, but were the opposite in the concrete. The operators
were painfully inadequate for the task. The race of giants, to the
extent that it existed, inhabited the upper reaches; elsewhere mortals
such as Dale and Morris blundered and botched. It is some consolation
to observe that the 20th century does not have exclusive access to
history's store of villains and fools nor of fiascos at the national and
international levels.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. Primary Sources
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113
Lay, Tracy Hollingsworth, The Foreign Service of the United States, New
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