Joyce Holmes Steinmetz. EXAMINING MID-ATLANTIC OCEAN SHIPWRECKS AND COMMERCIAL FISH TRAWLING & DREDGING. (Under the direction of Dr. Lawrence E. Babits) Program in Maritime Studies and Nautical Archaeology, Department of History, October 2010. This study examines the major site formation processes of commercial fish trawling and dredging impacts on mid-Atlantic ocean shipwrecks. Exploring this human-related interaction requires multi-disciplinary sources, including historical archival research, maritime archaeologists, fisheries, and sanctuary management. Non-traditional sources include fishermen who experience damage to their gear and divers who observe gear impact damage to shipwrecks. From statistical database analysis, shipwreck case studies, and fishing community interviews, this thesis demonstrates that 1) commercial trawl nets and dredges damage shipwrecks and 2) shipwrecks negatively affect commercial fishing. From a 52-case sample, 69% of mid-Atlantic shipwrecks have 1 to 5 derelict trawl nets or scallop dredges on site. Derelict scallop dredge presence on shipwrecks markedly increased near and in scallop marine protected areas. Wooden wrecks may not survive impacts of towed scallop and clam dredges. Millions of dollars of commercial trawl nets and scallop dredges continue to be lost each year on the U.S. East Coast. Commercial trawling and dredging is an archaeological site formation process with three modes: depositional, scrambling, and extraction. This study presents factual awareness and lays the foundation to formulate realistic, economically viable, and motivational proposals to safeguard commercial fishing gear and non-renewable underwater cultural resources. EXAMINING MID-ATLANTIC OCEAN SHIPWRECKS AND COMMERCIAL FISH TRAWLING & DREDGING A Thesis Presented To The Faculty of the Department of History East Carolina University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Masters of Arts in Maritime History and Nautical Archaeology by Joyce Holmes Steinmetz October 2010 ©Copyright 2010 Joyce Holmes Steinmetz EXAMINING MID-ATLANTIC OCEAN SHIPWRECKS AND COMMERCIAL FISH TRAWLING & DREDGING by Joyce Holmes Steinmetz APPROVED BY: DIRECTOR OF THESIS:_________________________________________________________ Lawrence E. Babits, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER:________________________________________________________ Wade G. Dudley, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER:________________________________________________________ Lynn B. Harris, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER:________________________________________________________ Donald H. Parkerson, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER:________________________________________________________ Frank J. Cantelas, M.A. CHAIR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY: _________________________________________________________ Gerald J. Prokopowicz, Ph.D. DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL: _________________________________________________________ Paul J. Gemperline, Ph.D. DEDICATION I dedicate this work to two special individuals who have each had a profound effect on my life: my father Richard Holmes, a role model for adventure and that dreams can come true, and my husband Jim Steinmetz, for his endless support of my dreams. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Many people have encouraged, supported, and contributed to this research and deserve recognition and my sincere gratitude: Frank Cantelas, insightful outside reader and committee member, Joan Charles, shipwreck researcher and substitute mother, Dr. Wade Dudley, committee member and writing coach, Dr. Lynn Harris, committee member and underwater hockey mentor, Dr. Joseph Luczkovich, commercial fishing directed studies, mid-Atlantic recreational and technical divers, for their keen observations and hospitality, mid-Atlantic commercial fishing community, who gave freely of their time and expertise, Dr. Richard Miller and Mrs. Mary Miller, for morale support and a local sense of family, Dr. Donald Parkerson, committee member and statistical analysis mentor, Bradley Sheard, amazing underwater photography, Paul Whittaker, Admiral DuPont underwater photography, and especially, Dr. Lawrence Babits, for directing this research. Thank you everyone. TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES..…………………………………………………………………... vi LIST OF TABLES........................................................................................................... ix LIST OF GRAPHS…………………………………………………………………….. xii CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION Purpose............……………………………………………………………. 1 Significance................................................................................................. 2 Primary Research Questions........................................................................ 4 Secondary Research Questions.................................................................... 4 Research Design………………….............................................................. 6 CHAPTER 2. ARCHAEOLOGICAL THEORY Introduction............……………………………………………………….. 7 Deepwater Shipwreck Site Formation Processes…………………………. 8 Commercial Fishing as a Site Formation Process………………………... 15 Conclusion…………………………………………………………........... 18 CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY Introduction……………………………………………………………….. 19 Diver Observations……………………………………………………….. 19 Shipwreck Case Studies…………….……….............................................. 21 Commercial Fishing Interviews…………………………………………... 21 Multidisciplinary Analysis………………………………………………... 23 CHAPTER 4. HISTORICAL RESEARCH Introduction……………………………………………………………….. 25 Commercial Bottom Fishing……………………………………………… 25 The Great Cod Fishery………………………………………. 25 Vessel and Finfish Gear Evolution………………………….. 26 The Scallop Fishery…………………………………………. 38 Scallop Dredge………………………………………………. 41 The Clam Fishery……………………………………………. 43 Clam Dredge………………………………………………… 46 Fisheries Management………………………............................................. 47 Territorial Limits…………………………………………….. 48 Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act…….. 48 Worldwide Call for Responsible Fisheries………………… 49 Scallop Fishery Management……………………………….. 49 Marine Protected Areas (MPAs)………………………….. 52 Bottom Fishing Research……………………………………. 53 Marine Sanctuary Management…………………………………………... 57 Submerged Cultural Resource Legislation……………………………….. 59 Mid-Atlantic Shipwrecks………………………......................................... 60 Hang Logs………………………………………………………………… 67 Conclusion…………………………………………………....................... 70 CHAPTER 5. SPORT DIVER OBSERVATIONS Introduction……………………………………………………………….. 73 Database Description……………………………………………………... 73 Analysis……………………………………………………………........... 75 Conclusion…………………………………………………………........... 86 CHAPTER 6. ARCHAEOLOGICAL CASE STUDIES Introduction……………………………………………………………….. 88 Admiral DuPont........................................................................................... 92 Middle Ground Wreck……………………………………………………. 99 Cleopatra…………………………………………………………………. 99 Nina………………………………………………………………………. 101 Cherokee………………………………………………………………….. 103 S-5………………………………………………………………………… 104 St. Augustine……………………………………………………………… 107 Moonstone……………………………………………............................... 110 Charles Morand, Ethel C, Ocean Venture, San Gil, and Terror Wreck…. 112 Tomahawk………………………………………………………………… 113 Conclusion…………………………………………………………........... 113 CHAPTER 7. COMMERCIAL FISHING INTERVIEWS. Introduction……………………………………………………………….. 117 Trawl Netters……………………………………………………………... 117 Scallop Dredgers………………………………………………………... 121 Clam Dredgers……………………………………………………………. 123 Gear Salvage Divers……………………………………………………… 125 Gear Providers……………………………………………………………. 126 Discussion………………………………………………………………… 127 Analysis…………………………………………………………………... 129 Conclusion…………………………………………………………........... 132 CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION Introduction……………………………………………………………….. 134 Multidisciplinary Discussion……………………………………………... 134 Future Research…………………………………………………............... 140 Recommendations………………………………………………………… 143 Conclusion…………………………………………………………........... 145 REFERENCES ………................................................................................................... 147 APPENDIX A: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL............................ 161 APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW RECRUITMENT SCRIPT.............................................. 162 APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW FORM…………………………………………………. 163 APPENDIX D: PERMISSION LETTERS…………………………………………….. 166 LIST OF FIGURES 1.1: U.S. mid-Atlantic coast ………………………………………………………..... 2 2.1: Muckelroy flow diagram of shipwreck site formation processes……………….. 10 2.2: Agnes Irving, iron hulled paddlewheel, isometric drawing……………………… 12 2.3: Modified Muckelroy process diagram…………………………………………... 13 2.4: Expanded Muckelroy process diagram………………………………………….. 14 3.1: Mid-Atlantic shipwreck sample database map…………………………………... 20 4.1: Beam trawl ……………………………………………………………………… 26 4.2: Sylph, first U.S. experimental beam trawler……………………………………... 27 4.3: Otter trawl and door types……………………………………………………….. 29 4.4: Spray, first U.S. steam powered trawler………………………………………..... 30 4.5: Henry Dexter Malone, first Spray captain………………………………………. 31 4.6: Foam (probably), looking aft, George’s Bank, 1912…………………………..... 33 4.7: Ripple, Bay State Fisheries whaleback bow trawler, Boston, 1917……………... 33 4.8: Fabia, first U.S. diesel trawler…………………………………………………... 34 4.9: Blue Foam, one of first two Newfoundland draggers…………………………… 35 4.10: Trawl net size by vessel size and power……………………………………….. 37 4.11: Footrope sweep types on trawl nets……………………………………………. 38 4.12: Sea scallop, Placopecten magellanicus………………………………………… 39 4.13: Scallop distribution and abundance………………………………...................... 40 4.14: Scallop dredge, New Bedford style…………………………………………….. 42 4.15: Scallop dredge, Canadian style………………………………………………… 43 4.16: Quahog clam distribution ……………………………………………………… 44 4.17: Surfclam distribution …………………………………………………………... 45 4.18: Clam dredge, small vessel..…..………………………………………………… 46 4.19: Clam dredge, large vessel…..……………………………………………........... 47 4.20: Scallop Marine Protected Areas, New England and mid-Atlantic…………... 51 4.21: New Jersey artificial reefs and vessels………………………………………..... 55 4.22: Portland bow cut by trawl wire………………………………………………… 59 4.23: Mid-Atlantic coast with AWOIS shipwrecks…………………………………... 62 4.24: Andrea Doria trawl nets………………………………………………………... 67 6.1: Ship timber in clam dredge……………………………………………………… 89 6.2: Stones recovered by clam dredges……………………………………………..... 89 6.3: Rudder recovered by clam dredge……………………………………………….. 90 6.4: Ship anchor recovered by clam dredge………………………………………….. 91 6.5: Admiral DuPont, 1863…………………………………………………………... 92 6.6: Admiral DuPont site plan, 2000…………………………………………………. 93 6.7: Admiral DuPont, scallop dredge on sponson post and paddle wheel, profile…… 94 6.8: Admiral DuPont, scallop dredge on sponson post, close up……………….…..... 94 6.9: Cleopatra………………………………………………………………………… 100 6.10: Cleopatra site sketch, with stray Scotch boiler………………………………… 100 6.11: Nina, stern towing bitt …………………………………………………………. 102 6.12: Cherokee, in 1915-1917………………………………………………………... 103 6.13: Cherokee site plan and elevation……………………………………………….. 104 6.14: S-5 (SS-110), Navy submarine ………………………………………………… 105 6.15: S-5 (SS-110), conning tower and nets…………………………………………. 105 6.16: S-5 (SS-110), scallop dredge under stern………………………………………. 106 6.17: St. Augustine (PG-54)…………………………………………………………... 107 6.18: St. Augustine bow, 1929………………………………………………………... 108 6.19: St. Augustine, scallop dredge damage to forward gunwale…………….............. 108 6.20: St. Augustine, anti-aircraft gun hanging off starboard side……………………. 109 6.21: St. Augustine site sketch……………………………………………………….. 109 6.22: Moonstone (PYc-9), WWII patrol vessel……………………………………..... 110 6.23: Moonstone, trawl net on depth charge racks…………………………………… 111 6.24: Tomahawk, scallop dredge at wheelhouse……………………………………... 113 8.1: Enhanced Muckelroy site formation process diagram…………………………... 135 LIST OF TABLES 2.1: Sediment Shear Strength and Shipwreck Subsidence……………………………… 11 4.1: Mid-Atlantic Deepwater Shipwreck Population Estimates………………………… 63 5.1: Sample Shipwrecks, Fishing Gear, and Damage…………………………………... 76 5.2: Descriptive Variables of Identified and Unidentified Wrecks……………………... 81 5.3: Hull Material Versus Presence of Gear By Type…………………………............... 83 6.1: Iron-Hulled Blockade-Runner Site Comparison…………………………………… 98 6.2: Shipwrecks with Three to Five Scallop Dredges…………………………………... 112 6.3: Case Study Comparison of Diver Observations to Hang Log Gear Loss………….. 114 6.4: Diver Observation Summary of Fishing Gear Impacts to Case Study Shipwrecks... 116 6.5: Index of Site Formation Mode to Case Study Shipwrecks………………………… 116 7.1: Relative Impact Force by Gear Type……………………………………………….. 128 7.2: Relative Probability of Loss and Economic Risk by Gear Type…………………… 130 7.3: Economic Impact of Lost Gear…………………………………………………….. 131 8.1: Presence of Gear Types on Wood and Metal Wrecks……………………………… 137 LIST OF GRAPHS 5.1: Wreck location by coastal state………………………………………………….. 77 5.2: Hull material……………………………………………………………………... 78 5.3 Propulsion ……………………………………………………………………….. 78 5.4: Derelict fishing gear presence ………………………………............................... 79 5.5: Depth to seafloor………………………………………………………………… 79 5.6: Identified wreck tonnage……………………………………................................ 80 5.7: Identified wreck cause of loss…………………………………………………… 81 5.8: Damage severity to wrecks by fishing gear……………………………………... 85 5.9: Damage severity to trawl nets by wrecks……………………............................... 85 5.10: Damage to scallop dredges by wrecks…………………………………………. 86 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION Purpose This thesis examines the physical impact of commercial bottom fishing gear on U.S. mid-Atlantic deepwater ocean shipwrecks and the economic impact of shipwrecks on commercial fishermen. The primary purpose is to bring factual awareness of this issue to the fishing, diving, and archaeological communities. Damage was analyzed by gear type and shipwreck type, followed by suggestions to protect both the sites and gear. Multi-use stakeholder involvement can solve large environmental problems in conjunction with scientific investigation, interpretation, and analysis. This study is a foundation, a first step, towards a mutually beneficial solution. It attempts to postulate realistic, economically viable, and motivational proposals to safeguard non-renewable cultural resources, as well as minimize economic hardships to the commercial fishing community due to damaged or lost gear. Before proceeding, the terms mid-Atlantic and deepwater ocean warrant definition. First is the term mid-Atlantic. The Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council (MAFMC 2010a), Minerals Management Service (MMS 2008), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA 2010), and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS 2010) utilize the term mid-Atlantic with different state groupings. For this study, the term mid-Atlantic encompasses the U.S. coastline of southern New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia (Figure 1.1). This region is a major coastal transportation route and includes approaches to Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, and Norfolk. This same zone is also the fishing grounds for a community of commercial netters, scallopers, and clammers. Second is the term deepwater ocean. In his landmark text Maritime Archaeology, Keith Muckelroy roughly defined deepwater as below 50 meters, beyond the range of air-breathing 2 scuba divers in 1978 (Muckelroy 1978:149). With the advent of technical diving methods, mixed gases, and rebreathers, divers now commonly access the eastern deepwater edge of the continental shelf. While oceangraphers generally define deep ocean in thousands of feet, this thesis defines deepwater shipwrecks as wrecks spared the majority of natural rigors of pounding surf, storm surge, and sand erosion, generally below 90 ft. (30 m) depth, and out to the continental slope, at approximately the 300 ft. (100 m) isobath. The depth limits of this study align with the modern limits of recreational technical diving. FIGURE 1.1 U.S. mid-Atlantic coast. (Langley 2002:2.) Significance The issue of commercial fishing gear colliding with shipwrecks is global, yet the maritime archaeology community lacks landscape or regional data. New evidence shows derelict 3 commercial fishing nets and dredges littering ocean shipwrecks, resulting in economic hardship for fishermen, indiscriminate ghost fishing, destruction of essential fish habitat, and loss of structural integrity and historical context of non-renewable cultural resources. Ocean explorers have discovered derelict commercial fishing gear on shipwrecks in Australia, the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, English Channel, Irish Sea, Mediterranean, Southeast Asia, United States, and international waters (Flecker 2002:14-15,23; Foley 2007:1-3; Harris 2007:16,18-19; Ballard 2008:136; Delgado 2008:20,23,25-26; NMSP 2008a:10, 2008b:168; Steinmetz 2008:141-142, 148-150; Corkill 2009:3-4,10,12,18,21,28,31-33; Hagberg 2009:24-25,28-29,40-41,49-51,66-67, 110-113,123,158,165; Kingsley 2009). While individual observations are numerous, quantitative and regional landscape studies are lacking. In the English Channel and its western approaches, 42% of shipwrecks (112/267) displayed “mild to extreme” fishing gear related damage (Kingsley 2009:17). This thesis is the first U.S. regional study of ocean shipwrecks and commercial fishing damage. It is unique in that it combines fishermen’s input and decades of wreck site observations into its analysis. On the mid-Atlantic coast, the study discovered 69% of the shipwreck sample (36/52) had 1 to 5 large derelict gear on-site, resulting in unrecovered net(s) or dredge(s) permanently affixed to the shipwreck structure. The economic loss to the fishing vessel owner is significant at $10,000 to $50,000 per gear system. Despite advanced technologies (hang logs, global positioning systems, and chart plotters), diver observations confirm that fishermen continue to lose gear. To formulate a practical solution, it is helpful for all stakeholders to have access to the same information. Fishermen state accurate obstruction locations are required to avoid collisions of their expensive gear with shipwrecks. Conversely, critics believe that, if fishermen are given 4 accurate locations, they will fish closer to the obstructions, resulting in further shipwreck damage and gear loss. This study provides a factual foundation to seek a mutually beneficial solution for fishermen, sustainable fish stocks, diver tourism, and maritime heritage, for the mid-Atlantic region and perhaps globally. To fulfill the study’s purpose, the researcher posed discrete questions and tailored the research design to find the answers. Primary Research Questions The study seeks to answer two primary research questions: 1. Does commercial fishing gear damage mid-Atlantic shipwrecks? 2. Do mid-Atlantic shipwrecks damage or capture commercial fishing gear? Presence of fishing gear on shipwrecks equals economic loss for fisherman. Presence of fishing gear on shipwrecks may, or may not, equal less shipwreck structural integrity or cultural material damage or loss. Lack of fishing gear on a wreck does not equal no damage. Both questions require unbiased, thorough, quantitative, and qualitative investigations. If the answers to these questions are affirmative, the fishing, diving, and nautical archaeology communities have a common goal to avoid shipwreck and fishing gear collisions. Secondary Research Questions Subsequent to the primary questions, what are the contributing factors or drivers affecting impacts and their severity? During the course of the study, many secondary questions naturally occurred: ? Commercial fishing gear affects what percentage of mid-Atlantic wrecks? ? What percentage of wrecks have been impacted by fishing gear that was subsequently recovered? ? Is a specific type of derelict fishing gear found on wrecks? 5 ? Can wreck damage type be linked to specific gear type? ? Is bottom sediment type related to a higher frequency of gear impacts? ? Do metal wrecks display more derelict gear on site than wooden wrecks? ? Is there evidence that fishing gear pulls through wrecks? If so, which type of fishing gear and what type of wreck construction? ? As scallop Marine Protected Areas (MPA) concentrate fishing efforts, do they also concentrate shipwreck impacts? ? How do fishermen use their hang databases while fishing? ? How accurate and complete are the hang databases used by local fishermen? By visiting fishermen? ? What incentives do fishermen have to fish close to, or away from, obstructions? Do fishermen catch more fish next to wrecks? ? How do fishermen regard obstructions? ? How frequently do fishermen state they snag a wreck? Does hang frequency differ by type of gear? ? What is the magnitude of the gear damage or wreck damage across a sample population? ? How does gear damage or loss affect a fisherman’s profit margin? ? What aid do fishermen need to avoid the wrecks? ? How does this study contribute to the knowledge base of essential fish habitat, diver tourism, marine debris, ghost fishing, or offshore energy? ? How does this work contribute to the management of fisheries and submerged cultural resources? 6 Understanding the realities and motivations of various ocean stakeholders may enable safeguarding submerged cultural resources for future study, while perhaps providing valuable information for fishermen, fisheries management, marine debris prevention, recreational diver and fishing tourism, and offshore energy planning. Research Design This study employed three modes of data gathering: 1) historical research, 2) scuba diver observations, and 3) commercial fishing interviews. First, the author researched current maritime archaeological theory on shipwreck site formation processes, the history of commercial bottom fishing, and the history of mid-Atlantic shipwrecks. Second, divers witness abandoned fishing gear on wreck sites and radical changes in discrete portions of wreck sites over time. Third, fishermen interviews gathered their perceptions and behaviors pertaining to bottom obstructions through a standardized set of 15 questions. Analysis was both quantitative and qualitative. A published fisherman’s hang log provided a historical base. From diver observations recorded in dive logs and site sketches, a wreck database documented and statistically analyzed over 50 sites for presence of derelict fishing gear. Individual wreck case studies highlighted specific damage. Fishermen interviews generated recurring beliefs and themes, which may, or may not, concur with diver observations. Ultimately, the best understanding of the fishermen’s plight and site formation processes of the wrecks came from the multi-user approach, combining the historical, diver, and fishermen’s knowledge bases. CHAPTER 2. ARCHAEOLOGICAL THEORY Introduction Terrestrial archaeology provided a foundation for site formation theory, thanks to Lewis Binford, David Clarke, and Michael Schiffer. Their efforts produced processual archaeology, based on anthropology and theory (Stewart 1999:566). Schiffer delineated cultural (human behavior) processes from non-cultural (natural environment) processes, abbreviated as c-transforms and n-transforms. Schiffer delineated c-transforms into reuse, disposition, reclamation, and disturbance processes (Schiffer 1996:v-vii,xvii). He lamented, “little progress has been made explaining …various disturbance processes” (Schiffer 1996:122). Schiffer called to task the critical review of negative evidence, which this author used in shipwreck database analysis and several case studies (Schiffer 1987:356). Most telling, Schiffer highlighted “the archaeological record is not a safe haven for artifacts” (Schiffer 1996:121). Maritime archaeologists extended the terrestrial concepts of c- and n-transforms to submerged sites. The motivation to examine impacts to deepwater shipwrecks stems from understanding their historical and archaeological value. Archaeologists often call shipwrecks time capsules of maritime history (Muckelroy 1978:56; Gould 1983:66, 2000:12; Delgado 1997:109; Babits and Van Tilburg 1998:86). Maritime archaeologist Keith Muckelroy defined the time capsule effect as “objects in use at precisely the same time, to the nearest day, and were considered necessary by a group of persons occupied in certain well-defined activities” (1978:56). In a perfect world, material culture freezes in situ on the date of sinking. Ideally, each shipwreck is a singular opportunity to document and interpret its history, a window to the past. In reality, natural and cultural processes jumble, disperse, and deteriorate shipwreck sites. Understanding site formation processes provides a structure for informed and systematic 8 interpretation. Starting with Muckelroy, few archaeologists have postulated about the deepwater realm. Fewer still have mentioned commercial fishing as a possible site formation process. Deepwater Shipwreck Site Formation Processes “The potential importance of this [deepwater] area of research is not related to the quantity of vessels involved, but rather to the probability that in many cases the remains will be of very high quality” (Muckelroy 1978:150). Vessels that break up on the surface have their contents widely scattered (Muckelroy 1978:157-181). Vessels that reach the seabed intact “are likely to be of great archaeological significance” (Muckelroy 1978:150). Today, with current technology that enables deepwater visitation and systematic excavation, shipwrecks carry an enormous potential for learning about the past. With the recent exploration and artifact recovery of the Titanic, SS Central America, SS Republic, USS Monitor, Mardi Gras Wreck, and ancient Black Sea wrecks (Ballard 1987, 2008; Ford et al. 2008; Kinder 1998; Thompson 1998; Vesilind 2005; Ward and Horlings 2008; Watts 1975), Muckelroy’s future technology is now present. Exploration and artifact recovery demonstrate that deepwater technology exists, awaiting rigorous archaeological application. The research and learning potential multiplies many fold if the vessel is relatively intact, as the hull provides spatial context for material culture. Shipwreck structural integrity is a function of natural and human forces. Natural forces include corrosion of ferrous materials, sand erosion, storm surge, sediment movement by current and tides, organic deterioration, and bio-deterioration. Each archaeological site will have a different combination and level of natural threats. Singularly and in combination, natural forces have powerful effects. Bio-deterioration has two forms: bio-fouling organisms and woodborers. Bio-fouling organisms attach to vessel structural elements and artifacts, except copper due to its toxicity, and 9 seasonal temperature changes affect organism growth rate. The climax of thick growth coupled with high current causes organism detachment, which can defoliate wood and expose fresh surfaces. It is unknown if bio-fouling layers protect wood surfaces from woodborers, which are quick to devour exposed surfaces above anoxic sediments. On the HMS Swift site in Patagonia, Argentina, a mechanical site formation process is giant kelp entanglement that wraps around structural wreck elements and exerts great mechanical force with high currents (Elkin et al. 2007:51-55). This bio-fouling effect is analogous to the mechanical forces of entangled floating nets on shipwrecks. In Chapter 6, the St. Augustine case study is an example of mechanical forces of nets and currents. Wood-boring crustaceans and mollusks degrade organic archaeological material. Their effect is more detrimental in warm water versus cold water (Pournou, Jones, and Moss 2001:299). Overall, humans have little control over natural forces or their impact on ocean shipwrecks. Therefore, this thesis investigates possibly preventable human-related impacts. Human-related damage takes many forms. A short, not comprehensive, list includes recreational scuba diving, commercial diving, commercial salvage, recreational fishing, commercial fishing, pipeline and cable laying, artificial reef building, anchoring, wartime depth charging, navigational obstruction clearing, archaeological excavation, and dredging for harbors, channels, and beach replenishment. Dredging has the added complexity of obtaining fill from a borrow area or dumping spoil material. Most of these human impacts are self-explanatory but it may be helpful to quantify sport diver impacts. Four types of diver-related impacts include artifact recovery, physical contact with the wrecks, exhalation bubble corrosion, and dive boat anchoring. Of the four 10 types of sport diver damage, the New South Wales Heritage Office in Australia considers anchoring the most damaging diver-related impact to the wrecks (Edney 2006:201). Muckelroy was the first maritime archaeologist to combine natural and cultural shipwreck site formation processes into a readily understood flow diagram (Figure 2.1). Muckelroy viewed a wreck site as a closed system, represented by the large rectangle. An intact functioning ship enters the closed system through the wrecking process. Some materials float away. Salvors may remove material from the remains, shortly after sinking, centuries later, or both. Organic materials disintegrate and may be flushed from the site or buried. Currents, FIGURE 2.1 Flow diagram of shipwreck site formation processes. (Muckelroy 1978:158.) 