Georgalis, Nicholas2022-06-062022-06-062022-03-14Georgalis, N. (2021). A Neo-Searlean Theory of Intentionality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 51(7), 475-495. doi:10.1017/can.2022.8http://hdl.handle.net/10342/10612This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.I present Searle’s theory of intentionality and defend it against some objections. I then significantly extend his theory by exposing and incorporating an ambiguity in the question as to what an intentional state is about as between a subjective and an objective reading of the question. Searle implicitly relies on this ambiguity while applying his theory to a solution to the problem of substitution in propositional attitudes, but his failure to explicitly accommodate the ambiguity undermines his solution. My extension of his theory succeeds. I also indicate how the new theory can be deployed to resolve other outstanding problems.Searleintentionalityintentional objectCranethoughtthought-tokenArticle10.1017/can.2022.8