11 tides, waves, and storms may change the seabed. New material may be added to the site, such as salvage tools, modern litter, or another shipwreck. Archaeological excavation is also a site disturbance and must be carefully planned and documented. Muckelroy classified these processes extracting filters and scrambling devices. Extraction filters result in material removed from the site while scrambling devices jumble artifacts across the site. The end-result is the observed seabed distribution pattern of vessel remains and artifacts (Muckelroy 1978:157-181). Muckelroy validated the most important preservation factors of site formation are sediment type and grain size. Vessel burial in sediments equals anaerobic protection. He concluded his 20 site analysis by stating “…there can be no doubt that the nature of the sea-bed deposit is the main determining factor in the survival of archaeological remains underwater” (Muckelroy 1978:162). In a recent ten-sample study in the Gulf of Mexico, three sediment shear strength ranges correlated to the level of shipwreck subsidence (Table 2.1). Sediment shear strength of one kilopound per square foot (ksf) limited burial to less than 50% of the hull, 0.15 to 1.0 ksf enabled the vessel to settle to the waterline or above, and less than 0.15 ksf allowed up to complete burial (Keith and Evans 2009:63-67). The middle category describes the sand of the mid-Atlantic seafloor. TABLE 2.1 SEDIMENT SHEAR STRENGTH AND SHIPWRECK SUBSIDENCE Sediment Type Shear Strength Range Shipwreck Subsidence Clayey sand > 1 ksf Less than 50% of hull Sand Silty sand Clayey sand 0.15 – 1.0 ksf Settles to waterline or above Silty clay Clayey silt < 0.15 ksf Up to complete burial Source: Table created from Keith and Evans 2009:66-67. 12 Shipwreck diver, enthusiast, and isometric illustrator John Riley determined that upright metal-hulled vessels settle into sand bottom to the intended waterline, coining the phrase “waterline theory.” Riley derived his theory after recording over 100 iron and steamship wrecks off New South Wales, Australia. He also noticed that decks and deck beams collapse first, followed by hull plates not supported by bulkheads. The structurally robust bow, stern, engine, and boilers remain intact longest. On sites deeper than surface wave action can affect, cylindrical boilers tend to remain in situ on metal-hulled wrecks. After wood wrecks lose their hull to wood boring organisms, storm surge can roll boilers out of situ. Side paddle steamers naturally settle upright. To support the steam cylinders, boilers, paddlewheels, and shafts, robust frames and stringers in the engine section “form a very strong box,” as seen on the Agnes Irving (Figure 2.2) (Riley 1985:191,195). In Chapter 6 of this thesis, Riley’s theory and trends contribute to the site evaluations of tug Cherokee and paddlewheel Admiral DuPont. FIGURE 2.2 Agnes Irving, iron hulled paddlewheel, isometric drawing. (Riley 1985:194.) 13 In 1990, Debbie Hardy modified Muckelroy’s diagram to delineate extraction filters and scrambling devices (Figure 2.3). The modified diagram explains the site formation processes on the Centurion site off New South Wales, Australia. The site rests at 18 meters depth on a flat sand bottom. Wooden wrecks begin the closed system process after settling: once the vessel is waterlogged, doubling its weight, currents or storms are less apt to move site components. The extracting filters are salvage in antiquity, modern salvage, and disintegration of perishables. Hardy’s scrambling devices include current, sand movement, materials deposited after the wrecking event such as another wreck or modern trash, and damage by fishing nets or boat anchors. Hardy wrote one sentence describing fishing effects (Hardy 1990:25-26, 29). This is the first specific mention of fishing impacts in the literature of wreck site formation processes. FIGURE 2.3 Modified Muckelroy process diagram. (Hardy 1990:29.) Ward, Larcombe, and Veth expanded the scientific and environmental understanding of site processes. Physical, biological, and chemical processes contribute to the depositional result. 14 The major formation variables are the a) wreck itself, b) sediment supply, and the c) hydrodynamic environment, shown in Figure 2.4. Sedimentary processes are erosion, movement, and accumulation at the wreck site. Examples of vessel characteristics influencing the site formation processes include the deterioration pattern of wood versus iron hulls and iron bow and stern triangles surviving while hull plates flatten (Ward, Larcombe, and Veth 1999:561,563,569). FIGURE 2.4 Expanded Muckelroy diagram, with a) the wreck, b) the sedimentary environment, and c) the hydrodynamic environment. (Ward, Larcombe, and Veth 1999:564.) In contrast to extensive natural transform literature, maritime archaeology is lacking cultural site formation process research (Delgado 1997:388; Richards 2009:52). Australian archaeologist Martin Gibbs wrote one of the most recent articles on cultural wreck site formation theory. Gibbs built his theory on three wreck sites stranded close to shore. While his process 15 model is extensive, explaining survivor camps and subsistence salvage (Gibbs 2006), his model does not directly apply to offshore deepwater sites and associated fishing impacts. Commercial Fishing as a Site Formation Process Several archaeologists specifically discuss fishing impacts in relation to site formation theory. David Stewart divided fishing impacts into two categories: post-depositional [new] objects, such as hooks and lead weights, and artifact movement by line, net, or anchor. Stewart noted fishing lines and nets disturb unburied artifacts and that movement of artifacts by nets can be quite severe. Anchors can damage and displace buried artifacts, as interpreted at the Bozburun, Turkey site (Stewart 1999:577). John O’Shea reviewed shipwreck site formation processes off the shallow shoreline of western Lake Huron. Using Muckelroy’s extracting and scrambling filters, O’Shea called attention to cultural anomalies, such as scavenging, navigational dredging, piling construction, and unintentional disturbance from snagged fishermen’s nets (O’Shea 2002:214). Commercial bottom fishing gear is ideal for locating obstructions, including shipwrecks. Explorers first realized this in the late 1950s. In the Mediterranean, the abundance of wreck sites made commercial fishing inefficient and fishermen purposely destroyed wrecks. Turkish waters had so many submerged amphora-laden sites that trawlers and sponge draggers had difficulty fishing. As a standard practice, fishermen destroyed encrusted amphorae so nets would not be torn in the future (Throckmorton 1964:15-16). Peter Throckmorton and George Bass relied on the local fishermen’s knowledge to find the ancient wrecks of Turkey. Numerous examples of bottom fishermen finding shipwrecks abound. Discussed below are examples from the Gulf of Mexico, Florida’s East Coast, and the mid-Atlantic. In the Gulf of Mexico, oil industry cultural surveys discovered lost shrimp nets on historic shipwrecks, up to 16 500 ft. deep. Fishermen trawl these fishing grounds 37-75 times per year, however submerged cultural resource damage from fishing gear has not yet been quantified. No fishing regulations protect historic resources, only biological resources, such as coral. Few if any regulations require reporting of historic resources (Evans, Firth, and Staniforth 2009:45-46,50). Seventy nautical miles east of Jacksonville, Florida, at a depth of 1200 ft. (370 m), a fishing trawler brought up an intact earthenware jar that led to discovery of an 1850-1861 coastal sailing merchant ship, nicknamed the “Blue China” Wreck (Tolson, Gerth, and Dobson 2008:163). In 2003, Odyssey Marine Exploration mapped the site and artifacts. In 2005, Odyssey returned to find the site’s contents broken and dispersed amid trawl marks. The trawl flattened the wooden ship’s structure and little stratigraphy remained (Tolson 2009:9). Tolson concluded, “shipwrecks lying in hundreds of meters of water are in reality not beyond the reach of destructive human influences…the current prevailing model of in situ preservation is neither a practical nor responsible solution in many cases” (Tolson 2009:11). In 2009, British archaeologist Sean Kingsley compiled the first regional study of fishing impacts on deepwater shipwrecks. Kingsley utilized Odyssey Marine Exploration’s three-year shipwreck survey of the English Channel & Western Approaches. Dated between mid-17th century and modern times, 267 wreck sites rested at a maximum depth of 625 ft. (190 m). Vessel monitoring system (VMS) tracking verified the 4,725 sq. nautical mile area was well-traveled by bottom fishers using trawl nets, gill nets, and scallop dredges. Side scan sonar revealed cannons dragged offsite, deep furrows from otter trawl doors, and scallop dredges cutting through wreck sites. One 4-ton bronze cannon was dragged 180 ft. (55 m) from a wreck site. Remote-operated vehicle (ROV) video documented 112 of the wrecks, 42%, providing evidence of 147 fishing disturbance anomalies. Odyssey found nets snagged on 108 wrecks. A trawl net or dredge 17 chipped and dispersed a cargo of ironstone china plates, stacked on end. Fishing cables dragged wooden hull remains off site and wedged them between boulders. ROV cameras documented a bronze cannon flipped to expose its fresh unconcreted surface. Snagged fishing cables carved grooves into bronze cannons and ballast stones. Against forces capable of moving heavy cannon, wooden wrecks and smaller artifacts are doomed (Kingsley 2009:1-33). Kingley concluded the assumption of superior preservation on deepwater wrecks, compared to shallow water wrecks, is false. Commercial bottom fishing is a severe threat of direct physical disturbance. Fishing gear impacts result in loosening archaeological material, deteriorating organic remains through oxygen exposure, de-contextualizing, inadvertent recovery, broken hull structure, and loss and destruction of artifacts. After discussing future options, Kingsley recommends two steps: 1) comprehensive mapping and planning of sites to select a historically significant minority and 2) education and outreach to fishermen about the threats to their gear and the historical sites (Kingsley 2009:34-40). From the author’s experience, mid-Atlantic divers and dive boat captains seek obstruction locations from fishermen. Dive boat captains who provide an opportunity to experience a new wreck may build clientele and repeat customers. Experienced shipwreck diver and author Gary Gentile wrote “the most effective way to locate undived ocean shipwrecks is to investigate hang numbers: coordinates gleaned from the skippers of commercial draggers and trawlers” (Gentile 2004:45). Diving many uncharted obstructions, Gentile observed trawl doors and nets entangled in the wreckage of lost liners, tankers, freighters, submarines, and German U-boats (Gentile 2004:45). U.S. technical diver Richard Kohler utilized decades of fishermen’s hang numbers, in conjunction with historical records, to locate the U-215 (Kohler 2004:8). Fishermen can be allies for nautical archaeologists and divers, in the pursuit of locating shipwrecks. 18 Conclusion Since Muckelroy’s landmark model, several nautical archaeologists have refined shipwreck site formation process theory over the past three decades. By examining evidence in deepwater environments, this study attempts to prove that commercial bottom fishing is a major cultural process element. Mid-Atlantic case studies show commercial bottom fishing operates in three modes, as a material depositor, scrambling device, and extraction filter. Holistically adding this process element to deepwater shipwreck formation processes could aid individual site interpretation and submerged cultural resource management. CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY Introduction The author used three methods of data collection and analysis: on-site diver observations of derelict gear, individual shipwreck case studies, and commercial fishing interviews. Research methodology outlined the research plan and prepared a foundation to answer primary research questions: 1) does commercial bottom fishing gear damage shipwrecks and 2) do shipwrecks negatively impact commercial fishermen? Secondary questions abounded concerning what factors influence the interaction of commercial fish trawling, dredging, and mid-Atlantic deepwater shipwrecks. The combined analysis of the three knowledge bases found many, but not all, of the answers. Diver Observations The author has been an active mid-Atlantic wreck diver for three decades. She has had the opportunity to record detailed dive logs and wreck site sketches on approximately 1500 dives. This study utilizes the author’s records for observations of large derelict fishing gear. The study does not focus on fish pots, monofilament, or long line. The author believes these mechanisms create less significant damage to wreck structure than larger gear and are probably too numerous to count. Combing dive logs and site sketches, the statistical sample included a wreck site if the author was familiar with the majority of the site or photography documented the majority of the site. The term majority accounts for the possible presence of outlying structure beyond limited mid-Atlantic bottom visibility. The resultant sample was 52 shipwrecks, with depths from 65 to 250 ft. (20 to 76 m). An interesting question is whether this sample is appropriately representative of the whole population of mid-Atlantic shipwrecks. Since no one knows the location and 20 characteristics of every mid-Atlantic shipwreck, this may be hard to answer. Geographically, NOAA’s Automated Wreck and Obstruction Information System (AWOIS) plots a heavier density closer to the entrance of Delaware Bay, as would be expected due to increased vessel traffic. The sample database also recorded a heavier density of wrecks off the Delaware Bay entrance (Figure 3.1). Chapter 4 discusses AWOIS and Chapter 5 describes the database. FIGURE 3.1 Geographic plot of mid-Atlantic shipwreck sample database. (Data by author, graphics by Michael Krivor, SEARCH, 2009.) 21 Shipwreck Case Studies Analysis of each case study highlighted specific shipwreck damage. The author sourced case study wrecks from her dive logs and site sketches, encompassing three decades of mid-Atlantic shipwreck diving. Chosen case studies explored a range of ship build dates, sinking dates, material construction, hull type, vessel function, propulsion, and depth. Photographs and site sketches were the primary record of derelict gear presence and wreck damage. For each case, a brief history and description of the vessel precedes a description of the fishing gear and wreck damage. For example, the author observed the Offshore Paddle Wheel site over nine years, taking careful notes of site extent, wreck remains, and propulsion machinery. Combined with archival research, the author identified the wreck as the Admiral DuPont, which in turn enabled comparisons of vessel survey documents and similar vessel sites to the current condition of the wreck (Steinmetz 2008). Commercial Fishing Interviews The study reached out to the commercial fishing community to understand their perspectives and opinions about bottom obstructions and shipwrecks. With East Carolina University (ECU) Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval (Appendix A), the study aimed for a target sample of 9 to 12 fishermen, a combination of netters, scallopers, and clammers. In-person interviews were much preferred to telephone interviews. A pure random sample of licensed fishermen was not possible due to the transient nature of their work and field time constraints. The author conducted face-to-face interviews at commercial fishing ports along the mid-Atlantic coast. The process of anonymity precludes identifying specific ports, dates, or fishermen. 22 To start, several dive boat captains suggested fishing captains to interview. These interviews led to another and another, known as a snowball sampling technique (Bernard 2002:185). When recommended fishermen were not available, the author sought new fishermen by touring commercial fishing centers, adding a degree of randomness to the sample (Bernard 2002:184). In total, dive boat captains recommended two fishermen (15%), fishermen recommended five fellow fishermen (38%), and six fishermen were randomly available at fishing centers or docks (46%). The resultant sample consisted of 17 interviews: 3 netters, 5 scallopers, and 5 clammers, plus 2 fishing gear salvage divers and 2 gear providers. Fishermen recommended gear salvage divers and gear providers. Of 17 interviews, 13 were face-to-face and 4 were by telephone. For all interviews, the interviewee was in a familiar environment: eight in their wheelhouse, four at home, two at a restaurant, two at their place of business, and one at a marina. Each interview followed a protocol, sanctioned by the IRB. A recruitment script (Appendix B) stated the study’s purpose and requested the fisherman’s informed verbal consent to be interviewed. The script emphasized the voluntary nature of the interview and that the interviewee could stop at any time. Once a fisherman gave consent, the interviewer completed the contact sheet and assigned an identifier. To protect the interviewee and obtain unbiased information, the study assigned identifiers, such as Netter 1, Scalloper 3, or Clammer 5. The interviewer stored contact identification forms securely and separately from interview forms. Only the principal investigator, the author, conducted the interviews and handled contact sheets and interview forms. As a survey technique, the standardized 15 question interview form (Appendix C) asked the primary research questions three times, in slightly different ways. As possible, secondary 23 questions interweaved the primary questions. As the interview progressed, it was natural for the interviewer and the interviewee to become more comfortable with each other. The fishermen generally added more detail as the interview progressed and the questions jogged memories. Fishermen answered questions about their years of fishing experience and vessel size, age, and propulsion power. They described their fishing grounds, fishing days per year, and how often they snag or lose gear. Fishermen discussed how they get confirmation of a hang and ranked severity by how often gear is not damaged, slightly damaged, damaged but still useable, unusable and partially or fully recovered, or not recovered. Next, the survey asked them to estimate the cost to repair or replace gear. Later in the interview, fishermen responded to questions about the type of shipwreck-associated artifacts or remains recovered by their gear. The interviewer asked what information or tools they currently use to avoid obstructions and what they think would help them more reliably avoid obstructions. Since fishermen are concerned with regulations, the survey asked if past or present fisheries management policies have increased or decreased obstruction impact occurrence. The survey asked fishermen to tell about their most memorable hang and, if given very accurate obstruction locations, would they fish as close as possible, or stay off a reasonable distance, and to define a reasonable distance. An open-ended question asked if they had information not yet discussed that might help this study. Lastly, the survey asked the fisherman to recommended other persons who could contribute to the study. Multidisciplinary Analysis Platt (1964) and Chamberlain (1965) described scientific inquiry by utilizing a number of propositions and testing each against the archaeological and historical data sets. An analytical process of exclusions and rejections leaves a remaining probable positive statement. This study 24 used the process of multiple working hypotheses to prove or disprove the primary research questions. Seeking the root causes of shipwreck damage, all site formation processes were considered as possible contributing factors. Testing the scale of damage to fishing gear, the author analyzed data for significance through a variety of methods. The term multi-disciplinary refers to the sources of information and the broad study of particular occupations, practices, or communities that specialize in unique sets of local environmental knowledge (Mish 2007:356,465,1197). The combined experiences of fishermen and divers explained site formation processes and quantified severity of impact. Fishermen described types of fishing gear used, areas fished, number of damaged/lost gear events over specific time periods, economic losses due to hangs, and opinions on tools required to reduce obstruction impacts. Divers observed impact areas on-site and usually dove a wreck many times over several years, resulting in an informal monitoring of wreck sites. Above-water and below-water observations combined to give a unique opportunity to assess site formation factors and possible solutions. The thesis findings create a common knowledge base to formulate realistic, economically viable, and motivational proposals to safeguard commercial fishing gear and non-renewable underwater cultural resources. CHAPTER 4. HISTORICAL RESEARCH Introduction This chapter discusses previous literature important to various mid-Atlantic stakeholder groups. It includes the history of commercial bottom fishing, fisheries management, marine sanctuaries, submerged cultural resource legislation, mid-Atlantic shipwrecks, and commercial hang records. The history of commercial bottom fishing covers the evolution of vessels and bottom gear: the trawl net, scallop dredge, and clam dredge. Fisheries management covers limits, legislation, stock declines, habitat, and rotational areas. Commercial Bottom Fishing The Great Cod Fishery Early large-scale commercial bottom fishing started in Europe and spread west to the New World. The Basques were first to discover bountiful cod stocks on the Grand Banks off Newfoundland. From the 1600s to the 1930s, sailing ships carried nested stacks of 20 ft. (6.1 m) long dories on deck to the Banks. Upon arriving at the cod fishing grounds, two fishermen rowed a dory away from the main vessel and bottom fished with hand lines. In 1713, Andrew Robinson built the first schooner in Gloucester, Massachusetts. Large fast sailing schooners revolutionized commercial fishing with form fitting function and speed (German 1984:114-116; Kurlansky 1997:83, 114). Commercial fishing had two distinct perspectives: the view of the fishermen and the view of the vessel/business owners. For fishermen, the work environment was bitterly cold, exhausting, and life-threatening. In the days of sail, fog, snowstorms, and gales prevented dories returning safely to the ship. As understood today, commercial fishing had a high fatality rate. In the harsh environment, fishermen enjoyed a high esprit de corps, an elite brotherhood, tied 26 together by the common threads of physical and economic survival (Goode 1887:104-126; Kurlansky 1997:112-113,117). While fishermen yearned for safer and more productive fishing methods, labor was an expense deducted from ship owners’ profits. Commercial fishing is a business. For owners to consider adopting vessel and gear technological improvements, the advances had to pay for themselves (Sainsbury 1996:2). Vessel and Finfish Gear Evolutions As fish stocks dwindled, Europeans transitioned to more productive vessel and gear technologies. In 1815, the French introduced trawl line fishing (long lining), an improvement in efficiency. Each line had multiple hooks and bait. The time intensive labor of hauling fathoms of line could now produce multiple fish per haul (Kurlansky 1997:118,121). Next, European sailing vessels advanced from long lining to beam trawling. By the 1830s, the sailing British and Flemish were first to employ the beam trawl (Figure 4.1). A stout elm horizontal beam kept the mouth of a net open while fishing for Channel shrimp at the sea bottom (German 1984:114; Kurlansky 1997:130). FIGURE 4.1 Beam trawl: isometric, plan, and end views. (Sainsbury 1996:42-43.) 27 In 1862, a British scientific philosopher, Thomas Henry Huxley, and his fishing investigative commission ignored drift net herring fishermen’s complaints that long liners were diminishing the stocks. Misunderstood at the time, catches were larger because fishing methods became more efficient, not because the fish stocks were sustainable (Kurlansky 1997:121-122). In 1865, American fishermen tried to combine their swift schooner design with European fishing gear. A few Boston fishermen of Irish descent experimented with a beam trawl obtained from the North Sea fishing fleet. They contracted Dennison J. Lawler of East Boston to build the 55 ft. long by 17 ft. beam by 10 ft. draft (17 x 5 x 3 m) schooner Sylph (Figure 4.2). When the beam trawl experiments proved unprofitable, the owners converted Sylph into a market vessel, ferrying the catch from fishing grounds to market, which better suited the schooner’s speed (Chapelle 1973:107-108). FIGURE 4.2 Experimental beam trawler Sylph, East Boston, 1865. (Chapelle 1973:108.) In the 1880s, two men promoted the use of beam trawls in the U.S. In 1884, an English fisherman, John Exon, used a beam trawl off Portland, Oregon, but he and his vessel were lost in 1886. By 1887, Captain Joseph Collins, fisherman, U.S. Fish Commission member, and Massachusetts Commissioner of Fisheries and Game, was the driver of American fisheries 28 technology advances on the East Coast. With Collins’ coaching, Provincetown, Massachusetts, fishermen utilized small sloops to drag beam trawls for flounder on Cape Cod Bay’s flat bottom. Two years later, Provincetown had 27 sailing beam trawlers and, by 1904, the number increased to 67 vessels. Their nets were 75 ft. long, using beams 25 ft. wide (23 x 7.6 m). Despite East and West Coast attempts, the beam trawl was not widely accepted by American fishermen (German 1984:115). Further gear improvements required a more powerful and reliable vessel propulsion system. Although designers first applied the steam engine to marine propulsion in the early 1800s, commercial vessels required compact and fuel-efficient engines (Gardiner 1993:8). In the second half of the nineteenth century, fishing vessels adopted steam driven capstans for hauling anchors and sails (Sainsbury 1996:2). By 1862, European steam vessels ferried the catch from offshore sailing trawlers to dockside markets. American menhaden and oyster fleets began experimenting with steam-powered fishing vessels in 1871. In 1877, an English steam-powered tug pulled a trawl net with great success (German 1984:114-116). By 1881, Hull, England, shipwrights designed and built the first steam-propelled trawler, Zodiac. It quickly proved effective and European fishermen converted most sailing trawlers to engine-powered trawlers within a decade. With the transition, speed was controlled and vessels could drag a net consistently just above the bottom. Stuck on tradition and requiring transition capital, most of the U.S. Georges Bank fishery remained a sailing fleet for almost thirty years. Some Gloucester fishing schooners sailed until World War II (Kurlansky 1997:125,129-132). Once European fishing vessel owners installed steam engines, European gear technology made a huge leap to the otter trawl (Figure 4.3). The beam trawl was hard to handle on deck and fishermen could only use it on a flat sea bottom. In 1894, the otter trawl was named for an Irish 29 device that caught lake trout and pike. The otter trawl is a net and/or metal ringed bag towed across the sea bottom to catch fish, with doors keeping the mouth of the net open. Otter doors are large heavy planes, attached between the tow, or warp, lines and the two leading ends of the net. The forward motion of the tow causes the angled doors to fly outward against water resistance, maintaining an open net mouth (German 1984:114). Fishermen use otter trawls for finfish, scallop, oyster, and shrimp harvesting (Still 1987; Maiolo 1982, 2004; Kelly 1993; MAFMC 2008). The otter trawl’s main advantage over the beam trawl was the ability to condense the net mouth for hauling on deck. For otter boards to keep the net mouth open while fishing, the vessel required a constant powerful source of propulsion, such as an engine. FIGURE 4.3 Otter trawl and five types of otter doors: a) steel bison b) steel oval, c) standard wooden rectangular, d) steel VEE, and e) steel Portuguese. (NRC 2002:16; Sainsbury 1996:42.) Steam powered ships with otter trawls reported six times the catch of sailing ships. By 1895, the North Sea fleets had converted to the otter trawl. By the late 1890s, fish stocks were dwindling in the North Sea. In 1893, on Cape Cod, the U.S. Fisheries Commission experimented with the first U.S. otter trawl (Kurlansky 1997:131-132). In 1903, Collins asked a Wellfleet, 30 Massachusetts, oysterman to test an otter trawl. By 1904, the otter trawl proved more productive than the beam trawl in America (German 1984:115). In the U.S., Admiral Francis Tiffany Bowles, U.S. Naval Academy graduate who studied iron and steel shipbuilding at the Royal Naval College in Greenwich, England, initiated the building of a fleet of steel steam-powered otter trawlers. After resigning his naval commission in 1903, Bowles became president of Quincy Fore River Shipbuilding Company. He secured a contract from the Bay State Fishing Company to build the first American steel otter trawler, based on the North Sea design (German 1984:117). In 1905, the first steam trawler Spray (Figure 4.4) left Boston for the Grand Banks (Case 1961:107-108). The 350-ton Spray was 139 ft. long overall by 22 ft. beam by 12.9 ft. depth of hold (42.3 x 6.7 x 3.9 m) and cost $60,000, three times the cost of a first-class fishing schooner. Spray had a 900-indicated-horsepower triple-expansion engine and a Scotch (fire-tube) boiler. The otter trawl net was 90 ft. wide under tow, 4 ft. high at the mouth, and tapered to the cod end at 130 ft. long (27.4 x 1.2 x 39.6 m). The vessel trawled at 3 knots (5.6 km/h). Over one and a half hours, the net swept a corridor 90 ft. wide (27.4 m) and 5 miles (8 km) long (German 1984:117, 119). FIGURE 4.4 First American engine-powered fishing trawler Spray. (German 1984:117.) 31 The Bay State Fishing Company prepared their venture for success, except for one factor, shipwrecks. Spray’s first captain was a popular and seasoned Boston fisherman, Henry Dexter Malone (Figure 4.5). Malone visited Grimsby, England, to observe fishing techniques for several months. On Spray’s maiden voyage, Malone and the crew of fourteen included three skilled Grimsby fishermen: a captain, mate, and fisherman. On 19 December 1905, off Chatham, Massachusetts, the crew cheered as the first bountiful haul emptied from the net onto the deck. The second haul was a different experience (German 1984:117): …the second set pointed out the hazards of otter trawling on unknown ground. Spray was brought up short [stuck] when the trawl snagged on a wreck; and the trawl itself came up in shreds, the first of uncounted ‘rimracked’ otter trawls in the New England fisheries (German 1984:117). Malone resigned in June stating he believed schooners could catch more fish and travel faster than steam otter trawlers, however Spray had a slight advantage in that it could fish when the weather was too rough for the dory men. Malone returned to his schooner Manhassett. By 1914, he owned three schooners and retrofitted the Manhassett with a 120-horsepower diesel Nelseco FIGURE 4.5 Henry Dexter Malone, first Spray captain. (German 1984:118.) 32 engine, which powered the vessel at nine knots. The Manhassett was the first New England auxiliary fishing schooner, having both sail and engine power (German 1984:118). On the Spray, testing the powered otter trawl continued. The Bay State Fishing Company hired Michael Green to captain and prove the Spray. He and the crew methodically sampled the fishing grounds to find where the otter trawl could be safely deployed. They perfected shooting [deploying] and hauling back [retrieving] the trawl. Despite the crew’s constant mending of the net due to snags on obstructions [hangs], Green’s approach was profitable. After the 1908-1909 recession, the Bay State Fishing Company contracted Quincy Fore River Shipbuilding Company for five steam otter trawlers: Foam (Figure 4.6), Ripple (Figure 4.7), Crest, Surf, and Swell. Each was ten ft. shorter than Spray, with a raised whaleback topgallant forecastle deck to protect the workers and the fish hatch, 450-indicated-horsepower triple-expansion engines, electric generator and lights, and a 100-ton capacity fish hold. In 1912, each vessel averaged 49 trips and 2 million pounds (907 m tons) of fish. Comparisons in 1913 showed powered otter trawl catches were of similar size to line trawl schooner catches but twice as frequent (German 1984:120-122). By 1915, U.S. fishermen adopted and fine-tuned the new gear technology. Their otter trawls caught large quantities of cod, pollock, haddock, and flounder (Pol and Carr 2000:332). By 1929, otter trawling landed three times the catch taken by line trawlers. The height of the net’s headline, at the top of the net’s mouth, increased from 4 ft. to 8 ft. high (1.2 to 2.4 m). When positioned far ahead of the net, heavy dragged otter doors generated sediment clouds that herded fish into the net (German 1984:129-130). With the transition to powered vessels, the U.S. otter trawl was a success. 33 FIGURE 4.6 Looking aft, probably aboard Foam, George’s Bank, 1912. Trawler winch was forward of bridge. (German 1984:123.) FIGURE 4.7 Ripple, second of five Bay State Fisheries whaleback bow trawlers, Boston Harbor 3 January 1917. (German 1984:119.) Shortly after Bay State Fisheries proved the otter trawl, vessel propulsion transitioned from coal-fired steam to liquid diesel. Built in 1920 by Frank Rice in East Boothbay, Maine, for 34 Gloucester fisherman John Chisholm, Fabia was the first successful diesel trawler. Fabia (Figure 4.8) was 131.6 ft. long by 25 ft. beam by 13.4 ft. (40.1 x 7.6 x 4.1 m) and had a 360-horsepower diesel engine. Diesel powered vessels required a smaller crew than coal-fired steam vessels and diesel was less expensive and a more compact energy source than coal. Diesel power was safer and more economical than gasoline power, which enabled medium sized vessels to utilize diesel engines. Capital investment from a large company was no longer required to otter trawl (German 1984:127-128). FIGURE 4.8 Fabia, first successful U.S. diesel trawler. (German 1984:127.) 35 Equipped with reliable power, independent of the wind, fishing vessels grew in size, cargo capacity, and capability. By 1937, British trawlers had wireless communication, electricity, and an echometer, a prelude to sonar for detecting depth. WWI and WWII provided fish stock replenishment periods as the military called trawlers into war service (Kurlansky 1997:52,139,152). After WWII, Newfoundland fishing fleets changed from sailing schooners and dories to powered draggers. In 1948, seasoned schooner captain Arch Thornhill took command of Blue Foam (Figure 4.9), one of the first two Newfoundland steel-hulled draggers. Blue Foam was 140 ft. (43 m) long and 399 tons with an 805 hp engine. A 7/8 in. (2.2 cm) diameter wire towed the trawl net and 1200 lb. (544 kg) otter doors (Andersen 1998:4,241,244,263). FIGURE 4.9 Blue Foam, one of the first two Newfoundland trawlers. (Andersen 1998:286.) For the first three or four years, Thornhill damaged and lost his nets and otter doors to old anchors, rocks, and many wrecks on the shallow hard Grand Banks. In some areas, obstructions 36 tore the net every set. Dragger captains recovered 8 to 10 rusty anchors per trip, which they dumped close to homeport (Andersen 1998:256-258,261,268). In 1976, Thornhill said: We fellows effectively cleared the ground for the skippers who went dragging eight to ten years later. Bethel Shoal, in particular, we had as clean as your living room. But we got all the grounds clean, and there’s hardly a place out there now that you can’t go dragging (Andersen 1998:258). Navigational aids progressed from land sightings, dead reckoning, and star sightings to Loran A and later Loran C. Each technology added more positional accuracy, leading to today’s Global Positioning System (GPS). Position accuracy enables fishermen to reliably return to productive fishing grounds and habitats. Today, chart plotters and databases of hangs and obstructions (McGee and Tillett 1983) are tools to help fishermen avoid bottom anomalies that may damage or snag their gear. After World War II, three inventions synergized into the factory ship: large high-powered ships, large trawl nets (Figure 4.10), and the ability to freeze fish at sea (Kurlansky 1997:52,139,152). Next, synthetic fibers increased net durability and cost effectiveness (NMSP 2008b:133). In the 1970s and 1980s, modern factory ships grew to approximately 450 ft. (122 m) long, 4,000-ton capacity, twin engines of 6,000 hp or more, and trawl with “openings large enough to swallow jumbo jets.” A factory ship crew dressed, packaged, and froze the fish, ready for distribution upon arrival at port. After dragging, the “ocean floor…is a desert” (Kurlansky 1997:138,140). To facilitate trawling over uneven or rocky bottom, fishermen developed roller and rockhopper sweeps (Figure 4.11), attached to the net footrope. Chain, cookie, and street sweepers physically disturbed the bottom to catch bottom fish. In 1995, fisheries managers deemed street sweeper gear too efficient at harvesting fish and banned it (Pol and Carr 2000:332). Today, fishing vessels tow otter trawl nets at speeds up to 4.8 knots (8.9 km/h) (NRC 2002:14). For the 37 past 50 years, otter trawls and scallop dredges have been the highest economically valuable fishing mechanisms in New England, after lobster pots (Pol and Carr 2000:329). FIGURE 4.10 Trawl net size by vessel size and power. (NRC 2002:17.) 38 FIGURE 4.11 Footrope sweep types on New England trawl nets. (Pol and Carr 2000:332.) The Scallop Fishery Compared to cod fish, the scallop industry is quite young. The first commercial harvests of Atlantic sea scallop, Placopecten magellanicus, (Figure 4.12) started in the late 1800s, from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to Cape Hatteras (Figure 4.13). In the 1920s, fishermen started landing Mid-Atlantic Bight scallops in New York. In the 1930s, U.S. and Canadian fishermen discovered the rich scallop beds on Georges Bank and started to develop an offshore scallop fleet. Heavy investment began after WWII and continued into the 1950s. The New England scallop fleet hailed primarily from New Bedford, Massachusetts. From the 1940s to 1959, the New England Trawls Trawl nets have been used in New England since about 1915 (Com- missioners of Fisheries and Game 1916). Trawl nets are highly efficient, funnel-like nets that are towed behind a fishing vessel. This fishery was limited by the amount of backbreaking labor required until the develop- ment of plastic twine and hydraulic hauling equipment in the 1950s, which allowed for faster and easier net deployment and retrieval. Increasing horsepower of boats, a development that affected all fisheries, has led to new designs in the footrope, or sweep of the trawl net (the leading edge of the bottom half of the net opening). The development of different sweeps (and the power and ability to deploy them) has allowed trawlers broader access to fishing grounds. The introduction of cookie, roller, and rockhopper sweeps allowed access to fishing grounds initially inaccessible to trawlers due to rocky and un- even bottom (Fig. 2). The development of bristle sweeps and modification of rockhopper sweeps also increased the efficiency of the gear by blocking any escape of fish between elements of the sweep. The bristle sweep, or "street sweeper" gear, appeared in 1995 in New Bedford, Massachusetts and was felt to be so efficient that it was quickly banned. Roller Gear Rockhopper Gear Street Sweeper Gear Floats Headrope / CodjExt ension Sweep :_ -- ' . .,- - . . ....... Raised Footrope Raised Footrope Sweep Hanging Line Traditional Chain Sweep Hanging Line Cookie Sweep Figure 2. Six types of sweeps used on the footropes of trawl nets in New England. Adapted from Carr and Milliken (1998). 332 Northeastern Naturalist Vol. 7, No. 4 39 fleet operated under industry-sponsored effort restrictions: a trip catch limitation per man, maximum crew size, maximum trip length, and a mandatory layover period. Fishermen heavily harvested the mid-Atlantic grounds by the early 1960s. From 1975 to 1979, mid-Atlantic landings fluctuated, by as much as a factor of eight over George’s Bank landings (NEFMC 1982:33-38; Rodger 2006:182). FIGURE 4.12 Sea scallop, Placopecten magellanicus. (Photograph by Dann Blackwood, USGS, http://sanctuaries.noaa.gov/pgallery/pgstellwagen/living/Bivalus_300.jpg) In 1965, three factors contributed to U.S. fleet abandoning Georges Bank grounds in favor of mid-Atlantic scallop grounds. First, George’s Bank stock levels dropped, evidenced by a decreased catch per unit effort (CPUE). Second, mid-Atlantic scallop beds were bountiful. Third, the price of finfish began to rise, providing incentive for New England scallopers to convert to trawling. The New England scallop fleet reduced by half in one year, with the remaining vessels harvesting Great South Channel and mid-Atlantic grounds (NEFMC 1982:33-38). 40 FIGURE 4.13 Sea scallop distribution and abundance during NEFSC scallop surveys 1994-2003. (Hart and Chute 2004:21.) Eleven years later, both the U.S. and Canadian fleets enjoyed record landings from the mid-Atlantic and Georges Bank fishing grounds. In 1975, 60% of the New Bedford fleet landings came from the productive mid-Atlantic grounds and the price of scallops rose above finfish. Since the late 1970s, fishermen have landed mid-Atlantic scallops in Cape May, New Jersey, Hampton, Virginia, and Wanchese, North Carolina. There is historical precedent of non-local scallop boats traveling long distances to dredge the productive mid-Atlantic fishing grounds (NEFMC 1982:33-38). 41 The sea scallop shell is typically 5 to 8 in. (13 to 20 cm.) in length and found from Newfoundland to Cape Hatteras. Primary commercial harvest grounds are George’s Bank, Mid-Atlantic Bight, Bay of Fundy, and the Gulf of Maine. Scallops live at depths of 60 to 200 ft. (18 to 61 m) or more, dependent on water temperature, and prefer gravel or rock bottom, high current, and high nutrient flow. In the Mid-Atlantic Bight, from New York to Cape Hatteras, scallops prefer depths of 130 to 230 ft. (40 to 70 m), with heavy population density near Hudson Canyon and off the Delmarva Peninsula. The sea scallop can see with dozens of primitive eyes around its outer rim and can swim by clapping its shells together. Scallops can swim or jump over a dredge or rake (Hart and Chute 2004:1,6; Rodger 2006:182-183; NMFS 2009). The sea scallop life cycle encompasses the entire water column. Sea scallops spawn from late August to early September. Fertilized eggs rise to the water’s surface and drift with the current for approximately three weeks when they sink to the bottom. Larvae attach to large sand particles, shell fragments, or filamentous animals, which tend to inhabit adult scallop shells [and shipwrecks]. Adult scallops live with sponges, hydroids, anemones, bryozoans, polychaetes, mussels, whelks, amphipods, sea cucumbers, and tunicates. Natural predators include starfish, snails, crustaceans, and finfish. Currently, the population stock is healthy, through a management strategy of effort limitation and rotating harvest areas. In 2007, the scallop fishery was the most valuable fishery in the U.S. (Hart and Chute 2004:1,6; Rodger 2006:182-183; NMFS 2009). Scallop Dredge The modern scallop dredge is a heavy, welded steel A-frame, 8 to 15 ft. (3 to 4.5 m) wide, with an attached steel ring bag. There are two styles. In the New Bedford style (Figure 4.14), a metal cutting bar, in the dredge mouth, rides on the sea bottom and scoops up scallops. The Canadian style (Figure 4.15) uses a pressure plate on top of the frame that converts forward 42 water resistance into downward pressure. Like the otter trawl, the scallop dredge has changed little in the last 50 years. The cutting bar has grown longer as fishing vessels have become more powerful (Pol and Carr 2000:333). Since scallops are mobile and try to avoid dredges, vessels tow scallop dredges up to 4.8 knots (8.9 km/h). Empty, scallop dredges weigh from 1100 to 2200 lb. (500 to 1000 kg). Large modern scallop trawlers up to 200 ft. (60 m) use two dredges, one on each side, while smaller vessels use one stern-mounted dredge, usually slightly less than the vessel width (NRC 2002:13). FIGURE 4.14 Scallop dredge, New Bedford style: top, rear, and side views, without steel ring bag attached. (Sainsbury 1996:163.) 43 FIGURE 4.15 Scallop dredge, modern Canadian style: side and bottom views with pressure plate, steel ring bag, rope net top, and club stick. (Sainsbury 1996:163.) The Clam Fishery The Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council (MAFMC) manages Fisheries Management Plans (FMP) for the Atlantic surfclam, Spisula solidissima, and Northern quahog clam, Mercenaria mercenaria. Management strategies have changed from traditional management to Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) to annual quotas. The 3 to 4 in. (7.6 to 10.1 cm) length quahog burrows into the bottom sediment from Newfoundland to the Gulf of Mexico. The quahog commercial harvest zone is from Long Island, New York, to Cape Charles, Virginia (Figure 4.16) from 82 to 200 ft. (25 to 61 m) deep. The quahog clam is primarily an ingredient in chowders and main meal entrees (Metzner 1996:22-24; Cargnelli et. al. 1999b:2; Rodger 2006:162-165). 44 FIGURE 4.16 Ocean quahog clam recruit distribution during NEFSC summer surveys 1980-1997. (Cargnelli et. al. 1999b:10.) The 6 to 9 in. (15.2 to 22.9 cm) length surfclam is the largest clam on the East Coast, harvested mainly between Long Island and Virginia (Figure 4.17), from the low tide line to 150 ft. (46 m) depth. The surfclam lives from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to Cape Hatteras. New Jersey records two-thirds of the commercial landings. Minimum harvest length for surfclams is 4.75 in. 45 (12.1 cm). Almost all surfclams are canned or minced for chowders (Metzner 1996:18-22; Rodger 2006:164-165; Federal Register 2009). FIGURE 4.17 Atlantic surfclam recruit distribution during NEFSC summer surveys 1980-1997. (Cargnelli et. al. 1999a:11.) 46 Clam Dredge The design of scallop and clam dredges differ based on the characteristics of the target animal. Scallops live on top of the sand and can swim short distances by clapping their shells together and producing short bursts of water. Scallop dredges drag on top of the sea bottom. Hard shell clams burrow into the sediment. At the front of the clam dredge, pressurized fluidizing jets of water loosen the sediment, producing a slurry. Behind the jets, a knife or blade, a constant wear item, scrapes clams into the dredge. Behind the knife, a small vessel clam dredge has a flexible steel ring bag (Figure 4.18). Large clam vessels tow integrated 12.5 ft. (3.8 m) wide, or wider, by 15 ft. (4.6 m) long, or longer, steel rectangular cage dredges, unloaded from gantry frames on the vessel’s stern (Figure 4.19). A clam pump on board the vessel and a flexible clam hose provide fluidizing water to the dredge jets. Clam dredges have three connections to the vessel: the wire lifting cable, the poly towrope, and the clam hose. Towed or dragged fishing gear covers a considerable area of bottom and is the most energy intense of all fishing methods, as compared to encircling or static gear. “Dragged or towed gear is susceptible to damage from hard, uneven, rough or rocky conditions, or from wrecks or debris” (NRC 2002:13-14; Sainsbury 1996:11-12,15,22,29) FIGURE 4.18 Clam dredge, for a small fishing vessel. (Sainsbury 1996:159.) 47 FIGURE 4.19 Large clam dredging vessels and dredges. Profile and stern views of clam dredges, gantry frames, and water jet hoses. (Photos by author, 2008.) Fisheries Management During 20th century vessel and gear innovations, unregulated New England and mid-Atlantic fishing communities did not heed European warnings of stock depletions. In July 1992, the Canadian government imposed a groundfish moratorium off Newfoundland, the Grand Banks, and most of the Gulf of St. Lawrence (Kurlansky 1997:3). Since cod seek safety on the ocean bottom, draggers had rendered the once bountiful cod commercially extinct (Kurlansky 1997:10). In 2004, a cod biomass study of the Canadian Scotia Shelf concluded current fish stocks at a meager 5% of mid-1800s levels, based on historical log books of two Beverly, Massachusetts, fishing schooners (Rosenberg et. al. 2005:78). The lessons not learned in the cod fishery were a stiff challenge to U.S. fisheries management agencies. “If we learn nothing else from the tragedy in New England, it must be that it can never be allowed to occur again,” 48 cautioned U.S. representative Gerry Studds at a hearing on The Fishery Conservation and Management Amendments of 1995 (Fordham 1996:149). Fisheries management has involved defining territorial limits, development of national and international sanctions, relevant fisheries research, and limiting mechanisms such as quotas and protected areas. Territorial Limits As fish stocks were depleted off Europe, Iceland, and the Grand Banks, fishermen petitioned their native governments to claim national seaward territorial rights. Signed by France, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Britain, the North Sea Fisheries Convention of 1882 introduced the 3-mile territorial limit from their own coastlines (Barclay 1907:293). At first, larger nations, especially those with superior naval force, like England, shrugged off smaller nations’ claims, such as Iceland. In 1945, President Harry Truman issued proclamations that the United States had control of oil, mineral, and fishing resources on its continental shelf. In 1950, Iceland extended its claim to 4 miles. Eight years later, Iceland extended its limits to 12 miles, and, in 1972, extended its limits to 50 miles. In 1973, the United Nations Seabed Committee of 34 nations agreed on a 200-mile limit. Iceland followed in 1976 (Kurlansky 1997:159-161,163,166). Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act In 1976, U.S. Congress passed the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, which prohibited foreign fishing, that contributed to depletion of the Northeast groundfish stocks, and declared a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (United States Congress 1976). The Act established eight regional fishery management councils to safeguard the nation’s fish and shellfish stocks. The Act charged regional councils to prepare fishery management plans (FMPs) within their area. Stocks continued to decline, especially Northeast groundfish stock. After 20 49 years, regional council critics cited political filibustering and fishing industry control of the council members, advisors, and representatives (Fordham 1996:ix,149). Worldwide Call for Responsible Fisheries In response to the collapse of multiple fisheries, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) produced the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Endorsed by all 188 FAO nations in 2004, the code endorsed 13 objectives including: 1. Identification of endangered or threatened species 2. Protected areas 3. Yearly or seasonal closure areas 4. License limitations such as fewer fishing days 5. Conservative quotas and Total Allowable Catch (TAC) limits 6. Individual vessel quotas 7. Limited bycatch harvest methods 8. Increased mesh sizes 9. Rotational fisheries 10. Biomass surveys 11. Market and biological sample collection and processing 12. Observer programs at sea and on land, and 13. Monitoring programs, including port validation of landings. One topic not addressed was the scientific position on habitat damage from offshore dragging and bottom dredging, due to conflicting and/or inconclusive research results (FAO 2004; Rodger 2006:7). Fisheries science and geosciences communities have rallied to assess habitat damage from commercial bottom fishing. Scallop Fishery Management The New England Fisheries Management Council (NEFMC) is responsible for scallop policies for New England and Mid-Atlantic fisheries. From 1960 to 1980, scallop boats were landing their catch in Maine, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, and North Carolina. Cape May, New Jersey, and Hampton, Virginia, were major scallop ports. In 1982, the Fishery Management Plan (FMP) for Atlantic sea scallops increased the dredge bag’s ring size 50 from 3 1/4 in. to 3 1/2 in. (8.3 to 8.9 cm) (NEFMC 1982: iv,33-39). In 1993, the NEFMC imposed a maximum dredge width of 15 ft (4.6 m) (Pol and Carr 2000:333). In 2004, Amendment 10 increased ring size to 4 in. (10.1 cm), established rotational closed areas, specified minimum mesh size for finfish bycatch release, established a set-aside program to fund research, and closed areas seasonally for sea turtle migration (FR 2004:35194). Increasing mesh size on the top of the bag has decreased the incidental catch of flounder. The future of the New Bedford scallop dredge may rest in its ability to reduce adverse bottom impacts and limit its bycatch of skate, flounder, monkfish, and the endangered sea turtle. (Pol and Carr 2000:334). In the mid-Atlantic region, the primary environmental factor for scallop reproduction and distribution is the non-tidal southwesterly current, with varying speeds of approximately five nautical miles per day. Spawning occurs from late August to early September. Fertilized eggs float to the surface. Larval scallops drift with the current for three to six weeks before settling to the sea floor. Spat location is dependent on the current’s direction and speed during the drift period (NEFMC 1982:11; Rodger 2006:183). In addition, through Amendment 10, the National Marine Fisheries Services (NMFS) switched harvest allocation strategy from days at sea (DAS) to rotational area management (FR 2004). In 2004, NEFMC created six scallop rotational restricted areas (Figure 4.20), off Cape Cod and the Mid-Atlantic states. Off Cape Cod, three discontinuous areas, South Channel, George’s Bank, and Nantucket Lightship, are scattered in an east-west pattern. In the mid-Atlantic region, NEFMC arranged three adjacent areas, Hudson Canyon, Elephant Trunk, and Delmarva, north to south. The areas align with the local current, which distributes scallop spawn. Each mid-Atlantic scallop access area is approximately 1500-1700 square miles. 51 FIGURE 4.20 Scallop Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), New England and Mid-Atlantic regions. (www.seatrade-international.com, 2009.) 52 Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) On 26 May 2000, President Clinton signed Executive Order (EO) 13158 to “help protect the significant natural and cultural resources within the marine environment for the benefit of present and future generations by strengthening and expanding the Nation’s system of marine protected areas (MPAs).” The order defines an MPA as “any area of the marine environment that has been reserved by Federal, State, territorial, tribal, or local laws or regulations to provide lasting protection for part or all of the natural and cultural resources therein” (Clinton 2000). The national MPA inventory categorizes the purpose of each area by conservation focus and level, permanence, constancy, and ecological scale of protection (MPA 2009). The number and purpose of MPAs has grown in the mid-Atlantic region over the past decade. From 1997 to 2001, NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) designated six marine protected areas. These areas protect weakfish, Atlantic right whale, harbor porpoise, lobster, cod, and horseshoe crab through the use of no flynets, weaklinks on traps and anchored gill nets, gill net modifications, closed seasons, and no-take zones (Shipley 2004:99,101). The national MPA inventory includes over 1100 areas, including the six East Coast rotational access areas for scallops. Although EO 13158 mandates protection of significant natural and cultural resources, none of the mid-Atlantic MPAs has a designated purpose to protect cultural heritage. Complementing enforcement of MPA closures, in 1996, all New England and mid-Atlantic fishing vessel owners installed a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS). Every hour, or every 30 minutes for scallopers, the VMS automatically reports the vessel location through satellite communications (FR 2009:648.9) 53 Bottom Fishing Research From a fisheries perspective, sunken vessels are relevant as purposely-placed artificial reefs, ghost fishing sites, and essential fish habitat (EFH) sites. Ghost fishing refers to untended, snagged, and floating nets that continue to capture and waste fish, turtles, and other wildlife. Commercial trawl nets and dredges have two adverse biological affects when operated around shipwrecks: ghost fishing and disturbance of EFH structure. Both may have important considerations to long-term fish stock sustainability. While general literature on ghost fishing and EFH is plentiful for low relief bottom and coral reefs, few studies address shipwrecks as artificial reefs or for ghost fishing or EFH. In the northern Gulf of Mexico, a recent master’s thesis validated World War II shipwrecks less than 5000 ft. (1500 m) deep serving as artificial reefs. The sea bottom is flat sand and mud, with little natural hard bottom relief. It is still unknown if artificial reefs enhance fish stock production or simply increase catch rates due to aggregation. In either case, the fish species found on seven Gulf of Mexico shipwrecks were not commercially exploitable (Morris 2007:3,5,90). State agencies purposely sink vessels and other hard structures for recreational fishing and diving as artificial reefs. New Jersey has a long-standing artificial reef program. “Artificial reefs provide structure and cover which attract fish on a largely featureless ocean bottom” (NJDFW 2010:8). Reef materials provide structure for invertebrates such as mussels, barnacles, sponges, hydroids, tubeworms, bryozoans, and stony coral. These encrusting organisms attach to hard surfaces with strong threads or cement. Sand is not a suitable habitat due to its movement. The food web continues with crustaceans, amphipods, isopods, crabs, shrimps, snails, lobster, and fish that seek structure for food and cover (NJDFW 2004:4,5, 2009:4-5). 54 Fish commercially targeted by trawl nets do not require a reef type structure. Demersal or bottom fish need a reef habitat. Mid-Atlantic demersal fish are black sea bass, tautog, and cunner. Mid-Atlantic fishermen harvest demersal fish in fish cages, traps, or pots. Schooling baitfish, such as menhaden, round herring, and anchovies, will temporarily school around high-profile structures. Pelagic, or open water fishes, such as bluefish, amberjack, cobia, and shark, are transient feeders at a reef and do not require reef structure (NJDFW 2009:5-6). New Jersey has 17 manmade reef areas (Figure 4.21), up to 195 ft. (60 m) deep, featuring rock, tanks, subway cars, concrete structures, and 162 sunken vessels. The smallest vessel is 32 ft. (10m) long and the largest vessel is the 460 ft. (140 m) long Algol, sunk in 1991. In 2010, a partnership of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and the U.S. Navy is preparing to sink the 563 ft. (172 m) long destroyer USS Arthur Radford at a 135 ft. (41 m) depth site. The vessel’s superstructure will rise to within 70 ft. (21.3 m) of the surface. The New Jersey Artificial Reef Program hopes the Radford’s high relief might attract pelagic fish for recreational anglers (NJDFW 2009:9, 2010:4). Respondents to the 2009 New Jersey Artificial Reef survey preferred vessels as reef material and prioritized catch importance as summer flounder, black sea bass, blackfish (tautog), porgy, and lobster. Recreational fishermen hook summer flounder and sea bass via drift fishing versus anchoring. Anglers rated commercial fish pots, primarily for lobster and sea bass, as the largest detractors (NJDFW 2010:4,8-11). New Jersey recreational anglers are typically not catching fish targeted by trawl netters. Additionally, New Jersey Reef Program divers have not observed trawl nets or dredges on the widely published artificial reefs locations (Bill Maxwell 26 April 2010, pers. comm.). 55 FIGURE 4.21 New Jersey artificial reef locations, containing 162 purposely sunk vessels. (NJDFW 2010b:19.) 19 Sandy Hook Sea Girt Shark River Axel Carlson Barnegat Light Garden State North Garden State South Little Egg Atlantic City Great Egg Ocean City Townsends Inlet Wildwood Deepwater Cape May Del-Jerseyland Inshore Del-Jerseyland Offshore Shark River Inlet Manasquan River Inlet Barnegat Light Inlet Little Egg Inlet Absecon Inlet Great Egg Inlet Townsends Inlet Hereford Inlet Cape May Inlet ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 56 Acknowledging shipwrecks as aggregation devices of specific reef fishes and understanding shipwreck ghost fishing and EFH is of primary interest. Ghost fishing is derelict fishing gear that continues to capture and kill aquatic organisms without human control. In 2005, a derelict gill net study quantified ghost fishing effectiveness. The researchers believe their findings are applicable to other net types, such as trawl nets. A gill net experimentally draped over a three-dimensional structure retained its original fish mortality effectiveness throughout the three-year study. Nets easily tangle on three-dimensional structures and retain their stretched area of webbing in situ over shipwrecks, a threat to wreck fishes (Matsuoka, Nakashima, and Nagasawa 2005:691-694). Gear loss prevention is the preferred proactive solution over reactive derelict gear removal. Fishermen choose their fishing grounds, deciding to avoid rough bottom or to risk gear loss (Matsuoka et al. 2005:699). This simplistic decision process assumes fishermen know all obstruction locations. From a submersible, Massachusetts’ fisheries scientists observed a 3 ft. by 4.5 ft. (1 x 1.5 m) boulder at one end of a 12 ft. (4 m) long trench. Scientists believed a trawler dragged the boulder (Carr and Milliken 1998:101). There is a growing wealth of biological and benthic environmental research on the effects of bottom fishing gear but a lack of information specific to shipwrecks as essential fish habitat. Most literature addresses the effect of fishing gear on benthic (sea bottom or sediment) habitat (Hall, Robertson, Basford, and Heaney 1993; Dorsey and Pederson 1998; Goudey 1999; McCallum 2001; Barnes and Thomas 2002; NRC 2002; Lokkeborg 2005; Valdemarsen, Jorgensen, and Engas 2007; NEFMC 2009). The extensive 2002 National Research Council report documents trawling effects on sand, mud, gravel and hard bottom sediments but neglects to provide data on damage to cultural resources (Evans et al. 2009:46; NRC 2002). 57 Marine Sanctuary Management National marine sanctuary (NMS) research contributes to the knowledge base of commercial fishing gear impacts with shipwrecks. On the Atlantic coast, two national sanctuaries contain historic shipwrecks: Monitor National Marine Sanctuary (MNMS), off North Carolina, and Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary (SBNMS), above Cape Cod, Massachusetts. Fishing and environmental conditions vary for each sanctuary, compared to the mid-Atlantic region. Due to warm Gulf Stream waters surrounding the MNMS, nets are the common large commercial gear utilized. Scallops and clams require cold water so the productive southerly use of commercial scallop and clam dredges ends at the Chesapeake Capes (Cargnelli et. al. 1999a:3-4, 1999b:3; Hart and Chute 2004:5). With the cold Labrador Current, SBNMS has trawl net, gill net, scallop dredge, and clam dredge use. With these differences in mind, the history of commercial fishing impacts to shipwrecks in each sanctuary is valuable. South of the mid-Atlantic region, USS Monitor has a history of fishing gear impacts and damage. In 1975, Congress created the first NMS specifically to protect and preserve the historic Civil War ironclad. Naval historians consider Monitor to be the prototype to the modern warship and therefore historically significant. Monitor rests in 230 ft. (70 m) of seawater, 16 nautical miles off Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. The MNMS is one nautical mile in diameter, centered on the wreck site. Warm high-current Gulf Steam waters accelerated the vessel’s organic and inorganic deterioration. Due to its historic importance and fragile state, MNMS restrictions are stringent, prohibiting bottom fishing, trawling, anchoring, stopping, or drifting within the sanctuary boundaries. Environmental stressors include strong currents, high temperature, and high salinity water. In 1997 and 2004, NOAA recorded fishing gear damage to the vessel’s 12.5 ft. (4 m) maximum relief. A permitted volunteer dive team documented the 2004 incident. 58 MNMS archaeologist John Broadwater stated NOAA has documented recreational and/or commercial fishing gear on almost every Monitor visit since its initial discovery (NMSP 2008a:2,4-6,10,16-17,19; Broadwater 2009:654; Broadwater and Nutley 2009:72-73; Poe 2004:56). North of the mid-Atlantic region, Stellwagen Bank NMS archaeologists documented commercial fishing gear on 11 of 18 historic shipwrecks, 61%. Five historic vessels are identified: side paddlewheel steamer Portland, eastern rig dragger Joffre, and coal schooners Paul Palmer, Frank A. Palmer, and Louise B. Crary. Portland has an otter trawl net with roller sweep wrapped around the bow and the length of the starboard side forward of the boilers. A tow wire cut deeply into the stem post (Figure 4.22), more wire crosses the boiler uptakes, and an otter door lies on deck. Similarly, a trawl net engulfed Paul Palmer’s chain pile and windlass, possibly altering the windlass orientation. Yearly monitoring documented broken timbers and displaced anchors. Comparing two coal schooner sites at similar depth, the intact vessel is located in an area less frequently fished by bottom gear. The other collier site was stripped of hull structure, iron fittings, and anchors above the sediment. Comparing eastern rigged dragger sites, some sites are remarkably intact, with wheelhouses and masts standing, while other sites are discontinuous and flattened. From another type of submerged historical craft, fishermen recovered military aircraft parts. Fishing gear effects include structural damage and removal of artifacts through gear entanglement and capture in nets (NMSP 2007:ii,iii; 2008b:iii,17,120-130, 171). In 2008, SBNMS management staff declared bottom fishing gear the primary threat to maritime archaeological sites. Repeated impacts have reduced historical, scientific, or educational value and may jeopardize some sites’ National Register of Historic Places eligibility. 59 The protection of sanctuary submerged cultural resources is mandated by nine laws or regulations: the Antiquities Act of 1906, Historic Sites Act of 1935, Archeological and Historic Preservation Act of 1960, National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Presidential Order 11593 of 1971, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), National Marine Sanctuaries Act of 1972, and the Stellwagen Bank National Marine Sanctuary Regulations of 1992 (NMSP 2007:ii,iii; 2008b:iii,17,120-130). While most scientific research has focused primarily on fishing impacts to environmental habitats, the 2008 Stellwagen Bank Draft Management Plan states, “marine archaeological literature has not yet adequately addressed fishing impacts to maritime heritage resources” (NMSP 2008b:125). FIGURE 4.22 Steamship Portland bow cut by trawl net wire towrope. (NMSP 2008b:127.) Submerged Cultural Resource Legislation Beyond NMS boundaries, policy and legislative protection for open ocean shipwrecks is limited to the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (ASA) and the Sunken Military Craft Act of 2005 (SMCA) (NPS 1987, 2005). The ASA delegated submerged cultural resource responsibility to the coastal states, from the low tide mark to three nautical miles off the coast. Two decades ago, the ASA tasked the coastal states to inventory their shipwrecks and understand the potential 60 for new finds. The ASA failed to provide or identify sources of funding. Due to budget and staff shortages, many coastal states still struggle to complete this task. On the mid-Atlantic coast, the gently sloping sea bottom reaches deepwater approximately 13 to 25 nautical miles from shore (National Ocean Service 1990a; 1990b; 1990c; 1993), well beyond the states’ 3-mile obligation. If a state cannot complete this requirement within its three mile jurisdiction, the state will not have the resources to safeguard deepwater shipwrecks, leaving the task to federal agencies. Clearly, the ASA is not relevant for mid-Atlantic deepwater shipwrecks. Recognizing the public’s lack of clarity surrounding ownership and management of military vessels, the SMCA (NPS 2005) specified that military craft, belonging to a sovereign nation, remain property of that nation, unless publicly stated as abandoned. The term craft covers aircraft, tanks, and vessels. Military craft litter the mid-Atlantic coast. Off Maryland and Virginia, military shipwrecks include: the WWII patrol vessels St. Augustine (PG-54) and Moonstone (PYc-9), Spain’s 1802 34-gun frigate Juno, British Ministry of War transport Ocean Venture, and the Liberty ship John Morgan. Off New Jersey and Delaware, the list of military shipwrecks continues with the German submarine U-869, WWI destroyer Jacob Jones (DD-130), the 1920 submarine S-5 (SS-110), and Navy tugs Nina and Cherokee (Gentile 1992; 2002a; 2002b; 2002c). These military heritage sites are under the same threats as all deepwater wrecks in the mid-Atlantic. Six of the above vessels are damage case studies in Chapter 6. In summary, only military craft have legal heritage protection in mid-Atlantic deep waters. Mid-Atlantic Shipwrecks A popular question is “How many mid-Atlantic deepwater shipwrecks exist and can snag fishing gear?” This question has three parts. First, primary historical records indicate how many vessels were lost. Second, a percentage of the historical population is in deepwater. Third, 61 hydrographic survey and diver records indicate how many wrecks have relief and survive above the sediments. Many sources vary on their population size estimates of deepwater shipwrecks. Two historical sources answer the first part of the question, how many vessels were lost. As a reference for researchers, Joan Charles compiled and published verbatim newspaper and primary source information on mid-Atlantic shipwrecks from 1623 to 1950. Charles documented 1400 shipwrecks off New Jersey and Delaware and 1200 shipwrecks off Maryland and Virginia (Charles 2003, 2004). She sorted each book by date lost, by vessel name, and by location description, which is most helpful from a researcher’s perspective. Many records indicate the wreck occurred close to shore while others are non-descript. Deepwater wrecks are an unknown percentage of the 2600 total. Historian Donald Shomette compiled a list of 2300 shipwrecks off the Delmarva coast from 1632 to 2004, with an unknown deepwater portion (Shomette 2007). Willard Bascom answers part two of the question; an estimate of how many historically recorded wrecks sank in deepwater. Deepwater wrecks are a percentage of most wreck listings. In 1976, Bascom attempted to quantify the ratio of deepwater versus shallow water shipwrecks. Utilizing 10,000 Lloyd’s of London insured vessel records from 1864 to 1869, about half wrecked and, of these, 20% were lost at sea, not connected to a coastline (Bascom 1976:84). Archaeologists George Bass, Toni Carrell, Donald Keith, and Keith Muckelroy utilized Bascom’s deepwater estimation in their work (Muckelroy 1978:150; Bass 1988:251; Keith and Carrell 2009:133). Applying Bascom’s 20% deepwater guideline to Charles’ and Shomette’s historical wreck lists yields a minimum of 500 mid-Atlantic deepwater wrecks. Answering the third part of the question, how many deepwater wrecks still exist, is a bit more difficult. From site formation process theory, an unknown percentage of deepwater shipwrecks protrude above the sand today. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric 62 Administration’s (NOAA) Office of Coast Survey Automated Wreck and Obstruction Information System (AWOIS) holds approximately 3500 records for the mid-Atlantic region (NOAA 2009a). NOAA codes each record as a wreck, an unspecified obstruction, or unknown. Deepwater shipwrecks are a subset of this total. AWOIS sources include historical archives, fishermen, divers, and NOAA hydrographic surveys. Per NOAA, many AWOIS records are inaccurate in description and location. Many recorded obstructions may be shipwrecks and some recorded wrecks may not be vessels. Duplicate or multiple records of one obstruction are possible, with a different name or slightly different location coordinates. Figure 4.23 is a mid-Atlantic satellite map, with AWOIS data point labels (i) for identified shipwrecks and (o) for unidentified obstructions. The minimum estimate of 500 deepwater shipwrecks fits within NOAA’s wreck and obstruction database. FIGURE 4.23 Mid-Atlantic coast with AWOIS shipwrecks (i) and obstructions (o). (Google Earth, 2009.) 63 Culling volumes of obstruction records, one source was most helpful to determine the known locations of mid-Atlantic deepwater shipwrecks. Shipwreck diver and researcher Gary Gentile chronicled 195 confirmed mid-Atlantic deepwater shipwrecks visited by recreational divers (Gentile 1992, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). Gentile described identified and unidentified wrecks and very few wrecks are inshore. Written by a fulltime author for a popular audience, Gentile’s research is comprehensive but not cited. If the deepwater estimate of 500 shipwrecks is correct, recreational divers have verified 39% of mid-Atlantic deepwater shipwrecks. Table 4.1 summarizes the most useful historical and diver records of mid-Atlantic shipwreck population estimates. TABLE 4.1 MID-ATLANTIC DEEPWATER SHIPWRECK POPULATION ESTIMATES Source Area Obstruction Records Historical Record Wrecks Deepwater Wrecks Charles, Bascom NJ to VA 2600 520 estimated Shomette, Bascom DE to VA 2300 460 estimated NOAA Mid Atlantic 3500 Gentile Central NJ to VA 195 confirmed Sources: Bascom 1976:84; Charles 2003, 2004; Gentile 1992, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c; NOAA 2009a; Shomette 2007. Due to the regional boundaries of this study, the nature or organization of many extensive sources impeded their usefulness. Some wreck lists are alphabetical by vessel name over a huge geographic area. Most include inland, inshore, and deepwater wrecks. Some focus on warships while another is strictly merchant ships. Nine examples follow. In 1894, the U.S. Hydrographic Office published a statistical summary of Wrecks and Derelicts in the North Atlantic Ocean: 1887 - 1893. Its sources were voluntary mariners’ reports and Navy demolition reports of hazards to navigation. On average, 19 to 35 derelict vessels per month were adrift off the American coast. Observers sighted the same derelict an average of four 64 times and identified less than a third of derelicts. The average floating derelict drifted 30 days before sinking. Thirty percent floated bottom up. One in four collisions with a derelict resulted in sinking the occupied vessel. Almost all floating derelict vessels were wood construction. The fate of derelicts varied: towed to port, burnt or blown up to clear navigation, or sank unobserved in an unrecorded location (United States Hydrographic Office 1894). A review of the seven-year derelict and wreck listing shows several wooden sailing vessels not previously recorded in major sources. While not a major source, it is a valuable supplement of individual wrecks and understanding the site formation process of buoyant drifting derelicts. After World War II, the U.S. Hydrographic Office compiled the wreck information of numerous wartime losses with its record of pre-war wrecks. The 1945 Wreck Information List was the official list of wrecks utilized to create navigation charts. Wreck locations had gross lat/long coordinates. While location accuracy was weak, the information column gave insights such as sinking date, cause of loss, how reported, condition of wreck, and least depth (United States Hydrographic Office 1945). Most modern sources have cautiously assimilated this information. In 1964, Adrian Lonsdale and H. R. Kaplan, U.S. Coast Guard, co-wrote A Guide to Sunken Ships in American Waters. Their New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia sections contain 229 shipwrecks with lat/long coordinates and brief thumbnail histories. However, many vessels are inshore and locations are only approximate. Bruce Berman’s Encyclopedia of American Shipwrecks divides the East Coast into two sections, north and south (Berman 1973). Each section lists wrecks by name, rig, tons, built and loss dates, cause of loss, location description, and brief comments. The dividing line bisects this thesis study area, assimilating mid-Atlantic wrecks into the entire East Coast. 65 Charles Hocking’s large Dictionary of Disasters At Sea During the Age of Steam 1824-1962 is an alphabetical global listing of warships and merchant ships, sunk inland, coastal, and deepwater (Hocking 1969). It does not enable a region specific search and is not comprehensive. Erik Heyl’s landmark six-volume set of Early American Steamers has standardized profile illustrations for each vessel in addition to each vessel’s history (Heyl 1953, 1956, 1964, 1965, 1967, 1969). The set does not facilitate a regional study. The researcher must read all entries to possibly determine site locations or know an eligible vessel’s name from other sources. Norbert Freitag’s Shipwrecks Unforgotten from New Jersey to the Gulf of Florida: A Reference Guide lists vessels by state, then alphabetically, resulting in over 3000 records for the four Mid-Atlantic states. Unfortunately, Freitag mixes 1) shallow water and deepwater losses and 2) historical losses, artificial reef material, hangs, and confirmed wrecks, resulting in possible multiple accountings (Freitag 1998). Diver Richard Moale’s book Notebook on Shipwrecks: Maryland Delaware Coast chronicles 250 lost vessels but the information is difficult to use for this thesis. Moale’s book mixes known location wrecks with those known only by historical references and includes shoreline and deepwater losses (Moale 1990). Bradford Mitchell’s Merchant Steam Vessels of the United States 1790-1868: The Lytle-Holdcamper List utilizes official Merchant Marine documents and other sources to compile an alphabetically list of commercial vessels. The loss section captures 3700 vessels by the nature of loss, date, place, and lives lost. It is not regionally organized and covers only merchant ships from 1790 to 1868 (Mitchell 1975). This concludes the nine source examples of less comprehensive wreck information. 66 With the relative protection of depth as compared to more dynamic shallow water, deepwater shipwrecks span the genesis of American maritime history to the present day. A quick review of Shomette, Charles, and Gentile’s lists show the population diversity is broad in terms of vessel age, construction, and purpose. Vessel age spans almost 400 years. Construction was wood, iron, composite, and steel. Propulsion spanned the age of sail through the era of power. Vessel use included immigration for religious and economic freedom, transportation of passengers and freight, fishing, and national defense throughout the Revolutionary War, War of 1812, Civil War, WWI, WWII, and Cold War. The combinations of construction and purpose are staggering, from European immigrant ships and trans-Atlantic and coastal merchant ships to modern freighters and tankers (Charles 2003,2004; Gentile 1992, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c; Shomette 2007). One of the most well known shipwrecks off the East Coast is the 700 ft. long by 90 ft. wide (213 x 72 m) Italian passenger liner Andrea Doria. Although a Northeast versus mid-Atlantic shipwreck, it is worthy of discussion in relation to derelict commercial fishing gear. In 1956, after a collision with Swedish liner Stockholm, Andrea Doria sank in 240 ft. (73 m), 50 miles south of Nantucket Island, Massachusetts. Coast Guard and helicopter film crews covered the eleven-hour deathwatch from collision to sinking (Gentile 1989:8,11-13,54-56). Neither Andrea Doria’s huge size nor government and media coverage have protected the liner from commercial fish trawl nets. In the 1970s and 1980s, recreational divers considered Andrea Doria the Mount Everest of Northeast wreck diving, due to its depth, size, and adverse dive conditions. Dive charters visited the wreck several times each dive season. Their published accounts and photographs document trawl nets on Andrea Doria from 1968 to 1989. The floating and draped nets pose an entanglement hazard to divers and continue to snare fish that cannot be 67 harvested (Figure 4.24) (Gentile 1989:128,155; McMurray 2001:17,122,132,153: Sheard 1998:187). If a large well-publicized wreck, like Andrea Doria, continues to snare trawl nets, how can fishermen avoid collisions with the multitude of smaller lesser-known wrecks? FIGURE 4.24 Andrea Doria, artist’s impression from diver accounts. Notice draped and floating nets midships. (McMurray 2001:dust cover.) Hang Logs To assist mid-Atlantic fishing captains in avoiding bottom obstructions, hang logs exist in many forms, from handwritten private diaries to published lists. This section discusses three publicly available sources: North Carolina Sea Grant, NOAA’s AWOIS database, and Strickler’s Master Hanglog (McGee and Tillett 1983; Strickler 2008; NOAA 2009). 68 In 1975 and 1983, North Carolina Sea Grant published Hangs and Obstructions to Trawl Fishing: Atlantic Coast of the United States. Over 30 trawl fishing captains provided the hang and obstruction locations. The objective was to help experienced and inexperienced fishermen “avoid expensive damage to gear as well as loss of fishing time and catch” (McGee and Tillett 1983:i). During this time, navigational technology transitioned from Loran A to Loran C. A Coast Guard computer program converted the locations to Loran C. It was [and still is] too expensive to seek out and “catch” every hang location in the field with the newest technology. McGee and Tillett made a strong statement about the data accuracy: It is felt by the authors that the accuracy and reliability of this log retains the level of accuracy and reliability that existed in the collection of hangs recorded in Loran A. It should be recognized that some hangs were recorded under adverse conditions and that a certain degree of variance can result from operator and equipment error (McGee and Tillett 1983:ii). In 1981, NOAA created the Automated Wreck and Obstruction Information System (AWOIS) to assist planning hydrographic surveys and record the resultant information. AWOIS focuses on hazards to navigation and is not a comprehensive list of shipwrecks in any region. NOAA acknowledges that the database is of interest to marine archaeologists, historians, fishermen, divers, and salvage operators. NOAA warns these users of AWOIS’s limitations and encourages the database be used as a supplement to other sources of information. Since 1997, AWOIS User Guides state, “historical research is constantly being conducted to improve the quality of the file, but it will never completely address every known or reported wreck.” From the 1997 User’s Guide to the 2006 User’s Guide, the 229 bibliographic references have remained unchanged. The latest East Coast reference was Van Strickler’s 1992 Master Hanglog (NOAA 1997:1,20-30, 2006:3,15-23). 69 Since 1994, Strickler has published The Master Hanglog, now in its fourth edition. Strickler is a commercial trawl and scallop captain out of Virginia Beach, Virginia. His sources include fishing captains, wreck divers, Gentile’s books, University of Rhode Island Sea Grant Study, and NOAA’s AWOIS database. The hang coordinates range from south of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, to north of Montauk, Long Island, New York, and east to the Hague Line of Georges Bank, the U.S. Canadian border (Strickler 2008:1,193). Strickler’s motivation is best cited in his own words: Quite a lot of gear has been lost or damaged over the years in the day-to-day business of trawl fishing. The bulk of the hangs in this logbook were obtained over a period of twenty years I have spent running different trawlers in several fisheries…. Many fishermen do not embrace the spirit of cooperation when it comes to sharing information. I, however, hope this book will help other fishermen prevent losing expensive gear and valuable time to the thousands of hangs which line our coast (Strickler 2008:193). The Master Hanglog lists 4975 individual hang records and various attributes. Most pages contain columns for Loran C coordinates, Lat/Lon coordinates, name, description, size, and depth to the bottom or least depth above the obstruction. Identified shipwreck names are in capital letters. Strickler cautions that each Loran unit manufacturer uses different software to convert Loran to Lat/Lon, therefore his book has separate versions for NorthStar and Furuno (Strickler 2008:1-193). The hang log provides evidence of 165 lost dredges, 111 lost nets, and 23 lost rigs. Fishermen brought 50 anchors, 32 cables, 3 clam dredges, and 84 bombs, depth charges, rockets, mortar shells, or torpedoes to the surface for disentanglement and simultaneous identification. While lost net and lost dredge comments are common, the hang log is sprinkled with unique comments like “Cable – Stopped Me Dead,” “2000 lb. Bomb,” and “Bad-It’s There” (Strickler 2008:37,38,102). Strickler’s hanglog provided a baseline for further analysis in Chapters 6 and 7. 70 In the above three obstruction publications, accuracy of locations is unknown. None methodically cite the date and source of each record, whether a fisherman, wreck diver, or government agency recorded the original data. Clues are sometimes in the notations of gear lost or damaged. A damaged clubstick or chain bag is a scalloper, with a generally short layback from bottom snag to fishing vessel wheelhouse and navigation instruments. A lost sweep or torn belly is a trawler with a long layback. For the historian, identified shipwreck records do not document how the contributor identified the remains. The recording date would have been helpful in determining the original navigational technology: Loran A, Loran C, GPS, or DGPS. It is unknown how many times the authors transposed the location from one technology to another and what software conversion they used. As stated by McGee and Tillett, the accuracy of location is only as good as the technology used to originally record it. Bottom line, a validated public obstruction database does not exist. Conclusion To understand the present state of shipwrecks and commercial fishing impacts, the background literature was diverse, due to many user groups of the mid-Atlantic continental margin. Managers and participants in commercial fishing, fisheries management, fisheries research, marine sanctuaries, legislative agencies, and recreational diving each contributed unique knowledge. Reviewing the historical literature as a whole, many conclusions surfaced. Historically, mid-Atlantic fisheries adopted most fishing practices, vessel types, and fishing gear from New England, which, in turn and slowly, had borrowed from Europe. Vessels transformed from sail to steam to diesel propulsion and from wood to steel hull construction. Finfish hand lining transitioned to long lining, the beam trawl, and, finally, the otter trawl. 71 Over 100 years ago, the marine engine enabled larger gear systems and more harvest throughout a broader range of weather conditions. Subsequently, fishermen discovered damaging bottom hangs. Since the first American otter trawl in 1905, nets snagged on wrecks. With marine engine power, the majority of the scallop industry transitioned from otter trawl to modern scallop dredge. Clam fisheries developed large hydraulic-jet steel cage dredges. Synthetic fibers increased the durability of nets and positional electronics enabled fishermen to return to productive grounds. The mid-Atlantic region is a productive fishing ground for finfish, sea scallops, surfclams, and ocean quahog clams and gear evolved to match the bounty. Mid-Atlantic sea scallop harvests exceeded New England harvests in the 1970s, attracting fishermen from New England to North Carolina. As vessels became more powerful, trawl nets extended to 1300 ft. (400 m) behind the vessel and 330 ft. (100 m) wide. Scallop dredges grew to 15 ft. (4.5 m) wide with cutter bars, and weigh 1100 to 2200 lb. (500-1000 kg.). Large 12.5 ft. (3.8 m) wide clam dredges use hydraulic jets to fluidize bottom sediments and clams, followed by the clam knife that extends into the sea bottom. Scallopers tow large steel dredges up to 4.8 knots (8.9 km/hr). In the last century, the evolution of gear mass and speed equaled increasingly damaging collision forces. Geographically, the mid-Atlantic ocean region is a complex ecosystem supporting finfish, scallop, clam, and human activity. Fishers harvest surfclams from the low tidemark to 150 ft. (46 m), quahog clams from 82 to 200 ft. (25 to 61 m), and scallops from 130 to 230 ft. (40 to 70 m) and deeper. The overlapping fisheries and their harvest technologies produce an inadvertent high-risk area for mid-Atlantic shipwrecks. Fisheries management is a complex political and scientific journey. In 1972, territorial limits eliminated foreign fishing inside the 200-mile EEZ. In 1976, the Magnuson Fishery 72 Conservation and Management Act created eight regional Fisheries Management Councils. The latest amendment has ten new mandates, including ecosystem-based management. Global support for sustainable fisheries of migratory stocks is progressing. America’s most valuable fishery, sea scallop, is healthy and growing, thanks to a combination of gear modifications, rotational restricted areas (MPAs), permits, annual quotas, and closed seasons. Research demonstrated that nets tangle easily around wrecks and continue to ghost fish for years. Unlike commercially harvestable New England cod and pollock, which seek structure, mid-Atlantic fish targeted by otter trawl are not reef or wreck dwelling. Collision prevention requires accurate knowledge of obstructions. Both national marine sanctuaries north and south of the mid-Atlantic region have experienced damaging collisions of fishing gear with cultural resources. Only sovereign nation military craft have legal heritage protection in U.S. deep waters. By rough estimate, of approximately 500 vessels sunk in mid-Atlantic deepwater, at least 195 have been located, most likely by fishing gear, and explored by recreational divers. The remaining wrecks may be recorded in private logs, may not lie in productive fishing ground, or may have no structure above the sediment. In publicly available hang logs, historical obstruction locations are not validated and accuracy is suspect. The author was surprised to find no evidence of maritime cultural resource management in the Mid-Atlantic MPAs. This reality is especially hard to comprehend as 1) Executive Order 13158 specifically addresses conservation of cultural resources in MPAs and 2) with each rotational area opening comes an inevitable flood of scallop dredge impacts to shipwrecks. Electronic position accuracy of a fishing vessel does not equal fewer collisions unless obstruction and wreck locations are equally as accurate. CHAPTER 5. DIVER OBSERVATIONS Introduction Scuba divers have observed and casually documented commercial bottom fishing gear on mid-Atlantic ocean shipwrecks. The primary data source was the author’s observations on shipwrecks from 1974 to 2009 (Steinmetz 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d). Scuba certification agencies teach divers to log each dive. Typical dive log entries include date, dive partner, location, objective, dive time, breathing gas, equipment, dive boat, depth, visibility, air and water temperature, tank pressure, and remarks/observations. Some members of the recreational and technical diving community document their visual observations with personalized logbooks, sketches, photography, videography, Internet dive accounts, articles, and books. The long-term technical diving community is tight-knit and relatively small. The author supplemented the sample data set by polling technical divers for observations about derelict fishing gear and sudden discrete wreck changes. The author obtained data from divers on dive boats, at dive club meetings, by telephone, via Internet, and from published materials. Using the quantitative statistical analysis software SPSS 18.0 (SPSS 2006) and Making Sense of Statistics (Pyrczak 2006) as a reference, the author created a statistical database and analyzed the results to answer the research questions. Database Description Combing her personal logbook accounts and sketches, the author entered a shipwreck into the sample database if she was familiar with a majority of the site or photography documented the majority of the site. The term majority accounted for outlying wreck pieces that may be beyond average 15 ft. (5 m) bottom visibility. With this methodology, wrecks with and without gear had an equal opportunity of inclusion. The resultant sample database was 52 wreck sites. The author provided input for 98% of the cases. One case, the Tomahawk, was photo 74 documented. The dependant variable, or case, was each shipwreck. Conveniently, the database split evenly between identified and unidentified wrecks. For identified shipwrecks, independent variables included the vessel name when lost, year built, and gross tonnage. From vessel registrations and insurance surveys, further independent variables included number of engine cylinders, number of boilers, length, beam, and draft. From contemporary newspapers and insurance investigations, independent variables were the last port of call, destination port, in ballast or cargo, organic or inorganic cargo, year sunk, and cause of loss. Data emerged from several secondary sources: Erik Heyl’s Early American Steamers (Heyl 1953), Richard Moale’s Notebook on Shipwrecks: Maryland Delaware Coast (Moale 1990), Gary Gentile’s shipwreck series by state (Gentile 1992, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c), and Joan Charles’ published works of shipwreck newspaper accounts (Charles 2002, 2003). For unidentified shipwrecks, the wreck’s nickname given by divers was the case name. Sea bottom observations contributed as many independent variables as possible. Independent variables included sediment type, equipment, and physical remains’ length, width, and height. For all wrecks, the author recorded the closest coastal state, whether the wreck site was contiguous or broken, depth, sediment, and traditional hull or submarine. Further information included propulsion type, hull material, compass bearing of remains, and the number of trawl nets, scallop dredges, and clam dredges observed by decade. Lastly, the author rated damage severity to the wreck and to fishing gear. Wreck damage from a gear impact had five levels of severity: none, structure or equipment damaged but relatively intact, structure or equipment displaced but on site, structure or equipment missing, or unknown. Gear damage rated as none/appears usable, torn/mangled, not repairable, or unknown. Unknown ratings resulted from poor underwater visibility, obstructed vision, or limited bottom time. 75 The resultant sample may be atypical for statistical analysis. Unlike census material, no one has systematically documented the mid-Atlantic shipwreck population; divers have not discovered, dived, and recorded every mid-Atlantic shipwreck. Inlet geography stratifies the dataset; dive boats typically visit sites within a 10 to 50 mile radius of homeport. If a shipwreck is close to an inlet utilized by dive boats, its observations are more thorough and more frequent than a wreck 50 miles distant. On the mid-Atlantic coast, the number of divers and dive boats has declined, as evidenced by fewer dive club members and dive shops. Fewer divers equal fewer observers. Conversely, four factors added to the dataset integrity. First, most polled observers were 20 to 30-year veteran divers, who conducted 35 to 60 dives per year. Years of diving experience have sharpened and reinforced the divers’ observation skills, from remembering favorite lobster holes to creating a mental map of wreck topography for returning to the dive boat’s anchor line. Second, divers have favorite wrecks that they prefer to visit multiple times per year and, perhaps, for many years. Repeated monitoring enables divers to recognize recent dramatic changes. Third, fishermen hire several of the more experienced divers to recover lost gear, primarily expensive clam dredges. Veteran salvage divers are familiar with bottom fishing gear and the frequency and location of losses. Fourth, through personal communication, the author validated and updated 13 cases with 10 experienced divers. Table 5.1 is an abbreviated summary. Analysis As a first step of analysis, the author conducted descriptive, frequency, and means tests, to describe and understand the resultant sample population. Geographically, each mid-Atlantic coastal state was equitably represented: 25% southern New Jersey, 35% Delaware, 19% Maryland, and 21% Virginia (Figure 5.1). Hull composition of the sample was 42% wood, 76 TABLE 5.1 SAMPLE SHIPWRECKS, FISHING GEAR, AND DAMAGE Name Hull Material No. Nets No. Scallop Dredges Discrete Wreck Damage Wood Wreck in Hole Composite Monroe Iron 3 Admiral DuPont Iron 2 2 Paddle damage, missing bow & stern Eureka Iron 2 Charles Morand Iron 1 3 Bottle Wreck Iron 1 Cherokee Iron 1 Missing bow & deck gun Manhatten Iron 1 Nina Iron 1 Upturned towing bitt Inshore Paddle Wheel Iron San Gil Steel 2 4 St. Augustine Steel 2 1 (2) Peeled deck guns, gunnel damage Moonstone Steel 2 Wrenched bow & depth charge racks Terror Wreck Steel 1 5 Ethel C Steel 1 3 S-5 Steel 1 1 Displaced pipes City of Athens Steel 1 Gordon C. Cooke Steel 1 Harold's Sailboat Wreck Steel 1 Not the Francis Powell Steel 1 Sea Bass Wreck Steel 1 Washingtonian Steel 1 Ocean Venture Steel 5 Tomahawk Steel 1 Brian C Steel Jacob Jones Steel Miss Lori Dawn Steel Misty Blue Steel North Beach Wreck Steel Northern Pacific Steel H Buoy Wreck Wood 2 Lucy Neff Wood 2 Middle Grounds Wreck Wood 2 Ralph's Wreck Wood 2 Cleopatra Wood 1 Deposit of stray boiler aft of propeller Cry Baby Wreck Wood 1 Cutlass Wreck Wood 1 Elizabeth Palmer Wood 1 Fourth of July Wreck Wood 1 Labor Day Wreck Wood 1 Max's Wreck Wood 1 Patty's Pitcher Wreck Wood 1 Willy’s Jug Wreck Wood 1 Big Wood Wreck Wood Bill's Wreck Wood Crystal Wave Wood Double L Wreck Wood Jake's Wreck Wood Jennifer's Wreck Wood Pipe Barge Wreck Wood Wendy's Wreck Wood Wood Wreck at Steel Wood 77 39% steel, 17% iron, and 2% composite, wood strakes over iron frames (Figure 5.2). Of 38 discernable cases, comprising 73% of the sample, propulsion was 21% sail, 71% propeller, and 8% side-wheel paddle (Figure 5.3). A majority, almost 80%, of the sites had robust engine and boiler structures. The remaining 14 indiscernible sites could be schooner barges, with no sail or engine, or engine salvage may have skewed the archaeological record. The first significant finding was that 69% of the 52 sample cases have large derelict fishing gear on site (Figure 5.4). Site continuity, hull structure, sediment, depth, and compass heading of wreck remains may factor into fishing gear impacts. Contiguous remains were a majority at 72%, versus broken up sites. The sample contained one submarine, S-5, and its pressure hull was intact. Bottom sediment was 72% sand, 20% silt, and 8% combination. Depth ranged from 65 to 250 ft., with a mean of 121 ft (Figure 5.5). Of 35 recorded cases, the predominate compass headings of the keel were north-south at 24% and northeast-southwest at14%, which roughly parallels the mid-Atlantic coastline and constant-depth trawling and dredging routes. FIGURE 5.1 Wreck locations off the four coastal states were an equitable case distribution. 78 FIGURE 5.2 Vessel hull material was 42% wood, 39% steel, 17% iron, and 2% composite. FIGURE 5.3 Propulsion was 74% propeller, 18% sail, and 8% side-wheel paddle, of 38 discernable cases. 79 FIGURE 5.4 Derelict bottom fishing gear was present on 69% of the sample population of 52. FIGURE 5.5 Wreck depth at the seafloor ranged from 65 to 250 ft., with a mean of 121 ft. 80 Identified wrecks were half or 26 of 52 cases. Of identified wrecks, gross tonnage ranged from 136 to 8256 tons, with a mean 2361 tons (Figure 5.6). Archival records disclosed the cause of loss for identified vessels as 50% collision, 23% leak or storm, 12% torpedo, 4% fire, and 11% unknown (Figure 5.7). Three modern commercial fishing boats, Miss Lori Dawn, Misty Blue, and Tomahawk, were the unknown loss cases. Of the identified wrecks, the build dates span from 1847 to 1976, with a mean of 1907. Sinking dates range from 1865 to 1983, with a mean of 1922. The average vessel life span was 1922 minus 1907, or 15 years. The general descriptive variables showed the average length of an identified wreck as 258 ft., while unidentified wrecks averaged 201 ft. (Table 5.2). The author cautiously speculates that older wrecks were smaller when built, have fewer remains due to natural deterioration, and are therefore more difficult to identify. Older wrecks are more fragile and are less likely to survive fishing gear impacts. FIGURE 5.6 Gross tons ranged from 136 to 8256, with a mean of 2361 tons, for 24 identified shipwrecks. 81 FIGURE 5.7 Cause of vessel loss was 50% collision, 23% leak or storm, 12% torpedo, 4% fire, and 12% unknown, for identified wrecks. TABLE 5.2 DESCRIPTIVE VARIABLES OF IDENTIFIED AND UNIDENTIFIED WRECKS Variable No. Min Max Mean Identified Wrecks Built Date 24 1847 1976 1907 Sunk Date 24 1865 1983 1922 Length, as Surveyed, ft. 24 85 509 258 Beam, as Surveyed, ft. 24 21 63 37 Draft, as Surveyed, ft. 24 8 34 18 Unidentified Wrecks Remains Length, ft. 17 30 315 201 Remains Width, ft. 7 25 70 40 Remains Height, ft. 25 2 40 17 A second finding, and an interesting phenomenon, was the increased occurrence of scallop dredges in the past decade. As divers have not observed all wrecks in all decades, individual cases sufficed to demonstrate the pattern. The oldest vessel in the sample, side-wheel 82 paddle steamer Admiral DuPont, has two scallop dredges. The most recent dredge was leaning precariously on the port paddle wheel, stripped away four paddle buckets, and placed strain on the 1847 iron hull (Steinmetz 2008:148). Charles Morand acquired three scallop dredges in the last 10 years. San Gil now has at least four scallop dredges. The Terror Wreck snagged one scallop dredge before or in the 1990s and now has five scallop dredges. Ocean Venture has five scallop dredges on its stern. In total, fishermen lost 25 scallop dredges on 9 sample wrecks. Of seven cases observed over two or three decades, the rise of scallop dredge deposition was noticeable. It would be an interesting anthropological study to investigate if rotational MPAs concentrate threats to cultural sites, inside the boundaries and in the surrounding area. Lucy Neff and S-5 are located in the Elephant Trunk MPA. Ethel C, San Gil, St. Augustine, and the Fourth of July Wreck are in the Delmarva MPA. Admiral DuPont, Charles Morand, Ocean Venture, and the Terror Wreck are west and south of the MPAs. More than ten cases are required to draw significant conclusions about the drivers of observed increases (Donald Parkerson 24-26 May 2010, pers.comm.). A remarkable third finding was that divers observed scallop dredges only on metal wrecks. Divers found no scallop dredges on wood wrecks. Comparatively, trawl nets had similar snag percentages for wood and metal wrecks, 59% and 67%. As expected, the depth of wrecks with scallop dredges was in the deeper range of this study, from 150 to 250 ft. Eight deep metal wrecks had 1 to 5 scallop dredges on site, with an average of 2.6 dredges per wreck, while 3 wooden deep wrecks had no scallop dredges. It is possible that scallop dredges pull through wooden wrecks. 83 Negative evidence also yielded a fourth finding. Although the sample database had 64% presence of nets and 17% presence of scallop dredges, no derelict clam dredges were observed on any wreck. Many divers claim this is due to the powerful clam boats driving though obstructions, leaving no direct evidence of the clam dredge, only displaced or missing hull structure or wreck components. A second factor is that the clam dredges are expensive and clammers hire salvage divers to retrieve their snagged dredges. Table 5.3 summarizes the findings of wood versus metal wrecks and the three types of gear. TABLE 5.3 WRECK HULL MATERIAL VERSUS PRESENCE OF GEAR BY TYPE Hull Material Trawl Nets Scallop Dredges Clam Dredges Wood N=22 59% 13 0% 0 0% 0 Metal N=30 67% 20 30% 9 0% 0 Total N=52 64% 33 17% 9 0% 0 Zero evidence of scallop or clam dredges on wooden wrecks makes sense from a general physics standpoint. Cables transmit towing force to bottom gear, which transmits force to any resistance. On a trawl net, two to four cables distribute vessel force to otter doors and a large web of net. Trawl nets flex to envelope large obstructions. Each contacting strand of the net transmits a small portion of the towing force. On dredges, the scallop cutting bar or clam knife delivers the entire towing force through a metal surface area of approximately 1/4 in. (6.33 mm) high by 12.5 ft. (3.8 m) wide. From an individual wood timber’s perspective, the scallop cutting bar or clam knife delivers a stronger concentrated blow than a portion of trawl net. Wood naturally yields before metal. 84 Following this thread, fishing-related damage could have occurred on wrecks where fishing gear was not present on site. Mobile fishing gear could have struck and pulled through site remains causing damage to gear and/or wreck. Table 5.1 summarizes observed discrete site damage. Some fishing gear linked directly to wreck damage, such as Admiral DuPont’s paddle wheel damage, Moonstone’s depth charge rack displacement, Nina’s upturned towing bitt, S-5‘s displaced pipes, and St. Augustine’s peeled deck guns and gunwale damage. Some observed damage could not be conclusively linked to commercial fishing but, given the force dynamics of towed gear, fishing causality was probable. Examples include Admiral DuPont’s missing bow and stern, Cherokee’s missing bow and deck gun, Moonstone’s wrenched bow, and the deposit of a stray boiler aft of Cleopatra’s propeller. In Chapter 6, archaeological case studies discuss these examples in detail. The last finding was that collisions cause damage to wrecks and fishing gear. The author was conservative in individual case evaluations of damage. Of the sample population, 6% of wrecks had structure or equipment damaged but remained relatively intact, 12% had structure or equipment displaced but on site [scrambling], 6% had missing structure or equipment [extraction], and 77% of wreck damage was unknown (Figure 5.8). Of 33 wrecks with derelict trawl nets, 6% had torn/mangled nets, 88% had irreparable nets, and 6% had nets in unknown condition (Figure 5.9). Of 9 wrecks with scallop dredges, 56% had dredges which appeared usable, 11% were torn/mangled, and 33% were in unknown condition (Figure 5.10). While wreck damage was sometimes difficult to attribute to fishing collisions versus n-transforms, damage to fishing gear was clearer to evaluate. After snagging a wreck and time exposure until diver observation, trawl nets are generally not usable while scallop dredges appear mainly usable. 85 FIGURE 5.8 Damage severity to wrecks by fishing gear was difficult to attribute specifically to fishing impacts, except by individual case. FIGURE 5.9 Damage severity to trawl nets by wrecks was generally not repairable. 86 FIGURE 5.10 Damage severity to scallop dredges by wrecks was generally usable. Conclusion From sample incidence rates, shipwrecks and fishing gear affect each other. Several distinct findings were prominent. According to the sample, 69% of mid-Atlantic shipwrecks have derelict trawling and dredging gear on site. Approximately 2 out of 3 wrecks, 64%, had 1 to 3 derelict trawl nets on site. Scallop dredges snagged permanently on metal wrecks but were absent on wood wrecks. Between 150 and 250 ft. (46 and 76 m) depth, 100% of metal wrecks had 1 to 5 derelict scallop dredges on site. Scallop dredge disposition appears to be increasing in and near the rotational scallop access MPAs. Recreational divers did not observe clam dredges on wood or metal wrecks. Divers judged trawl nets generally unusable while scallop dredges appeared usable. Future surveys could capture observations from the recreational and technical diving community at large and provide robustness to the conclusions. The high presence of derelict trawl nets and scallop dredges on mid-Atlantic wrecks validates one primary research 87 question that shipwrecks continue to negatively impact commercial fishing. Addressing the second primary research question, individual case studies in the next chapter discuss wreck damage by fishing gear. CHAPTER 6. ARCHAEOLOGICAL CASE STUDIES Introduction To understand the capability of commercial fishing gear to damage, dislodge, or move wreck structure or contents, it is helpful to examine specific artifacts and sites. Under sail power, from the early 19th century, Mediterranean fishermen demonstrated the ability to recover shipwreck contents. Trawlers recovered shiploads of amphorae and life-sized bronze statutes (Throckmorton 1964:34-35). In the mid-Atlantic region, a review of recovered artifacts and wreck site damage documented the impact capability of modern bottom fishing fleets. One week in August 2009, the author observed four items recovered by mid-Atlantic commercial fishermen: a ship timber (Figure 6.1), stones (Figure 6.2), a large rudder (Figure 6.3), and an anchor (Figure 6.4). The 10 ft. (3 m) ship timber was wedged inside a clam dredge. Stone patches are an infrequent occurrence on the flat sandy mid-Atlantic shelf, according to David Mallinson, East Carolina University marine geology professor (pers. comm. 18 September 2009). A second possibility is the recovery of artificial reef material, where tumbling in the dredge removed marine animals from the rock surface. Since the stones were 1 to 2 ft. (0.3 to 0.6 m) diameter, generally smooth, portable size, and exhibited no encrustation, Lawrence Babits, ECU Maritime Studies professor, suggested the rocks may be ballast stones from wreck sites (pers. comm. 12 September 2009). All stone possibilities could be viable. A clam dredge knife impaled the 16 ft. (4.9 m) high remains of a copper-clad rudder. Bronze pins that once secured the pintle to the rudder were bent down towards the rudder shoe, indicating the clam dredge hit the metal shoe and extracted the wood rudder timbers from the grip of the apparently stationary pintle. In 1981, a clammer captain recovered a 2.5-ton anchor, now in front of the Ocean City, Maryland, Life Saving Station Museum. 89 Recognizing commercial fishing gear can inadvertently recover large wood, metal, and stone items, how does modern commercial bottom fishing affect shipwreck sites? Derelict fishing gear presence is not necessarily site damage. Based on eyewitness observation of wreck damage, the author chose several wrecks as case studies. The case studies span wood, iron, and steel construction, sail and power, 20 to 160 yrs old, and depths from 75 to 250 ft. (23 to 76 m). FIGURE 6.1 Timber, 10 ft. long, wedged in clam dredge. (Photo by author, August 2009.) FIGURE 6.2 Stones, 1 to 2 ft. wide, recovered by clam dredges. (Photo by author, August 2009.) 90 FIGURE 6.3 Rudder remains, 16 ft. long, and stones recovered by clam dredge. Pintle bolts bent towards the reader. (Photo by author, August 2009.) 91 FIGURE 6.4 Ship anchor, 2.5 ton, recovered by clammer. Anchor stock was reconstructed. For scale, author’s sister is 5 ft. 4 in. tall. (Photo by author, August 2008.) 92 Admiral DuPont (1847–1865) This case study highlights 1) scallop dredge and wire cable damage to iron machinery and 2) possible extraction of large iron hull sections. Admiral DuPont had a varied history from British coastal ferry to blockade-runner to U.S. merchant passenger ship. Built at West Ham, England, in 1847, the iron side wheel Anglia was 198 ft. long by 28 ft. beam (60 x 8.5 m). A Maudsley Sons & Field double cylinder engine powered the 750-ton coastal ferry between Holyhead, Wales, and Dublin, Ireland. Its 7:1 length to beam ratio and low profile attracted the Confederates to purchase Anglia for Civil War blockade-running duty. After capture at Bull’s Bay outside Charleston, South Carolina, the Union Navy sold Anglia as a prize of war in New York and the vessel returned to carrying passengers. The new owner renamed the vessel Admiral DuPont (Figure 6.5). On 8 June 1865, the paddle steamer collided with a sailing ship and quickly sank in 150 ft. (46 m) off Cape May, New Jersey (Steinmetz 2008). FIGURE 6.5 Admiral DuPont. (Bufford 1863, courtesy of National Archives.) 93 In 2000, the wreck’s midship elements were structurally intact: 25 ft. (7.6 m) diameter paddle wheels, iron hull, boilers, and unique Maudslay double cylinder engines (Figure 6.6). Per Riley’s waterline theory, Admiral DuPont’s iron hull sunk into the hard clay, with sand and silt top layer, up to the lowest paddle buckets. Consistent with Riley’s observations of side paddle steamer sites, Admiral DuPont settled upright on its keel. Engine compartment frames and transverse shaft support beams under the first deck formed a strong structural midships box. FIGURE 6.6 Offshore Paddle Wheel field drawing, mid-section plan, August 6, 2000. Identified in 2008 as Admiral DuPont (Steinmetz 2008). (Drawing by author, 2008.) Multiple trawl nets and two scallop dredges inflicted damage on the wreck. Trawl nets draped the midships’ standing structure and upright iron paddlewheels. An encrusted scallop dredge rested against the aft end of the boilers. In 2006, a scalloper impaled a second dredge on the port sponson post and the tow cable sheared off 4 of 12 feathering paddlewheel buckets (Figure 6.7). The dredge’s weight threatens to topple the port paddle wheel, exposing the engine and midships to accelerated decay (Figure 6.8). Commercial fishing gear is a threat to Admiral DuPont’s structural and archaeological integrity (Steinmetz 2008). 94 FIGURE 6.7 Admiral DuPont port paddle wheel with suspended scallop dredge (left), rebreather diver for scale (lower left). (Copyright Paul Whittaker, 2006.) FIGURE 6.8 Admiral DuPont port sponson post and scallop dredge, close up. (Copyright Paul Whittaker, 2006.) 95 The Admiral DuPont site is informative by what is different compared to similar vessel sites. Compared to other iron-hulled paddlewheel shipwreck remains, the Admiral DuPont site displays two significant differences: absence of bow or stern structure on site and presence of commercial fishing gear. For initial comparison, the author chose English-built iron-hulled side-wheel blockade-runners Nola and Mary Celestia, at 30 and 60 ft. (9.1 and 18.3 m) deep off Bermuda. Both sites retained the reinforced 3-dimensional structures of bow and stern (Watts 1988a:163-168, 1988b:218). For a regional comparison, the author polled Mark Wilde-Ramsing, of the North Carolina Underwater Archaeology Branch, and Gordon Watts, director of Tidewater Atlantic Research and past professor in ECU’s Program in Maritime Studies. Both have extensive experience with iron-hulled blockade-runners. Wilde-Ramsing provided archaeological observations on the large number of blockade-runners in the Cape Fear region. “The quick answer is that all iron paddlewheel steamers (and screw steamers as well) that we have observed retained relatively intact bow and stern quarters, which have broken off from the hold areas” (Mark Wilde-Ramsing, pers. comm., 19 February 2010). Watts echoed Wilde-Ramsing’s observations by stating: Virtually all of the iron or steel blockade-runners I have worked on have surviving bow and stern sections. Like those sections of Nola and Mary Celestia, they are heavily-built and normally survive reasonably intact although not infrequently separated from the adjacent cargo holds. I am somewhat surprised about Anglia's missing bow and stern. Perhaps they are still there but no longer exposed (Gordon Watts, pers. comm., 21 February 2010). To further expand observations of iron-hulled English-built side-wheel paddle steamers of the same era, the author consulted archaeology reports and site plans of Iona II, sunk in England, and Denbigh, sunk off Galveston, Texas. Both wrecks are near shore in shallow water. Iona II is missing its bow and stern structure above the turn of the bilge, a faint outline of the lower framing remains. Denbigh’s bow and stern may be beneath a soft mud sediment 96 overburden. Both have evidence of fishing nets on site (Wessex Archaeology 2009:3,9,24; Arnold 2001:400,409,412). Using the above cases and others for comparison, 14 similar wreck sites lying in sand without trawling or dredging have their bow and stern structural triangles on-site (Table 6.1). What factors explain the lack of bow and stern structure on the Admiral DuPont versus their presence on Bermuda and North Carolina iron-hulled steamers of the same vintage? How do the Iona II and Denbigh site observations correlate? What other forces could hide or remove these large sections? The author considered five multiple hypotheses. 1. Could the bottom sediments cover the Admiral DuPont’s bow and stern sections, as Watts questioned? The bottom sediment is hard clay with a thin top layer of silt and fine sand. Admiral DuPont’s midships was intact with full relief. The possibility of the bow and stern sinking beneath the sediment, while the engine area midships has full relief above the intended waterline, is unlikely. 2. Did the original wrecking collision shear off the bow? The sailing ship Stadacona struck the Admiral DuPont’s starboard side just forward of the paddle wheel. “The steamer was cut open nearly down to her keel; the fore-mast was carried away and she began to settle fast” (Heyl 1953:3). This option is not likely as the full length of the keel exists onsite and this would not explain the absent stern. 3. Theoretically, modern freighter anchors could have snagged each structure, and dragged each off site, but the logical probability of both is low. 4. Could natural deterioration completely consume iron structures above the sand? Saltwater corrosion is a factor in all cases considered. Surface effects play a strong role on the shallow water wrecks, Iona II, Denbigh, and the coastal North 97 Carolina wrecks. While saltwater corrosion and surface effects play a strong role with the Nola and Mary Celestia, remarkably, their bow and stern relief structures are fairly intact. At 150 ft. (46 m) depth, the Admiral DuPont is less susceptible to surface effects such as storm surge. 5. Numerous nets and scallop dredges on Admiral DuPont are circumstantial but telling evidence. While not confirmed, it is possible that many years of large commercial trawl nets, scallop dredges, or clam dredges displaced the robust end sections of Admiral DuPont. Bermuda and North Carolina waters do not have scallop dredges or clam dredges, as the waters are too warm. In addition, Bermuda has a moratorium on fishing in its shallow waters. Strickler added a single record for this wreck site in the hang log’s third edition (Strickler 2008:74). Looking worldwide at comparative sites, Admiral DuPont’s bow and stern should be on site. Riley’s Australian studies of over 100 iron and steamship wrecks had bow and stern structures on site, collapsed over time, yet still on-site. The author’s summary of similar U.S., Bermudian, and English sites in Table 6.1 showed a 93% presence rate, including the Denbigh wreck as an unknown. It appears an extractive site formation process removed Admiral DuPont’s bow and stern structures. While this discussion is neither exhaustive nor positively conclusive, given the data available, two conclusions are clear. First, a combination of metal corrosion and towed commercial fishing gear most likely explains the deterioration and removal of the bow and stern framed structures. Second, a modern scallop dredge is definitely responsible for severe damage to Admiral DuPont’s port paddle wheel. 98 TABLE 6.1 IRON-HULLED BLOCKADE-RUNNER SITE COMPARISON Vessel Name Built Sunk Propul- sion Where Sunk Site Depth Sedi- ment Built Length Site Length Bow Relief L x H Stern Relief L x H Notes Admiral DuPont, ex-Anglia 1847 1865 PW NJ 153 Sand/ Clay 195 or 198 208 Center- line Center- line Plan Bendigo 1863 1864 PW NC Sand 162 176 Present Present Burnt Condor 1864 1864 PW NC 16-19 Sand 221 215 12 x 4 33 L Plan Duoro 1862 1863 Screw NC Sand 20 L Sanded Ella 1864 1864 PW NC Sand 225 Present Destroyed, detail bow General Beauregard 1858 1863 PW NC Surf Sand 223 Sanded Sanded Destroyed Hebe 1863 1863 Screw NC 22 Sand 165 169 Present Present Shelled Iona II 1863 1864 PW England 45 Sand 249 C Outline Outline Mary Celestia 1864 1864 PW Bermuda 60 Sand 221 C 29 L 33 L Perspective* Modern Greece 1860 1862 Screw NC 30 Sand 210 224 38 x 10 34 x 28 Perspective* Nola 1863 1863 PW Bermuda 30 Sand 236 C 30 L Present Perspective* Ranger 1863 1864 PW NC Sand Large Large Burnt Stormy Petrel 1864 1864 PW NC Sand 225 240 30 L Sanded USS Peterhoff, ex-Peterhoff 1861 1864 Screw NC 35 Sand 210 22 x 10 24 L Plan* Wild Dayrell 1863 1864 PW NC Sand 215 220 Present Present Destroyed Denbigh 1860 1865 PW TX 8-12 Mud/ Clay 182 Plan Legend: C=Contiguous. PW=Side Paddle Wheel. *=Detailed Site Drawing. Measurements in ft. Sources: Arnold 1999, 2001; Steinmetz 2008; Watts 1988a, 1988b; Watts & Lawrence 2001; Wessex Archaeology 2009; Wilde-Ramsing and Angley 1985; Wise 1988. 99 Middle Grounds Wreck This case study reveals the affect of a snagged floating net on archaeological documentation, diver safety, and dive tourism. At 95 ft. (29 m) depth, the sailing era Middle Grounds Wreck has large floating towers of trawl nets and suspended cables on the bow and midships machinery that stress the wreck’s wooden structure (Steinmetz 2009a, 2009c). The site name is a nickname as the vessel’s identity is unknown. Found off Chincoteague, Virginia, recreational divers recovered large deadeyes and have not observed an engine, boiler, or shaft, indicating a sailing vessel or schooner barge. The water clarity is poor as the wreck sits in a mud hole with fine silt. The wooden wreck site is flat with discrete relief at the bow and midships machinery. Although the wreck lies within recreational depth limits, undulating floating nets and suspended cables are quite unnerving for a diver unaccustomed to the dangerous combination of low visibility and overhead environment. In 2008, upon hearing a description of the net hazards, one dive boat captain elected not to return to the site. Floating nets have negatively affected the wreck’s structural integrity, archaeological investigation, and dive tourism. Cleopatra (1865-1889) The Cleopatra site demonstrates fishing gear is capable of extracting large items from one site and depositing them on another site. Built in 1865, Cleopatra’s power plant was simplistic. A single 46 in. (1.2 m) diameter cylinder with a 36 in. (0.9 m) stroke powered the 1,045-ton wood screw steamer. An equally simplistic boiler system matched the engine, two low-pressure box boilers. Cleopatra was a coastal freight steamer, with dimensions 184 x 43 x 15 ft. (56 x 13 x 4.6 m) (Figure 6.9). In October 1889, Cleopatra was steaming from West Point, Virginia, to New York with a load of cotton. After a bow-to-bow collision with side-wheeler 100 Crystal Wave, Cleopatra sank in 95 ft. (29 m) off New Jersey and Delaware (Heyl 1953:89; SHSA 1986:103-104; Gentile 2002a:41-44). FIGURE 6.9 Cleopatra. (Gentile 2002a:42, courtesy of Steamship Historical Society of America.) FIGURE 6.10 Cleopatra site sketch, with unassociated cylindrical Scotch boiler in upper left. (Sketch by author, Steinmetz 2009c.) 101 Commercial fishing gear has affected the wreck site with two deposits (Figure 6.10). First, a derelict trawl net runs the length of the wreck from engine to propeller. Second, the wreck site has a cylindrical Scotch boiler aft its propeller. It is possible the Cleopatra carried the Scotch boiler as freight in addition to cotton. Due to the position of the Scotch boiler behind the propeller, the author believes it is more likely a trawl net or dredge snagged the Scotch boiler at another wreck site, transported it to the Cleopatra site, and dumped it so the boiler would not be caught again (Steinmetz 2009c). Commercial fishermen cited this behavior in Chapter 7. USS Nina (1865-1910) The Nina site demonstrates 1) a towed trawl net’s ability to displace [scramble] heavy machinery and 2) a floating net’s affect on fish mortality, diver safety, and dive tourism. In 1865, iron-hulled tug Nina was one of six sister ships built for the U.S. Navy. The coal-fired screw steamer was 137 x 26 x 9 ft. (42 x 8 x 2.7 m) and registered at 420 tons (Figure 6.11). At the mature age of 45 years, Nina and 32 men disappeared in a 1910 gale off Delaware. In 1977, recreational divers discovered and later identified Nina at 75 ft. (23 m) depth on the sandy bottom off Delaware. The wreckage had a standing bow, windlass, boiler, and deck beams in place forward of the engine. The stern was low to the sand. Over the next 15 years, the bow hull plates fell, exposing the triangular iron bow framework (Gentile 2002a:115-119). In the early 1990’s, divers found a submerged floating net snagged on the wreck’s stern. The vertical net was a hazard to fish and divers. Stark white fish carcasses carpeted the wreck, dropping from the net once dead. The water column below 50 ft. (15 m) depth contained suspended organic particulates, which created near blackness at the bottom. Without visibility, divers sometimes found themselves under the swaying net. 102 Removing the net exposed fishing gear related wreck damage. Armed with several knives, the author and her husband cut the submerged float buoys off the net to allow it to sink to the bottom, slightly off the wreck due to a favorable current. The next visit revealed wreck damage from the snagging event. The net snagged the encrusted stern towing bitt, ripped the bitt and attached mounting beams from the hull, and re-deposited the assembly upside down on the stern. The beams protruded at a 45-degree angle from the bottom, ripe for the next snag. FIGURE 6.11 Nina, in drydock in 1905, with large towing bitt just aft of deckhouse. (Gentile 2002a:118, courtesy of Naval Photographic Center.) 103 USS Cherokee (1891 – 1918) Fishing gear may have scrambled and extracted hull structure and equipment from another U.S. Navy iron-hulled tug. Built in 1891, coal-fired Cherokee (Figure 6.12) surveyed at 120 x 25 x 15 ft. (36.6 x 7.6 x 4.6 m) and 272 tons. The Navy purchased the tug in 1917 and mounted a 3 in./50-caliber gun on the bow. In 1918, Cherokee sank in a storm, and landed upright on the sand at 90 ft. (27 m) depth off Delaware (Gentile 2002a:21-22,26-27). In 1978, the stout iron hull was structurally intact. The 1993 plan and elevation sketches (Figure 6.13) show a collapsed bow, with the gun and windlass atop the debris (Steinmetz 2009a, 2009c). By 2003, two changes caused concern. A discrete section of the midship starboard hull collapsed inward. Most upright hulls deteriorate by collapsing outward via gravity. The author did not observe the gun and assumed the bow area had sanded in. On a subsequent dive, the author probed for the gun and bow structure and found neither. China cups and crew personal effects were spilling into the open sand. The sport diving community is small and no one is aware of gun salvage. It appears scrambling and extraction devices have pushed hull plates inward and removed the pedestal gun and bow structure (Steinmetz 2009a, 2009b). FIGURE 6.12 Cherokee, 1915-1917, before Navy ownership and deck gun addition. (Gentile 2002a:27, courtesy of Naval Photographic Center.) 104 FIGURE 6.13 Cherokee site sketch, 1993 and 2003. (Sketch by author, Steinmetz 2009c.) Submarine S-5 (1920-1920) The submarine S-5 (Figure 6.14) is an example of non-traditional hull shape that snagged fishing gear and sustained damage. Built March 1920, the 1092 ton steel submarine was 231 x 21 x 13 ft. (70 x 6.4 x 4 m). Sunk in September 1920 by operator error and a faulty induction valve, S-5’s bow struck hard sand at 170 ft. (52 m) off Cape May, New Jersey. Miraculously, all 38 crewmembers escaped through a hole cut in the temporarily floating stern. After 477 dives by hard-hat divers attempting to raise the submarine, the Navy officially struck the S-5 from its list of ships in 1921 (Gentile 2002a:135-142, 147; Hill 2002:208). Divers observed trawl net warp cables pulling at pipes and equipment around the conning tower (Figure 6.15) and a scallop dredge and nets at the stern (Figure 6.16). Despite the submarine’s general cylindrical shape, the outer smooth skin has disappeared, leaving a 105 honeycombed surface of framing on the exterior of the inner pressure hull. A submarine-shaped hull is also susceptible to gear hangs. FIGURE 6.14 Submarine S-5. (Gentile 2002a:135, courtesy of National Archives.) FIGURE 6.15 Submarine S-5 conning tower with nets and displaced pipes. (Copyright Bradley Sheard, 2009.) 106 FIGURE 6.16 Scallop dredge club stick, chain bag, ship anchor fluke, and trawl net remains at the stern of U.S. Navy submarine S-5 (SS-110). (Copyright Bradley Sheard, 2009.) 107 USS St. Augustine (1929 – 1944) This case study highlights 1) the cutting force of a scallop dredge wire cable against steel and 2) possibly the ability of fishing gear to displace machinery, through currents, storm surge, or towed force. Built in 1929 at Newport News, Virginia, Viking was a twin-screw private yacht, measuring 272 x 36 x 15 ft. (83 x 11 x 4.6 m) and registered at 1,720 gross tons. In 1941, the U.S. Navy purchased the steel yacht and converted it to a patrol boat by adding deck guns, hedgehog launchers, and depth-charge racks. The newly commissioned St. Augustine (PG-54) (Figure 6.17) served as an Escort Commander in convoy duty along the eastern seaboard. On the night of 6 January1944, at 16 knots, tanker Camas Meadows knifed St. Augustine’s starboard midships. A gunner’s mate waded to the stern and disarmed the depth charges, before the vessel sank 250 ft. (76 m) to the sand off the Maryland coast. Casualties totaled 115 men. In 1945, a destroyer escort dropped depth charges and launched hedgehogs on the site, mistaking 36 ft. (11 m) of relief for a German U-boat. The attack resulted in a 2000 yard diameter explosion (Gentile 2002a:205-212; Shomette 2007:280-284). FIGURE 6.17 St. Augustine. (Gentile 2002a:208, courtesy of Naval Photographic Center.) Of two discrete damage areas, one is tied directly to fishing gear and the second has circumstantial evidence. First, a scallop dredge wire tow cable cut a large hole into the starboard 108 bow gunnel. Figure 6.18 shows the gunnel in 1929. In 2008, Figure 6.19 shows a scallop dredge on the sand bottom with its tow wire rising vertically into a torn gunnel. One can envision the fairlead capturing the cable while the scalloper struggled to recover the dredge. FIGURE 6.18 St. Augustine bow in drydock, 1929. (Burgess 1963:197, courtesy of Mariners Museum.) FIGURE 6.19 St. Augustine damaged bow with scallop dredge. (Copyright Bradley Sheard, 2008.) The second damage area is an anti-aircraft gun hung off the starboard side, twin barrels pointing upwards (Figure 6.20). The wreck lists to port about 30 degrees (Gentile 2002a:211-212). There are several hypotheses for this odd placement. 1. Natural deterioration does not explain the gun location. Gravity would drop the gun inside the hull or slide it to port, following the wreck inclination. 2. The 1945 depth charges or hedgehogs could have peeled the gun off the deck. However, it is doubtful the gun would have remained suspended for 60 years. 109 3. Curtains of floating nets ascend from the port and starboard amidships (Figure 6.21) (Steinmetz 2009a, 2009c). It is possible that swaying nets in storm surge dislodged the gun, similar to the mechanical forces of current on the HMS Swift site in Patagonia, Argentina, discussed on page 9. 4. A towed trawl net or dredge could have dragged the gun over the starboard side, peeling the deck with it. The Nina case study supports this hypothesis. Of four hypotheses, the towed net or dredge appears the most probable site formation process for the suspended anti-aircraft gun but this is not conclusive. It is conclusive the scallop dredge tow cable carved a hole in the steel gunwale. FIGURE 6.20 Anti-aircraft gun hanging off the starboard side, pointing upwards, sand in background. (Gentile 2002a:212.) FIGURE 6.21 St. Augustine midships sketch with floating curtains of nets. (Sketch by author 2006, Steinmetz 2009c.) 110 USS Moonstone (1929 – 1943) The Moonstone case demonstrates trawl net ability to move equipment and large structural steel components. Built in 1929 as the private yacht Lone Star in Kiel, Germany, the twin-diesel vessel registered 171 x 26 x 12 ft. (52 x 8 x 3.7 m) and 469 tons. In 1941, the U.S. Navy purchased the steel yacht, changed the name to Moonstone (PTc-9), and added machine guns and two depth charge racks (Figure 6.22). On the night of 15 October 1943, at a speed of 13 knots, WWI destroyer USS Greer (DD-145) penetrated Moonstone’s port bridge wing, into the pilothouse up to the wheel, and cut down to the keel. The gunner’s mate waded aft to secure the depth charges, eight per rack, which were set to explode at 75 ft. (23 m) depth. Within 3 minutes, Moonstone sank to the sand at 130 ft. (40 m) off the Delaware coast. In 1950, a wire-drag cleared the navigational hazard to 77 ft. (23 m) (Gentile 2002a:104-109; Shomette 2007:279-280). FIGURE 6.22 Moonstone, as owned by Navy. Notice depth charge racks on stern. (Gentile 2002a:109, courtesy of National Archives.) 111 Divers have observed many site changes over 40 years. The wreck sits upright on its keel; rusted depth charge drums with white explosive material still lie in the racks. From the 1960s through 1978, the wheelhouse and superstructure were intact. By 1990, the bridge disappeared, the midship superstructure collapsed, and the top deck was flush with the main deck. By 2002, the majority of the decks had collapsed into the hull (Gentile 2002a:109-111; Steinmetz 2009a). Divers also observed fishing net damage: on the bow, stern, and starboard side. A fishing net snagged on the starboard aft end, twisted the starboard hull sideways, and pulled vertical plates outboard. The bow separated from the main hull, rested on its port side at 45 degrees, with a trawl net draped over the majority of the structure (Gentile 2002a:109-111; Steinmetz 2009a). On the stern, nets enveloped the depth charge racks, which are askew (Figure 6.23). In summary, nets have disturbed [scrambled] the length of the wreck site. FIGURE 6.23 WWII patrol vessel Moonstone stern, depth charge racks enveloped in trawl net. (Copyright Bradley Sheard, 2008.) 112 Charles Morand, Ethel C, Ocean Venture, San Gil, and Terror Wreck Liberty ship Ocean Venture, unidentified Terror Wreck, and freighters Charles Morand, Ethel C, and San Gil have the distinction of snagging 3 to 5 scallop dredges each, in addition to trawl nets. It is difficult to ascertain wreck damage by scallop dredge as the triangular frame, ring bag, and club stick obscure the contact area. The purpose of examining these sites is to attempt to understand the driving force for the high number of derelict dredges. Looking at similarities, the wrecks are metal, contiguous, and from 200 to 425 ft. (61 to 130 m) in length. Depth range is 130 to 185 ft. (40 to 56 m). Large engines and multiple boilers powered each vessel. Vertical relief is substantial, estimated from 20 to 40 ft. (6 to 12 m). Each site has 0 to 12 obstruction records in Strickler’s hang log (Gentile 1992:49-50,124-127, 2002a:199-204, 2002c:65-66; Strickler 2008; Steinmetz 2009a, 2009c, 2009d). All are located close to or inside a scallop MPA: Charles Morand is west of Hudson Canyon MPA, Ethel C and San Gil are in the Delmarva MPA, Ocean Venture is south of Delmarva MPA, and the Terror Wreck is west of Elephant Trunk MPA. Table 6.2 summarizes the historical data and site observations. Without knowledge of the extent of a wreck site or the as-built vessel size, scallop fishermen appear to be skirting too close to large wrecks. TABLE 6.2 SHIPWRECKS WITH THREE TO FIVE SCALLOP DREDGES Wreck No. of Scallop Dredges No. of Hangs Depth Size Hull Tons Built Sunk Charles Morand 3 0 160 200 x 27 x 15 Iron 761 1884 1890 Ethel C 3 2 185 328 x 44 x 19 Steel 2847 1943 1960 Ocean Venture 5 12 160 425 x 57 x 34 Steel 7174 1941 1942 San Gil 4 2 130 325 x 46 x 29 Steel 3627 1920 1942 Terror Wreck 5 2 170 315 site length Steel Measurements in ft. 113 Tomahawk Snagged by fishermen and identified by divers in 2004, the steel-hulled Tomahawk has a scallop dredge pinned to the port gunwale and wheelhouse at 190 ft. (58 m) depth (Sheard 2006:20,24). Wreck damage was not determined. Although vessel origin and demise are unknown, Figure 6.24 shows relative vessel size compared to the 8 to 15 ft. (2.4 to 4.6 m) wide dredge. This case was included to demonstrate how small wrecks can adversely affect bottom fishing. FIGURE 6.24 Tomahawk with scallop dredge at wheelhouse. (Copyright Bradley Sheard, 2008.) Conclusion The case studies contributed to both primary research questions. Diver observations recorded 1) the number of commercial gear systems lost at each wreck site and 2) specific damage to each wreck by fishing gear. It is important to remember the author purposely selected cases to enable examination of wreck damage by fishing gear. The chosen cases may not representative of the whole population. 114 On the case study sites, diver observations validated many more lost gear sets than noted in the commercial hang log. Across the case study wrecks, divers observed 41 derelict gear systems. Strickler’s hang log comments documented 3 lost gear sets, or 7% of the actual total observed (Table 6.3). Interestingly, the total number of obstruction records was 34, closer to the total lost gear sets at 41, but 12 records pertained to one wreck, Ocean Venture, rendering this statistic untenable. To make sense of the count discrepancy between actual lost gear and lost gear TABLE 6.3 CASE STUDY COMPARISON OF DIVER OBSERVATIONS TO HANG LOG GEAR LOSS COMMENTS Shipwreck Diver Observations Hanglog Records Hanglog Gear Loss Comments Discrepancy Admiral DuPont 2 nets, 2 scallop dredges, missing bow & stern 2 [Misidentified as Champion] 2 nets, 2 scallop dredges Charles Morand 1 net 3 dredges 0 1 net 3 dredges Cherokee 1 net 2 1 net Cleopatra 1 net, stray boiler 0 1 net Ethel C 1 net 3 dredges 2 1 net 3 dredges Middle Ground Wreck 2 nets, with floats 1 2 nets Moonstone 2 nets 2 2 nets Nina 1 net 2 1 net Ocean Venture 5 scallop dredges 12 5 scallop dredges S-5 1 net, 1 scallop dredge 4 Tore Up, Solid 1 net, 1 scallop dredge San Gil 1 net 4 scallop dredges 2 3 dredges lost 1 net 1 scallop dredge St. Augustine 2 nets, with floats, 1 scallop dredge 2 Bad 2 nets, 1 scallop dredge Terror Wreck 1 net 5 scallop dredges 1 1 net 5 scallop dredges Tomahawk 1 scallop dredge 2 1 scallop dredge Total 41 lost gear systems 34 3 lost gear systems, 7% of observations 38 lost gear systems Sources: Diver observations from author’s database. Hanglog comments. (Strickler 2008:14,35,43,55,56,61,62,63,67,70,74,79.) 115 comments, note that fishermen are not obligated to report their hang locations or lost/damaged gear to Strickler. Neither are divers. Two wrecks, Cleopatra and Charles Morand, have been well-known to the diving community for 20 years, yet the hang log omits their names or locations. Although Strickler cites Gentile’s books, which contain both wrecks, Strickler’s information is not complete. The comparison illustrates that while Strickler’s hang log is well organized with almost 5000 records, it is not comprehensive. It is the only regularly published hang log available. Recreational divers have a unique perspective to directly observe damage caused by fishing gear on wreck sites. Mid-Atlantic poor water clarity and depth prohibit fishermen from observing obstruction type, size, and construction from the surface. Table 6.4 summarizes specific site damage in the case studies. Chapter 7 discusses obstructions from a fisherman’s ocean surface perspective. In summary, diver observations confirm that commercial trawl nets and dredges are mechanisms of depositional, scrambling, and extraction processes. Fishermen have deposited trawl nets, scallop dredges, and/or the occasional stray boiler on case study wrecks. Based on case study sites, Strickler’s hang log documents a scant 7% of actual observed lost gear. Snagged nets create synthetic fiber marine debris, ghost fishing, and diver entanglement hazards. Towed nets and dredges scrambled pipes, paddlewheel buckets, a tugboat towing bitt, pedestal deck guns, and depth charge launch racks. Extracted artifacts range from a deck gun, a stern, and bow structures. Table 6.5 indexes the three site formation modes to the case studies. Commercial bottom fishing gear can damage shipwreck structure and archaeological context. 116 TABLE 6.4 DIVER OBSERVATION SUMMARY OF FISHING GEAR IMPACTS TO CASE STUDY SHIPWRECKS Shipwreck Hull Depth ft. Wreck Damage Observations Admiral DuPont Iron 150 Missing bow and stern structure above the keel 4 of 12 port paddlewheel buckets by scallop dredge Charles Morand Iron 160 Undetermined, 3 scallop dredges Cherokee Iron 90 Missing bow structure and deck gun Cleopatra Wood 90 Stray cylindrical boiler deposited aft of propeller Ethel C Steel 185 Undetermined, 3 scallop dredges Middle Ground Wreck Wood 95 Undetermined, wreck structure stressed by floating nets Moonstone Steel 130 Stern depth charge racks displaced by trawl net, Bow and starboard side pulled/collapsed by trawl nets Nina Iron 75 Stern towing bitt and mounting beams flipped by floating trawl net Ocean Venture Steel 170 Undetermined, stern surrounded by 5 scallop dredges S-5 Steel 170 Dislodged deck pipes by trawl net San Gil Steel 130 Undetermined, 4 scallop dredges St. Augustine Steel 250 Anti-aircraft gun hanging off starboard side, Starboard bow gunnel gouged by scallop dredge warp Terror Wreck Steel 170 Undetermined, 5 scallop dredges Tomahawk Steel 205 Wheelhouse and gunnel support scallop dredge on end. TABLE 6.5 INDEX OF SITE FORMATION MODE TO CASE STUDY SHIPWRECKS Shipwreck Depositional Scrambling Extraction Admiral DuPont ? ? Possible Charles Morand ? Cherokee ? Possible Cleopatra ? Possible Ethel C ? Middle Ground Wreck ? Moonstone ? ? Nina ? ? Ocean Venture ? S-5 ? ? San Gil ? St. Augustine ? ? Terror Wreck ? Tomahawk ? CHAPTER 7. COMMERCIAL FISHING INTERVIEWS Introduction Fishermen have the option of not speaking to outsiders, but divers, archaeologists, and fishermen can greatly benefit from each other’s knowledge. As Throckmorton wrote, “I knew that, with one exception, no sponge divers had ever voluntarily shown things to outsiders” (1964:34). Attempting to survey the archaeological potential of Turkey’s Bodrum waters, Throckmorton relied heavily upon, and appreciated, the guidance of sponge divers. With a sponge captain’s assistance, Throckmorton doubled known sites in the Mediterranean (Throckmorton 1964:77-78,118). This thesis study gained valuable insight from experienced fishing captains, who willing shared their knowledge through standardized interviews. Results are grouped by user type: trawl netter (N), scallop dredger (S), clam dredger (C), gear salvage diver (D), and gear provider (P). All interviewees spoke fluent English. Figures are given as approximate ranges to safeguard fisher identities. Each group’s findings are arranged by sample description and their perceptions about obstructions. Discussion, analysis, and conclusions follow the five interview groupings. Trawl Netters Two offshore netters, N1 and N2, and one inshore netter, N3, contributed to this study. All three fishermen were captains and owners of their vessels and each had 30 to 40 years of commercial fishing experience. Vessel length ranged from approximately 50 to 150 ft. (15 to 46 m). Engine horsepower ranged from approximately 400 to 2500 hp, which transmitted an average of 7 to 11 tons and up to 35 tons of pulling force. Offshore netters fished from George’s Bank, New England, to Hatteras, North Carolina while the inshore netter fished within 40 miles 118 of homeport. The offshore netters caught squid, mackerel, herring, and butterfish while the inshore netter caught flounder, porky, scup, butterfish, croaker, and black sea bass. Clarification is required about trawl net use for black sea bass since the species is structure-seeking. When sea bass fishing on wrecks, mid-Atlantic fishermen employ fish pots, not trawl nets. N3 strongly stated netters do not trawl for sea bass on wrecks as their nets would be readily torn or lost. Fishermen use trawl nets to catch black sea bass on open ground and on rock patches, by employing roller sweeps. Rock patches occur inshore and offshore, for example, above Washington Canyon, at Kidney Rocks, and off Cape May from 38 to 45 fathoms (70 to 82 m). This information speaks to the origin of stones collected in dredges in Chapter 6. Trip lengths and gear cost varied between offshore and inshore trawl fisheries while tow speed aligned by species. Inshore trips consumed up to 24 hours while offshore trips averaged 4 days. Fishing offshore, a net costs $50,000, tow wire costs $6,000 to $10,000, and a cod end costs $4,000 to $5,000. Small inshore nets cost $2,500 to $5,000. Trawl speed varied by target species: 2.8 knots for squid, 5 knots for mackerel, and an average of 3 to 3.3 knots. In the beginning of the interviews, netters were satisfied with electronic plotters and GPS hang numbers for avoiding snags, with a few lingering concerns. Offshore netters had 30,000 to 60,000 hangs in their plotters. Initially, netters expressed four generic concerns: 1) storm surge and currents move sand, covering and uncovering obstructions, 2) clammers expose obstructions with hydraulic dredging, 3) derelict telecommunications cables are a constant snag, described as pulling a plant root, and 4) if fishermen believe the obstruction is a shipwreck, netters give it more room because it might have a large footprint. 119 Trawlers regarded snags as part of their working environment and the evolution of navigation technology as a welcomed tool. N2 commented on the maneuverability of the three gear types. A trawler steers long arcs to avoid collapsing the net. A scalloper can turn 90 degrees and may skirt a wreck for better productivity. “They [can] wait until they can see the wreck under the boat, then turn to drag the dredge close. Sometimes they cut it too close” (N2). A clammer pulls in a straight narrow path and is not maneuverable, “like backing [a vehicle] up and down a driveway” (N2). Netters stated they utilize a 1/4 to 1/2 mi. (0.4 to 0.8 km) buffer zone. As the interviews progressed, more details emerged about snags and gear loss. Offshore netters severely snagged a net once every 1 to 4 years, noting they do not feel small snags, and complete net loss occurred every 5 to 10 years. The inshore netter lost a net every 2 to 5 years, noting that since regulations have limited fishing, the opportunity to snag has been reduced. N2 believed “95% of snags are man-made versus 5% natural. Four to five percent are wrecks, maybe more, hard to tell.” Trawlers reinforced the uncertainty of hang location accuracy and snag ability in many comments. “Fifty percent of hangs are not there, 30% are not big enough [to change fishing behavior], and 20 to 25% are true hangs. Two thirds [of hangs] are not a problem for large boats” (N2). N2 believed dredges and nets move obstructions, rendering previous hang numbers inaccurate. “If netters snag something heavy, we may drift 1.5 miles by the time it’s freed from the net” (N2). New nets snag on locations previously fished without incident (N2). N1 stated, “if I even think I feel a tug, the net is devastated” (N1), due to vessel power. N2 was emphatic that netters are always repairing nets, even though they may not feel snags during the tow. N2 and S1 120 commented that scallop dredges may bounce over a hang location while a net would catch. N1 stated firmly “Net fishermen stay away from wrecks at all costs. Too much to lose.” Netters listed many recovered items, some apparently extracted from shipwrecks. The list included military ordinance, such as torpedoes and drones. Artifacts possibly extracted from wrecks, or discarded from active vessels, include old bottles, bones, and a heavy coffee cup [which may have been a shaving mug]. Wreck artifacts included sailboat chocks, deadeyes from mast rigging, a modern boat rub rail, ship timbers with bronze spikes, and a piece of a wreck with raised decking. When asked how fishermen could avoid collisions in the future, netters had two suggestions for information and communication. “If there was a way for fishermen to know what the snags are, most fishermen will avoid it. We need an accurate description so we know to stay away” (N1). “Out-of-towners run into hangs” (N2), referring to non-local fishermen who do not have knowledge of local hangs. One netter told a story about fishing as a young boy with his father. Sitting in his father’s wheelhouse, the son asked “Dad, wouldn’t it be great if the water was transparent and we could see everything that’s on the bottom?” Most of the fishermen interviewed displayed much curiosity about what is on the bottom and believed accurate hang locations would reduce the number of gear collisions with obstructions. Across the netter sample, observations and opinions were consistent. Mid-Atlantic trawlers try to avoid shipwrecks and obstructions. They credit electronic plotters and hang logs for reducing the number of snags. Net entanglement leads to labor-consuming repairs or expensive replacement. During the tow, trawlers do not feel small snags, evidenced later by constant net repairs, and therefore they are unable to record small snag locations. Recovered 121 artifacts re-affirm a portion of net snags are shipwrecks and trawl nets have the ability to displace and extract shipwreck components. The reader should keep in mind this is a small sample and all interviewees were local owner/captains with decades of experience. Their insights may differ from non-owning, non-local, or less experienced captains. Scallop Dredgers Five scallop captains contributed insight for this study and ranged from approximately 1 to 5 decades of experience, with a median of 35 years. The scalloper sample differed substantially from the netter sample in the proportion of owning to non-owning captains. One owner/captain (S1) and four non-owning captains commanded vessels from approximately 70 to 115 ft. (21 to 35 m) length, with 450 to 1000 hp. engines. The 1000 hp medium-length vessel towed twin 15 ft. (4.6 m) wide dredges. Trips lasted 4 to 10 days to both the MPAs and open areas from the Hague Line to Virginia, with depths from 20 to 40 fathoms (37 to 73 m). Captains towed scallop dredges from 4.2 to 4.5 knots. Complete scallop dredges cost $10,000 to $15,000. Some scallopers enter all known hang numbers into their plotters while others take a minimalistic approach. S4 has two generations, 30 years, of personal hang numbers plus 99% of Strickler’s hang numbers entered into his plotter. Conversely, S3 chooses to enter wreck numbers and “bad hang” commented snags but not necessarily all hang numbers. He reasoned, if it is not a wreck or solid hang, fishermen might move the obstruction. S3 employs this selective strategy to reduce ghost numbers on his plotter screen. S4’s hang rate varies trip to trip while S3 hangs every trip. Scallop dredges recovered a variety of items including rocks, aluminum, a 16’ sailboat, an Army helmet, ammunition and boxes, old bottles, old tow wire, parachutes, cannonballs, and a wooden block and tackle. Most probably extracted from shipwrecks, recovered artifacts 122 included wood wreck pieces, deadeyes, a wooden rudderpost with spikes, a mast cap with a signal pulley, and ship anchors. Snagged anchors ranged in size from 5 to 15 ft. (1.5 to 4.6 m) plus a big ship’s anchor that almost tipped the scalloper’s boat. All five scallopers stated they attempt to stay away from wrecks by giving hangs a 1/8 to 1/2 mi. (232 to 926 m) berth, with a mode of 1/2 mi. (926 m). The scalloper utilizing the least buffer distance, 1/8 mi. (232 m), had the least fishing experience, 10 years. If given accurate numbers, none of the scallopers said they would fish close to obstructions. When asked why divers observe numerous scallop dredges on wrecks, scallopers shared their impressions of possible causes. 1) S1 stated, “depends on experience.” This comment related to the captain’s knowledge of local hangs, maintaining a reasonable buffer zone, and ability to recover dredges. In addition, the captain is not always behind the wheel. A crewmember steers while the captain rests between shifts or attends to other duties (S1, S4). 2) How a dredge snags determines its probability of recovery. Eighty percent of snag events result in gear recovery according to S1. To recover a snagged scallop dredge, S1 recommends pulling straight up with the boat in neutral. If the ring bag snags the wreck, the fishermen can usually recover the dredge, with damage to the bag (S1). If the steel frame snags or the tow-wire parts at a splice or weakened area, the fisherman is “out of luck” (S1). A grapnel may recover a dredge in relatively flat sand but not on a shipwreck (S2, S3, S5). 3) Language barriers may deny Vietnamese-operated scallop boats sharing or receiving hang numbers. Several fishermen spoke of their inability to communicate with Vietnamese-operated boats about navigational safety while at sea (S1, S5). If captains are 123 unable to communicate about avoiding surface collision courses between boats, the probability of sharing hang numbers is almost zero. 4) Equally hindered by a lack of local networking, “out-of-towners” and recent day scallopers may not know the locations of hangs (N2, S5). 5) The interviewees believed operator error occurred, such as not paying attention to the plotter and depth sounder for bottom structure. In 1998, Amendment 7 of the Magnuson-Stevens Act limited scallop vessel crew size to seven (NMFS 2009a), which may be a contributing factor. Autopilot may be a tempting substitute for crew. This small scallop fisher sample had many decades of experience. Interviewing inexperienced, out-of-town, or non-English-speaking scallopers may produce different results. Interviewed scallopers had three recommendations to reduce collisions of fishing gear and obstructions: 1) complete accurate location numbers that are repeatable on any navigation system, 2) fishermen reporting moved obstructions, and 3) fishermen paying attention to avoid hangs. Clam Dredgers The clammer sample was five captains, no owners, and was uniform in perceptions and opinions. First, a general description of the sample is warranted. The 2009 clam fleet was 43 vessels (MAFMC 2010b:21); hence, the interview sample was 12% of the total population. In the recently consolidated clam fleet (MAFMC 2010b:12-13), the experience level was high. Captain experience ranged from 10 to 40 years, with a median of 30 years. Vessel lengths varied from approximately 100 to 180 ft. (30 to 55 m) with power plants from a single 1000 hp engine to twin 850 hp engines, with a mode of a single 1000 hp engine. One vessel fished only surf clams, one vessel fished only quahog clams, and three vessels fished both clam types. Boats fished 150 124 to 300 days per year with regulated trip lengths up to 48 hours. Two vessels were built in the 1980s and three since 2000. Clammers tow dredges at 3 to 3.5 knots. Clam dredges cost $30,000 to $50,000 and require several welders for 1 to 2 months to build. A 150 in. (3.8 m) wide dredge weighs over 23,000 lb. (10 tons). One vessel carried two stern-mounted dredges. All five clammers dredged northern to central New Jersey, three vessels extended south to Delaware, Virginia, and North Carolina, and two vessels operated north to Massachusetts Bay and George’s Bank. All five clammers expressed much satisfaction with the current system of electronic hang numbers entered into chart plotters. They believed the majority of obstructions are now marked, and their navigation systems are cost-effective, although they recognize fishermen have not recorded all obstructions. Captains observed obstructions with relief above the sand on depth sounders. Decreasing a major snag potential, communications companies now bury their cables 2 to 3 ft. (0.6 to 1 m) deep. At the start of the interviews, clammers stated they snagged obstructions once a week to once in 25 years, with a mode of very seldom. Later in the interviews, fishermen listed many recovered artifacts. Artifacts included rocks, bombs, grenades, steel, old communications cables, fossils, and bottles. Artifacts possibly extracted from a wreck included copper pipes and plates [perhaps sheathing], cannonballs, cups, plates, wood, and a bundle of Civil War muskets. Artifacts probably extracted from wrecks were a 1700s sextant, 3 large anchors, and brass binnacles. It appears most clammers do not readily associate extracted artifacts with snags or shipwrecks, as their tows continue unabated and fishing operations are rarely affected. In keeping with this perception, only two of the five captains thought shared accurate numbers would help them. 125 Clammers spend roughly $10,000 to $15,000 per year on gear repairs (C3, C5). One wear item on a clam dredge is the clam knife, which the crew replaces once or twice every trip, at a cost of $5,000 per year. Most clam captains hire at least one crewmember who can weld to repair mangled steel on the dredge, equipment, or boat. Clammers readily admitted their dredges easily tow through wooden wreck sites (C1, C4). Two clammers (C1, C4) said they try to avoid shipwrecks but later clarified that if a shipwreck is wood, collision is not an issue. Wood wrecks break up and go into dredges (C1). If gear snags on a sturdy obstruction, such as a metal wreck, salvage divers usually recover the dredge (C1). One clammer said, “the ocean’s been raked over” (C2). If given accurate obstruction numbers, two clammers (C1, C2) said they would fish as close as possible, if clams were there, defining a reasonable buffer distance of 1/4 mi. (0.5 km) while three clammers said they would fish “right next to it” (C3, C5) or 40 to 50 ft. (12 to 15 m) (C4). If they knew a wreck was wood, they could tow through it while harvesting clams. One clammer told of intentionally towing his dredge along the keel of a sunken fishing vessel laying on its side and harvesting more clams than the surrounding area. Interestingly, one clammer said if the obstruction was rocks, he would stay away, as there were not enough benefits of clams harvested versus rock damage to the gear (C3). Fishermen give active telecommunications cables a 1/2 mi. (0.9 km) buffer and are liable for damages (C5). Clammers are more concerned about and avoid rocks and telecommunications cables, which have consequences of dredge repair or liability, before shipwrecks. Gear Salvage Divers A commercial diver over 20 years, D1 recovered 1 net, 1 scallop dredge, and 35 to 40 clam dredges. If a scalloper breaks a tow wire, the dredge is difficult to find. Of the 35 to 40 126 salvaged clam dredges, only 2 were snagged on shipwrecks: an artificial reef vessel and a sunken fishing boat. In D1’s experience, clam dredge cables wear and break close to the dredge clevis. D2 has been a commercial diver almost 25 years and has recovered a few scallop dredges and approximately 200 clam dredges. D2 firmly believes there is no way to clear a net from a shipwreck. D2’s understanding is that clam dredges weigh 10 to 20 tons and cost $50,000 to $60,000. D2 believes the reason clam dredges are not typically found on wrecks is that clam dredges pull through wrecks. D2 stated the cause of lost dredges is 10% shipwrecks or rocks and 90% human error, such as letting out all the wire cable, crushing the clevis, or not tending to a kinked cable before it parts. Both salvage divers recovered mostly clam dredges and very few nets or scallop dredges. Both salvagers considered nets almost impossible to recover from wrecks. Fishermen do not hire salvage divers to recover scallop dredges because the single connection to the surface is usually lost. Both salvage divers reflected a lack of shipwreck snags when recovering clam dredges, indicating clam dredges probably pull through shipwrecks. Gear Providers P1 manufactures scallop dredges in three sizes, up to 15 ft. (4.6 m) wide, which sell for $5,000 to $7,000. There are three wear/replaceable items on the frame: the cutting bar, heel, and shoe. The cutting bar is 3/8 to 5/8 in. (0.95 to 1.6 cm) thick and scoops scallops into the chain bag. The manufacturer or crewmember welds the hardened steel heel and shoe to the frame. A club stick costs $1000 to $1200. The fabricated steel parts range from $6,000 to $8,200. After purchasing the A-frame and club stick, crewmembers add steel rings, chain links, mesh top, chafing gear, assembly labor, and a wire tow cable to complete the scallop dredge. 127 P2 sells small nets and parts to complete a scallop dredge. The ring bag, mesh top, turtle chains, and wire cable range from $3,000 to $4,500 for an 8 to 15 ft. (2.4 to 4.6 m) wide dredge. In total, all purchased parts for a scallop dredge are $9,000 to $13,000. Adding assembly labor, a scallop dredge costs $10,000 to $15,000. P2 also sells small nets for $10,000 to $15,000. Discussion Shipwrecks present varying entanglement risks based on fishing gear type, fishing boat towing power, and over time as the wreck disintegrates and gear displaces components. Upside -down metal wrecks are less of a snag issue until hull plates fall off frames and large sections separate, exposing rough protrusions. Intact upright wrecks with wales or rub rails may deflect fishing gear until the collapsed hull exposes large heavy engines and boilers. Wooden sailing wreck sites may no longer pose a snag hazard after worms weaken the wooden hull and fishing gear removes anchors, timbers, and perhaps ballast stones. The variety of wreck site conditions and fishing vessel and gear combinations, plus the fact that fishermen are operating blind to the sea bottom, is similar to a game of Russian roulette. Those who chose to tempt fate and play the game will, eventually, lose their gear. Like the spectrum of gamblers, each captain chooses a level of tolerated risk, based on known and unknown factors, and weighs the benefits versus consequences. Level of tolerated risk depends on level of experience and perhaps whether the owner of the gear is steering the boat. The netter sample was all owners, the scalloper sample had one owner out of five interviewees, and the clammer sample had no owners. Recent decline and consolidation of fishing fleets has increased the trend of hired captains for an owner’s many boats. 128 A factor to consider is the gear force at impact. Dynamic impact force is mass times acceleration, F = m*a. Simplifying the equation, assuming acceleration at impact equals 1 second, impact force equals mass times velocity, F = m*v. Trawl net impact force is difficult to estimate as nets snag and flex around obstructions, acting as shock absorbers. Rigid steel dredges are well suited to the equation. Clam dredge impact force is 10 times the impact force of a scallop dredge, shown in Table 7.1. Ability to pull though the obstruction after impact, continued pulling force, is a function of vessel engine power, drive system efficiency including propeller, and friction or resistance forces of the boat and gear to the water and the obstruction. Clam boats have more horsepower than scallop boats. Higher impact force can equal greater wreck damage. Higher impact force and vessel horsepower equals a greater possibility to pull through the wreck and recover the gear. TABLE 7.1 RELATIVE IMPACT FORCE BY GEAR TYPE Gear Type Mass Tow Speed Impact Force, Newtons Vessel Hp Trawl Net Flexible net 3.15 knots (1.621 m/s) Variable 400-2500 Scallop Dredge 1500 lb. (680 kg) 4.40 knots (2.264 m/s) 1,540 450-1000 Clam Dredge 23,000 lb. (10,432 kg) 3.25 knots (1.672 m/s) 17,442 1000-1700 Another known risk factor is what this author calls the Virgin Patch Theory. If a scalloper or clammer can get closer to an obstruction than previous captains, there is the possibility of a more productive harvest. The more powerful the vessel, the less risk of gear loss. Clammers harvest as close to obstructions as their 1000+ hp. vessels can probably free the dredge if snagged. The end effect is a semi-private MPA where the most risk-tolerant fisherman determines the rotational access schedule. 129 An unknown risk factor is the accuracy of each captain’s hang data. In 2001, the author compared a second-generation offshore netter’s database of 19,000 hangs to her confirmed shipwreck database. To her surprise, the netter’s database missed 16 large shipwrecks within 50 miles of homeport. The missing wrecks were over 200 ft. (61 m) length and 15 ft. (4.6 m) relief. Kingley’s English Channel report echoes this finding (Kingley 2009:38). Fishermen’s obstruction data is certainly helpful but not accurate or complete. Analysis Some readers may question if fishermen intentionally discard gear on the wrecks. It is difficult for a recreational diver to judge the remaining life of an abandoned fishing net or dredge, especially if bio-fouling organisms cover the gear at the time of the diver’s observation. Have fishermen purposely dumped worn out nets and dredges in the ocean or on wreck sites for inexpensive disposal? This might explain the hang log listing only 7% of diver observed gear in the case studies. Perhaps 93% of the gear was not lost but dumped. The disposal explanation is a possibility but was not raised by fishermen when asked “is there anything we haven’t discussed that you think I should know?” Four subsequent conversations with netters and scallopers confirmed purposeful disposal at sea is not a known practice. Trawlers retain old nets as spares and scallopers sell worn dredges for scrap metal. Addressing the first primary research question, does fishing gear impact shipwrecks, fishermen shared their insights about collision risk throughout the interviews. Of the three types of bottom fishermen, trawl netters are quite willing to avoid shipwrecks due to high probability of entanglement, low probability of recovery, and high replacement cost of gear. Scallopers may be willing to skirt closer to wrecks than trawlers, to attempt a fresh haul, but not intentionally close enough to be snagged. If they hit a wreck, the single connection to the surface may be lost. 130 Clammers are the most brazen at fishing next to wrecks, due to power of the towed clam dredge and three connections to the surface for retrieval. Table 7.2 summarizes the relative loss probabilities and economic risk by gear type. TABLE 7.2 RELATIVE PROBABILITY OF LOSS AND ECONOMIC RISK BY GEAR TYPE Gear Type No. Ties to Surface Entanglement Factor Probability of Loss Gear Cost, $K Buffer Zone, mi. Trawl Net 2 - 4 High High 5 - 50 1/4 - 1/2 Scallop Dredge 1 Medium Medium 10-15 1/8 - 1/2 Clam Dredge 3 Low Very Low 30-50 0 - 1/4 Addressing the second primary research question, do mid-Atlantic shipwrecks damage or capture commercial fishing gear, the author analyzed Strickler’s Master Hanglog to determine the cost of commercial fishing gear lost on obstructions (Table 7.3). Given the absolute lack of clam dredges observed on wrecks, the author assumed noted lost dredges were scallop dredges. The hang log cites 111 lost nets, 165 dredges, and 23 unspecified rigs, for a total of 299 lost gear systems, from the Hague Line to Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. This figure is a gross underestimate of real costs due to three major factors. First, it is only lost gear reported to Strickler. Fishermen have no obligation to report obstructions or lost gear. Second, it does not include repair costs of damaged but recovered gear. Third, it does not account for ancillary costs such as harvest in the lost gear, fuel to return to port for replacement gear, lost fishing opportunities until the fisherman replaces the gear, and business overheads. To account for the first factor, the author used the findings in Table 6.3, which used the case studies to show the commercial hang log accounted for only 7% of the actual observed lost gear. Using this multiplier, the actual total lost gear is 4,123 gear systems. The fishing interviews provided 131 gear system costs but not repair or ancillary costs. Accounting for lost gear only, replacement cost was over 76 million dollars from the Hague Line to Hatteras, North Carolina. TABLE 7.3 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LOST GEAR Gear Type Hanglog Lost Gear Actual Lost if Hanglog is 7% Average Cost of Replacement, $ Lost Gear Replacement Cost, $ Trawl Net, Door 111 1521 27,500 41,827,500 Scallop Dredge 165 2260 12,500 28,250,000 Rig, unspecified 23 343 20,000 6,860,000 Total 299 4123 76,937,500 Sources: Data extracted from Strickler 2008, gear replacement cost from fishermen interviews. Assuming no future preventative action, what is the expected rate of lost gear and associated cost annually? This question is difficult to answer but a rough estimate is possible. Assuming Strickler’s information spans 25 years of fishing, replacement cost of lost gear averages $3,077,500 or 165 gear systems per year. Critics may object to projecting this rate into the future since the fishing community has access to published hang logs and, if accurate, should be able to avoid the snags. To address this concern, the author reviewed hang records of two case study wrecks to evaluate if the rate of snags has declined. The hang log lists the Ocean Venture three times in capital letters, indicating an identified wreck, 425 ft. (130 m) long with a 57 ft. (17 m) beam. Three listings are coded as first appearing in Strickler’s editions 2, 3 and 4. Additionally, nine unidentified obstruction records correspond to the Ocean Venture’s location, which appeared once in edition 2, once in edition 3, and 7 times in edition 4 (Strickler 2008:35). The San Gil, the hang log lists one record in edition 2 and edition 4 lists two related obstructions with comments that several dredges have been lost. Fishermen continue to affect the Ocean Venture and San Gil, despite a published hang log. 132 Conclusion From a fishing perspective, the three types of mid-Atlantic bottom gear have different inherent risks related to shipwreck collisions. Economic risk varies from $5,000, for small netters, to $50,000, for large netters and clammers. Probability of gear loss varied from high, for trawl netters, to zero, for clammers. For trawl netters, shipwreck collisions equal a high economic risk and high probability of gear loss. All net fishermen interviewed stated that if they had accurate obstruction locations, they would avoid the area with a 1/4 to 1/2 mile buffer zone. For scallopers, if their single connection to the surface severs, dredge loss equals $10,000 to $15,000. The scallop dredge does not catch wrecks as easily as a billowing trawl net but can snag to the point of loss, as seen by diver observations. Most scallopers chose the same buffer zone as the netters. Clammers have the least probability of gear and economic loss and therefore, admittedly, fish close to wrecks. Clam dredges have 10 times the impact force of scallop dredges. Clam dredges plow through wooden wrecks and possibly metal wrecks. All three types of bottom fishermen have recovered and moved shipwreck artifacts. Bottom line, netters and scallopers try, sometimes unsuccessfully, to avoid hangs and clammers can and do fish close to obstructions. Commercial bottom fishing does negatively affect shipwrecks. Millions of dollars of lost gear proves the second primary research question that shipwrecks do negatively affect commercial fishing. Combining fishing gear cost, diver observations of derelict gear, and hang log records, the estimated replacement cost of lost gear is $3 million per year from the Hague Line to Hatteras, North Carolina. Generally, fishermen have no idea what they hit. Interviewed netters and scallopers expressed a desire to have accurate locations and descriptions of obstructions. They were quite curious and interested in the author’s descriptions of shipwrecks, their identities, history, and 133 present condition. Can divers and archaeologists fill this void for fishermen? Would this knowledge initiate a form of stewardship for essential fish habitat? Chapter 8 will discuss this topic. Despite dire predictions from social scientists and historians that commercial fishermen would not talk to an academic, the 13 interviewed fisherman were approachable, forthright, and insightful. Although the standardized interview form should take 25 minutes to complete, the shortest interview was 45 minutes and the longest was 3 hours. Several fishermen stated they were pleased that the author was 1) knowledgeable about the local shipwrecks, 2) willing to listen to their perspective, and 3) looking for a mutually beneficial solution. The author is grateful for their time and their willingness to accommodate and educate a stranger. Perhaps this positive experience foretells a future symbiotic relationship between commercial fishermen, divers, and nautical archaeologists, seeking a common goal of no shipwreck collisions. CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Introduction “The most important archaeological discoveries of the first half of the 21st century will be made underwater” (Bass 2002:804). Maritime archaeologists require better methods and technologies to find these sites (Bass 2002:805). The combined local knowledge of sport divers and commercial fishers collected over 30 years can lead maritime archaeologists to a significant group of submerged historical sites. In this study, combining the findings and analysis of the historical research, diver observations, and fishing interviews yielded new insights into shipwreck site formation processes. Multidisciplinary Discussion This study answered affirmative to both primary research questions. Case studies documented specific wreck site changes by commercial fishing gear. Evidence showed commercial fishing is a major site formation process with three modes: depositional, scrambling, and extraction. Depositional events included a boiler, trawler nets, otter doors, and scallop dredges. Scrambling evidence was dislocated pipes, a tugboat towing bitt, iron paddlewheel buckets, a steel gunnel, depth charge launch racks, and possibly an anti-aircraft gun. The most radical events involved extraction of anchors and possibly ballast stones, an iron-hulled stern, and two iron-hulled bows. From these findings, Figure 8.1 offers enhancements to Muckelroy’s classic shipwreck site formation process diagram, Figure 2.1, as well as incorporating Hardy and Stewart’s contributions. Left to right, columns represent depositional, scrambling, and extraction modes, expanding on Figure 2.3. The intact ship is the initial deposit and, as such, moved to the left column. The large rectangle defines the boundaries of the site’s closed system, while 135 acknowledging pre-existing sediment type and hydrodynamic environment contributions, Figure 2.4. The author added the major process driver ‘bottom fishing’ after ‘seabed movement’ with a recirculation loop to previous processes, which accounts for fishing gear salvage, disintegration of newly exposed materials, and continuous sediment movement. With strong evidence of fishing gear deposits, ‘material subsequently deposited on site’ links to ‘bottom fishing’. Finally, a line to the right of ‘bottom fishing’ represents material removed from the site by fishing gear. The enhanced process flow diagram accounts for the inadvertent material deposits, rearrangements, and extractions due to bottom fishing gear. Figure 8.1 Enhanced Muckelroy site formation process diagram with three bottom fishing modes: depositional, scrambling, and extraction in column format. (Drawing modified by author.) 136 Addressing the second primary research question, mid-Atlantic shipwrecks do damage or capture commercial fishing gear. A commercial fisherman’s hang log documented 299 lost gear systems, divers recorded 42 trawl nets and 25 scallop dredges on 52 sample wrecks, and fishing community interviews provided evidence of snagged bottom fishing gear on wreck sites. The estimated negative economic impact of gear loss is $3.1 million dollars per year from the U.S Canadian border to Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. The study answered the majority of secondary research questions. Secondary questions not answered led to future research threads. For simplicity, the secondary questions, answers, and future research questions are listed in bullet form below: ? Commercial fishing gear affects what percentage of mid-Atlantic wrecks? Answer: Sixty-nine percent of the sample population have gear systems abandoned on site. ? What percentage of wrecks have been impacted by fishing gear that was subsequently recovered? Answer: If 69% of wrecks have expensive gear systems abandoned on site, the logical probability is gear has hit the majority of remaining wrecks and fishermen have recovered the gear. ? Is a specific type of derelict fishing gear found on wrecks? Answer: Mid-Atlantic wrecks display derelict trawl nets and scallop dredges. Salvage divers recover clam dredges via multiple connections to the surface. ? Can wreck damage type be linked to specific gear type? Answer: Yes. Through circumstantial evidence, trawl nets move boulders and major portions of wrecks. Scallop dredges remove shipwreck artifacts and snag on hull 137 structures. Clam dredges remove wooden timbers and anchors. Both dredge types recover stones. ? Is bottom sediment type related to a higher frequency of gear impacts? Answer: By diver observation of surface layers, most mid-Atlantic wreck site sediment is sand, which negated differentiation. Core sampling of lower sediments versus wreck subsidence would be an interesting research study. ? Do metal wrecks display more, or less, derelict gear on site than wooden wrecks? Answer: Metal wrecks display more derelict gear than wood wrecks. While divers observed trawl nets on metal and wood wrecks, divers found scallop dredges on metal wrecks only. Table 8.1 summarizes the findings. TABLE 8.1 PRESENCE OF GEAR TYPES ON WOOD AND METAL WRECKS Gear Type Wood Wrecks Metal Wrecks Comments Trawl Nets Yes Yes Scallop Dredge No Yes Clam Dredge No No Salvaged ? Is there evidence that fishing gear pulls through wrecks? If so, which type of fishing gear and what type of wreck construction? Answer: Several clam fishermen stated their dredges pull easily through wooden wrecks. Divers found no scallop or clam dredges on wooden wrecks. It is likely that scallop and clam dredges pull through wooden wrecks. ? As scallop Marine Protected Areas (MPA) concentrate fishing efforts, do they also concentrate shipwreck impacts? Answer: Geographically, wrecks with the highest number of scallop dredges are close to or in the rotational scallop access MPAs. 138 ? How do fishermen use their hang databases while fishing? Answer: Interviewed fishermen use electronic navigational chart plotters preprogrammed with hang locations from private and published logbooks. ? How accurate and complete are the hang databases used by local fishermen? By visiting fishermen? Answer: The repeated occurrence of derelict gear on published hang locations demonstrates the inaccuracy of the locations and/or the ineffective use of the chart plotter. Addressing the completeness question, a massive two-generation private hang log was missing 16 large wrecks within 50 miles of homeport. It is assumed non-local fishermen’s hang logs are less complete than local logs. ? What incentives do fishermen have to fish close to, or away from, obstructions? Do fishermen catch more fish next to wrecks? Answer: Mid-Atlantic finfish anglers have not found the commercially harvestable quantities on wrecks to risk losing expensive nets. Scallops and clams may be found in higher density close to wrecks since most experienced fishermen will not risk losing their gear on obstructions. The author calls this effect the Virgin Patch Theory. The patch is equivalent to a fisherman’s private rotational marine protected area, with expensive consequences. ? How do fishermen regard obstructions? Answer: Most interviewed fishermen said they avoid plotted wrecks and obstructions. Two clammers said they fish close to wrecks and obstructions. Buffer zones varied by type of gear and captain experience. Netters and scallopers gave 1/4 to 1/2 mi. (0.46 to 139 0.93 km) buffer while clammers fished as close as possible. More experienced captains gave larger buffers. ? How frequently do fishermen state they snag a wreck? Does hang frequency differ by type of gear? Answer: The 13 interviewed fishermen stated, from their perspective on the surface, they rarely hang on a wreck. From the clammer interviews and salvage divers, derelict telecommunications cables are the majority of snags. Considering the number of fishing vessels multiplied by many decades of fishing, the contribution from each fishing captain may be infrequent. Experienced captains, who have survived years of economic difficulties of commercial fishing, are less likely to risk their gear next to a wreck. ? What is the magnitude of gear damage or wreck damage? Answer: From diver observations, gear damage achieved the ultimate price, abandonment. Recreational divers judged most derelict trawl nets unusable and salvage divers judged nets unrecoverable. From the case studies, wreck damage ranged from displacement of pipes to a dragged boiler from one site to another. ? How does gear damage or loss affect a fisherman’s profit margin? Answer: Understandably, interviewed fishermen were hesitant to quantify this effect, which encompasses lost fishing days, fuel, crew wages, etc. plus gear replacement costs. Fishermen and gear merchants provided replacement gear costs. ? What aid do fishermen need to avoid the wrecks? Will they avoid the wrecks? Answer: Most fishermen stated they need accurate and complete obstruction locations. If provided, 11 of 13 fishermen stated they would give the obstruction a reasonable avoidance zone, appropriate to their gear type. 140 ? How does this study contribute to the knowledge base of essential fish habitat, diver tourism, marine debris, ghost fishing, or offshore energy? Answer: This study presents factual awareness of the quantity of mid-Atlantic shipwrecks, the issue of marine debris and ghost fishing by nets on wrecks, and possible accelerated structural deterioration of shipwreck structures by fishing gear. Less wreck structure equals less fish habitat and less diver tourism. ? How does this work contribute to the management of fisheries and submerged cultural resources? Answer: Looking forward, effective fisheries and submerged cultural resource management determine the activities most likely to cause damage and create practical mitigation strategies. In relation to fishing damage to historic resources, this may involve mapping accurate submerged resource locations, defining hazard zones, fishing community outreach, and fishing industry research partnerships. Maritime archaeologists have an opportunity to fulfill a role as facilitators and advocates for the preservation of submerged cultural resources (Evans et al. 2009:46,51-52). Future Research As with most research, the primary investigation generates further questions. It is important to capture these seed thoughts for future study. For example, the diver observation database could be more robust by surveying the mid-Atlantic diving community. For fishermen, questions arise about the motivating factors and behaviors to fish, or not to fish, close to obstructions, and the biological and environmental factors affecting fish behavior around wrecks. The questions follow an outline form for ease of use. 141 1. Will the database results change significantly by utilizing a larger diver pool? Accessing the mid-Atlantic sport and technical diving community could increase the number of observations. An online survey of this small community would access the modern technical divers but may leave out the more historical observations of “old time divers” who may or may not be actively diving or use a computer. This research track would increase the number of observations and wrecks but will also introduce a level of inaccuracy, based on human memory error versus dated site plans and dive logs. 2. Economic Motivation to Fish the Wrecks: a. Can dredges catch more scallops or clams next to an obstruction or shipwreck? Each fishery type should be investigated independently as the answers may be different. Also site conditions, such as water depth, water temperature, obstruction size, obstruction material, and/or surrounding sediment type, may play influencing roles in catch density. b. If the above is true, is the targeted catch density higher near wrecks due to a certain portion of fishermen understanding the possibility of losing gear in the obstruction perimeter, resulting in a richer zone for risk-tolerant fishermen? Is this distinction based on seasoned experience, the fisherman’s individual comfort level with risk taking, or whether the driver of the vessel is the owner? The vessel owner typically owns the gear, however, the vessel owner is usually not the driver. 3. Obstruction Location Accuracy and Buffer Zone: Beyond a single lat/long location for a wreck as given by the diving community, remote sensing could 142 thoroughly outline the extent of each shipwreck. Simultaneous magnetometer survey could document ferrous remains below the sand or dragged off the main site. Sub bottom profiling could detect non-ferrous wreck portions below the sand, as perhaps many wooden wrecks are today. Unlike traditional remote sensing surveys, the author proposes geographically mapping the fishermen’s hang databases and only surveying the discrete resultant clusters, for cost efficiency. 4. Cultural Understanding: Do the mid-Atlantic immigrant fishing communities value obstruction data more or less than the longtime locals? Is language the only barrier to avoiding shipwreck impacts? 5. Behavioral and Cultural Understanding: In order to change behavior, one must understand the circumstances, concerns, and motivations of a particular group. What information would best inform, educate, and motivate the scallopers and clammers to avoid wrecks? Examples are: a. Historical Understanding. Would fishermen care about shipwrecks if they knew the story of each wreck? b. Military Connections. Will fishermen respect a military site? Would information about the Sunken Military Craft Act change fishermen’s behavior toward a wreck? c. Fishing Connections: Are fishermen more reverent of sunken fishing vessels? d. Human Loss: Will fishermen give a shipwreck a wide berth if human lives were lost in the wrecking event, whether military, merchant, or fishing in nature? 143 e. Wreck Site Conditions: Fishermen appeared interested in a diver’s knowledge about the condition of the wreck today. Would the length, width, or relief dimensions of the remains change a fisherman’s navigation around a site? Would knowing an obstruction is metal encourage a larger buffer zone? Conversely, would knowing a wreck is wooden encourage less caution? Recommendations There are several myths objecting to providing the public with accurate obstruction locations: 1) fishermen will purposely trawl and dredge as close as possible to the wrecks due to their fish aggregation device (FAD) properties, 2) souvenir-seeking sport divers will have access to new wrecks, and 3) newly defined obstructions may become treasure hunter targets. Each myth is examined separately. First, in the mid-Atlantic region, netters and scallopers do not trawl close to wrecks yet clammers do because their consequences are small. The clammer fleet is around 40 vessels, owned by a few entities (MAMFC 2010b:12). If vessel owners express the desire to avoid dredge repair, salvage costs, and lost fishing time, and conserve EFH, hired clammer captains would take more care to avoid the wrecks. The attraction of higher clam production near wrecks is tempting. An unbiased cost-benefit analysis would be useful for management decisions. Second, after 40 years of recreational diving on the mid-Atlantic coast, the sport diving community has the most accurate locations of shipwrecks. Recreational divers pay boat captains to visit shipwrecks, not flat sand. Publicly publishing accurate wreck numbers to fishermen will not substantially add to a dive boat captain’s selection of wrecks. 144 Third, none of the known 195 wrecks are treasure wrecks. None of the possible 500 historical offshore wrecks are treasure wrecks. The true treasure is in safeguarding wreck structural integrity for biological, cultural, tourism, and historical goals. Collision prevention is more cost effective than gear loss, costly removal of marine debris, and ghost fishing. Submerged cultural resources are non-renewable, unlike renewable natural resources. We have a choice: 1) continue on the current path of each community harboring their own obstruction locations while commercial bottom gear runs into or through the majority of shipwrecks or 2) invest in research, education, and outreach to pilot a solution to reduce shipwreck and gear collisions. To cost-effectively provide fishermen with accurate obstruction locations, the author proposes spatial analysis of their hang logs, versus diver numbers, to develop a predictive model. Once refined with hang clusters against known diver numbers, the model may predict true locations of obstructions that divers have not visited. A pilot study of this concept will be part of the author’s dissertation in Coastal Resource Management. Results could be the beginning of marine spatial planning of submerged cultural resources on the mid-Atlantic OCS. Once commercial fishermen are aware of accurate shipwreck locations, several advances are possible. Representatives from each stakeholder group in brainstorming sessions could expand this list of possible solutions. If chart plotters could operate in depth layers, technology innovations could include 1) automatic collision alerts and avoidance programming for bottom obstructions, similar to surface obstruction avoidance via radar, and 2) chart plotter manufacturers could add buffer circles to obstruction points. Chart plotter buffer circles would give operators clear boundaries for safety and captains and owners could review boat tracks for discrepancies. If knowledge fosters stewardship, chart plotters may be able to graphically 145 differentiate wrecks from unidentified obstructions. For significant historical wrecks, artificial reef agencies may be encouraged to construct generous rock perimeters. Partnership and outreach will be a critical component towards the success of any initiative. From understanding differences in regional ecosystems, it becomes apparent that “one size does not fit all.” New England has cod and pollock, commercially harvestable and structure-seeking species, caught with trawl and gill nets. The U.S. Southeast Atlantic region is too warm for clams and scallops, hence no dredge threats to wrecks, and may not have a net issue on wrecks. New England will need a full evaluation and probably a different solution than mid-Atlantic. Conclusion This regional thesis brings factual awareness that 1) commercial bottom fishing gear damages deepwater shipwrecks and 2) shipwrecks negatively affect commercial bottom fishing. From a 52-case sample, 69% of mid-Atlantic shipwrecks have 1 to 5 derelict trawl nets or scallop dredges on site. Derelict scallop dredge presence on shipwrecks markedly increased near and in scallop marine protected areas. Deeper than 150 ft. (46 m), all metal wrecks had 1 to 5 scallop dredges on site. Wooden wrecks may not survive towed scallop and clam dredges impacts. Determined through a theoretical framework, the thesis demonstrates commercial bottom fishing is a major shipwreck site formation process. Commercial fishing alters archaeological remains in three modes: as a material depositor, scrambling device, and an extraction filter. From a point of motivation, recreational divers wish to retain shipwreck structure, fisheries management strives to preserve essential fish habitat, maritime archaeologists desire to safeguard maritime heritage, and most fishermen try to avoid shipwrecks. Yet, millions of dollars 146 of commercial trawl nets and scallop dredges continue to be lost each year on the U.S. East Coast. Most fishermen believe the solution to be knowledge of accurate locations of shipwrecks. From the birth of maritime archaeology, divers and fishermen collaborated with archaeologists. Starting in 1958, Turkish sponge divers befriended journalist, adventurer, and diver Peter Throckmorton and, with the help of archaeology graduate student George Bass, the field of underwater archaeology was born (Throckmorton 1964:viii,250-253). From this collaboration of fishermen, divers, and archaeologists, the wonders of Mediterranean submerged maritime heritage continue to be shared with the world today. Upon finding and identifying the USS Monitor in 1975, Gordon Watts wrote: Although deep water sites are at present beyond feasible limits of archaeological investigation, this will not continue to be the case. With ever-increasing economic utilization and exploitation of the ocean bottoms, the importance of locating and evaluating these sites becomes clear. Deep water surveys can provide both the data necessary to protect archaeological resources and the site inventories which will be essential for effective planning of future work and efficient resource management (Watts 1975:325). Commercial fishermen will continue to locate possible maritime heritage sites and recreational divers will continue to explore new shipwrecks. Maritime archaeologists who build strong working relationships with fishermen and divers have access to site locations and observations not typically afforded by maritime archaeology funding. Derived from collaboration, this thesis is the first step towards a mutually beneficial solution to reduce collisions of fishing gear and mid-Atlantic submerged cultural resources. REFERENCES Andersen, Rauol 1998 Voyage to the Grand Banks: The Saga of Captain Arch Thornhill. Creative Publishers, St. John’s, Newfoundland, Canada. Arnold, J. Barto, Thomas J. Oertling, and Andrew W. 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Wise, Stephen R. 1988 Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running During the Civil War. University of South Carolina Press, Columbia. 161 APPENDIX A: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL 162 APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW RECRUITMENT SCRIPT Hello, my name is Joyce Steinmetz. I’m a graduate student at East Carolina University’s Program in Maritime Studies and an active Mid-Atlantic diver. My master’s thesis research project examines Mid-Atlantic Deepwater Shipwrecks and Commercial Fish Trawling and Dredging. The research sources are fishermen, divers, fisheries management, and nautical archaeologists. The research will attempt to formulate mutually beneficial solutions that reduce fishermen’s gear damage or loss, minimizes fish habitat loss, preserves fishing and diving tourism, and conserves cultural resources. I would appreciate your responses to 15 topical questions. Your participation is voluntary. The interview takes approximately 15 minutes, depending on your interest. I’d like your permission to audiotape, which will enable me to devote full attention to our conversation, effectively utilize your time, and take notes later. The published research will not use your name, only a pseudonym such as Netter 1, Scalloper 2, Clammer 3… Do I have your verbal consent and is now a good time? 163 APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW FORM Shipwrecks and Commercial Fishing Impacts – Thesis Study Fisherman’s Questionnaire Introduce myself: Use recruitment script, business card if face-to-face, answer any questions, and ask permission for their time and help. 1. Contact information a. Fisherman’s Name: ___________________________________________ b. Job Title: __________________________________________________ c. Address:____________________________________________________ d. Contact Numbers: ____________________________________________ e. Email: ______________________________________________________ f. Vessel Name_________________________________________________ g. Vessel Captain_______________________________________________ h. Vessel Owner________________________________________________ i. Vessel Built_________________________________________________ Assign Identifier: (Circle fishing type and next consecutive number in that type) Netter Scalloper Clammer Gear Salvage Gear Provider 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 TOP SHEET TO BE SEPARATELY AND SECURELY STORED. 164 Identifier_______________________________________ j. Interview Date(s)_____________________________________________ k. Years of Commercial Fishing Experience: _________________________ l. Information Gathered by Telephone or In Person. (Circle one) 2. Fishing Vessel Information: a. Vessel Length x Beam x Draft: __________________________________ b. Vessel Power Plant (Hp): _______________________________________ c. Typical Length of Fishing Trip: __________________________________ d. Home Port: __________________________________________________ 3. Type of Fishing and Location: a. Territory fished: ____________________________________________ b. Type of fish harvested: _______________________________________ c. Bottom fishing gear used: Nets Scallop Dredge Clam Dredge (circle) d. Days Fished in a Year: ________________________________________ 4. How often do you snag obstructions? a. How often in a typical day? _________________ b. How often in a typical week? _______________ c. How often in a typical year? ________________ 5. How often do you get confirmation that the obstruction is a shipwreck? _________________________________________________________________ a. How can you tell? __________________________________________ 6. Considering the total number of snags, what percent of the time is the fishing gear impacted negatively? Should add up to 100%. a. Percentage of impacts where gear is not damaged? _________ b. Damaged slightly? _________ c. Damaged but still usable? _________ d. Unsable and partially or fully recovered? _________ e. Not recovered? _________ 7. How would you quantify, in dollars, a typical fisherman’s losses to obstructions or shipwreck impacts in a year: Consider: Total Obstructions Shipwrecks Repair or loss of gear ________________ ___________ Lost fishing time _______________ ___________ Crew’s wages _______________ ____________ Crew’s food _______________ ___________ Fuel _______________ ___________ Travel time _______________ ____________ Insurance ________________ ____________ Lost opportunity for a catch ________________ ____________ 165 Salvage operations ________________ ____________ _____________________ ________________ ____________ 8. What types of shipwreck remains and artifacts have you recovered? _____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________ 9. What would help you not snag on obstructions or shipwrecks? _____________________________________________________________________ 10. Do you have a hang location list, book, database, electronic copy, chart, or plotter? (Circle all that apply.) a. How do you use it? ______________________________________________ b. Do you find it effective? __________________________________________ 11. Have past or present fisheries management policies increased or decreased obstruction impact occurrence? Explain. 12. Information you think might be helpful to this study of understanding fishing snags and possible shipwrecks? _____________________________________________________________________ 13. Tell me about the most memorable hang ups. ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ 14. If given very accurate obstruction locations, would you a. Try to fish as close as possible? ________________________ b. Stay away a reasonable distance? _______________________ c. What is a reasonable distance? _________________________ 15. Other people you recommend I contact? Additional Notes: 166 APPENDIX D: PERMISSION LETTERS Signed letters are on file. 167 168